Behaviourism and Theological Freedom: An Exploration in Theological Anthropology

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BEHAVIOURISM AND THEOLOGICAL FREEDOM:
AN EXPLORATION IN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

by

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B.Th. University of Ottawa, 1968

Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree, Waterloo Lutheran University

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PREFACE

The following thesis has developed in a School of Religion and Culture. It is not written in traditional theological style, since it uses a culturological method. As theology it situates itself in the school of process empiricism. These empirical interests come from my reading of Bernard Lonergan, Charles Hartshorne, Alfred Whitehead and the ever creative discoveries of process thinkers. Furthermore, it is an effort in theological anthropology, which means theological statements come into existence when reality is perceived as an interaction of actual entities to actual entities continually in the process of creativity.

"...an eternal object can be described only in terms of its potentiality for "ingression" into the becoming of actual entities, and...its analysis only discloses other eternal objects. It is pure potential. The term "ingression" refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity.

Alfred North Whitehead
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A CONCEPT OR FREEDOM: A SENSITIVITY FLOW - I

Freedom is a word with which everyone immediately identifies, serving as a powerful semantic catalyst since everyone finds in the word important dimensions of meaning. The existence of freedom is important to every man since it is in the ethical exercise of freedom that human dignity abides. In this thesis I shall offer a certain description of freedom and try to prove that this concept expresses the dynamics of freedom in contemporary society.

There are six established definitions of the word freedom: 1) a being free; 2) political liberty, as freedom of speech; 3) exemption from a specified obligation, discomfort, etc.; 4) a being able to act, use, etc., without hindrance; 5) ease of movement, facility; 6) frankness.\(^1\) Definition number five, ease of movement, facility, is the one I have selected as the most proper concept of freedom for the modern period. Definition number one refers to a philosophical mode; two, to a category of politics; three, to a system of moral or legal sanctions; four, to a biological construct; six, to a matter of interpersonal relations. Number five is rather elastic in that it refers to a sense of flow, a rhythm that passes through the mind, a sentient cerebral flow of impression and decisions or an

\(^1\)Webster's New World Dictionary, (Toronto: Public Library), p.219.
inner state of abstracted reality giving to man the foundation for a non-material spiritual sense of being. Using this definition indicates that freedom in this construct is seen as man's desire to move with ease through reality and his states of consciousness. In order to move with this ease it means that man desires basically not to be restricted by a lack of control in his consciousness, his skills, institutions, plans and hopes. So, from the beginning we must see the correlation between freedom and control. Without control there is no freedom; only a state of non-movement, a continual acceptance of any type of reality that is fed to us. Freedom is the need for movement, control is the need to remove obstacles within ourselves or outer obstacles that obstruct such an ease of movement. However, there is a cultural need to arrive at a wider moral understanding of freedom and control, and it is suggested that the real change in our present historical period is the effort to re-think the nature of freedom.

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1 Herman Hesse, *Magister Ludi or The Glass Bead Game*. Foreword by Theodore Zidkowski. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Bantam Books, 1947). Beyond a doubt Hesse's most difficult and metaphysical work. In my study of Hesse, especially this book I discovered the same questions of interiority and cognition that Lonergan treats. Hesse is especially helpful in pointing out how the same questions exist in the eastern mind.


and control may bring. The only safe thing a person can say is the effort is unavoidable, and one must hope that there is within man and history a certain destiny, and part of this destiny must be a greater awareness of the dynamics of freedom.

A SENSITIVE FLOW

Discovering the new dynamics of freedom has become the role of the ethicist. He is the one who must develop a sensitivity to changes of perception that history causes. The scientist has the responsibility of discovering the order of history, but it is the responsibility of the ethicist to ask basic questions in order to affirm or deny what is taking place within history. It is the movement of history that causes man to reach new horizons and insights. For this is the basic process in which man expresses his intellectual and spiritual capacities in the discovery of history and in affirming or denying its meaning for his present existential moment. What this thesis is concerned with is how does one discover and make value judgments on new concepts of freedom. Fundamentally, the argument runs through the entire thesis that it is in culture and in the possibilities that culture presents to the individual that freedom is

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found. Working on this premise means that freedom is a cultural question before it becomes a systematic question. A change of insight, horizon, values and life-style is, therefore, first a change that occurs within culture. When science, religion and philosophy accept this as a possible starting point in their understanding of man the whole process used to make important statements concerning man begins to change. It turns into a vast inter-play of determinants, social functions and quests for significant meaning. When this inter-play is slowly put together new horizons begin to appear resulting from this unity between scientific perception and ethical discourse. This is most necessary since contemporary man is painfully facing the fact that he may lose control over culture, and should this happen the cost is his own human identity. For every man is most human when he feels that in some ways he controls his environment.

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*Leslie White is a strong determinist who like Skinner denies the freedom principle, yet much of his thought is to be seriously questioned, mainly his cultural investigation in the way culture has laws unto itself in the producing of information and social limitations.


So I have selected the concept of freedom because I feel that upon it much of our theological and ethical discourse hangs.

By culture I am referring to group patterns of behaviour, mores and symbols. This will be developed much more in the course of this paper. The ethical concern about culture is questions brought about by cultural change. But before asking any questions there are two major questions that ethical discourse must first resolve. One, is culture (group learning) a static thing which contains, as it were, a body of essential questions and answers, or is it a dynamic process always presenting new questions and new insights? Rather quickly I answer this question in the affirmative. Culture is not static; it evolves into continually new forms, always offering new questions. The argument of this paper will be that in seizing upon the new questions man gains freedom. The second question is about the evolution of culture into new forms. Is it the result of man giving reality meaning or does it arise independently of man? My answer to this is that culture is a most puzzling reality, and the growth and control of culture is possible if there is a continuing inter-play of a philosophy of determinism and an acceptance of man as meaning maker. Does man create culture or is he enslaved by it? I have rushed ahead of myself to establish attitudes towards freedom. This is necessary before beginning to organize a system

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and themes on the topic that freedom is a flow; it is man's desire for flexibility in a world that threatens the flexibility he so dearly demands.¹

Proper ethical discourse is always dialectical.² In doing this it attempts to do more than just ask the questions, it tries to resolve the questions. Being dialectical it turns ethical discourse into not just a process of conceptualization, but it enters into the dynamics of problem-solving.³ Doing a paper in theological ethical discourse immediately places the freedom question into a schemata of freedom as a problem.

Often the question of freedom is not treated as a problem. Its existence is presumed and ethics discusses its need or the use and misuse of freedom. However, contemporary insights forces ethics to come to grips with the more essential question, the whole possibility of freedom. Even if intuitively the existence of freedom is a good presumption, avoiding the more basic question is most dangerous for ethical discourse. The danger in avoiding the fundamental question of freedom as a social possibility limits the ability (and, therefore, the freedom) of ethics itself in responding to a large part of social


science, namely those branches of social science that in part or totally reject freedom as a valid term for understanding the nature of man and the dynamics of culture.\(^1\) Therefore, in this ethical construct the main concern is a new horizon on the question of freedom for social science and ethics. It is in dealing with the dynamics of the different schools of thought that surround the freedom question that will eventually cause this new horizon.\(^2\)*

A way of solving a problem is to jump right into it, and this is achieved if the problem is initially limited. There are four areas of scientific speculation where one can discover the problematical questions surrounding freedom; the four schools of thought in social science dealing with freedom are functionalism, determinism, behaviourism, and existentialism. Functional theories usually come out of the field of sociology, and they visualize social functioning as an inter-play and ordering of certain essential forms and orders tending in various ways to repeat themselves. The study of society and its free flow depends upon certain patterns which are predictable. Determinism is more associated with schools of social anthropology although it overlaps into sociology. Its intention is to discover determinants that cause society to evolve and explain the formation of man's identity on the

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* This is a dialectical procedure that Novak refers to as a technique of going from standpoint to standpoint, and so the same dialectical technique must be used if religion is to offer intelligent statements on the existence of freedom.
basis of these determinants. Behaviourism is usually found in schools of psychology that explain behaviour in terms of conditioning forces, discovered through scientific investigation. Existential theories are also usually associated with the field of psychology, but are radically different from the other three in that they emphasize the presence of certain qualities within man, e.g., choice, desire, courage to be, in order to explain behaviour. Each of these schools overlap into the neighbouring science, and each presents very deep questions on the nature of social and individual freedom.

This is where we go to find an expression of the problem in theoretical form. To do justice to the question it is necessary to limit the problem area, and so I have limited it to a dialogue with the behaviourist school as I discover it represented in the thoughts of B.F. Skinner. Initially limiting the theme of freedom to Skinnerian concepts allows the problem to become much more apparent. Even though I am directly limiting the problem to the questions behaviourists ask, much of my response comes out of a dialogue and a conflict with the school of determinism. I should, therefore, explain briefly my relationship with determinism. My acquaintance and at times use of determinism comes from a study and reflection upon the anthropologist Leslie White in his work, *Science of Culture*. White being a strong determinist finds little value in the freedom premise, for him freedom says next to nothing about the nature of society. Society, rather, is a collection of behaviour and behaviour is born out of symbols which
are the cultural media through which man learns.\(^1\) The only constant we have in any understanding of man is the human organism "O", it is the constant, it is the invariable and everything else shapes the "O".\(^*\) Culture is the embodiment of symbols and behaviour is the product of the human organism and cultural symbols: \(0 + C_s \rightarrow \text{Behaviour}\).\(^2\)

This is an extreme oversimplification of White, but I only present it at this time because there is something of the determinist in me, and my concepts on freedom are a result from the ethicist fighting the determinist. I might add for the sake of interest that White sees certain determinants shaping our symbols and the most basic cultural determinant is the harnessing of energy drive. Such a system is a very sophisticated development of the premise that man is fundamentally the toolmaker.

But this presentation does not deal with White, rather it is an encounter with B.F. Skinner. He has been selected because his statements and propositions are clear, concise and bold, and demand a response from the ethicist. A confrontation is most necessary from

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\(^*\)Most important to note is that White holds for symbols being produced out of necessity, i.e., they are completely the result of socio-economic determinants. Symbols are an effort, as it were, to catch up with a growth process which has already taken place. *Science of Culture* -- note particularly chapters 12, *Man's Control Over Civilization, and Energy and the Evolution of Culture*.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 160-161.
schools of religion since it becomes their responsibility to ask a whole new set of questions. The basic methodology of schools of religion in this type of process is to begin asking some very fundamental questions.\(^1\) At least, the ethicist Gibson Winter so defines the whole purpose of ethics, the asking of fundamental questions. And so freedom as a topic of ethical inquiry is to search out these questions and this begins by facing its deinal.

If one is to understand the present scientific predicament, it is necessary to become somewhat familiar with the works of August Comte and Edmund Husserl. In the philosophical discourses of these two philosophers, the foundation is laid for the scientific-philosophical theoretical question: namely, what is a human organism? It will serve here to mention that present controversy in science stems from a philosophical positivism and a phenomenological understanding. Logical positivism was a great break from Western philosophical heritage. What it really did was to destroy any appreciation for a complete understanding of man and his dimensions of meaning. Positivism asserts that the meaning of all things is the appearance of things as they appear. Edmund Husserl rejects this concept and builds a philosophy on the limitations of man to perceive things. Jumping off from Descartes, "I think therefore I am", Husserl holds for radical doubt of all that is perceived, and creates a philosophy on the fundamental principles of radical doubt and monadic understanding taking

the "I" as the centre of the universe.\textsuperscript{1} Most important is how do I know? Although this is a philosophical battle of the abstract, it has taken on great importance when it is applied to the field of psychology which must ultimately justify itself on the basis of empirical and tested understanding. I hope to further illustrate that much of the confusion in the area of the social sciences and the science of behaviour (if such a distinction is necessary) has been caused by either a lack of a unifying base or an indifference to wider cultural viewpoints.\textsuperscript{2} Such a comment is permissible if one is ready to accept the premise that it is impossible to have any scientific methodology without finding its desire for insight and intelligibility in some preconceived concept of just what is insight and intelligibility.\textsuperscript{3} Sigmund Koch gives serious expression to this problem in an article "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary", where he writes:

\begin{quote}
...we are not known (referring to psychologists) for our readiness to be in the wavefront of history. It could almost be maintained that modern psychology ran out of its independence at the moment of declaring it. In every period of our
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1}Henri S.J. DeLubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, translated by Edith M. Riley (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1963), pp. 79-147.

\textsuperscript{2}Sigmund Koch, "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary" (paper from Rice University Symposium, 1963), pp. 1-7.

history, we have looked to external sources in the scholarly culture, especially natural science and the philosophy of science for our sense of direction. And typically we have embraced policies long out of date in those very sources. What is unique about our present relative to the rest of the scholarly culture is that each branch of the latter seems to be either working toward, or into existence, a redefinition of knowledge based on empirical analysis of inquiry of a sort which most largely depend on psychological modes of analysis.¹

Claiming the need to expand the boundaries of psychology is Koch's main argument against B.F. Skinner. This type of argumentation is one way of validly attacking Skinnerian behaviourism for it seems that Skinnerian behaviourism is founded on a limited concept of the science of human behaviour. In my critique of Skinner, I lay emphasis on the fact that his type of behaviourism is of its nature incapable of giving full understanding to the questions of freedom, dignity and the design of culture.

Escaping the Skinner box is much easier for philosophers, theologians and anthropologists who can develop a behavioural methodology that contains a greater totality in its insights and the intelligibility immanent in the study of the human organism. Psychologists, as Koch explains have a much more difficulty problem to handle in their confrontation with Skinner. I feel that Skinner forces psychology to face itself, and define more precisely its philosophy and methodology.

¹Sigmund Koch, "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary" (paper from Rice University Symposium, 1963), p.30.
PRELIMINARY SUMMARY

Briefly, B.F. Skinner is to be handled as follows:

1. Behaviour is a question of the totality (or wholeness) of human consciousness, understanding and control.

2. A new face for the social and behavioural sciences is possible. This new image promises a greater totality of method. And this new face will come from the insights growing out of a new concept of ethics and cognition.

3. Psychology may not be able to solve the problem itself. If it does, the answer lies somewhere within phenomenological psychology, dynamic therapy and neo-neo-behaviourism.

4. A wider constructional theology is necessary to answer questions regarding the nature of freedom and dignity.

These four points will not be considered in any chronological order. They are presented here so that the reader may know immediately a general methodology. By giving these four points I am trying to illustrate how I propose to wrestle with B.F. Skinner. As these four points are the essence of a rebuttal, it is possible to develop a wider science of human behaviour by first condemning Skinner's inability to make distinctions, and then partially rebuilding his method into a more total system. I stress the word distinction because I believe Skinner, the 'Philosopher', fails to understand that the most basic
rule in philosophy, especially a philosophy of science, is the need to make distinctions. Lacking this philosophical art, his philosophy of science remains trapped in an intellectual vacuum or better still, a box. It might sound at this stage of analysis as if I am very much opposed to behaviourism, but not so. My four methodological points liberate behaviourism and neo-behaviourism by opening up a horizon for a neo-neo-behaviourism, a piece of terminology I have taken from Michael Scriven.¹

SKINNERIAN CONCEPT OF FREEDOM - II (A)

As an experimental psychologist, B.F. Skinner has made a considerable contribution to the understanding and control of behaviour. But there is also the philosopher in Skinner, even though he might vehemently deny this,² and it is his application of experimental behaviourist principles that has caused the recent public outcry. Long before his present popularity, Skinner was in the thick of the fight with his fellow psychologists who had divided into two camps, the phenomenologists and the behaviourists. The whole conflict is the age-old controversy about what happens within that highly developed organism of the human brain. Psychology began with a behaviouristic

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¹Michael Scriven, "Views of Nature" (paper from Rice University Symposium, 1963). Cf. above.


*In chapter 8 of Beyond Freedom and Dignity Skinner becomes a topic philosopher. It is in the chapter that Skinner leaps from empirical findings to give
bias (as given in the teachings of its founding fathers, e.g., Pavlov, Thorndike and Watson). Skinner is a direct descendant of this line, and his career has been dedicated to the renewing and development of earlier behaviouristic concepts. And as a neo-behaviourist he has become a strong opponent of other schools of psychology, namely phenomenology and dynamic therapy.¹

Any behaviourist has very set principles on which he works. The most basic of all behavioural principles, as is consistently seen in the works of B.F. Skinner, is that man, or better still, the human organism, "O", is a reality strongly or completely controlled by external variables which affect the "O" in the form of stimuli causing responses which cause in turn reflexive respondent behaviour. In symbolic form it goes $S + R \rightarrow O$. If behaviour is to be understood such knowledge does not come about by studying "O" in itself, rather behaviour is understood by arriving at a knowledge of the external variables and contingencies that condition behaviour. Understanding behaviour means accepting basic scientific behavioural laws as expressed in such key concepts as variables, invariables, stimuli, responses, respondent behaviour, operant behaviour and contingencies. In chart

form, it might be illustrated as follows:

**CHART I**

On = Organism Neutral  
S = stimuli  
R = responses  
B = behaviour  

\[ S_1 R_1, S_2 R_2, S_3 R_3, S_4 R_4, \text{ etc.} \quad \text{On} \quad B_1, B_2, B_3, B_4, \text{ etc.} \]

Behaviourism does not disclaim that there are not the internal functions of the "0", but it holds that these internal functions are of little account and are effective insofar as they might alter certain moods. Internal variables are restricted to the smooth muscles which cause certain organic functions, e.g., secretion, sweat, Salivation, hunger, etc., and these are not of any great importance to a science of behaviour.\(^1\)

Skinner is a neo-behaviourist. And neo-behaviourism is a development of the earlier behaviourist discoveries in the study of reflexes. Neo-behaviourism accepts earlier scientific laws of reflex action, e.g., Pavlov's work in the area of Salivation, and explains all respondent behaviour on the basis of conditioning. Earlier behaviourism was primarily concerned with smooth functioning muscles, whereas neo-behaviourism is concerned with total functioning of striated muscles.\(^2\)

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\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 91-106.
Pavlov studied reflexes, whereas B.F. Skinner investigates the totality of operant behaviour. It is a total understanding of the "I" as formed by conditioning and contingencies. All behaviour is the result of conditioning. In such a view, the cause of behaviour becomes the independent variables and the ensuing effects are known as the dependent variables. Quite simply, behaviour is explained from the outside. To attempt an explanation of behaviour from something occurring inside man is to resort to primitive animistic and non-scientific thinking. We have, Skinner would claim, several remaining examples of such thinking in our common scientific vocabulary. Animistic thought holds for such theories as the little inner man expressing himself in concepts of soul, i.e., ego, super ego, top dog under dog, etc. Adhering to the strict behavioural canon of parsimony means that to understand behaviour in terms of innate choices, purposes, goals and aims has little scientific validity for these are unobservable data and in all probability result from the little inner man theory.¹

Within this restricted canon of parsimony the dialogue with behaviourism begins in order to establish whether B.F. Skinner's philosophy, as a theory of science will win, survive, renew itself or prove totally inadequate. Giving full respect to Skinner as a behaviourist

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scientist, I argue that Skinner is weak in his cultural applications which follow from his lack of appreciation for the total functioning of the cognitional structure. It is here that Skinner dogmatically displays his Achille's heel -- his Nothing But story. He seems to suggest, at least to his fellow psychologists, the cognitional structure is only understood in behaviourist concepts: i.e., S & R.

**THE COGNITIONAL STRUCTURE - II (B)**

Understanding the cognitional structure became a problem for scholars long before B.F. Skinner. Philosophy has dedicated the entire field of epistemology to the problem. Greek philosophers were the first to give full attention to the problem and two opposite schools came into existence, the Platonic and the Aristotelian. The concern in the past as in the present is how do I know? If it stopped here, however, philosophers would argue we are dealing with psychologisms and would immediately follow with a more complete question, "how do I know, I know". Time and time again we see Aquinas, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, etc. return to the problem, "how do I know" and "what is an idea?" Since the 1800's the greatest amount of contemporary philosophical development has been in epistemology, and we return to the same question of knowledge, "how do I know" when attempting to form a critique on Skinner. I suggest that we have a problem of knowledge and can observe

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the controversy at a high contemporary level of thought in the psychologists Rogers, Skinner and Chomsky.

Skinner holds that Rogers, for example, is Platonic and views man as the possessor of shadows of reality within himself.¹ The Platonic view is that man never sees reality, but only shadows of it on the wall of the cave in which he is imprisoned. Knowing is a "camera observing." A thin pencil of light penetrates the brain and is photographed.

If the retina could suddenly be developed like a photographic plate, (Skinner writes) it would yield a poor picture. The nerve impulses in the optic tract must have an even more tenuous resemblance to 'what's seen'. The patterns of vibrations which strike our ear where we listen to the music are quickly lost in transmission. The bodily reactions to substances tasted, smelled, and touched would scarcely qualify as faithful reproductions. These are discouraging for those who are looking for copies of the real world within the body, but they are fortunate for psychophysiology as a whole. At some point the organism must do more than create duplicates. It must see, hear, smell, and so on, as forms of action rather than of reproduction. It must do some of the things it is differentially reinforced for doing when it learns to respond discriminatively. The sooner the pattern of the external world disappears often impinging on the organism, the sooner the organism may get on with these other functions.

The need for something beyond and quite different from copying is not widely understood. Suppose someone were to coat the occipital lobes of the brain with a special photographic emulsion which,

¹B.F. Skinner, "Behaviourism at Fifty", paper from Rice University Symposium, 1963, p. .84.
when developed, yielded a reasonable copy of a current visual stimulus. In many quarters this would be regarded as a triumph in the physiology of vision. Yet nothing could be more disastrous for we should have to start all over again and ask how.

The organism sees a picture in its occipital cortex and we should now have much less of the brain available in which to seek an answer. It adds nothing to an explanation of how an organism reacts to a stimulus to trace the pattern of the stimulus in the body. It is most convenient, for both organism and psycho-physiologist, if the external world is never copied if the world we know is simply the world around us.¹

Such words come from a scientist who in no way holds for Platonic thinking. Instead of calling Skinner a behaviourist we might call him a realist, inasmuch as knowing is understood by grasping the nature of the real, the real as it exists outside.

The immediate popular and scholarly response to Skinner is that he studies lower organisms, i.e., pigeons. He observes in the lab, formulates laws and places his research into the hand of applied science. In reading Skinner it is most obvious that he is completely an experimental scientist who places much emphasis on a classical concept of science.² He might deny this, but nonetheless, it is true. Classical science, e.g., in physics and chemistry works on a level of law-to-law. Discovering the immanence of nature by discovering its laws is the heart of classical science. Such a view was strong


and was the only possibility in science until the dawn of relativity. Relativity introduced a more complete attitude towards science in that it introduced an empirical residue. This residue, the cosmos of exploration, is the open-ended range of frequencies, velocities and probabilities scientists must face. Though Skinner would not deny this, I do get the impression he is too complacent with abstract law-to-law findings; lacking because of this a wider understanding of the relationship between abstract generality (classical law) and the empirical residue (laws of relativity).  

Any good criticism of Skinner has hit upon this major error. He is a man who does not face the totality of scientific method. Rogers, a dynamic therapist, challenges the S-R theorists on these grounds. Dynamic therapy is quite opposite to behaviourism in that it claims the "O" to have laws unto itself allowing the "O" to function as master of its own ship. A necessary condition for the prediction of the behaviour of an organism is the specification of its internal states. Such predictions demands the full attention of the sciences of neurology and physiology. Behaviourism becomes a shallow concept of science if it ignores what happens at contact and excludes the yet unknown mystery

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of neurons, synapses and central nervous system.¹

Man is in potentiality and act a multi-dimensional creature who functions on several levels. In this level functioning dynamics the fundamental distinction is between primary and secondary levels. Philosophically and theologically it is permissible to accept man as a creature on a primary level where he responds to an environment of external stimuli, e.g., the little baby enjoying pleasant or aversive stimuli.

However, the organism of the mind clothed in the human spirit is differentiated and beyond primary levels of existence. Accepting such a fact does not demand any blind existential leap, rather it is obvious if a broad methodology is used in understanding knowing, and knowing our knowing. One of the greatest advantages man has had in the exercise of the large frontal lobe of his brain is that he can verbalize and symbolize. The human ability to function, question and think establishes a presence of a secondary level. It is a secondary level of meaning where the cognitive drive is towards deeper and deeper levels of meanings. Because of the secondary cognitive level of meaning, man has evolved to the state of differentiated consciousness. Anthropology, art, philosophy, literature and day to day verbal existence of man testify to the fact of a uniqueness of the human mind in its ability to capture insight and meaning in symbols. Most clearly we can understand the dynamics of this human process in

the Socratic method. Socrates teaches his students the meaning of secondary cognitive levels of pushing them to ask deeper and deeper questions about symbols they have accepted. Socrates understands the totality of man's cognitive nature by using the symbols of reality to judge, understand and bring about a better life. It is man's symbolic nature which gives him dignity and intellectual freedom. The process begins very early in life as one observes the small baby coming into contact with the external environment. Infancy is a time of primary level stimuli experience, but it not long before the child becomes inquisitive about the stimuli, e.g., of the hand, and becomes concerned about its functionality. From early primary stimuli experience, the child begins to formulate that most beautiful question, "what's that?" And here we have that most obvious drive of quid sit upon which all philosophy, science, art and common sense find their origin. Greek philosophers demanded their students define their symbols in omni et soli definitions, fully aware of the fact that such definitions would never be reached. What they did achieve, however, was to force their students to enter into the cognitive process of experiencing, knowing and knowing knowing. The possession of the cognitive want

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2 Ibid., pp. 258-267.
to arrive at insights through the use of experiencing, judging and knowing brings one continually to new stages of self-awareness, but even more importantly one can understand the meaning of these stages.

Treating this human characteristic so lightly is Skinner's major error as any linguist will so vehemently point out. The linguist attacks the Skinnerian concept of "verbal repertoire". Just what does it mean, if anything, to understand symbolizing, language and symbol making as a verbal repertoire inherited from our verbal community? Does the reader read David Copperfield, as Skinner would suggest, only to receive positive reinforcement or is it not more probable that the reader enters a cognitive world of meanings?¹ Do I read Beyond Freedom and Dignity only to receive reinforcement, or do I read Beyond Freedom and Dignity in order to realize my cognitive nature which becomes satisfied in the discovery of insights?

Surely if we understand our secondary level of existence even the word reinforcement itself opens up an area of scientific exploration encompassing an incredible amount of cognitive data. Missing the all important distinction between stimuli and symbol limits behaviourism to the narrow confines of the Skinner box. As one given to the anthropological method, I must challenge Skinner's basic thesis regarding operant behaviour, for I understand much of our behaviour as being reinforced through the cognitive grasp of symbols. Ignoring

this fact will restrict the science of behaviour to the strictly primary level. Persuasion, choice, aim, goal only become verbal expressions of S-R theories. Therefore, I hold the best way to confront behaviourism is with the linguistic-cognitive school. Another method would be to support the phenomenologist who argues from a completely separate type of scientific clinical vision. My two favourite representatives of this school are Victor Frankl and Paul Tournier. However, it is better to look for another link which is the linguistic link. It is the linguistic-cognitive school that at least leads us to the area of symbolism, within an open residue, where from a school of religion a response can develop. This has to be done since to attempt a synthesis between the behaviourist and phenomenologist seems impossible, both these schools having such opposing fundamental views of man that any type of synthetic union is doomed to break down. Therefore, the best method is to look for another method, one that possesses a different vision and body of premises. It is possible if the linguists, and schools of symbolism offer another avenue for the understanding of behaviour. The separation between determinism and anti-determinism, behaviourism and phenomenology, freedom and non-freedom is the result of a false dichotomy which is the old western philosophical problem of objective-subjective.¹ Not until this problem is re-interpreted is it possible to recognize the

dichotomy that runs through all of social science, theology and philosophy. This objective-subjective split is most obvious when schools of thought begin to argue whether meaning resides outside or within man. When objective meaning is pursued there results a quest for universal essences via metaphysics, that argues questions of being as opposed to becoming, or a quest for empiricism via empirical realistic universal laws. When subjective meaning is pursued there results a quest for an inner consciousness of the "I" as the possessor of all meaning. Objective schools make outer process the things of importance so when it is affirmed that "I perceive" it is the perceiving that explains the nature of man. With the subjective school, when it is affirmed that "I perceive" it is the "I" that becomes important. I suggest there is another way of knowing man's behaviour and explaining inner-outer consciousness. In order to discover this we can begin in the area of cognition or "the process of knowing". With cognition we may discover a new clue to human nature, and therefore behaviour.

In searching for clues to the meaning of human nature there are two techniques that can be used. One is a method of idealization better known as philosophical method; the other is to observe empirically, "trial and error", experimentation and the conclusive statements

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resulting from this experimental method. The knowing of man's cognitive flow is either conducted then in terms of idealization or realization.\(^1\) To know something about man means fundamentally to know how he knows, which makes it possible to say something important about his behaviour, how he makes decisions and how he might control his outer world. We might call this an ethnography of knowledge and habits of knowing. Not so much an ethnography of small group knowing but some general ethnographic statements concerning the process of cultural knowing.\(^2\) An ethnography of this type lends itself to questions about theological language.\(^3\) A general appreciation of the interaction of knowing within the restriction of reason and culture makes it much easier to join religion and science, in this case religion and behaviour.

Looking for direction in this area help is offered by Ernst Cassirer and Joseph R. Royce who attempt to link religion-cognition and scientific cognition. It would seem that an organization of their theories allows the study of science, culture and theology to form into a greater process.

\(^1\)Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1944), pp. 6-11.


Before entering more deeply into theories of knowing and behaviour a different terminology that embodies language and symbols is required since the argument is that behaviour is cognition and cognition is symbols. To accomplish this, behaviour is explained always as acquired or learned behaviour which is passed on by a some body of symbols.¹ When there is a sufficient amount of symbolic passing on we have a culture. A culture is an abstract term to express the sufficient presence of enough information to produce forms of individual and group behaviour. Just as culture and knowing can never be separated, the argument is just as equally justified that behaviour and culture are not to be separated. In other words, a culture is the dynamic flow of information in its symbolic form to operant behaviour, and the study of a culture is a study of how behaviour is related to this information. There is yet the further and often the more interesting question of what is the source of the information. Inversely, cognition is a process of codifying and organizing entities into information patterns and the style of behaviour that results. Therefore, it is presumed that if there is learning there must be a certain abstraction which exists independent of the individual or the group. Operant behaviour is then an adaptation to culture, and the first phase (enculturation) is the individual acquiring behaviour

usually for purposes of maintaining the culture. Failure to appreciate this interplay is dangerous in that it prevents any real unity between empirical analysis and philosophical theological analysis.

Finding a new clue to human nature as a source of unity would not only explain the dynamics of culture and behaviour, but would combine several different types of perceptions in contemporary culture. Until recently it has been impossible to achieve such a unity of cognition since there has been no strong epistemological base. Traditional forms of Western philosophy dealing with these problems have divided into idealism and realism. Aristotelian philosophy represents the realist school of thought which attempts to understand cognition, and man's cognitive acts, by searching for clues as they exist in nature, that is, for some type of cosmological expression. Opposed to such a view is the Platonic concept portraying human knowing in terms of inner reality. That is, all cognition is explained by discovering the shadows of reality that lie within. Socrates, again, sees cognition as primarily the act of inquiry, and knowing is understood as one understands how man searches. Under these traditional categories of idealism, realism, and dynamic inquiry most studies of cognition in a Western society take place. It is quite possible that the Eastern pursuit is different. If this is proven, it serves to explain much

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of Eastern cultural and societal development.

Is it necessary to link these three schools into a whole? The answer to this question is what the cultural process is all about, and if we are to develop any type of strong response to behaviourism and determinism it is in finding a dynamic element running through idealistic, realistic and dynamic cognition.¹ It will have to be a clue that explains the operation of both culture and behaviour.

Arriving at this clue will mean re-defining man in terms other than those traditional Western philosophical discourse has used. This re-definition has not been possible until Western culture had gone through several decades of empirical-scientific perception. The traditional definition of man attempting to unite various school is man as a rational animal. Starting from this definition in traditional epistemology, man's uniqueness is defined in terms of his rationality and his operations of intellect and will.² We see today that a scientific perception of man does not necessarily begin with this premise. For example, Skinner sees man only in scientific terminology as being conditioned. Even existential therapy with its bent towards existential philosophy does not begin with the rational premise, instead it is given to interpret man as having a character of universal drives


and needs, and it is only from a confrontation with these drives beyond reason that man becomes truly himself. All of this presents real problems for schools of religion which lay so much emphasis on man's free attributes of intellect and will as expressions of his rationality. Cassirer offers the excellent suggestion that the division is overcome if we stop defining man in essence as being rational, and begin to define him on the basis of a new clue, the symbolic. With this outlook on human nature man becomes the symbolic animal as opposed to the rational animal.

Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man's cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum. By so doing we can designate his specific difference, and we can understand the new way open to man -- the way to civilization.¹

MAN AS A SYMBOLIC BEING - III (B)

If science and studies in religion are willing to understand man as symbolic, then a new system of cultural process arises. By creating this system and fully exploring the nature of symbolism a deeper concept of culture and behaviour is offered. Seeing man as symbolic opposed to reason becomes a means of avoiding epistemological

encapsulation,¹ a result of the past age of enlightenment which has become the greatest obstacle in a sincere dialogue among all the disciplines interested in man. Making man a case of either/or, either he is rational or non-rational, leads to an encapsulation of views among systems, and this limited perception contributes significantly to destroying the freedom and dignity of man. Here, a comment on Skinner is apropos. Skinner seems aware of this encapsulation when he demands a rethinking of social science into a general science, a technology of behaviour but by his over emphasis on S-R theories makes this enterprise impossible.² A method of open communication founded on an appreciation of man and his symbolic life is much more viable. When schools of religion share in this open system it turns into an attitude of critical realism, transcendental symbolism or process theology. The strength of such a system is its constant desire to fight against encapsulation, thereby avoiding the old pitfalls of realism, idealism or common sense thinking. Perhaps the description of freedom as a flow, presented previously, is becoming more apparent. The flow of freedom becomes more than a vague wish; instead, it serves as an axiom for the overlapping and interplay of definitions and


systems. The pivotal point to this, however, is the symbolic.¹

The Dynamics of Symbolism

A symbol is any event, happening, perception or occasion to which man gives meaning.² The stimuli is a physiological organic process, whereas the symbol is a meaning-making process. A car, for example, is a stimulus that causes various responses. The response will depend on various things -- the car's position, locomotion, when it is given, how it is given, etc. More broadly the car is a reality of several dimensions of meaning. For some it symbolizes power, for some danger and others a simple means of transportation. The father who owns the car has several different responses to the car than the son who has just received his license and is driving the car for the first time. More than being a stimulus the car conveys, through symbolic presence, meaning. Nowhere, as with language, do we encounter the significance of symbols, so much so that a whole new philosophical system of linguistics has come forth. Words are in culture more than just phonetic stimuli. They are symbols containing depth of meaning; one strata of meaning in the words themselves and several others when they are put into use.³ It is in the symbolic that man is given his


potential for being human. The best example of the symbolic process producing human ability is the story of Helen Keller, and in the story of Helen as recorded by her teacher, Mrs. Sullivan, we get a good illustration of the general problem.

I must write you a line this morning because something very important has happened. Helen has taken the second great step in her education. She has learned that everything has a name and the manual alphabet is the key to everything she wants to know.

....This morning while she was washing, she wanted to know the name for "water". When she wants to know the name of anything, she points to it and pats my hand. I spelled "w-a-t-e-r" and thought no more about it until after breakfast...[Later on] we went to the pump house, and I let Helen hold her mug under the spout while I pumped. As the cold water gushed forth filling her mug, I spelled "w-a-t-e-r" in Helen's free hand. The word coming so close upon the sensation of cold water rushing over her hand seemed to startle her. She dropped the mug and stood as one transfixed. A new light came into her face. She spelled "water" several times. Then she dropped on the ground and asked for its name and pointed to the pump and the trellis and suddenly turning around she asked for my name. I spelled "teacher". All the way back to the house she was highly excited, and learned the name of every object she touched, so that in a few hours she had added thirty new words to her vocabulary. The next morning she got up like a radiant fairy.

She flitted from object to object, asking the name of everything and kissing me for very gladness. ...Everything must have a name now. Wherever we go, she asks eagerly for the names of things she has not learned at home. She is anxious for her friends to spell, and is eager to teach the letters to everyone she meets. She drops the signs and pantomimes she used before, as soon as she has words to supply their place, and the acquirement of a new word affords her the liveliest pleasure. And
we notice, that her face grows more expressive each day.\footnote{Ernest Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 34.}

The argument in symbol analysis is that the mind is not passive, rather it is a receptor-effector system. It perceives because it experiences a continued amount of symbolic input. Contrary to straight behaviourism students of the cultural process see the symbolic input as the important element in the shaping of behaviour. Symbolic information is retained and retained for definite purposes. Because of this the ego (I) is in a continual flow of abstraction. Not only does the individual ego abstract but there is a continual collective cultural minding that takes place. The presence of symbols causes the mind to be in a state of minding, and so we might refer to the ego (I) as a minding information reception process. This means that the "I" is always relative to a culture which makes certain symbols available -- $0 + C_s$ -- OB.\footnote{Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture, A Study of Man and Civilization (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1949), p. 161.}

This type of process depends on the operation both of an inner faculty memory and an outer operation of symbolism, both operations functioning in a constant interchange and thereby conditioning each other. Symbols when placed within this type of cultural process have three areas of scientific interest: the physiological, operant behaviour, and symbolic information in-put out-put. Physiology is
used here in a very wide sense of a molecular study of the brain. A molecular study of the brain is a serious attempt to deal with the brain in terms of a genetic code and what this has to relate to the topic of behaviour. Little so far has been done in this area, however early considerations offer interesting findings for the cultural process school, as opposed to schools of straight behaviourism and determinism. Studies in physiology and psycho-chemistry bring about a better awareness of memory retention, and symbolic human organization and codification. In a way it is an endeavour to use the computer as a model to understand human brain functioning. Etheralization of reality becomes a process of one's memory bank stimulated by outer material and inner codification. An in-depth presentation of the physiology of symbolization and retention is not necessary in this paper.\footnote{Isaac Asimov, The Human Brain, Its Capacities and Functions (New York: Signet Classics, 1963) pp. 318-321.} However, to add to the construct of the theory of cultural process, I have added a few thoughts from the biochemist Isaac Asimov who touches upon the future question in his book, The Human Brain. These are vague speculations in an, as yet, open field of inquiry, genetics and behaviour.

A MOLECULAR VIEW OF BEHAVIOUR - III (C)

(a) The region about the auditory area in the temporal lobe is the auditory association area. There, particular sounds are associated with physical phenomena in the light of past experiences.

(b) There is also a visual association area in the occipital lobe surrounding the actual visual area, and a somesthetic association area behind the somesthetic
area. The different sensory association areas co-ordinate their functioning in a portion of the brain in the neighbourhood of the beginning of the lateral sulcus in the left cerebral hemisphere. In this area, the auditory, visual and somesthetic association area, all come together. This overall area is sometimes called the gnostic area. The overall associations are fed into the area lying immediately in front ideomotor area, which translates them into an appropriate response. This information is shunted into the premotor area (lying just before the motor area in the frontal lobe), which co-ordinates the muscular activity being finally brought about by the motor area.

(c) There is the area of the frontal lobe that lies before the motor and premotor areas and is, therefore, called the prefrontal lobe. Its lack of obvious function is such that it is sometimes called the "silent area".

There might be a tendency, rather to consider it of all sections of the brain, the most significant. In general, the revolutionary trend in the development of the human nervous system has been the piling of complication upon complication at the forward end of the nerve cord. In passing from the primitive chordates, such as emphioxus, into the vertebrate subphylum, one passes from unspecialized nerve cord to one in which the anterior end has developed into the brain. Also, in passing up the classes of vertebrates from fish to mammals, it is the forebrain section of the brain that undergoes major development, and the cerebrum becomes dominant. In going from insectivores to primates and within the primate order, from monkey to man, there has been a successive development of the foremost section of the cerebrum frontal lobe.

In the early hominids even after the brain had achieved full human size, the frontal lobes continued development. Neanderthal man had a brain as large as our own, but the frontal lobe of the brain of tree man gained at the expense of the occipital lobe, so if the total weight is the same, the distribution of weight is not. It is easy to assume then that the prefrontal lobes, far from being unused, is a kind of very epitome of the brain.

(d) Even granted that the behaviourist stand is correct in principle and that all human behaviour, however complex, can be brought down to a mechanical pattern of nerve cells (and hormones) the further question arises as to whether it is useful to allow matters to rest there.
Clearly we have much further to go than the distance the pat phrase "trial and error" or "conditioning" can carry us. Briefly, as a change progresses there can come a point (sometimes quite a sharp one) where the outlook must change, where a difference in degree suddenly becomes the equivalent of a difference in kind. To take an analogy in the world of the physical sciences, let us consider ice. Its structure is pretty well understood on the molecular level. If ice is heated the molecules vibrate more and more until at a certain temperature the vibrations are energetic enough to overcome the intermolecular attractions. The molecules then lose their order and become randomly distributed, in a fashion, moreover, that changes randomly with time. There has been a "phase change", the ice has melted and becomes water. The molecules in liquid water are like the molecules in ice and it is possible to work out a set of rules that will hold for the behaviour of those molecules in both ice and water. The phase change is so sharp, however, as to make it more useful to describe ice and water in different terms, to think of water in connection with other liquids and ice in connection with other solids.

Similarly, when the process of etherealized trial-and-error becomes as complicated as it is in the human mind, it may well be no longer useful to interpret mental activity in behaviourist terms. As to what form of interpretation is most useful that is not yet settled.

(e) The point is, one might reasonable suppose, that at which reason becomes complex enough to allow abstraction; when it allows the establishment of symbols to stand for concepts, which in turn stand for collections of things or actions or qualities. The sound "table" represents not merely this table and that table, but a concept of "all table-like objects", a concept that does not exist physically. The sound "table" is thus an abstraction of an abstraction.

Once it is possible to conceive an abstraction and represent it by a sound, communication becomes possible at a level of complexity and meaningfulness far beyond that possible otherwise. As the motor areas of the brain develop to the point, where a special center exists, enough different sounds can be made, easily and surely, to supply each of a vast number of concepts with individual sounds. And there is enough room for memory units in a brain of such complexity to keep all necessary association of sound and concept firmly in mind. It is speech then, rather
than reason alone that is the phase change, and that fixes the gulf between man and non-man. The existence of speech means that the gathering of experience and drawing conclusions is no longer a function of the individual alone. Experience is shared and the tribe becomes wiser and more knowledgeable than any individual in it.

(f) More and more it is becoming fashionable to look upon the brain as though it were in some way an immensely complicated computer made up of extremely small switches, the neurons. And in one respect at least, that involving the question of memory, biochemists are coming to look to structures finer than the neuron, and to penetrate to the molecular level. In a computer, a memory can be set up by making suitable changes in the magnetic properties of a tape, changes that are retained until called in to use. Is there an analogous situation in the brain? Suspicion is currently following upon ribonucleic acid (usually abbreviated RNA) in which the nerve cell, surprisingly enough, is richer than almost any other type of cell in the body. I say surprisingly because RNA is involved in the synthesis of protein and is therefore usually found in those tissues producing large quantities of protein either because they are actively growing or because they are producing copious quantities of protein-rich secretions. The nerve cell falls into neither classification, so the abundance of RNA within it serves as legitimate ground for speculation. The RNA molecule is an extremely large one, consisting of hundreds or even thousands of subunits of four different kinds. The possible number of different arrangements of these subunits in the RNA molecule is astronomically immense. Each different arrangement produces a distinct RNA molecule, one capable of bringing about the synthesis of a distinct protein molecule.¹

This rather lengthy quote from Asimov has been selected merely to establish that science is still at a very early stage in its study of behaviour and knowing. Often such insights from other areas of

science are too easily overlooked by behaviourists, because of this they are guilty of possessing a far too limited canon of investigation. Peter Winch in *The Idea of a Social Science* has most adequately, as has Asimov, treated this most crucial question, although Winch is much more concerned about the establishment of sociological laws and the determinants of moral behaviour. The point is, however, that science is developing a whole new attitude to cause and effect. No longer does science really think in straight cause-effect concepts. Cause-effect relationships meaning there is always a necessary causal relationship between cause A and effect B. The effect is always traceable to some elements or operation of A; given that B happens A is the explanation.

Cause-effect mentality changes when there is a more profound appreciation of the relativity of all investigation and experimentation. With this awareness there is a deeper method of giving A $\rightarrow$ B explanations. They become only a general expression of probabilities since there is always the series of interplays. A series of interactions in cause and effect laws means that B as a result or effect is known in terms of A1, A2, A3, A4 causing B, but the listing of all variables in causation or as Asimov says "Phase Change" can become so great that a term other than A is to be discovered. Winch put it in other words: when questioning cause-effect laws in social or behavioural studies, the major error is to think in terms of nothing more than a change of degree. If laws explain the physical universe then laws founded on a similar methodology will explain behaviour; it is only a
question of degree. Of course, this argument was solved long before Skinner in the debate between the philosophers Hume and Mill. Mill seized upon the major error, to say that it is just a matter of degree between physical operation and experimentation and behavioural studies, is to try to sneak by with a horrendous intellectual error. It is like saying that if I cut down a tree and there is a certain response, this response is similar to cutting off an arm, it is just a question of degree.¹

This suggests in terms of behaviour that to know operant behaviour demands more than an outdated Hume, Augustus Comte, Aquinas type of cause-effect science or moral philosophy. A system that deals with the complexity of middle terms and the great question of relativity in behaviour is required. This system is found in symbol analysis, cognition, information reception and behaviour. A wider system of this type avoids the danger of taking a law discovered in a limited lab. set-up, e.g., a pigeon box, with a limited frontal lobe to explain the totality of operant behaviour.

SCIENCE AS A TIME-SPACE PROCESS - III (D)

A wider frame of study which seeks to study behaviour within a context of culture must necessarily, as does all science, function on an understanding of space and time. It is only when space-time are

taken as axiomatic does science make any valid statements on any scientific level, and this applies equally to cultural and behavioural studies. It is the time-space element that finally eliminates the old cause-effect philosophical scientific outlook. Even more than doing this, a proper appreciation for the time-space question gives an order to any scientific statements. A time and space element in cultural studies becomes a time-space continuum which allows for methodical investigation in culture and the behaviour it produces. To achieve this continuum in a cultural process system time and space, as with all science, are joined into a time-space unity, and link together to form a temporal-formal relationship, relativity. History, as an example, takes place in time, but to interpret history it depends on how one organizes a time-space dimension. Should history be seen as just one event after another, we have a strictly time concept of history. This perception sees Lincoln as an historical figure dying once or the Napoleonic wars as having taken place, and never is it possible to repeat such events. A time-space concept of history interprets historical events and acts as occurring in a particular time-space model which serves as a model or a sample space. From this perception cyclical statements are made, meaning that when a similar space occurs the time element will be somewhat similar. There is the prophetic or eschatological time-space view of history, usually found in schools of religion, where history becomes the effort to transcend the time-space categories either by a unique intervention into time or a time-space movement as having a definite destiny. A great deal of
similarity exists between this religion-perception of history and ideological types of perception, e.g., Marxist historical consciousness. Finally, still with the example of history a new perception can be established, a process analysis of time-space. Time and space in a process view is no longer a matter of time alone (brute history) or time + space (cyclic history), it is time multiplied by space. (T x S -- events). History results from the product of time and space, it is a continual interplay of variables wherein the variables increase or decrease continually in intensity, and may or may not blend together at particular spots within the time-space continuum.

The example of history has been selected only to give an impression of a time-space continuum. Such an axiom is essential to the overall picture of a cultural process, since the study of culture and cultural behaviour is always relative to an evolution of realities that happens in time-space relations. And this relativity of culture and behaviour is called a temporal-formal relationship.¹ This is a basic axiom we can start off with in the study of behaviour -- consciousness in a continual interaction of inner and outer space happening in a temporal-formal relationship. From this it is concluded that all systems interested in cultural behaviour share this common respect for the question of relativity when offering statements about the nature of man.

Again one wonders if Skinner who prides himself on being scientific has really considered such a position. For what Skinner is really speaking about is cultural behaviour. He never directly says this, but all of his findings only make sense when they are studied in the cultural environment of Walden II. This being the case it necessitates that his S-R theories be qualified by other considerations that are involved in a science of culture.

ETHNOLOGY OF CULTURE AND BEHAVIOUR - IV (A)

Initially we enter this construct of cultural process with language. The uniqueness of man, and his behaviour, is the symbolic, but the symbolic begins in culture and individual ego with language. It is only when the homo sapiens enters the stage of propositional language as opposed to animal type phonetics that we sense his uniqueness. Chronologically man is the builder or tool maker responder, but to explain human uniqueness in terms of homo faber (tool maker) or responder is too narrow, since such an explanation presses toward the broader capacity of memory. Memory is the attribute that allows man to retain tools and responses for definite purposes, and with this exercise of memory, he, of course, retains sounds. So in a psychological or culturological study we must start with language.\(^1\) Culture, in

many ways, is really no more than the passage of language. Man in the use of symbolic language begins to control environment. It must be carefully pointed out here that the term language should not, as is often done in schools of linguistic analysis, refer merely to syntax, grammar and sound. Language can also refer to the several layers of non-verbal communication that is part and parcel of cultural expression; then language is expanded to include both body and emotive language. Because of this, research done in Extra Sensory Perception is of vital importance. All these forms of language provide man with his symbolic behaviour, and the purpose of such behaviour is obviously to express dimensions of meaning.\(^1\) Outer space is the stuff of which he makes this meaning, therefore, outer space is more than a source of motor or emotive stimulation. It is a presence to be grasped in symbols. The first step in this symbolization process is language. From here the cultural process moves into a sequential order of development, namely myth, art, history and science.\(^2\) This sequential order is the order selected in Cassirer's analysis of culture. In developing my construct I shall interpret the basic cultural process as development of symbols, but with always a return to the centre, the myth which provides a better way of interpreting how man forms meaning in a temporal-formal process.

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Language is of its nature a complicated gift. Though it is the heart of cultural growth, it likewise serves as a great source of ambiguity in any given culture, since language is logical and rational while simultaneously being the ground for illusion, fallacy and incompleteness. The logic of language is in its general names; however, in application to concrete situations it becomes ambiguous. Language is of its nature ambiguous since it contains several dimensions of meaning and often many of the dimensions of meaning are beyond even the symbolic configuration of language, e.g., schools of linguistic philosophy are established on this ambiguity principle, though they tend to push the principle to the point of the absurd. Spencer, aware of the ambiguity of language, described human speech of its essence as metaphorical, filled with similes and analogies. Having such an ambiguous and metaphorical form of symbolism is the root of all other forms of cultural cognition, for language has potentially a multi-form function. A culture is never comprehended only through linguistic analysis, a futile effort, instead it is known if language is seen as the potential for more complicated forms of consciousness, namely the mythical.¹ Myth is always the product of the temporal-formal evolution of language and behaviour in the cultural process. Before developing

our thought in this area one other dimension should be mentioned. If this is not done the false impression may be given that language and communication theories are being used completely to explain culture and behaviour.

Language and communication theories by themselves give a partial explanation of culture, since there is considerable evidence of more than a communication drive in man. This evidence is most obvious in man's emotional drives which are a combination of fundamental tendencies, appetites, needs, desires, alongside language. Any elementary study of primate behaviour, or any animal studies, for that matter, easily establishes the presence of such drives. Desmond Morris, in *The Naked Ape*, does a beautiful popular job on the whole topic when he presents interesting non-verbal drives and appetites, what we might call the will to power or domination within the group.¹ And so another level of consciousness is added to the cultural process, the subconscious. This gives six different cognitive operations that are means of organizing outer reality, namely to: language, myth, art, history, science and the subconscious (or unconscious). As I proceed these forms are combined into the mythical. It is the myth that serves as the centre and the other modes as the peripheral, that is, in culture. These six do overlap (on this theological freedom hangs), and each contain within them-

selves individual symbol-making operations. In this paper there is not that much attention given to the elements of the emotional drive, to do this would demand a whole different avenue of investigation.\(^1\)

A complete view of the cultural process would demand that full attention be given to these six forms of consciousness. The only one to date who has attempted this is Ernst Cassirer, in his Essay on Man and The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. My intention is not to develop such a philosophy or theology of culture, but only to show that these are theories of perception other than straight behaviourism or determinism.

A SYSTEM OF CULTURAL PROCESS MYTH - IV (B)

Based on the systematics of Langdon Gilkey the final block is in order to organize an open-ended cultural process system. It is a matter of taking seriously mythical consciousness, and seeing it as central to the cultural meaning-making activity of man.

Language and the emotional drive exist within man, but most important

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Should one wish to study the emotional drives under process theories a basic work is Freud's "Totem and Taboos" (Freud, 1938) and the theories of the neo-Freudian Geza Roheim who is trying to situate Freudian principles into cultural studies in his work, The Origin and Function of Culture. As a neo-Freudian, Roheim is not concerned with temporal-formal statements, as much as he is with basic laws and determinants, but his efforts may lead to promising results in the study of basic emotional drives within cultures. Another important consideration is the whole topic of the collective unconscious as established by Jung; this theory should be of great interest to schools of religion who are into the study of culture.
they are a group, tribal or societal function. Taking seriously these movements within culture it produces a complete definition of man as meaning maker, meaning here being understood in the sense of purpose, order and explanation. Along with Victor Frankl, and his school of logo therapy, I interpret man fundamentally in search of meaning;\(^1\) however, he goes about this meaning-making with a certain structural order, the structure being the elements, information and skill his culture makes accessible. Rather than explaining symbolic man, as does Max Muller, in terms of the ambiguity of language, or Spencer in terms of language being metaphorical, or Freud and Jung in terms of unconscious drives or in terms of conditioning as does Skinner, I choose to explain symbolic man in terms of cultural formation. Thus man grows because of the total operation of certain processes,\(^2\) primarily language + unconscious drive + the need for meaning, and these are the constants and operations upon which a culture is founded. (Lang + uncon Drive + Need for meaning -- Culture). Therefore, it is an involvement in these processes that produces behaviour.


Putting all these three together we can say that a person always becomes part of a story. From a culture (group, tribal or societal), the individual begins to share in a story, and the story is the myth. Always distrustful of definitions it is better to first give a general description of myth.

Myth is central to culture since it is the category we must return to if we are to know how man knows, and how, in cognition and feeling, he adapts and changes with his environment. Man is of his nature mythical, and his search for meaning is an interaction between being mythologized and demythologized. Myth as a significant category of the cultural process has not been able until rather recently to gain for itself a proper academic or popular image. Instead myths have been seen as part of a dark and primitive past when man was supposedly very childlike in his primitive consciousness. Philosophers have had mixed opinions about myths. Aristotle saw myths as metaphysical statements; for Plato, allegorical expressions of natural philosophy; the Church fathers maintained that myth is what is believed always, everywhere, by everybody. Most uncomplimentary of all have been certain rationalistic philosophers who out of necessity under-estimate myth, since it ran contrary to the spirit of the age of Enlightenment. Tylor spoke of myth as belonging to an age of insanity. Spencer felt that

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the savage was neither rational nor conscious; there is no such thing as primitive philosophy since they merely accept the obvious without questioning. Most striking in his condemnation is Voltaire who calls them the works of "charlatans". A few of the Romantic philosophers were condescending towards myth. Vico felt that they gave a figurative meaning to life, the German Romantic Johann Gottfried Herder called for a synthesis between the philosopher and the poet, but here even theRomantics only accepted myth as part of a poetic endeavour to conceptualize an existential relationship with reality.\(^1\)

In my use of myth there is a heavy bias towards a sociological approach which interprets mythical consciousness as a means of explaining the paradoxes of social order within the chaos of the universe. This is primarily a functionalist interpretation. To situate myth within a process system, that of meaning-making, it is necessary, as does Cassirer, to associate it with language or a development of language in a meaning system. From this it follows that all forms of cultural communication eventually result in myths. Langdon Gilkey is even more helpful here, and the following theory of myth in culture is a combination of both Gilkey's and Cassirer's theories, which I shall call the process school of myth and culture. It will be this theoretical school that will be used in the conclusive analysis of the behaviourist school via B.F. Skinner.

Myth in this construct is a form of language that grows from man's symbolic meaning process, whose symbols are multivalent and whose referent in some strange way is the transcendent or the sacred. And it is the appropriate mode of religious discourse, thereby interpreting religion as a necessary and functional part of any cultural process, i.e., religion as a reality or category for the purpose of cultural integration. From this definition three theses follow.

(1) In a secular technological mood, technological man and culture is such that in its eyes myth is inappropriate and unintelligible.

(2) Mythical symbolic thought and language is necessary for the life of any culture. Therefore, we, in technological society, produce our myths under the table, but in a distorted and self-contradictory form.

(3) Religion is so familiar with mythology that it should provide the best means for understanding the nature, function, need and caution to be exercised with a mythical consciousness.¹

The above description and outline argues that contemporary forms of cultural cognition have not taken myth seriously, as we shall see later with Skinner. As mentioned above, various scholars have tended to treat mythology as something of the past or as a form of poetic expression. However, myth is perhaps best treated as a necessary cultural form causing a particular type of societal interaction and

¹Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), pp. 283-284.
policy making. To appreciate the significance of myth, common effort of a science of culture, behaviour and religion is pressing. Achieving this will take it out of a pure functional construct, and give it the much broader scope of society searching for new forms of motivation through which culture makes or intuits new types of metaphysical (universal-abstracted) statements. In contemporary schools of Religion there have been two recent systems presented that make myth a more accessible category for theology. The first is Bultmann who introduced the question. But his treatment is insufficient since he believed that it is possible for theology to escape myth; he did not really see it as a necessary cultural form and fell into the myth of psychologism. It is with Langdon Gilkey that a system comes into being that allows for a deeper treatment of the topic, for Gilkey places theology into the cultural meaning-making process. And theology comes into being to the extent that culture seeks meaning. Schools of Religion can now take myth as a constant within culture, its functionality is understood and it serves as a source of scientific and theological intuition. This treatment of myth can begin by dividing myth (and the mythical consciousness) into two basic categories: archaic and pejorative myths, and for

purposes of greater clarity divide archaic into primitive and classical mythology. Pejorative myth refers to the myth-making process of contemporary society, and this is referred to as techno-myths.¹

Myth and Its Meaning-Making Process

The most inclusive way of describing the social function of myth is to state that it gives to a culture its sense of the sacred. The word sacred is interpreted by Novak as an adherence to whatever a culture finds to be awe-inspiring, and provides the individual with universal meaning.² Whatever is taken as the sacred provides explanation for the enigmas of life, and also gives models for man's social and personal existence. Looking for symbols that are awe-inspiring results in a myth structure that is multivalent in that while referring to the finite (given-reality), they act in culture as unconditional statements, thereby becoming the sacred. Each culture and civilization in its temporal-formal existence develops its own idea of the sacred and its grasp of the sacred is its myths. Western civilization has evolved through three distinct phases of myth-making, the archaic, the classical-religio period and the contemporary period of technological myth-making. Each of these periods has its own separate process and means of referrent towards the sacred, i.e., the sacred as social necessity brings it into existence.³


³Langdon Gilkey, op. cit., p. 300.
Archaic myth is the product of primitive man or as Henri Frankfort describes him, man "Before Philosophy". Primitive man is quite different in his concept of time and space in that his cultural perception of time-space is the concrete, and his symbol process is not an effort to form pure abstractions, rather they are a blunt corporeal type of symbolism. For the primitive, space is an occasion of experiencing, and with an undifferentiated consciousness he perceives sense phenomena. Reality is a place of contact rather than a space for abstraction. It is a fundamental trait in archaic mythical thinking that wherever it posits a relationship between two members, it forms this relationship into a concrete identity. An attempted synthesis leads here necessarily to a coincidence, an immediate concrescence of the elements that were to be linked. Having an undifferentiated consciousness is not to say that primitive man is illogical or possesses a childlike imagination, instead he has a logic of his own which serves in a highly personal way to symbolize space and time. The world is perceived as a world of emotional encounter that causes joy, fear, grief and elation. Consequently, the world is a place that is encountered, not one of abstraction and theories.¹

A close modern day analogy would be the musical "Hair" which expresses this concrete emotional feel for life. Much of the modern day ecological

concern in a similar fashion expresses this earlier type of logic. It is a consciousness that produces concrete symbolic configurations whose purpose is to form a unity with reality. Therefore, with the finite primitive man finds cause for the transcendent, his sacred, and any explanation of the finite must somehow resemble that which is given in experience. Because myths are an extension of cultural forms of cognition, when the primitive myth process creates symbolic meaning it is of an earthly or anthropomorphic nature. For example, within stories that explain his social order the gods are depicted in term of kinship.¹

A distinction may be made between archaic and classical myth because I feel that within archaic myths there is present a potential for a different type of cultural story-making, and within this potential the primitive process leads to a new type of myth (cultural story) making, the religious. When primitive culture reaches a certain level of organization, known as civilization, it searches for new horizons in its moral awareness. It begins to seek out abstract principles beyond concrete body experience. Babylonian culture shows signs early in its cultural process of a different symbolic awareness in its interest in astronomy and algebraic symbols. This in turn produced a new type of encounter with reality. Increasing its mastery

of outer-space caused the culture to go beyond a strictly physiognomic
cognition. This was most clearly obvious when it changed its mythical
discourse, and created more ultimate ethical dimensions. As a
consequence, the culture began to design itself around moral symbols.
In Greek mythology there is a decline in the importance of the gods.
Homer and Hesiod, and Herodotus and Anaxagoras become the symbols of
a different type of mythology, stressing certain moral standards for
purposes of a work ethic. Zeus, rather than being a god who holds sway
over nature, becomes a god who demands a search for moral standards.
Myth ceased being just an awe-inspiring transcendent compulsion, and
became a conscious search for a moral will. Zoroaster's religion
looks for the "supreme being", the "Ahura Mazda", the wise lord.
The divine was no longer sought only in analogical rites, but in the
triad of good thoughts, good works and good deeds. Higher forms of
mythmaking attempt to depart from the strictly taboo principle and
define uncleanness in terms of more than mere physical contact, instead
it defines personal uncleanness in terms of inner will and volition.
Semitic myth-making rules of holiness and uncleanness are indistinguish-
able in their origin, eventually semitic myths reach the point of
discovery that the impurity which counts is that which is written on
the heart; it is not what enters a person that counts, but that which
comes out. The point of this is that it is valid to make a distinction
between primitive myth and classical religious myth, and such a
distinction is needed because religious consciousness introduces a
different type of abstraction process. It handles space and time with
unique ethical language containing a different horizon in its concern for first principles and a self-subsistent comprehensible first cause.¹

Every culture must have within it a certain sense of social praxis. The social praxis of a culture or civilization is the method by which nature is controlled and ordered to the demands of human expression. Both ancient myth and religio-myths share a common social praxis.² Social change and order is achieved in the acting out of the ritual, and the ritual is the hand maid of the myth. Myth provides the explanation, the ritual is the enterprise whereby the culture exercises its freedom. This is so since the acting out of the ritual is an attempt to control the social holocaust and the enigmas of life. A very clear example of this is the Biblical account of creation. Genesis chapters 1 and 2 explain the present chaos of history and man's existential reality by returning it to cosmic origins. Evil has resulted because man has violated the original order. What the ritual is always attempting to do is please the deity so that order may be restored.³


²Gibson Winter, "Human Science and Ethics in a Creative Society" (delivered at the American Society of Christian Ethics, Los Angeles, 1971) p. 10.

³Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), p. 287.
Obviously, a technological culture discovers increasingly little purpose in such a cultural process. Mainly, contemporary culture sees history as a forward movement wherein man exists more in time than space; he is moving towards a goal rather than searching for a return to the original order. Because of this there grows a particular understanding of human autonomy and freedom. Social chaos and the existential enigmas become problems to be solved through the exercise of human activity which in turn causes meaning to exist in patterns of development in time. Happiness, meaning and social control is found in the need to face the present and solve present problems in utopic language and terms. Therefore, the myths (cultural stories) created by a techno-culture must refer to this meaning process. And so, a foundation for technological myths is in a liberal view of history and technology. Western technological culture expresses this spirit in its radical commitment to a certain pioneer spirit of hard work and planning, while Eastern technological culture develops a radical commitment to a Marxist vision. Somehow the language and symbols of a technological age begin to centre around a cosmic evolutionary meaning process and a Marxist materialistic dialectics. Cultural meaning goes through a change in its myths when the underlying spirit of social praxis is turned into a sociological vision which is to come about through a scientific vision and technique. Scientific consciousness from its founding in writers such as Comte, Marx, Durkheim, etc. offers a radically different type of horizon.
It is this sociological vision which is supported when Darwin introduces his *Origin of Species*. From there it leaps out of its scientific biological foundation to become part of a new cultural meaning-making process.¹ From this point it is only a matter of time until levels of symbolism that deal with social meaning, control and chaos are evolutionary in nature. Early scientific views of nature and man, a linear concept of history along with a total acceptance of human autonomy as creating forces,

are no longer part of a limited structure, but deal with universal structure and patterns. They are no longer part of an original scientific base in biology and economics, but provide a universal service as visions of the total structure of things.²

This spirit (history, sociological vision and autonomy) serves as an intelligible explanation of the evils and the enigmas of historical life and contains a vision of an ultimate structure, which thereby determines the character of social and individual events. As traditional myths did they relate our values and our hopes to the objective nature of things. The change of cultural meaning is most apparently seen in language. Where symbolic ethical imperatives are no longer terms of ought to be, as much as terms of what will be, language becomes indicative and assertive. The cultural spirit then creates a new set of determinants for contemporary models and norms, for individual human

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¹Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), pp. 296-300.

²Ibid., p. 295.
existence, for socio and political decisions, patterns of education and life style.

This particular techno-spirit must produce myths (cultural stories) that will support its intentions. In order to do this these myths build upon either of two particular attitudes: one, that laws of mechanical efficiency will bring about the social vision; two, that social praxis is brought about with a complete faith in human autonomy. Langdon Gilkey, therefore, categorizes techno-myths as being either Mechanomorphic or Anthropomorphic.

Mechanomorphic Myth

Mechanical myths are those myths that offer a solution for social chaos on the basis of objective scientific laws. All problems have a solution depending on the discovery of certain scientific laws that serve as constants. The myth comes under the guise of science, i.e., the myths are seen as true statements verifiable or falsifiable by the experience of the community of science. A Marxist vision is guarded by certain economic laws and a sociology of a class power structure. If these economic and sociological laws are followed society will solve its problems and the enigmas of life; people will become free in their obedience to the ideology, which becomes awe-inspiring or sacred. It is an awe-inspiring manifesto demanding intellectual and ethical obedience. Western techno-society expresses the mechanical myth in quite a different form. The scientific vision boasts of the same problem solving ability, only in a Western culture it is laws of free enterprise and a work ethic that promise mastery over the enigmas of
life. Freedom is to become committed to economic, psychological and sociological laws.

Mechanomorphic myths differ from traditional religious myths in their claim not to have any hidden mysterious power. They are not revelations, but are generalizations and statistics that can be observed by anyone who may validate them through objective inquiry.

Just as all myths must have ritual to solidify them within the cultural process, mechanomorphic myths are reinforced by secular rituals such as sporting events, stressing the virtues of discipline and competition. It is the Sunday afternoon football game, for example, that highlights how one is to order his personalities. Players become prototypes of a cult of rugged individualism. And the scientist in the white jacket with his scientific instruments becomes a shaman figure, for it is the man with scientific language and skills that can really solve the problems given enough time. When dialectical materialism and a liberal evolutionary view jump from their scientific base to give a total explanation of cultural purpose they must then be interpreted as myths, and in doing this run the risk of becoming ridiculous. Because their symbols are not nearly analogous enough, they can offer only a one dimensional sequential concept of man and cannot represent the several realities of human existence or social chaos. It is for this reason that contemporary society is entering a period of cultural revolution. The mechanical myths have ceased to have the power to give adequate cultural meaning.
Besides a lack of symbolic value the mechanomorphic myth tends to destroy a spirit of human drama. At least in old classical mythology there was a drama of encounter with a divine will. Although the divine will was a mythical proclamation of necessity and order life was seen as a process of contingency and accident. Science forces reality into a necessary process of finding the laws and variables to automatically control human conduct. When this happens the drama of man's free participation becomes unintelligible and precarious. Although there is evidence that mechanomorphic myths are still part of the contemporary cultural process, there are several signs that they are losing ground, and new myths are developing.

With the holocaust of World War II contemporary man began to realize the great danger to a mechanomorphic consciousness. For in so many ways it was the Nazi myth that appealed to the mechanical aggressiveness of man. But this myth was made up of ingredients that came from a Hegelian philosophy (linear history) and the ideology of a master race developed along "so called" genetic principles. During the war and with its conclusion an existential spirit came into existence, a spirit fundamentally distrustful of mechanical concepts of man and the myths it produces. The existential spirit stressed once again the drama of the human will. It differs from classical mythology in that within human autonomy itself the absolute is found. Even though the mechanomorphic myths for the greater part are breaking down the cultural spirit of linear history, human autonomy and social praxis continues. Which means the mechanomorphic myths will be replaced by
new myths, but these myths will remain within the process of the contemporary-techno cultural spirit.

Myths of Human Autonomy

A technological culture must then radically turn to the human spirit, to have a sense of the sacred, so it makes human freedom the sacred, that which is awe-inspiring. Fortunately, myths of human freedom have a great advantage over mechanomorphic myths, since their language is much more analogous to life. Human autonomy myths have a richer multivalent symbolic language; they are more capable of embracing all of reality, its ambiguities and enigmas. These myths are anthropomorphic since they are man-centred, and it is in transcending encapsulated empirical discourse that contemporary culture looks for a deeper awareness of the sacred and ultimate meaning.

Already, there is interesting data being collected that substantiates the observation that new myths are being created to explain the social chaos and enigmas of life. A familiarity with contemporary literature, songs or drama clearly indicates that it is the free man who is the holy man, it is the uninhibited man who discovers the mystery of life.¹

The anthropologist Ben J. Wallace conducting field work in northern New Mexico for Southern Methodist University has done a

¹Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), pp. 302-312.
suitable ethnography on communes. His work is an ethnography of Rural Hippie Communes: An Experiment in Culture Change. Most important, however, is his main theory that the purpose of the counter culture, or as he describes it, intentional-culture, is process, the constant search for meaning, but a meaning always of an anthropocentric nature that one arrives at in a free, uninhibited, unorganized and non-scientific environment. ¹ Gibson Winter of the University of Chicago has a much broader sociological type of investigation in his book Being Free. In this readable book he has assembled a great deal of data which argues that the youth culture in America has entered a new meaning-making process. ²

Beyond my own almost daily impressions I have attempted to verify the theories of Wallace and Winter in two field projects; (a) a summer project which ran for two summers, called S.O.L.E. (Summer Opportunity for Learning Experience); and (b), a Dropout School, W.A.I.T. (Working At It Together) sponsored by the K-W Separate School Board. Both of these projects substantiate the arguments that meaning is being sought in radically new ways. One can easily read in projects of this type a rebellion against mechanical forms of teaching and education and the passing on of mechanical myths.

¹Ben J. Wallace, "Rural Hippie Communes: An Experiment in Culture Change", pp. 63-64.

When the mythical elements of the cultural process change or two strong cultural stories are fighting for dominance behaviour changes. It would seem that the basic behavioural types coming into being in a contemporary process are: (i), scientific man; (ii), existential man; (iii), liberal and democratic citizen; (iv), new left rebel.

Scientific man has the characteristics of the professional and academic. He is supposedly of critical intelligence, scientific knowledge and humanitarian principles. Existential man, who appears unrepressed, presumes himself to be free and loving of much philosophical psychology. The liberal and democratic citizen is well trained in formal education and often travels in humanist circles. Or, the New Left Rebel who represents autonomous anthropocentricity, sees himself as uncomprising and hard-headed. His theme is the need to drop out for the sake of authenticity and develop valid alternatives to the mainstream of technoculture. A fair guess is that liberal types share the anthropomorphic myth and conservative types the mechanomorphic myth. In chart form a very brief outline is suggested for the purpose of the thematic development of this paper.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECHANOMORPHIC (MECHANICAL)</th>
<th>ANTHROPOCENTRIC (HUMAN AUTONOMY)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Conservative Institutionalist of social structure</td>
<td>-Scientific man</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Militarist</td>
<td>-new type - existential</td>
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<tr>
<td>-power balance</td>
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<tr>
<td>-war games</td>
<td>-Existential man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Authoritarian dogmatist</td>
<td>-radical concept of freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-usually in ecclesiastical aide, but in culture more and more assoc. education</td>
<td>-Liberal and democratic man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Ideologist</td>
<td>-crosses all classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Marxist - party</td>
<td>-predominantly middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-capitalist - politics - business types</td>
<td>-sometimes known as bankrupt liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Scientist</td>
<td>-New left radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-schools of behaviourism and determinism</td>
<td>-youth</td>
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Both of these two types share in common the belief that to be able to understand, to know about or to be aware of something is to be able to control and direct it. Knowledge and an awareness which traditionally has also served as a blindly determining force in man and most often given to evil, now become a new humanizing instrument of man. Realization of human freedom now promises freedom from evil rather than freedom for evil. Awareness and freedom become the social
praxis, the means of solving the social chaos.

Before beginning the section of theological reflection on the nature of freedom a brief summary is necessary.

(a) Neo-behaviourism of the Skinnerian type has been structured within the limits of stimuli-response theory, and this he has applied to cultural design.

(b) It is argued that stimuli-response theories are significant scientific statements but to have valid statements about behaviour and freedom all statements must be placed in a larger whole -- the whole process of culture and meaning-making.

(c) Behaviour must also be considered in terms of meaning, and the understanding of behaviour means an interaction of all forms of symbolic formation.

(d) Meaning is a human drive -- to understand the elements of this drive demands recourse to underlying forms of consciousness. Therefore, the whole domain of the subconscious remains valid even in light of behaviourist findings. It is my personal belief that the study of the subconscious is more applicable to social problem solving if it is done in terms of the will to power, and how this expresses itself in symbolic forms of behaviour.

(e) A new clue to human nature offers a pivotal point for this process system. It is the symbolic seen as behaviourial input-output.

(f) Accepting the interaction that takes place in man's cognitive acts is where a theological system begins to defend freedom.
As Wallace quotes one of the young people in the commune he studied, "We are a process of becoming, fitting together and falling apart. It changes and we change and it changes..."¹

THEOLOGICAL FREEDOM AND THE PROCESS OF BECOMING - V

I have selected the terminology, theological freedom, not because other ways of describing the reality of freedom are unavailable, but because it is a form of symbolism that contains expressions of ultimacy. For it is the function of theology to discover and organize symbols that represent the human desire for ultimate meaning. So when I speak theologically I am stating that I wish to believe always in freedom and my wishes have concrete validity when the cultural process is understood.² Yet, I want to express it in language that exists outside of myself and this I can do when I opt for theological expressions, since it is a means of expressing an inner flow of ultimacy and feeling to others. Wishful thinking, then, turns into a theological expression of hope and possibility. Theology serves to express deep human wishes and ultimate drives.³ Thus, theology in terms of what has

¹Ben J. Wallace, "Rural Hippie Communes: An Experiment in Culture Change", p. 69.


³Ibid., pp. 11-24.
been said about the cultural process is a special type of meaning-making within the whole. Basically, its method is to understand the elements of story-making and relate this to deeper questions. In order to arrive at this type of meaning theology uses its own form of symbolism. The continual question of importance for theology is, does its symbols explain and give meaning to the cognitive flow of the cultural process? I argue that on the basis of recent theological development its symbols do.¹

In the contemporary period theology has entered three distinct phases -- liberalism, neo-orthodox, and radical theology -- each school attempting to formulate meaningful theological discourse. Liberalism is a school of thought that creates its theological discourse from a commitment to a human quest. In the symbolic forms of culture itself it discovers strong and natural grounds for theology. Much of its exploration and dialogue are usually in the area of science and the evolutionary scientific view of society. Neo-Orthodox is a reaction to the liberal efforts, holding that in the liberal movements there is a negation of basic theological symbols. Neo-Orthodoxy in its reaction is an effort to retrieve fundamental theological symbols that proclaim the inadequacy of the human evolutionary vision. Furthermore, this retrieve is necessary, neo-orthodoxy claims, because theology cannot express the true nature of the Holy other than in

purely human terms. Radical theology is a much different endeavour, and becomes known as the "God is dead" movement. The movement realizes the needs for religious and theological symbols, but differs from liberalism and neo-orthodoxy in that it sees these symbols only in terms of poetic imagery through which man professes his desire to become human. Religion is the process of man humanizing himself.

There is perhaps another approach to theology other than the above mentioned three, and this resembles the cultural process. It is that theological school which fully accepts culture and society as a process, a process of discovering insights and horizons. Process theology is the methodology upon which this paper has been developing. As a theological system it has great respect for the three above mentioned approaches, namely liberalism, neo-orthodoxy and radical theology. It reacts, however, when schools of thought become encapsulated systems. It is true that theological discourse may very well need certain basic symbols, even radical theologians must accept these symbols if they are to create any type of theological discourse. It is likewise true that theology must have an understanding of the natural meaning-making process of man. The important thing to realize is that both symbolism and theological discourse are always in a temporal-formal relationship, meaning that the theological symbols,

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even if traditional symbols, are relative to the time-space continuum in which theological thought is pursued. Thus, theology is necessarily seen as a particular discourse at a particular time, leaving the theologian the task of forming language and understanding symbols, simultaneous to his awareness of the dynamics of culture. Of course, it is never really possible to fully know the present process. The necessary point is that the effort is being made to know how one knows and is motivated, and then to task speculative and ethical questions.¹

Such a theological process is begun when religion is first of all willing to objectify its own myths (cultural stories). Admitting that man is mythical and lives on stories makes theology, as Bultmann suggested, a demythologizing enterprise. But Bultmann failed in his school of thought when he refused to appreciate the fact of myths being necessary elements in culture that serve as existential ciphers. Bultmann was correct in defining theology as a demythologizing activity within culture, yet theology cannot escape the fact that any culture must also remythologize, for the cultural story is essential to maintaining the societal interaction. Theology must, therefore, maintain its purpose in the cultural whole by pointing out that secular existence, despite its heated denials, raises ultimate questions for which myth and symbolic language provide the only mode of conceptualization.

Moreover, mythical discourse is relevant to the life of secular culture, as evidenced by the significant re-appearance of myths born out of this culture. However, secular myths are seen by theology as suffering from the inability of the secular mind to think symbolically and so are unable to comprehend the enigmas as well as the blessings of life.¹

Bringing human awareness to deeper insights is the theological contribution to the cognition that happens in a culture. This demands two categories, the epistemological and the ethical. When this happens a brighter light is always shed on the question of being and becoming. Bernard Lonergan engages upon such an enterprise in his system of critical realism. In his system philosophical-theological discourse is one of possibility, e.g., the possibility of being, and the possibility of good.² As the theologian of culture, Tillich, argues that the dynamics of culture lead to ultimacy and a sense of the unconditional. Depth and ultimacy or critical realist theology allows each generation through its cultural process to recreate religious symbols.³ Or, as Novak in Ascent of the Mountain and Flight of the Dove argues, it is the continual awareness of our ultimate drives

¹Langdon Gilkey, "Modern Myth-Making and the Possibilities of Twentieth-Century Theology" (a paper delivered at the University of Toronto Theology Conference, 1967), p. 298.


that gives cause for new horizons in reflection and in facing the drive for meaning.

With Novak I agree that theology centres around the fundamental question of whether one exists in a surface or depth culture. Theology, in order to have purpose, must delve into all the complexities and ambiguities of reality. In the dynamics of culture theology discovers its material. From the language gained in this process, theology in secular language, speaks of the possibility of that which is wholly other. Reminding culture it never possesses absolutes as much as it is in a continual process of inquiry.¹ Often this will give to theology a position of conflict within society -- it will have to deny what it takes to be false ultimates. The religious man in contemporary process thinking is the one who is willing to travel from insight to insight and here is the beginning of freedom, as theology must interpret it. Freedom comes with the theological horizons that give a deeper view of the whole process that man is part of in his temporal-formal relationship with history. Rather than calling it process, Lonergan refers to it as critical realism. A system whereby religion criticizes the whole or knows the whole in order to prevent any part from becoming dominant.²


Just as there are certain theologians concerned with the nature of religious revelation, so there are the ethicists who must work out of a process vision, the method by which man gives meaning to history. Process ethics stands on the premise that if man is free to give meaning, then he is free to change meaning. Here is where the ethicist disagrees with the determinist and behaviourist. He does not view time and space as being determined by variable and invariable laws, rather it is determined by the quest for meaning, the drive of culture for stories (myths). Cassirer in "The Myth of the State"\(^1\) clearly traces how what is taken as objective political science is really the result of several decades of cultural stories. For example, the scientific myth of the artistocracy (the power elite) as destroyed by the French revolution, as all myths are vulnerable to being destroyed by revolutions. It is true myths are never created independent of determinants such as the socio-economic or subconscious drives, etc., and they are taught through enculturation and acculturation. But they are finally stories, story learning, and just as stories are formulated and accepted in groups, the ethicist argues they can be unformulated and rejected, a process that must exist with some type of ethical discourse. The determinants, the scientific laws and the variables are only a part of the story. It is in knowing the story that one discovers the freedom to change

the story. Freedom on a wide societal scale is when a culture begins to de-mythologize in order to re-mythologize. In this process the ethicist looks for a set of questions that will guarantee the greatest amount of humanization and justice to take place within the parameters of the myth. On a daily concrete level of existence theology and ethics teaches man the need to objectify, place outside of himself, his experiences, and teach the techniques for entering the subjective-objective process.  

This freedom process begins when man is willing to discover within himself a state of restlessness. The ethical imperative in process learning is "our hearts are restless, until they rest in thine". A serious confrontation with human restlessness and anguish is the foundation of freedom. Social ethics is a large scale acceptance of restlessness, which turns that restlessness into a balanced, just and possible revolution. Political and cultural revolution establishes man's ability to transcend and transform history. Animals adapt to their environment, they function on stimuli. Man liberates his environment, he thematizes because he lives on symbols. Revolution comes from restlessness turned into themes that become the social praxis. These themes come with the discovery of a Void that exists within


human existence. Language, myth and ideologies are of their nature incomplete and when they exist for long enough begin to fail in answering questions of ultimacy and depth.¹

Aware of the void, individuals must make a decision at this point, although it is not really a decision. Responding to the void may cause an uncontrollable neurotic or psychotic rebellion or the decision may be to discover ethical freedom. Escaping the void in terms of a praxis that changes the culture and oneself is the theological process. Of course, the culture will react against the outsider sensing the void, and here the outsider must ask himself if he cooperates with the culture, modifies the culture, dies in bitterness, or engages upon some revolutionary vision. Freedom is liberation when the void is discovered within the cultural flow and causes plans for action. Freedom is never a pure subjective cause and effect analysis for this is only perception. Neither is it objective understanding or revolutionary bitterness, for encapsulated bitterness is no more than existential nausea and bespeaks a consciousness that inversely enjoys obstacles and deprivation.²

Because freedom is a flow man becomes most authentic when he is in a subjective-objective flow of understanding. The individual,


the "I", is minding, feeling and hoping in order to find horizons for purposes of experience and justice. Man is free when he hears this sensitivity within himself. It is an existential call to search for this flow in others (objectifying) and with others, and there with organize theories for action. Because there exists within every man some longing for growth (alteration) ethics believes in freedom. Yet, ethics insist that achieved freedom demands communication and transcendence so that man can transform reality from an ethical distance. We might call this ethical initiative.

I shall summarize the ethical flow in chart form, but before doing this I once again remind the reader of my approach to culture, an approach I believe is necessary if there is to develop any creative social praxis. A culture is a group or groups where one acquires learned behaviour. Early learning enculturation and its following forms come about through acculturation. This acquiring process through groups is in contemporary society a most complex process. From this process one gains stories, attitudes and mores. One's culture is the basic group and the variety of groups the individual encounters in their time-space travel through life. At this point the subjective-objective categories can be transcended and the process is described in monograph-autobiography terms. See Chart III (Appendix I).
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<th>CHART III</th>
<th>Examines</th>
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I have been describing theological freedom in theory and concrete practice, since a flow of reality resists any state definition. This method preserves freedom, hopefully, in terms significant to those cultural settings wherein freedom is being associated with highly hypnotic devices used to condition behaviour.

Freedom, it is suggested, exists in the following thematics:

(a) A drive for meaning that happens strongly in some, potentially in all.

(b) Its appearance guarantees the promise of new horizons.

(c) Horizons come about from the Void existing in culture, a void answering only in terms of ultimacy and depth.

(d) Societal freedom is the mutual sharing, organizing and justifying of these horizons.

CONCLUSIONS: A RETURN TO SKINNER - VI

Originally, the problem of freedom was restricted in the first part of this paper in order to have a centre from which to begin. I now return to that point to make final conclusions from the theories put forth on freedom and culture.

First of all, it seems to me that Skinner represents a serious type of epistemological encapsulation. Many of his statements are most important for the understanding of behaviour, but to turn them into an ideology is dangerous. Process ethics would interpret such an encapsulation as de-humanizing. I believe that Skinner does this because in his
attempt to describe the dynamics of culture he, at the expense of the richness of those dynamics, forces all of societal and cultural change into the limited symbolism of S-R theories. In point of fact Skinner is heavily indoctrinated with the mechanomorphic myth. Skinner feels a breakdown is taking place in contemporary society with the lack of appreciation for mechanistic views, and he responds by returning to the peak of his acculturation -- mechanomorphic conditioning. As a powerful individual who is deeply enmeshed in this myth he makes on an evangelistic mission, preaching the dogma of mechanistic technique to solve the engimas of life. In this way he becomes a high-priest, who knows the true mysteries of human behaviour. As the story of man-centered autonomy grows, Skinner like many others recognizes the weaknesses in this story and reacts with a total proclamation from his process.

Because of this he does not face the limited symbolic value of mechanical myths and ignores the demands within the process of culture for ultimacy and depth. For Skinner, ultimate reality becomes the Utopia of Walden II, and therewith succumbs to the danger of any Utopian who believes the dimensions of time and space are solved when the new Utopia arrives. The limitation of such a stance is made manifest in the affirmation that planning and laws will solve the problem of evil. There are great signs of hope to be found by combining the ethical press for the good and scientific technique. However, these signs of hope ought not obscure the seriousness of the question of evil. There are several ways of speaking to this problem and my preference is in the will to power. Evil expresses itself in the drive for dominance and
control. In straight animal studies this is clearly demonstrated on the level of empirical perception. It becomes especially obvious in that as soon as a small group (five or six) becomes large power structures automatically develop. At present, Dr. Thomas MacFeat from the University of Toronto, School of Anthropology, is researching the inter-dynamics of small group behaviour and political structures. Power and the thirst for it is a reality ethics must take seriously. Skinner, too, easily solves the problem in Walden II: it all depends on early conditioning. Therefore, it must be asked, is there any guarantee that even with well conditioned people who live in a protected culture that the will to become dominant will disappear? As Tillich once pointed out, if the controller is free to control, it must also be presumed that the one being controlled has at least the equal freedom to control.

I would suggest that this longing for power will eventually occur in any culture, and the only check on it is the ethical awareness that the controlled longs to be the controller. A power theory can find a great amount of support in socio-linguistic theories because it is not beyond analysis to see information as a source of power. Information is received by groups that have access to various symbols or individuals exercising a certain mobility within culture. Skinner mentions in his design of culture that the operation will be controlled by well balanced, freely elected technicians of human behaviour. What he overlooks is the acquisition of information to control culture leads
to the gaining of power.* Are we really to believe that even technicians with excellent control of their emotions will not be tempted to rule with their acquisition of information.

These insights concerning information and power become especially significant in light of the apparent over-riding temptation of behaviourists to exercise their power on the basis of their information. In theology, dogmatists are similarly susceptible to this ethical temptation. In both cases the temptation is facilitated by the attempt to employ limited bodies of information for the exhausting explanation of reality. To do this is to improperly use the part to explain the whole. In the process of culture development this leads to an over-centralization of power. Skinner claims that his theories destroy the powersyndrome, but this claim is belied by his development of a system of cultural design which places strong emphasis on the gathering of more and more information. Jacques Ellul in his Treatment of Technological Society has clearly shown how power and information are tied together. And it is just this danger which is one of our major ethical questions, can we handle the power that comes with knowledge.

*Ethicists such as Paul Friere, Reinhold Niebuhr (Moral Man and Immoral Society), Paul Tillich (Love, Power and Justice) build much of their ethical system on man's drive for power. However, it is not only a systematic ethical principle, it is a social process easily recognized and scientifically studied and predicted in a process system that studies human behaviour. I would agree that power is treated in ethics with the same interest as the physical sciences treat energy, i.e., in terms of its components.
Sensitive to the unanswered questions of the anthropocentric myths Skinner exercises his ethical concerns and denies these contemporary myths. Becoming thus a prophet he challenges contemporary society with his book *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*. In point of fact what he has done is de-mythologize present culture. Unfortunately, his challenge is not prophetic enough. It is not founded on ultimacy and depth, but rather returns to his earlier group behaviour, and the past work of Thorndike and Watson. Not unfairly Skinner's challenge to the science of behaviour, could be paralleled to the challenge placed on Orthodox theology. It may be no accident that Skinner's work has been called neo-behaviourism.

Skinner's work on conditioning is extremely important since it sheds a great deal of light on how behaviour is acquired and supported through contingencies and reinforcement in the cultural process. The empirical work on motivation towards positive reinforcement is invaluable to ethical constructs, but encapsulation will destroy it. Skinner becomes a type of behaviourist mystic. There is an all holy power to S-R theories, it is a solution to everything. For in the little box (Skinner box) all mystery is revealed. When reading Walden II one often gets the impression that what is being described is in one sense an advanced primitive religion.

It has not been my intention to do polemics with Skinner for the purpose of denying behaviourism as a school of thought. Rather I suggest that behaviourism is valid if it means certain things, but invalid if it stands for certain erroneous principles. Obviously the erroneous
principles are the denial of freedom and dignity and the radical
scientific emphasis on outer space or the total passivity of man.
Behaviourism, however, is most deserving of attention if it puts forth
its principles in other ways. If it argues that to know behaviour we
need a wider base, e.g., wider than Freudian principles of inner
consciousness, then I agree. A science of human behaviour must have a
base that allows for the overlap of perception and investigation of
several systems. When this base and fundamental axiom is established
a system of behaviour grows that can analyze in terms of a behavioural
theology. The building of this base must be based on the dynamics of
symbolism, the quest for meaning and symbols of the unconscious, and
the recognition that behaviour is always operant within a culture.
Behaviour is a question of culture, human behaviour outside of a culture
has never existed, and cannot exist. All scientific or theological
investigation which ignores this is doomed to encapsulation. Furthermore,
when one defines behaviour as an independent entity abstracted from a
culture, findings will have little application in the real world of
dynamic culture. Freedom is an underlying sensitive flow of questions
and rebellious actions. It is the task of theology to respond to these
questions, and ensure that rebellious action is of the most human type.
A type which also faces the deeper ethical questions of strategy. Even
conditioned people possess an underlying sensitive flow that promises
either growth towards the good or resignation to evil!!
APPENDIX II

BEHAVIOURAL CULTURAL STRUCTURE: Culture as a source of meaning and motivation

ACTS OF ANIMALS

ACTS OF HUMANS

ETHICAL FREEDOM BASED ON Awareness and decision making—nonexistent

Primarily adapts to culture as opposed to design of culture

KEY

B = Behaviour (Human)
B = Behaviour (Animal)
C = Components (General)
S-R = Stimulus-Response
R-E = Symbolic-Receptor-Effect System
D = Drives power needs
S-M = Myth (Story Making)
GR = influence of group culture in formation of behaviour
overlap = Reciprocal interaction
A = Awareness

U.I. = Unconscious Imprint
L = Language Codified
M = Quest for meaning

* = Process predominance in development of behaviour

* = less
** = quite
*** = strongly
**** = extremely

*—question of dominant behaviour factor may vary tremendously given individual cases
APPENDIX III

Suggestions for Further Reading


In many ways Cassirer balances Lonergan. One of the limitations (if that is a proper choice of words) to Lonergan is that he stresses interiority so much that he is inclined to overlook empirical positivistic questions. Cassirer offers a much more positivistic treatment of culture and knowing.


Chapter 3 gives a full treatment of ethics and radical humanistic dialectics.


Included in:

Because of this paper I could develop my fourth factor in a behavioral theological sketch, namely S-M--Storymaking. Unfortunately, Gilkey has never expanded this particular paper into a major work. I used his material in my thesis but in manner somewhat different than Gilkey's theological method. Gilkey is really an historian, however, he has a great talent for summarizing large scale cultural insights. What I have done is to place his research into an empirical construct. Of all my sources I remain most indebted to this work, it was the key.


Again Hartshorne, an empirical philosopher-theologian, provided a process metaphysical vision. It is a theological analysis that draws from reality with a categorical scientific awareness.
His analysis allows one to overcome dualistic concepts as applied to the knowing of behaviour, and he also would defend freedom on the Lonergan and Whiteheadian principle of "sensitive underlying flow". Note: Chapters 3 and 4 "Elements of Truth in the Group-Mind Concept": synthesis of Idealism and Realism.


Beyond a doubt Hesse's most difficult and metaphysical work. In my study of Hesse, especially this book I discovered the same questions of interiority and cognition that Lonergan treats. Hesse is especially helpful in pointing out how the same questions exist in the eastern mind.


The whole method of my behavioural study is based on the technique of Lonergan. It is a combination of empiricism and quest for interiority (highly structured phenomenology); from the problems of interiority (inner consciousness) and the method of scientific consciousness Lonergan offers a new sense of insight, and a concept of mystery founded on complexity and ambiguity.


A work helpful in its simplification and application of Lonergan's Insight. The major contribution of Ascent was the ethical analysis of surface-depth culture.


Royce was extremely helpful as an empiricist (psychologist) who has seriously considered Tillich's theological principle of ultimate concern and meaning. As an empiricist Royce breaks this principle down into its cultural modes of perception, and substantiates his argumentation from Gestalt psychology.


Ethnographic technique was drawn from this work. The final key chart finds its theoretical base in chapter 4 "Cultural Meaning". Much of Spradley's ethnographic technique, however,
was adjusted, since Spradley is of the linguistic analysis school. Nevertheless, his concepts on graphs and data collection do apply to a behavioural study.


It is only because of this book that one even dares to explore the topic of theological anthropology. My method differs from Tillich in that it emphasizes empirical technique, but is not opposed to the ecstasy concept of Tillich (Morality and Beyond).


His study of symbols as organized determinants was used extensively: note chapters 2 and 12. Although my final chart illustrates that I work out of a process model as opposed to determinist's models and paradigms.


This paper is one of the most important works to have appeared in the field of ethics in recent times. It presents ethics in a techno-society as an exercise in asking fundamental questions. Doing this ethics then offers its unique contribution to societal change, and argues that change is ethical when social science and society (i) regains a Sociological Vision (ii) a centrality of praxis (iii) a retrieve of symbolism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


