Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science (MSc)

Department

Mathematics

Faculty/School

Faculty of Science

First Advisor

Dr. Marc Kilgour

Advisor Role

Supervisor

Abstract

Aspects of behavioral decision-making can be integrated into game-theoretic models of two-player bargaining using finite automata which can represent bargaining strategies in combination with various behavioral traits. The automata are used as bargaining agents who must jointly agree upon a fixed allocation of transferable utility in an infinite-horizon Rubinstein bargaining game. At each turn, the automata are given the opportunity to accept a proposed portion of the transferable utility, or to reject the proposal and make a counter-offer of their own. A round-robin tournament and ecological simulations were run to explore strategic dominance under different conditions. Principles of bargaining strategy were discussed and future fields of research explored.

Convocation Year

2019

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