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Abstract

This piece explores the apparent disjuncture between the prescribed duties of both the judicial and legislative branches of the Canadian government, and the genuine means by which such duties are attended to regardless of codified jurisdiction. Namely, this piece conducts a dual analysis - including both normative and descriptive components - in order to consider whether or not the Supreme Court of Canada has unduly encroached upon both the Provincial Legislature's and the Federal Parliament's duty to formulate legislation through their exercising of judicial review. In assessing the judiciary's role in policy-making, abstract considerations - such as the inherently undemocratic nature of the judiciary - are examined alongside more practical items, such as the courts' veritable ability to craft sound policy in the first place. Ultimately, this piece concludes that the adoption of a conventional coordinate model would serve best as both a means through which to make sound policy in both a normative and descriptive sense.

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