This article will examine an important but neglected phase of the Allied strategic bomber offensive in the Second World War. Given the very rich literature on the bombing war it is surprising to discover that litle attention has been paid to the daylight attacks undertaken by Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command in the fall and winter of 1944–1945. Nowhere in the existing literature is there a systematic analysis of this period of operations when the RAF and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) carried out 153 daylight raids between 27 August 1944 and 24 April 1945. Two primary issues will be addressed. The first concerns the accuracy achieved by Bomber Command in its daylight missions. The second is to determine if the reintroduction of daylight attacks resulted in Bomber Command carrying out a different and more selective targeting policy. Both of these issues are related to the more general question of the role played by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris in shaping the policy of Bomber Command. Harris’s name is usually associated with doctrinaire commitment to area bombing in general and the destruction of German civilian housing in particular. The evidence presented in this essay will allow the reader to form a more complete picture of Harris’s repsonse to the changing circumstances of the war.