TENTATIVE SECURITIES: 26/11, ISRAEL AND THE POLITICS OF MOBILITY

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TENTATIVE SECURITIES: 26/11, ISRAEL AND THE POLITICS OF MOBILITY

by

Rhys Machold


B.A.Sc. McMaster University, 2008

Dissertation

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Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the global mobility of security knowhow in relation to the management of terrorism in megacities. Specifically, it offers three insights. First, it shows how historical events are performed as sites in need of transnational policy intervention. Second, it enables an understanding of how and why the sourcing of policy ‘models’ actually takes place. Third, it sheds light on how mobile policy schemes travel geographically and are put to work in particular contexts. In doing so, it elaborates on the conditions under which policies move geographically but also addresses the kinds of constraints and contradictions they face.

The dissertation develops two closely related theses. The first has to do with how policy models are constructed as mobile objects while the second highlights the kinds of pressures and conflicts that such models are used to resolve. Regarding the construction of policy models, Israel’s status as a global policy exemplar should not be understood as a closed professional consensus or incontrovertible fact that exists independently ‘out there’. Rather it is a deeply ideological construct, emerging from processes of geographic interaction. Israel’s claim to expertise in security knowledge needs to be constantly re-articulated. Indeed, the Israeli involvement in the 2008 Mumbai attacks (26/11) reveals a basic tension. On the one hand, the Israeli officials’ prerogatives to comment on the handling of 26/11 reflects Israel’s dominant position on matters of counter-terrorism and homeland security (HLS). On the other hand, the extensive efforts of Israeli officials to situate Israeli security expertise as a ‘solution’ also reveals that the relationship between 26/11 and the ‘Israeli experience’ of fighting terrorism was not, in fact, obvious or natural. This link had to be actively made. Indeed, the event’s status as a failure of governance in need of urgent policy intervention emerged through Israeli criticisms of Indian security authorities and comparisons to their own alleged success in managing live terror attacks.

The second component of my thesis is that the Mumbai authorities’ decision to take up Israeli security ‘solutions’ must be situated in relation to local public pressures and conflicts to which 26/11 gave rise. The reason why Maharashtra politicians decided to learn from Israel in 2009 was not because they suddenly woke up to the reality of global terrorism and realized that ‘securing’ Mumbai against this threat would require a set of technical skills that they lacked. Rather it was because they believed that an association with Israel would be helpful in managing public dissent and restoring their authority to govern. What ‘learning from Israel’ offered was not a set of concrete policy prescriptions for how to manage terrorism but rather an image of progress and success.
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Introduction

When Mumbai was brazenly attacked in November 2008, like so many others, I was shocked and captivated by the unfolding scenes of terror emerging from the city. Coverage of the attacks felt strangely familiar as part of a larger sequence of recent events. As media commentators rushed to analyze the unfolding scenes of chaos on live television, they were quick to compare the violence to previous attacks elsewhere: the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad only a few months before, the 2005 London attacks and, not least, to the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington DC. While many suggested that what happened in 2008 could have happened anywhere (and allegedly had already happened somewhere before), the Mumbai attacks soon became understood within security policy circles as a sui generis ‘case’ that could be used by state authorities to prepare for terror attacks yet to come. Thus immediately following the event, a group of officers from the NYPD travelled to Mumbai in order to protect New York from a ‘similar’ attack in the future. Since 2008 moreover, anytime there is a terrorist attack involving armed assailants shooting indiscriminately in a large urban centre, it is often referred to as a ‘Mumbai-style’ attack.

When the attacks took place, my knowledge of Mumbai and its long history of violence was limited. The discussions nevertheless raised questions. Why did 2008 seem to matter more (or at least somewhat differently) than previous instances of violence in Bombay/Mumbai? Moreover, although the discussions ostensibly focused on the specificities of the Mumbai attacks, they seemed rather detached from the city itself. In other words, there was something unsettling about the casual manner with which this event was being used as ‘only the latest’ confirmation of some broader global pattern.
I revisited these questions through another security event – the preparation for the G20 meetings in Toronto in the summer of 2010. In the weeks leading up to the meetings, authorities constructed a barricaded perimeter around the areas where the meetings were to be held. Police personnel from around the country became increasingly visible across the city, engaging in the violent repression of anti-G20 protesters (and many bystanders), culminating in the largest mass arrest in Canadian history – all at a cost of $1 billion (Malleson and Wachsmuth 2011). One police tactic drew particular attention, namely the “kettling” of protestors, a practice whereby police in heavy riot gear surround small groups of protesters from all sides to control their movement.

My initial reaction to this increased ‘security’ presence in my city was more one of anger than of analysis. It seemed like Toronto was under marshal law. Yet the police’s handling of the Toronto G20 simultaneously reminded me of the policing tactics used at another anti-G20 protest I had attended in London only a year before. Indeed news reports at the time suggested that the tactic of kettling had recently been imported, possibly from London. Thus it appeared that the methods used to contain the protests in London had followed me back home. Over that summer I found myself repeatedly asking questions about how and why policing knowhow, which developed in one city, had apparently travelled to be re-applied in another. What did it mean that the police crackdown in Toronto was inspired by prior policing experiences elsewhere? Might this help to explain why the security measures surrounding the Toronto G20 were so grotesquely excessive?

I recount these anecdotes because they helped to inspire this dissertation. While academic debates and media discussions around events like the Mumbai attacks and the
Toronto G20 raise critical concerns about threats to civil liberties and the intrusion of military and police violence into the fabric of the everyday, I have found them to be unsatisfying. The framing of terroristic events and episodes of police repression as both radically new but also as indicative of some broader global pattern of violence too easily slides into circular ‘analyses’ that conceal far more than they reveal. This in turn prompted me to think about how to analyze and critique the changing nature of contemporary urban spaces in ways that disrupt rather than contribute to their self-evident familiarity. This avowedly political objective forms the basis of the present project.

In carrying out this research I engage closely with critical scholarship on the securitization and militarization of the urban, which has been a source of inspiration through its astute rejections of the core ‘logics’ of security. Yet, this literature suffers from oversights and conceptual limitations. Critical urban scholars have rightly drawn attention to new security regimes as excessive and unwarranted, documenting the insecurities, dangers and fears, which they work to (re)produce. Throughout the chapters that follow, however, I argue that in trying to better understand the global proliferation of militarized approaches to urban governance, we need to move discussions beyond how public spaces are physically barricaded and overtaken by aggressive policing tactics and how acts of local resistance might contest these trends. The reason is that a focus on the exclusionary and repressive effects of urban policy developments alone is insufficient in trying to make sense of them.

Though important, efforts to expose the repressive effects of such policies also frequently come with problematic assumptions about security and its publics. In particular, critical scholars often imply that militarized expressions of state sovereignty
are generally unpopular. As I will demonstrate, this position is empirically unfounded and analytically unhelpful. Another unfortunate consequence of the impulse to denounce security agendas is that critical scholarship has invested little energy in grappling with the kinds of labour that go into assembling them. By under-playing the paradoxes and difficulties encountered in building these new policy agendas critical scholars have unwittingly contributed to their perceived coherence and inevitability.

Following these concerns, the challenges, frictions and the work of security have informed my analysis and critiques of empirical trends. I draw attention to how public controversies, struggles and conflicts are created and resolved through claims about ‘security’, raising some basic questions about how ‘urban security’ is bought and sold and how we might rethink the politics surrounding these transactions. In doing so, however, I insist that it is important not to take the politics of security for granted. The political dimensions of urban security preparedness need to be carefully specified rather than assumed in advance; otherwise we risk superimposing some general assumptions that can prove limiting.

This dissertation aims to understand how certain policy experiences are produced as success stories and under what conditions these supposed ‘models’ become appealing to the officials who take them up. I develop my arguments in relation to two areas of research that might seem to have little in common, namely the policy response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks and Israel’s Homeland Security (HLS) industry. Through an examination of how these two sites intersect, I show that there is much to be learned about how the production of security knowledge is constituted, employed and diffused. The Mumbai attacks had policy repercussions reflective of broader changes in how
matters of terrorism, policing and security are imagined and governed in the contemporary metropolis. In particular, the attacks emerged as an occasion for local security agencies to ‘learn’ from the experiences of others around the world in protecting their city from future attacks. In theorizing these developments I begin from the basic premise that the commonsensical appeal of global policy learning - its very taken-for-granted-ness and ubiquity - is precisely what makes it an important object of critical scholarly investigation.

‘India’s 9/11’

The 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai – which soon became known simply as ‘26/11’ – were scripted as an unprecedented event that singlehandedly transformed the meaning of terrorism in India. Indeed, the most influential narrative situates 26/11 as ‘India’s 9/11’ – that is, as a singular shocking event that suddenly revealed a number of important new strategic realities while highlighting deficiencies in the city’s and country’s approaches to counter-terrorism. This sense of departure can be seen in two ways. First, the attacks were heralded as the moment marking the coming of ‘global’ terrorism to India. Second, 26/11 became synonymous with the ‘failure’ of local agencies to prevent and manage the three-day long siege. In addition to crucial intelligence lapses enabling assailants to enter the city undetected via the sea route from Pakistan (Rabasa et al. 2009), the mainstream media and defence circles within India and internationally focused on Indian authorities’ apparent technical deficiencies in responding to the violence. One policy commentator argued that the attacks “exposed the utter inadequacy, inappropriateness and incompetence of Indian security responses” (Sahni 2008d).
Another pointed out that one image in particular symbolized the event’s overall significance: “The image is of police officer Jillu Yadav doing battle with Kalashnikov assault rifle-equipped gunmen at the Chattrapati Shivaji Terminus railway station, armed with nothing more than a bolt-action rifle - and a chair. For millions of Indians, the image represented the threat that dogs everyday life in an increasingly volatile region - and the apparent inability of the state to defend them” (Swami 2009b). The handing of 26/11 was also sharply criticized by a number of Western governments, including Israel’s government.

When examined more closely, however, the attacks’ ‘novelty’ is anything but obvious. First, while the handling of the attacks was no doubt marred by a number of tactical errors, delays and misinformation, persistent allegations of incompetence, brutality and corruption have characterized the operation of Indian policing since its emergence under British colonial rule and persisted following independence (Arnold 1986). In particular, the Mumbai police have long been “reviled for […] corruption and ridiculed as incompetent” (Prakash 2010:18). Second, instances of large-scale terrorism in India have been nothing if not ubiquitous. Between 1998 to 2006 India was ranked only behind Iraq and Israel and the Palestinian Territories in the total number of terrorist attacks (Piazza 2010: 10). Bombay/Mumbai itself has a long relationship with urban violence (Appadurai 2000, 2006; Blom Hansen 2001a, 2001b; Rao 2007), as it has suffered from a number of major terrorist attacks in the years leading up to 2008 and another smaller attack in 2011. Thus 26/11 in many ways seemed to signify continuation of the city’s longstanding experiences with terrorist violence (see Bishop and Roy 2009: 265).
While the 9/11 narrative did not go unchallenged (e.g. Patwardhan 2008; Roy 2008), it proved influential, working to foreclose any substantial analysis of the local specificities of the 2008 attacks. As some have noted, “almost every news service offered up the same formulaic account that ‘terrorism’ has finally reached India without any analytical insight into what was actually happening or where the unfolding drama could have its roots” (Pieterse 2009: 290). Others have argued that the attack was “plugged into a local history of religious violence in Mumbai and elsewhere in the country, if only to scramble and so utterly transform this past” (Devji 2008). In light of the intense media focus of the attacks, which suggested that they marked the entry of ‘global’ terrorism into India, 26/11 was effectively written out of its own historical context and situated within a broader imaginary of ‘networked’ terrorism targeted at ‘global’ cities.

The event also had important consequences within India. First, it had political repercussions: this was the only instance where the government’s response to terrorist attacks forced senior elected officials out of office. While the intense live coverage of 26/11 ushered in vitriolic anti-Pakistan sentiment, this anger soon turned on the domestic political establishment. In surveying television headlines, Ninan (2008) documents prominent framings such as “Enough is Enough” and “Mumbai is angry”. Large-scale protests erupted at the Taj Hotel with protestors bearing placards that read: “India has woken up. When will the politicians?” (Lakshami 2008). As one commentator noted, “[n]ever before has a terrorist attack in India brought such raw outrage and calls for sweeping changes in government” (Wax 2008). In other words, 26/11 became an object of public contestation in ways that previous incidents of terrorism in Bombay/Mumbai had not. In particular, the attacks were understood as the Indian state’s abdication of the
responsibility to provide ‘security’. As one commentary noted: “Residents of Mumbai are grieving, but also angry. The grief is over the senseless loss of life […] The anger, however, is over what was clearly a colossal failure of governance” (Sharma 2008: 13).

Second, 26/11 was followed by immediate calls for a major institutional overhaul of the governmental architecture for handling terrorism. In the aftermath of 26/11 the prevailing view was that “terrorism can be stopped or ended by some tough action: that India is a soft state and therefore we are facing such attacks. If we become a hard state (read: a militarist state), we can overcome terrorism” (Palshikar 2008: 11; also see Barnard-Wills and Moore 2010: 399). Thus the representation of 26/11 as a game-changing ‘global’ event immediately generated pressure on India’s political class to address the threat of terrorism through the adoption of ‘hard’, ‘modern’ approaches to security and policing, which meant emulating so-called policy ‘models’ from the West. As one author noted, “[a]mong the analogies to have emerged from Mumbai 26/11, this is perhaps the most facile and dangerous - that the US […] is an example for India” (Muralidharan 2008: 16). At a national level, politicians spoke of the need to replicate the apparent success of US authorities in preventing a major attack after 9/11 through the creation of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) as well as a proposed National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). Within Mumbai there arose a similar impetus to seek lessons from the experiences of others, including Israel. In 2009 the Government of Maharashtra (GOM) sent an official delegation to Israel under the auspices of seeking expertise in urban counter-terrorism and HLS. Since 2008 Israeli security contractors have trained newly created commando units in the city.

1 While the NIA has come to fruition the NCTC has been resisted by politicians from certain states and has yet to be instituted.
There is thus a central paradox at the heart of ‘26/11’. On one hand the event appeared to forge an immediate consensus on what the attacks signified and what should be done to ‘secure’ Mumbai from similar attacks in the future. The scripting of 26/11 as ‘India’s 9/11’ thus strongly shaped perceptions about how the state should respond to the attacks. On the other hand, almost every aspect of the attacks’ supposed novelty and singularity is deeply contested. It is therefore far from clear why 26/11 instantly took on the significance it did within India and beyond. The event therefore immediately raises two key questions: First, how did the issue of urban security preparedness become ‘political’ in new ways in the wake of the attacks? Second, as the attacks were by no means unique in their levels of destruction and loss of life, how did ‘26/11’ emerge as a point of entry for a series of novel policy interventions – specifically those of a transnational nature?

Answering these questions clearly suggests the need to focus on the politics and policy dynamics to which 26/11 gave rise to within India in order to theorize how the event produced new forms of consensus but also controversy and disagreement (Rancière 1999). Yet it also requires a closer examination of the attacks’ supposed global dimensions. The scripting of the attacks as a ‘global’ event reflects an important dynamic associated with the US-led war on terror. As Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams (2009: 4) have argued, the framing of certain instances of terrorism under the self-evident headings like ‘9/11’ or ‘7/7’ (or ‘26/11’) “contributes to the (re)production of a seemingly continuous sequence that has come to appear self-evident, straightforward and uncomplicated”. As they note, “in stringing these dates and place names together, we conjure a particular view of global politics, and often forget the broader geographies and
histories involved in different events at various sites” (ibid). These reductive geographical imaginations are also reflected within the governance practices of contemporary urban spaces. Across a wide and varied range of major cities in both the global north and global south, approaches to security management and policing have developed important resonances. This raises questions about how and why the global diffusion of urban security knowhow takes place.

At first glance, the post-26/11 impulse to learn from the policy experiences of Western states might seem rather unproblematic. Given that the event was widely understood as a failure of local technical capacity, the subsequent focus on emulating policy models developed elsewhere appears rather straightforward. Yet when examined more closely, the focus on global policy learning after 26/11 raises red flags, not least because of the ‘models’ to which India turned. As one commentary following 26/11 argued, Israel and the US seemed like case studies for “How to Not Fight Terrorism” (Sharma 2009, emphasis added).

While the US and Israeli policy experiences of fighting terrorism were quickly valorized as unequivocal successes in the aftermath of 26/11, they have been widely condemned for their violent repercussions and extraordinary costs. The US-led ‘war on terror’ has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere by igniting a vicious wave of sectarianism across the Middle East that rages on today. Domestically, the 9/11 attacks have produced a rapid growth of governmental spending, giving rise to the expansion of domestic policing authority and unprecedented levels of surveillance power that threaten the basic civil liberties and human rights of many Americans (as well as many living beyond its borders). Post-26/11 representations
of Israel’s ‘experience’ fighting terrorism as an unequivocal case of policy ‘success’ are even more jarring, given that the ongoing Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands represents perhaps the quintessential form of late modern colonial rule. The exceptional brutality of the techniques used to control the Occupied Territories alongside the Zionist state-building project constitute what Israeli architect Eyal Weizman (2007: 9) calls “a laboratory of the extreme”.

In trying to make sense of post-26/11 policy developments and offer a critique of them, however, we need to be careful. As I argue in the following chapters, the representation of policy experiences as cases of either success or failure is never innocent; it is itself a deeply ideological and power-laden process. Therefore, asking why policy failures are misrepresented as successes (or vice versa) is an untenable starting point because it would assume that their status as such is obvious and unproblematic. Yet what we can quite clearly say is this: the US and Israeli experiences fighting terrorism are nothing if not deeply controversial, both internationally and within their ‘contexts of origin’. What is therefore striking about the post-26/11 discourse is that these same experiences could be re-presented as a settled case of policy ‘success’ worthy of emulation. The critical question is how.

Answering this question requires much more than merely condemning policy decisions as outlandish, excessive and exclusionary, even if they may be all of these things. What is necessary, I insist, is to challenge the premise that security governance takes place in an insulated technocratic space beyond the realm of conflict and contestation. As I will demonstrate, efforts to construct and export policy ‘models’ face a range of practical and political obstacles. Addressing the politics of urban security means
taking these overlooked sites of tension and difficulty seriously and grappling with them as an essential part of theorizing. As such, this dissertation is an attempt to re-politicize issues of urban security, yet in such a way where “the terrain of politics is itself at stake and in question” (Collier 2011: 251).

**Argument Summary**

This dissertation examines the global mobility of security knowhow in relation to the management of terrorism in megacities. Specifically, it offers three insights. First, it shows how historical events are performed as sites in need of transnational policy intervention. Second, it enables an understanding of how and why the sourcing of policy ‘models’ actually takes place. Third, it sheds light on how mobile policy schemes travel geographically and are put to work in particular contexts. In doing so, it elaborates on the conditions under which policies move geographically but also addresses the kinds of constraints and contradictions they face.

More specifically, the dissertation develops two closely related theses. The first has to do with how policy models are constructed as mobile objects while the second highlights the kinds of pressures and conflicts that such models are used to resolve. Regarding the construction of policy models, Israel’s status as a global policy exemplar should not be understood as a closed professional consensus or incontrovertible fact that exists independently ‘out there’. Rather it is a deeply ideological construct, emerging from processes of geographic interaction. Israel’s claim to expertise in security knowledge needs to be constantly re-articulated. Indeed, the Israeli involvement in 26/11 reveals a basic tension. On the one hand, the Israeli officials’ prerogatives to comment on
the handling of 26/11 reflects Israel’s dominant position on matters of counter-terrorism and HLS. On the other hand, the extensive efforts Israeli officials undertook to situate Israeli security expertise as a ‘solution’ to 26/11 also reveals that the relationship between 26/11 and the ‘Israeli experience’ fighting terrorism was not, in fact, obvious or natural. This link had to be actively made. Indeed, the event’s status as a failure of governance in need of urgent policy intervention emerged through Israeli criticisms of Indian security authorities and comparisons to their own alleged success in managing live terror attacks.

The second component of my thesis is that the Mumbai authorities’ decision to take up Israeli security ‘solutions’ must be situated in relation to the local public pressures and conflicts to which 26/11 gave rise. The reason why Maharashtra politicians decided to learn from Israel in 2009 was not because they suddenly woke up to the reality of global terrorism and realized that ‘securing’ Mumbai against this threat would require a set of technical skills that they lacked. Rather it was because they believed that an association with Israel would be helpful in managing public dissent and restoring their authority to govern. What ‘learning from Israel’ offered was not a set of concrete policy prescriptions for how to manage terrorism but rather an image of progress and success.

This dissertation begins with the ‘push factors’ driving the Government of Maharashtra’s (GOM) decision to seek Israeli security expertise. I argue that Israeli state officials, security experts and commentators in the Indian and international media constructed 26/11 as a failure of local, technical capacity, thus requiring outside policy intervention. These actors further seized on 26/11 and its political fallout as an opportunity to expand Israel’s HLS industry. However, these activities are insufficient for
explaining how Israeli security expertise emerged as a solution to the attacks. It is necessary to consider how the so-called ‘Israeli experience’ of fighting terrorism emerged as a policy model for others to emulate in a more general way.

Existing critical accounts of Israel’s HLS industry offer important insights here, showing how Israeli firms are able to lay claim to ‘combat-proven’ expertise, thereby helping Israelis to gain a competitive edge in a global marketplace as well as to (re)produce and entrench the very dangers they claim to remedy. Yet this literature fails to readily address how Israeli HLS approaches have come to be understood as *mobile* and *universal* strategies to be applied worldwide. It also upholds some problematic assumptions of conventional accounts of policy transfer, particularly the notion that Israeli security solutions exist as naturally mobile objects independent of the international clients who enroll them. Building on policy mobilities and policy assemblages scholarship, I argue that Israeli claims to global expertise are performatively constituted through their encounters beyond Israel/Palestine and in ways that stabilize their security practices as global models.

These ‘push factors’ only account for part of the story of why Indian government officials looked to Israeli security experts to develop their policy response to 26/11. To make sense of the policy response to 26/11 – particularly its focus on police modernization, the raising of new specialized commando units and the use of foreign expertise—the perspectives of local policymakers must be considered. Yet here we run into an underlying problem. Although the post-26/11 policy response seems to follow rather straightforwardly from prevailing media framings of the event as a failure of local capacity, when examined more closely the specific policy measures put into place after
2008 seem to defy a rational calculus. Even officials involved in crafting the response to the attacks recognized that police modernization and the sourcing of foreign security expertise were unlikely to radically transform Mumbai’s vulnerability against future terrorist attacks.

My interviews with Mumbai officials ultimately reveal that the objectives of these policy decisions lie elsewhere. The policy response to 26/11 was primarily aimed at containing the anti-politician backlash to which 26/11 gave rise. The GOM’s response to the attacks can thus be understood as an exercise in public relations, which sought to ‘arm’ state agencies against charges of weakness and incompetence. These efforts are characterized by a focus on highly visible displays of state power, which draw on militarized imageries through an appeal to ‘modern’, ‘state-of-the art’ weapons and gear. The use of Israeli police trainers and security experts represents an important part of this broader attempt to build public ‘confidence’ in the Mumbai police.

Yet rather than simply responding to pre-given public concerns and policy problems, the policy response to 26/11 involved diagnosing these problems and re-framing them. In addition, the GOM’s decision to send an official delegation to Israel helped to divert attention away from the findings of the GOM’s own expert commission on 26/11. It also allowed the GOM to (re)make the policy ‘problem’ at hand. The decision to learn from Israel gave the impression that the apparent failure of 26/11 was reducible to a lack of modern security knowhow and technology within the Mumbai police. Seeking forms of urban security knowhow from Israel was thus presented as the ‘best’ means of addressing technical deficiencies at the local level. Learning from Israel also had important anti-political effects. By naming Israeli expertise as ‘best practice’,
Mumbai officials were able to set up Israeli security policy as a measure to which one could not reasonably be opposed. Indeed, I argue that learning from Israel has helped to police and circumscribe the terms of public debate on the handling of 26/11 and delimit the range of possible responses to the attacks.

The theatrical nature of the policy response to 26/11 necessarily raises questions about the effects of global policy learning, specifically whether anything tangible was ultimately transferred from Israel to Mumbai through this practice. Here I show that, facing a series of technical and business challenges of operating in India, Israeli efforts to capitalize on 26/11 as a commercial opportunity come up short. The production of policy ‘success’, however, had little to do with the literal transfer of expertise and technology from Israel to Mumbai. While seeking Israeli security expertise was presented as a radical overhaul of the Mumbai police, it has effectively done the opposite. Learning from Israel produced a sense of reform while keeping existing policing structures in place. Nevertheless, encounters between Mumbai and Israeli officials were bound up with the production of new forms of knowledge. The interactions between these officials bred a sense of success for both parties: Mumbai officials claimed success by virtue of having sought out ‘the best’ in urban security knowhow and Israel’s HLS industry used their Indian clients as evidence of the universal application of their security solutions.

Finally, I address efforts of Indian and international security actors to build an Indian HLS market in the years since 2008. While industry actors were quick to make declarations of a sudden shift in governmental and corporate priorities to invest in security following 26/11, I note the various interruptions they have faced in capitalizing on the event. These challenges and frictions should be taken seriously because they reveal
something essential about how the category of HLS exists in India today. They also raise questions about the resonances between neoliberalism and the securitization of the urban.

**Research design and methodology**

This dissertation addresses four key areas of investigation. First, I examine how terrorist attacks are constructed as ‘global’ events and sites of governmental failure in need of *transnational* policy intervention. Second, I consider how urban security policies and practices are ‘mobilized’. More specifically, I discuss how Israel’s deeply controversial approaches to combatting terrorism have been constituted as a form of expert knowledge with perceived universal applicability. Third, I inquire into what makes certain policies attractive to policymakers. In the case of Mumbai - a city with longstanding experience in combating urban violence - I ask why decisions were taken to look outward to external sources of urban security knowledge after 2008. Fourth, I trace the practical repercussions of global policy learning and explore the extent to which policy ‘models’ transform as they travel between different sociopolitical fields to be adopted into practical settings. Following Valverde (2011: 5), I approach security “not as a thing, concept or condition but rather as an umbrella term under which one can see a multiplicity of governance processes that are dynamic and internally contradictory”. Accordingly, my aim is to better understand how contemporary discourses on security operate and the kinds of effects they bring to bear.

This work is based on empirical fieldwork in two primary research areas, Israel’s HLS industry and Mumbai’s post-2008 policy response. While based in Tel Aviv I conducted 17 interviews with representatives of Israeli HLS firms between July and
September 2012. The firms interviewed for this project were all private (rather than state-owned) although I also draw on interviews with officials from state-funded Israeli trade promotion bodies such as the Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute (IEICI). Some of these firms had experience working in India before and after 2008. I also spoke with one former Israeli Major General and weapons scientist. While in Israel I visited sites like border crossings, checkpoints and border walls to observe manifestations of Israeli security policies, technologies and practices on the ground. I also attended two demonstrations against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, which were met with the typical violent response from Israeli security forces, including the use of rubber bullets, tear gas, “skunk water”\(^2\) and arrests.

Research at the second site was conducted over a seven-month stay in Mumbai from October 2012 to May 2013. In Mumbai I conducted interviews with 20 current and former public officials some of whom were directly involved in Mumbai’s counter-terror planning including senior Indian Police Service (IPS) officers, Home Ministry bureaucrats and government ministers from the Government of Maharashtra (GOM). My extended stay in Mumbai also allowed for extensive first-hand observation of the physical manifestations of the policy response to 26/11 within the city of Mumbai. In addition, I spoke with two locally-based Israeli HLS representatives and one private individual responsible for promoting Israel-India cooperation and facilitating business dealings and delegation visits between the two countries.

While the research design is built around the examination of these two empirical sites, my wider approach addresses the practices, discourses and interactions that sustain

\(^2\) Skunk Water is a putrid smelling liquid developed in Israel and routinely used by Israeli security forces in controlling Palestinians.

The data was gathered and analyzed using an interdisciplinary methodology based on discourse analysis and performativity, semi-structured qualitative interviews, and ethnographic approaches. Discourse analysis plays an important role in my analysis, particularly in terms of identifying the influence of certain ideas and public debates about security and tracing their translation into policy prerogatives. I draw on a variety of sources including journalistic literature, academic research, official public statements, reports, policy papers, security industry publications and websites, conference materials, white papers and consultancy reports. My reading of discourse corresponds most closely to the poststructuralist conception of the term focused on issues of power and the ways in which forms of knowledge emerge as ‘truth’ within particular social contexts. This is an understanding of discourse is most commonly associated with the work of Michel Foucault (1973; 1977) and his notions of power/knowledge and regimes of truth (Foucault 1980). Following this reading of discourse, the purpose of discourse analysis, is not to reveal the hidden truths ‘behind’ discourse. Rather, analysis begins from the premise that nothing is outside of discourse (Dittmer 2010). Accordingly, when conducting discourse analysis, my goal was not to differentiate between true and false
statements, but instead to “work with what has actually been said or written, exploring patterns in and across the statements and identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 21). Through discourse analysis I was also able to identify contestations and controversies to which the event gave rise. As Neumann (2008: 61) argues, discourse analysis is a particularly apt methodological approach for analyzing political contestations and conflicts as well as tracing the genesis of certain logics through various “re-presentations”, textual or otherwise.

While drawing attention to how certain representations consolidate patterns of meaning discursively, I complement discourse analysis with the concept of performativity. Developed by Judith Butler in the context of gender studies, performativity highlights the reiterative and referential practice, whereby discourse generates the very outcomes that it names. As Butler (1988: 519) emphasizes, “gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather it is an identity tenuously constituted in time—an identity instituted through a *stylized repetition of acts*” (emphasis in original). The implication is that a pre-given audience does not simply receive these ‘acts’ but is instead constituted by and through their repetition. As Butler emphasizes, “the appearance of substance is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and perform in the mode of belief” (ibid: 520, emphasis in original). So while discourse analysis allows me to map the contours of debate and trace potential controversies that may have followed the attacks, my focus on performativity will be critical to understanding how certain narratives and
actors establish their positions and authority in their persistence and repetition. While I elaborate on this concept more fully in Chapter 1, as a methodological approach the use of performativity enables me to understand how certain narratives and sources of authority are constituted through their repetition and circulation over time.

The second methodological approach I draw on is qualitative interviews. As noted above, I conducted the first set of interviews in Israel with the representatives of Israeli security firms in 2012. I focus on these representatives’ accounts of selling their products and services within a global marketplace and some of the specific challenges of working in India. The emphasis here is on the kinds of claims that these actors employ in order to constitute their authority as security experts and the marketing strategies they employ in selling their products and services around the world. The information drawn from the interviews is supplemented by an analysis of the marketing materials of Israeli HLS companies and promotional bodies like the IEICI. During my stay in Israel I also met with journalists and scholars who have studied India-Israel relations and Israel’s weapons and security industries.

The Mumbai interviews were utilized as a means to reveal insider perspectives on how policymaking processes unfolded after 26/11, particularly surrounding the sourcing of foreign counter-terror knowhow and policy models. Through my interactions with officials in India I sought to gain a better sense of the mentalities and rationalities involved in urban security policymaking in order to understand the appeal of mobile policy schemes from the perspectives of those who adopt them. During my stay in Mumbai, I had a number of conversations with of Mumbai-based journalists, scholars, lawyers and activists. During the trips to Delhi to attend HLS trade fairs and conferences
in November 2012 and March 2013 I also conducted interviews with several leading Indian security experts and private sector representatives working within the security divisions of Indian management consultancies.

My use of interviews, however, is not intended to re-create a definitive, factual retelling of particular events or processes. It also considers my own positionality as a researcher, specifically as an outsider dependent on the cooperation of the authorities I engaged with. I thus situate my interviews with officials as “complex and contested social encounter[s] riven with power relations” rather than simply as opportunities to exchange information (McDowell 2010: 161). Indeed, the statements of interviewees are conditioned by what they are willing to disclose and expect to get out of the interviews. I approached these encounters with what Peck and Theodore (2012: 26) have termed a “self-consciously disruptive posture” in order to unsettle and interrogate the taken-for-granted-ness and self-implied necessity of policy prerogatives and industry tropes, resulting in dynamic and, at times tense conversations with certain officials. Such points proved important opportunities to unsettle scripted representations of policy decisions and marketing claims. Although many informants would likely take issue with some of my conclusions, I believe that I have represented their statements accurately.

Although I would not characterize my third methodological approach as fully ethnographic, it draws on methodologies associated with “global ethnography” (Burawoy 2000) and “multi-sited ethnography” (Hannerz 2003) based on attendance of international security trade shows, conferences and expos. First-hand engagement with these events provided important opportunities to engage with corporate-led efforts to build an Indian HLS market after 2008 such as HLS trade shows and policy conferences and speak with
some of the officials involved in these efforts. Information was gathered at these events through participant observation and informal conversations and captured through ethnographic field notes (Emerson et al. 1995). Participant-observation takes place by “pay[ing] close attention to, and sometimes partak[ing…] in, everyday geographies” in order to “become familiar with how social spaces are constituted” (Watson and Till 2010: 129). These approaches have thereby functioned in my research as “a practice of discovery” in unfamiliar worlds rather than as a means to piece together an objective account of what takes place (ibid: 126) at industry events. Ethnographic approaches have served as a means of “interrogating […] public presentations” whilst simultaneously “engag[ing…] with them” (Barry 2001: 23). In particular, attendance at these events gave me insight into the challenges and paradoxes of efforts to expand India’s security market after 2008 and enabled me to establish contacts as part of my fieldwork. This builds on recent critical scholarship, which has productively engaged with civil security trade shows (Hoijtink 2014) and counter-terror expos (Feigenbaum 2011) as critical research sites.

In bringing these three approaches and sources of data together, I draw extensively on the methodological insights from geographical literatures on “fast policy” (Peck 2002; 2011b), “policy mobilities” (McCann 2008; McCann 2010; McCann and Ward 2011; Peck 2011a; Peck and Theodore 2010; Ward 2006) and “policy assemblages” (McCann 2011b; Prince 2010). This “post-transfer” (McCann and Ward 2012b) literature argues for an eclectic mix of methodological approaches ranging from interviews, discourse analysis, genealogy and ethnography and is characterized by an explicitly post-positivist orientation. It importantly challenges the notion that policies
emerge as fully formed coherent entities, which are then subsequently exported elsewhere. As such, post-transfer approaches contest the understanding of mobility as the literal ‘export’ of policies from one place to another, alternatively situating mobility as a power-laden process bound up with the mutation of policy. This literature additionally places a strong emphasis on the methodological importance of following policies (and even places) as they move in order to trace the complex geographies that such travels give rise to. Engaging closely with this scholarship I situate the production and mutation of urban security knowledge alongside its geographic movement.

**Research scope, challenges and limitations**

The most significant methodological challenge I faced was gaining access to interview subjects. Given the secretive nature of security and policing matters in general (Walters 2014; Coleman forthcoming) and my research sites in particular, gaining access to relevant officials proved extremely challenging. Nevertheless, with persistence I ultimately succeeded in gaining access to many of individuals I approached in Israel and India. Though some interviewees preferred to remain anonymous, most of my interviews were on the record. As a result, while the majority of my interviews are organized by name and location of where they took place, others are simply listed ‘Anonymous’ in Appendix A. Questions might be raised, however, about the veracity of their statements. I handle issues of truth and reliability somewhat differently in the two research sites, however, so I take them up separately.

Given that the aim of dissertation is to understand how Israel’s position as an HLS leader has been consolidated discursively, the main purpose of my interviews was to get a
sense of how their promotional strategies work. Here my position as an outsider proved helpful. Interviews often became part interview and part marketing exercise, with representatives trying to convince me of the merit of their particular products and services and explain the specificities of so-called ‘Israeli approach’ to security more broadly. The interviews therefore, reflected the kinds of encounters and messages that potential foreign buyers of Israeli HLS knowhow would experience in Israel, and were full of claims about Israel’s position in international politics and the persistent threats to its ‘survival’. Rather than trying to assess the veracity of these statements, my aim was to unpack and make sense of them in order to understand the kinds of imaginaries that they produce and sustain. I also spoke with some of these representatives about their work in India. Here again, however, my emphasis was primarily on their subjective experiences of trying to secure projects with Indian state agencies rather than on specific facts about one deal or another.

With regard to the interviews in Mumbai, questions of accuracy are somewhat more complicated. Some of my interview subjects were remarkably forthcoming, particularly certain retired officials and those who spoke off the record. Others, however, were considerably less so and sometimes quite defensive and even confrontational. Certain officials likely withheld some of their knowledge. I also received contradictory information from officials. I address these issues in a few different ways.

First, because my study does not begin from the premise that there is a singular objective truth about ‘what exactly happened’ in the post-26/11 policy process, my specific aim is to draw attention to the conflicting accounts about how the policy process took shape and gain a sense of the different kinds of considerations that informed
particular outcomes. Accordingly the existence of contradictory accounts of how this process unfolded is to be expected and indicative of multiple, competing interpretations and perspectives among different officials. Moreover, because I spoke with certain parties who had been in direct conflict with one another in the aftermath of 26/11, their accounts are, not surprisingly, sometimes at odds with one another.

Second, I have approached officials’ comments in India not as statements of fact to be taken at face value, but instead as self-interested re-presentations. Many of the individuals I spoke with in India (even those who were retired) had stakes in protecting their own personal legacies or the image of the institutions they represented. Their statements are thus indicative of how state agents wish to present their work (particularly to outsiders) and can thus be best understood as a form of public relations. As such they are useful to my project in trying to understand how they wished their policy decisions to appear to a wider public audience. Nevertheless, some told me things that reflected their own misgivings and limitations of the measures they instituted and these too must be acknowledged. So while certain officials were unwilling to go off-script, others displayed the ability for introspection and self-criticism about the nature of their work.

Third, I found some important commonalities in the testimonies of officials. Of course, the fact that there are common themes among officials does not itself say anything about the accuracy of their claims. Instead, these commonalities are indicative of shared mentalities that underwrite urban security policymaking, which taken together, offer important raw material for putting together an account of how officials went about developing a policy response to 26/11 and the kinds of factors that were considered. Indeed, while I have utilized interviews in order to reveal individual insider perspectives
on how policy processes unfolded, my broader aim was to uncover “the practices and discourses that transcend the level of the individual” (Gusterson 2008: 107).

Despite my success in gaining access to key officials, there are still necessary limitations to the scope of my analysis, which are in no way trivial. Given my position as an outsider in India, it proved simply impossible for me to witness the effects of anti-terror policies and policing practices first-hand, beyond their physical manifestations in certain public places in Mumbai. My claims about the effects of global policy learning are, therefore, gleaned from conversations with locally-based lawyers, journalists, newspaper editors, academics and activists who have been follow these kinds of issues over a much longer period of time than I have. To this end, I have also extensively engaged with the media coverage of policing and security matters in the English language media in order to understand the terms of public debate on these matters. While this helps to understand some of the implications of post-26/11 policy schemes, there are likely certain effects that have been overlooked.

The remainder of this work proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 provides a review of the literature on the ‘urban turn’ in security studies and how the securitization and militarization of cities might be theorized. I then outline a number of limitations and problems with these theorizations and develop a strategy for overcoming them.

In Chapter 2 I investigate how 26/11 emerged as a ‘failure of governance’ and a site of policy intervention on matters of urban security. After reviewing the specific nature of the anti-politician backlash that the handling of 26/11 gave rise to, I examine how 26/11 was constituted as a technical failure of local capacity. Here, I address how the handling of the attacks emerged as a site of controversy and political contestation
before reflecting on how Israel’s HLS industry exploited the event as a commercial opportunity.

Chapter 3 then provides an account of how Israel has emerged as an HLS model. The chapter first highlights how Israel’s position as security leader has been theorized to date and the limitations of these approaches before providing an alternative account, drawing on policy mobilities and policy assemblages literatures to demonstrate how Israeli HLS solutions are mobilized as global policy models.

The GOM’s policy response to 26/11 is examined in Chapter 4. I situate this discussion within the context of the GOM’s highly visible program of urban militarization used to restore public confidence in the Mumbai police, situating it as a form of militarized performative politics.

In Chapter 5, I develop an account of why Mumbai authorities decided to learn from Israel after 26/11. I address how learning from Israel has served to contain existing political controversies and delimit public debate issues of ‘urban security’, locating governance through ‘best practice’ as an anti-political strategy.

The effects of learning from Israel are explored in Chapter 6. Here I examine how the interactions between Mumbai officials and Israelis have worked to give an impression of progress and success. I further show how the response to 26/11 broadly, and learning from Israel in particular, have worked to maintain rather than disrupt the status quo of police practice in Mumbai and (re)produce pre-existing geographies of exclusion in the city.

In Chapter 7, I turn to the corporate-led efforts to exploit 26/11 as an opportunity to build an Indian HLS market, examining the relationship between the securitization of
the urban and neoliberalism. I further address how the enduring legacies of British colonialism continue to shape the tentative position of the Indian police and hence, of matters of security in India today.

The conclusion then outlines some key challenges and possibilities for critical work on security in the future. I argue that there is much at stake analytically and politically in terms of how critical scholars go about representing the officials and institutions they investigate. While existing critiques of militarization and securitization have been important, they have proven limiting and sometimes even directly counterproductive in certain instances.
Chapter 1: Urbanizing Security: Toward a research agenda

Introduction

There has been a resurgence of interest in cities as spaces and sites of security across the social sciences suggestive of an ‘urban turn’ in security studies (e.g. Abrahamsen et al. 2009a). This reflects global trends toward precarious forms of urbanization, changes in military strategy and political concerns about the repression of civic activity through the physical barricading and privatization of public space. Stephen Graham’s (2010) Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism provides a useful synthesis of these closely related trends. The new military urbanism literature forms part of a broader discussion of changes in the scalar and spatial shifts in the nature of territorial borders and security practices (Bauman 2002; Coaffee and Rogers 2008; Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006) associated with a blurring between police and military functions (Bigo 2001; Bigo 2002; Feldman 2004; Kraska 2007; cf. Neocleous 2014; Weiss 2011). While this literature addresses a wide range of empirical trends, my dissertation is concerned with one aspect in particular, namely the ways in which the threat of terrorist violence is governed in the contemporary megacity. In what follows, I reflect on how the new military urbanism is being assembled as a global project through a central focus on the transnational mobility of security knowhow. I begin by briefly sketching some key empirical developments associated with the urban turn in security studies and how these might be theorized. I then turn to some of the limitations of the literature on the new military urbanism and outline my theoretical approach for addressing its limitations. I argue that attention to market processes and policy rationales, and their relationship to issues of politics, is critical to developing a more robust account
of how the new military urbanism is assembled.

1. Security re-enters the city

‘Security’ has become a hot topic in discussions of contemporary urbanism. High on the agenda of municipal governance agencies, policy think tanks and military strategists, it has also emerged as a burgeoning field of critical social science research. First, literature probing the militarization of the urban encompasses trends associated with the everyday governance of cities such as the rebordering and barricading of cities through the growth of “fortress architecture” (Davis 1990; 1992; Bauman 2003) and the rise of gated communities (Caldeira 2000; Low 2001, 2008). This literature has also investigated the criminalization of poverty (Smith 1996; Wacquant 1999) and the emergence of paramilitary styles of policing (Jefferson 1990; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Kraska and Cubellis 1997; cf. Waddington 1999). The militarization of the urban has also been discussed in terms of how cities are conceptualized as objects and as mediums of military violence (Campbell et al. 2007; Coward 2009b). Scholarship has also investigated how cities become (urban) theatres of war (Bratton 2009; Croser 2007), associated with the rise of an “urban geopolitics” (Graham 2004) and with what Derek Gregory (2011) has termed “the everywhere war”.

The literature on the increasing securitization of urban space deals with a range of social issues within cities. The process of urbanization has increasingly come to be understood and governed through the parameters of threat, risk and danger (Coaffee 2003; Coaffee 2009b; Shapiro 2009). Such accounts focus on the production of insecurity within everyday urban spaces (Marcuse 2006; Murakami Wood 2010; Graham 2006),
reflecting concerns about the spread of precarious forms of urban existence alongside patterns of global urbanization (e.g. Davis 2006; Kilcullen 2013). As Coward (2009a: 399-400) summarizes: “One might [...] say that a reciprocal dynamic of urban securitization is under way in which the security agenda is urbanized and urbanity is—insofar as it induces insecurity and vulnerability—securitized. One could refer to this reciprocal dynamic as the urbanization of security” (emphasis in original).

Graham’s concept of the new military urbanism captures the complex intersections of these securitizing and militarizing trends as an emergent global phenomenon. While covering a wide range of global socio-technical processes, the new military urbanism consists of five related elements: “the urbanization of security and military doctrine; the links between militarized control technologies and digitized urban life, the cultural performances of militarized media consumption; the emerging urban political economies of ‘security’ industries and the new state spaces of violence” (Graham 2011a: 2). Such developments, Graham argues, “[i]creasingly work to problematize urban life per se” (ibid:14, emphasis in original).

These urban policy trends have raised alarm, particularly through their tendency to produce “fearfulness, suspicion, paranoia and ultimately insecurity” (Coaffee et al. 2009b: 507). Securitized planning strategies and militarized policing tactics have been linked to a decline in democratic participation, alongside the physical barricading and privatization of public spaces (e.g. Coaffee 2009a: 345; Wekerle and Jackson 2005: 35; Marcuse 2002: 602; Shapiro 2009: 446). According to such accounts, security is becoming increasingly preemptive and anticipatory in its urbanized articulations, based on the perceived inevitability of future terrorist attacks (Coaffee 2009a; also see Amoore
Central to literature on new military urbanism is the claim that a wide range of cities are developing resonances or even converging around shared visions of security. For Adey (2010: 54), “the dream of megacity security strategies is one and the same the world over”. While noting that although “the effects [of the new military urbanism] observed in the urban Western setting differ widely from those seen in the war-zone”, Graham (2010: xiii) maintains that “these hi-tech acts of violence are predicated on a shared set of ideas”. These assertions play an essential role in representations of the urbanization of security as a global phenomenon. How do scholars account for the assembly of new military urbanism as a worldwide project? It is to this question that I now turn.

To understand the urbanization of security as a global phenomenon, it is first necessary to address the issue of historical change. While some scholars take a more historical perspective (Collier and Lakoff 2008; Light 2002; Farish 2004), the majority focus on trends emerging as part of the US-led ‘war on terror’ and the rise of “Homeland Security” (HLS) (e.g. Graham 2006; Mitchell 2010; Ruben and Maskovsky 2008). At the same time, there is widespread agreement within critical literature that such trends may be more indicative of a return, reframing or intensification of erstwhile trends rather than evidence of an entirely new phenomenon (e.g. Abrahamsen et al. 2009b; Bishop and Clancy 2004; Coward 2009a; Sassen 2010; Virilio 2006). Most critical urban security scholars are aware of some historical antecedent to contemporary trends. Nevertheless, there is a sense that following 9/11 “the fortification and militarisation of globally significant cities has proceeded at an unparalleled pace” (Coaffee 2009b: 3).
For some, political crises function as moments of opportunity whereby already existing patterns of urban securitization are deepened and/or accelerated. For instance, as David Lyon (2003: 666) argues: “What transpired after September 11th is that companies and government departments that already had an interest in […] surveillance systems now had a rationale—and public support—for installing them […T]his represents a continuation, albeit at an accelerated pace, of trends that were already strongly present in all advanced industrial (or ‘informational’) societies”. In other words, rather than viewing 9/11 as a starting point for a range of new militarized urban responses to terrorism or other perceived threats, these events may be better understood as accentuating already existing trends. Moreover, the security technologies (and the interests that benefit their promotion) pre-existed these crises. The intensification of securitizing trends following key events cannot, therefore, be understood as entirely new phenomena. Rather it is the conditions that change under which these agendas can be publicly legitimized. Here an extensive literature on security planning around international mega-events has shown how the staging of these events serves to accelerate and deepen already existing patterns of securitization and militarization, sometimes in radical ways (e.g. Bennett and Haggerty 2011; Fussey et al. 2012; Giulianotti and Klauser 2010; Kitchen and Rygiel 2014).

Some of this literature highlights the economic dimensions of urban security trends, focusing on the profit motives and political economies of fear that sustain securitization and militarization. Various kinds of ‘urban’ anxieties, insecurities and fears can be produced and exploited by the commercial actors who benefit from their management (Davis 1990, 1992; Glassner 1999; Light 2002: 612; Parenti 1999). More broadly, the urbanization of security has been linked with the spread of global capital and
the rise of “global cities” (Sassen 2001). Here securitization imperatives are seen as closely aligned to neoliberal restructuring projects as cities compete with one another to gain a competitive edge in attracting foreign capital and global tourism. Thus ‘security’ becomes increasingly viewed as a key aspect of major cities’ international brand image (Coaffee 2009b; Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006; Mitchell and Beckett 2008). Some have even suggested that neoliberalism and (urban) securitization imperatives represent part of the same historical process (e.g. Cowen and Smith 2010: 37).

Building on the importance of economic considerations and the role of neoliberalism, a number of accounts have drawn attention to the production and transmission of knowledge in facilitating the securitization and militarization of cities. Beginning in the 1990s, discussions around the militarization of the urban have been animated by references to radical, exemplary ‘cases’. As Coaffee (2009b: 45) points out, during the 1990s Los Angeles “assumed a theoretical primacy within urban studies with an overemphasis on its militarisation, portraying the city as an urban testing ground for anti-crime measures”. During this same period, New York City assumed an imaginative role as a “planetary showcase for an aggressive approach to law-enforcement” through experimentation with so-called ‘zero-tolerance’ policing under the administration of Mayor Rudolf Giuliani and NYPD Commissioner William Bratton (Wacquant 2014: 72).

The experience of Belfast is another important, though less frequently discussed example. Coaffee and Murakami Wood (2006: 506) point out that beginning in the 1970s Belfast was viewed as “a laboratory for radical experiments on the fortification and territorialization of urban space” through efforts to address the use of car bombing as a tactic of political violence (also see Coaffee 2004, 2009b). This experimental dynamic is
perhaps most pronounced through the Israeli occupation of Palestine where Israeli security forces routinely engage in radical forms of military experimentation within the built environments of cities in Gaza and the West Bank (Li 2006; Weizman 2004; 2005; 2007).

A number of scholars have further addressed how some of these radical forms of urbanism been exported beyond their ‘sites of origin’. Even during the 1990s, the experience of New York was emerging as a kind of global example. Neil Smith (1998: 9) notes how “New York’s zero tolerance and workfare programs have already become national, even international, models”. An extensive literature has since documented the global spread of zero tolerance policing strategies worldwide (Smith 2001; Frühling 2007; Wacquant 1999; 2003; 2008; Mitchell and Beckett; Mountz and Curran 2009; Swanson 2007). Coaffee (2004) similarly documents how the “ring of steel” modeled after the experience in Belfast in the 1970s was re-appropriated by the City of London in the 1990s. He has more recently pointed out that security strategies developed in London have been exported to cities like Sydney, Hong Kong, New York and Mumbai (Coaffee 2009b: 278).

Zero tolerance policing strategies continue to animate discussions about authoritarian forms of neoliberal urban governance (Davis 2013; Swanson 2013; Wacquant 2014). Since 9/11 and the rise of the US-led war on terror, scholars have increasingly documented Israel’s central role in the production and export of radical forms of militarized urbanism around the world, influencing everything from military doctrine, to counter-terror strategies, crowd control and policing. As Graham (2010: xxii) argues, although “the colonization of urban thinking and practice by militarized ideas of
‘security’ does not have a single source [...] the Israeli experience of locking down cities and turning the Occupied Territories into permanent, urban prison camps is proving especially influential. It is the ultimate source of ‘combat-proven’ techniques and technology”. So while scholars have used profit-making and neoliberalism to situate the broader structural parameters of the urbanization of security, knowledge transmission is positioned as a key mechanism in underwriting the spread of specific logics of governing around the world.

2. The field and its limitations

Literature on the new military urbanism represents a rich and diverse field of critical scholarship, which illuminates the spread of militarized logics to manage urban spaces alongside the commodification of security as a form of expert knowledge and source of profit. Yet this scholarship suffers from a number of important conceptual limitations and empirical gaps. My project emerges out of five key concerns with this literature.

First, while these critical accounts represent important counterpoints to the popular representations of key geopolitical events as unproblematic starting points of novel historical processes, they fail to problematize the concept of the event itself. That is, they do little to theorize how particular historical moments come to be understood as radical points of departure and how we might engage with such events, analytically and politically. Most importantly for my purposes, existing accounts do not adequately address how key historical events, such as terrorist attacks, emerge as sources of public controversy and sites of urgent policy intervention, particularly those of a transnational
Second, urban security trends are often attributed to ‘neoliberalism’ in imprecise ways as if patterns of securitization follow in lockstep with the spread and deepening of neoliberal governmentalities around the world. As a result, these accounts do little to address policy patterns within particular localities. As Raco (2003: 1870) reminds us, “whilst there are clear trends in policing strategies towards the securitisation of space, the ways in which these processes are governed and implemented are modified by existing local socio-political relations” (emphasis added).

Scholarship linking neoliberalism and urban security trends often treat neoliberalism as some monolithic, deterministic force ‘out there’. For instance, while Ruben and Maskovsky (2008: 200) endorse the view that the securitization of the urban must be explained in terms of neoliberal governmentalities, they point out that much of the literature connecting these two trends is “liable to the interpretation that neoliberalism has, after a period of coexistence and contestation […] emerged as a singular, dominant mode of governance”. They suggest instead a more contingent ascent that is considerably less successful than often imagined.

Third, while the literature on military urbanism provides an important critique of militarizing and securitizing trends by drawing attention to their exclusionary and anti-democratic implications, it tends to (unduly) represent security schemes as settled and unchallenged. As Raco (2003: 1879) points out, “[s]ecurity issues [in cities] are deeply politicised and contested in ways that some of the more critical literatures on policing strategies underplay” (emphasis in original; also see Cowen and Bunce 2006: 436). Moreover, while scholarship has focused on the repressive and anti-democratic effects of
urban security policies, considerably less attention has been devoted to the politics and forms of public discourse that surround and inform the process of urban security policymaking, albeit with some important exceptions (e.g. Coaffee 2009b; Coaffee et al. 2009a).

My point is certainly not that critical scholars are somehow incorrect in claiming that urban security practices produce new forms of fear and insecurity. Rather it is to emphasize that the focus on the repressive effects of urban security policies often comes with a set of embedded assumptions. More specifically, critical accounts often imply that security measures (and the growth of militarized forms of policing more broadly) are generally unpopular. Yet as Waddington (1999: 129) points out, “there is no clear international correlation between public affection for the police and their levels of armament”. This suggests the need to more clearly specify the relationship between urban security planning and its publics, rather than to assume a general relationship in advance.

Fourth, I am concerned about the way in which questions of knowledge production and transfer are situated in the current literature. There are repeated references to the influence of the “Northern Irish Model” or “London Security Model” (Coaffee 2009b: 139, 294), the roles of “communities of practice” (Coaffee 2009b: 42) and “best practices” (Coaffee et al. 2009a) and the growth of global policing networks (Newburn 2001), which facilitate the “copying of strategies” on an international scale (Warren 2002: 18). Yet it remains unclear whether these ‘models’ or ‘exemplars’ represent coherent policy agendas or the extent to which they are literally applied as they are taken up beyond their sites of origin (although again there are some exceptions).

For example, in contrast to its original stated purpose of protecting the
commercial core of Belfast from acts of political violence, Coaffee (2004: 208) argues the City of London’s re-appropriation of these fortification strategies “represented a far more symbolic and technologically advanced approach to security, which tried to avoid the ‘barrier mentality’ of Belfast”. In London, however it was used to restrict traffic access and ultimately served quite different roles, which suggests that strategies mutate as they travel geographically. Coaffee (2009b: 47) also raises important questions about the supposed universal applicability of urban policy models: “Whilst LA is often held up as a template of contemporary or future urbanism, particularly the ‘Fortress’ model” […the] universal applicability implicit in such accounts is misguided”. In other words we need to avoid uncritically assuming that so-called models can be easily transferred from one place to another.

These skeptical remarks represent a crucial first step in trying to qualify the influence that policy models have in shaping the governance agendas of cities around the world. Yet even Coaffee has devoted little theoretical attention to issues of geographic movement and mobility. As a result, it is important to consider how it is that highly localized experiences of urban security planning come to be understood as global examples to be emulated by others. References to urban security ‘laboratories’ suggest that the introduction of security strategies into real-world scenarios constitutes a crucial aspect of their development as global exemplars. While not without insight, the relation of this alleged ‘real-world’ experimentation to issues of mobility is not elaborated in sufficient depth.

There has also been surprisingly little attention devoted to understanding how exemplars of the new military urbanism come to be seen as such. As Graham (2011a: 15)
points out, “[l]ittle is yet known […] about the detailed policy processes through which
certain norms emerge as mobile exemplars within and through the burgeoning
transnational political economies that sustain the new military urbanism”. Thus the
diffusion of security expertise is presented in ways that are generally imprecise and even
uncritical, giving rise to an idea of policy transfer that is unduly smooth, literal and
unproblematic.

Finally, I question the geographic bias within the existing literature by privileging
Western contexts and perspectives. While studies of cities in the global south represent an
important part of literature on the new military urbanism, the empirical basis for
arguments about the scalar re-drawing of security have been derived from the experiences
of cities the global north. This raises questions about the extent to which alleged shifts in
the overall nature of security should be interpreted in totalizing worldwide terms. These
concerns reflect a broader tendency in security studies to privilege the experiences of
countries from global north, stimulating calls for a “postcolonial moment” in security
studies (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; also see Hönke and Müller 2012)

Indeed, critical accounts of an ‘urban turn’ in logics and practices of security also
reflect the past neglect of more subtle forms of violence as a constitutive feature of
everyday life. As Cowen and Gilbert (2008: 5) point out, because the majority of post-
1945 warfare has occurred beyond Europe and North America, this has produced an
“uneven geography of war” that has allowed intellectuals within rich countries to negate
the central role of war as a quotidian process (also see Pieterse 2009: 299; for alternatives
see Appadurai 2006; Mbembe 2003; Ries 2002; Bajc and de Lint 2011). This is not to
suggest that the urban centers within the global north have not experienced forms of
violence and unrest but rather to point out that these trends have rarely been theorized into core understandings of warfare and security, which have typically remained conceptualized within the frame of “foreign policy” (see Campbell 1992).

These concerns also have an important relationship to the way in which issues of politics and policy transfer are addressed within literature on the new military urbanism. While scholars like Graham (2010) emphasize that movement of exemplars between cities in the global north and global south must be understood as a two-way process, others have gone considerably further in contesting the prevailing notion that new forms of global governance emerge in the north and then migrate southward. As Paul Amar (2013: 20) argues, there is need to move away from positioning the global south “as external to the politics of security, as either projections of securitization processes or as victims of repression and war” (also see Hönke and Müller 2012).

Overall, while critical scholars have invested much of their energy in contesting the premises on which contemporary security approaches rest in order to mount a substantial “critique of security” (Neocleous 2008), they have devoted less attention to explaining how militarized approaches to urban security governance become influential. In other words, while revealing the false premises and negative repercussions of urban securitizations, such scholarship fails to grapple with the kinds of work that go into assembling new urban security agendas. There is a failure to probe the role of the local policymaking processes in underwriting the diffusion of security expertise on a global scale. Existing accounts also have a homogenizing tendency. They risk implying that a broad swathe of what might be considered ‘militarizing’ or ‘securitizing’ trends emerge in relation to a uniform set of pressures, always serve similar interests and necessarily
give rise to the same kinds of repressive politics or other negative effects. In the next section I outline some strategies for responding to these concerns, sketching my theoretical framework for the following chapters.

3. **Assembling militarized urbanism(s): Mobility, (anti)politics and the event**

My dissertation specifically seeks to challenge the premise that security governance takes place in an insulated technocratic space beyond the realm of political negotiation. I therefore develop an empirically grounded focus on the policy processes, struggles and controversies that surround the assembly of the new military urbanism. This does not mean that the issue of neoliberalism can be simply bracketed off and I will return to it in Chapter 7. Rather, it suggests the need to ensure that a commitment to analysis through the frame of neoliberalism does not limit our gaze and prevent us from pursuing other possible analytical avenues. With this consideration in mind I develop a theoretical framework that situates the global mobility of security policy *not* as a response or outgrowth of neoliberalism, but in relation to questions of politics and the political.

Despite its general critical orientation and extensive contributions from critical geographers, the urbanization of security literature has adopted an approach to the diffusion of security knowhow borrowed from mainstream political science and policy studies. These include influential literatures on “policy transfer” (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Benson and Jordan 2011), “networked governance” (Slaughter 2004) and the roles of “communities of practice” (Wenger 1998; Wenger and

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3 Much of this reliance is only implicit. However, some studies reference mainstream policy transfer literature, using concepts like CoP and ‘best practice’ explicitly (e.g. Coaffee 2009b; Coaffee et al. 2009).
Snyder 2000). These literatures position the issue of policy diffusion in rationalist terms as a way to solve objective ‘governance challenges’ by sourcing expertise allegedly demonstrated to be effective in certain contexts.

The notion of governance through ‘best practice’ captures these rationalist premises perhaps most explicitly. Best practice has its origins in a technical business management literature and has been traced back to Peters and Waterman’s (1982) *In Search of Excellence* (Kaplan 2003: 410). By the 1990s, however, best practice became an influential governmental/public policy strategy (Zaring 2006), which continues to span an ever-growing number of sectors. The underlying logic of best practice is both intuitive and straightforward. It asserts that the most efficient approach to policymaking takes place by emulating the practices of other ‘successful’ paradigmatic cases in order to avoid ‘reinventing the wheel’. It is suggestive of “the diffusion of an innovation on the basis of its demonstrable success” (Brannan et al. 2008: 26) thereby generating new opportunities for policy transfer or other kinds of “learning” as a way to address governance challenges in particular localities (Bulkeley 2006: 1035).

I have already pointed out some problems and limitations with the issue of policy transfer within the literature on the urbanization of security. In addition to these, scholars of urban security trends have also importantly not engaged with ongoing debates on various forms of “mobile urbanism” (McCann and Ward 2011), which respond directly to many of the problems associated with conventional policy transfer approaches. In developing a critique of policy transfer literature as well as its own alternative perspective, scholarship on “policy mobilities” and “policy assemblages” has provided a

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4Although the book does not use the term ‘best practice’ it seeks to understand the defining business practices of leading so-called ‘excellent’ American corporations and focuses particular attention on the importance of knowledge gained through experience through trial and error.
much more nuanced alternative account of such trends with specific emphasis on their complex spatializing dynamics (McCann and Ward 2012a; Prince 2012). Work on policy mobility draws extensively on a broader literature on “global assemblages” (Collier and Ong 2005), derived from the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987).

Policy mobilities and policy assemblages literature has been characterized as a series of “rolling conversations rather than a coherent paradigm” (Peck 2011a: 774). Nevertheless, as McCann and Ward (2012b: 328-329) point out, these discussions are unified by four underlying characteristics. First, is the premise that “[p]olicies and the territories they govern are not entirely local constructions but neither are they entirely extra-local impositions” (ibid: 328). This claim has two important implications. It challenges the notion that policies emerge as fully formed stable entities in particular localities and only then subsequently move elsewhere. In so doing it contests the idea that “policies are internally coherent, stable ‘things’” (ibid). The second key characteristic of “post-transfer” approaches is their insistence that mobility must be understood “as a complex and power-laden process, rather than a straightforward A-to-B movement” (ibid). Third, is the notion that mutation is bound up with the development of policies as mobile entities, rather than something that happens to policies only once they move beyond their ‘context of origin’. Fourth, policy assemblages and mobilities approaches embody a methodological commitment to “the following of people, policies and even places” (ibid: 329, emphasis in original).

I do not rehearse the geographical critique of policy transfer literature here because that has already been undertaken in considerable detail (see especially McCann and Ward 2010, 2012b). Rather my aim is to generate dialogue between ongoing debates
about the production and global diffusion of urban security knowhow and the questions that policy mobilities scholarship has opened up, as some have recently begun to do (e.g. Jacobs and Lees 2013).

To this end, post-transfer literature is useful to my project in four important ways. First, I employ it in order to conceptualize the development and diffusion of urban security policy exemplars as a power-laden process. By this I mean that the process through which certain policy experiences come to be seen as global models reflects deliberate efforts to represent them in particular ways. Second, it provides a framework for addressing how certain places, policies or practices come to be understood as ‘models’, rather than taking their status as such for granted. In particular, it allows us to systematically think through the territorial “disembedding” of policy (Cook 2008: 776) as well as examining strategies that attempt to “skirt around the problem of particularity” (Prince 2010: 171). This framework also importantly allows us to think though the tension of relationality and territoriality productively rather than as an aberration from the ‘normal’ functioning of policy regimes. As McCann and Ward (2010: 176) argue, “the tension between policy as relational and dynamic, on the one hand, and fixed and territorial, on the other, is a productive one. It is a necessary tension that produces policy and places”. In doing so, policy mobilities literature helps make sense of the paradox that is sometimes noted by urban scholars, namely that although policy ‘models’ seem to emerge in relation to highly specific contextual circumstances, they come to be understood as global, universal forms (e.g. Smith 2001: 69).

Third, policy mobilities literature challenges the assumption that the key importance of global policy learning is the ability to replicate concrete policies. Scholars
of policing ‘models’ have addressed these concerns to some extent. For instance Smith (2001: 73) argues: “The danger of zero tolerance globally […] is not that it will be transplanted whole in its especially brutal New York form […] Rather, the danger is that […] governments will nonetheless use the New York model to establish new authoritarian forms of governance”. While important, such remarks do not contest the idea of there being some coherent “New York model” in the first place. Nor do such accounts systematically address how the experience of New York in the 1990s came to be represented as a kind of universal example for others to emulate.

Finally, this post-transfer literature places a premium on the methodological importance of trying to “follow the policy” (Peck and Theodore 2012) rather than assuming the nature of their journeys in advance. Indeed, an empirical focus is given high priority in theorizing policy mobilities (see McCann 2011b: 145). Thus when we hear that some policy model has been ‘exported’ from one place to another, post-transfer scholarship reminds us that the actual work of finding out what may have been learned through these interactions remains to be done. Following these considerations, I draw on policy mobilities literature in order to understand the production of urban security knowledge alongside its geographic movement.

As I have noted above, engagement with literature on “global assemblages” represents a core foundation of post-transfer approaches, which have employed the analytic of assemblage to disrupt the clear divide between local and global and the understanding of policies as “internally coherent, stable ‘things’” (McCann and Ward 2012b: 328). Indeed, the concept of assemblage is useful in conceptualizing “how global forms interact with other elements, occupying a common field in contingent, uneasy,
unstable interrelationships” (Collier and Ong 2005: 12) (McCann 2011b). The concept further emphasizes the importance of continuous labor (McFarlane 2009) and invention in the constitution of policy mobilities (McCann and Ward 2012a; McCann 2011b; Prince 2010).

Building on the impetus within global assemblages literature to focus on forms of labour, I emphasize the importance of work in understanding contemporary security trends and forms of policy mobility. In doing so, I shift the analytical focus from one of discourse to the analytic of performativity. Much like the focus on the role of continuous labour within the literature on global assemblages, the concept of performativity locates power in “its persistence and instability” (Butler 1993: 9). Performativity takes place “not as a singular or deliberate “act,” but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (ibid: 3). In short, it does not take the authority of certain actors or salience of ideas as pre-given.

Since its emergence in the late 1980s (e.g. Butler 1988), the concept of performativity has assumed important role across the critical social sciences, including the security field. As Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) have powerfully argued, understanding the constitution of imaginative geographies of security and their roles in contemporary geopolitics requires a move from the frame of construction to one of performativity. A performative register is advantageous, because it contests the premise of preexisting subjects. I employ the concept of performativity in understanding how policy models are constituted as universal and mobile. Rather than taking a preexisting ‘audience’ that receives such messages as given, however, my approach draws attention to how “both ‘subjects’ and ‘acts’ come to appear at all” (Butler 1993: 9). It is through their persistence
that Israeli claims to global security preeminence come to build their momentum and come to resonate.

As I have argued above, literature on the urbanization of security focuses extensively on issues of politics in terms of the barricading of public space and threats to democratic activity but much less on the forms of politics that surround the process of policymaking, particularly as it relates to issues of policy mobility. I therefore reconsider how issues of politics, the political and anti-politics relate to the practice of urban security governance.

My focus on politics, the political and anti-politics reflects three main analytical objectives. First, I reconsider the relationship between security and its publics in ways that move beyond a focus on mapping the repressive effects of urban policy schemes. My aim here lies in trying to understand how issues of policing and security preparedness emerge as sites of conflict, disagreement and dissensus. Rather than situating questions of ‘security’ as inherently political because they concern issues of power and identity, my analysis begins from the empirical observation that while under certain conditions such matters may arouse little public debate, in other circumstances they can become highly politicized and contentious. Grappling with this observation informs my concern with the political.

Second, I seek to address how disruptive political events give rise to new public demands and pressures on state authorities to govern matters of security and how these forms of dissent are in turn negotiated. I am interested in the conduct of urban security governance and the processes of policymaking that accompany it. In addition to revealing the often hidden dimensions of governance, I show how efforts to assert security
‘competence’ are played out in public settings through theatrical, performative gestures. These activities, I argue, can be best understood as attempts to negotiate public demands, resolve conflicts and create order. Such activities I will broadly refer to as forms of politics.

Third, I suggest that the practice of urban security governance is characterized by anti-political tendencies in the sense that it actively works to prevent forms of dissensus from arising and suppressing those forms, which do emerge. Indeed, the very concept of governance has been linked with anti-political inclinations. As Walters argues “governance discourse” reflects a liberal vision of politics in terms of consensus-seeking and problem solving. As such, this discourse “seeks to redefine the political field in terms of a game of assimilation and integration”, which effectively “displaces talk of politics as struggle or conflict” (Walters 2004: 37; also see Mouffe 2005: 102). While exploring the anti-political implications of governance discourses and practices, I seek to disrupt the idea that security policymaking does, in fact, take place in some insulated technocratic space outside of political negotiation.

I have been inspired by a few key theorists who have contested conventional understandings of politics in terms of the exercise of power and the negotiation between pre-defined interests, classes and social movements. In defining the political, politics and anti-politics more precisely, I now briefly review some of their key contributions and outline how they relate to my project.

Following Jacques Rancière (1999) I understand the political to mean the index of disagreement, where under certain (limited) conditions situations forms of dissensus can arise. As Rancière (1999: 32) emphasizes: “If everything is political then nothing is”.
Indeed limiting what counts as politics is essential to Rancière’s approach, which contests conventional understandings that equate politics with the mechanisms involved in the exercise of power and the management of interests. Whereas politics is generally equated with “the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectives is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems of legitimizing this distribution”, Rancière re-names these mechanisms as the police (ibid: 28). To be clear, Rancière’s conception of the police is not equivalent with the state apparatus or the police in its institutional sense. As he emphasizes the essence of the police is not repression or control and can instead be understood as “a certain way of dividing up the sensible” (Rancière 2010: 36).

Politics, however, takes place only when the police logic is interrupted by the egalitarian logic of the political: “The essence of politics is dissensus. Dissensus is not a confrontation between interests or opinions. It is the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself” (Rancière 2010: 38, emphasis in original). Consensus, accordingly, represents the “‘the end of politics’” (ibid: 43). While he draws this distinction between the police and the political, in Rancière’s formulation the boundary between the political and the social remains contested. It is the process of re-articulating this boundary, which lies at the heart of political activity: “Politics is a way of re-partitioning the political from the non-political. This is why it generally occurs ‘out of place’, in a place which was not supposed to be political” (Rancière 2011: 4).

A crucial implication of this move away from an equation of ‘politics’ with the organs of formal democratic rule is that “politics is often muted or absent within the places that are supposed to be its natural habitat (parliaments, parties, etc.) but manifest
within all sorts of unexpected sites and occasions” (Walters 2012: 80). I build on Rancière’s impetus to look for new sites and terrains of political contestation, drawing on other scholars of technopolitics like Andrew Barry. While Barry’s work diverges from Rancière’s in a number of ways, their accounts share some important points of intersection. Like Rancière, Barry locates the political as an “index of space of contestation and dissensus”, focusing on “the ways in which artefacts, activities or practices become objects of contestation” (Barry 2001: 7, 6). Similarly to Rancière, Barry (2002: 269) also contests the idea of politics as a ubiquitous phenomenon, noting that politics represents “a rather specialist activity”.

While following Rancière’s theorization of the political in terms of dissensus, his definition of politics and the political in opposition to the police is too rigid and restrictive for my purposes. The first reason is that my empirical focus and analytical aims are very different from Rancière’s concerns. Simply put, I am not attempting to theorize the activities of radical, emancipatory efforts to overturn the order of the sensible. Indeed, the forms of politics that I will be principally discussing reflect elite and middle class concerns, often articulated in the kind of managerial language that Walters’ (2004) account of “governance discourse” describes. The second reason is that I find it unhelpful to simply bracket off all those state activities that Rancière calls the police as issues that do not pertain to political thought. I aim to show how within practices of security governance there are important (and frequently overlooked) sites of contestation, which need to be grappled with and unpacked through a political lens.

So although I follow Rancière’s effort to dismantle the prevailing equation of ‘political’ issues with those pertaining to questions of power, it becomes important to
more clearly differentiate between the concept of *politics* and *the political*. Here Chantal Mouffe (2005: 7) argues that ‘politics’ concerns the ontic level whereas ‘the political’ relates to that of the ontological. Following this, she defines ‘the political’ as “the dimension of antagonism […] constitutive of human societies” and ‘politics’ as “the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created” (ibid: 7). Barry (2002: 270) has similarly drawn a distinction between “politics – as a set of technical practices, forms of knowledge and institutions – and the political as an index of the space of disagreement”. In the following chapters I follow this basic division.

Barry’s contributions are particularly critical to my project because he shows that although politics is in many respects a limited phenomenon (often associated with managerial practices and technical experts), its boundaries are unstable. This point shares much in common with Rancière. As I have noted above, Rancière argues that contesting the boundary between the political and the social lies at the centre of political activity. Yet Barry importantly emphasizes that forms of consensus and dissensus do not necessarily exist in such strict mutual opposition:

In politics the collective is not a given, but an entity in process. The fact that there is never likely to be a consensus about what the collective is and what individual rights and duties are does not prevent the emergence of a common view. Conversely, the need for a common view does not make the fact of disagreement evaporate […] The divisions between the realm of political contestation, on the one hand, and the realms of law, administration, science and the economy, on the other, are always temporary and, in principle, contestable (Barry 2002: 271).

For Barry, then, the analytical emphasis should be placed on the moments when these
divisions become unsettled, thereby allowing for unexpected sites of contestation to arise.

While building on these contributions, it is also necessary to examine forms of politics in an empirical sense of how they are actually practiced and understood in India today. I therefore engage with Partha Chatterjee’s (2004; 2011a) theorizations of postcolonial democracy. Chatterjee’s reflections on postcolonial democracy are crucial to my project in a few ways. First, is his basic rejection of the idea “that a common activity called politics can be seen to be going on everywhere” in the world (Chatterjee 2011a: 135, emphasis on original). This places central importance on elaborating on the specificities of particular kinds of politics as they emerge in particular contextual situations. Second is his distinction between the realm of “civil society” and that of “political society”. As he points out, although independence in 1947 brought the institution of a democratic system based on a liberal democratic constitution and universal suffrage, it also divided the space of politics between civil society and political society. Civil society denotes the bourgeois realm where citizens relate to the Indian state as rights-claiming citizens. Alternatively, political society is a realm consisting of members of the urban and rural poor. He argues that members of political society are governed by the Indian state as populations and gain access to state resources through forms of collective political negotiation. Finally, I engage with Chatterjee’s claim that populism represents the core of democratic politics in the contemporary world. His thinking on postcolonial democracy provides me with some crucial conceptual tools for making sense of the kinds of politics that 26/11 gave rise to as well as understanding the nature of the policy response to the attacks.

I now turn to a closer examination of strategies aimed at narrowing the space of
political dissensus, focusing on literature on governmental technologies, depoliticization and anti-politics. Scholarship on the privatization of security has already developed some instructive insights here. This literature has addressed the increasing willingness of states to outsource their security management to private actors. Much like literature on the urbanization of security, scholarship on the privatization of security situates the rise of private military companies (PMCs) and private security contractors (PSCs) as a neoliberal rationality of governing (e.g. Abrahamsen and Williams 2007a; 2007b). A number of such studies have additionally explored the relationship between privatization and political debates about security, arguing that the use of private actors can be used by states to actively manipulate, suppress or sidestep deliberative debate and evade democratic accountability (Berndtsson 2012; Leander 2005; 2011; Leander and van Munster 2007).

Such accounts suggest that the rise of private actors serves to depoliticize security questions by rendering them as technical matters in need of management. In drawing attention to the depoliticizing roles of private security actors, these scholars engage with a wider Foucauldian-inspired literature on what Rose and Miller (1992) have termed “governmental technologies”. Here, a crucial part of the operation of ‘liberal’ government is the ability to develop spaces apparently beyond the realm of the political as a way to “govern ‘at a distance’” (Rose and Miller 1992: 181). In Chapter 2 I situate the public discourse that surrounded the handling of 26/11 in relation to these literatures and in Chapter 5 return to them in trying to understand the GOM’s decision to learn from Israel after 26/11.

This literature on governmental technologies and the privatization of security has
made a number of important contributions to understanding issues around politics and depoliticization in security governance. However, the discussion has been somewhat one-sided. Focusing almost exclusively on how political issues are depoliticized through their rendering as technical problems in need of management, it has spent much less time addressing how security governance gives rise to new forms of politics and dissensus.

Rose and Miller’s approach also presents some conceptual and practical problems. Though helpful in showing how matters of security have become depoliticized through recourse to the calculative activities of various specialists and experts (also see Rose 1993; Rose 1999) this approach upholds the juxtaposition of the ‘politics’ on the one hand and ‘technical’ matters on the other. As a number of scholars have argued, this binary is both empirically untenable and analytically counterproductive in the security field (see Lakoff and Collier 2010; Walters 2011, 2014) and beyond (see Barry 2001; Braun and Whatmore 2010). Most importantly, scholarship on governmental technologies tends to technify our understanding of politics itself by rendering strategies of governing as purely instrumental activities or techniques (Barry 2002: 269-70).

In re-assessing the debates about governmental technologies, the depoliticization of security and the global diffusion of knowhow, policy mobilities scholars have developed some useful avenues. As I have noted above, at the heart of scholarship on policy mobilities and assemblages is a commitment to understanding mobility as social and power-laden. Scholars have also linked forms of policy mobility with the suppression of public dissent (e.g. McCann 2011a: 8; Peck 2011b: 176-8; Peck and Theodore 2010: 206).

As Clarke (2012) has recently argued, there is more to be done here, particularly
in the context of urban governance. As he points out, because most municipalities are generally run on some form of democratic governance structure, urban policy is not simply negotiated among politicians, bureaucrats, and technocrats but also between citizens and their representatives. As Clarke insists, “[a] properly relational geography of urban policy must […] consider not just relationships between municipalities, or between municipalities and national or international governmental organizations, but also relationships between local authorities and their constituents” (Clarke 2012: 34). To this end, he has systematically connected the rise of “anti-politics” (Schedler 1997) with new forms of policy mobility and vice versa.

While there is some variation in how the term is used, “anti-politics” is broadly concerned with active strategies that seek to delimit or close down the space of the political – both within a technical setting and in the sense of a wider deliberative space. Building on a conception of democratic decision-making based on the centrality of language and deliberative process, Schedler (1997: 12-14) frames as “antipolitical” those “efforts to subvert communicative rationality of politics and replace it with other, one-sided forms of rationality” developing a four-fold typology of different anti-political forms. According to Schedler (1996: 293), the notion of anti-politics “hints at much more than simple discontent with current political practices”, instead denoting “a rejection of politics per se” whereby “politics would be replaced by operating principles of other societal spheres of action”.

Following Barry, Hindess, Schedler and others, Clarke (2012: 37) usefully distinguishes between three main anti-political dynamics. First are efforts which aim to “abolish the political domain and vacate the public sphere”, either by imposing forms of
self-regulation as a replacement of collective dilemmas, basing politics on the principle of uniformity (populism, nationalism, etc.) or by foreclosing contingency with a determinative account of all-powerful-external forces (supernatural, market, etc.). Second are those practices and strategies that aim to replace the centrality of a communicative rationality of politics with another. The third aspect of anti-politics can be understood as those practices that attempt to substitute public contestation and disensus with a consensus among a self-disciplined group of ‘stakeholders’, thereby rendering all who fail to self-discipline as fringe extremists.

The anti-politics literature has two crucial implications for my project. First, is the assertion that the practice of politics (in Barry’s and Mouffe’s senses above) often takes place through active strategies to delimit the space of the political. Anti-political tendencies, in other words, should be understood as part of, rather than an alternative to the operation of politics (Barry 2002; Hindess 1997). As such, political and anti-political activities should not be approached as mutually exclusive and pertaining to different realms of action. As Barry (2002: 271-2) emphasizes, “[t]hose engaged in politics are necessarily concerned with the tension and the relation between political and anti-political activity” (emphasis added).

Second, literature on anti-politics is helpful in moving beyond the prevailing focus on depoliticization in terms of ‘rendering technical’ (see Büscher 2010: 34). My focus will not be on showing how issues are stripped of their erstwhile ‘political’ qualities through their rendering as ‘technical’ problems. Instead, I am concerned with trying to understand the “antipolitical motifs and tendencies” (Walters 2004: 33), which characterize the very nature of public debates on security matters. I further explore how
anti-political strategies are used to suppress forms of controversy, contestation and dissensus when they arise.

Building on this scholarship, Chapter 5 explores the anti-political dimensions of governance through ‘best practice’ and seeks to contest the terms of debates on governmental technologies, security and the political. First, following concerns about how the global south is positioned within literature on the urbanization of security and studies of transnational security governance more broadly (Amar 2013; Hönke and Müller 2012), I situate best practices as inventions of local policymakers themselves rather than as coherent policy prescriptions exported from the global north. Second, while investigating the capacity for best practice to act a technology for negotiating political debate around matters of security, I contest the notion that the use of so-called Israeli ‘best practices’ by Mumbai authorities represents an example of technical reform. Third, I suggest that in order to understand the salience of global policy ‘models’ we need to grapple with the performative dimensions of security policymaking in the sense that policy decisions help to constitute policy problems themselves, rather than simply respond to them.

Here I draw on Walters’ (2008) approach to “anti-policy”. As Walters (2008) has argued, it is tempting to see “anti-policy” (such as anti-terrorism, anti-racism, etc.) as a kind of policy that emerges to prohibit, limit or prevent things from occurring. Yet he presents an alternative position by suggesting that anti-policy is not, in fact, a particular variety of policy. It can be better understood, he argues, “as an analytic” or a kind of “sensitizing device” (Walters 2008: 269). It is thus important to draw attention to the “positivity of anti-policy” in the sense that “the objective of negating things frequently
goes hand-in-hand with calling something new into existence” (ibid: 275). As I outline in
Chapter 5, this approach provides a crucial vantage point from which to analyze the
decision to seek expertise from Israel. I draw on Walters’ approach to anti-policy in order
to understand how the policy response to 26/11 has worked to (re)frame the issue of
‘urban security’ in Mumbai after 2008. His approach also presents some important
critical avenues for rethinking the relationship between security policymaking and
depoliticization.

Finally, I draw on the analytic of performativity in order to show how certain
actors gain traction in public discourses on security and become embedded in the events
they describe. As I argued above, existing literature has developed some fruitful ways to
think through the roles of key historical events in underwriting the securitization and
militarization of the urban. They point to a kind of “disaster capitalism” (Klein 2007) at
work whereby preexisting interests mobilize to capitalize on events in order to further
their political and corporate agendas. While insightful, it is important to theorize how it is
that certain events give rise to new forms of policy intervention. Below are some
alternative ways of thinking through and responding to events, which open up new
possibilities for theorizing terroristic events as moments of political upheaval and policy
change.

Wendy Brown (1997) has outlined two possibilities for responding to events. The
first is what she calls “reading events”, namely a careful and detailed retelling of
particular events. The second approach focuses on theorizing the political conditions of
possibility of certain historical moments. As she argues, “there is a world of difference
between reading events and theorizing the conditions and possibilities of political life in a
particular time. Indeed, understanding what the conditions of certain events means for political possibilities may entail precisely decentering the event, working around it, treating it as contingency or symptom” (Brown 1997). Drawing on Brown, Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams (2009: 9) have also shown the importance of “working around” terrorist attacks like the 2005 ‘7/7’ bombings in London to “analyse how they were explained in ways that establish particular practices and forms of sovereign politics that exceed the timings and locations of the events themselves”. These approaches to decentering the event are analytically important for theorizing the conditions of possibility of ‘26/11’ as a moment of historical change and a site of policy intervention. They suggest the need to take events seriously as transformative historical junctures but without assuming their meaning and implications to be obvious or pre-determined.

Andrew Barry’s (2012) concept of “political situations” also proves helpful in addressing how the performance of certain events gives rise to new forms of governance and technical regulation. Responding to a literature on transnational governance, Barry has argued that this body of work has drawn attention to how examples of disasters and failures give rise to the development of new forms of transnational regulation. Yet as he points out, there is an additional need to “address the question of how knowledge of disasters […] is generated” as well as “how such demonstrations of failure are performed and contested” (Barry 2012: 327). In Chapter 2, I draw on these authors to theorize how 26/11 was performed as a ‘failure’ of local capacity and how these performances gave rise to a new politics of urban security, which in turn placed particular public demands on the Indian state.
Conclusion

Taken together, my theoretical approach helps re-invigorate wider critical discussions about the politics and anti-politics of security policy by connecting these debates with issues of transnational governance and mobility. Throughout the chapters that follow, I examine the rationales given by security officials to explain their decisions, exploring how these narratives may be situated in relation to political pressures at the local level. This adds an important analytical dimension to our understanding of urban security trends by taking into account the extent to which the concerns of publics may factor into the considerations of politicians and policymakers. Connecting political contestation and securitizing trends at the urban scale is not only a necessary step to address these lacunae but also opens up a number of important opportunities for critical engagement. In addition to showing in a more precise way how urban security agendas are assembled, I also follow their trajectories to explore if and how they may transform or even potentially break down over time. In the next chapter I return to the story of 26/11 and how the event was scripted as a ‘failure of governance’ and how this representations made the event into a site of politics and policy intervention.
Chapter 2: Performing ‘failure’: The politics of technicality

[You can say that 26/11 is a glamorized melodrama of the rich…[The English language media] are not covering the tragedy, they’re covering an event.⁵

Mumbai Must be Secured. Now!⁶

Introduction

26/11 has been widely cited as a watershed event, both in terms of the strategies of violence it employed and for its various ‘global’ dimensions. Bishop and Roy (2009: 265) go so far as to suggest that it was through the globally televised siege that Mumbai “accomplished for its own self-understanding—perversely and exactly through terrorists’ targeting of it as such—the status of a ‘global’ city”. 26/11 also generated a fierce anti-politician backlash and calls for institutional reform. How the attacks became politically contentious and created new public pressures on the Indian state to ‘secure’ Mumbai from the threat of terrorism, however, remains far from clear. This reflects a broader silence within the literature on the new military urbanism. As I argued in Chapter 1, the broad historical and structural underpinnings of the urbanization of security and its various repressive and marginalizing implications have been duly explored. Yet far less attention has been devoted to how issues of security preparedness actually emerge as matters of public discord or how such controversies might be negotiated at particular sites.

In this chapter I highlight the way that new public demands for ‘security’ were created through 26/11’s scripting as a failure of local capacity. I argue that the handling of 26/11 became politically consequential through the media scripting of the event as a

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⁵ Interview with Kumar Ketkar, April 2013
⁶ Title of 2009 ‘Security Summit’ organized by Mumbai First
technical matter and contestations to define the event’s significance. We can speak of a (geo)politics of failure in two senses: both in relation to how indictments of failure were constituted but also in terms of how they became matters of public discord. I suggest that the parameters and very meaning of failure must be viewed as a terrain of political contestation, the meaning and consequences of which are neither obvious nor predetermined. In doing so I outline what we might think of as the ‘push factors’ driving the GOM’s decision to seek Israeli security expertise: first, by showing how Israeli state officials and security experts shaped the public discourse surrounding the handling of 26/11 and second, by actively exploiting the attacks as an commercial opportunity to expand the role of Israel’s security industry in India.

1. Securitization and/as event

As we have seen in the previous chapter, situations of political crisis emerge as moments of opportunity whereby already existing patterns of urban securitization are deepened and/or accelerated. Yet while scholars have begun to develop a connection between issues of securitization, events and politics, they have done little to theorize how particular historical moments come to be understood as radical points of departure in need of new forms of policy intervention, particular those of a transnational character. Coaffee (2009b: 106) makes some important first steps here by showing how in the wake of an Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing in London in the 1990s “the media, and sections of the business community […] began to suggest that drastic changes should be made to City [of London’s] security”, in particular calling for the adoption of a “Belfast-style scheme”. His study draws attention to the roles of corporate interests and the media
in generating pressure on governments to act decisively as well as shape public imaginations for possible policy interventions following terrorist attacks. Yet considerably more is necessary to problematize these moments of transformation and begin to theorize how they give rise to new kinds of politics and policy debates on matters of urban security.

Following Closs Stephens and Vaughan-Williams (2009: 2), I will not attempt to uncover “what exactly happened” from November 26-28 2008 (emphasis in original). Instead, I explore how the framing of the attack worked to enable certain kinds of politics and policy prescriptions. Here Andrew Barry’s (2012) concept of “political situations” proves helpful. As he argues, “a political situation should be understood as performed or empracticed, whether through the publication of policy statements, news media, public demonstrations and experiments, or in the analytical writings of social scientists” (Barry 2012: 331). As such analyses of political situations become entangled with the events they describe and the controversies to which they give rise. Accordingly, I show how 26/11’s representation as a ‘failure’ opened Mumbai’s security preparedness as a site in need of transnational policy intervention. Before proceeding, however, it is important to first examine the nature of anti-politician backlash to which 26/11 gave rise.

The handling of 26/11 emerged as an object of public dissent in ways that previous incidents of terrorism in Bombay/Mumbai had not. In particular, the event quickly became understood as a ‘failure of governance’, which in turn generated an elite-led anti-politician backlash. While the handling of 26/11 was represented as a technical failure of local capacity, the sources of these alleged deficiencies were framed in much broader terms. As Roy (2009: 316) points out, while the attacks and their aftermath
engendered the rise of elite-based expressions of citizenship through a language of accountability, “[p]aradoxically [...] this particular public articulated its claims through a totalized rejection of ‘politics’, which was conflated with histories of corruption and criminal inefficiency”. The anti-politician sentiment after 26/11 has three distinct characteristics: “it represents an overall disappointment with our politics felt mostly by the urban middle class; it surreptitiously calls for the withdrawal from or distancing from competitive politics; it recommends “tough” measures to combat terrorism; it seeks to “reform” politics” (Palshikar 2008: 10). While this discourse was clearly reductive, as Palshikar argues, “it is the anti-politics tendency more than the tendency towards simplification that requires attention” (ibid: 11).

What is most striking about the fallout from 26/11 is the kind of ‘politics’ to which it gave rise. At the root of the “antipolitician sentiment was a desire for politics as administration” where the ideal of politics was “construed [...] to mean the clean and efficient management of society” (Prakash 2010: 19). For instance, following the conclusion of the attacks, it was suggested that a CEO be appointed to oversee Mumbai’s security preparedness, though this never materialized.

Thus embedded within this antipolitical outrage were prescriptions about what should be done to correct the alleged ‘failure’ of 26/11. These sentiments are well captured under what Barry Hindess (1997) has termed “political antipolitics”. Hindess (1997: 22) argues that anti-politics is often exercised as “a rejection of the world of public affairs”, suggestive of an alternative to politics. There is, however, another less obvious form: “[T]here is also a more directly political antipolitics in which ‘politics’ as a means of conducting public affairs is condemned and some alternative way of conducting
those affairs is proposed is its place. In these cases, a range of activities and institutions known as ‘politics’ is rejected in favor of another kind of politics” (ibid: 22).

This rise of ‘anti-politics’ was not entirely unprecedented, being a residual phenomenon in Indian politics and key repertoire of the Hindu nationalist wave of the 1990s (Blom Hansen 1999: 12) as well as having played a central role in the rise of Shiv Sena in Mumbai (Blom Hansen 2001a). Anti-politics also has important linkages to discourses of corruption in India beyond 26/11, which has re-emerged as a central aspect of the recent anti-corruption movement led by Anna Hazare (Chatterjee 2011b; Gupta 2012). Yet, the way this discourse was articulated and its relation to matters of security post 26/11 does appear to be quite novel in the Indian context.

Moreover, while clearly reflective of the bourgeois nature of urban civil society and its relation to the Indian state as rights-claiming citizens (Chatterjee 2011a), the manner in which these demands for ‘security’ were publicly articulated is quite unusual. As Chattterjee suggests, although this capitalist class holds considerable sway over the conduct of the central and state governments in India, its power is not typically exerted through voting in elections or mass mobilizations; rather it is brought to bear through bureaucratic channels, the influence over state organs like the judiciary, and in the media (ibid: 220). As charges of Indian police incompetence and distain for corruption of politicians are hardly new in India, we need to understand how 26/11 was performed as a technical ‘failure’ and what was new about this performance. In the next section I argue that 26/11’s status as a technical failure was performed by range of interventions of state officials and security ‘experts’ who criticized the handling of the attacks. This representation rendered the issue of ‘urban security’ a technical problem in need of
transnational policy intervention. I focus particular attention on the roles of Israeli state officials, media commentators and self-proclaimed security ‘experts’.

2. Performing failure

The handling of 26/11 by the National Security Guard (NSG) commandos and the Mumbai police was widely ridiculed in the Indian and international media. In trying to explain the apparent ease with which the attackers were able to enter Mumbai uninterrupted and inflict large numbers of casualties, news stories, which presented Indian security authorities as woefully underprepared, focused on a number of technical deficiencies. There was extensive discussion about outdated and faulty protective equipment and weapons used by the Mumbai police such as vintage .303 rifles and .410 muskets, defective bulletproof vests and plastic helmets as well as a lack of adequate emergency preparedness training. As Kaplan (2009: 306) notes, there was prevailing “perception, repeated in innumerable variations in every form of media […] that the local and national forces were tactically and strategically outmatched by a highly mobile and fully networked enemy”. While many of these charges came from Indian journalists and policy commentators, indictments from beyond the country also played a crucial role in framing the attack’s handling as a failure of local capacity. These charges crucially reinforced the ‘global’ character of 26/11 but also the notion that the alleged shortcomings in the response to the attack were attributable to a lack of modern counterterrorism expertise, weapons and technology within India.

Even as 26/11 was unfolding, a range of foreign governments whose citizens were killed in the attacks openly criticized their handling by Indian authorities (McElroy
2008), but none more unabashedly than Israel’s. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who condemned the activities of Indian security personnel, claiming that they were inferior to elite Israeli units, offered humanitarian and intelligence assistance to the Indian government (Katz 2008a). While his offer was not taken up, on November 28, 2008, a group of Israeli forensics experts and a ZAKA team were dispatched to Mumbai (Lappin 2008).7

A number of Israeli officials and security ‘experts’ also began offering up their analysis of the unfolding scenes on live television. Various Israeli security officials expressed their outrage over the commando raid of the Chabad-Lubavitch Jewish center Nariman House, where the assailants killed a number of Israelis. A former commander of the Israeli police’s counterterrorism unit Yamam maintained that “there’s no chance in the world that captives will survive an incident that doesn’t end within minutes of the break-in” (cited in Harel 2008a). Lior Lotan, a former senior officer with the elite Sayeret Matkal unit, was similarly critical of India’s response, claiming that “[w]hen you’re rescuing captives, you enter fast, with maximum force, and try to reach the hostages as quickly as possible, even at the price of casualties” (cited in Harel 2008a). Other Israeli officials, though equally critical of the raid, proposed a different analysis of what allegedly went wrong at Nariman House. A Jerusalem Post article quoted a former Shin Bet official as saying: “In hostage situations, the first thing the forces are supposed to do is assemble at the scene and begin collecting intelligence”, arguing that “In this case, it appears that the forces showed up at the scene and immediately began exchanging fire

7 ZAKA is a voluntary emergency response organization in Israel that was originally developed to assist ambulance crews with the identification of victims of terrorism. ZAKA members, most of whom are Orthodox Jews, help with the gathering of blood and body parts of victims of terrorism and other accidents for proper burial. The organization also claims to have a presence in over 15 countries worldwide (see www.zakarescue.org).
with the terrorists instead of first taking control of the area” (Katz 2008a).

These narratives were soon picked up by Indian and international journalists who ‘read’ the event of 26/11 through the lens of the ‘Israeli experience’ fighting terrorism. As one such article began, “If Israel is grieving the death of its eight citizens in the November 26 attacks in Mumbai, its terror experts cannot help regard it with a sense of déjà-vu. The attacks were a near repeat of the Savoy hotel attacks of March 1975 carried out by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)” (Unnithan 2008).

As an op-ed commenting on the Israeli response to 26/11 summarized: “in typical Israeli fashion, much of the commentary in the media, informally on the street and occasionally in the government has been critical: The operation took too long, it wasn’t professional and, of course, “why didn’t they just let us [Israelis] come in and take care of it”” (Kolben 2008). Indeed, a crucial implication of these criticisms was that India had something to learn from Israel. “Israel’s experience offers some lessons [for India]: Depend on yourself, be willing to face unfair criticism to engage in self-defense, take counterterrorism very seriously, mobilize your citizens as an active warning system and decide when and where to retaliate” (Rubin 2008). Another article further suggested that Israel was looked to by Indian security agencies with a sense of admiration, claiming “Israeli expertise in striking at its enemies across borders and continents was widely envied [by Indian security authorities]” (Bedi and McElroy 2008). Accordingly, India might take 26/11 as an opportunity to become more ‘Israeli’.

A focus on the Israeli intervention into 26/11 reveals a few key things. First, rather than reflecting a sudden ‘awakening’ to India’s shortcomings in security preparedness in the face of ‘global’ terror (as the ‘India’s 9/11’ metaphor implies), the
media representation’s focus on technical failure was in no way a natural or logical deduction of the events that took place. 26/11’s status as a failure was not simply deduced from the pattern of events that took place on 26/11 but actively produced by a range of interventions from various journalists, state officials and security experts. My point here is not that Indian authorities were somehow undeserving of criticism. Rather, it is to emphasize that the conclusion that 26/11 represented a failure was reached in absence of any systematic analysis of how the events took place. Israeli diagnoses were not even consistent with one another, which suggests that it was less than obvious to them what exactly had failed. Certain Israeli commentators even acknowledged that they lacked any inside knowledge about any of the operational tactics being used to by Indian authorities. For instance, retired Israeli Colonel Jonathan Fighel conceded: “I really don’t know what the operational tactics in Mumbai were” (cited in Unnithan 2008). Yet this did not stop him from weighing in on the attacks. As Fighel went on: “From what I have seen on TV, it looks as the assault forces were not equipped with special typical counter terror arms, clothing, night vision, laser viewfinder, ballistic shields, special helmets with communication devices” (cited in Unnithan 2008).

Second, the media discourse surrounding the handling of 26/11 was transnationally constituted from the outset. The rendering of 26/11 as a technical failure of local capacity was defined in relational terms. The conclusion among various media commentators and foreign experts that something had ‘failed’ was formulated in relation to the (unwarranted) counterfactual argument that Western countries, like Israel, would have fared better because of their allegedly superior security knowhow. The suggestion that Indian authorities’ handling of the attacks was primitive and ill-informed gained
force through reference to alleged ‘successful’ handling of terrorism elsewhere. The role
the Israelis was particularly crucial here because of the comparative nature of their
criticisms. While narratives of shared threat and common enemy between India and Israel
against Islamist terrorism predate 2008 (Oza 2007; 2014, Chapter 6), the coverage of
26/11 suggested the emergence of an apparent new consensus that Israel takes terrorism
seriously while India has systematically neglected it.

In dismissing as ‘grossly deficient’ local and national responses, Israeli security
‘experts’ bolstered their position as authoritative sources of expertise within the security
field. Indeed, implicit in Israeli charges of Indian authorities’ incompetence were
comparisons to their own alleged ‘success’ in managing live terror incidents. As one op-
ed pointed out, comparisons between Israel’s experience fighting terrorism and 26/11
were deeply misleading by rendering very disparate attacks as somehow comparable and
obscuring Israel’s own failed efforts to respond to live terror events in the past (Pedahzur
2008). In fact, Lior Lotan was himself one of the mission commanders of an unsuccessful
attempt to rescue an IDF soldier Nachshon Wachsman in 1994. Yet while comparisons
between India and Israel were misleading in any number of ways, what is important for
my purposes here is what these statements imply. When juxtaposed against the alleged
‘failure’ of 26/11 the ‘Israeli experience’ fighting terrorism appears as an undisputed
success story worthy of emulation.

The allegations of Indian incompetence by Israelis were nakedly self-serving and
played an important role in legitimating the use of Israeli security experts into post-26/11
Mumbai (see below). It is important to emphasize here how the Israeli intervention

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8 Wachsman was ultimately killed by his Hamas captors as a result of that operation. Lior Lotan was
appointed as the IDF’s spokesman in 2011.
shaped the discourse surrounding the handling of the attacks. Israeli criticisms shaped the public discourse surrounding the handling of the attacks in two important ways. First, they actively contributed to the very notion that 26/11 represented a failure of local capacity in Mumbai. In doing so, the Israeli intervention helped to frame the policy discourse surrounding 26/11 as a matter of technique. Second, the Israeli officials’ statements introduced a set of comparisons between an ‘Israeli way’ of handling terrorism and an ‘Indian’ one, situating Israel as a ‘model’ for India to emulate, which has been a recurring theme in policy debates since 2008 (see Chapter 5). In doing so, these representations helped to conjure a new policy ‘problem’ that did not exist as such beforehand. This was the dual notion that the security ‘failure’ of 26/11 was attributable to a lack of ‘hard’, ‘modern’ approaches to security and that these deficiencies could be remedied by seeking foreign expertise. This helps to explain why post-26/11 policy debates have been so heavily focused on learning from the experiences of Western countries and the imperative to adopt so-called ‘hard’ approaches to the management of terrorist threats.

Thus while Israeli representations of 26/11 were misleading, it is unhelpful to simply say that 26/11 ‘didn’t happen’ in the way that it was portrayed in the media. As Patton (1997) argues, “[i]t is not plausible to claim that events are reducible to their representations, but it is equally implausible to claim that events and their representations are entirely distinct from one another”. Yet rather than presenting Israeli indictments of incompetency as settled and stable, it is important to approach the framing of 26/11 as a ‘failure’ as a site of contestation. As Patton (1997) further points out, “event attributions do not simply describe or report pre-existing events, they help to actualize particular
events in the social field. That is why politics frequently takes the form of struggle over
the appropriate description of events”. As I explore next, the inflammatory nature of
Israeli criticisms of Indian authorities gave rise to struggles over the meaning of ‘26/11’,
thereby helping to make the issue of ‘urban security’ politically contentious in new ways.

3. Becoming ‘political’

So how did the 2008 attacks emerge as a source of pressure on the Indian state to
‘act’ on matters of ‘urban security’? One approach might be to determine what (if
anything) was specific about the nature of the targets of attacks in relation to previous
instances of terroristic violence in Bombay/Mumbai. Others have emphasized that in
addition to being India’s first terrorist incident covered on live television, 26/11 was also
the first to specifically target elites and foreigners. As Sassen (2010: 41) argues, “the real
dramatic impact of the Mumbai attacks was that they struck symbolic sites of the
cosmopolitan and transnational elite”. This led some to suggest that the unusual public
response “could be [explained by] the fact that this time, terror hit a section of [Indian]
society that has always felt secure” (Sharma 2008: 14).

Undeniably the targeting of elites distinguished the attacks from previous ones
and helped to make them a subject of international concern. Yet the suggestion that 26/11
became politically consequential simply because it implicated elite sites and foreigners
would imply that the repercussions of 26/11 follow straightforwardly from facts on the
ground. This is clearly not the case. For instance, while the targeting of foreigners at
luxury hotels was widely portrayed by the media as the defining feature of 26/11, which
distinguished 26/11 from other instances of terrorism in Bombay/Mumbai, the vast
majority of its victims were actually Indian nationals. Although live television images of
the burning Taj hotel became the defining image, more people were killed and injured at
Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) railway station than at any other single site. The
key point, then, is not that the attacks targeted foreigners or elites per se but rather that
this targeting exposed handling of 26/11 to foreign criticism. As one news article noted,
“Indians are used to their Government’s chaotic approach to security, but [26/11 was] the
first terrorist attack on their soil to target foreigners on such a large scale has exposed it
to international scrutiny for the first time” (Page 2008). In other words, 26/11 “added a
new global dimension to Indian ‘terrorist threat’ perceptions” (Kolås 2010: 83).

Attributing the backlash to the nature of the attack’s targets also leaves a number
of important questions uninvestigated, particularly regarding the potential reasons why
highly technical matters emerged as flashpoints of public anger and dissent. As Lakoff
and Collier (2010) have convincingly argued, the conditions that allow for material
objects to become political must be clearly specified rather than taken for granted. In
analyzing security trends from a critical perspective “what is important to specify is how,
at a given moment […] technical artifacts […] are taken up as problems of collective
existence: according to what rationality, and with what aim, do material things become
political?” (Lakoff and Collier 2010: 244, emphasis in original). In the remainder of this
section I develop some answers to this question by showing how the production of 26/11
as a technical failure opened up a new politics of urban security. I do so by developing

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9 The lone surviving assailant of 26/11 Ajmal Kasab and his partner Ismail Khan entered CST on the
evening of November 26, 2008, first strategically placing timed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at
certain locations around the station and then proceeding indiscriminately fire at commuters with their AK-
47 rifles as well as throwing hand grenades resulting in 58 dead and 104 injured. They were eventually
confronted by Mumbai police officers and security personnel, which eventually forced Kasab and Khan to
flee the station. No foreign nationals were killed or wounded at CST during 26/11.
the relationship between the production of 26/11 as a technical failure and the event’s emergence as a political situation.

As noted above, Israeli criticisms of Indian authorities generated knowledge about what took place during 26/11. In doing so these actions clearly depoliticized the issue of ‘security’ by rendering it as a technical problem to be managed (see for instance Leander and van Munster 2007; Leander 2010, 2011). At the same time Israeli criticisms clearly politicized the issue of security preparedness in important ways. For instance, in ridiculing the operation of the Chabad house as incompetent, certain Israeli authorities insinuated that the NSG had Israeli blood on its hands. Without any forensic evidence to back up his claims, Haim Weingarten, the head of the ZAKA team that travelled to Mumbai declared: “Based on what I saw, [although] I can’t identify the type of bullets in the bodies [of the victims], I don’t think the terrorists killed all the hostages, to put it gently” (cited in Lappin 2008). These comments, which were anything but “gentle”, in turn provoked a fierce response from Indian Foreign Ministry officials who accused the ZAKA team of “selling all kinds of stories to journalists looking for stories, and taking credit for things they didn’t do” (cited in Keinon 2008). Enraged by the public nature of the Israeli criticism, Indian officials shot back with remarks calling Israeli indictments of incompetence “an embarrassment for them [the Israelis]” (cited in Keinon 2008). Some worried that with “all the negative chatter in Israel will only lead to a wasted opportunity for building up support and unity” between the two countries (Kolben 2008). Indeed, Israeli officials soon realized that such criticisms were getting out of hand, potentially threatening the countries’ close bilateral relationship.

Israeli state representatives therefore shifted into damage control, issuing
conciliatory statements that praised the bravery of Indian security forces. Israeli President Shimon Peres wrote an open letter to his Indian counterpart declaring that Israel “very much” appreciated the heroism of Indian security forces “despite the adverse conditions and casualties” suffered during the operations (cited in BBC Monitoring South Asia 2008). Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert similarly praised the “brave response and determination” of the Indian forces (cited in Keinon 2008). Olmert also emphasized India’s cooperation and bilateral dialogue with Israeli officials throughout the attacks, going on to note that Israel “would be happy to provide any and all information or specific assistance that we might be asked to give” (cited in Haaretz.com 2008). Both Olmert and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made statements pledging increased counter-terror coordination between their countries in the attacks’ wake. So what may have become a serious diplomatic flashpoint between two allies was quickly smoothed over, with high-level officials working swiftly to repair the strained bilateral relations.

At this point, however, the damage to the Indian political establishment was already done. Through their incendiary charges of technical incompetence, Israeli criticisms made highly technical matters of police modernization and security preparedness into objects of public concern by framing the issue of ‘security’ in terms of its mismanagement by governmental authorities. A key implication of this narrative was that 26/11 could have (and would have) turned out very differently had the issue of security preparedness been taken more seriously. This in turn promoted questions about why security not been taken seriously by the Indian state. The answer came almost immediately. As one editorial pointed out, “A few hours after the attacks began, commentators and senior journalists on television zeroed in on those whom they
considered the main culprits: our incompetent, self-serving politicians” (EPW 2008:7). So while the handling of 26/11 was framed as a narrow technical matter, the sources of these alleged deficiencies were represented in much broader terms.

To be clear, Israeli criticisms played no direct role in linking the issue of preparedness to the issue of corruption. This was done almost exclusively by Indian media commentators and security experts, who concluded: “India lacked the technical capability to combat terrorism because of bickering between political leaders” (Page 2008). What Israeli indictments of incompetence contributed to was the suggestion that the alleged mishandling of security responses to the 26/11 attacks could be reducible to a matter of modern technical capability and, by extension, that things could have been different. So while the rendering of an issue as technical is typically associated with taking matters outside of the political through the calculative activities of experts (Rose 1993, 1999; Rose and Miller 1992), the dynamics I am tracing here seem indicative of a far more complicated and challenging picture, whereby issues of security are depoliticized in certain respects but also highly politicized in others (see Walters 2008: 282). I therefore argue that experience can be understood as a process of what I call de/politicization. On the one hand the simplistic scripting of the attacks as a technical failure served to frame issues of ‘security’ in an incredibly reductive way. Yet this same portrayal also allowed issues of police modernization and security preparedness to emerge as issues of urgent public concern. At issue here, however, is not simply the potential limits of technical expertise, whereby issues previously located as technical are then re-posed in political terms. My concern is instead about how the production of ‘failure’ as a technical matter gave rise to a new kind of politics of security in India.
Here Barry provides key insights into understanding the nature of the backlash that followed the attacks. As he points out, the notion of political situations highlights that “the significance of a controversy is not so much determined by its specific focus” and must instead “be conceived in terms of its relations to a moving field of other controversies, conflicts and events”, both past and future (Barry 2012: 330). We can see this dynamic at play in relation to the kinds of politics that 26/11 produced. While the elite-led backlash was triggered by condemnations of the Indian response to the attacks, this controversy merged into broader public dissatisfaction with Indian ‘politics’ as a whole associated with longstanding discourses on corruption in India.

The central importance of international voices like the Israelis in these developments reflects Akhil Gupta’s seminal argument about discourses of corruption in relation to the Indian state. As he convincingly argues, “discourses of corruption (and hence of accountability) are from the very beginning articulated in a field formed by the intersection of many different transnational forces” (Gupta 2006: 230). Similarly, I want to argue that the anti-political backlash, which 26/11 gave rise to, is inextricable from event’s various ‘global’ dimensions.

4. Capitalizing on calamity

As we have seen, Israeli criticisms of how Indian authorities handled the 2008 attacks actively contributed to making 26/11 politically contentious. Israeli state officials’ criticisms of Indian authorities further introduced a set of comparisons between an ‘Israeli way’ of handling terrorism and an ‘Indian’ one, thereby promoting the idea that some singular ‘Israeli approach’ or HLS ‘model’ might offer a potential solution to an alleged lack of such expertise in India. By ‘daring to compare’ the ‘failure’ of 26/11 with
their own ‘success’, Israeli actors were able to gain traction as legitimate sources of authority. In both of these respects the Israeli intervention played an important role in shaping imaginations about what happened during 26/11 and the kinds of policies that might be used in responding to it after 2008, issues to which I will return in Chapters 5 and 6. In addition to shaping the discourse surrounding 26/11, however, Israel’s security and weapons industry seized on the event as an opportunity to expand its role in the Indian marketplace.

As we have seen, following the conclusion of 26/11, the initial Israeli criticism immediately shifted to a more conciliatory tone. Some noted that this turn could be attributed to the fact that by 2008 Israel was already one of India’s main military suppliers and many lucrative defense deals at the national level risked being lost (Katz 2008; Peraino 2008). In addition to their efforts at reducing bilateral tensions, however, Israeli trade officials soon declared their intention to exploit 26/11 as a key commercial opportunity to expand the activities of the Israeli security industry in India. An article published on December 3, 2008 in the Israeli business newspaper Globes stated: “The Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute (IEICI) believes that Israel […] could benefit from India’s misfortune”, speculating that the attacks might spurn a spike in demand for Israeli security solutions. It quotes IEICI chairman David Arzi as saying: “Presumably, because of what has happened [on 26/11], the Indians will allocate more funding for the purchase of sophisticated anti-terrorism security equipment, such as warning systems, cameras, control systems, electronic systems and more. Israelis sell them to the Indians anyway, but there’s always room to sell more” (cited in Peretz 2008). In a subsequent article Avi Hefetz, former CEO of the IEICI, recalls that as he watched
the attacks unfold, “I thought to myself, if we have the state-of-the-art technology, the defense know-how and our considerable experience gained throughout the intifadas, why not organize a platform for displaying our technologies in this field?” (cited in Sanders and Sobelman 2010). Led by Hefetz, the IEICI launched the 1st India-Israel HLS Cooperation Forum, held in Mumbai March 16-19, 2009. Guy Zuri, the Former Director of Aerospace, Defense and HLS at the IEICI, also told me that following 26/11 it was Israeli authorities that approached the GOM, subsequently arranging an official delegation of Mumbai police and Maharashtra state officials to visit Tel Aviv in 2009.\(^\text{10}\)

Taken together, then, such efforts can be seen as a very deliberate effort by Israel’s HLS industry to capitalize on the unfolding political crisis.

In light of critical discussions about the tendency of the global security industry to exploit political crises as a source of profit (Chapter 1), Israeli efforts to capitalize on 26/11 are hardly unexpected. What this chapter adds to these discussions, however, is how the potential benefactors of political crises may be involved in their very constitution as moments of change and sites of policy intervention.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have argued that ‘failure’ is not an obvious and self-evident descriptor by showing that there is a (geo)politics to the representation of 26/11 as such. This follows the broader emphasis of critical scholars in trying to deconstruct historical moments like 9/11 as unproblematic events with singular inherent meaning (see Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 8). Yet it is equally important to theorize how these events emerge as sites of controversy and work to effect policy change. Here I have argued that

\(^\text{10}\) Interview with Guy Zuri, August 2012
the production of 26/11 as a technical failure was a key catalyst for public outrage regarding the issue of security preparedness in Mumbai. The reasons 26/11 mattered in novel ways is not because something did or did not objectively ‘fail’ (if this can even be known) but rather because of the particular manner through which allegations of failure are articulated and by whom these allegations are made. The event’s status as a site of policy intervention emerged through struggles to define its meaning, which in turn produced new terrains of controversy. Finally, I have drawn attention to how the event of 26/11 was actively exploited by Israel’s HLS industry as a moment of opportunity to expand their activities in India.

The Israeli intervention into 26/11 also reveals somewhat of a puzzle. On the one hand, the Israeli prerogative (and ability) to comment on the handling of 26/11 attacks reflects Israel’s dominant position as a source of expertise on matters of HLS and counter-terrorism. As Agnew (2007: 139) points out, “what knowledge becomes ‘normalized’ or dominant and what is marginalized has something to do with who is doing the proposing and where they are located”. Yet this does not mean that the Israeli’s authority to speak on 26/11 arose organically. My focus on the deliberate attempts by Israeli officials to situate Israeli security knowhow as a policy solution to the attacks reveals that the relationship between 26/11 and the ‘Israeli experience’ fighting terrorism was not, in fact, obvious or natural. This link had to be actively made. In certain respects the Israeli intervention into 26/11 is quite specific. Yet as we will see next, it reveals something critical about the ways in which the so-called ‘Israeli experience’ fighting terrorism has been has been constructed as a global policy model.
Chapter 3: Mobility and the model: Policy mobility and becoming of Israel’s homeland security dominance

Look...Israel’s got a lot of expertise of terrorism. [But] I think even the British police [had experience] with the Irish...and the Spanish with the Basques, Sri Lankans also could have [expertise]...Anybody who has an experience of dealing with terrorism, I suppose...would be able to give you some inputs that you may have missed. It’s fine...I don’t think that there is anything wrong in that. Even in India we have Punjab. The police in Punjab have been dealing with terrorists...so they could tell them [the Mumbai police] how it was fought.11

Introduction

During my fieldwork in India I spoke with a number of current and former police and government officials, some of whom had intimate knowledge of the post-26/11 policy process while others did not. Julio Ribeiro, who served as Bombay Police Commissioner from 1982-5, belongs to the latter group. Ribeiro is known as a ‘Super Cop’ particularly for his role in fighting Sikh terrorism in Punjab and he remains an important public figure in Mumbai, writing in leading dailies on policing and security issues. While his remarks tell us nothing specific about the reasons why the Maharashtra government decided to learn from Israel after 26/11, I found them striking because they pose a simple yet almost never asked question: how is it that, despite the global ubiquity of terrorism, certain countries come to be seen as having useful practical expertise to impart to the world whereas others seem to have little to offer?

The default answer, of course, would be that Israel has succeeded in its fight against terrorism where others have failed. Yet even advocates of Israeli security approaches dispute such a simplistic view, conceding that Israeli authorities have “bungled operations” in the past and pointing out that the country’s history of protracted conflict might itself appear as “a stunning failure” (Byman 2011: 3). This suggests that there is no simple answer as to why certain countries are looked at as security exemplars

11 Interview with Julio Ribeiro, Mumbai, January 2013
and others not. Yet in this chapter I will suggest that this question deserves closer attention than it has received within security studies to date. Although Ribeiro may be correct that there is no obvious reason not to learn from the experiences of others, his remarks gesture to another important point: there is no obvious reason why some countries are held up as success stories and others not.\(^\text{12}\)

As I pointed out in Chapter 1, the literature on the urbanization of security has paid some attention to the geographic movement of security expertise in trying to understand the growing tactical similarities in policing and counter-terror practices across a range of major cities around the world. Yet there has been limited attention to understanding how certain policies, practices or even places are constituted as models for others to emulate. Responding to this gap, this chapter seeks to better understanding how Israel has built its status as a global HLS leader.

Building on policy mobilities literature, I show that bound up with the development of an Israeli HLS ‘model’ is the constitution of an audience, which is central to giving these approaches their global appeal and respective political force. I draw on the policy mobilities framework to position the production and mutation of Israeli security knowhow alongside its legitimation and geographic movement.\(^\text{13}\) I argue that Israeli claims to HLS dominance are realized through their encounters beyond

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\(^{12}\) This point is repeatedly emphasized within a RAND report on urban warfare (Fair 2004), which notes that although the Sikh insurgency against the Indian state in the 1980s far outstripped other terrorist campaigns around the world in terms of deaths (claiming over 21,000 lives) it also represents an unusual case of a state managing to entirely eliminate a militant movement. The report therefore recommends leaning lessons from this ‘Indian experience’ to inform US military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

\(^{13}\) The kinds of security ‘solutions’ that the Israeli HLS industry promotes abroad include material technologies such as weapons and surveillance equipment as well as a wide range of security practices and policies for population and spatial control. However, the strategies used to mobilize these HLS ‘solutions’ do not follow any clear divide between technologies and policies, particularly given that many Israeli HLS firms are involved in the development and promotion of both, often in combination with one another. For the purposes of analyzing Israel’s position as an HLS ‘model’ I will therefore not focus on the distinction between policy and technology, though this is not to equate them.
Israel/Palestine in ways that stabilize their security practices as global models. Critically reflecting on how Israel’s security policies come to be seen as universal and mobile unsettles the notion that Israel’s status as an HLS leader represents a straightforward outgrowth of the country’s national specificity as well as the idea that its authoritative position exists as a stable professional consensus. By drawing attention to the kinds of messages and strategies used to cement its ‘leadership’ credentials in the remaining part of this chapter, I locate Israeli HLS dominance as a dynamic and still emergent process of “becoming” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Connolly 2011), where its HLS ‘solutions’ are “regarded as complex and evolving social constructions rather than as concretely fixed objects” (Peck and Theodore 2012: 23). This point is critical as it allows us to better understand the elusive flexibility of Israeli security ‘solutions’ on the move, whilst helping to constitute the misleading singularity of an ‘Israeli approach’ to HLS.

1. Israel as HLS capital

Israel’s status as a leader in HLS and counter-terrorism is now widely acknowledged, particularly in urban environments. Yet, how can we understand this apparent ‘success’? How have the Israelis managed to cement their leadership status in this field and what might this achievement signify? The existing literature has positioned the rise of the industry as an outgrowth of certain domestic processes specific to Israel’s historical, political and cultural development. These accounts, which overlap with accounts of Israel’s development as a high technology hub (e.g. Breznitz 2005), have focused much of their attention on the importance of the so-called Israeli “Security Network” and its role in civil-military relations within Israel (Barak and Sheffer 2006,
The focus on this informal policy network draws attention to “the increased penetration of active and retired personnel of the security sector into most of the civilian sphere” (Barak and Sheffer 2010: 25). Barak and Sheffer (2006: 240) argue that this network’s control of resources and its corporate influence in Israel has shaped the country’s approach to foreign policy and its general “global orientation” by forging close security/defense relationships with other states.

Building on this approach, Neve Gordon (2009, 2011) provides an incisive and detailed account of Israel’s HLS industry. His work makes a major contribution in mapping the key actors within Israel’s HLS industry as well as pointing out the unique features that differentiate the country’s security and high tech industries from those of other states. He shows how Israel’s colonial practices of occupation and militarism are (re)produced, diversified and entrenched by the industry. Most important for my purposes here is Gordon’s approach to understanding how the so-called ‘Israeli experience’ of fighting terrorism is commodified and projected outward to an international clientele. There is insufficient space here to engage with the full breadth of Gordon’s analysis. My intention here is instead to build on one aspect of his work and extend it further. In other words, Gordon’s (2009) analysis ends where mine begins, on the question of why after 9/11 Israel’s militaristic experience of fighting terrorism, which is widely known for its negative repercussions, has become increasingly popular among policymakers and politicians around the world.

Gordon (2011) attributes Israel’s rise as an “HLS capital” to a range of factors, historical, technological and symbolic, which give Israeli HLS products and services important advantages in a global marketplace. Of particular importance is Israel’s alleged
capacity to “test” its products in real-world environments (Graham 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Li 2006; Weizman 2012). As Gordon (2011: 162) argues, “[t]he ability to test the products serves two important goals. First, it allows the companies to improve their goods through trial and error. Second, it enables the companies to establish or demonstrate some “truth” about their products and services, which both “certifies” them and provides them with credit”. Moreover, “this experience also engenders a regime of truth involving the management and control of populations that resonates among certain politicians and institutions particularly after 9/11” (Gordon 2009: 42). Taken together, these factors have helped to position Israelis as global security leaders as well as to perpetuate and extend the very kind of dangerous world they claim to help remedy.

While making an essential contribution to understanding the rise of Israel’s security industry, the existing critical literature tends to give the impression that Israeli firms operate from a uniquely privileged position of authority, based particularly on its underlying militarism. However, this portrayal also poses certain limitations. First, it places undue emphasis on the capacity of the ‘Israeli brand’ to sell itself. Second, it suggests that this ‘brand’ has a singular and inherent meaning. Finally, it overplays the role of experimental testing in the constitution of Israel as an HLS model.

It is clear that the ‘Israeli experience’ and its claims to real-world experimentation play an important role in the marketing strategies of individual firms and the success of the industry as a whole. Often drawing directly on such narratives, most Israeli HLS representatives I spoke with commented on the importance of the strong reputation of the Israeli ‘brand’ in promoting their products and services. As Guy Zuri, Former Director of Aerospace, Defense and HLS at the IEICI explained, “in homeland security,
Israel…comes as a brand. This is [the] advantage. You know, when you are saying Nike, everybody has some opinion about the product. [It] Doesn’t matter if the…product is very good or not”.\textsuperscript{14} Many other representatives also talked about providing ‘references’—that is, physical ‘test sites’ such as Ben Gurion Airport and the so-called ‘security fence’ around Gaza and much of Israel. These were shown to potential clients to physically ‘verify’ their efficacy.

While many contractors I spoke with agreed that the widespread awareness of the Israeli brand was crucial in certain respects, they also qualified its significance in a number of ways. They often portrayed the process of selling their products and services as an ongoing challenge, repeatedly citing the importance of hard work in securing new customers. They also stressed that the potential advantage of the Israeli brand is hardly a guarantee of anything. As noted in Chapter 2, Israeli officials actively weighed in on the handling of 26/11 by criticizing Indian authorities, thereby helping to carve out a role for Israeli ‘solutions’ within the policy response. Their ability to speak authoritatively on the crisis reflected their already existing position as global security experts. At the same time, this episode suggests that something more than the power of the ‘Israeli brand’ was necessary to position Israel as a viable ‘solution’ to 26/11.

Through their accounts of selling to international clients, a number of Israeli representatives I spoke with made a similar point. Even well-established firms referred to the necessity of persistence in trying to make their firms known within an increasingly dense and competitive field of purveyors. As one such contractor put it, “Look…we…Israelis, are…very pushy…I don’t want to say aggressive…[but] We are

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Guy Zuri, August 2012
doing fieldwork...looking for opportunities...trying to be in field...as much as possible”.\textsuperscript{15}

Closely related to this, many representatives focused on the importance of maintaining their presence in global security forums like international trade expos, less for signing deals with new customers than for generating and maintaining their global visibility. When I asked one CEO how his company goes about entering new markets, he stressed: “Only [by] being there. Fly there, be there” noting that foreign clients “have to see you there [in their countries]”.\textsuperscript{16} The crucial point, then, is that the ‘Israeli brand’ is clearly not a substitute for the hard work of selling Israeli security solutions. Moreover, to become visible as global sources of expertise, Israeli actors told me, they needed to travel abroad.

More unexpectedly, representatives cited a range of specific problems that they must (to varying degrees) negotiate as part of their promotional strategies. As Gordon (2009: 47) notes, the decision to leverage the Israeli “experience” in repressing Palestinians “has the potential to become a double edged sword”. This problem, however, is more than hypothetical. Although a number of representatives maintained that being an Israeli company was an asset in general, they claimed that in certain circumstances this status equally acts as a barrier to sales. As one marketing director explained, although being an Israeli company can be useful in attracting new customers, “I don’t push it...because some people don’t like it. Even though they respect Israeli technology, there’s...unfortunately, a lot of bad press about Israel”.\textsuperscript{17} Thus despite the widespread agreement that the Israeli ‘brand’ bestows greater credibility on its companies’ products and services in general, industry voices insisted that its value is not unequivocal. For

\textsuperscript{15} Interview with Anonymous 1, August 2012
\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Uzi More, August 2012
\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Martin Kowen, July 2012
instance, numerous firms claimed that in selling to certain countries their Israeli status must be disguised through the use of third parties or subsidiaries.

There also seems to be a particular geography to the salience of the ‘Israeli brand’. As one representative summarized: “In Africa it doesn’t matter, in India...it helps a lot because Israeli companies are appreciated there...but in Europe...you have to camouflage it”. In this way, the Israeli reputation was positioned as a variable rather than a given within firms’ marketing approaches, with differential importance depending on the target market at hand. In the case of India, the warming of diplomatic relations since the 1990s and the increasingly close defense ties at the national level clearly helped Israeli actors to sell their services to Indian state agencies. Yet it is also important not to push the importance of bilateral ties too far, particularly because, as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, Israeli efforts to enter the Indian HLS market have faced considerable challenges.

The role of experimental real-world testing is also more ambiguous than scholarship on Israel’s HLS industry would suggest. As I have pointed out, existing accounts present Israel’s position as an HLS leader as derived from the country’s historical development and its colonial occupation of Palestine, the ‘products’ of which are then projected outward to international customers. A number of the firms with which I spoke explained much of their own development in these terms but this was by no means the rule. I spoke with companies like Athena GS\(^3\), which as matter of corporate policy does not work within Israel. Nor do all products developed by the ‘Israeli experience’ become export commodities. For instance, after describing the characteristics of his company's bomb shelters and modular building fortification systems, one

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\(^{18}\) Interview with Rami Zarchi, August 2012
Marketing Director interestingly noted, “in this case I have to admit that most of those products are specifically Israeli…products”, meaning that they were developed for domestic use only and had little appeal elsewhere. Accordingly, not all Israeli HLS solutions become export commodities nor do all Israeli HLS companies working abroad necessarily supply to the domestic market prior to ‘going global’. While the domesticity of Israeli HLS solutions may help to facilitate their export abroad, this same quality can equally act as a barrier to their mobility.

There are a number of reasons to reject the narrative of moving from the perfection of Israeli HLS solutions ‘at home’ to selling abroad. Furthermore, specifying the conditions that make Israeli HLS firms outward looking is not the same thing as addressing how the ‘Israeli experience’ fighting terrorism has come to be understood as an exemplar to be adopted elsewhere. So without disputing the specificity of Israel’s historical experience, I suggest that the regime of truth surrounding its security knowhow still requires greater qualification.

In building on existing critical literature, I reconsider the basic terms through which Israel’s rise as a policy exemplar might be understood. While making essential contributions, existing accounts demonstrate a number of important conceptual deficiencies. In particular, they attribute an independent force to certain messages based on an essentialized meaning of their claims and status as Israeli companies. Closely related to this, they problematically assume a prior existing (external) audience against which such claims are adjudged, which in turn receives these messages in a consistent manner. Finally, while drawing attention to various ‘international’ considerations that help Israeli firms to sell abroad, existing accounts position these as enabling conditions of

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19 Interview with Anonymous 2, July 2012
HLS security solutions that already exist as naturally mobile objects.

As I argue below, understanding how Israel has cultivated its claims to represent universal security knowhow requires an understanding of mobility that goes beyond this literalist frame. Rather than framing the industry as something that has chosen to ‘go global’ after perfecting HLS doctrines ‘at home’, my approach seeks to show how the constitution of policies as mobile objects is bound up with the creation of an external market or audience. So in addition to Gordon’s focus on how the specificity of Israel helps to differentiate its goods and services from other competitors, I am concerned with understanding how Israel’s distinctiveness as a producer of security knowhow is constituted relationally by “rethinking difference through connection” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 8, emphasis in original). In the next section, I begin to do this by illustrating how the Israeli HLS industry has worked to cultivate its status as a policy model by performing this audience into being.

2. Becoming mobile

What kinds of factors should we consider in developing an understanding of how Israeli HLS solutions have come to be viewed as universal and mobile? Of course, the very idea of Israel as a global security leader clearly implies that Israeli approaches are not simply superior but also universally applicable. Yet one of the essential paradoxes of the status of Israel as an HLS capital is that its own ‘experience’ in fighting terrorism seems to have little in common with the security environments of the countries to which it exports its ‘solutions’ (see Chapters 5-6). Industry insiders acknowledge this basic problem. Despite the industry’s claims of being innovators in the HLS field, the
contractors I spoke with typically did not suggest that security approaches developed in/for Israel had an inherent universal appeal. As Athena GS’s CEO Omer Laviv bluntly put it, “no security professional—Israeli professional—really believes that [what] we use here for a certain problem will be valid for another place...We are aware that we have unique circumstances”. Following this, he and other representatives stressed the need to adapt their Israeli ‘prototypes’ to the needs of foreign clients.

In other words, my basic analytical starting point is the premise that the so-called ‘Israeli approach’ to HLS has no singular essence nor can it be assumed to be somehow inherently universal or mobile. As McCann (2011a: 109) points out, it is important to avoid “fetishizing policies as naturally mobile objects”. Accordingly, the analytical task at hand is to understand how exactly Israel has managed to cultivate its implicit claims to universality, however misrepresentative these may turn out to be. Before proceeding to develop an account of how the problem of relevancy is overcome by the Israeli HLS industry, however, it is important to consider how Israel became linked to 9/11 in the first place because this connection is far from natural or obvious.

It is now common sense to think about the Israel/Palestine conflict as part of the global war on terror; not least because of the regime of truth that Gordon describes. The decision by the George W. Bush administration to frame the war on terror as a global war has been highly successful in collapsing what might otherwise be understood as highly specific ‘local’ conflicts into a common ‘global’ frame. Yet this does not mean that the very real differences in policing and security practices between geographical contexts suddenly ceased to matter (see Chapters 5-6). It is also crucial to recall that the Israel’s connection to 9/11 was hardly natural or obvious. As Derek Gregory (2004) points out,

20 Interview with Omer Laviv, August 2012
early attempts by Israeli state officials to draw parallels between 9/11 and the Israel/Palestine conflict were actively rebuffed by the Bush administration, which at the time had strained relations with Israel. Despite these initial challenges, Gregory shows how then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was able to cynically manipulate 9/11—both as a distraction from the intensified pattern of illegal settlement activity and a pretext to further militarize the occupation. Despite the longstanding geopolitical reasons for US-Israel rapprochement, “what gave this reaffirmation its teeth—what gave it both voice and bite—was a series of parallels between the imaginative geographies deployed by America in its military assault on Afghanistan and those deployed by Israel in its military operations in the occupied territories of Palestine” (Gregory 2004: 117). The critical implication of Gregory’s claims is that it was through the consolidation of these imaginative geographies linking the Israel/Palestine conflict with the US-led war on terror that Israeli security knowhow has increasingly come to be conceived of as ‘applicable’ beyond Israel/Palestine. That is, to be thought of as ‘global’ knowledge, the ‘Israeli experience’ needs to be imagined as part of the war on terror and in order to be thought of as an HLS exemplar, Israel needs to be positioned not simply as a part of this war but rather as a precursor to it.

One strategy employed by Israeli HLS firms to distinguish themselves from other potential competitors is to claim the entire field of HLS as an Israeli invention. An important pattern I observed during my interactions with Israeli HLS officials was the tendency to equate security per se with the ‘Israeli experience’. That is, rather than merely staking claims to superiority within a broader field of security experts, some contractors argued that Israel invented the very notion of security. For instance, when I
asked a Magal S3 representative what gave Israeli firms their advantage over non-Israeli competitors, he responded that security in general should be thought of as an Israeli notion “because Israel is surrounded by enemies...our way of life is security”.21 A number of other representatives also more subtly policed the boundaries between what security ‘really’ is (and isn’t), recounting anecdotes of how they faced all kinds of misconceptions about what it means to ‘do’ security correctly with their clients abroad, arguing that many required a (re)education about the true meaning of security, which is one based on the Israeli experience. This dynamic has been recognized by Gordon (2009: 42) who points out that “[t]he grim experience…creates the art of homeland security, and […] the art of homeland security (re)produces the grim experience”. Yet Gordon devotes little attention to how Israel’s basic relevance to contexts beyond Israel/Palestine is constituted or how its global audience actually comes into being. To this end I suggest that it is also important to consider how the very relevance of Israel’s experiences is established vis-à-vis the world at large.

In speaking about their work, Israeli HLS representatives frequently compared the security experiences of Israel and other countries in ways that sought to position Israel as an innovator ahead of its time. For instance, referring to challenges faced by the US Government forays into the Islamic world during the war on terror, Leo Gleser, founder of International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) explained: “These things now the people understand. [What] Happened to us 30 years ago others are facing this just now”.22 As his firm’s brochure boldly proclaims, the company has been “fighting and winning the war on crime and terror since 1982” (http://isds.co.il).

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21 Interview with Yehonatan Ben-Hamozeg, July 2012
22 Interview with Leo Gleser, July 2012
So while maintaining that 9/11 has heightened awareness about the specter of global terror has formally given rise to HLS as such, representatives claimed that Israel had developed counter-terror strategies long before 9/11. The implication is that Israelis can serve as security clairvoyants, not only giving their clients tools to manage current dangers but also to anticipate future developments. Through such narratives, then, Israel’s history of violence is developed as a distinct ‘special case’, which is in some respects incomparable to other instances of protracted conflict and suffering but that also represents a source of generalizable practical knowhow that others can benefit from in anticipating and preparing for future events. Attention to such messages thus shows how “[mobile] policies are…shaped and given momentum by the telling of stories” about them (McCann 2011a: 119) by defining themselves as models to be emulated and managing to preserve the specificity of the ‘Israeli experience’ as a unique historical antecedent to the war on terror. In this way, the simultaneous situation of Israel’s violent history as HLS has been used as a platform to define security in general whilst additionally asserting Israel’s leadership vis-à-vis the rest of the world, always and necessarily ahead of the curve. Industry voices thereby sought to (re)educate me about the core meaning of security and assert its universality based a particular contextual genesis in Israel. Such efforts have thus enabled HLS to “transform […] into more than just a key word: it becomes an [Israeli] outlook on life” (technologies.co.il) that can and should be emulated by others.

A focus on these messages shows how Israeli marketing strategies work relationally. Difference, rather than an impediment to universality, becomes reconfigured as its essential basis. Indeed, if Israeli approaches to security lacked specificity, then by
definition there would be nothing to gain in ‘learning’ from them. As one CEO candidly put it, “I think it’s obvious that every...[security] consultant is talking from his own experience...that’s why they [clients] pay us, to talk about our own [Israeli] experience. Otherwise they don’t need us”.

These claims, moreover, illustrate how an audience is constituted by “creating an uneven landscape of “teacher” and “learner”” (McCann 2013: 10). That is, Israel’s status as an HLS exemplar comes into being through a particular relation to an ‘other’ or ‘outside’, which is conveniently set up to be lacking in what the country has to offer. This tension between Israeli exceptionalism and likeness to other states provides the essential basis through which the country’s security practices are rationalized to the international community more broadly (Brown 2010: 34-5). Yet developing claims to universality also involves something more than developing these strategies of legitimation. Israel’s status as a policy ‘model’ is also constituted by the actual and perceived physical movement of Israeli HLS experts and their ‘solutions’ across territorial borders.

3. Transnationalization, credibility and preeminence

Thus far I have reflected on some of the discursive strategies used to position Israeli HLS approaches as an exemplar to be imitated, thereby showing how the staging of the Israeli experience as HLS serves to enroll followers. I have further drawn attention to the geographical imaginations that these narratives depend on and reinforce. It is also crucial to address how the work of Israeli firms abroad cements their credentials as HLS leaders. This is because one of the reasons why the ‘Israeli experience’ is increasingly

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23 Skype interview with Uzi More, August 2012
thought of as part of the war on terror is that Israelis have been actively involved in carrying it out. For instance, Israelis advised the US military on its counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq (Gregory 2004; Graham 2011b) and continue to provide expertise to a range of governments on various policing and security-related matters. The ability of Israeli firms to secure contracts overseas clearly reflects their already existing status as global HLS leaders. Yet matters are not quite so straightforward.

Scholars of policy mobilities have argued that the constitution of an audience is central to giving policy exemplars their global appeal. As Peck and Theodore (2012: 23) maintain, “[a] policy ‘model’…can only exist as a model once it has enrolled an ‘audience’ of interlocutors and would-be emulators”. Others have similarly pointed out that policy models are relational in the sense that they “only become models when they acquire and articulate “outside” disciples and admirers who are, most commonly, located elsewhere” (McCann 2013: 10). Didier Bigo has pointed out that the authority of security professionals is constituted through strategies of transnationalization:

Within the production of this regime of truth and the battle to establish the ‘legitimate’ causes of fear, of unease, of doubt and uncertainty, the (in)security professionals have the strategy to overstep national boundaries and form corporatist professional alliances to reinforce the credibility of their assertions and to win the internal struggles in their respective national fields…draw[ing] resources of knowledge and symbolic power from this transnationalization” (Bigo 2008: 12-13).

While Gordon’s attention to the inter-personal connections that facilitate international business networks helps to explain how specific deals get made, Bigo’s claim highlights
how the transnational movement of security professionals serves to further bolster their overall credibility and stature. The transnational movement of security professionals not only forges useful networks, which facilitate sales, but in doing so actually bestows greater credibility upon these same actors by allowing them to lay claim to an ‘international’ status. This strategy, moreover, serves to legitimate the security ‘solutions’, which they export.

In light of these insights, it is notable how the Israeli HLS industry has built its dominant status vis-à-vis a global field, where their status as leaders and their persistent claims to already existing preeminence can actually help to realize these claims. In addition to leveraging their Israeli status and work on Israel’s (domestic) security apparatus, promotional materials of the HLS industry frequently appeal to the work of Israeli firms abroad. For instance, an IEICI brochure proclaims: “The prominent position gained by Israel’s security industries is reflected in a growing number of security projects that have been won by Israeli contractors in recent years… Israeli security systems protect some of the major symbols of Western civilization, including Buckingham Palace, the Vatican, and the Eiffel Tower” (IEICI 2010).

This issue also came up in my conversations with various representatives who stressed that their ‘leadership’ credentials were developed through their work beyond Israel as much as from their ‘Israeli experience’. For example, while speaking with Leo Gleser, I inquired into how important it was to be an Israeli company. He maintained that it was indeed advantageous “To say that we are [an] Israeli company, that we have our Israeli experience”. Yet as he quickly added, “our company already has been proved many times in many areas [outside of Israel]”, going on to cite contracts for the US Navy

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24 Interview with Leo Gleser, July 2012
and work on international mega-events. As he summarized, “This is...our strength...[being] Israeli. But we are also foreign company”. According to Gleser, then, referencing the ‘international’ reputation of ISDS was at least as important as the experience gained from working within Israel’s immediate regional neighborhood. Thus rather than simply speaking to the weight of certain signifiers that exist prior to the encounter with foreign markets, many such claims are constituted through interactions beyond Israel. While clearly drawing on the symbolic power of the ‘Israeli experience’, Israeli approaches to HLS are “‘made’ into a success” through their introduction into “real world” settings (Ward 2006: 70) beyond Israel/Palestine. That is, their global ‘application’ plays a key role in constituting their status as such. Israeli firms seem rather well aware of this dynamic, actively leveraging their international clients’ testimonials as proof of their actually existing universal authority. As the preface to one firm’s webpage featuring testimonials from clients puts it: “We believe that personal experience of our clients speaks louder and stronger than any marketing material regarding our services and capabilities” (www.max-security.com/about-max-security/testimonials).

In addition to constituting Israeli actors as already dominant, however, their transnational movement plays a crucial role in inventing the very idea that some singular ‘Israeli approach’ to HLS actually exists. One of the striking features of the Israeli HLS industry is to speak in a common language about a shared experience, thereby giving the sector a strong sense of coherence and singularity (see Gordon 2009: 41-2). The artificial nature of this implied unity was revealed by the attempts of Israeli HLS representatives to define the ‘Israeli approach’ to HLS. While constantly making allusions to a supposed Israeli ‘model’, the officials I spoke with were far from unequivocal on what was
distinctive about it. Though frequently referencing approaches to profiling, specific tactics like so-called “instinctive shooting”, the martial art *Krav Maga*, the importance of the “human factor” and the virtues of “security awareness” (see Schouten 2014), there was certainly no agreement on what defined their ‘solutions’ as specifically *Israeli*. What became clear through these interactions, rather, was that their very Israeli-ness was a highly elastic, elusive and specifically relational ‘characteristic’. Guy Zuri went as far as to claim that “The Israeli approach is tailor made. It’s…coming from our knowledge and understanding that internal security problems…[are] sometimes different...in every state”.  

This is a highly paradoxical statement. It says, in effect, that what the Israeli approach ‘is’ depends on who is asking and what they are looking for. Yet it was a claim that I heard repeatedly from Israeli HLS representatives. Many claimed that what gave Israelis a competitive edge is *not* the universality or singularity of the ‘Israeli experience’, but the ability to adapt general insights to the specific requirements of individual clients abroad. Without taking this claim at face value and thereby reifying this sense of dynamism as some quintessentially ‘Israeli’ quality, I suggest that an underlying malleability – the ability of Israeli security experts and their solutions to appear in multiple guises – needs to be taken seriously.

As Temenos and McCann (2012: 1319) point out, there is a necessary tension within mobile policy schemes that requires them to be represented as “*prêt-à-porter*” or “*off the rack*” but also appear to be “*tailored*” to the needs of particular localities (emphasis in original). We can see a similar tension within the marketing strategies of Israeli HLS firms. While many advertise ‘turnkey solutions’ to securing facilities like

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25 Interview with Guy Zuri, August 2012
industrial sites, airports, and university campuses, they additionally represent themselves as flexible innovators who can adapt their ‘solutions’ to new circumstances, taking concerns over commensurability head on. As promotional material for an Israeli security training seminar “The Israeli Security Model” states: “[S]ome critics have claimed that what works in Israel won’t work anywhere else. I disagree. The precepts on which the Israeli system is based can be adapted anywhere” (Chameleon Associates 2014).

Earlier in this chapter I pointed out that the Israeli ‘brand’ is selectively accentuated or withheld in interactions with customers abroad depending on the market at hand. In light of the persistent claims that the Israeli brand is a key selling point of such firms, this flexibility is quite striking. Of even greater theoretical concern, however, is to specify how the encounters of Israeli companies with foreign clients work to bolster the very coherence of the ‘Israeli approach’ itself. In addition to legitimating Israeli practices and technologies as they move geographically, such applications actually play an important role in constituting the essence of the original. In other words, the mobility of policy plays a role in creating the actual idea of there being an essential model. As Peck and Theodore (2012: 23) note, the “field of reception itself represents more than some passive hinterland, but an active zone of adaptation and transformation, not to say joint constitution”.

It is through interactions and work for international clients that the very idea of an Israeli HLS model is invented and stabilized where “[t]he imitator…creates the model, it attracts it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 13). So in addition to legitimating practices and technologies as they move geographically, such applications actually play an important role in constituting the essence of the original. Swanson (2013: 977) similarly notes how
the term “zero tolerance” policing was coined not by its alleged inventors (Former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and NYPD police chief Bill Bratton) but rather by former British Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw in 1995. She further stresses the importance of flexibility of mobile policing regimes because this quality allows the politicians who take them up to deploy such schemes toward a range of different possible ends.

4. Assemblages, mobilities, performativities

The elusive and dynamic nature of the so-called ‘Israeli approach’ to HLS has an obvious resonance with a recent literature on “global assemblages” (Collier and Ong 2005). As I pointed out in Chapter 1, engagement with this literature already represents a core foundation of the policy mobilities scholarship, which has usefully employed the analytic of assemblage to disrupt the clear divide between local and global and the understanding of policies as “internally coherent, stable ‘things’” (McCann and Ward, 2012b: 328). The concept further emphasizes the importance of continuous labor and invention in the constitution of policy mobilities (McCann and Ward 2012a; McCann 2011b; Prince 2010).

As I pointed out above, a key weakness of the literature on Israel’s HLS industry is the lack of attention to the continuous work that goes into making Israeli HLS actors visible as sources of expertise. An emphasis on issues of instability, indeterminacy and continuous work therefore offers some valuable insights into the way the engagement of Israeli HLS exporters beyond Israel constitutes their status as global experts by way of their connections with other geographic sites and actors. Security scholars have also drawn attention to the crucial importance (and general under-appreciation) of the various
forms of “work” in creating new spaces of security (see Chapters 6-7).

Yet a focus on iterative repetition in the constitution of mobilities has received little attention within policy mobilities literature to date. There is much talk of work, invention and things being perpetually ‘under construction’ but less of the performative, iterative staging of success and globality. McCann’s (2013) work on “policy boosterism” begins to orient analysis in this direction, though as he notes there is only a limited understanding of how the practice of boosterism functions in the production of policy exemplars. In emphasizing the mobilizing strategies of Israel’s HLS industry through a performative rather than simply discursive frame I seek to address this gap. Accordingly, I situate Israeli claims to HLS dominance as a technique of its own validation corresponding to what Butler (1993: 15) terms a process of “sedimentation” or “materialization” based on “a kind of citationality, the acquisition of being through the citing of power” (emphasis in original). That is, their universal appeal is established by citing their status as already dominant, where “specifying the ways ‘the world is’ [...] actively (re-)mak[es...] that same world” (Bialasiewicz et al, 2007: 411).

Some have already begun to develop such an approach to the global spread of “zero tolerance” policing strategies. Drawing on Butler, Mountz and Curran (2009: 1038) argue that “each city that adopts it invokes the ‘success’ of others, so that zero tolerance policing is validated by the very fact of its broad discursive diffusion and iteration, despite the questioning of its success”. In addition to validating it through its global diffusion, moreover, this process also serves to make the assumptions and exclusionary implications of these very policies disappear from view (ibid). Graham (2011a:15) similarly argues that “the new military urbanism gains much of its power from the ways
in which key exemplars of militarization and securitization emerge as mobile norms to be imitated and applied more generally”. Extending these insights I argue that closer attention is required to how the resonance of universalizing claims is cultivated, specifically through the Israeli HLS industry’s use of what Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 409-10) term “non-state scribes”. As they argue, “by identifying the citational practices that are reiterated in cultural and political sites outside the formal institutions of the state”, we can contend with the role of performative imaginative geographies in shaping foreign policy prerogatives (ibid: 409). As Leander and van Munster (2007) further point out, private security contractors have moved well beyond the status of technical experts, influencing public opinion and in doing so effectively (re)configuring the very meaning of ‘security’ itself.

This scholarship on the privatization of security represents a major discussion in security studies associated with the erosion of the state’s monopoly on violence (Leander 2005) and blurring in the distinctions between public and private (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009). Notwithstanding the importance of these ongoing debates, I do not engage with them directly here. My focus is instead on the roles of unofficial voices in constituting Israel’s position as a security model. What is immediately striking about the Israeli position as an HLS leader is that awareness of this status is remarkably mainstream, extending its reach well beyond professional ‘communities of practice’ and academic circles (e.g. Karlin 2005; Schwartz 2005). The Israeli HLS industry has proven extremely deft at utilizing media as a self-promotion tool to promote its various ‘innovations’ in order to link its HLS prowess with broader narratives of Israel’s rise as a high-tech “start-up nation” (Senor and Singer 2009). Indeed, the regime of truth
surrounding Israeli HLS prowess becomes actualized through its repetition within commercial forums like trade shows and security conferences but also within business magazines, newspapers and now increasingly on social media. Many of the firms I interacted with had mainstream media articles featuring stories about the genesis of their various innovations and the kinds of problems they can be used to solve. Following acts of terror, hostage situations or other “security controversies” (Schouten 2014) around the world, moreover, Israelis are often the first ‘experts’ to arrive at the scene, appearing in various forms of media to extol the virtues of the so-called ‘Israeli’ approach in relation to the issue at hand and offer their assistance. In this sense, the Israeli intervention into 26/11 can be seen as part of a broader pattern.

As the case of 26/11 suggests, Israelis’ recommendations in these situations are generally taken at face value. Yet it is important to recognize that their authoritative position is not derived from content of these utterances. That is, Israel’s status as an HLS leader must be looked at in terms of the industry’s persistent and conspicuous presence rather than being attributed to the symbolic weight of the claims they bring to bear, whether to ‘combat-proven’ knowledge or otherwise. As Brighenti (2007: 334) points out: “A model can be defined as something or someone who is endowed with visibility. For a model to exist, it has to be before everybody’s eyes” (emphasis in original). Following this, to the extent that the ‘Israeli brand’ and the regime of truth that surrounds it ‘works’ it does so by virtue of its performative repetition and entrenchment that places the ‘Israeli experience’ before the world’s eyes, albeit in highly mediated and deceptive ways. It also requires an understanding of regimes of truth as spatialized constructs (see Prince 2012), which are consolidated through geographic interaction and entanglement.
This invites further analysis that might link mobility and performativity conceptually, thinking performativity geographically as it were.

Conclusion

As I pointed out at the end of the previous chapter, although the status of Israelis as global security experts gave them privileged platform from which to speak, the relationship between Israel and 26/11 was hardly natural or obvious: rather, it was fabricated through a series of very aggressive, public and politically charged interventions and comparisons. In this chapter I have extended these arguments further. I have argued that Israeli claims to universal knowledge are constituted through the actual or perceived mobility of Israeli HLS experts and their solutions across borders. So while the Israeli intervention and the process of gaining access to Indian policy circles following 26/11 is in many ways highly unique and specific, it reflects the fundamentally relational character of Israel’s position as an HLS model.

I have argued that Israel’s status as a policy exemplar cannot be limited to issues of legitimation and validation that work to transfer coherent policies from one locale to another. It is also crucially bound up with their very development or even invention, a process that takes place through repetition, interaction and geographic movement. By drawing attention to these activities we can see how an Israeli ‘model’ of HLS is performed into being by enrolling a global audience and how this audience is leveraged as a resource in the industry’s further expansion and entrenchment. It is also through assertions of dominance beyond Israel/Palestine that its claims to superiority gain much of their force by staking a claim to an actually existing global authority. This strategy
works to blend claims to superiority with those of preeminence in ways that make the two largely indistinguishable from one another. As I have argued, these are most successful through their ability to become one and the same.

In making these claims I have suggested that the focus on the so-called Israeli Security Network, though important, is insufficient in understanding the constitution of Israel as an as a policy exemplar. To be clear, however, by this I am certainly not saying that the process of networking is somehow insignificant. The roles of personal and professional ties clearly did play an important role in the trajectories of Israeli firms into India after 26/11 and I will return to the issue of networking again in Chapter 7. Yet the question of why some Israeli firms managed to secure contracts in India after 26/11 whereas other (Israeli and non-Israeli) firms failed has not been the focus of this chapter. More importantly, if the whole affair were simply reducible to a matter of backchannel deal-making there would be no particularly good reason why the use of Israeli experts and trainers by the Mumbai police would have necessarily been spoken of publically at all (see Chapter 5). Nor do they help to understand the considerable challenges faced by Israeli firms in selling their solutions to Indian authorities since 2008 (see Chapters 7-6).

Beginning in the next chapter, I continue to focus on issues of visibility and media presence, but shift the focus away from the Israeli HLS industry back to policy developments in post-26/11 Mumbai. As I begin to elaborate there, it is useful to conceptualize the ‘response’ to 26/11 in terms of a highly visible project of urban militarization - a pattern that reveals the need to develop accounts of such trends through a political register.
Chapter 4: Militarizing Mumbai: Theatrics, visibility and the politics of response

[Following 26/11] the whole country suffered heavily, morale was low and [there were] ...attacks from various people, municipalities, the press people, [the] public, [the] opposition party, political backlash—all that happened. So the government was basically at the receiving end. The police were [also] having very low morale. So that was the scene where I was brought as the Commissioner of Police [in June 2009].

Introduction

In this chapter I focus on how the issue of terrorism has been governed in Mumbai since 2008. While a number of commentators have raised alarm over the militarism that 26/11 engendered (e.g. Puniyani and Hashmi 2010), little critical attention has been directed toward analyzing how the Government of Maharashtra’s (GOM) policy response to 26/11 has actually unfolded since 2008. I seek to address this gap by sketching the policy dynamics at the state level, drawing attention to the ways in which public demands for ‘security’ surveyed in Chapter 2 were translated into governmental prerogatives. The immediate policy response to 26/11 involved a series of swift militarizing moves to reassure the public that security was being handled in a competent and ‘modern’ way. Governmental authorities sought to provide evidence of greater security through highly visible displays of weapons and military gadgetry. Such developments can be best understood as a response to the anti-politician backlash produced by 26/11. My findings suggest the need to rethink the politics of urban security planning, shifting the focus from the disciplinary and divisive effects of policies toward an emphasis on their theatrical and performative qualities. In other words, if we are to make sense of the militarized focus of the response to 26/11, we need to take seriously its populist, aspirational qualities.

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26 Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2013
1. Responding to 26/11

Although arguments that 26/11 represented a paradigm shift in the Indian state’s approach to urban security governance are overstated, the attacks did produce some important policy developments at the Mumbai city, Maharashtra State, and union levels – all of which might be loosely understood as part of the Indian state’s ‘response’ to the attacks. These include the creation of new anti-terror laws – the National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act (2008) and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act (UAPA) (2008) (see Mate and Naseemullah 2010; Sahni 2009) and the establishment of the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) – at the union level. Following 26/11, there has also been considerable debate about a proposed National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) (see Sahni 2012; Raman 2012). However, in this chapter I am chiefly concerned with police modernization and training efforts at the Mumbai city and Maharashtra state levels. Three dimensions are key to these efforts - the focus on the procurement of sophisticated weaponry and other security gadgetry, a strong emphasis on raising new commando units and the impetus to seek foreign expertise. First, central to the state government’s response was a renewed focus on police procurement. Prior to 26/11 various central government initiatives, such as the Modernization of Police Force (MFG) Scheme and the Mega City Policing (introduced from 2005 onwards) specifically geared toward equipping Mumbai’s police with new weapons and security equipment had already been launched (BPRD 2010; MHA 2010; also see mha.nic.in/policemodern). Although the latest installment of the MFG Scheme was in place by 2000 (and scheduled to run until 2009), Maharashtra’s procurement process was moving slowly, stalled by well-known frictions of the highly bureaucratic and poorly defined procurement process.
and by a lack of approved testing laboratories (HLEC 2009: Section IV). Following 26/11, however, modernization accelerated rapidly, albeit temporarily. Less than a month after the attacks, a new budget totaling Rs 126 crore (USD approx. 23.3 million) had been sanctioned by the Maharashtra legislative assembly (Agarwal 2008). This budget authorized a range of new purchases including imported weaponry, a fleet of new armoured vehicles and a range of other security gadgets (see Appendix B; Narayan 2014). Shortly after 26/11, the state government also announced a surveillance scheme to cover Mumbai with 6000 CCTV cameras. Though the program has been repeatedly stalled, video surveillance cameras are becoming increasingly visible in the south of the city.

In addition to the pace of these developments, it is important to draw attention to the nature of the procurements. Whereas the MFG largely focused on basic weaponry and equipment, the response to 26/11 featured public displays of expensive imported weapons, armored vehicles and new uniforms for special operations forces, leveraging their distinctly militaristic features. One of the most visible examples was the fleet of Mahindra Marksman bulletproof jeeps, ironically painted with desert camouflage. These are now stationed at prominent locations across south Mumbai such as the Maharashtra State Government headquarters Mantralaya, CST, the Gateway of India/Taj hotel and are typically manned by police officers carrying automatic rifles.

A second key development was the focus on raising new, locally based commando units, what some have termed the “Rambo model” of response to terrorism (Sahni 2008d). By April 2, 2009 the state government passed an order authorizing the creation of Maharashtra’s own ‘crack’ commando squad Force One (Swami 2009a).
tasked with responding to live terror incidents.\textsuperscript{27} The government also considerably expanded, strengthened and restructured the Mumbai police’s Quick Response Teams (QRTs) through new training regimens, uniforms, weapons and equipment. These units are now permanently stationed at all of Mumbai’s five regional police stations, under the command of their local Additional Commissioner of Police. The union government also created a local NSG hub located near Mumbai (in addition to other hubs in Chennai, Kolkata and Hyderabad) and a fifth hub near Ahmedabad was recently announced. The Government of Maharashtra also created the Maharashtra State Security Corporation (MSSC), a force of security personnel to protect private sites including industrial facilities, shrines and certain public buildings across the state of Maharashtra.\textsuperscript{28} The MSSC’s guards are outfitted in camouflage uniforms and have the authority to carry weapons and have the power to arrest on the premises where they are employed (unlike private security guards in India), though lack many of the legal powers of police officers (Government of Maharashtra 2010; also see mahasecurity.gov).

A third aspect of police modernization has been the impulse to emulate so-called policy ‘models’ from abroad, including the use of foreign trainers for local anti-terror forces. On July 11, 2009 under the auspices of seeking expertise in urban counter-terrorism and HLS, the Government of Maharashtra sent an official delegation to Israel and Israeli contractors have since become involved in training local commando units as part of the broader emphasis on training after 26/11. Later an official delegation was sent

\textsuperscript{27} There are media reports about the creation of Force One as early as December 2008.
\textsuperscript{28} Vappala Balachandran had suggested the creation of a similar force to ministers in the Maharashtra government prior to 26/11 but this was never acted upon until after the attacks (see Appendix C).
to Scotland Yard in 2010 to examine London’s approach to surveillance.\textsuperscript{29} In 2013 a UK trade delegation traveled to Mumbai help situate UK security firms in local security market.\textsuperscript{30}

I examine the specificities of the deference to Israeli security experts and the use of Israeli police trainers in greater depth in Chapter 5. Here the main point I want to highlight is the efforts to make these initiatives visible. Once the new wave of weapons, vehicles and equipment arrived in Mumbai, they were extensively showcased to the media through various exhibitions and in military-style parades on Marine Drive on the first anniversary of 26/11. Beginning in 2009 the Mumbai police launched its new English language police magazine the \textit{Mumbai Protector}, a media initiative started under Sivanandan (see theprotector.in). As some excerpts from the early issues of Protector illustrate, the magazine’s purpose is to create an impression of rapid change in the capacities of the Mumbai police, as a “Pledge to Keep Mumbai Safe and Secure” (\textit{The Protector} 2009b: 9). The following example, taken from the second issue of the magazine captures this nicely:

It has been a year since Mumbai came under the dastardly terrorist attack on 26 November 2008. Much has happened since then. The Mumbai Police has since streamlined its overall preparedness in preventing recurrence of such events in the future. Most important, we have been able to create Quick Response Teams & Force One, an anti-terrorist combat-ready contingent comprising well-trained men armed with the \textit{most modern weaponry and bullet-proof vehicles, complete with

\textsuperscript{29} These developments are not entirely unprecedented. For instance a version of the City of London’s Project Griffin called Project Sayhog was allegedly instituted in Mumbai in August 2008 (just before 26/11) as well as to other Indian cities like Bangalore (see Coaffee 2009b: 278).

\textsuperscript{30} The delegation was organized in partnership with the Mumbai lobby group Mumbai First, which hosted a closed-door policy conference “Collaborating for Security”.

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Such articles stress the aggressive, militaristic features of these new policy initiatives. One article emphasizes that since 26/11 “the Maharashtra Government and the law enforcing authorities have […] initiated several security measures on a war-footing” (ibid: 9, emphasis added) and the pages of the Protector feature photos of police officers posing with their newly acquired gadgets and weaponry.

There is also a clear aspirational quality to the post-26/11 policy trends in the sense of a desire to assert an equivalence to the ‘modern’ security strategies of other cities around the world: “In terms of weaponry, the Mumbai Police have further fortified itself with more Smith & Weston 9mm pistols, M4 Carbinos, MP9 tactical machine guns, M82 sniper rifles, all are universally acknowledged by experts as the best anti-terrorist urban warfare equipment available in the world” (The Protector 2009b: 9). Quoting Joint Police Commissioner (Law & Order) Himanshu Roy, one article emphasizes “a paradigm shift in our thinking, our motivation and our morale and our mindset” noting that “[t]he Mumbai Police is now supported by technology, equipment and training comparable to the best in the world” (The Protector 2009b: 10).

These developments bear a strong resemblance to the critical debates on the securitization and militarization outlined in Chapter 1. A key aspect of the militarization of the urban concerns the application of aggressive tactics in policing and security management and the use of global policy exemplars. On the surface, the post-26/11 policy trends also appear to flow straightforwardly from the prevailing reading of 26/11 as a technical failure of local policing capacity (see Chapter 2), with a kind of symmetry
between the attacks and the response. As Kolås (2010: 93) notes, “[t]he Mumbai attacks were carried out ‘commando style’, and many of the ‘solutions’ offered followed in the same vein”. Not surprisingly, a number of officials I spoke with asserted that the focus on police modernization was straightforward and uncontroversial, born out of senior IPS officers’ “collective wisdom” about how security priorities should be handled after 26/11. As one former senior police official put it, terrorists are “armed to the teeth with all automatic weapons...[so] you need to be armed too!”. In speaking with various government officials and IPS officers, many displayed a general faith in the inherent value of technology and modernization in relation to counterterrorism and beyond.

Officials also frequently invoked the ‘India’s 9/11’ metaphor to account for the nature of the policy response, focusing on the ‘global’ dimensions of the attacks—both as a turning point in the nature of terrorism and having generated potential opportunities to address it. For instance, when I asked the commander of Force One how “crucial” it was to adopt strategies and technologies from abroad, he responded that learning from the experiences of others is “not crucial, but essential”, noting that the “threat of terrorism is a global threat”, which can only be combated successfully through international collaboration. As another senior IPS officer further stressed, “today in this globalized situation of the world that we are in it’s always best not to reinvent the wheel. Wherever there’s good expertise, wherever there’s better equipment/technology and it’s available” it should be taken up. In short, they tried to suggest that the focus on military

31 Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2012
32 Interview with Anonymous 3, January 2013
33 Interview with Rajnish Seth, January 2013
34 Interview with Ahmad Javed, December 2012
procurement after 2008 was an inevitable development that was merely accelerated by ‘India’s 9/11’.

However, understanding the policy response as a straightforward outgrowth of the experience of 26/11 only takes us so far. Even some of the strongest defenders of these measures struggled to articulate a coherent account of the specific contributions of these new procurements in combatting an allegedly novel form of urban terrorism. Moreover while the emphasis on police modernization might at first sight appear rather straightforward, upon closer inspection its manifestations become considerably less so. Despite widespread emphasis on learning lessons from the attacks (e.g. NYPD 2008; Rabasa et al. 2009; Elkus 2012), it is difficult to square many of the most widely agreed upon revelations about 26/11’s handling with the specific policy measures instituted since 2008.

For instance, while a lack of adequate protective gear was widely cited as a key reason why so many police officers (including ATS Chief Hemant Karkare), died on 26/11, sufficient numbers of bulletproof vests have yet to be purchased. Yet some of the most expensive procurements that have arrived clearly lack any obvious purpose. One of the most striking examples of this is the M82/M107, a .50 caliber anti-materiel weapon. A number were purchased by the Mumbai police following the attacks despite the fact that they cannot be tested by local authorities as they exceed the capacities of local firing ranges (Swami 2009a). As one Mumbai journalist told me of the procurement process, it was as though those in charge made their decisions based on tastes developed playing the video game Call of Duty, seemingly oblivious to the catastrophic damage that the application of such heavy weapons would inflict if ever actually deployed in one of the
world’s most densely populated urban environments. While media coverage of 26/11 emphasized that local forces lacked sufficient numbers of modern automatic rifles, subsequent stories have reported that the Mumbai police had a cache of 247 AK-47s on hand during 26/11 but that these weapons were not made available to Mumbai police officers (Dixit 2009). This raises questions about why the procurement of new (and much more costly) imported weapons took on such urgency within GOM’s policy response to 26/11. Similar trends can be seen around issues of coastal security. Although the entry of assailants via the sea route into Mumbai on 26/11 generated an impetus for the procurement of costly speedboats and amphibious vehicles, many of them have gone unused due to a lack of trained personnel (Dey 2011) and because sufficient funds were not allotted for their fuel costs (Gangan 2011).

There continue to be sympathetic news articles about progress in improving Mumbai’s security preparedness, often appearing with such technologically deterministic headlines like “NSG emulates US Navy Seals, goes hi-tech” (Tiwary 2013) or “A Smart Anti-Terror Force for Mumbai Now” (Menon 2009). However, the overwhelming majority of commentaries on the response to 26/11 have been sharply critical, suggesting that in the years since 2008, the “Mumbai attack lessons [have been] ‘unlearnt’” (BBC 2013). Even some very conventional accounts of the policy process from within Indian policy and strategic circles have had difficulty ascribing these trends to a rational calculus, characterizing them instead as what some have termed “arming without aiming” (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010). So even if one accepts the basic premise that police modernization was a reasonable response to the attacks, its manifestations appear incoherent at best, if not entirely dysfunctional.

35 Anonymous 4, January 2013
In making such claims, these mainstream commentators advance certain arguments that critical scholarship has articulated for some time, namely that urban security policies are not always successful, even on their own terms (e.g. Lyon 2003: 667) and rarely, if ever, bring about more ‘security’. For instance, Marcuse (2006: 922) notes that post-9/11 urban security measures “do little or nothing to reduce danger”. As Parenti (1999: 133) similarly emphasizes, “military technology and training [in policing] do not make people safer”. What distinguishes mainstream critiques from these critical narratives, however, is the nature of their concerns. After 2008 the most pointed critiques have been of a conservative rather than radical nature. Their concern is not that para-militarized policing strategies will be applied overzealously in ways that increase forms of fear and insecurity but rather that new units and gadgetry may never be ‘applied’ at all (see for instance Swami 2009b; Indian Express 2014).

This does not mean that the policy response to 26/11 has not had any exclusionary effects (see Chapter 6). Nor do I mean to suggest that violence is not employed by the Mumbai police as an instrument of repression in controlling political dissent. Indeed, this has historically been the case and remains one of its most essential mandates of the Indian police today. Rather, it is to suggest that the focus on police modernization seemingly has very little to do with crowd control. In fact, this activity remains very much a low-tech endeavor, based on longstanding approaches to spatial control dating back to the Indian police’s colonial functions (see Chapter 7).

In the pages that follow, I critique the reductive analysis offered by leading Indian security experts like Ajai Sahni and Praveen Swami. Yet despite their numerous problems, they do get at least one thing right: while the policy response to 26/11 has
sought to create an impression of radical change through the creation of new laws, security agencies and an acceleration of police modernization programs, these developments have had little to no effect on the operation of everyday policing in Mumbai. As the commander of Force One emphasized to me, issues of law and order and security are “totally different”.\textsuperscript{36} In fact, the lack of a radical overhaul of basic police training and technical capability is the principle basis of much of the mainstream criticism of the response to 26/11. For instance, although noting that “Special Forces and QRTs would appear to have some natural utility”, Sahni (2009) argues that “the strategic success of India’s counter-terrorism responses will depend overwhelmingly on the capacities, mandate and effectiveness of its ‘general forces’” referencing the alleged success of ‘broken windows’ policing strategies in New York. Much to his dismay, however, the capacities of these ‘general forces’ have received little attention since 2008 (see Chapters 6-7).

Thus while Mumbai’s post-26/11 experience might appear as yet another example of the militarization of the urban, the ways in which the responses emerged also unsettles some of the terms of these existing critical debates. Whereas literature on the new military urbanism has focused on the negative effects of securitization and militarization, such as the production of urban fear, threats to civic activity and access public space, as well as the blurring in functions between military and policing agencies, the analytical (and political) ‘problem’ of post-26/11 policy trends in Mumbai is rather different. It involves less an issue of revealing the negative effects of militarization than of understanding the sudden investment measures that quite plainly lack any overt tactical purpose. So how might the post-26/11 policy developments be best understood?

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Rajnish Seth, January 2013
Perhaps the most obvious interpretation would be to ascribe them to corruption. Indeed, the initial wave of new purchases after 26/11 was immediately followed by a host of controversies and charges of corruption and mismanagement surrounding the procurement process (Joseph 2012; Swami 2009a). The purchase of faulty bomb disposal suits and defective bulletproof vests (Daily News and Analysis 2012) were investigated and there have been allegations of bribery around the purchases of speedboats (Unnikrishnan and Shivadekar 2012). Yet we must be careful here. While the issue of corruption might help to explain the purchase of allegedly overpriced speedboats and certain forms of defective equipment, it ultimately tells us very little about the specificities of the post-26/11 period. What is noteworthy is not the persistence of corruption in the GOM’s procurement process for police equipment. Rather it is how the state’s procurement process, which is normally characterized by its systematic red tape, suddenly opened up to deliver a new crop of expensive new purchases, albeit temporarily. In fact it is the temporary nature of these developments, which makes any blanket deference to ‘corruption’ rather unhelpful in explaining post-26/11 developments. If officials’ willingness to ‘invest’ in urban security was primarily driven by their efforts to enrich themselves, we would expect the emphasis on expensive police modernization to continue over time. Yet as we will see in Chapters 6 and 7, this has clearly not been the case.

In my conversations with officials involved in crafting the policy response or familiar with it, it was clear that rather than reflecting a sudden ‘awakening’ to the threat of ‘global’ terrorism after 26/11, the post-26/11 policy process is better understood as a form of public relations used to soothe the public demands for ‘security’. Accordingly it
must be situated in relation to the controversies and public pressures to and public pressures to which 26/11 gave rise.

3. The policy process

The purpose of this section is not to delineate the GOM’s police procurement process in general, but rather to show how its sudden focus on the purchase of military equipment emerged as the default solution to the attacks. 26/11 produced acute pressure on the GOM and the Mumbai police to act swiftly and decisively, giving rise to an accelerated program of police modernization. However, these measures were not informed by the findings of the GOM’s committee that studied the handling of 26/11 and made policy recommendations for improving Mumbai’s policing and security capabilities. The officials I spoke with also contested the ability of police modernization to prevent or mitigate future terrorist attacks in the city.

As explained to me by Home Ministry and police officials, two main groups were involved in crafting the response. Its overall development was led by the GOM (particularly by leading politicians in the Home Ministry and those in the Group of Ministers) who set budgets that defined certain policy prerogatives such as the creation of Force One. However, the demands for specific items apparently came from senior police officers such as former Mumbai CP Hasan Gafoor and DGP A.N. Roy (and later by their successors). As Home Ministry officials emphasized to me, as generalist bureaucrats who had no particular technical knowhow on anti-terrorism and policing, they essentially deferred to the police on such matters.

Beyond these two official bodies, however, there are also a number of other influences to consider. Certain police officials explained that they too lacked the
technical knowhow for specific procurements (particularly around the issues of coastal security and CCTV systems) and therefore sought advice from officers in the Indian Army, paramilitary bodies like the NSG and the Indian Navy as well as from technical institutions like the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Bombay. Certain private consultancies like Sundeep Waslekar’s Strategic Foresight Group also apparently contributed advice.\(^{37}\) A 66-member committee of private citizens and officials was also established after 26/11 to stimulate new debates on Mumbai’s security preparedness (Indian Express 2009), though produced few, if any, tangible results.

Officials also told me that almost immediately after 26/11 they were lobbied by unsolicited private interests (both domestic and foreign) as well as official representatives from foreign state governments seeking to sell various security products and services. As one former senior Home Ministry bureaucrat recalled, after 26/11 “lots of teams had started arriving…from Israel from Germany and from Canada and from London, people coming and saying ‘Do this, do that, buy this, buy that, take of this, take of that, we have this, we have that’”.\(^{38}\) While reflecting the effects of the Israeli intervention from Chapter 2, this also shows that Israel was clearly not the only government that tried to capitalize on 26/11 as a commercial opportunity.

I examine the impulse to learn from Israel in greater depth in Chapter 5. Here it is sufficient to note that the development of a response to 26/11 appears to have emerged in a rather loose and ad-hoc way based on a range of sources of expertise rather than following a pre-defined organizational structure with clearly set roles for the various actors involved. It is nonetheless possible to discern how the focus on police

\(^{37}\) Although Waslekar refused to speak with me about his work, his name came up unprompted in numerous conversations with police officials and Indian security commentators.

\(^{38}\) Interview with Chitkala Zutshi, January 2013
modernization emerged as well the kinds of agendas that drove this impulse.

In trying to understand the way in which the post-26/11 policy process unfolded, the first major development was the appointment of the High-Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) on 26/11 by the GOM. The Committee, headed by former Union Home Secretary (Ret’d) Ram Pradhan and Vappala Balachandran (a former bureaucrat and intelligence official), was appointed on December 30th, 2008 to look into the handling of the attacks from the perspective of the Mumbai police and state government architecture for handling terrorist attacks and to make recommendations to strengthen them. The appointment of the HLEC reflects a longstanding procedural response to crises in India. The Committee was also widely perceived as a toothless gesture specifically designed to absolve senior officials and politicians of any wrongdoing (see Pai and Mathur 2008; Baweja 2009). One former senior Home Ministry official told me that Ram Pradhan was specifically selected to head the Committee because of his longstanding ties to the ruling Congress Party, claiming that he was specifically “told what to write down” by high-ranking government ministers and instructed not to name names.\footnote{Interview with Anonymous 5, January 2013} The Committee also lacked any legal authority to summon witnesses and its mandate was limited to interviews with officials from within the Maharashtra government and the Mumbai and Maharashtra state police. Its scope thereby excluded any analysis of alleged intelligence lapses by Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing’s (RAW), the role of the union of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) or the activities of the NSG in finally putting an end to the siege.\footnote{While most of the criticisms of the NSG operation focused on its delayed deployment from Delhi, some have also contested efficacy of the tactics employed by NSG forces on the ground in Mumbai during 26/11 (e.g. Swami 2008c).} In short, the HLEC’s mandate was deeply constrained from
Nor were its findings particularly radical. Indeed, in certain ways the Committee’s recommendations reinforce the prevailing media narratives that surrounded 26/11, repeatedly noting that certain units were strategically outmatched by the assailants in terms of their weaponry and equipment as well as noting that a lack of ammunition prevented adequate live fire training. There is certainly some overlap between the HLEC’s conclusions and the policy developments sketched above. The report suggests that a key problem was that the police response was handled like a ‘law and order’ situation, reflective of a civil policing approach rather than one based on commando tactics. Consequently, the Committee recommended the strengthening of QRTs and the creation of a small commando unit at the disposal of Mumbai’s CP. It also drew particular attention to how stalled police modernization hampered within the Mumbai police’s operational capacities, arguing that red tape and political interference slowed the state’s police procurement process, recommending the creation of an ‘Empowered Committee’ to streamline this process.

Yet while the report suggests that technical deficiencies and a general lack of police training contributed to the mishandling of 26/11 and that political interference in the procurement process was largely to blame for this, it makes no specific technical recommendations on procurement. Nor does it suggest the need for an extensive CCTV system or the use of foreign experts. Moreover, according to the HLEC, coordination was at least as significant a problem as any technical deficiencies in terms of weapons or equipment. For instance, the report emphasized that the local “Marcos” (navy commandos) who were deployed on 26/11 fared little better than local police, despite
being very well trained and equipped (HLEC 2009: 3.28). The report also repeatedly emphasized that it was not a lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs) but rather that existing SOPs were simply not followed. It also stressed the Hasan Gafoor’s lack of leadership and the duplication of duties, noting that “[a]lthough [the] DGP has no operational responsibility in view of the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Police in Mumbai, he [A.N. Roy] gave advice and assistance to senior police officers” (HLEC 2009: 3.18.2).

More important than its substance, however, is the fact that the report did not actually serve as the basis of the post-2008 policy process. First, many key decisions on procurement and commando units were taken before it was even submitted to the government on April 18, 2009. The creation of Force One was already authorized by the time the report was submitted. Second, once it was submitted to the government, the report was classified and partially rejected just before its scheduled release in 2009, leading Ram Pradhan to publicly call for its release. I will return to the dynamics surrounding the government’s handling of the HLEC in greater depth in Chapter 5. Here it is sufficient to say that the experience of 26/11 did not produce a clear policy consensus between the HLEC’s authors and leading GOM ministers about how the alleged ‘failures’ in the handling of the attacks should be corrected. While there seems to be a kind of symmetry between the response and understanding of 26/11 as a technical failure, there was certainly nothing natural or inevitable about these developments. As we will see below, the post-26/11 policy process unfolded in an ad-hoc manner, driven by the need to act swiftly. Certain officials also conceded that a focus on police modernization was unlikely to radically transform Mumbai’s vulnerability to future terrorist attacks.
Nevertheless, they claimed such measures were constructive in other ways, namely in restoring public confidence in the Mumbai police.

As some have argued, “[t]he surreal (or perhaps hyper-real) drama of the Mumbai attacks produced a strong sense of immediacy and urgency in the policy debates that followed” (Kolás 2010: 86). Contributing to this sense of urgency was the fear of another potential attack. As Ram Pradhan told me, when he and Balachandran were appointed to lead the HLEC “we were very conscious that another attack might also take place” and therefore they tried to conclude their investigation as quickly as possible.41 Considerable public doubts remained about the Mumbai police’s capacity to withstand another similar attack. As one IPS officer who fought against the assailants told me, although there was widespread public appreciation for the courage of police officers, following the conclusion of the attacks “confidence building…was a major issue because people were nervous [about] whether they can be...secured properly”.42

Discussions with politicians and bureaucrats also make it clear that the climate of public outrage—and its specific relation to issues of technical capacity—was a key driver of subsequent developments that compelled officials to act quickly and decisively. As Jayant Patil, who was appointed to head the Maharashtra Home Department immediately after 26/11, explained: “We wanted to take quick decisions” on issues of procurement, particularly in light of “the sensitivity of all the issues of having good arms and ammunition”.43 When I asked former Additional Chief Secretary (Home) Chitkala Zutshi about how politicians sought to address public criticism, she went a step further, claiming that: “They didn’t…want their image to be tarnished; they wanted to come out well out of

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41 Interview with Ram D. Pradhan, April 2013
42 Interview with Anonymous 6, January 2013
43 Interview with Jayant Patil, April 2013
this. That’s why…they took all those very quick decisions about empowering the [police] force, strengthening the [police] force and things like that”.44

Indeed, it seems that giving the police everything they requested in the months following the attacks (or at least giving that impression) was the principal strategy politicians employed to address enduring public misgivings about Mumbai’s security preparedness. For instance Sivanandan told me that immediately following 26/11, the Maharashtra government effectively “gave…carte blanche [to the Mumbai police] by saying whatever is right for the city to secure, do that”.45 He claimed that following the attacks, as the CP “you just walked up to the Home Secretary, the Home Minister, the Chief Minister…convinced them with a presentation…[and] It was sanctioned in one minute!”.46

Due to the apparent urgency to procure new weapons, even the most basic testing and competitive evaluation procedures were bypassed (Swami 2009a) and certain officials claimed that decisions were undertaken in an extremely ad hoc way based on the whims and tastes of individual officers. As one former IPS officer described the process, once committees were established, “they would to go into the various aspects of the particular weapon and then someone would say, ‘No, that thing is better or this thing is better.’ …[T]his process continued for a very long time ‘til ultimately it was decided that we will purchase X weapon”.47 As a senior Mumbai crime editor similarly stressed, “It was not that they tried all these guns and…[then] shortlisted [them]”, instead claiming

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44 Interview with Chitkala Zutshi, January 2013
45 Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2013
46 Ibid
47 Interview with Jayant Umranikar, February 2013
that some officers simply thought one was better than another.\textsuperscript{48}

Some officers even went a step further, suggesting that the specific measures undertaken as part of the response—particularly the impulse to address terrorism through the procurement of new equipment—were somehow misguided. There was a strong sense among police officials that the government’s imperative to act quickly came at the direct expense of what could have been a more considered and planned security strategy. As one former very senior IPS officer who was involved in the early stages of planning lamented: “Suddenly such a big incident happened, the biggest shock for government and society. So the government response at that time was kneejerk: do whatever you want, whatever you need...[and] not a very planned and long-term response. For a few months, the mindset was...‘Ask for anything and...take it’”.\textsuperscript{49} Another similarly emphasized that 26/11 put the “government in a panic mode” and that it responded “in a reactionary way...[by] pump[ing] in funds”. As he summarized, “It’s like trying to...close the gate after the horse has bolted”.\textsuperscript{50} The former ATS chief who took over following 26/11 claimed that “too much emphasis has definitely gone into empowering...[on] more arming and more equipment,” noting that in general terrorism will focus on the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as a 26/11-style attack will likely prove to “be a very rare thing”.\textsuperscript{51}

Some even contested the very premise that the lack of weaponry or technical preparedness was the essential basis of alleged lapses in the handling of 26/11 in the first place. As one former senior officer claimed, “simply saying that...we were...not

\textsuperscript{48} Interview with Anonymous 11, January 2013
\textsuperscript{49} Interview with Anonymous 3, January 2013
\textsuperscript{50} Interview with K. Subrahmanyam, February 2013
\textsuperscript{51} Interview with K.P. Raguvanshi, February 2013
modernized and so unable to deal with it [26/11]—it is not that…Bombay city had…sophisticated weapons”.52 Others similarly stressed, “it’s not that we had really outdated armory or weapons, it’s not that. I think the issue is more complex than that”.53 One former senior officer who suggested that a lack of sophisticated weapons was a major issue on 26/11 also conceded: “preparedness is not only a matter of buying equipment”. As some scholars have already pointed out, it is not uncommon for officials involved in urban security planning to acknowledge practical limitations of the policy measures they put into place. For instance, Boyle and Haggerty (2009: 262) note an “increasing official willingness to acknowledge that absolute security is a chimera” and that “zero risk is unattainable”. However the officials I spoke with did not simply reveal an awareness of that absolute security is unattainable per se but actually asserted that the specific measures undertaken were essentially unwarranted and therefore unlikely to be effective preventing future terrorist attacks.

While these officials questioned the basic premise of police modernization as a practical fix to Mumbai’s security problems, they also suggested that it served other important ends. In fact, rather than stressing the operational capabilities of various new procurements and units in fighting urban terrorism, they emphasized the roles of these measures in terms of building “confidence”.54 For instance, though claiming the focus on arming was essentially ill conceived, one former DGP nonetheless insisted that: “Whatever has been done as a result of the creation of Force One has produced tremendously good results…I mean for developing confidence” not only within the

52 Interview with K. Subrahmanyam, February 2013
53 Interview with Ahmad Javed, December 2012
54 Coaffee (2009b) has similarly elaborated on the role of security measures in the City of London in terms of inspiring “confidence”. However, his remarks largely concern efforts to restore the image of City of London as a safe site for investment, particularly to global investors.
police itself but also in terms of public relations: “You know, if you see a QRT vehicle standing somewhere in public it inspires confidence”.\(^{55}\) Another IPS officer who fought during 26/11 suggested that with the creation of 1500 QRT personnel “the police force came back with more preparedness, more combative teeth”, noting that having such personnel is “a great effect”. As he summarized, with the creation of newly created commando squads and sophisticated weapons, “we are [now] feeling confident”.\(^{56}\) Advocates of the Israeli training within the police similarly claimed that its significance was specifically not in terms of replicating Israeli tactics or policies in Mumbai, but rather in rebuilding “confidence” within the Mumbai police (see Chapter 5).\(^{57}\)

The pages of the Protector make this emphasis on confidence building quite explicit. An article by Sivanandan emphasized that public displays of newly acquired equipment by local forces are “meant to infuse confidence among the people of Mumbai about the preparedness of the police force to meet any terrorist attack” (cited in The Protector 2009b: 6). Another article emphasized the increasing physical fitness and agility of the Mumbai police: “A slow-moving cop with a paunch doesn’t inspire much confidence in the public. Which is why Police Commissioner D. Sivanadhan places a hefty premium on the fitness of his force. The Top Cop is putting his men through a fitness regime by making available to them the state-of-the art gymnasiums at most police stations” (The Protector 2009b: 84). In short, “[t]he Mumbai Police is a confident force that inspires confidence in the public” (ibid: 10). What changed after 26/11, then, is the appearance of the Mumbai police has sought to project.

My conversations with officials thus revealed an underlying tension. On the one

\(^{55}\) Interview with K. Subrahmanyam, February 2013  
\(^{56}\) Interview with Anonymous 6, January 2013  
\(^{57}\) Interviews with Deven Bharti, April 2013 and Rakesh Maria, December 2012
hand, their accounts suggested that the policy process took shape in ways that seem to defy considered systematic analysis, with officials suggesting that the imperative to act quickly resulted essentially misguided priorities. On the other hand, some of these same officials nevertheless insisted that the results of this very process were generally positive. So how might we reconcile these two positions? As I argue next, rather than positioning these dynamics in negative terms as a kind of absence of knowledge or lack of foresight on the part of policymakers, this should prompt a reconsideration of how issues of politics and politicization are positioned in relation to issues of securitization and militarization. From observing the physical manifestations of the response and speaking with officials involved in crafting it, is quite clear that the issues were at their core matters of public relations rather than a calculus of the threat of terrorism and how it might be managed. It is specifically by drawing attention to their non-tactical objectives and public visibility that these moves become more intelligible.

4. For your eyes (only): Militarization as political spectacle

In addition to situating urban security policies as threats to public space and democratic activity, critical scholars have shown how security messages can be used to communicate with citizens and would-be terrorists. For instance, chronicling the emergence of various forms of defensive architecture within everyday urban spaces, Coaffee et al. (2009b) argue that such structures can be used to transmit messages to members of the public as well as to potential terrorists. Through these physical structures

58 This term refers to the principle of deterring terrorist attacks or otherwise mitigating the effects of explosives or other weapons as part of architectural design and urban planning. Examples include measures to develop a security perimeter through bollards, fences and gates as well as less overt measures such as the integration of blast-resistant and bulletproof building materials into structural design.
“[t]he public is ‘told’ that a place can be used safely, while would-be perpetrators are ‘told’ that their malign intent is likely to be in vain” (ibid: 496). In doing so, such accounts begin to elaborate a relationship between urban security policies, governments and their publics. Yet whereas critical scholars have focused primarily on the role of these measures in the production of fear and insecurities, I take the discussion of urban security practices and their publics in a different direction. Building on scholars who have examined urban security practices as forms of public spectacle (Boyle and Haggerty 2009), I argue for developing the performative, theatrical elements of urban security policies.

As I noted above, the majority of Indian security commentators have criticized the policy response to 26/11 as ineffectual and misguided. What is also notable about their commentary is their perpetual frustration with the apparent ‘politicization’ of the response (and Indian policing more generally)—i.e. the politicians’ tendency to indulge in theatrical displays of power apparently at the expense of addressing what they deem to be ‘real’ security imperatives. As one such account by Sahni (2009) argued: “In the weeks that have followed […] it seems that politicians are more interested in finding new and theatrical ways of doing nothing, focusing principally on the political and electoral fallout of the Mumbai attacks, rather than on creating capacities to fight the menace [of terrorism]”. As Sahni continued, “the truth is that, far from offering any ‘solution’ to terrorism, these proposals simply confirm that India, today, is a country utterly consumed by irrational belief systems and unexamined faiths. What we see here, is a triumph of form over content, a kind of ‘strategic vaastu shastra’—a symbolic shifting about of doors and windows, a shuffling of spaces, that has no realistic impact on the strength or
utility of the edifice” (ibid). As Sahni explained to me, “the illusion of security is infinitely more important to the political establishment than the creation of actual security or actual capability of response”. 59

The efforts to display newly required procurements were ridiculed along similar lines. As a well-known Indian journalist and policy commentator argued, these attempts to reassure Mumbai’s citizens through the public showcasing of new gadgets and weapons simply revealed the hollow nature of post 26/11 claims of progress. As he recounts: “Mumbai police commandos drew spanking new automatic weapons to eye-level, aiming at imaginary enemies in the distance—a visual metaphor evidently intended to signal to Indians that the government is working to make them safe. But experts who watched the same programme saw in it a graphic illustration of all that is wrong in the ambitious police modernisation programmes underway across India. The laser sights fitted to the police’s new weapons are designed to eliminate the need to raise the weapon to eye-level before taking aim—a lesson the Mumbai police instructors had evidently neglected to tell their students” (Swami 2009b). According to these critics, then, nothing has fundamentally changed about the Indian state’s willingness to take security ‘seriously’ post-26/11: it is all ‘politics’, no substance.

In pursuing this line of critique such accounts have the tendency to situate these ‘irrational’ tendencies problematically in orientalist terms, attributing them to the mindset of the “uneducable Indian” (Sahni 2008a) and thereby implying that officials are somehow blind to the response’s tactical limitations in ‘solving’ the issue of terrorism. As the skeptical remarks from officials above illustrate, this position is clearly untenable. Nevertheless, the focus on ‘politicization’ cannot be so easily dismissed either because

59 Interview with Ajai Sahni, March 2013
these commentators importantly locate the policy response to 26/11 as a form of public relations. So how might we more critically re-think the role of politics in urban security practices?

While essentially agreeing with mainstream commentators like Sahni and Swami that the response must be understood as fundamentally irrational and incoherent, we need to address the issue of ‘politicization’ not as some kind of pathological tendency but as an intelligible and productive force. Instead of invoking it as a convenient catchall to explain why security imperatives are perpetually diverted from their would-be aims, we must take seriously the capacity for theatrical displays of power to act as forms of governance in their own right.

Here Wendy Brown’s (2010) account of the global growth of “walling” provides fruitful avenues for thinking through the theatrical nature of the response to 26/11. Brown grapples with an underlying paradox, namely that although walls do not perform the functions that legitimize their growth, they remain widely popular. Reconciling the tension between walls’ lack of efficacy and their popularity, she argues, requires taking seriously the theatrical and performative nature of borders. According to Brown, then, the fact that walls do not prevent or interdict flows is significant, not simply because these barriers fail to perform their stated goals, but rather because they performatively stage the very function which they are fundamentally incapable of ever achieving.

Brown’s broader theorization of the relationship between changes in state sovereignty and neoliberalism does not concern me here. However, her account is crucial to my argument in two ways. First, I concur with her argument that the theatrical qualities of the response need to be taken seriously for what they are, namely as performative,
aspirational projections of sovereign power. Second, Brown’s approach directs our attention to the popular appeal of contemporary borderings, despite their lack of technical efficacy. This is not to deny the very real exclusionary tendencies and violence of contemporary walls on the individual bodies and populations they govern. Yet it is not sufficient to simply draw attention to the exclusionary effects of walling to explain its proliferation as a global practice.

Following Brown, the focus on police modernization can be best understood as an attempt to ‘arm’ the Mumbai police against charges of weakness and incompetence. It reflects the prerogatives of “keeping up appearances” of police competency in the face of perceived failure (Brownlow 2009). More specifically, the post-26/11 experience shows the need to locate the development of urban security policy in terms of its relation to specific publics, namely the English-speaking, middle class and elite constituencies that protested in front of the Taj after 26/11. In this sense, the post-26/11 experience reflects the importance of grasping the “affective dimensions of state power” in the Indian context, rather than focusing exclusively on its disciplinary roles (Gupta 2012: 38). For instance, throughout the pages of the Protector there is an emphasis on “[r]eaching out to the people” to “encourage participation of people towards the security of the state” (The Protector 2009b: 16). As Sivanandan explained to me, the magazine was an attempt “to have a dialogue with the people…to convey what we have been doing”.

My point here is not to ascertain whether or not these performative and militarized gestures or attempts at public ‘dialogue’ were successful in asserting claims to modern security competence. Despite frequent pronouncements since 2008, the policy response to the attacks in Maharashtra continues to be treated with considerable

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60 Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2013
skepticism. According to a recent news article, the Mumbai police continue to be plagued by virtually all of the same problems cited in the immediate aftermath of 26/11: a lack of adequate firing ranges, sufficient modern weaponry and proper training for constables. For instance, live fire training with AK-47s had to be halted as they exceeded the capacities of local ranges and bullets were straying into populated areas. As the article’s title sums up, the Mumbai police remains “[a] force that has little firepower, even less skills” (Indian Express 2014).

In some quarters, claims about security progress are treated with indifference. As one Marathi newspaper editor explained to me, while middle classes and elites of south Mumbai took to the streets after 26/11 to protest politicians’ perceived negligence, the city’s poor instead “began to internalize what happened”, viewing the attacks as only yet another example of the fact that “this is the kind of life we have to live”. As he pointed out, the fact that approximately 4000 Mumbaikars (residents of Mumbai) die annually from rail accidents alone gives them a different perspective on the state’s promises to provide them with ‘security’. Whether or not the response worked to reassure Mumbaikars that their government would secure their city, however, is not essential to my argument here. The key point is that in the immediate aftermath of 26/11 Maharashtra politicians clearly believed that a rapid program of police modernization was their best hope of doing so. The theatrical nature of the response further suggests that these policy measures cannot be readily understood by seeing security policymaking as an insulated ‘technical’ matter somehow uncontested—either internally within governmental bureaucracies or in terms of the wider relations with their publics. Rather it is emphasize the importance of grasping the securitization of the urban as a contentious and contested

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61 Interview with Kumar Ketkar, April 2013
Yet we can go a step further. The attempt to create a sense of confidence through the highly visible spectacles suggests that these gestures can be understood as forms of politics in their own right. As Thompson (2005: 49) argues, “[t]o achieve visibility through the media is to gain a kind of presence or recognition in the public space, which can help to call attention to one’s situation or to advance one’s cause”. Such mediated forms of visibility are not simply the media through which social and political issues are given voice but have instead “become a principal means by which social and political struggles are articulated and carried out” (ibid, emphasis added). Following Thompson, we can see that the parading of military equipment was not merely a manifestation of political prerogatives of leading Maharashtra politicians but also a kind of “politics of permanent performance” (Blom Hansen 2001a: Ch. 8) through which the postcolonial Indian state “comes into view” – to be seen by certain publics in mediated ways (Corbridge et al. 2005: 7). Indeed, the bold claims about major improvements in Mumbai’s security preparedness since 2008 were clearly not for everyone. They were not a response to a general ‘public’ but rather to members of India’s urban civil society.

Here we can also see the importance of Chatterjee’s attention to the role of populism in the conduct of postcolonial democracy, albeit in a somewhat inverted way. As Chatterjee (2011a: 141) argues, “[o]ne of the key features of modern governmental techniques is the flexibility in the domain of policy—the ability to break up large agglomerations of demands and to isolate specific groups of benefit-seekers from others”. For Chatterjee this represents “the differential mode of responding to democratic demands”. His insight here lies in trying to understand how these differential demands
are then re-constituted as a general, popular claim on the name of “the people”. This is achieved, he argues, through “rhetorical and performative political acts that establish chains of equivalences over different demands” (ibid). His thesis helps to understand the conditions under which “the politics of the governed” can take place where the “the governed” are members of the rural and urban poor, specifically not treated by government institutions as citizens. While my concern is to understand how state authorities sought to address the demands for ‘security’ made by members of Mumbai’s urban “civil society”, Chatterjee’s approach helps us to locate the policy response as a kind of strategic politics that allows “governments to deal with [public] demands in a differential way” (ibid: 147). Yet while the demands were elite-driven and the attempts to restore public “confidence” were clearly not for everyone, the policy response to 26/11 nevertheless took place through a series of populist, performative gestures in the name of protecting “the people”.

Recognizing this helps us move past the binary division between what Marcuse (2006) calls “legitimate and sensible” versus “false and manipulated” responses to terrorist threats - or what Schneier (2003: 38) has termed “security theater” - to draw attention to the importance of security measures to “provide the feeling of security instead of the reality” (emphasis in original). While these distinctions seem straightforward, they retain the rationalist assumption that security policymaking (in general) reflects some dispassionate ‘apolitical’ attempt to calculate and manage the threat of terrorism. In doing so, they problematically imply that the manipulation or politicization of urban security planning represents some kind of aberration. Such a view reinforces a liberal ideal of politics as the consensual resolution of technical problems
(see Mouffe 2005). As a result, these critical accounts fail to make sense of the active efforts by state bodies to contain the conflicts and controversies to which 26/11 gave rise.

My findings further suggest the need to reassess how the material dimensions of militarization and securitization in urban settings relate to their performative and theatrical dimensions. As Aradau (2010) has argued, it is crucial to treat urban securitizations as processes of materialization, by drawing attention to their distinctly physical dimensions. Yet while the focus on the physical and the material are generally taken as signifying a “shift in the referent object of security away from the “spectacular” to the “banal”” (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011: 370), the trends addressed here suggest almost exactly the opposite dynamic. Rather than being indicative of the subtle or stealthy dimensions of securitization, the response to 26/11 has instead focused on very public displays of security competence through spectacles of security competency.

These considerations take us back to concerns about the ways in which the global south is positioned within literature on the urbanization of security (see Chapter 1). While the arguments in this chapter in no way dispute the empirical findings of scholarship based on contexts in the global north, they do raise doubts about their implied universality. The focus on highly visible expressions of sovereignty through forms of public spectacle in postcolonial contexts as well as the endurance of policing approaches from India’s colonial past highlight the importance of contextual difference in trying to make sense of the policy patterns and industry trends that ‘26/11’ produced. Indeed, it is important to emphasize that the policy response to the attacks has actually been quite conservative in many respects.

First, from a tactical perspective, the ‘new’ militarizing imperatives that
materialized after 2008 have not acted as replacements for, or alternatives to, preexisting policing/security strategies in Mumbai. Second, there are other militarizing patterns that actually have nothing to do with police ‘modernization’ at all. Indeed, one of the more noticeable aspects of post-26/11 developments within Mumbai has been the increased physical fortification around strategic sites in the city. These include the Bombay High Court, large railway stations as well as around most police stations in the city with the use of improvised sandbagged bunkers, typically manned by police officers armed with Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) rifles or vintage British Sterling submachine guns. In addition, security perimeters have been set up at numerous other sites around the city, ostensibly to impede and control movement at sites deemed to be most vulnerable. These barriers, however, are constructed from crude steel roadblocks seen across India and are of a decidedly low-tech nature.

As Belur (2011: 420-1) further argues, while the use of stop and search tactics using nakabandi (roadblocks) have long been a staple of the Mumbai police in crime control, following 26/11 their usage has become more widespread in response to public pressure on local authorities “to do something or at least appear to be proactive”. Thus, it would be mistaken to suggest that the influx of new equipment and foreign experts has replaced preexisting approaches to security and spatial control in Mumbai. The militarizing developments I have traced can be better understood as something grafted onto the city’s policing apparatus, often in very ad hoc and partial ways. In fact, a crucial corollary of the theatrical nature of the response is that general everyday policing within the city has been largely unaffected by these developments (see Chapters 6-7). As one former senior IPS officer put it, despite the immediate political pressures to act, “in
hindsight I can say that again, this was a very seasonal approach…we are [now] more or less back to square one except for the fact that we gave raised a unit or…have some more arms”.

**Conclusion**

While certain officials sought to defend the focus on police modernization as an inevitable trend that was simply accelerated by the events of 26/11, I have contested this claim. I have done so by arguing that the response was not a response to the event of 26/11 per se, but rather to its political fallout. These dynamics thereby return us to questions about how to situate the issue of historical change. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, a number of critical scholars have argued that recent securitizing and militarizing developments can be understood as inflections in preexisting trends rather than as entirely novel processes. To a degree this is true of the post-26/11 response in the sense that pre-existing police modernization programs were accelerated by the attacks. Prior to 2008, moreover, Mumbai was already one of the most militarized cities in all of India in the sense that much of its infrastructure was under the direct or indirect control of the Indian navy, the Indian army, and the Mumbai/Maharashtra police departments (Appadurai 2008).

Yet while clearly driven by the concerns of Mumbai’s urban elite, the demand for more ‘security’ post-26/11 notably came from outside the state. Thus in contrast to Lyon’s (2003) account, it is not simply that political actors were given a new pretext for pursuing their longer-standing agendas. Rather, the anti-political sentiments acted as a form of pressure on state authorities to demonstrate that something was being done to

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62 Interview with Jayant Umranikar, February 2013
protect (certain) residents. This distinction might seem somewhat trivial. However, it is important in two ways. First, it matters politically in terms of contesting the determinism of the discourse that surrounded 26/11 as an unproblematic ‘global’ event with obvious policy consequences. It is a reminder that post-26/11 policy decisions were political choices. Second, as we will see in later chapters, this distinction proves crucial in the charting the limits of the policy changes that 26/11 actually produced in Mumbai and India more broadly.

While the scripting of 26/11 as a technical matter played a crucial role in forming public dissent, it is equally important to recognize that this same scripting has ultimately served as an important resource for the GOM and the Mumbai police in negotiating these very same pressures. By focusing on police modernization, moreover, the policy response to 26/11 has effectively upheld the notion that the issue of security preparedness was a narrow technical matter that could be easily solved through the adopting of ‘modern’ militarized approaches to policing and security. In the next chapter I develop these arguments further. I argue that rather than simply ‘responding’ to perceived problems of terrorism (or even political pressures), the swift adoption of various militarized solutions also seem to have an important diagnostic and anti-political effects.
Chapter 5: Re-inventing Best Practice

[W]e [Israelis] have a good reputation in the [security] industry...but again...the way we see it, it’s not really the best...it’s a different approach based on our personal experience and based on the way that we have had to deal with threats, which was less theoretical more practical...[W]e cherish very much [the] fast and [the] efficient, less stylish, less classical...we see a problem and see how best...to solve it.63

Introduction

We have already seen how Israel’s HLS industry tried to capitalize on 26/11 as a moment of ‘opportunity’ to expand its reach into India and I have elaborated upon how Israel’s status as a policy exemplar has been constituted more broadly. While these are essential aspects to understand the focus on Israel as part of the Maharashtra state’s policy response to 26/11, they are at best only half of the story. It is also necessary to address the perspectives of those who decided to learn from Israel.

I have so far argued that the GOM’s policy response to 26/11 must be understood as an exercise in public relations. Building on this claim, I address the kinds of work that deference to Israeli security experts has performed in public debates on urban security in 26/11’s aftermath, paying close attention to references to Israeli urban security knowhow as a ‘best practice’ by Mumbai officials. Learning from Israel can be seen as part of the broader effort to ‘arm’ the Mumbai police against charges of weakness and incompetence. However, it adds something critical: learning from Israel has helped state authorities to diagnose the ‘policy problem’ at hand, helping them to change the conversation about what ‘26/11’ signified and what should be done to address the alleged security gaps that the attacks revealed. I argue that deference to Israeli security experts can be seen as an attempt to negotiate the enduring controversies and conflicts and police the boundaries of ‘failure’, situating best practice as an anti-political strategy of

63 Interview with Anonymous 7, July 2012
governing. By naming Israeli expertise ‘best practice’, Mumbai officials were able to set it up as a policy measure to which one could not reasonably be opposed. What gives best practice its rhetorical force is its ability to institute policy measures that are, by definition, good. Before proceeding, however, I briefly review its basic ‘logic’ of best practice as well as some of the questions it raises in the context of public policy.

Interestingly, the Israelis I interviewed did not see themselves as examples of ‘best practice’. Yet the term came up frequently in my interviews with state representatives in Mumbai, often specifically in relation to Israel. This raised the question of why Indian officials invoked Israel as an urban security best practice whereas the very purveyors of Israeli expertise actively resisted this designation? Were they talking about the same ‘thing’? What is ‘best practice’?

Best practice has emerged as an influential governmental/public policy strategy over the past few decades, characterized by its intuitive, commonsensical appeal (see Chapter 1). As Morrell and Lucas (2012: 184) point out, “[t]he idea that […] there is a model of ‘best practice’ […] is appealing because it suggests a route to effective administration without the substantial costs and risks associated with learning or experiment”. Despite its ubiquity, surprisingly little scholarly attention has been devoted to the production of best practices and their role in policymaking processes, nor are the implications of their diffusion well understood (Bulkeley 2006: 1041).

Moreover, while the ‘logic’ of best practice draws much of its appeal from its intuitive nature, from a critical perspective it raises at least three basic questions. First, how does a given practice or policy become classified as a ‘best practice’? Second, how do policymakers ascertain whether policies labeled as ‘best practice’ were, in fact, ever
successful? Third, how are issues of relevance or ‘fit’ determined? In examining the logic of best practice more closely, I certainly do not want to essentialize it as a singular ‘thing’. Yet as I will show below, it warrants closer attention than it has so far received, particularly because it has become so taken for granted.

There is also much politically at stake in Israel’s representation as a best practice, particularly given the controversy surrounding Israel’s international reputation. In my discussion of Israel’s status as an HLS leader thus far I have made no reference to it as a ‘best practice’ because the term never came up in my discussions with Israeli HLS industry representatives. The few times I did introduce the notion, it either failed to resonate at all or was actively rebuffed. Although the Israeli officials I spoke with did not employ the term, their tireless self-promotion of the ‘Israeli experience’ as an example of success based on real life experimentation through trial and error draws its intuitive appeal from the same logic as that of best practice.

Within mainstream policy studies literature the term is generally taken at face value as an unproblematic governance strategy. Within security studies literature the concept is treated more skeptically though not fully interrogated. For instance, the literature on the privatization of security notes the role of best practice alongside other neoliberal governance regimes like benchmarking and standardization (e.g. Abrahamsen and Williams 2007a: 134; Leander and van Munster 2007: 209). Scholars of urban security planning also refer to best practice (e.g. Coaffee et al. 2009), without elaborating on its specificity as a governing strategy. Literature on policy mobilities and benchmarking has problematized the concept considerably, specifically by contesting the idea that the ‘best’ designation can be taken at its word (e.g. Larner and Le Heron 2004;
McCann 2004; McCann and Ward 2010; Peck 2002; Temenos and McCann 2013; Theodore and Peck 2001). However, the tendency is to put inverted commas around the term and leave it at that. Building on these scholars but also extending their insights further, this chapter seeks to better understand how best practice learning actually works as a regime of governing by examining best practice in practice.

2. Learning from Israel

What is immediately striking about the decision to learn from Israel is its intuitive appeal. Much like the program of military procurement outlined in the previous chapter, the use of Israeli experts in the Maharashtra government’s policy response to 26/11 seems to flow straightforwardly from media portrayals of 26/11 as a technical failure of local capacity. For instance, on the eve of the delegation to Israel, a leading Indian journalist remarked that given the clear deficiencies in the handling of 26/11, it is unsurprising that the Government of Maharashtra “was the first off the block to respond to Tel Aviv’s offer for assistance to export its expertise on counter-terror responses and homeland security” (Sarin 2009a). In justifying their decision to learn from Israel, moreover, Mumbai officials drew on the comparisons between ‘Indian’ and ‘Israeli’ security approaches. After returning from his visit to Israel in 2009, newly appointed Mumbai CP D. Sivanandan declared that, in sharp contrast to Israel, which responds unapologetically to terrorist attacks. India suffered from its lack of a similar “killer instinct”: “For thousands of years, we [Indians] have been passively witnessing terror attacks. We never want to fight with anybody. That’s what our main problem is and we lack the killer instinct” but now “[t]he time has come to protect ourselves and we need to
take utmost safety precautions in the wake of recent audacious terror attacks” (cited in Times of India 2009). He further proclaimed that “[w]e will strongly recommend replication of certain Israeli solutions in India”, praising their standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergency management and asserting that a range of joint training programs were already underway (cited in Sarin 2009a).

Media coverage of the visit to Israel thus gave the impression that some coherent Israeli model for security was available and ready for adoption. One article claimed that the “team will look to develop, with Israeli cooperation, a total security solution for a city like Mumbai in order to prevent another 26/11-type terrorist attack” (Sarin 2009b). Another similarly asserted that, “[t]he decision to visit Israel was taken after a consensus among senior [police] officers and the government, that 26/11 had exposed several chinks in the city’s armour, and plugging them would need a complete overhaul of police’s approach towards security” (Tiwary 2009a). In this way, learning from Israel was portrayed as a kind of catchall solution to a set of alleged technical deficiencies at the local level.

Upon closer inspection, however, the decision to learn from Israel is far from straightforward. First, there was never any obvious need to which the delegation to Israel actually responded. While officials like Sivanandan publically lauded Israeli security solutions, at no point did they specify what was specifically lacking at the local level in terms of technical knowhow nor did they spell out how the use of Israeli security expertise would help to address any alleged gaps. Second, much like the procurement patterns outlined in the previous chapter, the decision to seek lessons from Israel in no way reflected the Pradhan Committee’s findings. While the report makes a number of
recommendations including the need to overhaul the procurement process and an emphasis on more rigorous training, there was no suggestion that foreign expertise was a necessary to improve Mumbai’s security preparedness.

Finally, there were very basic questions of ‘fit’. Even advocates of Israeli HLS solutions raised doubts about its applicability to Indian conditions. As one Indian defense commentator put it, “[w]hile Israeli resolve, training, high-tech security equipment are all worthy of emulation and need to be acquired, transplanting Israeli strategies onto the South Asian context may not be efficacious” (Rajiv 2009, emphasis added). Thus, far from being obvious, the decision to learn from Israel actually raises a number of very basic questions from the outset. How did the use of foreign security experts emerge as a solution to 26/11? What specific needs did they address? Why was Israel chosen as a source of expertise (as opposed to others) and how was its status as a best practice determined?

Unsurprisingly, when questioned, the interested parties invoked the common sense logic of best practice. State officials saw their deference to Israel as completely uncontroversial. As one former officer emphasized, “we thought they [the Israelis] are one of the best in combating urban terrorism and because of that we took the help of an Israeli company”.64 Maharashtra’s ATS chief Rakesh Maria similarly maintained that the impulse to source Israeli trainers for Maharashtra’s newly created commando unit Force One was driven by the need to get the “best in the field”.65 Indeed, police officials presented the impulse as a response to various unspecified needs, which could not be met by local expertise. For instance some told me that Israeli trainers were brought in only in

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64 Interview with Jayant Umranikar, February 2013  
65 Interview with Rakesh Maria, December 2012
cases where “we have fallen short of skills” and because “this kind of training was not available [locally]”.

In addition to seeking possible motivations of best practice adoption, I also asked officials what ‘best’ or ‘good’ actually signifies and how this quality might be ascertained. Just as the impetus for seeking Israeli expertise was presented as obvious, so, too, was the status of ‘best’. As one former Mumbai Police Commissioner told me, “all police organizations are very smart and intelligent and they know which are the best practices”. Others similarly defined best-ness as a tautology, claiming that “Good means they [the Israelis] are the best in the world and there is a perception...Between you and me, Israelis are considered to be the best in security matters. That’s it”. In this way police officials presented best-ness as a global professional consensus rather than a quality they ascertained for themselves, which is consistent with the definition of best practice as “some generally accepted view amongst practitioners of what is a ‘state of the art’ approach” (Brannan et al. 2008: 24).

Yet upon further interrogation official accounts became far less neat. For instance, in explaining how to assess best-ness, one former high-ranking IPS officer claimed that “All this is available today in the Internet world...there is nothing that you don’t know...you know who is the best...[and] who [the] second was”. When I pressed him to elaborate, however, his account became far less definitive: “instead of trying to arrive at who’s the best and who’s not, you...[just] pick from here, pick from there and you’re getting each one”, insisting that “it’s not that only just one person is the best in the world

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66 Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2013  
67 Interview with Jayant Umranikar, February 2013  
68 Interview with P.S. Pasricha, December 2012  
69 Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2013
only and has to be brought*.70 So while designating something as best clearly implies some kind of calculation or comparison, my interviews revealed no evidence that procedures to determine what was ‘best’ had been carried out.

Moreover, though best practice suggests competition between rivals, achieving a ‘best’ designation did not seem to rule out their ‘less-than-best’ peers. Although officials most frequently cited Israel as an urban security exemplar, I was told that other foreign experts from the US, the UK, Germany and Russia also provided various forms of assistance and training after 26/11. In fact, while certain officials maintained that the impulse to source Israeli trainers was driven by the need to get the “best in the field” they also claimed that it was advantageous to get diverse foreign experts and trainers, each apparently offering slightly different (though never specified) attributes. However, there was no evidence to suggest that the attributes of any of these different competitors had been systematically compared with one another.

Furthermore, while the impulse to seek Israeli expertise was presented as a direct response to certain gaps in local knowhow, as I probed which specific deficiencies it might have addressed, such narratives quickly changed course. For instance Maharashtra’s former Home Secretary Jayant Patil explained the decision to go to Israel as part of an impulse to develop a “scientific approach” to counter-terrorism, disaster management and coordination within the Mumbai police. Yet when I asked him if 26/11 had revealed a lack of expertise at the local level revealed by 26/11, he responded: “No, expertise is very much there in [the] Mumbai police; there is no doubt about expertise”.71 Another former senior IPS officer who had stressed the importance of sourcing the ‘best’,

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70 Interview with Anonymous 3, January 2013
71 Interview with Jayant Patil, April 2013
similarly qualified that it was not as though “you needed necessarily only external experts to create that specialization...that was not the case”. 72 In addition to raising questions about the basis for demand, officials also suggested that the contributions of Israeli expertise could not be taken for granted. Even Sivanandan who had publicly advocated for the adoption of an Israeli expertise expressed deep skepticism about its underlying relevance to Mumbai. As he bluntly put it, “Israel is only [a] 7 million population. We are talking about 1.2 billion people! The Israeli model will [therefore] not be applicable to India”. 73

Thus far from presenting a coherent account of why seeking expertise from Israel emerged as a policy prerogative, official accounts in many ways muddied the waters. While invoking the intuitive logic of best practice to explain the impulse to seek Israeli expertise, they also frequently contradicted the basic tenets of this mode of reasoning, referring to local needs as the reason for seeking expertise from Israel but failing to provide a coherent answer to why Israel might be considered ‘best practice’. Although claiming that Israel was ‘best’, they insisted that seeking a range of other less-than-best practices was also somehow necessary. Most surprisingly, the applicability of Israeli security ‘solutions’ to Mumbai - the essential premise of learning from Israel - was put into question by the very officials who had publicly advocated their adoption. Official accounts of best practice thus ultimately failed to really ‘explain’ why learning from others was so essential and what Israel specifically contributed.

The inconsistent official rationalizations of best practice learning might seem to suggest a lack of knowledge on the part of policymakers. Yet such a position suggests

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72 Interview with Anonymous 3, January 2013
73 Interview with D. Sivanandan, March 2013
that officials were somehow blind to the practical limitations of the policy measures that they put into place (see Chapter 4). Officials did seem dogmatically committed to the value of best practice learning. Yet this was not because they were somehow oblivious to its practical limitations. In fact, they were apparently well aware that engagement with Israeli security experts was unlikely to bring about a radical overhaul of local security approaches, with some even going as far as to claim that knowledge transfer was never exactly their ambition to begin with (see Chapter 6).

Making sense of the decision to learn from Israel takes us back to the government’s handling of the HLEC. As I have argued in the previous chapter, the Pradhan report did not serve as the basis of the GOM’s policy response to 26/11, noting that the document was classified and partially rejected just before its scheduled release. Although parts have been selectively leaked to the press, even today it remains officially classified. In this sense, the report has had little direct effect on the nature of the policy response to 26/11, including the decision to send the delegation to Israel. The story, however, is somewhat more complicated. Maharashtra politicians did not simply fail to implement the Committee’s recommendations but actively fought to suppress its findings. At this same time, they undertook a range of very costly policy decisions that did not reflect the Committee’s suggestions. So while the Committee no doubt took its mandate very seriously, it is quite clear that leading state politicians employed it to control public discourse and to pre-empt further political fallout.

Rather than signifying a misguided attempt to solve Mumbai’s security problems, however, the handling by politicians of the Pradhan report can be better understood as an attempt to take the entire conversation about the ‘lessons’ of 26/11 elsewhere. Whereas
the HLEC had focused on a wide range of lapses and problems such as duplication of duties, a lack of basic police firearm training and a failure to follow existing SOPs (see Chapter 4), ‘learning from Israel’ gave the impression that alleged (local) deficiencies could be easily solved by seeking ‘the best’ in technology, training and expertise from the global leader in urban counter-terrorism. As I argue next, making sense of the decision to learn from Israel requires contending with the fact that this move had specifically nothing to do with the HLEC’s findings.

3. Changing the conversation

Interested parties actively leveraged the deference to Israel as a marker of post-26/11 progress. In fact, certain officials with whom I spoke brought up recourse to foreign expertise as proof that their newly created commando units like Force One and QRTs can be considered truly world class. This suggested that the value of the delegation to Israel had something to do with the political optics of associating the Mumbai police with Israeli security experts. Indeed, a number of police officials spoke of the roles of foreign trainers in terms of inspiring public “confidence” much in the way that they explained the focus of the response on the procurement of new weaponry, vehicles and the raising of new commando squads. In this light, deference to Israel can be seen as part of the broader militarizing impulse that has sought to ‘arm’ the Mumbai police against charges of weakness and incompetence.

What deference to Israel adds to this broader pattern is the ability to assert authority by way of association with an allegedly proven case of policy success. For instance, when I asked one senior IPS officer what Israeli trainers brought to the table
that was not available locally, he responded that you want someone with real world “experience”. As he explained, the Israelis have demonstrated credentials of having faced terrorism on a routine rather than merely sporadic basis, making Israeli police trainers an obvious choice.\textsuperscript{74} Thus Israel’s role as a source of ‘combat proven’ knowledge (see Chapters 1 and 3) clearly made the use of Israeli HLS solutions attractive to police officials.

Rather than approaching the appeal of Israeli solutions in some general abstract way, however, I want to situate it politically. Here it is important to recall aspects of the discourse surrounding the representation of 26/11 as a technical failure of local capacity and Israel’s relationship to it. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, media commentaries on the handling of 26/11 referenced to India’s alleged ‘enjoy’ of Israel, for the perceived impunity with which Israel is able to strike ‘terrorists’ in enemy territory. For instance, in an article entitled “India’s Israel Envy”, an Indian politician argued: “Whereas many regard Israel’s toughness as its principal characteristic, India’s own citizens view their country as a soft state, its underbelly easily penetrated by determined terrorists [...] Terrorism has taken more lives in India than in any country in the world after Iraq, and yet, unlike Israel, India has seemed unable to do anything about it”. Others have similarly contrasted the “measured” response of India following 26/11 with the “‘Israeli way’ of dealing with terrorists”, namely offensive retaliatory airstrikes in enemy territory (Rajiv 2009). Clearly, then, Sivanandan’s praise of Israel’s “killer instinct” resonates within these wider popular discussions over India’s so-called ‘soft’ approach to counter-terrorism.

Indeed, India’s perceived unwillingness to take retaliatory military action against Indian terrorists was evident in the response to the 26/11 attacks. The Indian government’s initial response was characterized by a measured approach, focusing on investigation and intelligence gathering rather than immediate military action. This was in contrast to Israel’s swift and aggressive response to similar attacks. However, following the 26/11 attacks, India did take retaliatory military action against Pakistani targets believed to be involved in the attack, demonstrating a shift in its approach to counter-terrorism.

\textsuperscript{74} Interview with Deven Bharti, April 2013
Pakistan following the terrorist attacks represents a constant source of frustration among Indian security and defence commentators. They express concern that “India has shied away from punitive actions against terror groups operating overtly in Pakistani territory”, claiming that “this disinclination is at the core of India’s failed anti-terror policies” (Kumar 2009: 803). Accordingly, at least part of the appeal of traveling to Israel for Indian officials can be seen as a kind of fulfillment of the fantasy of becoming a ‘hard’, militarist state and doing so in a way that helps to consolidate the idea of a common Islamist other. I explore some of the wider geopolitical significance of the delegation to Israel in Chapter 6 but for the remainder of this chapter, I situate the decision to learn from Israel in relation to the local political context of post-26/11 Mumbai, focusing on what Clarke (2012: 34) has termed the “local politics of fast policy”—i.e. the ways in which forms of policy mobility are used by local actors within their respective political struggles.

Here Mountz and Curran’s account of former New York City mayor Rudolf Giuliani’s visit to Mexico City to unveil ‘Plan Giuliani’ as a masculinized performance is particularly instructive. The popularity of Giuliani’s proposals, they argue, does not reflect their capacity to reduce crime. Rather the Plan ‘worked’, they argue, by “produc[ing] a ‘cult of personality’” that leveraged Giuliani’s reputation as a “tough guy” (Mountz and Curran 2009: 1034). As such, Plan Giuliani essentially amounted to a political strategy to enhance the standing of the Mexico City police (ibid). In another context, Swanson (2013: 984) argues that “[t]he transfer of zero tolerance [policing strategies] to Latin America is simply a tool for showcasing get-tough politicians; its only real merit lies in being a great political catchphrase”.
Sivanandan’s endorsement of an Israeli approach to urban counter-terrorism in Mumbai similarly worked by leveraging the regime of truth surrounding the ‘combat-proven’ status of Israeli security experts to bolster the authority of the Mumbai police. As one newspaper claimed, “[p]ost the November 26, 2008 attack, Israel seems to have become the answer to most of Mumbai police’s problems” (Tiwary 2009b). This statement is correct, albeit with one important caveat, which is that the ‘problem’ being solved was a matter of the Mumbai police’s institutional credibility and political standing. This is not to underplay the very real problems within the Mumbai police. It is simply to say that the use of Israeli HLS experts was never intended to bring about a radical overhaul in their approaches to securing the city or policing more broadly. The target of this measure was something else entirely.

In addition to playing a role as a kind of militarized performance of competence, deference to Israel also helped Indian authorities to negotiate a number of controversies to which the handling of 26/11 had given rise. First, politicians (particularly those from the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) tried to make political gains from the perceived mishandling of the attacks by the ruling Congress government. An advertisement taken out by the BJP in major Indian dailies featured the slogan “Brutal Terror Strikes at Will. Weak Government, Unwilling and Incapable”, as well as: “Fight Terror. Vote BJP” (cited in Kolãs 2010: 89).

Second, in addition to the charges of incompetence discussed in previous chapters, there were a number of rumors surrounding the three senior IPS officers, including sitting ATS chief Hemant Karkare, who died during the attacks under mysterious circumstances. These questions re-emerged with the publication of books by
Vinita Kamte, the wife of one of the slain officers (Kamte and Deshmukh 2009) and a bestseller by a retired Indian police officer (Mushrif 2009). While the substance of such allegations is not relevant here, the point is that 26/11 remained a site of controversy and source of pressure on the Maharashtra government and the Mumbai police throughout 2009.

Third, while the Committee’s actual recommendations clearly did not inform the decision to send the delegation to Israel, it was shortly after the decision to withhold the report that the government sent its delegation to Israel to learn lessons on combating terrorism. The press reports on the visit to Israel came only a month after the government had announced its partial rejection of the report. In the context of ongoing calls from the BJP opposition and the Bombay High Court for the release of the Pradhan report, the decision to send the delegation to Israel thus can be seen to have offered the Maharashtra government a temporary diversion. As Vappala Balachandran co-author of the report emphasized, it was curious that “before…[the] Maharashtra government even digested our report, the first action that they took was send a delegation to Israel”. He noted that he and Ram Pradhan “did not want these people [the delegation] to go and get lessons from Israel because what they’re practicing is not applicable here at all. We have a different type of public [in India]”. In a 2011 op-ed, Balachandran went on to challenge

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75 Karkare’s death was deeply significant symbolically. In addition to being one of the most senior IPS officers in the Maharashtra Police at the time of his death, he was leading an extremely controversial case against instigators of Hindutva terror groups surrounding the 2006 Malegaon blasts. Mushrif’s account as well as others have suggested that 26/11 may have been engineered as a conspiracy to kill Karkare and thereby prevent his cases from proceeding against a number of high profile figures in the RSS from going forward.

76 Newly appointed ATS Chief (Mumbai’s current Commissioner of Police) Rakesh Maria threatened to resign in protest over questions raised about his activities during 26/11 by Vinita Kamte and others around the first anniversary of the attack.

77 Interview with Vappala Balachandran, January 2013

78 Ibid
the premise of these excursions, arguing that such “[f]oreign jaunts […] will not improve our counter-terrorist methodology”, insinuating that the Maharashtra Government’s impulse to send its officials abroad was designed as a diversion from the report (Balachandran 2011). Referring to the Israel delegation he stated, “[o]ne wonders whether such prompt action was taken on the recommendations we made on the systemic improvement of counter-terrorist methodology, which would not have cost a penny” (ibid).

The delegation to Israel did more than simply divert attention from the report: it helped to frame the understanding of the problem of Mumbai’s ‘urban security’ in a particular way. Walters’ (2008) approach to “anti-policy” (see Chapter 1) provides a crucial vantage point from which to analyze the GOM’s impulse to learn from Israel. Rather than simply ‘responding’ to a set of pre-existing policy problems, Walters argues forms of anti-policy play a key role in their very constitution. Anti-policy schemes “do not address racism, corruption, terrorism, crime, etc. in general”, but instead deal with them as very particular formulations (Walters 2008: 275).

We can see this performative tendency in Indian officials deference to Israeli security experts following 26/11. Following Israeli ‘best practices’ became generative of the ‘policy problem’ by helping to uphold the notion that the ‘failure’ of 26/11 was attributable to a lack of ‘modern’ counter-terror expertise within the Mumbai police. As other empirical studies have shown, instead of providing technical solutions to existing policy problems, “the significance of best practices […] lie[s] in the provision of a new concept, or understanding, of the policy problem and its potential solutions” (Bulkeley 2006: 1040). As Bulkeley goes on to point out, “this is not to imply that such processes
unproblematically lead to policy learning, nor that such learning can be readily identified” (ibid, emphasis added).

In a similar way we can see that sending officials to Israel helped the Maharashtra government to diagnose Mumbai’s security ‘problems’ thereby offering the potential to (re)make the issues at hand. Whereas the Pradhan report focused on deep institutional and coordination problems within the Mumbai police, a lack of basic police training, political interference and red tape in the police’s procurement process, recourse to Israeli expertise gave the impression that problems were attributable to a lack of specialized knowhow, which could be easily solved by learning from Israel. This move allowed the government of Maharashtra to frame the policy problem on its own terms. In other words, deferring to Israel helped the Government of Maharashtra to define 26/11’s security lapses as a narrow technical matter, ignoring the findings of their own executive committee. Following Li (2007: 267), we could say that deference to Israel emerged more “from a proposed solution rather than from a unified specification of a problem”, although even the substance of the proposed Israeli ‘solutions’ was never publicly elaborated in any concrete way.

This diagnosis has also helped the GOM to police the very terms of ‘failure’ by “patrolling the facts” (Ericson 1989) about how the events of 26/11 unfolded and the specific lapses they may have revealed. As the handling of the Pradhan report suggests, Maharashtra politicians were far less interested in finding out about the existence of potential security lapses and how they could be remedied than they were in looking for ways in which they could solve the issue of terrorism on their own terms. The efforts by governmental authorities to suppress the report’s findings have thus given rise to the
paradoxical situation where, although there is virtual consensus that the handling of 26/11 represents a failure of local capacity, an understanding of what exactly failed remains far less clear.

Indeed, the policy response has worked to obfuscate important details about how the attack actually unfolded and who or what might be responsible for any alleged security lapses. As one commentary noted a year after the attacks, “[t]he political class has effectively capitalized on the 26/11 tragedy to its own advantage” by preventing the Indian public from understanding “the real issues behind this tragedy as well as other issues of governance” (Teltumbde 2009: 12). Thus while I have situated the policy response to 26/11 in terms of its visibility, we can also observe a rather opposite tendency within the response based on making certain things disappear. As Brownlow (2009: 1697), points out, “[p]erceived safety […] is as much a product of what is made visible as what is suppressed or made invisible”.

So far we have seen that deference to so-called Israeli best practices has been used to demonstrate some kind of claim to authority by way of association with the “killer instinct” of Israel. As I pointed out above, official accounts of best practices were hardly smooth or straightforward. They repeatedly failed to make sense, even on their own terms. While their accounts of learning were incoherent and contradictory and did not readily explain anything, what my conversations with officials did quite clearly reveal was that best practice claims were self-affirming. Embedded in the ‘best’ designation is a not so subtle normative judgment that effectively justified the impulse to seek Israeli expertise. Indeed, throughout my encounters with officials, the premise of learning served as an end in itself that was used to rationalize foreign delegations. As Maharashtra’s
former ATS Chief emphasized to me: “There is no point in reinventing the wheel again when there is something better already available in the market. So if they’re having some capability [elsewhere]…why *not* know from them?”.

Apparently surprised by my question about why police officials chose to engage with foreign experts following 26/11, Sivanandan put it even more simply, telling me that “They [foreign experts] come here, so we are meeting them”.

In this way the very opportunity to ‘learn’ from elsewhere became its own justification where the mere existence of allegedly superior technology and expertise was presented as the chief reason to seek it out. Officials also sought to present the issue of superiority as a closed matter of professional consensus, sufficiently obvious as to defy the need of any kind of analysis or discussion. In fact, my search for the ‘reasons’ behind the impulse to seek best practices was effectively rebuffed by officials, who claimed that their decisions were so obviously beneficial as to actually preclude the need for any explanation. During these conversations I was frequently challenged about my apparent skepticism regarding best practices, with officials stressing that they could see no downsides of ‘learning’ from others. They effectively inverted my question of ‘why learn?’ into ‘why *not* learn’? Best practices are best, they claimed, *because* they are best, and therefore inherently good, essentially irrespective of any other consideration. These elusive, even evasive dimensions of best practice claims therefore point to the need to address questions about how mobile schemes may intersect with questions about the politics surrounding questions of ‘urban security’.

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79 Interview with K.P. Raguvanshi, February 2013
80 Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2013
4. Best practice as depoliticization

In the previous chapters, I have begun to trouble the idea of a clear divide between politics and technical matters. In Chapter 2 I emphasized that the anti-politician backlash did not signal the end of public debate but rather gave rise to the emergence of a new (and very particular) kind of “political anti-politics” (Hindess 1997) of security through which critiques of Indian politics and corruption became entangled with policy prescriptions about what should be done in the attacks’ aftermath. The framing of 26/11 as a technical failure was a crucial part of what actually made the event politically contentious. Building on the concerns about literature on governmental technologies and the political identified in Chapter 1, I want to extend these arguments in two ways: first, by locating the anti-political implications of best practice learning as part of, rather than alternative to politics and second, by contesting the idea that best practice learning works to depoliticize matters of security simply by rendering erstwhile political issues as technical ones.

As we have already seen, officials used a language of best practice to suggest that the impulse to ‘learn’ from Israel was effectively beyond question. We can also see that embedded within the ‘logic’ of best practice there is a decidedly “anti-political” tendency in the sense that it substitutes a communicative rationality of politics with a “one-sided” form of technocratic rationality (Schedler 1997: 12). In this respect the language of best practice has worked to “‘predetermine’ decisions and/or social and public outcomes” (Büsher 2010: 34) as somehow natural or preordained. As Morell and Lucas (2012: 187) point out, calls to adopt ‘best practices’ in policy discussions represent “an attempt to depoliticize (rhetorically) and strip away ideological aspects to activities and practices
that are inherently political and ideological”.

Given that the core ‘logic’ of best practice is a technocratic one, it has an obvious resonance with Rose and Miller’s (1992) Foucauldian-inspired account of governmental technologies and related debates about the privatization and depoliticization of security (see Chapter 1). These approaches are helpful to a degree. As illustrated above, the use of Israeli experts has worked to diagnose the policy problem of security preparedness in a narrow ‘technical’ way. Yet thinking about best practice as a technology of governing, which offers a clean alternative to ‘politics’, is neither terribly helpful in understanding the case at hand nor does it provide a fruitful way to approach the anti-political dimensions of urban security policymaking in general.

While sharing many of the same concerns as Rose and Miller, Barry (2002) has critiqued such Foucauldian approaches for framing politics as excessively technical. This, he argues, has the problematic tendency to render strategies of governing as purely instrumental activities or techniques. As he reminds us: “Politics, after all, is both about contestation, and the containment of contestation [...] It is about conflict, negotiation and the resolution of conflict” (ibid: 270). So while acknowledging that politics can assume a technical quality, it is critical to resist the impulse to frame politics as a smooth (and purely technical) matter. As he further points out, “what is commonly termed politics is not necessarily – or generally – political in its consequences” (ibid: 270). That is, “[p]olitics can often be profoundly anti-political in its effects: suppressing potential spaces of contestation; placing limits on the possibilities for debate and confrontation. Indeed, one might say that one of the core functions of politics has been, and should be, to place limits on the political” (ibid). Seen in this light the depoliticizing implications of
best practice ‘learning’ (and the response to 26/11 more broadly) clearly do not signify an end of politics, even though the deference to Israel clearly helped to delimit space for disagreement about the meaning of ‘urban security’ in Mumbai.

Although best practice learning offered local officials a convenient technocratic language to frame their activities, this should not be seen as evidence that they were in fact implementing some predefined (technical) policy regime. As will become clear in Chapter 6, they were clearly not. While asserting what some refer to as a “pretense to economic measurement and calculation” (de Goede 2008b: 295), what is quite striking about the process of ‘learning’ from Israel is the absence of any engagement with systematic comparisons of any kind. Determining Mumbai’s security needs or Israel’s status as a best practice did not take place through some process of ranking or benchmarking. While the delegation to Israel was legitimated on the basis of a need to seek various technical fixes, there is nothing particularly technical about this entire episode. This raises questions about how learning from Israel actually worked anti-politically.

Walters’ (2008) approach to anti-policy offers some important insights in this regard. Just as it is tempting to see anti-policy as a kind of policy that is simply against something, it is equally tempting to suggest that anti-policy goes hand-in-hand with processes of depoliticization. There is good reason for this particularly because anti-policy schemes take place through the imposition of technocratic expertise onto a field that might ordinarily be understood as a site of political controversy. Yet, as Walters points out, this is the case in all governmental schemes rather than something specific to anti-policy regimes. In this sense reading anti-politics in terms of the imposition of a
technical rationality is too general to do much explanatory work.

Walters therefore argues that two additional criteria are necessary to forge a more robust connection between anti-politics and anti-policy. The first is what he calls the “externalization effect,” whereby the state is positioned as a source of protection and security rather than as the source of the problems that anti-policy schemes claim to address (Walters 2008: 281). Second, and more pertinent here, is what Walters calls the “blackmail of security” (ibid) which sets up anti-policy regimes as something which one cannot possibly be against. As he puts it: “Anti-policy draws lines. It identifies a series of bad things and positions us in a certain way: either you are with us, or you side with the forces of chaos and disorder” (ibid 281-2).

We can see that best practice learning works in a similar way. By naming Israeli expertise ‘best practice’, Mumbai officials were able to set it up as a policy measure to which could not reasonably be opposed. What gives best practice its rhetorical force, then, is not simply its capacity to render erstwhile political issues as technical matters but rather because it makes a move that is, by its own tautological definition, good (see Wolman et al. 1994: 846). Asking why something that has already been normatively anointed as ‘best’ is worthwhile pursuing simply does not get very far. As I quickly found out, claims to ‘bestness’ proved to be slippery and even resistant to interrogation (see Peck 2002: 357; Peck and Theodore 2010: 206; Temenos and McCann 2013: 350). Official accounts of best practice effectively foreclosed the very premise of inquiry by presenting the efficacy of certain practices as simultaneously self-evident yet immune from analysis—a foregone conclusion not amenable to reevaluation or debate. For instance, when I tried to press Sivanandan about how the decision to seek lessons from
Israel emerged, he responded that “It was a need, it was [decided] with the best of intentions and the best of knowledge…done”.\(^{81}\) In this way the self-referential ‘logic’ of best practice provided officials with a façade of intuitiveness behind which they could quite readily hide. Moreover, the loose qualities of best practice ‘learning’ are not incidental; they are rather a central part of its work as an elusive strategy of governing.

Though official rationalizations were inconsistent, paradoxical and incoherent, the various contradictions embedded in them proved to be an convenient way to reassemble the ‘facts’ of 26/11 into a new narrative of endless learning and modernization which highlights certain developments while making other dimensions disappear. Specifically, deference to Israeli best practices has been used to simultaneously ‘respond’ to public misgivings over Mumbai’s security preparedness, yet to do so in a way that is somehow not an indictment of local incompetence.

This seems to be one of the most important features of best practice schemes that operate without any discernible standard: they can claim to improve security preparedness in ways that somehow do not displace pre-existing local approaches. Though this clearly defies the basic functionalist logic that serves as the underlying premise of best practice adoption, it has an element of expediency to it. While the visit to Israel can be portrayed as straightforward, functionally driven, and beyond the realm of debate, because there is never an Israeli ‘standard’ that is ever defined, there are no specific grounds on which to even assess, let alone contest, the claims to efficacy. In criticizing the logic of best practice learning, some have pointed to the tendency of Indian officials to “cherry pick our preferred ‘innovations’ from international examples […] or along personal proclivities and preferences” after 26/11 (Sahni 2012). As a strategy of

\(^{81}\) Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2013
governing, however, best practice learning notably institutionalizes these seemingly kneejerk impulses as a kind of ‘common sense’ that need not (and cannot) be readily explained.

All of this suggests the need for greater care and precision in the way we think about how security policymaking relates to questions of politics and the political. Simply saying that the rendering of security issues as objects of techno-managerial strategies depoliticizes them is simply too easy. Nor is such a move terribly productive analytically. It tells us precious little about how these schemes actually function and how practices of security governance might differ in character from other kinds of institutional strategies or regimes.

*Conclusion*

I began this chapter by noting an apparent paradox, namely that although Israeli HLS industry representatives never employed the term ‘best practice’ in relation to their products and services, the police and government authorities in Mumbai frequently invoked the ‘Israeli experience’ of fighting terrorism as such. In concluding this chapter I want to suggest that this difference in how Israeli security is named matters in at least two ways. First, it signifies that the ‘Israeli approach’ to HLS or counter-terror is an elusive notion. ‘It’ exists only to the extent to which others employ Israeli security solutions and becomes defined through these encounters. Second, Indian authorities’ propensity for referring to Israeli urban security knowhow as a best practice speaks to what an association with Israel does *for them* in relation to their own particular policy dilemmas and political controversies. In the case of post-26/11 Mumbai we can say that Israeli best
practices were specifically not a set of concrete policy prescriptions that local authorities simply appropriated. They were, rather, very much inventions of local political actors themselves, albeit ones that drew on and reinforced Israel’s as an HLS capital. As Peck (2011a: 792-3) points out, “best-practice models […] are not […] molecules circulating within an extraterritorial space, ‘touching down’ or ‘getting picked up’ by earth-bound policy actors; rather they occupy the same earthly domains as the policy-makers themselves” (emphasis in original).

How the ‘Israeli approach’ to security is named, then, suggests that its significance very much depends on the kinds of problems that those who claim to adopt ‘it’ are seeking to address. In this chapter I have also made a case for why the appropriation of policy exemplars should be positioned in relation to political debates and public controversies on matters of security. While Israeli actors ironically played an important role in creating 26/11’s political fallout through their criticism of local authorities (see Chapter 2), they also provided a number of important resources for the resolution of these very same pressures. My argument is not that seeking Israeli security solutions always or necessarily reflects anti-political imperatives. Nor is it to suggest that best practice is a singular modality of governing. Other policymakers elsewhere might well (re)invent their own ‘best practice’ schemes in different ways.

This chapter does, however, make a case for the political conditions to be placed front and center in terms of understanding why policy models become salient as strategies of governing. When public officials begin speaking of the necessity of adopting some best practice to solve a given problem, there is every reason to be suspicious. The decision to seek Israeli expertise following 26/11 also transcends the specificity of this
case in certain ways. It points to the growing reality that “the urban policymaking process has become increasingly relativized; it has become an interurban process” (Peck 2011c: 43, emphasis in original). That is, ‘local’ policy must be understood as necessarily bound up with activities and actors elsewhere. These interactions may serve to generate certain pressures and controversies but also potentially offer possibilities for their resolution. As we will see in the next chapter, however, this does not mean that Mumbai authorities simply replicated an ‘Israeli model’ of urban security.

In India...everything is urgent until they [Indians] have to respond or take action.
We are waiting patiently...

As for HLS in India I do not think that I have much to offer [in relation to my research] as I understood long back that I do not know how to play the “selling to government game” in India so we are focusing on selling to private companies and approach quote[s] to government only through [a] third party. 82

Introduction

The impetus to seek so-called Israeli ‘best practices’ by the Maharashtra government forms part of a strategy to negotiate the political fallout of 26/11 and concerns about the perceived weakness of the Mumbai police. Is the whole affair reducible to an empty political spectacle, then, or was anything tangible actually transferred, copied or otherwise imparted from Israel to Mumbai? In short, what travels? This question is all the more pertinent as the literature on the urbanization of security seems to imply a global convergence around specific practices, tactics and policy ‘models’ in controlling urban spaces. For all of these reasons the issue of what actually moves geographically in terms of technology, tactics and expertise is clearly an important one. Yet answering it proves less than straightforward. Although Mumbai officials had publicly recommended the use of Israeli security ‘solutions’, finding any specific information about such solutions has proved elusive.

There are two main reasons for this. The first is the methodological challenge of actually “following the policy” (Peck and Theodore 2012). The secretive nature of security issues makes it difficult to trace the trajectories of tactics and expertise from one location to another, reflecting a broader methodological challenge within research on policing agencies (Coleman forthcoming). Second, as the above quotation indicates, the

82 Email correspondence with Israeli management and investment firm, July 2012
actual work of Israelis in Mumbai (and India more generally) turned out to be less extensive than was initially suggested in the media. In this sense there is simply less ‘policy’ to actually follow than the public rationalizations of the visit to Israel would suggest. The story of Israeli involvement in post-26/11 Mumbai might thus be simply written off as a non-event—something that simply didn’t happen and the story would end here.

To be sure the story of Israeli involvement in Mumbai is clearly one about interruptions, frictions and challenges faced in the project of moving knowledge from one location to another and these should not be underplayed. In fact they are crucially important to understanding how the political economy of Israel’s HLS industry actually works. Yet to limit ourselves to specific tactics, technologies or security strategies that moved from Israel to Mumbai would be to negate the ways in which the interactions between Israel and Mumbai have worked to produce various forms of knowledge, albeit ones that have little to do with publicly declared objectives of ‘learning’ from Israel.

The central argument of this chapter therefore is that the production of ‘success’ actually had little to do with the straightforward geographic movement of expertise and technology from Tel Aviv to Mumbai. As I will show, the production of success is about sustaining contradictory patterns simultaneously: producing a picture of radical security reform without any real change in everyday policing; learning from Israel in a ways that do not displace the so-called ‘Indian model’ of policing; and ‘experiencing’ Israeli success first-hand but without actually finding out anything radically new or unexpected.

In this sense we might think about best practice as a kind of empty signifier of policy
change. Nevertheless, I will show that the interactions between Israeli and Mumbai officials have important discursive and exclusionary repercussions.

1. Encountering ‘India’

   As we have seen, 26/11 was actively seized upon as an opportunity to promote Israeli HLS firms in India. The Israeli intervention, however, did not come out of nowhere. Since the early 1990s the ties between Israel and India have gradually been strengthened, resulting in an increasingly close bilateral alliance (Inbar 2004; Kumaraswamy 1995, 2002, 2010; Oza 2007; 2014). In fact, in recent years Israel has emerged as the fourth largest supplier of weapons to India (Karny 2014), which is one of the fastest growing military markets in the world. Between 2009-2013, India became the single largest buyer of weapons accounting for 14% of global arms imports (Wezeman and Wezeman 2014).

   Although Israel accounted for only 6% of total arms imports to India during this period, Indian purchases account for 33% of Israel’s total arms exports (ibid). Reliable figures for the size of India’s HLS market are more difficult to obtain because this sector is less well defined (Nagaraj 2012) and weapons sales for domestic (non-military) use are not covered by organizations like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which monitor international arms transfers. The Indian HLS market also covers everything from the budget of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs through all state government expenditures on policing but it also includes the security projects for private industry spanning hospitality, heavy industry and finance to high tech. However, private sector reports have consistently estimated it to be one of the fastest growing HLS markets
in the world, which is expected to become one of the largest in the world in the coming decade (see Chapter 7).

Although 26/11 was leveraged as a point of entry for the Israeli HLS industry into India (see Chapter 2), Israel’s efforts to enter the Indian marketplace actually predate the attack slightly. As Guy Zuri explained, this effort began in 2007 through the Shavit Program. This IEICI-led initiative sought to position HLS companies within India in light of opportunities created by the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi.83 As one Israeli marketing director remarked, “It’s a big market, [so] the eye was on it all the time” even before 26/11.84 So what changed with respect to Israeli HLS initiatives in India after 2008?

One area that did open up for some Israeli HLS firms was police training. As Leo Gleser, the founder of ISDS told me, although he had worked on securing industrial facilities in India since the early 1990s for some of the country’s largest corporations like Reliance Industries, 26/11 gave his firm new opportunities to work with special units and the police within Maharashtra and beyond.85 Other Israeli firms like Max Security Solutions also developed local training facilities, though their representatives refused to confirm or deny whether they had worked with the Mumbai police or any other official agency in India. Some major Israeli HLS players like Magal S3 also formed a joint partnership with the Indian firm Veecon to form Veecon Magal Security Systems Ltd. in 2012. The Israeli firm B.G. Ilanit Gates and Urban Elements, which makes various security barriers and anti-crash bollards has moved its entire production to Gujarat and

83 Interview with Guy Zuri, August 2012
84 Interview with Anonymous 7, July 2012
85 Despite the longer-standing bilateral ties, Israel’s role in training Indian forces in defense and counterterrorism prior to 26/11 had been fairly limited (Peraino 2008).
formed an Indian subsidiary B.G.I Engitech Pvt. in order to take advantage of reduced labor costs and more readily target the Indian HLS market.\textsuperscript{86} A BGI security barrier is installed around the Bombay Stock Exchange. Thus certain Israeli HLS firms clearly have managed to sell their products services to some public agencies within India since 2008.

The expectations of large HLS contracts with the public sector, however, have generally proven premature. During my conversations with Israeli agents and contractors who sought work in India following the attacks, I was told countless anecdotes of firms that entered India with the hopes of securing major public sector contracts but ultimately came up empty handed. For example, the state-owned Israel Military Industries (IMI) Academy announced a joint venture with the Indian corporation Zicom to develop a police training facility in Mumbai (derivatives.capitaline.com 2009) but the partnership ultimately fell through.\textsuperscript{87} Even established Israeli security firms like Orad Control Systems and Athena GS\textsuperscript{3} that had opened offices in India were forced to exit the market entirely, complaining of high operating costs and lower than expected profits.\textsuperscript{88}

As Guy Zuri, told me, by 2010 a number of Israeli firms that entered India around 2008 returned to Israel because the Indian market, as he put it, “is kind of immature”, noting that to date there has not been any major HLS project in India awarded to an Israeli firm. As he summarized: “We are not there yet”.\textsuperscript{89} A number of representatives I spoke with raised questions about whether 26/11 had actually changed anything regarding the willingness for Indian public agencies to take security matters ‘seriously’

\textsuperscript{86} Skype interview with Amitava Mittra, January 2013
\textsuperscript{87} Interview with Kalyon Subbarao, December 2012
\textsuperscript{88} Interviews with Rami Zarchi, August 2012 and Omer Laviv, August 2012
\textsuperscript{89} Interview with Guy Zuri, August 2012
once the initial fallout from 26/11 had dissipated (see Chapter 7). Quite surprisingly, then, the strong bilateral relationship between India and Israel seems not to have had a significant impact on the number of Israeli HLS firms working in India. What did change was the demand for Israeli security systems on the part of luxury residential complexes, high-tech campuses and the hospitality industry. Accordingly, this is where the majority of Israeli HLS firms that remained in India have focused their attention.

Thus despite extensive efforts by Israeli authorities to position themselves within India in the aftermath of 26/11, many attempts have come up short. To be sure in July 2009 the Maharashtra government did send an official delegation to Tel Aviv and there have been some interactions of Israeli trainers with special units in the Maharashtra and Mumbai police since 2008. Reports of Israeli trainers working with special units in Mumbai remain ongoing (Mengle 2012), though there have also been reports that high costs and the lack of funds have constrained the use of Israeli trainers by the Mumbai police (NDTV.com 2010; Kumar 2011).

2. So what...travels?

The effects of learning from Israel are far from definitive. On the one hand, my discussions with officials who traveled from Mumbai to Israel suggested that the delegation did not result in a straightforward transfer of counter-terror expertise or security technology from Israel to Mumbai. Those who traveled to Israel struggled to recall any substantive lesson or tactic that they had picked up during their stay. In fact, some officials rejected the publicly declared aims of the visit, stressing that the delegation’s significance was not about the straightforward transfer of know-how, skills
or technology from Israel to Mumbai.

For instance, when I asked one former high level Maharashtra Home Ministry bureaucrat whether there was something particularly impressive about the Israeli security “solutions” the delegation had observed, she responded: “There are no solutions...It’s a question of how...in a situation like this in these issues [of terrorism], what is your preparedness, how are you prepared?” 90 Even Sivanandan seemed to backpedal from his bold statements outlined in the previous chapter. When asked about the delegation to Israel in interview in the first issue of the Mumbai Protector, he stresses that: “The Israeli trip is only a study group’s visit. It is too early to say that we have done any thing with Israel […] we have [only] seen how they are working and if there is anything to learn from them” (The Protector 2009a: 12). Others actively involved in promoting India-Israel security cooperation went even further claiming that the purpose of such delegations has little to do with their public rationalizations. As one private Indian businessman involved in organizing delegations of Indian officials to Israel cynically told me, although visits by officials are publicly rationalized under the auspices of “learning” through first-hand encounters, the purpose of these trips is “for a holiday, nothing else” and employed as part of broader strategies to influence officials and “win their feeling”. 91 Another senior IPS officer claimed that delegations and security conferences “are just a big racket” and that little of any substance typically comes out of them, except, of course, that their organizers are able to line their own pockets. 92

All of this seems consistent with the elusive qualities of best practice ‘learning’

90 Telephone interview with Chandra Iyengar, May 2013
91 Interview with Anonymous 8, December 2012
92 Interview with Rajnish Seth, January 2013
examined in Chapter 5. Indeed others further stressed that the role of foreign trainers was less a matter of transferring concrete tactics or developing specific skills. For instance, former ATS Chief Rakesh Maria maintained that the single most important post-26/11 development within the police has been the rise of “mental preparedness” among officers, which he saw as a matter of “confidence”. Such confidence, he argued, is a direct outcome of the expertise, SOPs, equipment and training imparted by the Israelis and others.93 Another senior IPS officer similarly emphasized that the role of foreign trainers was to help to develop mock drills, simulations and other “actually faced scenarios” from real-life experiences in the field, which he argued helped to “build confidence” within the newly created local units like Force One and the QRTs.94 Certain officials I spoke with also mentioned specific contributions from the Israeli trainers who worked with local forces. For instance, one former senior IPS officer spoke of Israeli trainers’ expertise in “built-up area intervention” for hostage rescue and disaster management operations as well as some “good practices” in shooting and training in the Israeli martial art Krav Maga.95

Yet even these advocates of foreign trainers categorically rejected any suggestion that a foreign ‘model’—Israeli or otherwise—had been taken up by the Mumbai police. For instance, when I asked the Force One Commander about the alleged use of an Israeli model in building the unit (e.g. NDTV.com 2010), he retorted, “We don’t have any such model...Our models are Indian”. So while maintaining that the Israelis have proven useful, Seth was adamant that the training local officers received did not displace Indian approaches. As he and other officials insisted, Israeli trainers merely supplemented the

93 Interview with Rakesh Maria, December 2012
94 Interview with Deven Bharti, January 2013
95 Interview with Anonymous 3, January 2013
roles of Indian trainers from the Indian Army and national paramilitary bodies like the NSG.

It is difficult to gauge the impact of any of these above-cited contributions for at least three additional reasons. First, matters of strategy and tactics within Indian police agencies are typically shrouded in secrecy, making it difficult to trace subtle transformations in operational logics and tactics over time. Second, as I pointed out in Chapter 4, a number of other foreign trainers have worked with local authorities, making it all the more difficult to disentangle the Israelis’ specific contributions. Third, although some journalists have voiced doubt about the capacities and operational structure of Force One (Thomas 2010; Naik 2012; Indian Express 2014; Kumar 2014), to date such special units have never been deployed in any actual terrorist incident, making any assessment of their tactics and capabilities challenging.

What is clear is that any tactical changes which have come about as a result of the interactions with Israelis are a far cry from the publicly declared aims of the delegation, which portrayed its purpose as a radical technologically-driven overhaul of the city’s approach to counterterrorism around supposed Israeli ‘solutions’. The current literature on the new military urbanism is unclear about whether the diffusion of urban security expertise leads to policy convergence. Notwithstanding the analytical challenges described above, convergence can be rather easily ruled out. Mumbai’s approach to counter-terror has not in any meaningful way become ‘Israeli’ and there are at least two very simple reasons for this outcome. First, Israeli firms simply did not secure the large-scale public contracts they had hoped for. Second, even those firms that did gain access also faced practical challenges of ‘applying’ their solutions to local personnel on the
Israeli HLS contractors themselves questioned the extent to which their ‘solutions’ were applicable beyond the country, emphasizing that forms of adaptation were necessary to meet the needs of their foreign clients. In Chapter 5 I showed that even advocates of ‘Israeli approaches’ to security raised serious doubts about whether these supposed best practices were in fact applicable to conditions in India. Following directly from these concerns, a number of Mumbai police officials suggested that the policing conditions faced on the ground in Mumbai constrained the extent to which Israeli security tactics could be applied. For instance, when I asked one senior IPS officer P.K. Jain about potential problems in adopting lessons from Israel to Mumbai, he told me that “yes, some of the things we have seen [in Israel] would be a problem [to apply in India] because…The numbers in our country are humongous”. As he emphasized, “the crowds that we have [in India], we didn’t see anywhere in Israel, or anywhere in the world”.96

Such issues of scale were not the only cited impediment to adopting Israeli counterterror solutions in Mumbai. For instance, Jain suggested that discrepancies in security preparedness between India and Israel stemmed from irreconcilable cultural/structural differences between the two countries. As he explained of Israel, “their [security] systems are slightly better…because their policy is different [and] their people are different. Their people are more security conscious [than in India]…because they have been fighting a war ever since they’re born”.97

Even some Israelis who worked with the Mumbai police conceded as much, noting a range of practical and cultural barriers preventing the straightforward transfer of

96 Interview with P.K. Jain, March 2013
97 Ibid
Israeli ‘solutions’ to their Indian counterparts. As Leo Gleser emphasized, “our [Israeli] society and the Indian society are very different, very different” noting the lack of general familiarity of handling modern firearms in India when compared to Israel.\textsuperscript{98} These applicability concerns also apparently proved to be more than merely hypothetical. For example, a former IPS officer who was involved with Israeli trainers working on the ground in Mumbai recounted that when Israeli experts arrived to Mumbai to train local forces, they showed a training video depicting a scenario in which an Arab-looking terrorist suspect was intercepted by security personnel just before carrying out a grenade attack in Tel Aviv. As he recalled, however, he had doubts that this tactic would be applicable to Indian conditions, because “the scale, the magnitude, [and] the numbers [in India] are very daunting”.\textsuperscript{99} He told me that he therefore asked the Israeli trainer to accompany him to Mumbai’s central railway station CST at rush hour. Umranikar laughed as he recalled that immediately upon observing the scene there, the Israeli trainer told him: “I withdraw my remarks; these things won’t work here”.\textsuperscript{100} An Israeli CEO, whose firm sought work in India post-26/11, recounted an almost identical story of encountering Delhi’s main rail station where he was scarcely able to even move through the dense and chaotic crowd. In light of his experience, he told me that “due to the size and the amount of people [in India], some of the [security] problems they have are not really solvable...There is nothing I can offer them. There is no way, from a security point of view, that you can do a real management of threat for a million people in one hour”.\textsuperscript{101}

Some officials claimed these challenges could be overcome through forms of

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Leo Gleser, July 2012
\textsuperscript{99} Interview with Jayant Umranikar, February 2013
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid
\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Omer Laviv, August 2012
adaptation. As one pointed out, “whatever expertise you acquire abroad, unless you can assimilate and adapt it to Indian conditions, your unit will never be successful”, emphasizing that “it is not that we adopted the whole [Israeli] training”.\textsuperscript{102} Another former senior IPS officer put it slightly differently, emphasizing that even after deciding which ‘best practices’ to source, “you can [still] decide which to follow and which not to follow”.\textsuperscript{103} In any case, Israeli and Mumbai officials raised fundamental doubts about the very premise of ‘learning’ from Israel, namely the practical utility of the Israeli ‘solutions’ in relation to the actual conditions faced on the ground in Mumbai. So although its implicit claim to universality is what allows the ‘Israeli approach’ to be claimed by Mumbai officials as a best practice, police officials suggested that making use of it required highly partial application or even non-application.

The need to adapt foreign approaches to local conditions seems to reflect very basic practical problems encountered in trying to make use of Israeli tactics under the conditions of Mumbai. Without disputing the reality of these challenges, I want to suggest that approaching the issue of calibration as a purely technical matter is insufficient. Although officials emphasized that adaptation or “indigenization” was essential to achieving ‘success’, they failed to elaborate upon exactly how this process might take place. That is, while Mumbai officials were prone to assert that the use of Israeli experts was ultimately successful, it was entirely unclear as to how the cited tactical incongruencies were overcome, or what specifically had been applied (and what left out). In fact, their references to the ‘Israeli approach’ were so nebulous that it was often unclear to what they were even referring.

\textsuperscript{102}Interview with Jayant Umranikar, February 2013
\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Anonymous 3, January 2013
Moreover, while acknowledging the inherent tensions involved in imparting Israeli know-how, officials refused to address the broader implications of what they were saying, namely that Israeli expertise was not directly useful for addressing the conditions they faced on the ground in Mumbai. For instance, while Jain expressed reservations about the ability to impart Israeli solutions to Mumbai, when I asked him about whether he or others on the 2009 delegation ever had doubts about the value of Israeli tactics and technologies to Mumbai, he emphatically replied: “No, there is no doubt”. It was by presenting such considerations as secondary to the inherent value of international security collaboration, the basic purchase of learning from Israel could be preserved. Through such portrayals, moreover, officials’ general disinterest in resolving the practical paradoxes and challenges involved in this process was clearly revealed. That the pretensions of best practice learning are unwarranted is not terribly surprising in itself. What is surprising is the readiness of officials to acknowledge the deep contradictions inherent in best practice adoption whilst continuing to uphold its value.

Rather than simply showing such premises to be problematic, it is important to address the capacity of best practice schemes to “make the ‘incommensurable commensurable’” (Larner and Le Heron 2004: 215). A key contribution of governance through best practice is its alleged capacity to create convergence around specific policies or technical benchmarks (Zaring 2006), a process that would require a clear specification of what these ‘standards’ or practices are. As some have argued, “the less detailed an example of best practice is […] the less likely it will be that the example can be replicated elsewhere” (Stead 2012: 108). Yet while things that are empty cannot, by definition, be ‘applied’, it seems that this empty quality is very much a part of what

104 Interview with P.K. Jain, March 2013
actually makes best practice politically expedient as a strategy of governing. In other words, making Israeli security solutions ‘work’ was not at its heart a technical matter. To assume that these schemes replicate any kind of model or standard is to take them at their word as practical solutions to knowable problems. As I argue in the next section, the ‘success’ of the interaction of Mumbai officials with Israelis has little to do with ‘applying’ Israeli security knowhow. These encounters, however, were nevertheless bound up with the production of new forms of knowledge.

3. Producing ‘success’

Policy models do not generate practices, they are sustained by them (Mosse 2005: 18).

Although the visit by Mumbai officials to Israel clearly did not give rise to the kind of radical overhaul of Mumbai’s security apparatus touted as its main goal, this outcome does not simply indicate an unforeseen failure to implement some plan nor does it necessarily imply that nothing of importance was learned from ‘experiencing’ Israel first-hand. These interactions have worked to produce a picture of success, even despite the clear barriers faced in imparting Israeli security ‘solutions’ to Mumbai following 2008.

As we have seen, much of the success of Israel’s defense and security industries has been attributed to its commodification of the ‘Israeli experience’ derived from its colonial occupation of Palestine and ongoing pattern of conflict with its neighbor states like Lebanon. These claims have been recently raised in Yotam Feldman’s 2012 documentary The Lab. The consumers of Israel’s defense and security industries, the film suggests, are not simply buying Israeli weapons and services but rather this “experience”.
Yet the ‘experience’ that was produced through the delegation to Israel seems somewhat different than that described by Feldman and other critical commentators like Neve Gordon (2009; 2011). It is more reminiscent of what some business management theorists have termed “the experience economy” (Pine and Gilmore 1998). Here ‘experience’ is not simply the packaging of some other product—in this case the “combat-proven” stamp of approval on Israeli security solutions—but rather the very product itself. “Experiencing” Israel first-hand was similarly presented by Mumbai officials as an end in itself rather than as a means to some other goal.

Gordon (2009: 3) defines his reading of the ‘Israeli experience’ fighting terrorism as an alternative to Pine and Gilmore’s approach to the experience economy. Yet elements of both readings are necessary because Israel does not simply sell its experience fighting terrorism but also creates a series of new experiences for the visitors’ consumption allowing them to observe (and thereby affirm) its HLS ‘success’ first-hand. As work on policy tourism has similarly argued, the physical movement of urban policymakers to experience certain cities works to legitimate urban policy schemes by (re)producing certain ideas as common sense (González 2011).

As pointed out above, certain officials who traveled from Mumbai to Tel Aviv rejected the notion that traveling to Israel resulted in the transfer of concrete security knowhow. Despite this, they portrayed the visit in an overwhelmingly positive light, emphasizing that various forms of learning did take place, framing the visit’s significance in terms of “showcasing” various security technologies and weapons. For instance, Jain claimed it was through the “knowledge” gained from such foreign excursions that “you are able to analyze and assess their equipment” helping to clarify “what you
exactly…have in mind”, which he argued “gives you more perspective” on updating counterterror strategies and the kinds of technologies to be procured.\textsuperscript{105}

Officials also stressed that the visit to Israel offered the opportunity to see “successful” security systems in action. For instance, when I asked Jain whether from a tactical point of view, any particular tactical revelations were gleaned from experiencing Israel firsthand, he responded with a categorical “No”. Yet as he went on to emphasize: “They [the Israelis] had these systems in place…which we don’t have…[in India] at all…So you could see them \textit{in action}”. This, he argued, was critical in transforming security systems from mere abstractions into tangible entities emphasizing, “Seeing was believing”.\textsuperscript{106}

By ‘experiencing’ Israel’s security apparatus first-hand, its status as a success story was seemingly consolidated as an incontrovertible ‘fact’ for the delegation participants. Indeed, it became apparent in the interviews that the key ‘lesson’ which they had all gained through traveling to Tel Aviv was the very reason that had allegedly motivated their visit in the first place, namely that Israeli urban security know-how represents an undisputed best practice. For instance, when I asked Sivanandanan whether there was something in particular which impressed him during his visit to Israel, he responded: “No, they [the Israelis] were very good. That’s it. They were very good”.\textsuperscript{107} Others similarly remarked: “Israel is very impressive. Their training…is very systematic. I found the whole thing very impressive”.\textsuperscript{108} The delegation thereby seemed to affirm to its participants what they apparently already knew beforehand, yet in a slightly new way that

\textsuperscript{105} Interview with P.K. Jain, March 2013
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid
\textsuperscript{107} Interview with D. Sivanandanan, January 2012
\textsuperscript{108} Interview with Chandra Iyengar, May 2013
helped to bring Israel’s HLS ‘success’ from the realm of the abstract to the real.

The visits also helped certain Mumbai officials to see ‘security’ through a mediated Israeli gaze, giving some the impression of common security ‘problems’. For instance, when I asked Jain what struck him as particularly relevant for Mumbai, he recalled having been shown videos and photos of Jerusalem by Israeli authorities depicting “skirmishes between Muslims and Jews” and the kinds of tactics and equipment used to manage them. As he remarked, “this is all relevant to our cities also; we have similar kinds of problems here [in Mumbai]”. So although the delegation to Israel seems to have generated few (if any) substantial policy outcomes, it did produce various ‘insights’—albeit extremely vague ones—about how the issue of terrorism should be managed. Perhaps more importantly, the ‘experience’ also served as a kind of security *Taglit* (birthright) that gave Indian officials an ideological stake in the ‘survival’ of the Israeli state and colonial occupation of Palestine.

The visit has also helped to perpetuate Israel’s status as an HLS ‘model’. Upon their return to Mumbai, officials like Sivanandan became new ambassadors of the Israeli success story. Indeed, some delegation participants spoke in language reminiscent of promotional material used by the Israeli HLS industry: “You see, Israel is one of the safest countries surrounded by enemies all around...so they have to survive and they [do] survive. So their security systems is one of the most foolproof I’ve found and I

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109 Interview with P.K. Jain, March 2013
110 There is an entire industry within Israel based specifically on this kind of security tourism. For instance Former Netanya police chief Marc Kahlberg’s “Experience Israel” tour offers participants “A Behind the Scenes inside look at how Israel’s Security Apparatus works” and there are countless others which specifically work by bringing foreigners to come and bear witness to Israel’s success through a series of staged ‘authentic’ encounters. Following these tours, participants then post testimonials on the organizations’ websites testifying to the value of the experience.
experienced it there”. Moreover, despite the self-proclaimed lack of Israeli success in working with Indian authorities following 26/11, the few Israeli firms like ISDS that did apparently manage to secure contracts have used this international “experience” working in Mumbai to further reinforce their authority as global experts. On its corporate website ISDS now features the Mumbai police among its many global clients (isds.co.il/clientele.htm) and firms like EL-GO Team similarly post pictures of their anti-ramming bollards installed at the Taj Hotel as visual evidence of their ever-growing global reach. In this way Indian clients become just the latest ‘reference’ that ‘proves’ Israel’s credentials as a global HLS leader.

So although the Israeli encounter with India might well call into question the universal status of Israeli HLS solutions, this experience has instead worked to reinforce and entrench the regime of truth surrounding its status as an HLS leader. Yet rather than being some stable, settled consensus it is critical to point out that this regime of truth needs to be constantly reaffirmed and remade anew; it has to “move in order to exist” (Freeman 2012: 20) and in doing so sustains its claim to an actually existing globality.

Here Tsing’s (2005) attention to the role of “friction” in constituting global connectivity is especially helpful. While the various problems associated with the difficulty in ‘applying’ Israeli security solutions might appear as a straightforward impediment to selling to international clients, Tsing has pointed out that the issue of friction is not simply a question of resistance. As she argues, “speaking of friction is a reminder of the importance of interaction in defining movement […] Friction is not just about slowing things down. Friction is required to keep global power in motion” (Tsing 2005: 6). As she continues, although universals “can never fulfill their promises of

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111 Interview with P.K. Jain, March 2013
universality” it is through engagement that they become viewed as such: “Engaged universals must convince us to pay attention to them. All universals are engaged when considered as practical projects accomplished in a heterogeneous world” (ibid: 8, emphasis in original).

Thus ‘success’ is not an inherent quality based on whether Israel has in fact ‘won’ the battle against Islamist militants ‘at home’. Nor does it say anything about whether Israeli solutions actually work on the ground in Mumbai. By generating narratives of experiencing success, such questions become increasingly “moot” (Ward 2011: 89). As Mosse (2005: 158) puts it, the question “is not whether but how a project is successful” in the sense of “how success is made and managed” (emphasis in original). The issue of success is not simply a question of how a given project performs in practice but also concerns “how particular interpretations are made and sustained socially. It is not just about what a project does, but also how and to whom it speaks, who can be made to believe in it” (ibid, emphasis in original). Thus “success”, according to Mosse does not signify the translation of a given development scheme into practice. Rather, development projects are successful, he argues, because they “sustain policy models offering a significant interpretation of events” that in turn “create a public audience for their work of social transformation” (ibid: 181).

So in addition to evading political fallout by making certain aspects of 26/11 disappear from view, we can also see how the deference to Israel has also worked in other more productive ways. Indeed, a crucial corollary of learning from Israel was that 26/11 could be effectively (re)cast as an opportunity for engagement, international collaboration and learning that gave officials a new language within which to couch their
activities. Indeed, this potential to remake the overall significance of the attacks seems at least partially responsible for the enduring enthusiasm for best practices among Mumbai officials. Best practice learning allows them to perpetually assert success and progress—essentially irrespective of systemic changes to the city’s approach to policing. Others have similarly stressed that mobile policy schemes can serve as “a legitimation (or fig-leaf) function for urban administrations, enabling politically legible actions” that work to give a picture of progress essentially regardless of substantial change (Peck 2011d: 12).

The crucial lesson to be drawn from all of this is that whether or not the interactions between Israeli and Indian officials result in tangible outcomes matters little. The transnational movement of these officials from Mumbai and elsewhere breeds a sense of success for both parties: Mumbai officials can claim success by virtue of having sought out “the best” and the Israeli HLS industry can use their few Indian clients as proof that their solutions work in any environment.

Thus extending my arguments in Chapter 3, success is not simply a production but a coproduction that takes place by way of Israel’s encounters with foreign clients. It is through these interactions that Israel’s global leadership status is reaffirmed by making questions about their ‘fit’ disappear from view. That is, if Israelis have already ‘succeeded’ in India, their services must, by definition, work! Of course, there is no follow-up article in Bloomberg or Forbes to discover that the entire project of exporting Israel’s security know-how did not actually materialize as planned. Instead there is a continuous stream of Indian journalists who travel to Israel to experience their success and re-affirm its relevance to India. For instance, a 2013 article in the Indian Express quotes a spokesperson for the Israeli national police as saying: “We are not trying to
boast but if something like the Mumbai attacks had happened here [in Israel], it would have been over in a few hours” (cited in Sinha 2013).

A similar trend can be observed in Mumbai itself. As I have pointed out, much like the handling of 26/11, the policy to the attacks has been ridiculed as ‘soft’, ‘politicized’, complacent, incompetent and ignorant. Yet this has not stopped the local authorities from projecting the post-26/11 experience as a case of policy success worthy of emulation elsewhere. In 2013 there were reports that Force One had trained 25 officers from Mozambique on urban combat operations (Dighe 2013). What becomes quite clear then, is that the projection of policy experience elsewhere does not reflect some consensus of past successes but rather produces them. In short, through their actual or perceived export abroad, the bandwidth of controversy surrounding the efficacy of policies and practices is apparently reduced.

4. Response as preservation

An important part of my overall argument is that 26/11 was politically disruptive and that the policy response to it has been a series of theatrical, politically driven gestures aimed at containing 26/11’s fallout. All of this clearly points to the potential hollowness of mobile policy schemes, suggesting that they may represent empty signifiers of policy change rather than concrete agendas. In relation to the policy response to 26/11 this is certainly the case.

If a totalizing transformation of Mumbai’s security apparatus is taken as the objective of learning from Israel then the entire episode might be easily written off as fairly inconsequential. Yet from the vantage point of Maharashtra politicians and the
Mumbai police, the apparent lack of tangible outcomes might be thought of somewhat differently. In other words, a key corollary of the emptiness of best practice learning is that rather than overhauling Mumbai’s approaches to policing and security, the policy response to 26/11 has in many ways helped to preserve the status quo, which can be understood as a kind of success in its own right.

Since colonial times the Indian police system has been widely ridiculed for its excesses, lack of professionalism and corruption, which has given rise to recurring (though largely unanswered) calls for its reform. As a RAND report notes, “[i]t is probably safe to say that given the mandate of the police in India, a fully functional relationship between the police (widely seen as corrupt and ineffective) and the populace is not likely in the policy-relevant future” (Fair 2004: 71). It is thus quite significant that, the predominant response to 26/11 was a program of rapid police modernization rather than basic police reform. The discussions about police reform that did emerge after 2008 focused on the issue of political interference in the Mumbai police rather than on the longstanding pattern of systemic human rights abuses by the force (see Desai 2009). Trying to explain the broader institutional inertia of the Mumbai police and Indian policing broadly is well outside the scope of this dissertation. Indeed the ability of the colonial Indian police system to survive independence almost entirely unchanged is one of the more troubling paradoxes of postcolonial India (see Chapter 7). Yet the experience of 26/11 has played an interesting role in this broader process.

Clearly part of the reason why basic police reform did not become a central issue after 26/11 reflects how the attacks unfolded and the way in which the Mumbai police was represented within the media scripting of the event. With the exception of sitting CP
Hasan Gafoor, who faced criticism for his handling of the attacks and was later forced out of office, the Mumbai police was largely shielded from the fierce public backlash that had engulfed politicians. In the event’s immediate aftermath, the Mumbai police “suddenly rose in the public’s estimation” as police casualties emerged as “instant heroes” (Prakash 2010: 18). This was in large measure due to the death of three high-ranking police officers during the siege as well as to the demonstrated bravery of other officers in capturing alive the sole surviving 26/11 perpetrator Ajmal Kasab. As Julio Ribeiro told me, had it not been for this bravery “the people would have totally gone berserk”.

What is interesting is that the perceived mishandling of 26/11 was widely blamed on corrupt politicians rather than on the leadership of the Mumbai police or the NSG. This narrative built directly on a longstanding, acceptance by journalists of the police’s narrative that if the police were only better resourced and less subject to political interference, they would be able to bring order to the city (Blom Hansen 2001a: 186, 225). The preservation of the policing status quo after 26/11, however, is also at least partially attributable to the efforts by governmental bodies in steering post-26/11 debates about urban security away from issues of basic police competency and toward a focus on modernization.

In previous chapters, I argued that the militarized response to 26/11 should itself be understood as a form of theatrical and performative politics, which did not result in any major overhaul in everyday police practice. Learning from Israel played a small but important role in this broader process of institutional preservation. While seeking Israeli solutions was presented as a radical overhaul of the Mumbai police, it has largely helped

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112 Interview with Julio Ribeiro, January 2013
to do just the opposite, giving the impression of change with few tangible results. The apparent failure to implement an ‘Israeli model’ to counterterrorism in Mumbai, then, is not just something that didn’t happen. Its significance can be better understood in terms of its ability to produce a sense of reform – effectively a rebranding of the Mumbai police – while allowing existing policing structures to survive almost entirely unchanged.

Jamie Peck (2011d: 13) has made a similar point, emphasizing that mobile policy schemes can work as an “enabling technology”, the core purchase of which can be understood in their “facilitative role as a flexible discursive frame—closely aligned with, and to some degree mystifying, already-existing ideologies, imperatives and practices”. In a similar way, Mumbai officials have been able to claim Israel as a best practice and leverage their associations with the Israeli state in their assertions of progress on security preparedness in spite and not because of discernible markers of change on the ground. These declarations have helped Indian officials to square the circle as it were, allowing them to demonstrate “claims to huge and quantifiable improvements” in security preparedness even alongside their own persistent “admissions of unchanging vulnerability” (Sahni 2012). To some extent, then, it really does allow them to have things both ways.

The tendency of learning from Israel to largely preserve rather than to transform existing institutional structures also has some wider ramifications to consider. As I argued in Chapter 5, the deference to Israeli security experts helped local authorities negotiate a range of political pressures and controversies. In this sense it provided a way out in relation to the elite-led public backlash that followed 26/11. Chapter 4 further noted that the militarized performances of security competency clearly were not intended
for everyone and this is reflected in the geography of the government’s response to 26/11. While the affluent south of the city received an increased presence of camouflaged personnel carriers and police personnel armed with automatic rifles (particularly around sites like CST, the Taj hotel and the Gateway of India), there is little physical evidence of change in the vast majority of the city.

In an analogous way we can observe that the militarized performances of security competency by way of association with Israeli security experts was clearly intended to soothe the demands for security from Mumbai elites rather than from those of the everyday rail commuter. Given the threats to existence faced by so many Mumbaikars, it is probably safe to say that it was of little interest whether high-level police officials and government bureaucrats went on a trip to Tel Aviv. Yet the interactions with Israeli security experts are not without wider symbolic and political significance, particularly in relation to those the policy response was arguably not intended to appease.

Indeed learning from Israel has an altogether different set of meanings in relation to Mumbai’s large minority Muslim population than it does to those who protested outside the Taj after 26/11. While the use of Israeli best practices was presented as a dispassionate, apolitical decision, it has a longer history to consider. First, the Indo-Israeli bilateral relationship has been extremely controversial among India’s Muslim population. As Oza (2007) has pointed out, the emergence of India and Israel’s bilateral security relationship in the early 1990s, founded on the premise of the need to fight the common enemy of Islamist extremism, took place at a time when the right-wing BJP and Likud were in power, serving to further marginalize the position of India’s Muslims.

Moreover, references to Israel as a potential source of knowledge on how to
manage India’s ‘security problems’ has always been highly symbolic and politically charged. For instance, in 1996 BJP leaders advocated for the introduction of identification cards as a means to differentiate between non-Hindu and Hindu immigrants, maintaining that in a similar way to which Israel is the homeland for Jews worldwide, so too should India serve as the “natural” homeland for all Hindus. This effectively implied that non-Hindus were somehow less entitled to citizenship (Blom Hansen 1999: 220). Bal Thackeray, the former Shiv Sena leader, who played a central role in instigating Bombay’s communal violence, rhetorically advocated for the use of the Mossad to come and train the Shiv Sena’s own anti-terror force in order address a wave of bombings and murders perpetrated by the Bombay underworld during the 1990s (Blom Hansen 2001a: 99). None of these schemes, however, actually ever came to fruition.

Issues of exclusion and communal tension have also long been at the center of concerns about the Mumbai police, particularly following the riots and serial bombings that began in the early 1990s. Indeed the overwhelmingly Hindu bias in the police force had been a cause of considerable tension following the 1992 riots as the implications of the anti-Muslim bias within the Hindu majority police force became increasingly undeniable. During the riots, police issued orders to “shoot to kill” Muslim demonstrators while generally being much more lenient toward those from the Hindu community (Blom Hansen 2001b: 222) despite the fact that the minority Muslim population was the primary victim of both police brutality and the militant violence perpetrated by Hindu activists (Appadurai 2000: 649).

Indeed the riots in the 1990s can be read as the last installment of a much longer program of political marginalization of Muslims in the city (Hansen 2001a: 126), which
is fuelled by the Mumbai police’s portrayal of Muslim areas as “security problems” (Hansen 2001a: 149; also see Rao 2007). As Appadurai (2000: 644, 649) has argued, under the “specter of Mumbai’s Muslims as a fifth column from Pakistan, ready to subvert the city’s sacred geography” the eruption of violence in the 1992-93 riots “translated the problem of scarce space into the imaginary of cleansed space, a space without Muslim bodies”. These patterns of urban fragmentation and marginalization have only intensified in the decades since and issues of communal tension remain.\(^{113}\)

This same geography was re-inscribed by the recourse to Israeli security experts following 26/11, which served to reinforce already existing patterns of political subjugation and the Mumbai police’s prejudicial attitudes toward the city’s minorities. As Mountz and Curran (2009: 1038) have stressed, it is important to draw attention to the “way in which local forces of oppression enact global policies to reinforce already existing geographies of exclusion”. There is also evidence that international influences are beginning to have some tangible implications in terms of how terror cases are managed by Indian police agencies, as part of India’s shifting geopolitical alliances alongside the war on terror (see Banerjee-Guha 2011; Oza 2007).

As one well-known Mumbai activist told me, “we are being affected...by the global perception of the terror issue”, which she suggested has had a detrimental effect on local police agencies by reinforcing prejudicial and racist attitudes toward Muslims. She noted Indian police authorities “don’t necessarily look at the evidence on the ground after a terror attack” but instead tend to “operate with a preconceived belief that only a

\(^{113}\) Even today the slightest evidence of restraint or ‘tolerance’ in relation to Muslim demonstrators by the police has major repercussions. Just before I arrived in Mumbai, sitting Commissioner Arup Patnaik was forced out of office by calls for his ouster from right wing political factions following his handing of the August 2012 Azad Maidan riots.
Muslim minority can do that”. This, she argued, is at least partly the result of India’s geostrategic partnerships with the US, Israel and the UK as well as the “cross-state nexus” between the anti-terror wings of the police agencies from these same countries. These prejudices in turn create biases within prosecutions of terror cases against Muslim youth whilst allowing Hindutva terror groups to avoid prosecution. In fact, those who do stand up for the rights of Muslims have become targets of violence themselves. Shahid Azmi, a Mumbai lawyer who was one of the most successful in exonerating those wrongfully accused in Indian terror cases, was gunned down in his office in 2010 while he was defending a suspect falsely accused in the plotting of 26/11.

For all of these reasons it is important not to simply write off the entire Israeli encounter with Mumbai as inconsequential, even though these interactions have not transformed policing or security planning in Mumbai in any fundamental way. Indeed, this represents a key aspect of the work that best practice learning performs in the policymaking process and in relation to wider public discourses on ‘urban security’. It is also important not to overdraw the significance of these international linkages in understanding the racialized forms of police violence and discrimination. The history of communal tension in Mumbai exists independently of Israel, both before or after 26/11, though there are certainly interesting connections to be drawn in relation to their connections with British imperialism.

In drawing attention to the exclusionary implications of the deference to Israel I do not want to imply that the reason that the government of Maharashtra chose to align itself with Israel was for the explicit purpose of marginalizing Mumbai’s Muslims. The

114 Interview with Teesta Setalvad, January 2013
115 Ibid
116 Faheem Ansari was acquitted after Azmi’s death for his alleged role in 26/11 for lack of evidence.
point, rather, is that this move reinforces many of the most problematic features of the Mumbai police and broader patterns of urban fragmentation that have defined the city’s transformation over the past two decades. It also precluded any potential role of Mumbai’s Muslim community in post-26/11 debates about the city’s future. As Rajagopal (2008) argued following the wave of post-26/11 protests, it is critical to examine the “growing separation between politics and publicity, between those who are visible and subject to the law and those who are invisible or who force themselves into visibility, [which] requires us to constantly reconsider who has a right to politics and who is to be denied it, and on what grounds”.

Although Muslims represent 42.4% of Maharashtra’s urban population there is not a single sitting Muslim MP in Maharashtra (Gayer and Jaffrelot 2012: 5, 10). In this sense, we might read anti-politics in a rather different way than that explored in Chapter 5, namely as the denial of the very right to politics or even the “right to the city” (Mitchell 2003). While clearly the use of Israeli trainers was presented as a dispassionate apolitical matter, I clearly touched a nerve when I asked Sivanandan how Mumbai’s minorities received the use of Israeli experts. His tone quickly turned from cagey to confrontational: “You can wonder yourself, because it is nothing connected with your research or anything like that. It’s going ahead at that point of time and it was the right thing to do. Nobody, no Muslim, no Hindu ever asked questions”. Apparently no one, including myself, was allowed to either.

Conclusion

The disjuncture between the publicly declared purpose of the delegation to Israel

117 Interview with D. Sivanandan, January 2013
and its policy outcomes is itself significant as it demonstrates the inability for such projects to realize their own stated goals. Various frictions and barriers encountered by Israeli firms in accessing India’s public sector have constrained the scope of their work in post-26/11 Mumbai. This is why careful work in following mobile policy schemes is of pressing analytical importance as doing so may help to lay bare the hollowness of their claims. As Temenos and McCann (2013: 351) have recently emphasized, “questions remain to be answered regarding exactly how policies move or don’t”. Yet, while mobile policy projects are clearly misleading or even empty in some respects, this does not mean that they are somehow facile or irrelevant. They have important exclusionary implications in privileging the concerns of some whilst sidelining the voices of others.

Indeed, it remains critical not to lose sight of the forms of knowledge production and politics that were constituted through these interactions. That is to say that even though best practice learning belongs within a wider family of ideological projects such as development, transparency, etc. that rarely bring about the outcomes they claim, they may well have real implications nevertheless. Moreover, it is misleading to take the ambitious public statements as the essential objective of the delegation, which then later failed to materialize for whatever reason. The ability to implement a set of concrete Israeli policies, procedures or surveillance systems is not the only (or necessarily most important) way in which to interpret the significance of ‘learning’ from Israel. As I have argued throughout this chapter, despite the very real practical problems that are entailed in this process, the interactions between Mumbai and Israeli officials and trainers have nevertheless produced a sense of ‘success’. Whether the elusive nature of ‘best practice’ regimes is unique to the case at hand or more general feature would require a further
comparative analysis between sites. The response to 26/11 does, however, raise important questions about the extent to which mobile policy schemes work to promote convergence around supposed standards or models.

These considerations also raise some important questions about how we might conceptualize the issues of limits or even resistance to the militarization and securitization of the urban. It is interesting here that the primary source of resistance to the Israeli security actors working in Mumbai and India since the attacks has been of a decidedly non-political sort. Despite Israel’s controversial status and the problems associated with the ‘Israeli brand’ surveyed in Chapter 3, the difficulties faced by Israeli firms selling in India had little to do with these sorts of challenges. Rather they reflected basic problems of negotiating the Indian bureaucracy.

As one CEO told me, in light of his firm’s experiences in trying to sell in India “the only kind of deal I will like to do with India is a straightforward one” meaning “give me a contract, I will give a solution, pay me the amount I want and we can do a deal”. Yet few such “straightforward” arrangements were available. Some voices have spoken out against the use of Israeli trainers by the Mumbai police raising questions about India’s complicity in the oppression of Palestinians among other concerns (e.g. Ansari 2012; Hameed 2010). The leaders of such groups (some of whom I spoke with) generally seem to have a wildly overblown understanding of the actual extent of Israeli involvement with the Mumbai police, claiming evidence of everything up to and including a close working relationship with the Mossad. These attempts at resistance, in addition to being entirely ineffectual, then, also give the false impression that cooperation between Israeli and Mumbai authorities has been both seamless and deep. This is why

118 Interview with Omer Laviv, August 2012
following the policy matters politically by showing that even as global security leaders, the Israeli HLS industry is not in fact all-powerful and faced major constraints in working in India.

In fact, although Mumbai authorities were all too willing to publicly claim that they were ready to adopt an Israeli solution to 26/11, they were apparently much less interested in actually buying and implementing one. In this sense, then, state officials in Maharashtra really did get ‘the best’ of all possible worlds. They could lay claim to Israeli knowhow without having to radically overhaul their policing apparatus. In any case, however, this chapter suggests that closer attention is required in understanding the actual challenges faced by actors working to promote forms of militarization and securitization rather than assuming the process to be easy or straightforward. This also requires a reexamination of the connections between neoliberalism and the securitization of the urban as I explore next.
Chapter 7: Educating a Market: Disaster capitalism, neoliberalism, and problems of difference

A spiritual country like India finds it difficult to think about security. So we had a tough job to penetrate the market [before 26/11]. But they [Indians] now realize that something is changing and are becoming receptive.\textsuperscript{119}

If you do your research over there [in India], you’ll find that a lot of Israeli companies did not took [sic] into consideration a very big matter that we felt...on our own flesh...the cultural differences. Not just the locals but the business culture...it broke a lot...of attempts of other companies from Israel [to work] over there. Many of them came back...I think some companies do well there, as well as we, but many, regardless of the reputation of Israelis...have found it very hard...it’s about adaptation to cultural differences...I won’t say it was easy for us at the beginning, but we were willing to adapt...it’s a Darwinian thing.\textsuperscript{120}

Introduction

As I have argued in previous chapters, 26/11 generated public demands for sweeping structural overhauls of the Indian state’s approach to security planning. Within the global security industry there was an understanding that 26/11 raised the importance of terrorism within Indian policy and corporate circles, fuelling expectations that the country would become a leading HLS market in years to come. It is equally clear that efforts to export Israeli HLS solutions to India after 2008 have not always gone according to plan. In this chapter I further reflect on some of the reasons why. Drawing on participant observation at tradeshows and conferences as well as analysis of private sector reports I focus on the efforts of corporate bodies to build an Indian HLS ‘market’ in the years since 2008. Despite widespread proclamations of a sudden shift in governmental and corporate priorities within India, industry efforts to capitalize on 26/11 have faced a series of challenges and interruptions. These difficulties cannot be reduced to transaction barriers or questions of networking. Attention to such frictions reveals that ‘HLS’ as a priority of governance occupies an uncertain position in India today. In trying to understand the industry changes to which 26/11 gave rise (as well as their limits), the

\textsuperscript{119} Uriel Bin, CEO of D-Fence Ltd., Israel (cited in Peretz 2008)
\textsuperscript{120} Interview with Anonymous 7, July 2012
issue of neoliberalism must also be centrally addressed, not least because the effort to build an Indian HLS market takes place as a self-consciously ‘neoliberal’ project. That is, corporate-led efforts to ‘secure’ Indian cities after 26/11 have been rationalized as a means of sustaining India’s position as a site of foreign investment and global tourism (see Chapter 1). Yet post-26/11 dynamics reveal that the resonances between securitization and neoliberalization are less obvious and clear-cut than literature on the new military urbanism would suggest. Through a closer examination of the ‘challenges’ faced by industry actors working in India after 26/11 and the strategies they employed to overcome them, this chapter addresses the possible sources of these difficulties and how they have constrained the project of building an Indian HLS market after 2008.

Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to say something about how I approach the concept of neoliberalism itself. This chapter responds to and offers a critique of the way that neoliberalism has been discussed within much of the literature on the new military urbanism and critical security studies more broadly (see Chapter 1). These readings of the term correspond to what Ong (2007: 4) has usefully described as “Neoliberalism with a big ‘N’”. Such accounts, often shaped by the influential work of David Harvey (and popularized mainstream commentators like Naomi Klein), present neoliberalism as a prevailing structural condition of contemporary global order, which drives patterns of social change within the nation state. Yet this is hardly the only possible way to define the term. Indeed, the subject of neoliberalism has been a vibrant area of critical scholarly debate in recent years (see Peck 2013) with scholars specifically contesting the idea that neoliberalism represents a coherent political ideology, historical
epoch or economic system that produces convergent patterns of change (e.g. Peck and Tickell 2002; Ferguson 2009; Collier 2011).

In this chapter, however, I draw primarily on Aihwa Ong’s (2006; 2007) accounts of neoliberalism. Rather than approaching neoliberalism as a “tidal wave of market-driven phenomena that sweeps from dominant countries to smaller ones”, Ong suggests that it is more productive to disaggregate neoliberalism into constituent governing technologies and strategies. She defines this “small n” conception of neoliberalism “as a new mode of political optimization […] reconfiguring relationships between governing and the governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and territoriality” (Ong 2006: 3). For her, neoliberalism can be understood as a novel kind of relationship between government and knowledge whereby “governing activities are recast as nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions” (ibid: 3). Her conception neoliberalism as exception emphasizes the importance of deviation from the norm within particular milieus of governing.

1. ‘Everything changed on 26/11’?

[The] Indian Homeland Security Market would literally be exploding in terms of the opportunities for the private industry in the next 5 years.\(^{121}\)

Although 26/11 became widely understood as key historical moment when India ‘woke up’ to the threat of ‘global’ terrorism, the event has clearly not entirely transformed the ways that matters of ‘internal security’ are governed in India. In fact, despite the concerted efforts by industry groups to heighten the importance of investing in ‘security’, efforts to increase demand for security solutions after 2008 have faced

\(^{121}\) Bhagwan Shankar, IAS, Joint Secretary (Police Modernization) MHA. Source: securitywatchindia.org.in
considerable challenges. These trends raise questions about how we might theorize issues of limits and constraints to patterns of securitization.

As I pointed out above, 26/11 has been widely cited as a point of departure in the governance of India’s ‘internal security’. The experience of 26/11 fueled expectations that India would become a leading HLS market by opening up new opportunities for private security contractors – both in relation to tenders with the Indian state as well as new opportunities to work with industry. These expectations clearly had some important implications. 26/11 was actively seized upon as an opportunity by international security purveyors (including Israelis) to promote their products and services to government agencies. Within only a few months of the attacks a range of joint partnerships were announced, including a number between Israeli and Indian firms. More broadly, the sense that 26/11 represented a paradigm shift in the country’s approach to handling terrorism put into motion a flurry of industry-led activities to expand India’s security marketplace. In the years since 2008, major security groups like the UK-based International Fire and Security Exhibition and Conference (IFSEC) began staging a series of Indian HLS trade shows and conferences, featuring a wide range of international and domestic security purveyors. Other organizations like Security Watch India (SWI) launched their annual conference and trade show Securing Asia in London in 2012, which was billed as “The Global Hub for Asian Homeland Security and Counter Terror”.

These industry efforts have sought to boost demand by flooding India with security solutions as well as making them more visible to potential buyers by showcasing them at such conferences, demonstrations and trade-shows across the country. In industry

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122 While the event was marketed as covering all of Asia (and was re-branded in 2014 as “Securing Asia and Africa”), it has primarily focused on the Indian security marketplace.
parlance this is typically referred to as ‘educating the market’, the process whereby potential security customers become aware of new security solutions and, as a result, their self-implied necessity. For instance, an IFSEC India event brochure states that the event will help in “educating and informing the market, keeping Indian security professionals at the cutting edge of industry developments” (IFSEC 2012).

By 2009 a number of private sector reports commissioned by industry groups had been produced, which proclaimed post-26/11 India to be the fastest growing HLS market in the world. As one such report argued: “Till a few years back, terror attacks were primarily in the form of sporadic blasts in the target cities. The situation changed somewhere around 2008 when India witnessed a new form of organized, sophisticated terrorism” (KPMG-ASSOCHAM 2010: 11). Another report from the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) suggested that 26/11 represented a “paradigm shift in threat perception by Corporate [sic] in India” (FICCI 2009: 12).

In making such claims, these texts focus on the threat of terrorism to India’s status as an emerging economy and site of foreign investment, warning that large-scale terror attacks “can have a considerable economic impact manifested in lower credit ratings for the country, negative branding through travel advisories impacting the tourism and hospitality sectors” (KPMG-ASSOCHAM 2010: 13). Another report similarly stresses that “[u]nless drastic measures are taken, there can be no assurance that India will be able to prevent the next major attack, and to reassure the global investor about the ‘India rising story’” (FICCI 2009: 6). Other corporate-led initiatives were even more explicit in their aims of raising the profile of terrorism and thereby transforming the willingness of public officials to invest in security. For instance, the inaugural issue of the FICCI-Pinkerton
India Risk Survey positions itself as “an attempt to sensitise Government about emerging risks and dangers they pose, so that well planned strategic policy decisions can be made and implemented” (FICCI-Pinkerton 2012: Foreword). A 2011 Indian HLS conference by the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) took as its title the project of “Securitising India” (Nagaraj 2012). These efforts seem to represent an almost textbook case of securitization, whereby interested parties began to make a case for viewing terrorism as a major threat to India’s overall stability and particularly its economy.

26/11 therefore seems to represent an important historical moment where neoliberal market forces descended on India following a political crisis – yet another example of Naomi Klein’s (2007) “disaster capitalism” at work. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, a number of accounts focus on the role of neoliberal restructuring and inter-urban competition in fostering patterns of securitization, as major urban centers increasingly compete with one another to gain an edge in attracting foreign investment and global tourism. These corporate-led strategies also resonate with scholarship on the commodification and privatization of security, which has argued that the appetite for security solutions is a supply-driven process which creates demand through the production of new (in)securities (Leander 2005; Leander and van Munster 2007).

Upon closer inspection, however, industry developments begin to diverge from this familiar script. Despite the best efforts of corporate interests to ‘securitize India’, this project has run into a number of roadblocks. First, despite all the talk of rapid change in the wake of 26/11, security purveyors and experts working in India consistently expressed a sense of frustration with a perceived lack of change in the Indian state’s
willingness to invest in security. Second, foreign security purveyors have faced a number of difficulties operating within the Indian business environment. Third, despite pressure on Indian politicians and government agencies to emulate Western security policy models, these pressures have not translated into a clear governance agenda on how to handle the issue of terrorism at the level of the union or Maharashtra state.

Some of my first encounters with these frictions were expressed in Israeli narratives about trying to sell their HLS solutions in India. As noted in Chapter 6, a number of Israeli firms cited problems in getting contracts with state agencies in Maharashtra and beyond, which forced some to exit the Indian market entirely. While the post-26/11 discourse gave the impression that there would be a sustained spike in public spending on urban security preparedness and policing (a claim which many Israeli firms clearly believed), the representatives I spoke with claimed that such expectations ultimately proved overblown. As one Israeli CEO lamented, despite all the talk of rapid change after 26/11, the public sector market “didn’t change at all”.

A number of Israeli HLS representatives cited various difficulties in negotiating the Indian business environment. For instance, one marketing director described a major Indian corporate client as “very, very slow like a dinosaur…slow to take decisions and change…they’re...just reactive, which is one of their problems”. Other Israelis cited a range of perceived barriers of a slightly different character, claiming that their Indian counterparts seemed to have a different understanding about the very meaning of ‘security’ from the Israeli vision of HLS. As one Israeli CEO explained to me, he had major doubts about whether 26/11 actually changed anything about how Indians

123 Skype Interview with Uzi More, August 2012
124 Interview with Martin Kowen, July 2012
approached issues of security planning because

the Indians are not looking for a solution, they are looking for a technology to solve their problem. They…don’t have any confidence in their capabilities of the manpower. And…to get a good security solution, you need to have a good combination of technology, manpower and procedures and protocols. They don’t invest anything in the other two, just in technology. They call it…‘gadget’. This is actually the way they look at it…when you show them, let’s say, an x-ray screening machine…and after that they start a debate…they will ask you, ‘How much are those ‘gadgets’, how [much] do they cost’? Not to diminish them but this is how they think about it. And it is true. For them, it…is…nice to have…stuff…[Y]ou cannot convince an Indian company or the Indian government to buy consulting, to buy knowhow. They will buy only equipment.  

There is, of course, nothing unusual about these orientalist clichés about India as a backward place. Some Israeli descriptions of their Indian counterparts verged on outright racism: “Indians are servants in nature...they were born to serve and they don’t feel comfortable at all being leaders...of anything”. Such accounts should certainly not, therefore, be taken at face value in describing of the reality of the country in any straightforward sense.

Nevertheless, the frustrations of the Israeli encounter with ‘India’ cannot be written off entirely either. The difficulties faced by Israelis clearly reflect a broader set of dilemmas encountered by security purveyors working in India after 2008. My interviews

\[125 \text{ Interview with Omer Laviv, August 2012} \]
\[126 \text{ Ibid} \]
with Indian security experts and purveyors revealed similar sense of frustration with a perceived lack of sustained change after 26/11. For instance, when I spoke with one well-known Indian security and defense commentator in New Delhi, he emphasized that it was good that 26/11 happened in Mumbai (rather than in a remote area of India) because it provided a wake-up call to India’s “corporate-industrial fraternity” about the need to take security more seriously. As he quickly pointed out, however, a few more similar events would be required for a full reckoning to take place about the ‘need’ for more investment in security.127

Many similar frustrations are apparent within promotional literature working to expand India’s HLS market after 2008. As I noted above, the lobby groups and private consultancies were quick to declare that 26/11 represented a game-changing moment of awakening to the threat of ‘global’ terrorism. Yet embedded in many of these reports is evidence of barriers that stand in their way. For instance, one report drew attention to the profoundly “disorganized nature of [the] Homeland Security apparatus in India”, arguing that a fundamental “lack of clarity regarding the extent of opportunity in this sector” has impeded efforts to promote its future development as a growth sector (KPMG-ASSOCHAM 2010: 13).

Although claiming a new consensus about the economic necessities of taking security more seriously, this apparent awakening is an insufficient condition for bringing a viable Indian HLS ‘market’ or ‘sector’ into being. According to these corporate texts, an Indian HLS market did not arise naturally from the heightened threat perception among corporate leaders. While drawing attention to a vast range of potential opportunities, these documents were quick to point out that the mere existence of threats

127 Interview with Anonymous 12
is an insufficient condition for a robust HLS sector to take shape. As a white paper commissioned by a Mumbai lobby group shortly after the attacks lamented, despite 26/11’s definitive role in exposing the need for a new approach to security planning across India, “[r]egrettably, we are not even at the starting point at the moment” about how to proceed (Bombay First 2009).

Statements such as these seem out of place in literature on the new military urbanism. This body of scholarship has contributed to the theorization of contemporary security trends and to contesting the political basis of an ever-expanding security agenda. Yet critical scholars have tended to treat the creation of demand for security solutions as a relatively smooth process. For instance, as Neocleous (2008: 156) argues: “In creating an endless supply of raw material and hardly lacking a demand or willingness to pay for its product, the industry’s continued existence and expansion is guaranteed”. Such statements overlook the potential frictions and tensions entailed in assembling new security agendas. Indeed, while this literature focuses attention on how security has been urbanized, commodified and privatized, there is little discussion of possible constraints or limits to these trends, beyond the need to ‘balance’ the prerogatives of security with those of economic activity and circulation in the contemporary city.

So how might we deal with the perceived lack of change and the difficulties security purveyors have encountered in building an Indian HLS marketplace? One possible approach might be simply to suggest that the initial proclamations that ‘everything changed’ on 26/11 were overblown. This position is not incorrect. As I have argued throughout the previous chapters, despite the efforts to portray 26/11 as a sui generis ‘global’ terrorist event, claims about its supposed novelty were always
unwarranted and misleading. Thus from the outset there was every reason to be skeptical about the initial proclamations of sudden change after 26/11. Indeed, I have argued that the issue of post-26/11 change should be seen as a qualified contingency, thereby contesting the prevailing media narrative as well as the idea that the policy patterns to which it gave rise were somehow inevitable.

Given, as I have argued, that post-26/11 policy developments were a ‘response’ to elite-led pressure on politicians, it follows that, as this pressure declined since 2008, so too has the GOM’s emphasis on staging militarized displays of state power. While the political establishment was the primary target of the outrage that immediately followed 26/11, this pressure was not sustained.

Thus Maharashtra Home Minister R.R. Patil, initially forced to resign from office, returned less than a year later, trumpeting the success of the government’s response to 26/11. Little public anger was expressed when 18 people were killed and 130 wounded in a bomb blast in a bus stop in Dadar in central Mumbai in 2011. As one commentary concluded, the muted public and government response to the 2011 attack simply re-confirmed that “Mumbai […] must now learn to live with terror” (Fernandes 2011). Former Maharashtra Home Secretary Jayant Patil explained to me, “in India we are very serious when incidents happen [but] as the time passes we think ‘No, no, no it’s not going to happen again’...[and] forget about it. That is how we survive”. 128 Yet, it is insufficient simply to accept the notion that things simply returned to ‘normal’ after 26/11 for this would occlude the changes in the discourse around security which 26/11 did bring about (however modest or temporary) and leaves us with the question of what ‘normal’ actually is.

128 Interview with Jayant Patil, April 2013
Another possible approach might be to suggest that India represents a country that has yet to become fully neoliberal. As a number of scholars have emphasized, the neoliberalization of India since the early 1990s, though important, does not represent a complete shift in India’s approach to economic planning. Instead, it reflects a more gradual process whereby Indian leaders have begun to actively shift the country’s image as a socialist bureaucracy toward one increasingly open to foreign capital (see Blom Hansen 1999; Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Oza 2006). Indeed, in Ong’s (2006: 3) terms, we could say that neoliberalism “is not the general characteristic of technologies of governing” in contemporary India. Yet even if we can agree that India’s ‘neoliberalization’ has been less far reaching than in some states, attributing post-26/11 security trends to a lack of ‘neoliberalism’ suggests that India’s experience differs only in degree, not in kind. This is problematic in two senses: it tells us nothing specific about how security discourse operates in India, whilst upholding the story of security in the West as the default. That is, it implies that there is some state of how security relates to neoliberalism in general, against which the Indian ‘case’ represents a (partial) anomaly. Alternatively we might say that efforts to ‘securitize India’ following 26/11 ultimately failed to raise the threat perception of terrorism. There is certainly something to this as well. Yet simply saying that the attempted securitization of India failed does not tell us much about how or why. It also implies that the key challenge faced by the security industry is a lack of insecurities. As we will see below, this picture is not quite accurate.

Thus while all of these potential lines of inquiry offer something important, they are ultimately unsatisfactory. For these reasons I argue that the frictions and difficulties must be understood in terms of what they are and what they do rather than merely as
absences, incompleteness or failures of some other processes. These challenges were apparent at Indian HLS trade shows and through conversations with security purveyors working in India. Similar narratives of struggle are also apparent within corporate reports geared to expanding India’s domestic security sector. If we are to understand the actual changes to India’s security governance that 26/11 brought about (as well as their limits), these difficulties need to be taken seriously.

2. The work of security

On the face of it, the challenges of Indian HLS might seem to be reducible to questions of networks and access to public officials. Indeed the development of security trade shows and conferences specifically devoted to the Indian HLS market reflects the basic challenges of networking and deal making. As Securing Asia 2012’s event brochure proclaims: “Bringing Asia closer to you, Securing Asia 2012 is not just an event but “the” event you can’t afford to miss. A first of its kind, this event offers a curtain raiser for select companies, with an exposure to a market estimated at $1 trillion over the next 7 years” (Securing Asia 2012).

One of the first sources of friction I observed were the difficulties faced by security purveyors in accessing the Indian state. Numerous vendors complained about the problems involved in selling their solutions in India, particularly to the public sector. In response, a number of consultants and agents made presentations at industry events, claiming to have the ability to open doors to certain government agencies. These business challenges were also represented as somehow ‘cultural’. During Securing Asia 2012 speakers constantly stressed that the actual “penetration” of “Asian” markets requires wit,
skill and adeptness to avoid falling victim to local pitfalls and setups. For instance, in his address to the conference, Suhel Seth, a well-known Indian corporate leader, spoke on the current state of the Indian business environment. Stressing that in India “nothing is how you see it”, he noted that although the country holds immense commercial opportunities as an export market, it is a deceptive environment, riddled with Indian agents and partners waiting to “screw you” along the way. In light of these so-called ‘cultural’ challenges, a number of area specialists made presentations to the conference delegates, claiming to explain the ‘culture’ of various Asian countries and to offer consultancy services about how to network ‘properly’ through their knowledge of local customs, etiquette and the ability to read social cues.

The challenge of culture was also articulated in a slightly different way, as having to do with perceived differences in the meaning of security in ‘the West’ and in ‘Asia’. In fact, Securing Asia 2012 was presented as a “platform” for overcoming a range of ‘cultural’ barriers. The first panel discussion at the event was devoted entirely to “Understanding the Asian mindset, attitudes and perceptions”. The premise of this session was debunking various “myths” inherent in Western views on security by giving space for authentic Asian perspectives to emerge. The participants constantly stressed the importance of “worldviews”, implying that there are differences between Western and Asian conceptions of security, without any real elaboration about what these supposed differences were. For instance Devdutt Pattanaik, Chief Belief Officer at Future Group, argued that Western perspectives failed to adequately appreciate the specificities of India, noting that because there is no harmony in Indian music, Westerners historically viewed it as primitive. He finished by asking the audience to consider whether we should “allow”
or “correct” different worldviews.

I also encountered efforts to change the terms of how security is understood in India. As one industry white paper noted, as a first step in building a greater consensus about India’s security priorities as Indians “we need to urgently take steps to change our attitude towards security”. It continued, “Every Government Authority, and more particularly the police should give the utmost importance both in words and action to security” insisting that “Nobody should belittle security” (Mumbai First 2009). Another report similarly claimed “[u]ltimately, all the great battles are fought in the mind”, suggesting the “battle” over India’s security future should be no different (FICCI 2009: 7). These narratives thereby frame the key challenge of Indian HLS not simply as a technical or tactical question about how to prevent or manage future terrorist attacks, but in relation to the definition and social importance of the concept of security itself.

In light of the concerns expressed about the social standing of security, a number of corporate-led efforts have focused on trying to build greater “security awareness”. Such efforts were visible in a range of security conferences and trade shows focused on the need to forge greater consensus on India’s security priorities. This dynamic is perhaps most succinctly captured by the activities of Security Watch India (SWI) a Delhi-based corporate lobby group that emerged after 26/11. The organization has focused on publishing articles and reports on security issues across Asia as well as generating a newsfeed featuring a compilation of articles and reports on issues of defense, public safety, policing and security. SWI also developed a circuit of seminars, workshops, conferences and trade shows, both within India and overseas. As its website states: “SWI works towards a secure tomorrow by enhancing security awareness and consciousness in
Indian industry and civil society” (securitywatchindia.org.in).

Securing Asia 2012 was specifically devised to further this goal. The event’s lead protagonist Harry Dhaul, an Indian industrialist and Director General of the Independent Power Producers Association of India (IPPAI), opened the conference with an address to its delegates, corporate sponsors and exhibitors. In his remarks, Dhaul repeatedly claimed that the event is not fundamentally about making money but instead about “raising awareness”. Here Dhaul drew a contrast between the conference and leading industry trade shows like Eurosatory and Counter Terror, stressing that these other events (merely) focus on showcasing the latest in weapons and security technology. In contrast, Securing Asia focused on building greater “awareness” and “raising the cerebral quotient” about debates on the future security challenges facing Asia. To this end the event entailed three full days of programming featuring a mix of well-known international relations scholars, current and former public officials, security experts and industry representatives all debating the key challenges and solutions to the security dilemmas facing the future of Asia.

So what are we to make of all of these challenges and the strategies to try and overcome them? How seriously should they be taken? Initially, the emphasis on debates and forms of cultural understanding within industry events struck me as out of place. As these forums are promoted as an opportunity to link the Asian buyers with Western suppliers of security solutions, the incessant talk of awareness and the cerebral dimensions of security in India seemed peculiar. In light of the focus on networking and opening access to public sector buyers, the emphasis on open debate sounded as if it was designed to conceal the intensification of the sales of weapons, security technology and
training under the auspices of providing a “neutral platform” for discussion, “collaboration” and the open exchange of ideas. As an Indian newspaper article about Securing Asia remarked, “[t]hough dressed up as a brainstorming exercise […] the summit is really designed to boost global weapons trade in the emerging Asian markets” (Suroor 2012). The great debates allegedly so important to the project of “Securing Asia” such as understanding the “Asian mind”, though striking in their use of crude orientalist tropes, also seemed to have little to do with securitization at all.

Yet as similar themes cropped up in a number of subsequent industry events, it became increasingly clear that the underlying premise of such discussions should not be so easily dismissed. The issue of cultural difference, however crudely articulated, is significant in the sense that it represents a very real source of friction for those seeking to sell HLS solutions in India as well as to the corporate interests trying to position India as an emerging security market for international sellers. Moreover, the emphasis on providing a platform for discussion does reflect that ‘HLS’ is not some stable commonsense category within India. That is, while clearly agreeing that a radical transformation in the meaning of security was necessary in light of 26/11, industry discourses seem to suggest that the basic security priorities and how they should be addressed has yet to be consolidated amongst the relevant stakeholders. The substance of these debates, then, is in many ways less revealing than their premise, namely the very notion that the ontological parameters of ‘security’ need to be debated at all. Taken together, the corporate imperatives to grapple with these issues suggest that the project of “Bringing Asia to Your Doorstep” (Securing Asia 2013) is not simply a question of linking buyers with sellers of security; it also requires negotiations about the status of the
various actors and interests involved in order to define security needs and develop solutions to them.

The strategies employed to overcoming these ‘security dilemmas’ thus reveal five key things. First, building on my arguments in Chapter 3, these narratives reflect the importance (and neglect) of “the difficult and painstaking labor that goes into assembling, maintaining or extending [...] new spaces of security” (Walters 2011: 54). The efforts to overcome the self-professed challenges of Indian HLS point to the need to pay attention to mundane practices in constructing appetites for security rather than taking them for granted. They also suggest that the creation of an endless supply of commoditized security solutions hardly guarantees their successful sale.

Second, they reveal something important about the dilemmas that working in India pose, particularly to foreign security purveyors like the Israelis. Despite the stereotypical depiction of Indian culture within industry forums, the problems of cultural difference are highly significant. However, the issue of difference goes beyond questions of scale and policing conditions on the ground in India. The issue of difference concerns the way the concept of security is understood, revealing that ‘HLS’ is not some universal category that exists in the same form everywhere. As one Tata Consulting Services (TCS) consultant emphasized to me, “Indian HLS” was not at all like HLS in developed countries and that “internal security” was a more useful descriptor, which had more resonance among the Indian public.129

Third, building on the arguments advanced in Chapter 3, we cannot take as given the existence of an Indian HLS marketplace or audience that receives security messages in a consistent way. While clearly important, limiting our analytical focus to issues of

129 Interview with Anonymous 9, March 2013
marketing or networking takes the existence of an Indian HLS market for granted. It is this assumption that post-26/11 developments fundamentally put into question. Industry efforts to build an Indian HLS market reveal that the challenges of selling security cannot be reduced to transactions between buyers and sellers of security solutions. As Figure 1 illustrates, although Securing Asia 2012 claims to link “Asian Security Buyers” with “Global Security Suppliers”, “networking” is only one dimension of this process.

Fourth, these efforts show that security as a category of governance in India is far from clear-cut. There is real disagreement about what security is and why it matters, even among the very parties seeking to promote a new security agenda. Far from reflecting a narrow professional consensus on India’s future security priorities, the parameters of India’s HLS discourse remain quite profoundly unsettled and open-ended, even insecure.

Fifth, the nature of the work being done does not seem to be primarily concerned with (in)securitization in the sense of fomenting new threats, dangers and fears. While the project of building “security awareness” might just seem like a softer face of
securitization, the term securitization doesn’t fully capture what efforts to raise security awareness are trying to do. Thus to ask whether something is being ‘securitized’ may not always be the most fruitful analytical question (see Collier and Lakoff 2008: 25). Rather, the relevant question is how a category called ‘Indian HLS’ is being fabricated as a social problem and site of governmental intervention.

3. A rude ‘awakening’

This section focuses on some of the effects of industry-led attempts to heighten the importance of investing in security since 2008. The obvious question that follows the efforts to promote greater awareness about India’s security priorities is whether these strategies have achieved their stated aims. Although such efforts do not necessarily succeed in forging a greater consensus about India’s security agenda, they are nevertheless instructive, as they help to unsettle the notion of some general relationship between the securitization of the urban and neoliberalism.

Although I anticipated that the discussions at industry events would be highly technical affairs, reflecting the narrow concerns of security professionals’ respective ‘communities of practice’, what I found was rather different. In fact the ‘neoliberal’ architects of India’s proposed security revolution did not always sound particularly neoliberal, at least not in the sense of a commitment to privatization and ‘free market’ fundamentalism without consideration of its social costs. An interview with SWI’s Harry Dhaul in an industry publication clearly illustrates this. He began by arguing for greater privatization in the provision of security, declaring: “I disagree with the premise that the responsibility for providing security rests solely with the central and state government.
Times have changed” (cited in Salute To The Indian Soldier 2011: 8). Yet he went on to say: “Any kind of dissent primarily arises due to the disagreement on sharing of the pie on economic, religious, social or other basis. As we make rapid economic progress, unequal distributions of wealth are bound to happen in the transition phase” (ibid: 9). In other words “economic progress” – not terrorism – is the ‘root cause’ of India’s security predicament. Other industry literature appears similarly ambivalent about India’s economic ‘progress’ reading more like a passage from Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society than like a pro-business lobbying effort. For instance: “Technology [...] is a queer thing. It brings you great gifts on one side and it stabs you in the back on the other. As the technology advances, risk too advances” (Pinkerton-FICCI 2012: 6).

In fact, some of the presentations at Indian HLS events seemed to be directly at odds with the project of raising the profile of terrorism in India and promoting technical solutions to it. For instance, the opening conference session at IFSEC and HLS India 2012 began with Rahul Gangal, the Director of Aviotech (an Indian aerospace and defense consultancy), discussing some of the key challenges facing Indian counterterror today. Just when his presentation was about to conclude, he turned to the issue of traffic deaths, stressing that terrorism kills relatively few people in India compared to road accidents. In other words, traffic deaths are the real security issue at hand.

At the same event, Sandeep Salunke, former Inspector General of Police in Uttar Pradesh, concluded his address by asking the audience rhetorically: “Can technology really secure the nation?” Answering his own question with a definitive “no”, Salunke argued that no amount of CCTV could have prevented the assailants from entering Mumbai on 26/11. Similarly, Dinesh Singh, a TCS representative, followed with
comments criticizing a “commoditized approach to solution architecture”, claiming that a focus on technology alone was unlikely to solve the security challenges at hand. Instead, he proceeded to advocate for a more “holistic” security agenda that would include citizen engagement. While these narratives might be written off as incidental off-the-cuff remarks, they are anything but rare. I encountered this kind of reflection at every Indian HLS event I attended, which led me to ask: what are these messages doing here and with what implications?

It is, of course, difficult to trace the long-term effects of statements made at such events. However, in at least one case—the FICCI-Pinkerton Risk Survey—we can quite clearly observe how a very deliberate corporate-led effort to raise the profile of terrorism in India did not simply fail, but actually backfired. Launched in 2012 the survey “aims to measure and quantify prevailing risk levels as faced by the actual users” and is “expected to provide a blueprint of prevailing risks in India to different stakeholders including policymakers, corporate [sic] and members of the civil society” (FICCI-Pinkerton 2012: Foreword). In other words, the Survey attempted to outline a new agenda for India’s security priorities by polling Indian corporate elites. Its emphasis on raising the profile of terrorism was readily apparent, proclaiming that “[t]he perils of terrorism have primed to be a part of risks occupying minds at all times” (FICCI-Pinkerton 2012: 4). In the 2012 edition the project seems to be going more or less according to plan with the Survey producing a ranking of the category “Terrorism” as the second highest “Overall Risk Ranking” just after “Information and Cyber Insecurity” (see Figure 2).

By the 2013 edition, however, this picture had already begun to shift, with the slightly modified category “Terrorism and Insurgency” falling to the 7th highest risk
rating after “Crime” (see Figure 3). By the 2014 edition, things had deteriorated even further with “Terrorism and Insurgency” moving down to the 10th highest risk rating after “Business Espionage” (see Figure 4). According to the 2014 Survey, these findings demonstrate that “[t]errorism ceases to be a prime risk for corporate India” (2014: 37). As it elaborates: “[T]he impact of terrorism on India’s economy proves to be short-lived. In the short term, terror incidents […] create security-related fear in the minds of foreign investors. However, consumers are unlikely to change their consumption patterns and businesses are unlikely to change their investment plans altogether […] Terror incidents are isolated events in India and their occurrence is seldom at regular intervals” (FICCI-Pinkerton 2014: 37). Thus despite the extensive corporate efforts to convince Indian policymakers that terrorism matters and needs to be taken ‘seriously’ after 26/11, the Survey concluded that ultimately, they got it wrong. That is corruption, strikes, political instability, crime, cyber insecurity, intellectual property theft, accidents, sexual harassment, and business espionage are all apparently more important to Indian corporate executives than terrorism and insurgency. In fact, the risks posed by terrorism and insurgency are trumped only by those from natural hazards and fire (see Figure 4).

My point is not to take the Survey’s findings as an accurate representation of risk perceptions in India today. Rather it is that while the Survey sought to reveal the new post-26/11 reality, it accidentally disclosed the persistence of the old one, namely that the threat of terrorism really isn’t a top priority for the country’s business elite. In other words, such corporate-led efforts to securitize India did not simply run into resistance
Figure 2: “Overall Risk Ranking” Source: FICCI-Pinkerton (2012)

Figure 3: “Overall Risk Ranking”. Source: FICCI-Pinkerton (2013a)

Figure 4: “Overall Risk Ranking”. Source: FICCI-Pinkerton (2014)
from outside, but rather tripped over themselves, in effect, producing less rather than more consensus around the proposition that the risk of terrorism threatens India’s position as a site of foreign investment. In fact, the 2014 edition’s revelations run directly contrary to the 2012 version’s ostensible aims, namely heightening the perceived threat of terrorism and the need to secure India from it. In attempting to map the risks facing the Indian business world, the Survey discovers that that business as usual – i.e. a status quo without security – will do just fine. Thus the Survey is instructive in terms of how we might go about unpacking the broader challenges faced in building an Indian HLS market – and by extension the resonances between neoliberalism and the securitization of the urban.

As I have emphasized throughout this dissertation, 26/11 was widely interpreted as the moment when India finally ‘woke up’ to the reality of ‘global’ terrorism. Yet as I have documented, the resulting patterns of change have been far from definitive. Part of the reason is that the project of securitizing India was interrupted by a series of unforeseen problems and unintended consequences. Yet while an account of these difficulties is critical for understanding why the post-26/11 story has unfolded in the way that it has, we need to go a step further. Simply saying that industry efforts were interrupted as they ran into the reality on the ground is insufficient because such a picture would leave intact the idea of a general relationship between the process of neoliberalization and that of securitization.

Thus looking at 26/11 as an awakening – however partial – is precisely the wrong metaphor to capture the changes to which 26/11 gave rise. Rather than waking up to some stable connection between neoliberalism and security, the post-26/11 experience
shows that this corporate-led discourse is actively trying to invent a new reality, namely that after 26/11 terrorism needs to be understood as a major threat to the future of India’s economic stability.

As I showed in section 1, Indian corporate actors have drawn on a logic of global competition to advocate for greater investment in security planning. Yet it is important not to confuse this neoliberal rationalization with the recognition of some pre-existing stable relationship between security and the (neoliberal) economy. Rather, these corporate efforts should be approached as performative statements that seek to build a new regime of truth about the costs and benefits of investment in security. As one corporate report claims: “All these years, security was considered as a support function for business, rather than a necessary evil, without much use. But post 26/11, terror has taken a new dimension and the subject of security has entered the corporate boardroom” (FICCI 2009: 12). Thus, these corporate texts are best seen as an attempt to develop a new understanding about their relationship in the Indian context. They are attempts to re-do ‘security’, as it were, by performing it in a new way – specifically one which presents it as an economic necessity. In doing so, and following Ong, we need to appreciate the particular nature of the Indian milieu of governing practices within which post-26/11 security interventions took place and in turn how these conditions shaped the efforts to articulate an agenda for governmental reform. Such milieus, she suggests, should be approached as “space[s] of betwixt and between”, representing both “the site of the problem and its resolution” (Ong 2006: 13).

We have already seen that these attempts to forge a connection between competitive market pressures and the need for an intensified focus on security have
proven less than successful, even on their own terms. This is partly because the encounter of Western security discourses with ‘India’ resulted in all kinds of unexpected points of tension and challenge. In particular, it produced discussions that are undeniably elite-driven, and neoliberal in their reasoning, yet they have not articulated a clear path forward. While these dynamics are certainly highly specific to security discussions in India, they provide a useful opportunity to displace the very idea of an already existing general relationship between ‘securitization’ and ‘neoliberalization’. While initially claiming that a vibrant economy requires more ‘security’, their attempts to forge a nexus between these two prerogatives illustrates that there is no obvious relationship between them ‘in general’.

The corporate assertion that the stability of India’s economy will require more ‘security’ shares an obvious resonance with discussions about the so-called “security-development nexus”—i.e. the notion that ‘development’ and ‘security’ are somehow inherently bound and mutually reinforcing (see Duffield 2001). Yet as the critical literature on the subject has quite aptly shown, even though the categories of ‘security’ and ‘development’ are becoming fused in discourse and practice, this does not itself testify to the claim that they are somehow inherently bound to one another – conceptually or otherwise (see Stern and Öjendal 2010).

In addition to displacing the idea of a clear-cut relationship between neoliberalism and security, it is also necessary to see the status quo position of security in India for what it is rather than what it isn’t. That is, we need to understand what, if anything, might be specific about the dynamics I have been tracing thus far. In next section I extend the above discussions and connect them with a number of tensions within the postcolonial
Indian state. I will argue that the tentativeness of security as it exists in India today owes much to the enduring ambiguities about the institutional position of the Indian police. Rather than being reducible to some backward essence of Indian culture, however, the position of security in India must be understood as already a product of previous transnational interactions.

4. Sources of friction: The postcolonial dimension

As India rises from a colonial past and shakes away socialist lethargy to reclaim its rightful place among the world’s biggest and most influential economies, it is constantly being challenged repeatedly by unexpected and unprecedented means of terrorism (FICCI 2009: 6).

Not surprisingly, the Indian security forums I observed were staged as a response to the growth of various “New Age Risks” (FICCI-Pinkerton 2013b), to which Western countries could offer various forms of assistance. 26/11 plays an important role in this, acting as a convenient point of entry for these activities to be rationalized. For instance, during a closed-door policy conference “Collaborating for Security” held in Mumbai in early 2013, Narinder Nayar, Chairman of the host organization Mumbai First, welcomed the speakers and guests from an official UK trade delegation. Emphasizing that 26/11 caused significant “trauma” that it is still “echoing with gunfire”, he presented the event as just the latest step in the pattern of positive international “collaboration” to which the attack gave rise. Quoting Helen Keller he proclaimed: “Alone we can do so little; together we can do so much”.

Despite efforts to present such collaborations as new, they are also positioned as a continuation of longstanding ties between India and the West. For instance, during Securing Asia 2012, James Brokenshire, the UK Minister for Crime and Security, spoke of the “historic bond” between the UK and Asia (India in particular) and how this
relationship could be further consolidated by invoking colonialism as an example of this longstanding partnership. Notwithstanding the bad taste of Brokenshire’s remarks, his comments are instructive in understanding the position of security as it exists in India today. By this I mean that we need to understand the current position of India’s contemporary security dynamics in relation to the enduring legacy of the country’s longstanding historical relationship to the West.

Indian policing (and hence matters of ‘internal security’) is inextricable from the institution’s colonial origins. Indeed, one of the central ironies of Indian independence is the fact that although the colonial police were the primary instrument of control and repression under the British Raj, the colonial policing system endured following decolonization virtually unchanged. While police violence served as a key catalyst for anti-colonial struggle, following independence it was re-appropriated as the primary instrument of control by the ruling Congress government. As some have pointed out, the rise of Indian nationalism and the demise of British rule “were both associated, paradoxically, with the growth of the Indian state” (Robb 1991:143; also see Arnold 1986).

The institutional longevity of the colonial police apparatus brings with it a number of complicated legacies. Most importantly, the authority that the contemporary Indian police wield is deeply fraught and ambiguous. As some have argued: “Colonial forms of sovereignty were more fragmented and complex, more reliant on spectacles and ceremony, and demonstrative and excessive violence, than the forms of sovereign power that had emerged in Europe […] As a result, the configurations of de facto sovereign power, justice, and order in the postcolonial states were from the outset partial,
competing, and unsettled”. As they continue: “The traces of the colonial state, or the culture of colonialism, have not withered away […] Sovereignty in the postcolonial world has in many ways remained provisional and partial, despotic and excessively violent” (ibid: 27). This does not mean that we should resort to the typical formulations of postcolonial states like India as simply “weak”, or even refer to “the postcolonial state” as an essential ‘type’ of state (see Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 14). Rather it suggests the need to focus on the complicated transnational entanglements and enduring institutional legacies that colonial forms of sovereignty and control have given rise to (see Anderson and Killingray 1991, 1992; Bayley 1969; Chatterjee 2011; Legg 2007).

Indeed, rather than dwell on the colonial origins of these enduring tensions, my concern here is how they relate to the contemporary discourses of security examined above. I am interested in how these paradoxical colonial legacies continue to influence the position of security as a category and priority of rule in India today. The difficulties faced by security purveyors in post-26/11 India reflect the ambiguous and tentative position of the Indian police and, hence, of ‘security’. Much like its position during colonialism, the contemporary institutional power that the Indian police command remains tenuous at best. On the one hand, the police continue to be capable of immense violence and repression whose primary role remains the control of public dissent. On the other hand, the police are widely viewed as ineffectual in investigating and prosecuting crime. Much like during the colonial period, the sources of the Indian police’s power and fragility are ironically rooted in many of the very same characteristics. As some have argued, the power of the colonial police in India, came from their underlying lack of professionalism and insulation from public scrutiny: “Much of the impact of the
[colonial] police lay in their unprecedented petty tyranny, their corruption and brutality” (Arnold 1986: 3).

So how does this play out in relation to contemporary questions over matters of security? As in many postcolonial polities, the “‘weakness” of everyday stateness is often countered by attempts to make state power highly visible. In this endeavor, issues of security, crime, and punishment occupy a privileged arena for performance of sovereign power” (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 29). In Chapter 4, I developed this line of argument to explain why a focus on performative displays of militarized strength became the default policy response to 26/11 by the GOM.

This might seem to suggest that the Indian state would have an almost boundless appetite for highly visible security solutions and in the immediate aftermath of 26/11 this was the case. Yet despite the initial need for state authorities to re-assert their authority after 2008 in order to restore public confidence through militarized displays of modern weapons and gadgetry, as public pressure receded, the focus of policing largely returned to its everyday functions. As it turns out, these prerogatives remain shaped much more by the longstanding concerns of colonial rule than about how to protect the city against large-scale acts of terrorism.

One thing consistently stood out in my interviews with police personnel in Mumbai. Irrespective of the nature of my opening question, many of the officials I spoke with typically answered the question they apparently hoped I would ask, namely, what they thought was the most important security issue facing Mumbai today. These responses typically covered a number of common topics, such as the issue of anonymous ‘floating’ migrant populations in the city, communal unrest and the threat of riots, efforts
to ‘indoctrinate’ and ‘radicalize’ local Muslim youth, and the alleged connections between local criminal groups and global terrorist in Pakistan. Here, the name of the notorious gangster Dawood Ibrahim frequently came up.

This recurring pattern initially proved a source of frustration as I had spent months tracking down these individuals to discuss the police response to 26/11, only to be treated to an in-depth account of their personal views on how, for example, the constant influx of anonymous migrants posed by far the gravest greater danger to the city. Some distance from these encounters allowed me to look at this pattern in a more productive way. It began to dawn on me that these officers were not interested in the kind of security that I had come to discuss but rather they had a different vision. They repeatedly insisted that Mumbai is by all accounts a very safe city. In effect, they claimed that the reason they did not require a ‘Safe City’, was because they already had one. As one senior IPS officer explained to me:

[U]nlike many, many countries around the world...Mumbai...I would say it’s still the safest city for a common citizen at any given point of time...Which does not mean...that crime doesn’t take place, it does, sure. But it is not unsafe...[T]herefore, when...people going in for [to buy] private security [this] is more for other reasons: maybe it will give them a little more sense of status or sense...[of] comfort, [but it’s] not to say that if they didn’t have the [private] security they would be robbed or something...it doesn’t happen like that. [During 26/11 there was] a breach of security or...a terrorist attack...[But] you can still have...an attack of terror...[without] affecting the safety of a lot of people.130

Indeed, as Thomas Blom Hansen (2001a: 186, 225) points out, Mumbai is

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130 Interview with Ahmad Javed, December 2012
not regarded as a dangerous in terms of everyday occurrences. Few people hesitate to walk the streets or sit alone in a train in the evening, and their homes are not fortified with bars against possible burglary. Instead, people’s sense of danger or, more precisely their anxiety about a lack of safety, is of an intangible nature, relating to the fundamental opacity and mystery of the multilayered life in the metropolis. In this respect, the problems of knowledge and policing in colonial Bombay […] have remarkably continued into contemporary Mumbai. […] The coexistence of intersecting modalities of power, and the tentative and improvised nature of both the exercise of multiple forms of and of bio-political governance, is probably one of the most crucial features of postcolonial urban governance in India.

The critical point here is that the target of the contemporary Mumbai police is clearly not ‘security’ in the sense of the city’s technological preparedness against the threat of future terrorist attacks. Rather, their attention remains focused on the quotidian regulation of everyday life – a task with which the status quo of policing will do just fine.

This point is reflected in the fact that, despite the focus on arming police personnel after 26/11, these efforts have not phased out the antiquated colonial-era weapons that were widely cited as a major problem in the handling of the 26/11 (see Introduction, Chapter 2). When I asked a senior IPS officer about the new weapons purchases after 2008, he stressed that these new weapons “are not for the whole force”.131 He and other officers saw the issue of police modernization as a matter of getting the “best” weaponry for new elite units like Force One, emphasizing that this had nothing to do with everyday policing. According to this officer, little of the old armory had been

131 Interview with Deven Bharti, April 2013
phased out, despite the fact that criticisms over malfunctioning equipment during 26/11 were the primary catalyst of the post-26/11 wave of procurement. As a former Maharashtra Home Ministry bureaucrat explained to me, “for the time being they [antiquated weapons] are being used” because police personnel “need weapons and until such time as we are able to give each a newer weapon, he has at least got something”. In the meantime, whether or not they actually worked was apparently not of much concern.

Certain HLS industry representatives with whom I spoke in India seemed to be acutely aware of the Indian police status quo situation and the barriers it posed to their work. In fact, some specifically invoked the endurance of a “colonial” mindset as the key impediment to their efforts to ‘secure’ the nation. As a TCS representative explained to me, India’s ongoing HLS “challenges” were not in fact really *security* problems, but rather “problems of governance”. As he emphasized, “we [Indians] want to control, not to govern” claiming that although some people in the Indian government are in the “22nd century”, enlightened to the “real” value of investing in security, the vast majority remain in the “12th century”, clinging to a “colonial” mentality of punishing individual crimes rather than resolving systemic governance issues.

To be sure, this is a self-interested corporate caricature of the ‘challenge’ of India’s security predicament. However it also holds a grain of truth, namely that the challenge faced by promoters of security in India is to convince public agencies to ‘empower’ their forces without reservation and begin restructuring the Indian policing along the lines of some Western police force. In this they face a perpetual uphill battle.

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132 Interview with Umesh Chandra Sarangi, April 2013
133 Interview with Anonymous 9, March 2013
While the challenges of changing the so-called “Indian mindset” on matters of security are perhaps most acute in relation to the bureaucratic Indian state, as noted above, even the corporate world in India is by no means outside of these considerations. This does not mean that ‘terrorism’ as such simply doesn’t matter to policing authorities in Mumbai and in India more broadly. Nor does it mean that India is somehow ungoverned. As Chatterjee (2011: 93) has recently argued, “India has never been more governed than it is today”. In fact, India’s Unique Identification (UID) number system represents the most ambitious biometric technology project anywhere in the world (Jacobsen 2012). Rather it is to emphasize that the way terrorism matters is quite different from the way in which it is approached in many Western states. In fact, this is what some of the struggles surrounding the Pradhan report were about. While its findings suggested the need to strengthen the capabilities of everyday police capacity, the leading government ministers had a rather different agenda in mind. Their aim was to create a new breed of heavily armed (though limited) elite units, whilst keeping the overall colonial police structure intact. In this effort they have undeniably succeeded. As sitting ATS chief Himanshu Roy recently emphasized in an interview: “Every constable does not fight terrorism. We have NSG and Force One to fight terrorism. We don’t expect the beat constable to fight terrorism. He does not do that anywhere in the world. He is the first line of defence, but not the ultimate line”. As he went on, “I don’t think the citizens of Mumbai would want their friendly beat cop to be carrying an AK-47” (cited in Mehta 2014).

**Conclusion**

26/11 has served as a key moment of opportunity around which interested parties
could mobilize in order to advocate for a new security agenda within the public and private sectors. Yet we have equally seen that the event of ‘26/11’ did not have some kind of inherent meaning or necessary ramifications for how matters of security should be governed in India since 2008. Despite all the talk of 26/11 as a game-changing moment that singlehandedly altered the cost-benefit calculus of investing in security, the project of actually capitalizing on the event has faced a host of formidable obstacles. Indeed, focusing too readily on the discursive shifts that 26/11 engendered would negate the various forms of hard work that has gone into building an Indian HLS sector in the years following 2008. The failure to address such frictions represents a key analytical oversight in critical literature, which tends to portray the processes of securitization as relatively smooth and seamless projects. This is why attention to forms of labour and struggle matter in analysis of contemporary security trends. It shows that the status spaces, actors and categories often portrayed as stable may be active sites of negotiation and contestation.

These dynamics also raise questions about the role of neoliberalism in analysis of urban security trends. I began this chapter by suggesting that the issue of neoliberalism needed to be addressed centrally in order to understand the industry dynamics. The reason is that efforts to “securitize India” after 2008 took place in a language that seemed nothing if not neoliberal. As became increasingly clear, however, there were aspects of this discourse that seemed out of place. There was considerable evidence to suggest that the efforts to build an Indian HLS market after 2008 had run into a number of challenges and dilemmas.

In conclusion I want to emphasize that although neoliberalism and the
domestication of security can be conceptually linked through trends like the growing privatization and commodification of security and inter-urban competition, these insights only take us so far. Most importantly, the findings of this chapter contest the idea that neoliberal or security ‘logics’ have some inherent essences or necessary resonances between one another. Rather than situating post-26/11 security trends as a response to the pressures of ‘big N’ neoliberalism, I have told a rather different story, namely one about Indian corporate actors trying to re-invent the relationship between economy and security on their own terms. In drawing attention to the problems and limitations about the role of neoliberalism within critical security literature, however, the point is clearly not to suggest that neoliberalism has no role to play in understanding the urbanization of security or that we should attempt a project of “explaining (with) [out] neoliberalism” (Peck 2013). There remains much fruitful work to be done on trying to understand how neoliberal rationalities of governing are used to legitimate new security agendas in more precise and reflexive ways that are informed by close engagement with “actual neoliberal practices” (Ong 2007: 7).

In doing so, however, we need also to explore ways to think more productively about how we put neoliberalism to work and the costs and benefits of employing the term’s different possible formulations. As others have recently suggested, this chapter points to the importance of reconsidering what it means, exactly, to be ‘critical’ or ‘political’ in these endeavors (see Collier 2011; Ferguson 2009). Yet while grappling with neoliberalism remains necessary, this does not mean that we need to be neoliberalism-centric either. As Walters (2012:42) puts it: “The point is not to behave like a political ostrich and ignore neoliberalism! We can’t. But we can practice a kind of
intellectual self-criticism that remains watchful of the possibility that an overvaluation of neoliberalism could block the possibility for discerning other ways of governing and contesting governing, however minor they may be”. Throughout this dissertation I have attempted to do just this.
Conclusion: 9 is (really) not 11

Introduction

I began this dissertation by drawing attention to how 26/11 was scripted as ‘India’s 9/11’. This portrayal did not go unchallenged. A number of Indian commentators, including Arundhati Roy, immediately refuted this narrative. In an essay entitled “9 is not 11”, she argued: “November isn’t September, 2008 isn’t 2001, Pakistan isn’t Afghanistan and India isn’t America” (Roy 2008). At the time, her remarks represented an important and rare counterpoint to the mainstream media portrayals of the attacks, which called for a ‘hard’ response by the Indian government, including military retaliation against Pakistan. In the longer term, however, Roy’s rebuff of India’s 9/11 narrative has also proved remarkably prescient.

In contrast to Roy’s desire to contest the simplistic comparisons between 26/11 and 9/11, my aim has been to understand the kinds of work that such comparisons have performed in framing the significance of the event itself and informing possible solutions to it. In particular I have focused on how the India’s 9/11 narrative gave rise to the idea that India needed to learn from the alleged ‘success’ of others. This dissertation has shown, however, that the supposed awakening to the threat of ‘global’ terror on 26/11 did not give rise to a new understanding of terrorism in India nor to the revolution in security governance for which many industry groups had hoped. In short, despite all the efforts to develop equivalences between 9/11 and 26/11, as it turns out 9 really was not 11.

This dissertation has focused on the production and diffusion of security expertise used in the management and control of contemporary urban spaces. It has connected issues of politics with questions of mobility. At first sight the global movement of
security policy exemplars appears as a relatively straightforward phenomenon denoting the literal transfer of knowhow from one geographic location to another. I have troubled this picture by developing an account of how Israel has emerged as a policy exemplar and the reasons why the country’s HLS ‘solutions’ were looked to as part of the GOM’s policy response to 26/11. I have further contested the rationalist picture of transfer by tracing the (limited) extent to which learning from Israel has actually transformed Mumbai’s approach to urban security governance and policing. I have repeatedly stressed that what appears straightforward, obvious and intuitive on the surface turns out to be considerably less so when examined more carefully.

In what follows I review my three central arguments. I then reflect on the possibilities for a more productive critical engagement with contemporary security trends.

1. **Regimes of comparison (and their limits)**

   Critical security scholars’ reliance on mainstream policy transfer approaches has ultimately proven analytically limiting and counterproductive as it tends to negate the extent to which policies transform as they travel across sociopolitical fields and uncritically celebrates their appeal as largely uncontested. Perhaps even more importantly, however, scholarship on the new military urbanism needs to engage with the growing theoretical literature on policy mobilities and policy assemblages. Building on this work, my dissertation has argued that policy exemplars are relational constructions that come into being through actual and imagined connections between different geographic sites and actors. They are politically constituted co-productions that emerge
through patterns of global interaction, and are transformed on the move.

I have thus focused on the conditions of possibility of contemporary governance regimes as well as the constraints faced in trying to construct new spaces and discourses of security. While mobile policy schemes are constituted relationally, this should not be read as evidence of intensifying patterns of global connectivity per se. Nor does it suggest a general decline in the importance of geographical or cultural difference. Quite to the contrary my analysis has shown that the actually existing connections between different sites are in many respects more fragile than scholarship on the urbanization of security would suggest.

The increasing securitization and militarization of the urban is on some level undeniable in its voracious consumption of public resources and ever-expanding reach into new dimensions of everyday life. Critical scholarship has therefore rightly contested new security regimes as excessive and unwarranted. In doing so, they have called attention to the role of securitizing and militarizing trends in producing new forms of (in)security, state violence, precarity, danger and fear. While acknowledging the political importance of these critiques, Collier and Lakoff (2008: 25) have argued that “there is a risk in replacing a blanket embrace of security measures with blanket denunciation”. Indeed, an unfortunate consequence of the impulse to denounce the new security agendas is that critical scholarship has invested insufficient energy in grappling with the kinds of work that go into assembling them. To borrow a quip from a security industry publication in the 1980s, we might say that critical scholars have often forgotten that under certain circumstances “[m]otivating people to care about security is a tough job” (Grau 1992 [1989]: 143). Following these concerns, my analysis and critiques of empirical trends
have been informed by challenges, frictions and the work of security, rather than primarily on the exclusionary effects that mobile policy schemes may bring about.

In this dissertation I have closely engaged with emergent debates on policy mobilities in two ways: as a methodological approach and as a conceptual framework for theorizing the complex geographies involved in the production and diffusion of policy models. Engagement with this scholarship has allowed me to address the politics and anti-politics of policy mobility. Yet this literature is also not without its own limitations. First, some have recently noted the danger “that studies of urban policy mobilities are as ‘fast’ in their analysis as polices are to move”, potentially producing apolitical forms of analyses as a result (Temenos and McCann 2013: 353). That is, while policy mobilities scholarship has emerged as an important corrective to the apolitical premises of policy transfer approaches and has demonstrated a sustained commitment to uncovering the forms of struggle and contestation involved in ‘mobilizing’ policy schemes, there is a need to not simply follow policy elites and their projects around the world, but also stay with them, especially after they ‘touch down’ in particular places.

Second, it is important to note that to date, this literature has focused almost exclusively on the sanitized realm of “traveling technocrats” (Larner and Laurie 2010) and much less so on forms of policy mobility in the context of security planning and policing, albeit with a few notable exceptions. There is much to be gained from a more extensive cross-fertilization between critical security studies and policy mobilities scholars, allowing these “rolling conversations” (Peck 2011a: 774) to travel to new places and empirical sites. Yet there are important limits and challenges posed to conducting research on the empirical sites with which I have engaged in this dissertation. The
secrecy surrounding security and policing issues made access to key officials and materials necessarily fraught and provisional. This raises some difficult and important questions about our relationships to the policy networks and centres of power that we aim to interrogate as critical researchers.

As Peck and Theodore (2012: 25) point out, a key challenge of policy mobilities research “is one of traveling within cosmopolitan policy networks without becoming another creature of those networks; of making sense of fast-moving ‘best practices’ without losing sight of prosaic practice; of taking account of phenomena like policy tourism and policy tradeshows without succumbing to explanatory dilettantism” or engaging in “methodological tourism”. These considerations have strongly shaped my own analytical disposition while studying spaces and circuits through which global policy learning takes place. They become perhaps even more acute, however, when our travels run into agencies like the police, which are considerably more opaque, arcane and (im)mobile than the fast-moving circuits global policy elites.

Here Richard Ericson (1989: 216) notes the “peculiar irony” of gaining knowledge about policing activities by reporters: “By working hard to establish the trust of the police, inner circle reporters put themselves in a position of being very knowledgeable about many aspects of policing. However, the very basis for achieving trust was their willingness not to divulge what they learned. The very methodology they adopted to be trusted and enhance their knowledge also limited the knowledge they could make public”. In short, our access to official agencies shapes what we are likely to say about them, and what we say about them becomes a key condition governing our further access. This issue directly concerns the dangers of contributing to apolitical forms of
analysis identified above.

There is clearly no easy methodological way around this dilemma. Simply put, there are places (physical and metaphorical) that will always remain impossible to visit. When access is granted, moreover, it remains necessarily circumscribed and conditional. Yet even within this state of affairs there are choices to make, particularly about the kinds of questions we are willing to ask when we do get opportunities to speak to relevant authorities we depend on in carrying out our work. This raises an important question: how disruptive should our “disruptive posture” (Peck and Theodore 2012: 26) in such situations be?

In a few cases in carrying out my fieldwork I asked interview questions that aroused some rather terse exchanges, some of which I have drawn on previous chapters. In at least one such instance asking an ‘out of bounds’ question came at the direct expense of further access to a key official. Yet while clearly not without obvious costs, I would argue that somewhat contentions interactions are not with utility. At the very least they provide important reminders of the physical places, practices and subjects continue to remain hidden and elusive, allowing us to potentially map these ‘no go’ zones by running into their boundaries. Officials’ confrontational and dismissive reactions to certain questions may also, nevertheless, reveal something about their relationships to these concealed subjects, even if only by way of their refusal to explicitly indulge our inquires. Finally, we might be surprised by officials’ willingness to depart from their scripts, as I was on a few occasions. So while acknowledging that as researchers we are not in any position to be particularly hard nosed in our inquiries, we too might wish to re-consider the circumstances under which it might make sense to depart from our own
scripts and in doing so open up possibilities for research encounters to unfold in less expected ways.

2. *Re-politicizing urban security*

From the outset, this dissertation has argued that issues of politics must be placed front and centre in understanding the policy trends to which 26/11 gave rise. As the attacks were by no means unprecedented in terms of their levels of destruction and loss of life, their unusual political repercussions immediately raised questions about how issues of security and policing came to matter politically in new ways. Yet my project has also been informed by my broader dissatisfaction with the way in which issues of politics are addressed in the literature on the new military urbanism. While threats to public space and democratic activity remain pressing concerns in contemporary urban spaces, analysis of the politics of urban security should neither begin nor end here.

I have focused on two aspects of the politics of urban security and their relationship to issues of mobility. The first aspect concerns how matters of urban security preparedness emerge as sites of public controversy and consternation in the first place. Here I have emphasized that the political dimensions of urban security preparedness need to be carefully specified rather than assumed in advance, otherwise we risk superimposing some general assumptions that may obscure more than they reveal. The media discourse that surrounded 26/11 has all the trappings of a neoliberal agenda, led by India’s corporate media and global security experts – dynamics we associate with the depoliticization of security. Yet while the media representations of 26/11 as a technical failure were undeniably problematic, they had some unexpected implications.
Representations of 26/11 as a narrow, ‘technical’ matter in fact contributed to politicization in new ways. As Walters (2014: 112) points out, “[t]he technologization of an issue does not necessarily entail its depoliticization”. Indeed, sometimes quite the opposite is the case.

Second I have explored how the post-26/11 fallout has been managed through practices of security governance. I focused on how state agencies have used militarized, theatrical displays of sovereignty to try and re-assert their authority to govern. Building on these concerns I have shown how mobile policy schemes were deployed to restore public ‘confidence’ in Indian security and policing agencies. The focus on visibility suggested the need to examine militarization as a process through which public concerns over security preparedness are negotiated.

I have also argued that the GOM’s militarized policy response worked to police the boundaries of existing controversies and circumscribe the space of debate on matters of urban security, thereby showing how the policy response has become generative of the policy ‘problem’ at hand. Yet the anti-political implications of best practice learning should be conceptualized as part of the operation of politics rather than an alternative to it. The ‘politicization’ of urban security planning in Mumbai, moreover, should not be understood as a pathological tendency but rather as an intelligible and productive force. This further suggests that the process of securitization is not simply a threat to democratic politics and public space. Security matters represent an important potential site of controversy and dissensus. I have thus sought to trouble the commonsensical binary separating ‘technical’ matters and ‘political’ ones. Indeed, I have troubled the idea that governance regimes like best practice learning are even really very technical at all.
My focus on issues of politics was driven by a desire to move away from the tendency to explain urban securitizations through a blanket appeal to ‘neoliberalism’. This does not mean that dealing with the issue of neoliberalism and addressing questions of politics and discord are somehow antithetical projects. As we have seen, the encounter of foreign HLS purveyors with ‘India’ produced a number of paradoxical and unexpected results. In drawing attention to the struggles in the industry developments that follow 2008, we can thereby begin to conceptualize how new security agendas are assembled but also begin to explore how they might come undone.

This study has also made a case for addressing questions of the politics of urban security governance in situ with considerations of mobility, sharing a strong resonance with Cresswell’s conception of “the politics of mobility”. Through this approach, he draws attention to “the ways in which mobilities are both productive of […] social relations and produced by them” (Cresswell 2010: 21). In a similar way I have shown how the use of mobile policy schemes has played a role in legitimating Israel’s practices of occupation as well as consolidating preexisting discourses of shared threat and common enemy between India and Israel. I have considered the role of policy mobility in reinforcing preexisting geographies of exclusion in Mumbai. Yet developing an understanding of how issues of politics and mobility relate also requires going a step further. The reason is that while playing a role in the (re)production of already existing social relations and structures of global authority, mobile policy schemes also give rise to something new – reconfiguring the social worlds and polities with which they engage. In this case the contributions of policy learning have no doubt been modest. Yet under different circumstances they might be considerably less so.
As Clarke (2012:34) and others have emphasized, there is much to be gained through a focus on the “local politics of fast policy”, further emphasizing the need to grapple with anti-political repercussions of these trends (emphasis added). Building on these considerations but also extending them further, this dissertation makes a preliminary contribution toward furthering discussions about what we might call the (geo)politics of policy mobility: that is, the ways in which the practices and discourses surrounding the global war on terror shape the emergence of policy prerogatives within particular local contexts (and vice versa).

What I have in mind here is directly informed by my reading of the Israeli intervention into Mumbai 26/11 and its resulting political fallout (see Chapter 2). The intervention and the subsequent impulse to ‘learn’ from Israel took place under the backdrop of India’s changing geopolitical position vis-à-vis the global war on terror and its closely related bilateral partnerships with Israel and the US. Indeed, as we have seen, references to the US and Israeli experiences in the war on terror directly shaped public understandings of what ‘26/11’ signified and how the policy response should take shape. As I was quite surprised to discover, however, this close bilateral partnership gave Israeli HLS purveyors much less of a competitive edge in selling their wares than I (and they) had initially anticipated. As such it would be a mistake to reduce the post-26/11 impulse to ‘learn from Israel’ to an outgrowth of the two countries’ close bilateral relationship. Yet, even if they do not always align, these different levels or spheres of interaction also clearly overlap and intersect in certain places. In beginning to theorize about the (geo)politics of mobility more fully, we need to grapple directly with questions about how these different scales intermingle, co-constitute and also depart from one another.
To be clear, there is nothing emancipatory about the kinds of politics of security to which 26/11 gave rise. If anything my study has served as a reminder of the classed origins of security as a concept. As Neocleous (2000: 43) has long argued, security represents the “the supreme concept of bourgeois society” (emphasis in original). Indeed, throughout my discussions of the politics of urban security, I have emphasized that the policy response to 26/11 was clearly not for everyone. More precisely, there are different security messages for different kinds of people.

On my walks throughout south Mumbai I often encountered improvised sandbagged bunkers with armed police around places like CST and the Bombay High Court. One such bunker at CST had a message handwritten on it that read “PLEASE NO ENQUIRY”. I found this message curious. While the structure was ostensibly constructed to restore public ‘confidence’ in the station’s security preparedness, the authors of the message apparently seemed to be somewhat less than interested in building the kind of “dialogue with the people” that Sivanandan stressed (see Chapter 4). That is, at the very site where the vast majority of 26/11’s victims had lost their lives, people were being told to carry on and not ask any questions. This dismissive tone was also in direct contrast to some of the security messaging I encountered in other locations of south Mumbai. For instance, on my way to an interview, I noticed security barriers outside of the Bombay Stock Exchange with printed messages that read “thank you for your cooperation” and “sorry for the inconvenience”. The differences between these two kinds of messages, then, suggest the importance of grasping the multiple publics that security policies interact with, sometimes in very different, even contradictory ways.
3. Beyond policy transfer and convergence

One of my central arguments has been that issues of mobility should not be limited to a concern with the literal movement of tactics, expertise and technologies from one place to another. As I have argued, learning from Israel did not bring about a pattern of convergence around a supposed Israeli ‘model’ of urban security. There are a number of reasons for this, not least of which are the various challenges which have limited the extent of Israeli involvement in post-26/11 Mumbai.

In her account of the neoliberalization of India, Rupal Oza opens with a metaphor emblematic of this process of transformation. She reflects on how new “multinational” advertisements have been grafted onto old “Indian” ones in such a way that the old continues to shine through the new. Building on this metaphor, she suggests “rather than producing sameness, global capital adapts to the particularities of the local—feeding on, rather than papering over, difference” (Oza 2006: 139). In light of Oza’s comments it is perhaps less than surprising that the export of their HLS ‘solutions’ to India after 2008 has not resulted in the seamless replication of some security model from the West.

In contrast to Oza’s focus on global capital’s adaptation to difference, however, I have focused more on the self-conscious problems of difference faced by industry actors in ‘applying’ their solutions on the ground in Mumbai and in building an Indian HLS market. Efforts to radically transform the “Indian mindset” on issues of security have not always exactly gone according to plan. As I argued in the case of the India Risk Survey, for instance, the project of heightening new forms of ‘awareness’ to the economic risks of global terror seemed to produce less, not more, clarity about how to ‘solve’ the self-professed challenges of Indian HLS.
These interruptions are clearly not the only reason why a literal policy transfer did not take place after 2008. I have argued that looking at policy mobility as a process which simply involves the transfer of policy agendas from one location to another is to take it too literally as a practical solution to knowable problems. While seeking Israeli ‘best practices’ was presented by officials as a radical overhaul of the Mumbai police, in effect it has largely done the opposite - giving the impression of change without major institutional reform. Despite its pretense to radical transformation through the frame of ‘police modernization’, learning from Israel largely amounted to an elaborate way to maintain the status quo of Mumbai’s approach to policing. This does not mean that interactions between Israeli and Mumbai officials were entirely inconsequential. What is clear, rather, was that this process of learning did not produce a copy (even a bad one) of some coherent policy prescription from Israel.

In moving beyond the literalism of conventional policy transfer approaches, however, we need to reconsider how we approach issues of difference. Certain practitioners I spoke with seemed rather unconcerned with questions of difference. For instance when I asked the commander of Force One about the unique challenges posed by fighting terrorism in Mumbai, he said there were few key issues to consider, namely the heterogeneity and density of the city’s population, the large ‘floating population’ of unauthorized migrants, and Mumbai’s status as the country’s economic capital, which makes it perpetually prone to terrorist attacks. Yet he seemed uninterested in elaborating on these specificities, ultimately claiming: “all cities are similar”. As he summarized, “cities are cities; they grow up vertical”, referencing the examples of New York and Shanghai. Grasping this ‘vertical’ reality was critical, he added, because “you should be
These geographical imaginations of global cities as generic and interchangeable blank canvases, clearly reflects Stephen Graham’s (2010 Ch. 5) “robowar dreams” (2010 Ch 5). Following this, Adey (2010a: 54) seems quite right to assert that “the dream of megacity security strategies is one and the same the world over” (emphasis added). Yet this clearly doesn’t mean that security strategies and policing practices on the ground in Mumbai necessarily have much in common with those in New York or Shanghai. So while Graham (2010: xxi) has argued that the transnational movement of policy exemplars are beginning to produce “startling similarities” in the security practices between cities around the world, my findings ask us to re-consider what actually counts as a similarity (or a difference) in the first place.

This also raises questions about when and to what extent dreams become real. In this dissertation I have emphasized the political consequences of making comparisons between different places and policies. At the same time, however, this does not mean that we should take them at face value. In fact some comparisons I encountered during my fieldwork were hard to really know what to make of. For instance when I asked an Israeli consular official stationed in Mumbai how he found the city, he told me that it was an endlessly fascinating place. However he went on to note that after a recent trip to Hong Kong, he was struck how utterly “perfect” Hong Kong was in relation to Mumbai. Hong Kong, as he eloquently put it, is “like New York but with Chinese people in it”. He went on to suggest that if all the world’s major cities were stacked on top of each other with the best at the top, Hong Kong would take the position of the penthouse. Mumbai,

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134 Interview with Rajnish Seth, January 2013
alternatively, would occupy “the place where they keep the garbage”\textsuperscript{135}.

Such remarks clearly say much more about their authors than the places and relationships they claim to describe. They are also rather stark counterpoints to official narratives of common threat and shared destiny that are typically used to describe ties between India and Israel. In my opinion, however, such off-script statements have provided useful reminders of the importance of taking official claims seriously but not literally. It remains important for critical scholars to engage closely with industry narratives and state officials in order to understand the work they do. Yet this also raises important questions about the role of critics in re-producing the regimes of truth that surround and sustain the new military urbanism. These considerations are particularly pertinent in light of another recent discussion about Israel’s role in promoting global militarism – namely, debates within the United States about the militarization of policing.

4. \textit{Dangers and possibilities for critical engagement}

In the wake of the fatal police shooting of unarmed teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri last year, the aggressive American police response has raised alarm and unleashed a wave of protest. A range of commentators quickly pointed out that the unfolding scenes looked like “war zones”, drawing attention to the use of armored personnel carriers, assault rifles, and combat-style uniforms used in US combat missions overseas. As part of these discussions, however, a number of media accounts have cited Israeli involvement in the training of US police personnel, sometimes in Israel, as a potential explanation for why the crackdown on protesters unfolded as it did:

The dystopian scenes of paramilitary units in camouflage rampaging through the

\textsuperscript{135} Interview with Anonymous 10, April 2013
streets of Ferguson, pointing assault rifles at unarmed residents and launching tear gas into people’s front yards from behind armored personnel carriers, could easily be mistaken for a Tuesday afternoon in the occupied West Bank. And it’s no coincidence. At least two of the four law enforcement agencies that were deployed in Ferguson up until Thursday evening—the St. Louis County Police Department and the St. Louis Police Department—received training from Israeli security forces in recent years”. (Khalek 2014)

These stories are now quite familiar. Over the past few years, news reports and scholarly works have documented the involvement of Israeli security experts and police trainers around the world. But they are not unproblematic. The first issue is their imprecision. As the alleged policy transfers to which they refer are never elaborated in any real detail, such articles offer little specific information about what exactly was transferred to American police authorities through their involvement with Israeli security experts. So while suggesting that events in Ferguson reflect a broader “Israelification” of American policing (Blumenthal 2011), such claims are made in absence of any clear evidence of what has actually traveled from Israel to America—tactically, ideologically, or otherwise. Furthermore, while involvement with Israeli trainers suggests a radical transformation of American policing since 9/11, these accounts offer few insights into what about this broader pattern of police militarization is distinctly Israeli. In doing so, stories about Israeli involvement in training security and police forces do important work for Israel’s HLS industry by reinforcing the picture that Israeli training results in the smooth and unhindered global replication of the so-called “Israeli approach” to security around the world.
The second problem, which follows closely from the first, is that such critiques end up largely reinforcing industry narratives of Israel’s status as an “HLS capital”. This is because articles about Israeli involvement with American policing have adopted an approach to critique, which is based on revealing “hidden truths” behind Israel’s repressive security apparatus. As one such account notes: “Training alongside the American police departments […] was the Yamam, an Israeli border police unit that claims to specialize in ‘counterterror’ operations but is better known for its extra-judicial assassinations of Palestinian militant leaders and long record of repression and abuses in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip” (Blumenthal 2011). In pursuing this line of critique, these narratives therefore only alter one aspect of the pro-industry narrative—namely, the normative position about the role of Israeli expertise in shaping the practice of American policing. In doing so, they also divert attention away from the violent and repressive character of police power, irrespective of Israeli influence.

Yet given that Israel’s security industry openly brags that its knowledge is derived from testing on live Palestinian bodies and explicitly leverages its involvement with foreign police forces around the world as evidence of its status as an HLS leader, these critical revelations ultimately give us little new information. Rather than supplying an alternative account of Israel’s rise as an “HLS capital” (and the contingencies involved in this process), they essentially tell us that what we (think) we already know, that Israel remains at the center of the global security landscape. In doing so, they do nothing to unsettle this image itself. Indeed, the trick of openly leveraging its claim to “combat-proven” knowledge by Israel’s HLS industry is that it effectively disarms many of the criticisms based on trying to expose this dark reality.
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that explicit critiques have actually been appropriated by Israel’s HLS industry in their promotional material. For instance, drawing on an *Al Jazeera* article critical of the growing reach of Israel’s HLS industry (Silver 2012), the Israeli HLS promotional group i-HLS recently posted the following news release on its website: “The Israeli homeland security industry attracts attention globally. *Al Jazeera* the TV network has recently devoted a report to this industry. In this report Israeli experts said that no other country has emerged as a serious competitor to Israel’s homeland security trade” (i-hls.com 2013). In this way, explicit criticisms of Israel’s HLS industry and its global influence can unwittingly work to reinforce and entrench Israel’s dominant position as an HLS leader. This is where political stakes of understanding of Israel’s emergence as a policy exemplar as an open and relational process becomes more apparent. While the Israel HLS industry gains much of its force through its self-presentation as some kind of closed professional consensus, accepting such a stance is not simply analytically problematic but also politically counterproductive. To do so is to mistakenly accept its leadership status as an incontrovertible fact rather than an emergent and unstable process, thereby playing directly into the hand of Israel’s security industry.

These considerations speak to a broader problem: existing critiques have not simply proven ineffectual at mounting a challenge to Israel’s security industry, but in some ways may even prove directly counterproductive. I do not mean to shoot the messenger here. After all, the only reason we know anything about Israeli involvement in police training is from the hard work of investigative journalists and critical researchers. Nor do I wish to suggest that academics or journalists can be fully responsible for how
their work may be re-appropriated by the Israeli military machine. (As Eyal Weizman’s (2005) work on the IDF program of “walking through walls” makes clear, even the radical scholarship of Deleuze and Guattari has been effectively put to work in the subjugation and slaughter of Palestinians). My point, rather, is to show that forms of critique that merely reveal the growing global influence of Israeli security doctrines, produce few, if any, actual revelations. They tell us little about how Israeli security tactics actually travel geographically to be ‘applied’ on bodies in Ferguson or elsewhere.

What is missing (and much needed) in the critical geographical literature is an active deconstruction of state and industry narratives and the imaginative geographies they conjure (see Closs Stephens 2011). This requires taking apart the very idea of security laboratories. By this I do not mean to suggest that the laboratory metaphor is inherently counterproductive—either analytically or politically. It does, however, suggest that we need to differentiate more carefully between the notion of Israel as a security laboratory as an ideological construct versus its potential to act as a critical analytic. It is worth asking here why it is that Israeli state officials and security industry representatives are so fond of referring to Israel and the Palestinian territories as a laboratory for military experimentation: What is this construct doing for them? We also need to start asking questions about boundaries and limits: What isn’t a security laboratory? If security laboratories exist, where do they begin and where do they end? We should not anticipate any easy answers. Yet asking such questions is necessary first step to unsettling the taken-for-granted qualities of industry claims and our relationships to them, particularly as critics. We should not anticipate any easy answers. Yet asking such questions is necessary first step to unsettling the taken-for-granted qualities of industry claims and our
relationships to them. In doing so, we must also be more reflexive about the roles we might play as researchers in re-producing the geographical imaginations that the war on terror depends on rather than assuming that we can easily stand outside of them.

One of the Israeli CEOs I interviewed asked me if I would be able to forward him a copy of my dissertation when it was finished. I assured him that I would do so, though mentioned that it will be some time before the final version would be complete. He replied: “Take your time. Terror is here to stay”. Maybe so. Yet there is certainly nothing assured about Israel’s status as a policy model, either now or in the future.

My focus in this dissertation has explicitly not been on the politics of security in the sense of emancipatory struggle. Yet my approach certainly does not foreclose such issues from entering into our thinking on the matters I have discussed. My attention to the performative construction of Israel’s status as a global policy ‘model’ leaves open the possibility for this position to be contested and for the activities of Israeli’s HLS industry to be resisted. A recent development suggests that such efforts may well be successful.

In 2014 the Israeli security firm International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) announced that it had been awarded a $2.2 billion contract to provide security for the 2016 Rio Olympics. This development was quickly celebrated within industry circles as a major milestone in Israel’s rise as a leading global HLS purveyor. Earlier this year, however, under pressure from Palestine solidarity activists and Brazilian labour unions, Brazil’s justice department officially denied that any such contract had ever been awarded, declaring: “Any contract made by Rio 2016 won’t result in compromises by the Brazilian government” (cited in Silver 2015). It remains to be seen what, exactly, ISDS’ (and Israel’s) roles in the Rio Olympics will be. In this instance, however, it appears that
the need of Israel’s HLS industry to be constantly visible in public media forums may have directly backfired.
Epilogue

Since taking office in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced a number of new policy initiatives, including a pact between India and Israel on counter-terrorism and HLS. Modi also announced an ambitious project to build 100 ‘smart cities’ in India, a topic, which has already been the subject of considerable debate within the Indian media. While Modi’s staunch pro-Israel stance is well known, it remains to be seen whether his tenure will produce deeper forms of bilateral cooperation on issues of urban and homeland security with Israel. It seems, however, that some of the conceptual ‘challenges’ about the meaning of security in India (discussed at length in Chapter 6) are already posing difficulties in relation to his smart cities initiative.

In moving the smart cities project forward, Modi’s government has gravitated to Singapore for technical assistance and there have already been a number of delegation visits between the two countries. Yet as one newspaper article documenting these interactions noted: “So far during preliminary talks, it has become quite evident that it [the smart city] means different things for Singapore and India” (Mitra 2014). The article further quotes a senior Singaporean government official as saying: “We got the impression that Indian officials think of smart cities in terms of IT-fying, broadband, fibre optics [sic]” (ibid). According to the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ambassador-at-large, Gopinath Pillai, overcoming these different visions is possible, claiming that the smart city “is a feasible concept, as long as you clearly define what it means” (ibid). Of course, the project of tracing the implications of India’s interactions with Singapore remains to be done. Yet as I have argued in previous chapters, such ‘definitional’ concerns and ‘problems of difference’ are unlikely to a trivial matter.
Appendices

Appendix A – List of Interviewees (Alphabetical)

Anonymous 1, Marketing and Business Development Manager of Israeli defense firm
Interviewed – Tel Aviv August, 2012

Anonymous 2, Marketing Director of Israeli HLS firm
Interviewed – Israel, July 2012

Anonymous 3, Fmr. Senior IPS officer, Mumbai City and Maharashtra State Police
(Ret’d)
Interviewed – Mumbai, January, 2013

Anonymous 4, Mumbai Journalist (major Indian daily)
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013

Anonymous 5, Fmr. Senior Home Ministry Official (Ret’d), Government of Maharashtra
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013

Anonymous 6, IPS officer, Mumbai city police
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013

Anonymous 7, Director, Business Development of Israeli HLS firm
Interviewed – Tel Aviv, July 2012

Anonymous 8, Private businessman working on India-Israel trade promotion and security cooperation
Interviewed – Mumbai, December 2012

Anonymous 9, Consultant, Tata Consultancy Services
Interviewed – New Delhi, March 2013

Anonymous 10, Israeli Consular Official
Interviewed – Mumbai, April 2013

Anonymous 11, Senior Mumbai Crime Reporter
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013

Anonymous 12, Well-known Indian security and defence commentator
Interviewed – New Delhi, November 2012

Vappala Balachandran, IPS, Fmr. Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat (Ret’d). Co-author of High Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) report on 26/11
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013 and April 2013
Yehonatan Ben-Hamozez, Senior Vice President, Research and Development & Project Management, Magal S3 Security Systems
Interviewed – Yehud, July 2012

Isaac Ben-Israel, Professor Tel Aviv University and Fmr. Israeli Major General (Ret’d)
Interviewed – Tel Aviv, August 2012

Deven Bharti, Special Inspector General (Law and Order), Maharashtra State Police
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013 and April 2013

Yuval Cannon, VP Sales and Business Development, EL-GO Team Security and Access Control Systems
Interviewed – Tel Aviv, July 2012

Leo Gleser, Founder, President and Managing Director, International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) Ltd.
Interviewed – Nir Tvi, July 2012

Amos Golan, Inventor and Founder Corner Shot
Interviewed – Kiryat Ono, August 2012

Haggay Keller, VP Business Development, Camero Tech Ltd.
Interviewed – Kfar Netter, July 2012

Kumar Ketkar, Chief Editor, Dainik Divya Marathi
Interviewed – Mumbai, April 2013

Janina Frankel-Yoeli, VP Marketing, Urban Aeronautics Ltd.
Interviewed – Yavne, August 2012

Tsachi Frishberg, VP Sales & Marketing, Mer Group Security and Communications Systems Ltd.
Telephone Interview, August 2012

Chandra Iyengar, Fmr. Additional Chief Secretary (Home) (Ret’d), Government of Maharashtra
Interviewed – Mumbai, November 2012 and by telephone May 2013

Ahmed Javed, Additional Director General (Law and Order) Maharashtra State Police
Interviewed – Mumbai, December 2012

Prem Krishan (P.K.) Jain, Addl. Director General (Special Operations), Maharashtra State Police
Interviewed – Mumbai, March 2013

Marc Kahlberg, CEO, Marc Kahlberg International Security Consulting Ltd.
Interviewed – Elyachin, July 2012
Martin Kowen, Export Director GM Advanced Security Technologies Ltd.  
Interviewed – Hod HaSharon, July 2012

Omer Laviv, CEO, Athena GS3 Security Implementations Ltd.  
Interviewed – Holon, August 2012

Rakesh Maria, IPS, Anti Terrorist Squad (ATS) Chief, Maharashtra State Police  
Interviewed – Mumbai, December 2012

Uzi More, CEO, Professional School and Services of Security (PSOS) and MIP Security.  
Skype Interview, August 2012

Amitava Mittra, Chief Operating Officer, India B.G.I Engitech Pvt. (India) a subsidiary of B.G. Ilanit Gates and Urban Elements (Israel)  
Skype Interview, January 2013

Ronen Nadir, CEO, BlueBird Aero Systems  
Interviewed – Kadima, September 2012

Parvinder Singh (P.S.) Pasricha, IPS, Fmr. Commissioner of Police Mumbai and Director General Maharashtra State Police (Ret’d)  
Interviewed – Mumbai, December 2012

Jayant Patil, Fmr. Home Minister and (current) Rural Minister for Rural Development, Government of Maharashtra  
Interviewed – Mumbai, April 2013

Ram D. Pradhan, IAS, Fmr. Union Home Secretary (Ret’d) and co-author of High Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) report on 26/11  
Interviewed – Mumbai, April 3, 2013

K.P. Raguvanshi, IPS, Fmr. Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) Chief, Maharashtra State Police  
Interviewed – Thane, February 2013

Julio Ribeiro, IPS, Fmr. Commissioner of Police Mumbai (1982-85) and Fmr. Director General, Maharashtra State Police  
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013

Ajai Sahni, Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management, Delhi  
Interviewed – New Delhi, March 2013

Umesh Chandra Sarangi, IAS, Fmr. Additional Chief Secretary Home (Ret’d), Government of Maharashtra  
Interviewed – Pune, April 2013

Teesta Setalvad, Indian civil rights activist and secretary of Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP)  
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013
Rajnish Seth, IPS, Commander of Force One, Maharashtra State Police
Interviewed – Mumbai. January 2013

Dhanushyakodi (D.) Sivanandan, IPS, Fmr. Commissioner of Police and Director General, Maharashtra State Police.
Interviewed – January 2013 and March 2013

Govind Singh Sisodia, Brigadier (Ret’d) Indian Army and National Security Guard (NSG) Head of Physical Security Management, Tata Consultancy Services
Interviewed – New Delhi, January 2013

Kalyon Subbarao, Head of Corporate Training at Institute of Advanced Security Training and Management (ASTM) Pvt. Ltd.
Interviewed – Mumbai, December 2012

K. Subrahmanyam, Fmr. Director General of Police (Ret’d), Maharashtra State Police
Interviewed – Mumbai, April 2013

Jayant Umranikar, Fmr. Director General of Police (Special Operations) (Ret’d), Maharashtra State Police
Interviewed – Pune, February 2013

Rami Zarchi, Division Manager, Engineering Division, Orad Control Systems Ltd.,
Interviewed – Holon, August 2012

Guy Zuri, Former Director Aerospace, Defense and HLS, the Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute (IEICI)
Interviewed – Tel Aviv, August 2012

Chitkala Zutshi, Additional Chief Secretary (Home) (Ret’d), Government of Maharashtra
Interviewed – Mumbai, January 2013 and May 2013
Appendix B: Maharashtra Government Home Department resolution on procurement
(Translated from Marathi by Pramod Mahale)

To purchase equipments and other security related instrument for Mumbai Police Department

Maharashtra government
Home department
Government resolution number- ISS-1008/.....
Mantralaya(administrative headquarter) mumbai-400032-13 March, 2009

Read: 1) Government resolution home department number- ISS-1008/.....date 5 Jan 2009
2) Government resolution home department number- ISS-1009/.....date 22 Jan 2009

Government decision- To purchase equipments and other security related instrument for making Mumbai police department stronger and for that government accepted to spend Rs.36,63,30,000 on 5 Jan 2009(government resolution dated 5 th jan). Document which shows the list of security related equipments and its cost was connected with above resolution. This was cancelled and new improved document is connected with this government resolution document. According to that purchase equipments and other security related instrument.

This government resolution is available on Maharashtra government website and its code number is 20090313181352001.

In the name and order of Maharashtra Governor
A. S. Ghagare

Deputy security, Maharashtra gov. Home dept.

To,
Director General of police, Mumbai
Commissioner of Police, Mumbai
...
....
........
....

Government resolution number- 'ISS-1008/ ....', date 13 March 2009
Detail information about spending required to purchase equipments and others security related instrument for Mumbai Police Department
A) Instrument required for Mumbai coastal police station
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No</th>
<th>Name of instrument</th>
<th>Total number of piece</th>
<th>Price per piece (in Lakhs)</th>
<th>Total cost (in lakhs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Digital video camera</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Night vision binoculars</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>90.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Searchlight</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Day vision binoculars</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Satellite phone</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Non skid shoes</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.20(calculatation problem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dangri (joint shart pant)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.20(calculatation problem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sealegs amphibious vehicle</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40.30</td>
<td>161.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12 m boat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>350.00</td>
<td>350.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total= 624.20**

**B) Tactical/assault vehicles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No</th>
<th>Name of instrument</th>
<th>Total number of piece</th>
<th>Price per piece (in Lakhs)</th>
<th>Total cost (in lakhs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bulletproof Mahindra scorpio</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42.55</td>
<td>85.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mahindra scorpio normal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>49.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>32 seater buses</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>96.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mahindra bolero jeep</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>41.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Light vehicle technical branch</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>37.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Launch speed boat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>160.00</td>
<td>800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>All terrain amphibious vehicle</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.61</td>
<td>190.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mahindra rakshak</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47.99</td>
<td>151.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Light armed troop carrier</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49.28</td>
<td>197.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Mahindra marksman</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46.51</td>
<td>465.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total=2115.00**

**C) Weapons for Sashastra dal (armed department)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr. No</th>
<th>Name of instrument</th>
<th>Total number of piece</th>
<th>Price per piece (in Lakhs)</th>
<th>Total cost (in lakhs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Colt M4 5.46mm carbine</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>105.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Colt M4 carbine accessories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Magazine for Colt M4</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Bullets for Colt M4</td>
<td>32000</td>
<td>0.00037</td>
<td>11.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>M203 grenade launcher</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Freight charges for cold M4 and M203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MP9 tactical machine pistol</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.7572</td>
<td>131.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Accessories for MP9 tactical machine pistol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Magazine for MP9 tactical machine pistol</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Bullets for MP9 tactical machine pistol</td>
<td>32000</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Freight charges for MP9 tactical machine pistol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Barrett M82 M107.5 caliber long range sniper rifle</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>13.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Accessories for Barrett M82 M107.5 caliber long range sniper rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Bullets for Barrett M82 M107.5 caliber long range sniper rifle</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.00238</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Freight charges for Barrett M82 M107.5 caliber long range sniper rifle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>9mm smith &amp; wesson pistol</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.2029</td>
<td>202.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Magazine for 9mm smith &amp; wesson pistol</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.0098</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Accessories for 9mm smith &amp; wesson pistol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Freight charges for 9mm smith &amp; wesson pistol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>N point for M4 carbine</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>51.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>M point for MP9 tactical machine pistol</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Bullet proof jacket</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>187.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Bullet proof helmet</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>total =924.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total(A+B+C)=36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Letter from V. Balachandran to Minister Shinde on proposed “Maharashtra State Industrial Security Force” and response

V. Balachandran, I.P.S (Retd)
Former Special Secretary,
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India

smisan@vsnl.net
Tel: 22881806/24964827
131, Buena Vista,
Gen. Bhosle Marg,
Mumbai. 400021.
June 28, 2004

Hon. Shri Sushil Kumar Shinde,
Chief Minister, Maharashtra,
Mantralaya,
Mumbai. 400032.

Respected Sir,

Sub: Establishment of “Maharashtra State Industrial Security Force” (MSISF) on the lines of the Central Industrial Security Force”.

I am making this proposal purely in the interest of better security in the State of Maharashtra and to provide employment to the local people. The serious situation created last year by the bomb blasts and the continuing strain on the police force which is being stretched to the maximum has made me think of an alternative way to provide security in some sectors in the city and the rest of the State by having a dependable and well trained corps of private security guards under the control of the government which will have the following advantages:

1. It replaces the ill trained, poorly paid private security guards who are employed without any background checks.
2. It will provide employment to thousands of locals, who will be recruited after a strict background check.
3. It will be managed by the Maharashtra State Police officers who could be on deputation to the MSISF, which could be set up as an autonomous board or as a Society under the government control.
4. The training will be done by the State Reserve Police Units.
5. Since the force will be under government management, there will be no exploitation of security guards which is happening now despite the Act of 1981 or the minimum wage notification of 2003. Also the surplus funds between the charges levied and the actual pay and allowances paid to the members of the Force will be controlled by the Government.
6. This trained force which will provide a training reserve, will always be able to help manning vulnerable points and supplementing the police like the Home Guards in times of extreme law and order situations.
7. It can eventually take over the private security of threatened individuals which is a drain on the police strength now.

I may submit that the Gujarat Government had set up a similar Industrial Security Force when Shri Shankar Sinh Vaghela was the Chief Minister. Brig. L.R.S Sarode who had worked with me in the Cabinet Secretariat set it up in 1997 and headed it till 1998, training in all 2,400 security guards. Shri Vaghela’s idea was to train nearly 55,000 such guards in 5 years to supplement the police strength and to give employment to the locals. At the peak strength the scheme had envisaged placing a pool of 10,000 to 12,000 men to the State Police in emergencies by merely extending the hours of duties of the men to 12 hours from 8. However politics played a spoiler and this excellent venture was frozen by the succeeding BJP Government. At the same time it is learnt that even now the GISFS employs nearly 2,250 security guards and the security of many of
the Gujarat Government Undertakings like GSIDC is being manned by them. Brig Sarode had worked out a scheme of ploughing back the surplus accrued between the charges levied to the customers and the actual pay and allowances paid to the members of the Force who are being paid minimum wages. As a result of this, there is a now corpus fund of nearly Rs. 3 Crores with the GISFS. A draft approach paper prepared by him at that time is enclosed. Also enclosed is a leaflet on the “Gujarat Industrial Security Force” which was registered as a Society.

It is common knowledge that the present general feeling of insecurity in Mumbai and elsewhere is exploited by interested parties who have floated several private security agencies. Quite a number of them have dubious reputation as the enclosed 2 new clippings would reveal. There is no reliable background check on the private “Guards”.

I know that this arrangement will disturb several vested interests including retired police and military officers who are making a lot of money by providing security guards. There would also be a propaganda and possibly an agitation that this measure would throw “Outsiders” out of jobs. In order to mitigate the hardship that may be caused to those displaced, a staggered programme of introduction of the force could be introduced. As in the case of Gujarat, it could first be introduced in the State owned enterprises, including the Central Government establishments. In the second phase it may be introduced to all the establishments within the State, by amending the existing law on Security Guards.

I request that this proposal may kindly be examined and introduced early.

With respectful regards,

Yours sincerely,

V Balachandran

Encl: As above

Copy with compliments to:

1. Hon. Shri R.R. Patil,
   Home Minister, Maharashtra State,
   Mantralaya, Mumbai. 400032
2. Shri Arun Kumar Mago, I.A.S.,
   Chief Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra,
   Mantralaya, Mumbai. 400032
3. Shri A.K.D Jagdale, I.A.S.,
   Additional Chief Secretary, (Home), Govt.of Maharashtra,
   Mantralaya, Mumbai. 400032
4. Shri S.M. Shanghavi, I.P.S.,
   Director General of Police, Maharashtra State,
   Maharashtra Rajya Police, Mukhyalaya, Mumbai. 400039
Response to letter from V. Balachandran (translated from Marathi by Pramod Mahale)

Maharashtra Government
No.SGA 15 2005/(135/7)labour 5
Industry, Energy and Labour department
Mantralaya (administrative headquarter) Mumbai-400032
Date-30 Sep 2005
To,
Sri.V. Balachandran
131,Bina Vista,
Jan bhosle marg
Mumbai400021

Subject:-To get concession according to clause 23 of Maharashtra private security guard Act, 1981(Regulation of Employment and Welfare)

Sir,

I want to inform you regarding your proposal dated 28-6-2004 of the above mentioned subject. Take (prescribed form) of security guard applications from Suraksha Rakshak mandal, L.B.S. marg, Bhandup (w), Mumbai and submit it to the government. Please submit prescribe form required for agency to the government.

Yours faithfully

(P.K. Jadhav)
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