1970

Some Disparities Between the Mackay Report on “Religion in the Schools” and the Concerns of Today’s Youth

John McMurray

Wilfrid Laurier University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/etd

Part of the Christianity Commons

Recommended Citation


http://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1553

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
SOME DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE MACKAY REPORT ON
"RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS" AND THE CONCERNS OF
TODAY'S YOUTH

by

JOHN McMURRAY

A Thesis submitted to the faculty in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF DIVINITY
from Waterloo Lutheran Seminary
Waterloo Lutheran University, Waterloo, Ontario
October 1970

Readers: Prof. Delton J. Glebe
Prof. Eduard R. Riegert
The Rev. Vernon Crommiller
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter I</strong></td>
<td><strong>YOUTH TODAY</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who are They?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where are They?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are We Trying to do With Them?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are their Concerns?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter II</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT COURSE</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reasons Why the Present Course is Unsatisfactory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter III</strong></td>
<td><strong>CHOOSING FROM AMONG ALTERNATIVES</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Looking at Some Alternatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A New Approach is Needed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter IV</strong></td>
<td><strong>SOME REACTIONS TO THE REPORT</strong></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Roman Catholic Church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Jewish Faith</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Protestant Church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter V</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY OF THE REPORT</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter VI</strong></td>
<td><strong>SOME DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE MACKAY REPORT AND THE CONCERNS OF YOUTH TODAY</strong></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter VII</strong></td>
<td><strong>PROPOSED DIRECTIONS FOR A &quot;PROGRAM&quot; OF RELIGIOUS INFORMATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

In March 1969, the Mackay Committee published its Report on Religious Information and Moral Development. This Report was the result of a three-year study by the Mackay Committee on the state of religious education in the public schools of Ontario. Its purpose was to recommend a "program" of religious information and moral development which would meet the needs of youth in a pluralistic school system as they seek to live responsible lives in today's world.

This thesis contends that there are some disparities between the Mackay Report and the concerns of youth today. Its particular stance has been shaped by the writings of Strommen, Tillich, Keniston, Erikson, and May, and from personal involvement with youth in church-related young people's work. It believes that youth have concerns which have deep religious roots, and that the needs of youth will not have been met until they have been provided with a religious interpretation of life. It is convinced that the Mackay Report will fail in its attempt to provide a dynamic "program" of religious information and moral development for our schools because it lacks an understanding of the real "felt-needs" of young people today.

In order to show the disparities between the Mackay Report and the concerns of youth today, this thesis will consider the needs of youth as they are mirrored in contemporary writing; see how these concerns are reflected in the Mackay Report; and present an outline of a "program" of religious information and moral development which will provide a religious
interpretation of life and meet the "felt-needs" of youth in our public school system.

The thesis is indebted to many sources for ideas and insights, especially the writings of Paul Tillich, Merton Strommen, Kenneth Keniston, Erik Erikson, and the Ontario Inter-Church Committee on Public Education. The faculty of Waterloo Lutheran Seminary have offered helpful suggestions and advice during the writing of the thesis, especially Dr. Delton J. Glebe and Dr. Eduard R. Riegert, without whose support and experienced counsel the thesis would not have reached its final form.
CHAPTER I

YOUTH TODAY

In this section, our purpose is not to provide a psychology of youth, nor yet to furnish a full-blown picture of the milieu in which they are called upon to live their lives. What we shall do is consider, in layman's language, who our youth are, where they are, what we are trying to do with them in terms of the educative process, and finally, what their concerns are in the light of studies by Strommen and Keniston.

Firstly, let us consider who our youth are. Those who work with young people today should have a practical, working theory of personality development to help them understand the various phases young people pass through as they move towards "maturity". Maier, in his book, *Three Theories of Child Development*, presents the theories of Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget, and Robert Sears, and their application to personality development. Basic to this thesis is the understanding that any concept of human development should take into account the contributions of Erikson, Piaget, and Sears. Maier shows that each theory deals with a separate aspect of development: emotional, intellectual, and behavioural. He views them as an "associated frame of reference on child development." He sees them as dealing with "distinctly separate but complementary approaches to personality development." Each part contributes to an understanding of the individual as an indivisible whole. Each interlocks, cogwheel fashion, with the others, while the sequential phases of development within its own conceptual framework remain
undisturbed. 1

It is important for us to reproduce Table 5.1 on page 211 of Maier's book:

Table 5.1: A Comparison of the Three Theories' Developmental Phases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (Years)</th>
<th>Erikson</th>
<th>Piaget</th>
<th>Sears</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Phase I: A Sense of Basic Trust</td>
<td>Sensorimotor Phase</td>
<td>Phase of Rudimentary Behaviour</td>
<td>Phase I: Establishing Primary Dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Phase III: A Sense of Initiative</td>
<td>Phasic of Intuitive Thought</td>
<td>Integration Phase Is Establishing Primary Dependence</td>
<td>Phase III: Establishing Meaningful Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Phase V: A Sense of Identity</td>
<td>Phase of Formal Operations</td>
<td>Little Research done by Sears thus far</td>
<td>Phase V: Achieving Social Dependence and Individual Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Phase VI: A Sense of Intimacy</td>
<td>Not Investigated by Piaget</td>
<td>Adulthood</td>
<td>Phase Phases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have reproduced this diagram because it not only outlines the theories of Erikson, Piaget, and Sears, it also provides us with Maier's own "synthesis" under the column "Integration". Maier's concern in this book is with those who "work with Children" in the "helping process."

This "synthesis" -- this "amalgamation of the three perspectives" will provide "applicable generalizations for practice" for those who are involved in the "helping process."

While Maier sees that the "helping professional must decide at some point in his diagnostic treatment work whether he is to deal basically with effective, cognitive, or behavioral aspects of development, and therefore, to which developmental processes he has primarily to relate himself", yet he realizes that it "is necessary to consider all three dimensions of human functioning when helping a child with his development or diagnosing and treating a developmental problem." "Each theory," he says, "obtains a partial, and, consequently, varying answer concerning the child's development; but the child, if he is to be helped toward successful and social development, must be viewed in light of his total development." He contends that the "pursuit of helping activities based upon any single theory would thus be incomplete as an approach." He concludes that the "tendency, therefore, of one theory to supplement the other by far outweighs all existing and residual conflicts noted in this chapter."

Maier's theory appeals to us as sound because (i) it is concerned with the "whole child"; and (ii) when applied educationally it results in a concept of education that includes the affective, cognitive, and behavioral aspects of a child's development as valid learning experiences.

Raths, et al., in Values and Teaching, gives us the analogy of a
giant continuum with people standing at various points along it, some in cluster, some alone, some in motion, and some immobile. Above the heads of the people is a sign with the words, CLARITY OF RELATIONSHIP TO SOCIETY. At one end of the continuum is a sign that says "CLEAR". At the other end is another sign which says "UNCLEAR". The people at the end marked "CLEAR" know where they are going; they are positive, purposeful, enthusiastic, and proud. At the other end, marked "UNCLEAR", the people do not seem to be clear about how to relate to the things and people around them. Some are apathetic; others are flighty; some are uncertain; some are very inconsistent; others are drifters; a large number are over-conformers; some are overdissenters; and some are role-players. This analogy has relevance for us because it gives us a sketch of what some of our youth are like today.

Kenneth Keniston's two books, The Uncommitted, and The Young Radicals, round out the picture for us. In 1965, the first of the two, The Uncommitted -- a study of alienated youth in American society -- was published. This book is important for our study because it provides us with insights into the lives of a certain section of youth who are at one end of Rath's et al., continuum.

"Alienation," Keniston tells us, "besets youth most heavily." It is a way of life -- an explicit rejection of the values and outlook of American culture. Rather than deplore alienation, he argues, we must try to "understand its origin, to search out the factors in individual life, social progress, and cultural history which underlie it; and we must ask, finally, whether alienation might not be applauded rather than deplored."
Alienation, according to Keniston's study, starts from a group of alienated individuals -- young men who reject what they see as the dominant values, roles, and institutions of their society. Such a rejection of society takes many forms, but, in terms of the students involved in Keniston's study, their rejection was primarily ideological. The young men, he tells us, were not delinquents, psychotics, or revolutionaries. They were merely deeply disaffected young men.

The components of an alienated ideology are easily identifiable: mistrust of any and all commitments -- people, groups, culture, self; life is full of misery and pain; the universe is empty and meaningless; a prevailing sense of powerlessness. Alienated youth lack the "courage to be." "Why sweat about what we can't control," they say, "or even explain.... No God, no determination anyway -- the universe seems dead. Not friendly, not unfriendly, not fighting or not helping. It sits and man works, and he doesn't realize his plight in the face of this fantastic joke, but, he has to go on." While the manifestations of an alienated ideology are to be seen in several contexts -- rejection of American society; rejection of active political and social involvements; no feeling of relationship with American society as a whole -- what unifies it is a generalised refusal of American culture which goes beyond matters of philosophy and belief, and extends deep into the personal lives of these youths.²

Keniston's study shows that alienated youth (1) focus on the present. They consider the past as irrelevant, and are pessimistic about

the future; (ii) they lack identity. They experience themselves as diffused, fragmented, torn in different directions by inner and outer pulls; (iii) they "idealize" the past. That is, they seek to find the dependency, the intimacy of childhood in adulthood; and (iv) they yearn for absolutes. They search for positive values but their inability to find them is related to their distrust of commitment. These four factors which comprise the major themes of alienation amount to a refusal of adulthood.

Keniston shows that alienated youth come from a group of "unalienated" young people who show in their youth culture comparable themes to those found among the alienated: (i) a preoccupation with the present; (ii) a concern with the search for identity; (iii) many symptoms of continuing problems of despondency; (iv) a quest for positive values which aborts in private commitment; and (v) a preoccupation with the ego demands of our technological society.⁴

Is alienation to be applauded or deplored? Keniston thinks that alienation can be "therapeutic": (i) it may point more to a society that needs a restraint than to an individual in need of therapy; and (ii) an explicit alienation can at times lead to a greater involvement with the public world -- to an "alienated commitment." But Keniston shows that alienation usually takes private and self-insulting forms -- scorn for politics; a feeling of social powerlessness, with withdrawal in face of the complexity of the modern world. "What is missing in the alienation of youths," he says, "is any radical criticism of our society or any revaluatory alternative to the status-quo."⁴

^Ibid., p.403.
⁴Ibid., p.419.
This feeling of powerlessness which afflicts alienated young people was evident in the lives of those young people involved in the Berkley incident. In *Psychology and the Human Dilemma*, Rollo May contends that modern man has lost his significance as an individual in the face of today's technological society. He refers to the "problem of identity" which was brought out clearly in the writings of Erikson and Wheelis in the 1950's. This "problem of identity" in the 1950's, he contends, has now become "the crisis of the loss of the sense of significance." As an example of this he cites the incident which took place on the Berkley campus of the University of California. The students were in the grip of a "mechanical moloch of education" which threatened to devour them. They were being treated as "anonymous cogs" in the wheels of an impersonal educational system. They wanted to be treated as "persons" and not as "things". This "mechanical moloch" dwarfed them into insignificance. So they "revolted". May sees the "revolt" as a "welling up of students of profound and powerful resistance" against the "powerlessness of students in the modern factory university."

This incident has significance for us, because many of our students are suffering under the same impersonal system in our society today. They experience the same sense of powerlessness and insignificance as did the students on the Berkley campus.

In 1968 Keniston's book, *The Young Radicals*, was published. It was written as a result of an encounter with young radicals who were involved in the now famous Vietnam Summer Project. The total group on whom Keniston's observations were based numbered fourteen. Their ages ranged

---

from nineteen to twenty-nine.

Keniston suggests that student dissenters generally fall into two types: (i) the political activist or protester; and (ii) the withdrawn, culturally alienated student. On page 345 f. he contrasts the young radicals who led Vietnam Summer with the group of alienated students on whom *The Uncommitted* was based. The following diagram will show some of the differences between these two groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alienated Youth (Committed)</th>
<th>Radicals (Committed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Uncommitted to any social or political endeavours, but have commitments in terms of aesthetic, artistic endeavours.</td>
<td>Committed to social, political, and interpersonal endeavours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Preference for withdrawal or introspective encapsulation</td>
<td>Prefer action and change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pessimistic about the possibilities of affecting social changes.</td>
<td>Optimistic about the possibilities of meaningful social change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Planted in the present; the past is dark; the future is unpredictable.</td>
<td>Continuity with personal and cultural pasts; open -- &quot;in motion&quot; -- to future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Anti-equalitarian; anti-idealistic; situationists.</td>
<td>Equalitarian; idealistic -- accept set of basic moral values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ego-centric.</td>
<td>Interested in serving others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above chart shows us the differences between alienated youth and young radicals, and at the same time, provides us with a sketch of the anatomy of a radical. An understanding of both the "committed" and
the "uncommitted" is important to fill out the picture of the youth who attend our school system.

Secondly, we shall consider where youth are. The purpose here is not to draw a graphic picture of the society in which our young people live, but rather to indicate the impact that society has upon them, and to show the forces at work within society which make it difficult for our young people to develop a valid value system.

In Chapter 2 of *Values and Teaching*, Raths, et al., show how difficult it is for young people today to develop clear values compared to what it was like for young people at the turn of the century. Among the factors contributing to the confusion they list the following: (i) the changes in family life: working mothers, the breakdown in family relationships, the lack of knowledge in terms of the nature of the father's employment, the moving population, the home a refuge from the world; (ii) the impact of the communications media: the telephone, radio, motion pictures, T.V., comics, newspapers; (iii) the impact of the automobile: families are on the move; (iv) the breakdown in community life with its attendant pressures; (v) the wane of the Church's influence; (vi) World events: war, the atom bomb, famine; (vii) pluralism: to avoid controversy, religion and morality have been dropped from school curricula; (viii) duplicity -- "might is as important as right"; (ix) individualism is encouraged, but then youth are told to "play it safe"; (x) the accent on "things"; (xi) the weakening of the authority of parents; (xii) unemployment and poverty; and (xiii) the standardized role of parents -- "to tell children things" instead of helping them to find some order amid all confusing and conflicting values.
Raths, et al., argue that because of all these factors it is increasingly difficult for children today to develop clear values of their own. How is the child to know what to believe? Raths et al., then go on to ask how all of this affects the behaviour of children; in what ways it shows up, in how they think, and how they react; how they plan and how they dream; and the implications it has for teachers. They feel that by introducing a "process of valuing" into the classroom, children will be able to learn about themselves and about how to make some sense out of the buzzing confusion of the society around them.\(^6\)

Our purpose here has not been to present a critique of the value theory of Raths, et al., but, rather to show where our young people are and to come to some understanding of those forces in society which make it increasingly difficult for them to formulate clear positive values.

Thirdly, let us consider what we are trying to do with the youth. In some church circles there is a great deal of confusion concerning the Church's Raison d'etre. The question is particularly valid in terms of young people's work. What is the Church trying to do with young people anyway? Unfortunately, some try to make Presbyterians out of them, or Methodists, or "Holy Willies", or "Little Christs". We try to force dogma upon our young people and then wonder why they rebel and refuse to conform to the Church's image of a young Christian. Again, we have been guilty of "talking down" to young people. We treat them as little children instead of accepting them for what they are -- young people who have imagination, initiative, creativity, and who can assume responsibility.

We need to realize that Christian young people are not the concern of the Church; they are the Church concerned. Indeed, youth can minister in certain situations where adults cannot minister. For instance, the Church needs youth to be the Christian witness among their peers. In certain areas in life, youth are strategically placed for mission. In a real sense, youth is the Church in high schools. The Church's ministry to youth then must be in terms of "to, in behalf of, with, and by, youth." And what is the purpose of that ministry? Is it to make youth conform to a denominational image? No! It is to support them in their efforts to live responsible lives in today's world. Now the Church may rightly argue that in order for young people to live responsibly today they must give allegiance to "Someone beyond themselves." That may be true, but the Church must never forget that youth, as well as adults, are faced with the tension of trying to live responsibly and freely in what Marshall McLuhan has called the "electronic age." If the Church adopts a "backward stance" towards young peoples' work, and neglects to prepare them to live their lives "now", in today's world, then either she will lose her young people altogether, or they will be "so heavenly-minded", they will be "no earthly use."

In our educational system -- at least as far as we understand the Mackay Report -- it seems we are trying to make "intellectual robots" out of our young people. That is, we propose to train them to reason morally, justly, unemotionally, and then assume that when faced with problems -- and some of them will be highly charged with emotion -- they will be able

---

to resolve them calmly by going through certain mental processes. This system is bound to fail because it is totally unrelated to life. It is to live in the "world of ideas" and not in the "world of relationships" where most human beings are. Our educational system needs to recognize that all problems have religious roots, and that only as youth are "grasped by an Ultimate Concern" can they respond positively to all of life and to all of its problems.

Both the Church and our educational system need to redefine their purpose in terms of youth. Both need to have a genuine concern for the "whole person." Both need to take seriously that their *raison d'être* in terms of young people is to assist them and support them in their efforts to live responsibly in today's world. This has far-reaching implications for both Church and education. To put it simply: it means that our youth will have to be trained socially and theologically in order to live responsibly.

Finally, we shall consider the concerns of the youth today. This consideration is based on a study done by Merton Strommen for the Lutheran Youth Research Division of the Lutheran Church in America. Dr. Strommen's book, *Profiles of Youth* is the official Report of a four-year study of Lutheran youth which began in 1958 and was completed in 1962. The study was sponsored by the Youth Boards of the following Lutheran churches:

- American Lutheran;
- Evangelical Lutheran;
- Lutheran Free;
- United Evangelical Lutheran;
- Augustana Synod;
- Missouri Synod.

The Report is divided into five sections: Section I orients the reader to such background information as the philosophy underlying the study, the instrument used, and the people under study; Section II presents
the general characteristics of Lutheran youth; Section III -- which is our main concern -- describes the problems of Lutheran youth as found in the major areas of concern; Section IV sums up the findings and indicates where help is needed; and Section V gives a complete account of the procedures used in the research.

The purpose of the study was to discover the "felt needs" -- the concerns of -- Lutheran youth in North America. The knowledge of what troubles youth would make it possible for church boards to develop a more sensitive and valid ministry to youth.

In order to determine how youth think, feel, and react two methods were used. The first was a projective device known as a sentence completion technique. This was used because it facilitated free response. Those concerns which appeared frequently in the questionnaires were added to an "item pool" which later became the Lutheran Youth Inventory (LYI). The second method involved an inventory approach in which 240 problem items drawn from the "item pool" were used. These items enabled the young people to express their concerns.

Three basic assumptions underlay this study; (i) that young people can be insightful and their report valid; (ii) that adolescent psychodynamics are evidenced in specific problems and that these problems, as symptomatic evidence, tend to cluster around specific concerns; and (iii) that a knowledge of youth's concerns is important to an effective youth ministry. From these assumptions, and a series of statistical analyses, it was possible to compile a list of youth concerns. It was

---

found that the 240 seemingly unrelated problems found 18 clusters of items which divided into families identifying seven major areas of concern. These areas of concern provide a framework of categories within which the concerns of Lutheran youth can be understood.

The LYR study has validity for this thesis because: (i) a competent study of the concerns of youth today was needed to compare with the concerns of youth as expressed in the Mackay Report. The LYR study was selected because it is the most comprehensive study of youth in which careful attention has been given to standards of psychological and sociological research; (ii) it is unbiased. Its data was analyzed by a variety of research methods to ensure complete fairness of analysis; (iii) it grew out of a concern of young people themselves; and (iv) it is fairly representative of young people in North America. According to the study, the "majority of them seem to fit the pattern of the average American undistinguished by class, colour, or creed." Further, Canadians were involved in the study. While the findings of the LYR inventory may not be applied holus bolus to young people in Ontario, the thesis contends that the concerns as expressed in the study reflect to a large degree the concerns of youth in our province.

The first concern of Lutheran youth as expressed in the study, is that of Family Relationships. This area of concern ranks lowest in troublesomeness to Lutheran youth although adults tend to exaggerate it. There are four subscale areas: (i) a troubled awareness over family disunity; (ii) a worry over a lack of family spiritual growth; (iii) irritation

---

9 Ibid., p.47
10 Ibid. This section outlines the concerns of Lutheran youth as listed in Profiles of Church Youth.
over autocratic parental behaviour; and (iv) an anxious concern over feelings of guilt regarding poor family relationships.

Secondly, there was a concern in terms of boy-girl relationships. In this area, problems clustered around concerns over: (i) feelings of guilt over present dating behaviour; (ii) worry about finding the right marriage partner; and (iii) anxiety over the disparity between the ideal held by the Church and the experiences of real life.

A third area of concern was personal faith. In this area there were two subscales: (i) Spiritual doubt; and (ii) Religious uncertainty. In a cluster analysis they grouped together in a way that showed this problem is one of the most troubling to youth.

Fourthly, there was a concern regarding self-acceptance. The three subscales in this area show that Lutheran youth are troubled by: (i) Inadequacy feelings; (ii) Academic problems; and (iii) Social relationships.

Related to Self-acceptance was a concern for acceptance by others. Youth seem to worry over: (i) Acceptance by teachers; and (ii) Acceptance by their peer group.

Conflict of Standards is another concern of youth. In terms of actual behaviour youth are keenly aware of a conflict between what they believe is wrong and what they feel drawn to do. Dating experiences provide the setting within which these conflicts arise. In this area there are four subscales: (i) Duty and morals; (ii) Dating and the Church; (iii) Peer acceptance; and (iv) Judgment of the Peer Group. The first three have been already dealt with in other areas.

The study also showed that youth were concerned with morality.
This area deals with problems relating to emotional involvement in questionable and unethical activities, e.g., sins of speech, drinking liquor, sex, etc.

Finally, under miscellani, we mention concerns which cannot be classified under any of the major scales. The concerns are as follows: (i) Feelings of guilt arising out of a sense of having violated certain moral values; (ii) Critical attitudes towards congregational adults over their failure to live up to high standards and ideals; and (iii) A feeling of inadequacy in terms of Christian witness.

In this chapter we have considered the concerns of youth as expressed by Strommen's study and other contemporary writings. In the light of this we must ask if these concerns are reflected in the Mackay Report. To answer that question we shall have to look critically at the Mackay Report in terms of some of its major concepts.
CHAPTER II

THE INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT COURSE

For some years now there has been a great deal of concern on the part of educators, clergy, teachers, and parents, with regard to the teaching of religion in our school system. Their concern is well-founded because the present course of studies in religion which is being taught in our schools leaves much to be desired. Since the 1800's, the subject of religious instruction in the public schools of Ontario has been a source of political and religious controversy. Since the inception of the present course in 1944, complaints expressing dissatisfaction with it have been registered with the Department of Education. The result being that, in 1966, the Minister of Education commissioned the Mackay Committee to study the subject in considerable detail.

The Committee had as its chairman a distinguished gentleman, the late Honourable J. Keiller Mackay, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Ontario, and formerly Lieutenant-governor of Ontario. Mary Q. Innis, former Dean of Women of the University of Toronto, was Vice-Chairman. The other members of the Committee consisted of a County Judge, three Queen's Counselors, and an author.

The Committee met regularly beginning January 1966, until the completion and publication of the Report in March 1969. In an attempt to be as comprehensive as possible, the Committee received and reviewed 141 briefs (105 of them were presented in public hearings in centres throughout Ontario); read letters from persons and organizations setting
forth their points of view; and called in a number of consultants to join
with the members of the Committee in their discussions. Committee mem-
bers also made visits to various centres for the purpose of observing
experiments and securing information concerning new trends in religious
education.

The Report is divided into five chapters. Chapter One deals with
the historical background of religious education in the public schools of
Ontario, the other Provinces of Canada, Great Britain, and the United
States. Chapter Two outlines the present course of study. Chapter
Three discusses the program recommended by the Committee and its imple-
mentation. Chapter Four deals with the professional development of
teachers in both elementary and secondary schools. And Chapter Five
summarizes the major recommendations of the Report.

"The present course is inadequate." This statement reflects the
thinking, not only of the Mackay Committee, but also of a large number of
Christian educators and clergy who have been saying the same thing for a
number of years now. A study of the Report will show that it contains
contradictions, inconsistencies, and inadequacies. Nevertheless, it does
offer some positive points in terms of developing an adequate program of
religious instruction for use in our public schools.

Why did the Committee reject the present course of study?

For one thing, the Committee contends that the present course is
too subjective.

The present course of studies in religious education has
failed ... It does not provide for the objective exam-
ination of evidence, nor stimulate the inquiring mind; it
does not teach children to think for themselves either
about the facts of religion or about ethical matters.
Instead, it presents Bible stories and religious ideas which may have little relation to the daily life of children, and it sometimes does so in terms that are offensive to many.11

Implicit here is the idea that subjectivity leads to indoctrination. According to the Committee, indoctrination is to be lodged with the church, synagogue, and home. Can one be totally objective in teaching any subject? Does subjectivity necessarily imply indoctrination or authoritarianism?

Secondly, the Committee considers the present course sectarian. The material provided for teachers was labelled as "definitely Christian and Protestant" in content. Such content is a "vehicle leading to religious commitment rather than to true education." 12 Thus, children from different cultural and religious backgrounds are exposed to Christian indoctrination. Pupils may come to believe that "all the high principles and ethics on which our society is founded are exclusive to Christianity." 13 Religions other than Christianity are made to appear inferior. All non-Christians are considered to be unenlightened persons.

The Committee is on solid ground when it criticizes the present course as being sectarian and exclusive. In a pluralistic school system, Christianity has no right to lay claim to exclusiveness. It must be prepared to be studied on a comparative basis with other world religions.

---


12 Ibid., p.21.

13 Ibid., p.22.
Christians may claim that God has revealed himself supremely in Jesus of Nazareth. But they cannot go on to say that God has not revealed, and cannot still reveal, himself to men through the teachings, events, and experiences of men and women of other religious persuasions. This idea that God can communicate to men through "non-Christian" religions is basic to Paul Tillich's thought in his book, *The Future of Religions*. One may say that non-Christians are without the unique revelation of God in Jesus Christ, but this does not mean that all non-Christians are beyond the pale of salvation.

Thirdly, the Committee rejected the present course because it considers it to be irrelevant. It is irrelevant, for one thing, because it fails to encourage young people to take seriously the social implications of religion. With its emphasis on Bible stories and moralisms it has a tendency to appeal to one part of the person, namely, the soul. It thus fragments the "whole person". The social thrust of the gospel is absent. Children who imbibe the pat moralisms of the present course are in danger of becoming "so heavenly minded they are no earthly use."

The present course is also irrelevant theologically. It concentrates more on the memorization of stories from the Old and New Testaments. At its best, it teaches nice little moralisms. There is no grappling with the real issues of human life and existence.

Educationally, the present course leaves much to be desired. It does not meet the standards of modern education. It is a non-credit course which is added to the curriculum. The Committee is to be commended for recommending a "program" of religious instruction which will pervade the whole curriculum from Kindergarten to Grade XIII.
The methodology employed in teaching religious education in our schools today is left (i) to the teacher who feels incompetent to teach religion. This feeling of incompetence is largely a reflection on the inadequacy of the courses in religious education given in our teacher-training colleges by professional clergy who have been known to utilize the time to give instruction in denominationalism; (ii) to the clergy, some of whom have been guilty of disregarding the recommended text books and of using their own courses of study. In most cases the deductive method is used. Many of those who teach religious instruction in our schools know nothing at all about the inductive approach in teaching. Anyone who has taught the present course in our public school system is aware of the dangers involved. The door is wide open for indoctrination.

Finally, because the present course is largely "Christian and Protestant" in content, divisiveness takes place. Students from different religious backgrounds exempt themselves from classes in religious instruction, and thus, are denied the right to have the benefits of a religious education.

These then are the main reasons why the Mackay Committee rejected the present course of study in religious education. We shall now proceed, in the next section, to look at the alternatives before the Committee, and then to consider the "new approach" to religious education as enunciated by the Committee in its recommendations.
CHAPTER III

CHOOSING FROM AMONG ALTERNATIVES

Having rejected the present course of study as unsatisfactory, the Committee began looking at alternatives. One alternative was to modify the present course to make it less offensive. It would include less intensive study of other major religions and could be up-dated by introducing more real-life situations. But this approach would still favour Christianity and could still lead to discrimination. Therefore, the proposal was rejected because (i) the manuals, although revised, are still objectionable to many; (ii) the teachers, although better informed, are still inadequately prepared; (iii) the course itself is only haphazardly integrated into the curriculum; (iv) the course is discriminatory; and (v) it invades the integrity of public education. The Committee wisely ruled that the present course of study could not be modified satisfactorily to meet the needs of children in a pluralistic school system.

Several other alternatives were open to the Committee. One alternative was that religious education should be taught by specialist teachers or clergymen and that such instruction should be postponed to the later grades of elementary schools. Another proposal was the complete elimination of religious instruction from the curriculum. Some favoured denominational schools. Others spoke in terms of "released

time" as an alternative. A further proposal was made that a course in morals and ethics should be made optional with the course in religious instruction. In the end, the Committee rejected these proposals because (i) they were incompatible with the basic principles of good education; (ii) they would promote dissension in the community; (iii) they would engender sectarian pressures among groups; and (iv) they would continue to create embarrassment for children who would not participate in the program. 15

One other alternative which was open to the Mackay Committee and which we shall consider briefly here is commonly known as The Kentucky Movement. This movement began in Kentucky just after the end of World War II. After several years of planning, classroom testing and experimentation, a program of moral and spiritual development evolved which has been used with success in the classrooms of the schools in Kentucky.

The Mackay Committee was undoubtedly impressed with what was taking place in Kentucky and in its Report notes the parallels between its own recommended program and the Kentucky Movement curriculum. Both are "avowedly programs of emphasis, both seek to exploit every learning in the curriculum and outside the curriculum in order to further their objectives." 16 It also notes the differences between the two programs: "the Kentucky Movement dedicates itself to the 'moral and spiritual' development of the child, whereas our program claims to be concerned primarily with the development of the young person's ability to reason

15 Ibid., p.27.
16 Ibid., pp.56-57.
moral, i.e., justly."\textsuperscript{17}

The Committee was concerned with and wished to de-emphasize the role of "behaviour and its apparent over-reliance on the influence of the peer-group to motivate conformity, and even excellence." The chief attraction of the movement to the Mackay Committee has been its "approach, and particularly its conception of moral education pervading the whole curriculum as a program of emphasis rather than of specific content."\textsuperscript{18}

It is important here to mention the British Report. The Mackay Committee briefly outlines the history of religious education in Great Britain since 1944 to the time the Mackay Committee met to deliberate and to make its recommendations. By 1964, there was widespread dissatisfaction with religious teaching in the schools in England and as a result, committees were set up and surveys were carried out in an effort to assess the results of religious education in the schools and to suggest new approaches and procedures.

One such study was appointed by the British Council of Churches in 1964. Mr. Colin Alves was chairman of the special committee appointed by the BCC. In 1968, he compiled a report of the findings of that committee and this was published in the same year by the S.C.M. Press Ltd., of London, England.\textsuperscript{19} We introduce it here because of the importance of the "new approach" to teaching that Mr. Alves recommends.

As a result of this study, Alves concluded that although there is

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p.57.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p.58.

more than enough evidence to justify the continuation of religious education in the schools in England, "we owe it to pupils and parents alike that the subject should be 'brought over properly', and that 'the teacher in the class should be a bit more modern.'"20

How was this "new approach" to be effected? Alves' thesis is very simple: Whereas, in the past, the teacher started with the Bible and moved out to present experiences, Alves recommends that the teacher start with the "experiences of the immediate present", and begin to "build up comparisons and contrasts, continuities and discontinuities with events and experiences in the past . . . the encounter with the historic past then becomes the meeting with meaning whenever a relationship with the present experience is recognized . . . faith becomes real not through amassing and mastering any quantity of so-called facts of history, but rather through fostering the quest for meaning out of present experiences so that through the meeting life may be quickened and meaning revealed."21

While the Mackay Committee would reject the system of religious education as enunciated by Alves in his report because (i) it is a course and not a "program"; (ii) the content is exclusively Christian and Protestant; and (iii) it could lead to discrimination in a pluralistic society such as we have in Ontario, yet it would do well to consider Alves "new approach" -- that is, the teacher should "start with the experiences of the immediate present" of the pupil, and "foster the quest for meaning out of present experiences", so that life, for the student,

20Ibid., p.152.
21Ibid., pp.158-9.
may be "quickened and meaning revealed."\textsuperscript{22}

We feel it is necessary to mention the Chateauguay experiment; although it is not mentioned in the Report, it seems reasonable to assume that the Mackay Committee was not unaware of it. In 1967, a non-credit course in Moral and Social Development (MSD) was offered to English Protestant students in the schools in Chateauguay, Quebec. The course has had a measure of success and is still being used, in its revised form, in several schools throughout Quebec. One important feature, which is important for our study, is its emphasis on discussion and enquiry.

The Chateauguay curriculum could have been a viable alternative to the Mackay Committee had it been developed further with the help of "specialists": the developmental psychologist, the literary critic, the sociologist, the theologian, the Biblical historian, and the educator. Certain factors would make it unacceptable to the Mackay Committee: (i) it was written specifically for high school students; (ii) it is a course and not a "program"; and (iii) it was produced for, and presumably by, Protestant Christians.\textsuperscript{23}

These, then, are some of the alternatives which were open to the Mackay Committee, but for reasons which appeared valid to the Committee, it was decided that a totally new approach was needed to resolve the problem of teaching religious education in our public school system.

This "new approach" has been dubbed Religious Information and Moral Development. The first objective of the Committee is to diffuse a

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., Cf. pp.158-9

\textsuperscript{23}Cf. Teaching Religion in Public Education, a Four-Way Consultation of Teacher Training in Religion, sponsored by the Ontario Inter-Church Committee on Public Education, Port Credit, Ontario, October 22, 1968, pp.28-29.
program of religious information throughout the public school system from Kindergarten to Grade XIII. The Committee recognizes that a "general knowledge of religion is necessary to form a well-educated person", but distinguishes between "religion as a subject for study and religion as a manifestation of faith." The presupposition here is that a study "about" religion is objective, whereas, a study "of" religion is subjective and can lead to indoctrination. We reject this presupposition as invalid and shall give our reasons later.

The second objective of the Committee is that of moral development. The underlying presupposition is that the student is to be taught "how" to think, not "what" to think. The basic idea is to "stimulate moral reasoning rather than to inculcate moral absolutes." Later, we shall consider the Committee's understanding of the meaning of moral education and the means whereby it hopes to achieve its objective. We shall conclude that its concept of moral development is inadequate because it is not designed to enable the student to come to grips with the issues and concerns confronting youth today.

In this section we shall consider some of the "basic ingredients" of the "new approach" under several headings with a view to determining to what degree, if any, these reflect the concerns of youth today.

The first thing we shall deal with is the matter of opening exercises. The Committee sought to evaluate this matter particularly in relation to the conclusion that there should be no religious indoctrination in the public school system. For elementary schools these exercises should consist of a "national anthem and a prayer, either of universal character appealing to God for help in the day's activities, or the Lord's
Prayer, and should be held in the home rooms each morning." For secondary schools they should be held at the beginning of any student assembly but not daily in the classroom.

The Committee wishes to retain these opening exercises in their abbreviated form for the following reasons: (i) their absence would suggest irreligion on the part of the people; (ii) to 'condition' the students for the rest of the day; (iii) to prepare students for state functions later in life; and (iv) to help students "acquire respect for their country, for their school, for their work, and for the beliefs of all people." 24

In the light of this we must ask, Who is this "God" to whom our students are encouraged to pray? Does praying not imply commitment? It seems that the Committee has departed from its professed stance of non-commitment to a particular view of God.

The second thing we shall deal with under this heading is content. The particular content is to be communicated to the student through a "program" instead of a course. In terms of religious information the content would be infused into literature and other appropriate courses throughout the curriculum from Kindergarten to Grade XIII. The Committee has recommended that the present course of study be replaced by such a "program". It would show the way in which political, social, and artistic developments have occurred through the influence of religious institutions. This information should be furnished "incidentally", objectively, and without giving undue emphasis to any one particular

religious institution. Selected stories from both Old and New Testaments would be included, not as religious material, but in the same manner as other works of art and literature which have enriched and ennobled our culture. Bible stories are to be included for their literary worth and not to be used as a basis for indoctrinating the students.

The Committee has recommended a "formal" course in world religions for Grades XI and XII. This course would be optional and would be taught by members of the history departments of our secondary schools. It would involve the systematic and detailed study of the religions of the world and would allow students to study them in far more depth than would be possible in the "program" of religious information offered in the elementary grades.

In terms of the development of persons, the MacKay Committee has recommended a "program" and not a formal course. The Committee was charged with a two-fold responsibility: (i) Evaluating the present course in religious education; as a result it has recommended a "program" in which religious information will be diffused throughout the curriculum from Kindergarten to Grade XIII; and (ii) studying the "means by which character, ethics, social attitudes, moral values, and principles might best be instilled in the young." As a result of their study the Committee has recommended a "program" of moral development which will pervade every curricular and extra-curricular activity from Kindergarten to Grade XIII. The purpose of the program is to foster the student's growing ability to make moral decisions.

What is the rationale behind the Committee's thinking in recommending such a "program"? The answer is to be found in certain presuppositions:

---

25 Ibid., p.41.
(i) there is confusion today in the minds of both experts and laity concerning the meaning of morality; (ii) morality is relative and not a set of absolutes; (iii) the child is a "situationist" and; (iv) there is a correlation between intellectual maturity and moral maturity.

The Committee, aware of the disagreements existing among the leading schools of developmental psychology, nevertheless states that:

The conclusions at which we have arrived concerning the role and purpose of moral education in our public schools are thus in no sense merely the product of our collective intuition. Rather, they are brought forward as a practical synthesis of the ideas of others, including those who have undertaken the principal investigations in this important but controversial area.26

In view of the contradictory views held by developmental psychologists, we must ask if the Committee is justified in asking the public to accept its "practical synthesis of ideas" on the basis of the information it has provided for us in the Report.

The Committee has an idealistic view of man. It lacks the realism of the Biblical doctrine of Man. According to the Committee's viewpoint, all we need to do is to educate people to enable them to function responsibly in today's society. This view fails to take into consideration the sinful, rebellious nature of man. Ultimately, it strikes at the Biblical Doctrine of Justification by Faith.

Morality, according to the Committee, is not a "bag of virtues", it is "primarily a measure of a person's ability to make moral judgments, and to arrive at decisions on the basis of moral principles." The Committee quotes Kohlberg to support its view:

26 Ibid., p.43.
The school is no more committed to value neutrality than is the government or the law. The school, like the government, is an institution with a basic function of maintaining and transmitting some, but not all, of the consensual values of society. The most fundamental values of a society are termed moral values, and the major moral values, at least in our society, are the values of justice... the problems as to the legitimacy of moral education in the public schools disappear, then, if the proper content of moral education is recognized to be the values of justice which themselves prohibit the imposition of beliefs of one group upon another.27

This, then, is the Committee's final rationale for a program whose purpose is to stimulate moral reasoning rather than to inculcate moral absolutes. The objective is to help the individual to "weigh the justice of alternative courses of action, or of varying conclusions open to him." Morality then becomes synonymous with justice, and to reason morally means to reason justly.28 It is the Committee's hope that the moral judgments of young people will come to be characterized by a healthy inquisitiveness, and a sincere respect for the differing judgments and conclusions of others, whether these differences stem from objective logic or subjective belief.29

The third thing we shall consider under the "new approach" is methodology. We shall deal with it in terms of objectives; strategy; and methods.

The primary objective of the Mackay Committee recommendations is to bring the students in our school system to "maturity." More specifically, in terms of the "program" of religious information, the "essential

27Ibid., p.48.
28Ibid., p.49.
29Ibid., p.49.
objective is the "acquisition of information about and respect for all religions." In terms of the "program" of moral development, the objective is "character building, ethics, social attitudes, and moral values and principles."

The recommendation regarding the moral development of the student means that, whereas "character building" was "implicit" in the school curriculum, it will now become an "explicit" objective throughout public education. The purpose of this approach is to involve young people in real and personal situations that will enable them to think and react morally and justly to life situations today and tomorrow.

For our purposes, the word "strategy" refers to the particular "shape" the recommended program will take. In terms of the Mackay Report, the strategy employed to get students to their destination (objective) is a "program" and not a course. This "program" will pervade every curricular and extra-curricular activity in the public school system.

The Committee was influenced in this regard by what has been taking place in education in terms of conservation. Some time ago, the Department of Education introduced in the curriculum a "program which emphasized desirable conservation attitudes and sound information regarding the science of conservation in most of the subject areas through the curriculum." Every opportunity was "exploited" which permitted the illustration of useful conservation principles and the reinforcement of desirable conservation attitudes. Conservation was presented as a "natural part of as many subject areas as possible, and integrated with the curriculum in a manner that minimized its charge on the timetable and enhanced its impact on the thinking of the pupil." Conservation thus became "infused in the curriculum, and
subsequently, influenced the outlook of a whole generation of citizens."

Can religion be taught in the same way as conservation or any other subject? Some would argue that to present religion as a "natural part of as many subject areas as possible" is commendable. This approach would avoid the dichotomy that seems to exist in the minds of some between the "sacred" and the "secular."

Another important curriculum experiment which impressed the Mackay Committee was the "Kentucky Movement." The chief attraction of the "Kentucky Movement" to the Mackay Committee has been its "approach, and particularly its conception of moral education pervading the whole curriculum as a program of emphasis rather than of specific content." However, the Committee feels that while the "peer-group influence" -- which is emphasized in the Kentucky Movement program -- may assist in the moral development of children, it must be used with discrimination, otherwise it can become an instrument of indoctrination.

The Committee recommends that the best methods are to be used in this new "program" of religious information and moral development. They urge the use of modern teaching aids in providing religious information to the pupils -- films, T.V. plays and presentations, recordings, books, slides, etc. -- but, such multimedia materials should be examined in advance of presentation to assure that it does not offend students of particular faiths.

In the program of moral development, anecdotes involving moral conflict are to be used in free discussion with a view to stimulating the development of the student's powers to make moral judgments. To support

---

30 Ibid., p. 36.
its view the Committee cites the six stages of development in moral reasoning as postulated by Kohlberg:

1. Punishment and obedience orientation;
2. Naive instrumental hedonism;
3. Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations, approval by others;
4. Authority maintaining morality;
5. Authority of contract, of individual rights, and of democratically accepted law;
6. Morality of individual principles of conscience.

In this system the movement is always towards the sixth and final stage of development.31

What is significant for the Mackay Committee in the works of Kohlberg and his colleagues is the specific technique they advocate for the purpose of stimulating the pupil to move upward in their developmental scheme of moral reasoning. In order to accomplish this the "young person should be faced with situational anecdotes and realistic accounts involving genuine moral conflicts which he will be prepared to discuss and resolve."32 But the Committee goes on to state that these situations and anecdotes should not relate to specific moral and ethical problems of the moment. Its concern is not to teach specific morals, but to inculcate the habit of moral reasoning. It seems that the Committee's fear of involvement in the classroom has prompted it to make this recommendation. Are young people going to be content with just an exercise in reasoning morally? Can involvement in the classroom not provide a valid learning experience? It seems that the Committee is saying "Don't get excited! Don't debate any issues! Don't get involved! Don't upset the system! Enjoy the exercise of reasoning morally!" Can a

31 Ibid., p. 59.
32 Ibid., p. 60.
program of moral reasoning pre-condition young people to "calmness"?

Later, we shall consider the "discussion technique" in the light of the Hall-Dennis Report, and offer some further suggestions that might make the teaching of Religious Information and Moral Development more meaningful. It is enough to say here that we consider the methodology as suggested by the Mackay Committee in its Report to be inadequate.

In this chapter we have analyzed the Report in terms of its objectives, its "basic ingredients", and its methodology. In the next chapter we shall discuss some reactions to the Report by representative religious bodies. We offer these reactions because they represent a valid criticism of the Mackay Report particularly the documents representing the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. In exposing the inadequacies of the main concepts of the Report the documents support the contention of the thesis that the "program" of religious information and moral development as presently envisaged by the Committee will not meet the needs of young people in our public school system.
CHAPTER IV

SOME REACTIONS TO THE REPORT

In this section we shall consider some reactions to the Report by representative bodies. The Roman Catholic Church shall be represented, firstly by an article written by Father Gregory Baum for the Ecumenist, a leading Roman Catholic periodical; and secondly, by the Canadian Bishops' Reaction to the Mackay Report, an official document submitted to the Minister of Education of the Province of Ontario by certain Roman Catholic Bishops whose dioceses lie within the bounds of Ontario. The Jewish Faith will be represented by a document submitted by the Canadian Jewish Congress (Central Region) to the Minister of Education on February 9, 1970. And the Protestant Church will be represented by The Mackay Report -- Opportunity or Disaster? (A compendium of comment and criticism on the Report, Religious Information and Moral Development, offered at an open meeting of the Ontario Inter-Church Committee on Public Education, June 12, 1969).

Beginning with the first representative of the Roman Catholic Church, we will discuss Father Gregory Baum's article "The Mackay Report." Father Baum's analysis of the Report is excellent, but his evaluation lacks robustness. In his judgment, the Report is an extraordinary achievement, "because it solves the problem of how schools in a pluralistic society may provide moral education and some insight into religion without any kind of indoctrination." The recommendations, he feels, are in harmony, not only
with the principles of education adopted by the Hall-Dennis Report, but "also with the principles accepted in the new catechetical programs devised by the Christian Church." He also feels that the "shift from content-oriented to process-oriented teaching is characteristic of the new approach to religious formation in the Catholic Church."

Father Baum believes that the Committee's "process of reasoning" has an implicit content which the Report does not allude to. "Creative pluralism in a society," he contends, "implies ideals of personal freedom, respect for others, and commitment to the community, values which constitute the implicit basis of the recommended program." The great difficulty of the program, he finds, is the availability of teachers who have the inner freedom to conduct a discussion which reveals their wholehearted acknowledgment of the pluralistic situation as well as the commitment to their own values. If the teachers are to have this "inner freedom" then their training will have to include not only intellectual but also emotional formation.

Speaking as a theologian, Father Baum believes that children should be comfortable in such a school system. He wonders about the implications of the recommended program for the Catholic Separate School system, and says that "if the Mackay Report is adopted for the public schools of Ontario, at least as an ideal, then there is hope that the Catholic schools, instead of seeking separation, will strive to share more programs with the public schools and to participate in their life."

The Roman Catholic Church's view is also represented in the Canadian Bishops' Reaction to the Mackay Report. The bishops feel that the constant rejection of "indoctrination" in the Report creates uneasiness.
If it means the elimination of any basic religious content, then they would have difficulty in understanding how the system would work. They see in the program a philosophical-theological contradiction, namely that a moral system can survive without a foundation of absolutes. They cannot see a moral order without due acknowledgment of the existence of God, of a teleological world, of the spiritual nature of man, of the brotherhood of man under God, etc. They are not convinced that a moral system can be built upon nothing.

They are convinced that courses should be taught on a denominational basis. They suggest that the present system of teaching religious knowledge in Teachers' colleges be maintained. They react to the statement that graduates who receive credit for religious studies under the history departments of our institutions would be considered equipped to teach a course in world religions in Grades XI and XII as members of the history department of a secondary school. Such a statement is a "humanistic over-simplification." For the Committee to relegate religion to the history department is naive; it opens the door to incompetence; and borders on the pedagogically incredible.

Representatives of the Canadian Jewish Congress (Central Region), on February 9, 1970, presented a resolution to the Minister of Education for the Province of Ontario, calling for the discontinuance of the present course of study in religious education in our schools.

In the preamble to their resolution they referred to a brief which they submitted to the Mackay Committee on February 10, 1967. They read the following excerpt from the summary of their brief:
1. The history of public education in Ontario reveals that until the 1940's the Department of Education consistently rejected any proposal to bring religious teaching into the structure of our public school system. It was not part of the tradition or the accepted practice, nor was it permitted by the regulation.

2. We submit that the 1944 innovation was a serious error not consistent with the maintenance of a truly public school system, and we strongly urge its removal.

3. We do not suggest that this removal should be contingent on the introduction of a new course to replace it. Our position is categorical; the present course should go. We cannot be expected to endorse any new course or alternative in advance. We certainly would oppose any course that contains teaching for commitment or which could lend itself to such use or misuse.

It is unfortunate that the Canadian Jewish Congress has not done a critical study of the Mackay Report. However, they are in general agreement with it and for the following reasons: (i) they agree with the Committee that the present course which is sectarian should be discontinued; (ii) they do not object in principle to courses "about" religion or courses in "comparative religion"; and (iii) they believe that moral and spiritual values can be presented to pupils in a public school system by the use of pedagogical techniques not requiring religious sanctions.

The reaction of the Protestant Church is represented by the Inter-Church Committee on Public Education. This body held a meeting in Toronto on June 12, 1969, to study the major recommendations of the Mackay Report. This Committee, under the chairmanship of the Reverend E.L. Johns, a Baptist minister from Sarnia, Ontario, found the concepts of religion, morality, and education, as enunciated in the Report to be inadequate largely as the result of the absence on the Mackay Committee of specialists
in these fields. Consequently, the O.I.C.C. asked some of its members who had special training in these areas to prepare papers to be discussed at its conference which was held in June of 1969. The O.I.C.C. went on record as approving the Mackay Report's recommendation of discontinuing the present course of study in religious education in our school system, but felt that before the Report could start us moving in the direction of a new dynamic approach in religious education, a better foundation upon which to build for the future is needed.

In this section, we shall deal with three papers presented at the conference sponsored by the O.I.C.C.: (1) Religion in the Keiller Mackay Report, by G.J. Freer, Associate Secretary, the Board of Christian Education of the United Church of Canada; (2) The Concept of Moral Development, by D.M. Warna, Secretary, Lay Ministry-Higher Education of the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in Canada; and (3) The Concept of Education, by Stuart B. Coles, Secretary for Lay Education, Adult Division of the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in Canada.

1. Religion in the Keiller Mackay Report

Freer sees the Report as polarizing "religious commitment" and "true education." The concept of religion, in the Report, is sectarian, ideological, and cultural. He contends that there is no concept of religion as the "radical human question," that is, the wrestling of man with the question of the meaning of himself, his world, and his existence.

Freer finds the Report's understanding of education as inadequate as its understanding of religion. He argues that education should be the arena where commitments meet head on. Indeed, he cannot see how this
Teachers are not completely neutral, he says. He suggests that total objectivity is a ridiculous idea. Commitment, he contends, is not limited to religion. It belongs to all of life. All education involves a variety of commitments. There can be no concept of "true education", he suggests, "apart from the emotions and points of view connected to genuine concern about life's meaning." The school can be the arena where commitments meet, where dialogue and confrontation take place. This way, he says, growth will take place.

Freer sums up his views this way:

The Report has a hang-up, then, about religion, about education, about commitment, about controversy. Or perhaps it is an ambivalent hang-up. Controversy will certainly not be avoided if the Report's moral development program begins to move. If we are to teach children and youth to reason morally, to examine the moral issue, then clash of ideas and commitment will come. But of religious reasoning, the Report seems to have no understanding. Religion, because of how the commission sees religion, is a matter of information, not reasoning and debate.

2. The Concept of Moral Development:

Warne feels that there is in the Report an over-emphasis on reason, and contends that there is a trend today to a much wider concept of the process of rational consideration of moral problems. According to Warne, the development of a child involves the "totality of his life." He notes the use of the words "instill," "inculcate," and "infuse". These suggest a concept of a value system which is worth preserving. The Government of Ontario has the right to be interested in the moral development of our children, Warne contends, but "there is something subtly wrong when the values of the status-quo or the establishment are interwoven into a document which is called open-endedness." He sees the
Report as advocating conformity to the "mainstream" -- the "mechanised world" -- "to those ideals which are generally commended by society."

Part of the moral process, he argues, is to opt out at times from the mainstream and to avoid adjustment to a mechanistic society. "The Report fails to face up to the fact that society may have to come to terms with the injection of radically different ideals which challenge the whole value system of contemporary society," he says. He sees the Committee, on the one hand, extolling justice as an absolute, and on the other hand, saying that there are no absolutes. There is nothing wrong with the Committee's description of "thinking justly" (reasoning morally), he claims, but it seems to be unaware of the "volcanic-type eruptions of our time which lead to the action so decried in this Report, namely, anarchism."

Warne feels that the whole section on moral development in the Report lacks a sense of the "reality of our times." Not only is there too much stress on the rational, he finds, but the section does not come to grips with the critical clash of value systems between nations, cultures, races, generation. Further, there is little examination of the major issues of our age -- race, poverty, war, powerlessness. Debate and commitment are taboo; yet these can produce valid learning experiences. Justice is vague. Who decides what it is? The situational anecdotes are privatistic and non-political. He wonders if the Committee really believes in an educational system which is free enough to allow individuals to question the status-quo. To separate commitment from the discussion of moral values is to be unrealistic. Young people have questions that have deep emotional roots. Moral education then "must include the process of enquiry, that is, the educational principle whereby all kinds of information
including emotional impact, can be fed into the discussion arena." "The school system," he concludes, "must be open to the honest encounter of committed people who are quite willing to share with others what the roots of their beliefs and actions really are."

3. The Concept of Education:

According to Coles, the Committee's "operative concept of education" is two-fold: (i) it involves the conveying of authentic information; and (ii) it involves the task of stimulating and nurturing the development of persons. His purpose, in his paper, is to see how these two elements operate in the subject area of religion, and particularly, how the Report "envisages in this area the interacting relation, the educational dynamic, between factual information and personal development."

Coles makes three comments concerning education in the Report. We shall deal briefly with each one.

Comment 1 deals with religious information. Coles commends the Committee for the important insights it has articulated about the task of communicating information in the subject area of religion, but condemns it for articulating some astonishingly poor thinking about this task. He notes the Committee's efforts to distinguish between educating and indoctrinating and then charges the Committee with the "over-simple sin of separatism" -- that is, "get rid of the problem by excluding religious indoctrination." He asks two pertinent questions in this regard: (i) "to escape the mischief of indoctrination is it necessary to become non-committal?" and (ii) "is it possible to educate while maintaining a stance of non-commitment either for the teacher or for the student?"

Coles concludes that "one can answer these two questions 'yes' only if one
Comment 2 deals with the development of the person. Coles praises the Committee for "perceiving clearly at times the task of helping persons develop," but warns that the Report has also "some dangerous blind spots here."

On the positive side, he argues, the Committee is concerned about the development of personhood. It denounces religious indoctrination, but then affirms and promotes cultural indoctrination. Referring to an analogous curriculum innovation" (conservation), he charges that this analogy is a "gregarious illustration of brainwashing, based on presuppositions that are at least as partisan, manipulative, and trite as anything the denounced course in religious studies could possibly have perpetrated." He warns of the dangers of a state-controlled educational system:

Furthermore, once you have secured admission for a pervasive system of moral reasoning in the educational curriculum, with everything disbarred which might seem to the authorities to be either unreasonable or immoral, everything disbarred which might raise serious dissent, deviation, or division, then there is nothing to stop whoever controls and operates the educational system from feeding into it whatever code of reasoning or of morality they may think desirable. 1984 is here in our schools with no sweat at all.

The Committee's most dangerous blind spot, he contends, is that it is unaware of the crisis of freedom in society today. "Only if the classroom can dare to become an arena for honest and all-out encounter of differing insights and commitments, including the religious," he says, "will it escape becoming an interruption in the real education of the student, the teacher, and the community."
Comment 3 deals with the dynamic between information and development. Coles feels that the Report contains the seeds for an exciting breakthrough in public education, if its proposals are given serious attention by the Ontario Department of Education, the Legislative Assembly, and by all educationists and religionists across the province. It would be tragic, he warns, just to let the situation drift — that is, to discard the present course without replacing it with something significant. Or it would be tragic, he feels, if the proposals were adopted without further serious thinking. The work of analyzing the real problem and uncovering the real possibilities has only begun. He urges that further research be done in terms of the recommended program and its implications regarding teacher-training.
CHAPTER V

THE UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY OF THE REPORT

In this chapter we shall present a brief critique of the philosophy underlying the Mackay Committee's recommendations. We believe it is important to attempt such a critique because the pre-suppositions of the Committee's philosophy form the basis for its proposed "program" which is supposedly designed to meet the needs of youth in the schools of Ontario.

On page xv of the Report, the Committee summarizes the philosophy behind its recommendations:

... we have felt little need, for example, to rationalize our views that education should always be concerned with the whole child, that it should seek to be in harmony with the discoveries of developmental psychology, and that it should be unequivocally non-authoritarian.

One of the basic pre-suppositions of the Report is that education should be concerned with the "whole child." Yet by over-emphasizing the role of reason, and by denying the validity of the emotional and behavioural aspects of child development as valid learning experiences, the Committee is guilty of fragmenting the "whole child." The concept of education as articulated in the Report is "mind-centred." It delimits education to the intellectual, and reduces all learning to the process of reasoning.

33

Henry W. Maier in his book, *Three Theories of Child Development*, quotes Toynbee as saying:

... we begin to see all aspects of human life as so many facets of a unitary human nature, instead of having, like our predecessors, to approach the study of Man departmentally by breaking it up artificially into a number of separate 'disciplines': history, sociology, economics, psychology, theology, and the rest. This new possibility of studying human life as a unity ought to enable us to embark on mental voyages of discovery that have hardly been practicable in the past.  

Maier makes the further observation -- which the Mackay Committee has obviously forgotten -- that "although the dictum to work with the 'whole person' is true, we are faced with the complex paradox that while working with the 'whole' we have to know and relate to its parts."  

D. M. Warne, in his article, *The Concept of Moral Development*, argues for a concept of education in the Mackay Report which will include the "totality of a person's existence" when he quotes the leader of a national student organization as saying: "Students are evolving a new critical approach to our society which is impressionistic. It is a total critique in contrast to the sequential and rationalistic approach traditional in our society." Warne further states that "there are other cultures such as that of the classical Hebrew people which avoided any segmenting of the totality of human decision-making. For the Hebrew, the moral development involved the totality of his life including economics,

---


And then he makes this incisive statement:

"There are many ways in which the prophets of today are saying that the influence of mass media with the immediacy of its impact, with the totality of its presentation of human inter-relationships, and with its lack of fragmentation, is developing a new culture which is somewhat beyond the age of reason."^{38}

Stanley Kutz, in *Educating the Emotions*, underscores the concept of the "whole person" when he says that the present generation of young people are:

... right in sensing that life is of a piece, and that there should therefore be some correspondence between the way we feel and the way we order or control it. None of this is intended to suggest that what we feel is an infallible guide to how one should act. What I am suggesting is that there can be no real growth in moral maturity, no deep espousal of values, no full realization of freedom, until the message emanating from the emotions has been received with respect, and has been understood and integrated into the fabric of one's existence.^{39}

Aarno J. Siirala's essay, "Implications of the Personalistic Era for Theological Education,"^{40} has some pertinent things to say in terms of the "whole person". He contends that in broad and general terms one could describe the predominant patterns of theological education as "scholastic". Its authority, he argues, lies in the biblical tradition.

---

^{37}Ibid., p.2.

^{38}Ibid., p.2.


There are similarities between the scholastic and modern structures in theological education: (i) the basic polarity in terms of authority and reason; (ii) both are mind-centred; (iii) both evade the risks involved in the empirical and experimental approaches and in the search for a new personal "identity". The first characteristic of the "new personalistic responsibility", Siirala argues, "is to question the absolute authority of the institutions of the old, sacred, traditional order." Another characteristic is the "call to be alone" -- that is, "to become an individual with conscience." This does not mean that the person becomes an "isolated individual," but rather, "a person who includes always what is encountered with fellow beings, with one's own self and with God . . . being rescued from the idolatry of the law and institutions, man becomes a person."

All this has implications for our study: (i) Education should be "non-authoritarian"; (ii) it should be concerned with the "whole person" and not "mindcentred"; (iii) a student should be free "to question the institutions of the old, sacred, traditional order" -- for only in this way can he become a "whole person."

Unfortunately, today, Siirala contends, most of the curriculum of the theological seminaries remains "scholastically" structured. "The integration of the 'academic' and 'practical' seems to remain an open question in most curricular changes." Siirala states further that "this difficulty in theological education of dealing with the person as distinct from the person's mind, is a dilemma characteristic of the whole Western educational world." The approach of the "naturalistic empirical sciences" is also "mindcentred." As a result there exists
"a "dichotomy between mind and person." "There seems to be a vacuum," Siirala continues, "both in the world of theological and of general higher education, where the personalistic era calls for a new awareness and for careful studies of the dynamics of the growing human personhood." Siirala concludes that "in all education the cognitive element tends to stifle other elements, because abstraction, although an essential element in man's way to build up his world, tends to widen the gap between mind and person." Siirala quotes from Samuel Miller's *Implications of Depth Psychology for Christian Theology*:

> The problem of the integration of knowledge, of knowledge with life, and of the student himself is an extremely stubborn problem. There must be a serious consideration both of the training program and also of the maturing of the student as a person.

"The remedy for the split between 'prophecy' and 'therapy' has to be sought," Miller suggests, "especially by putting emphasis on the non-verbal communication, by being alert to the dimension of the subconscious in all theological construction and by becoming aware of the numinous character of the primary events of life."

All this is to say that to fasten on the mind only is to "widen the gap between mind and person." For the student to mature as a person means that we shall have to deal with him in the "totality of his personhood." It means helping him to become aware of the numinous character of the primary events of his life. It means educating him socially and theologically in order that he might be in a position to live responsibly. For him this will mean confusion, re-evaluation, involvement, radical thinking, and a genuine wrestling with ultimate questions. In short, it means educating the "whole person" in the
totality of his whole life. As Stanley Kutz has said, a child's edu-
cation is not complete unless and until it has been approached through
the affective, cognitive, and behavioural avenues of his personality. 41

A second basic pre-supposition of the Report is that "education
should seek to be in harmony with the discoveries of developmental
psychology." We criticize the Committee, not because it utilized the
discoveries of developmental psychology, but because it utilized the
discoveries of developmental psychology in terms of one aspect of child
development, namely, the cognitive. It chose to ignore the works of
men like Erikson and Sears who have made important contributions to
developmental psychology in terms of the affective and behavioural
aspects of child development.

Maier, in his book, Three Theories of Child Development, views
the theories of Erikson, Piaget, and Sears as three parallel and congru-
ent theories of child development, which, when studied together, furnish
a single perspective on emotional cognitive, and behavioural develop-
ment. 42

Table 5.1 on page 211 provides us with a comparison of the three
theories' developmental phases:

The chart shows the differences in the three theories of child
development. It will be noted that Piaget (i) stresses the intellect
(is this the reason why his findings appealed to the Mackay Committee?);


42 Maier, Three Theories of Child Development, p.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (years)</th>
<th>Erikson</th>
<th>Piaget</th>
<th>Sears</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Phase I: A Sense of Basic Trust</td>
<td>Sensorimotor Phase</td>
<td>Phase of Rudimentary Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Phase II: Sense of autonomy</td>
<td>Preconceptual Phase</td>
<td>Phase of Secondary Motivational Systems: Family-centred Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Phase III: A Sense of Initiative</td>
<td>Phase of Intuitive Thought</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase of Secondary Motivational Systems: Extrafamilial Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Phase IV: Sense of Industry</td>
<td>Phase of Concrete Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Phase V: Sense of Identity</td>
<td>Phase of Formal Operations</td>
<td>(Little research done by Sears thus far)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Phase VI: Sense of Intimacy</td>
<td>(Not investigated by Piaget)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Phase VII: Sense of Generativity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Phase VIII: Sense of Integrity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) his system is not complete -- he has not done any work in terms of the middle teens and up; (iii) his theory suggests that there is a correlation between sensorimotor learning and intellectual growth. Mussen, Conger, and Kagan, in *Child Development and Personality*, have shown that Piaget's theory regarding intellectual growth implies that a normally endowed child who could not use his arms or legs would have great difficulty growing intellectually, for Piaget assigns an important role to
the infant's motor actions. These actions, say Mussen et al., subsequently become internalized as operations. They conclude that a study of the intellectual growth of thalidomide babies or babies born with paralyzed limbs would furnish an important test of Piaget's critical hypothesis; and (iv) Piaget's system does not take into consideration the "Crisis of Identity" which young people face in their teen years.

According to Maier, Piaget believes that:

The adolescent finds pleasure in this new power of manipulating ideas without seriously committing himself to any one . . . his major interest, however, centres in weighing, classifying, re-evaluating different social points of view . . . . Adolescence is known for its acquisition of new values which eventually will come into balance near the end of adolescence . . . .

Personality development from now on depends upon an exchange of ideas by social inter-communication in place of simple mutual imitation . . . . At this point . . . although Piaget does not commit himself, he does imply that the individual's basic pattern of thinking and reasoning has been established. The individual has reached intellectual maturity.43

Piaget's view that young people manipulate ideas without committing themselves to any must have appealed to the Mackay Committee. Is Piaget correct in his understanding of youth? Studies by Kenneth Keniston -- *Alienated Youth* and *The Young Radicals* -- to say nothing of "peace marches", "sit-ins", "marathon walks" etc., show that young people today are committed, involved, -- they do have strong views about the problems of society: sex, morality, war, poverty, hunger, and they are prepared to take action to dramatize their convictions. Is it a delusion to expect that "moral reasoning" can be authentic, penetrating,

---

without "moral acting"? Are not long hair and beards, the wild cacophony of sound that blares from transistor radios, and the use of drugs outward visible signs of strong inward convictions, on the part of our "rebellious" youth?

In discussing the differences among the theories Maier says that the major difference rests with the question: When is a mature person "mature"? With the completion of the adolescent phase, Piaget sees the "individual as a mature and complete personality who has made the transition from adolescence to adulthood in a single step." Erikson conceives of adolescence as "a new crisis -- a crisis of identity -- which both challenges and integrates anew all previously conflicting pulls", and has shown further that "genuine maturity is still three stages ahead." Adulthood, he contends, means more than outgrowing one's childish and youthful ways; that psychological maturity -- if it ever exists -- depends upon continued development of one's self-awareness and understanding. 44 Maier concludes that "Piaget (and Sears), having dealt far less with adulthood, yield to Erikson by default. Erikson's work continues," he says, "where the other two leave off in their investigation of development, and their developmental continuum." 45

We do not know to what extent Piaget and his followers have influenced the Mackay Committee other than what can be deduced from the Report. However, ultimately, one ends up accepting a theory of child development (hopefully, on the basis of thorough research) and applying

this educationally to produce a "program" or curriculum. Is this what the members of the Mackay Committee did? The one weakness in their position is that they evidently failed to take into consideration the contribution of Erikson. But then Erikson deals with the emotional aspect of personality development, and the word "emotion" is taboo to the members of the Committee who expect "moral reasoning" without "Moral acting".

A third pre-supposition which is basic to the Mackay Report is that "Education should be unequivocally non-authoritarian." We shall consider this aspect of the Report in terms of three things: (i) the Committee's "non-sectarian -- non-commitment" concept; (ii) the Committee's Concept of the Teaching-Learning Process; and (iii) the Committee's Concept of Personhood.

(i) The "non-sectarian -- non-commitment" concept:

Since we are no longer living in an exclusively Christian and Protestant society, the Committee contends, the program in religious instruction should be geared for children who live their lives in a pluralistic society. Both religious indoctrination and moral indoctrination are to be avoided, but unless the necessary "checks and balances" are built into the curriculum, we could end up with cultural indoctrination. Further, we disagree with the Committee's stance on commitment. How can we avoid a confrontation of ideas in the classroom? It is not our commitments that are at fault; it is the way we handle them. Commitment does not necessarily preclude objectivity.

(ii) The Concept of the Teacher-Learning Process:

The Committee has recommended that a "program" of religious
information and moral development be diffused through a "non-rigid, child-centred, de-centralized curriculum." Teaching is to be "incidental", using the discussion technique as the principal instrument of education. The teacher will play an "unobtrusive but quietly guiding role." Information "about" religion as overagainst information "of" religion will be transmitted to the student. Further, the student will not be given a set of absolutes, but will be encouraged to increase his ability to make moral judgments.

What "totally objective" person or group decides the content of this "non-rigid, child-centred, de-centralized curriculum"? Who decides its underlying philosophy, and its basic "thrust"? If the teacher is to be "unobtrusive" he will need to have special skills. For instance, he will need to be "sensitive" to the needs of the pupils. He will need to be non-judgmental in his attitude toward the student. These imply an openness on the part of the teacher to "hear" what the child is saying and to respect the views of the learner without imposing his own views upon him which he (the teacher) would see as authoritative. Further, a value system is implied here. We are warned about the thin line that exists between a program of emphasis on moral values, and a program of emphasis on moral reasoning, but we are not given an explicit value theory. Does the Committee's concept of the "process of reasoning" presuppose a "bag of virtues", and if so, who decides what it shall contain?

(iii) The Concept of Personhood:

The Committee sees as its aim the task of helping persons develop morally. That is, it recognizes that the person needs more than intellectual information. He must be educated to enable him to function
responsibly in society. Hence the recommended program in moral development. This concern for "personhood" is also evidenced in the Committee's statements regarding the treatment of students -- an individual's chain of reasoning, however immature or naive, must never be exposed to ridicule; there must be a respect for the beliefs and convictions of others.

But, however commendable these aspects may be, we must say that the Committee's concept of Personhood is inadequate. The Committee, having acknowledged (by implication) the individual's need for something more than intellectual information, then proceeds to dissect the "whole person" by equating moral development with moral reasoning. This concept of Personhood is "mindcentred". The inadequacy of the Committee's concept is reflected in its concept of teaching. Teaching is not seen as vital and dynamic. Rather, the pupil is encouraged to learn through the "best educational methods" -- films, interest centres, free discussion. There is no mention in the Report of real dialogue taking place between the teacher and the pupil. Teaching is a dialogical relationship between a teacher and a student in which the student is supported in his efforts to discover knowledge through experiences.

Rood, in his book, The Art of Teaching Christianity, says that education takes place through dialogue. In fact, according to Rood, dialogue is the teaching-learning process. Rood stresses the need for "love" (agape) -- that is, the teacher must not force his ideas upon the student; and for "encounter" -- that is, the encounter of God with man. According to Rood, to be a "Person" is to be "related" to all things -- objective, subjective, corporate, divine.

Education of the "whole person" is much more than helping a person
to reason morally. It is communicating to the total person -- to the human self as a whole. It means understanding the child in all aspects of his Personhood -- physical, emotional, intellectual, spiritual. It will necessitate special skills on the part of the teacher if she is to function effectively in a non-authoritarian system. Further, it means understanding the times in which the child is called upon to live his life. It also means utilizing the skills of scholarship which are available in the task of analyzing and developing new approaches in regard to human development in personhood and in community, and to see how these interact on each other and on the rest of the curriculum of public education.

In this chapter we have considered the philosophy which is basic to the Mackay Committee's recommendations. We reject that philosophy because it forms the basis for a "program" which fragments the "whole person"; pre-supposes an idealized view of man which is not consistent with the Biblical Doctrine of Man, nor yet true to the facts of life; and results in a concept of education which fails to take into consideration the personal and interpersonal nature of teaching.
CHAPTER VI

SOME DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE MACKAY REPORT
AND THE CONCERNS OF YOUTH TODAY

In this thesis, so far, we have considered the concerns of youth as expressed in contemporary thought. We have analyzed the Mackay Report to see if these concerns were reflected in the three basic concepts of the text. We have demonstrated the inadequacies of the Report particularly in terms of its main concepts and have concluded that they do not mirror the needs of modern young people. We shall now consider whether or not there are specific concerns of youth mentioned in the Mackay Report. If the answer is in the affirmative we shall then determine whether or not these concerns are in agreement with the needs of youth as we have come to understand them through our study of contemporary writing.

On pages 65 and 66 of the Report, the Committee gives a list of situational anecdotes which could be used as a basis for classroom discussion. These suggest a concept of ethics which is privatistic and non-political. None of these will challenge the student to do some critical, radical, prophetic thinking. Debate is to be forbidden in the classroom. One example describes a situation where a student discovers that he is wearing a pair of rubbers which do not rightfully belong to him. He is allowed to discuss what he should do in this situation but he is denied the right to ask "why" he should not steal them.
On page 70 of the Report, the Committee argues that although it has not been dealing with specific moral problems such as intoxication, marijuana, hippies, delinquency, dishonesty, LSD, illicit sex, there is a "certain sense" in which it has been discussing nothing else, but that these must be resolved by the young people themselves. If this is true, then the school system should provide the students with the opportunity to come to grips with these issues.

D.M. Warne, in his article, *The Concept of Moral Development*, has made the point that in the Report there is little examination of the major issues of our age such as race, poverty, war, powerlessness. The word "justice" in the Report is "ethical and remote", he contends, and unlike the justice of the Hebrew people which was a "justice in the gate" -- that is, "justice came face to face with the reality of human suffering." Warne quote Wm. Stringfellow who said that justice today is "property-oriented and not people-oriented." In effect, Warne says, "If justice is fairness, how do we help the learners in public education today to work through the reasons which have led modern nations to commit the atrocities which are evident in our society?" In Warne's view, none of the anecdotes listed in the Report will help our young people come to grips with the "reality of our times."

The Hall-Dennis Report says:

There is a restless search for truth among our young people that leads them to struggle for values rather than power . . . . they express a growing concern about

---

the world's problems and show a desire to share in the decisions of the community.

Our headlines scream of discontent, of depression leading to suicide, of the excitement induced by marijuana and LSD trips. We must learn to understand what our children are seeking and missing, for we cannot afford to contribute by default an unhappy, alienated mass of sick citizens.47

In contrast to the "vagueness" of the Mackay Report, the LYR, the writings of Keniston, and the Hall-Dennis Report show that young people today have specific concerns -- real "felt-needs." The LYR study showed that young people have concerns about family relationships, dating and morals, the choosing of a life partner, personal faith, feelings of inadequacy, academic failure, social relationships, acceptance by self and others, vocation, and morality. Keniston, in his study of alienated youth, says that it is easy to know what alienated youth are "against", but it is more difficult to know what they are "for". Yet they do have concerns: they have a concern to live a meaningful life as individuals in the midst of an impersonal society; they have a concern for freedom-- freedom to question the value systems of a depersonalizing and dehumanizing society, and freedom to opt out of the mainstream of society if that is necessary; they seek an "identity" -- an answer to the question, 'Who am I?'; they are committed to aesthetic, expressive, and artistic pursuits; they search for honesty; and while they may not have clear goals, they do have a concern for positive values.

Keniston's Young Radicals showed that in addition to those concerns which they share in common with alienated youth, the young radicals also

---

have real concerns: for social and political change; for "personalism"; for values that will fill the spiritual emptiness created by material affluence; for controls on violence whether violence be as a result of racist oppression or war; for a "morality that will confront power and support the powerless." The Hall-Dennis Report has shown that youth have a concern for truth; for values rather than power; a "growing concern about the world's problems and show a desire to share in the decisions of the community." And at a profoundly deeper level, we have seen that all problems have deep religious roots; that the problem of identity is really a "question of recognition" -- a recognition of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. This recognition will not mean an end to the problems confronting youth. But it will give meaning and direction to their lives.

We conclude this chapter by affirming that there are differences between the specific concerns of youth as expressed in the Mackay Report and as we have come to understand them as a result of our study of contemporary writing. The Mackay Report is uncertain in terms of the real "felt-needs" of young people; it fails in its understanding of those forces which make it difficult for our young people to formulate positive values and to live a meaningful existence in the midst of an impersonal society; and it is vague in its interpretation and expression of what it conceives to be the needs and concerns of the youth of Ontario.

We have already demonstrated that the three main concepts of the Committee's Report do not reflect the needs of modern young people living in a pluralistic society. Therefore, we conclude that there are disparities between the Mackay Report and the concerns of youth today, and
suggest that a new interpretation of the basic concepts is necessary if any "program" of religious information and moral development is to meet the needs of young people in our public school system. In the next chapter we shall propose directions in which we believe religious education must move if it is to minister to the needs of youth living in the latter third of our twentieth-century society.
CHAPTER VII

PROPOSED DIRECTIONS FOR A "PROGRAM" OF
RELIGIOUS INFORMATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

We have concluded that there are disparities between the Mackay Report and the concerns of youth today, and that a new interpretation of the three basic concepts is necessary in order to provide a "program" of religious information and moral development which will meet the needs of our young people. In this chapter we shall propose directions in which we believe any "program" of religious information and moral development must move if it is to meet the needs of young people today. We shall propose an interpretation of religion, moral development and education which we believe will provide the basis for a "program" of religious education which will meet the needs of youth as they seek to live meaningful lives in today's world.

First of all, we shall consider the concept of religion. We have already considered the concept of religion in the Mackay Report and have concluded that it is inadequate because it is sectarian, ideological, and cultural; it fails to come to grips with man and his existence; and it distinguishes between teaching "about" religion (objective) and the teaching "of" religion (subjective).

As an alternative to the Mackay Committee's concept of religion, this thesis is proposing a concept which would view religion as "The Religion of the Concrete Spirit"; as Encounter; as the Transformer of
67

Culture; and as the "Radical Human Question".

It was Paul Tillich who coined the phrase "the religion of the concrete spirit" in his book, *The Future of Religion*. Tillich makes it clear that one should not initiate an inter-religious discussion between different religions "with a comparison of the contrasting concepts of God or man or history or salvation," but with a more radical question, namely, "the question of the intrinsic aim of existence -- in Greek, the 'telos' of all existing things." He feels that there may be a central event in the history of religion in and under which revelatory experiences are going on -- an event which he thinks makes possible a concrete theology that has universalistic significance. Tillich proposes a "dynamic-typological" approach that seeks to discover the particular and the unique manifestations of the Holy within a given religion. He sees the true "telos" -- that toward which everything drives -- of all religions in a unity of three special elements, namely, (1) The Sacramental -- the Holy here and now which can be seen, heard, dealt with, in spite of its mysterious character; (ii) A critical movement against the demonization of the Sacramental, making it into an object which can be handled; and (iii) The element of "ought to be". This is the ethical or prophetic element. Wherever the Holy is experienced these three elements are to be found. Though no religion can be identified with this "Religion of the Concrete Spirit" historically, all religions approximate this reality more or less, and in fragmentary ways

49Ibid., p.81.
it has been and is being realized today. 50

We suggest that this concept of religion -- "The Religion of the Concrete Spirit" -- is much more comprehensive than the narrow, inadequate concept of religion as envisaged by the Mackay Committee in its Report. Further, it is true to the non-sectarian concept which is important in terms of including religion in a pluralistic school system. And further still, it underscores the spiritual basis of life. As Alves has said, quoting the Spers Report, 51 "No boy or girl can be counted as properly educated unless he or she has been made aware of the fact of the existence of a religious interpretation of life."

Religion is much more than "information"; it is Encounter. It is reasoning, debating, communication, dialogue. It is an "I-Thou" relationship. But if religion is merely a matter of information, then the relationship becomes and "I-It" relationship, that is, "I" (subject) pass on information to "It" ("Thou" -- object). Rather, religion is an "I" (subject) -- "Thou" (subject) relationship in which two people engage in dialogue about Ultimate Reality, the result of which is that both persons are encountered by the "Thou" behind the "Thous". In the final analysis, religion is an encounter between God and man, an encounter in which man is "grasped by Ultimate Reality."

This concept of religion as Encounter has implications for the "objective -- subjective" controversy. Religion is historical ("objective"); it is also personal ("subjective"). But it is both

50 Ibid., p.8.

"objective" and "subjective" because of the One who has encountered man in and through the events of history.

This also has implications in terms of commitment. It opens the door to commitment to God, the One who encounters men in the midst of life, and to causes and convictions. The Hall-Dennis Report has said:

One of the major demands of our time is a sense of commitment to aims, objectives, and purposes either centred in the self or found beyond the individual. Commitment brings meaning into one's existence.52

But when we talk about commitment we must also talk about freedom -- freedom to commit one's self and freedom to abstain from committing one's self. This will meet the requirements of the Mackay Committee's "non-authoritarian" concept.

This thesis would go further and posit a concept of religion as the Transformer of Culture, Tillich, in A Theology of Culture, has said that "religion is not a specific function of man's spiritual life, but it is the dimension of depth in all of its functions."53 Religion has to do with all of life and all of life's problems. This concept breaks down the dichotomy between the "sacred" and the "secular". There are two extreme positions which can be taken regarding culture and religion: (i) religion becomes equated with culture; and (ii) religion apart from culture. We would reject both of these positions in favour of Tillich's view that religion and culture are within each other. The sacred,

---


according to Tillich, does not lie beside the secular, it is its depths.\textsuperscript{54}
We view religion as the Transformer of Culture. We agree with Tillich when he says that religion acts as a "judgment of the secular", but it can only be this if at the same time it is a "judgment on itself, a judgment which must use the secular as a tool of one's own religious self-criticism".

Finally, our concept would view religion as "The Radical Human Question". Donald Soper, the British Methodist who has conducted open air meetings on Tower Hill, in London, for over thirty years, has said that all the questions that individuals have asked him can be reduced to three questions: (i) Who am I?; (ii) Where have I come from?; and (iii) Where am I going? These are ultimate questions, and in a real sense they are the questions that our young people are asking today.

The Hall-Dennis Report has said:

Children need to be free to ask questions about the world and about themselves.

Not only do they ask, "Where do babies come from?" but "Where did I come from?"

Children should be helped to cope with every-day problems. Every life brings with it crises, shattered dreams, and frustrating moments -- unexpected illness, death in a family, a missing parent, etc.\textsuperscript{55}

The LMK study and Keniston's studies in terms of alienated youth and young radicals, as well as the Hall-Dennis Report, all show that our young people have real concerns about human life and human existence.


Religion as the "Radical Human Question" will allow young people to express their concerns, to come to grips with contemporary issues, and to find some answers (albeit partial) to ultimate questions.

Next, we shall consider the concept of moral development. The Mackay Committee has defined morality as "primarily a measure of a student's ability to make moral judgments, and to arrive at decisions on the basis of moral principles". This statement presupposes two things: (i) a fundament of "moral principles", that is, "values of justice." The Committee thus equates morality with justice. The Committee is in trouble here because, on the one hand, it says there are no absolutes, and then on the other hand, it says that justice is the only absolute. We shall see that morality is more than justice. Here we would say that if we are to have an absolute then let it be love -- for justice can be stern whereas love is compassionate; (ii) that students can make moral decisions on the basis of moral reasoning. This presupposition is based on a humanistic philosophy which says in effect that, if one knows what is right, he will do it. In other words, it equates the "Intellectual Man" with the "Rational Man". John Goodlad in his book, School Curriculum and the Individual, distinguishes between the "Intellectual Man" and the "Rational Man". The "Intellectual Man" sees the problem but has no commitment to it. The "Rational Man", on the other hand, sees the problem, then takes action. He then becomes committed. Goodlad sees that the answer to the problems of society is not necessarily education. He contends that we have more educated people today than ever, and these people, he says, may bring a holocaust down upon themselves. This thesis then rejects this equation and its underlying presupposition, for it doubts the ability of man "to
produce 'moral' judgments in the 'secular' realm without an appropriate orientation in the 'religious' realm." 56

The Committee's definition of morality fails to distinguish between what is moral and how one develops morally as a human being. It therefore "lumps together" morality and human development in one ambiguous phrase. Our purpose, in this section, will be to attempt to define morality; to consider the dynamics of moral development; and finally, to state the need for freedom and love in such a program.

We would define morality in this way: it should include a fundament of values; an adequate concept of ethics; and an opportunity to consider ultimate concerns.

Beginning with a fundament of values, we agree with the Canadian Roman Catholic Bishops when they say in their Report, "we are not convinced that a moral system can be built upon nothing." Any moral system then should have a fundament of values. The question is, "What shall it be?" Shall it contain a set of absolutes? or shall justice or love be the only absolute? or shall it be a form of "act" or "rule" agapism?

Basic to any definition of morality is a consideration of the "Old Morality" and the "New Morality". The former stresses rules and regulations in human conduct. Certain things are universally and timelessly right and wrong. One is moral as he obeys the "rules". The latter, on the other hand, places the emphasis on love. Love is the only real good. Love focuses on the individual and his circumstances.

It assumes that laws were made for man; not man for laws.

Joseph Fletcher in his book, *Situational Ethics*, says that "love only is always good."\(^{57}\) John A.T. Robinson in *Honest to God*, says that "love alone, because as it were, it has a built-in moral compass, enabling it to 'home' intuitively upon the deepest need of the other, can allow itself to be directed completely by the situation."\(^{58}\) Paul Ramsey in his book, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics*, finds a place for both "rule-agapism" and "act-agapism" and admits the possibility that "there may be rules, principles, or precepts whose source is man's natural competence to make moral judgments." In terms of what the "fundament of values" should be, this thesis would support the position of a "general rule-agapism",\(^{59}\) because this will provide the most fruitful procedure in making moral decisions.

We accept a "general rule-agapism" because we believe that amid


"General-rule-agapism" begins with persons in the actuality of their concrete beings and then devolves or discerns the rules. It asks, What does love require? This may lead to a particular act or a general principle of conduct. Ramsey contends that "if it could be shown that to act in accord with one of these love-formed principles of conduct is in a particular situation not what love itself directly requires, then one way out would be to say that that was not a general principle of conduct but a less than generally valid summary rule only." Ramsey suggests that some combination of "pure-act-agapism", "summary rule-agapism", and "pure rule-agapism" will provide the most fruitful procedure in making moral decisions. He is not unwilling to welcome some "non-agapist" canons such as man's natural competence to make moral judgments. "Natural law theories" and "orders of Creation, according to Ramsey, may have a real though subordinate place in a category of "mixed-agapism". For the Christian, Ramsey argues, love is the source of all valid moral knowledge.
the changes of time, certain values still remain. Love is still a virtue; so is integrity. It is wrong to kill helpless people in any land. It is wrong to condone poverty and poor housing. It is wrong to deny people the right to live their lives in dignity. This is not to say that we should have a set of absolutes by which to determine what is moral and what is not. It is to say that society has the right and the duty to lay down certain "general principles" for the ordering of its life. But these "rules" and "principles" should be administered with love and compassion. It is for this reason that we have included the concept of "AGAPE" in our system of ethics. We need a "general rule-agapism" -- a "fundament of values" because as Robinson has said in Christian Morals Today, "no person, no society can continue or cohere for any length of time without an accepted ethic . . . a moral net there must be in every society."60

Morality should secondly include an adequate concept of ethics. We have already seen that the concept of ethics in the Mackay Report is privatistic and non-political. The anecdotes cited in the Report amount to pat moralisms which will eventuate in an exercise in futility instead of a real coming to grips with burning issues. Justice is defined as "tolerance and respect for the beliefs of others."

Ethics should deal with the social as well as the personal. In any future listing of anecdotes, care should be taken to see that the examples given be true to life and deal with all phases of a student's life -- social, political, cultural, economic, and religious. Justice

should be a "justice in the gate", that is, it should come face to face with the reality of human suffering. Warne says:

If justice is fairness, how do we help the learners in public education today to work through the reasons which have led modern nations to develop the overkill of many millions and to spend billions and billions of dollars upon anti-ballistic missiles? . . . How about fairness or justice when Canada has difficulty in storing one billion bushels of wheat and yet there are starving in the world? How can one judge the value system of a province such as Ontario and a nation such as Canada which benefit together up to almost half a billion dollars in war goods to support what is perhaps the most atrocious imperialistic war of our time in Vietnam? What about the justice of the authority of the immigration officer who can make a personal decision to turn back a political exile from our neighbour the USA? What are the structures of values which cause Canada to be so closely involved with the U.S. military plans?

If the program in moral development is going to meet the "felt-needs" of our students living in today's world then morality must include a concept of ethics which is social as well as personal and justice must be broadened to include the fundamental moral issues which are at stake today.

Thirdly, morality should also include an opportunity to consider Ultimate Concerns. It is impossible to see how any moral system can be considered valid which refuses to consider ultimate concerns. Yet the Mackay Committee has produced a system of morality which fails to deal with the questions and answers about life and death. John A.T. Robinson, in Honest to God, says that "it is impossible to assess one's doctrine of God without bringing one's view of morality into the same melting-pot."

---

These two are inseparable. On the basis of our studies of youth today, this thesis therefore contends that, in order for the program in moral development to be relevant to the needs of today's youth, morality must deal with questions of ultimate concern -- God, man, sin, human existence.

Now we must look at the dynamics of moral development. We have seen that the Committee believes that students can develop morally through a process of moral reasoning. We have rejected this because a study of developmental psychology shows that human development then should include the emotion, reason, and behavior, as avenues through which personhood develops.

A concept of moral development should include the role of the emotions. Stanley Kutz has shown the need for a re-evaluation of the emotions in terms of moral pedagogy. He argues that at first sight it would seem that a process of indoctrination and training would be sufficient to pass on the values and attitudes and norms of behavior which a particular people hold to be essential for the fullest realization of the human potential, both personal and societal. But then he goes on to underscore the role of emotions:

The present generation of young people is not willing to accept principles of conduct whose chief merit seems to be that they will keep a good thing going. They are even less willing if they suspect that their elders have not deeply felt the truth of what they propose, but are mainly concerned with keeping the system intact.

---


Kutz concludes by saying that there can be "no real growth in moral maturity, no deep espousal of values, no full realization of freedom, until the message emanating from the emotions has been received with respect, and has been understood and integrated into the fabric of one's existence." 64

This concept has implications for modern education. As Kutz has said, it means "opening up a whole new dimension of moral pedagogy -- the education of the emotions." We believe that the emotions have an important role to play in the moral development of our young people. We therefore appeal for the "education and liberation of the emotions to restore harmony and balance to man." 65

Secondly, the role of reason must be included in the concept of moral development. The Committee over-emphasizes the role of reason in the moral development of young people, but then fails to define what "reasoning" is. Is reasoning to be equated with the discussion technique as the Mackay Report seems to imply? What goes on in the mind when we exercise this faculty? While we do not know how the mind functions when one is reasoning, we can say that reasoning involves certain procedures: rearranging ideas, relating, evaluating, and drawing conclusions. By going through these procedures it is possible to reason critically, radically, prophetically, morally.

Making moral decisions involves the "ethics of decision", yet nowhere does the Mackay Committee make any mention of it. H.Richard Niebuhr, in Christ and Culture, deals with the problem Christians have of

64 Ibid., pp.146-147.
65 Ibid., p.11.
making valid Christian decisions. He contends that it is not possible to say: "This is the Christian answer." Yet, he says, we must make our decisions and, as Christians, we must make them responsibly. Niebuhr states further that "a valid Christian decision is compounded always of both faith and fact. It is likely to be valid in the degree to which faith is rightly apprehended and the facts are rightly measured."

A Christian then gathers together all the available information; he looks at all the alternatives open to him; and then makes his decision in the light of the Christian ethic and on the basis of faith. Only time will show whether or not he has made the "right" decision. A Christian must live in this situation, and make his decision under tension, and under Divine forgiveness.

All this has implications for students involved in a program of moral development in a pluralistic school system. They will need to be given some understanding of what is involved in terms of the "ethics of decision." By substituting their own religious (or "non-religious") ethic for the Christian ethic, they will be able to make their decisions within the context of their own particular faith.

The process of reasoning is part of the moral development of a student. We suggest that it will be effective to the degree in which our young people are aware of what is involved in terms of making moral decisions, and are taught to reason critically, radically, and prophetically.

Finally, our concept should take into consideration the role of behaviour in moral development. Sears has shown the importance of

behaviour in child development. As the child behaves, his personality develops. His behaviour is the product of his immediate social experiences in the home and beyond the home. The child learns to "identify" with others -- that is, he incorporates into himself something of the personality of his parents, teachers, or group he admires, and of their values and goals. Child development then is a consequence of learning.

Behaviour then is another avenue through which the child develops as a person. We therefore contend that our school system should be open to the honest encounter of committed people who are willing to share with others what the roots of their beliefs and actions really are. For as McGuire has said, "What is true in Church life about the development of Christian morality must also be true in school life, namely that morality, as much as religion, is caught and not taught." 67

Later we shall consider Buber's view that in "The Education of Character" -- according to Buber, all education worthy of the name is education of character -- "everything teaches." Our purpose here has been to underscore the role that emotions, reason, and behaviour play in the moral development of young people.

The need for freedom and love is necessary in moral development. We conclude this section by suggesting that any concept of moral development should include the freedom to question or not to question, to act or not to act, to commit or not to commit. And such a program of moral development as we have outlined will need not only freedom but also love.


68 D. R. McGuire, "An Assessment of the Proposals of the Mackay Committee with a View to their Workability", The Mackay Report -- Opportunity or Disaster? (Toronto: Ontario Inter-Church Committee on Public Education, 1969).
Encounter, involvement, and the clash of ideas can fruitfully take place within the concept of agape.

Lastly, we shall consider the concept of education. There is no adequate concept of education in the Mackay Report, certainly not one that is "geared to the reality of our times." Coles was right when he said that nowhere does the Mackay Committee directly ask the question, "What is education?" although the Report does contain a large amount of thinking about education. The Committee views education as involving two things: (1) the conveying of authentic information about religion; and (ii) the stimulating and nurturing of the development of persons. This two-fold objective is to be achieved by introducing a "program" of religious information and moral development which will pervade the entire curriculum from Kindergarten to Grade XIII. The best educational methods are to be used in this task, i.e., the use of audio-visuals, etc., plus the discussion technique.

The Committee is to be commended for seeking to integrate information "about" religion into the school curriculum and for its concern for the development of personhood. But we consider the Committee's concept of education to be inadequate because its basis rests on the developmental psychology of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Turiel, which, when applied educationally, results in a broadly based humanistic philosophy which assumes that religion is a matter of information and that moral development is a matter of moral reasoning. We do not deny the contributions of Piaget, et al.,

to developmental psychology, but we contend that their over-emphasis on the intellect has provided the Mackay Committee with the rationale to delimit education to the intellect and to underplay the role of the emotions and behaviour in learning theory.

This thesis is contending for a concept of education which says that religion has to do with all of life — social, political, cultural, economic, religious — and that moral development involves the "whole person" — his emotions, his reason, his behaviour — in the totality of his human existence. This concept has implications for our educational system: (i) it will necessitate an understanding of the dynamics of teaching religion; (ii) it will mean an understanding that moral development involves the "whole child" in the totality of his existence; (iii) it will mean utilizing the best educational methods available to implement the "program" of religious information and moral development; and (iv) it will have implications for teacher-training.

In the first place we believe that the teaching of religion is dialogue and not merely monologue. It is both personal and interpersonal in nature.

Rood, in his book, *The Art of Teaching Christianity*, contends that teaching Christianity is not unlike teaching anything else, yet it is different. It is different because the content of the Christian faith possesses a peculiar character which requires its teaching and learning to be unique. The content is unique because it conveys the revelation of God. That revelation is a self-revelation. In a sense, God is the content. In the teaching of Christianity, the mark of success is the surrender of the teaching role to the content. Further, the art of
teaching Christianity is the art of enabling dialogue in which the teacher enters into a dialogical relationship with the student in order, as Buber has said, "to put him (the student) again face to face with God."

What is important for us in Rood's remarks is that the teaching of religion is much more than the passing on of information. It is the "art of enabling dialogue" in which both teacher and student are encountered and grasped by Ultimate Reality. This concept has implications for teacher-training which we shall discuss later.

In the second place, we believe that moral development involves the "whole person" in the totality of his human existence and means, therefore, that the emotions, reason, behaviour, and the "totality of life" can provide meaningful learning experiences for the student.

Martin Buber, in Between Man and Man, underscores the impact that all of life has upon the student. He contends that "education worthy of the name is education of character." The concern is always with the "whole child". Who does the teaching? "Everything does," says Buber, "nature and the social context, the house and the street, language and custom, the world of history and the world of daily news in the form of rumour, of broadcast and newspaper, music and technical science, play and dream -- everything together . . . character is formed by the inter-penetration of all those multifarious, opposing influences. The educator, according to Buber, is only one element among other elements, but an important one. "For educating characters," Buber contends, "you do

---


71 Ibid., p.106.
not need a moral genius, but you do need a man who is wholly alive and able to communicate himself directly to his fellow beings." Such a teacher as this will need to gain the confidence of his pupil. Even though he may enjoy the confidence of his pupil the teacher cannot always expect agreement. Conflict must be met and dealt with in love. According to Buber, character is voluntary obedience to maxims which have been moulded in the individual by experiencing teaching and self-reflection. But it is only a form of self-control -- "outer obedience" -- and must be transformed into "inner obedience." Education of character, Buber writes, takes place through the encounter with the image of man that the teacher brings before the pupil in the material he presents and in the way he stands behind this material. "The educator", Buber says, "who helps to bring man back to his own unity, will help to put him again face to face with God."

All this has implications for the educative process in the development of persons. Moral development is not just a matter of teaching the child to reason morally. It means the development of character -- the "bringing of man back to his own unity" -- the "I" encountering the "Eternal Thou". It means an acceptance of the fact that "everything impresses" the "whole person", and that the classroom therefore should be the place where young people have the freedom to question their own values and commitments and the values and commitments of other people, and to attempt to find some answers to the problems of their existence. In this situation, the clash of ideas is inevitable, but growth and development will take place. Finally, it means too that the teacher will need special skills and training -- the inner freedom -- to enter into a dialogical relationship with the student, a relationship in which both teacher and pupil can discuss and
share commitments.

In the third place, we believe that the best educational methods available should be used to implement the 'program' of religious information and moral development. This includes the use of multi-media materials -- audio-visuals, books, etc., as well as the "discussion technique". We would also include enquiry-discovery-inductive type learning, which throws the spotlight on ways and means of involving students in searching and thinking. Warne has shown that this type of learning can handle all sorts of input -- emotional symbolic, dramatic, etc., besides the academic type of logical reasoning. It can also have built into it, he says, "the recognition that value systems are clashing, and that any process of understanding the morals involved will have to take due account of the conflicts of value systems in our society." The Hall-Dennis Report recognizes the possibilities of conflict in a pluralistic society. Our educational system should be cognizant of this fact and should provide the means whereby our young people are taught how to handle this conflict problem. Controversy should be allowed in the classroom. Indeed, we suggest that the problems confronting young people should be brought right into the classroom -- Swedish style -- and dealt with there. Involvement and controversy will take place, commitments will be made, but in this way our young people will grow and develop as persons.

In the fourth place, we believe that if religion has to do with all of life and if moral development involves the "whole person" then this will mean certain things in terms of teacher-training.

For one thing, if the teaching of religion is the "art of enabling dialogue" in which the "Thous" are encountered and grasped by the "Eternal
Thou" — then the teacher will have to provide the "setting" for this event to take place. We believe that an understanding of the teaching-learning process will prove invaluable to the teacher who is engaged in this task. This four-fold process -- hearing or listening, participation or voluntary involvement, exploration or analysis, and accepting responsibility or undertaking -- is based on the presupposition that it is important, not only to "hear" the content, but also to "respond" to it. The process may begin with any one of the four elements, but must include all the others. A brief outline will show what is involved in this process.

At some point the student must hear the "word" of God so that that "word" may speak to him and he may be enabled to respond to it. We believe that the "word" of God may be mediated to him through such things as sacred writings, "signs", and events. But the student must do more than listen; he must participate. He participates by identifying himself with the persons in the story or event as they listen to the "word" and struggle with the issues of life and death. This "word" then becomes God's "word" to him in his particular situation. Having heard the "word" and having participated in the event that that "word" has spoken about, the student then must move to exploring or analyzing. This means that he enters into the task of exploring the meaning and significance of his faith for his whole life. Having done this, the student then moves from analysis to action. He responds, he commits himself to the task which he considers to be his responsibility.

While the sequence of these elements may vary, all four are

essential if learning is to take place in the educative process of teaching religion. The process, it will be noted, puts the emphasis where it belongs, on a learning that involves the "whole person" and the whole of life. We believe that an understanding of this four-fold process will enable the teacher to provide the kind of setting which will be conducive to meaningful dialogue and which will eventuate in both teacher and student being grasped by Ultimate Reality.

For another thing, if the teacher is to support the student in his efforts to arrive at moral decisions without imposing his own beliefs and convictions on the student, then he will need the insights of a value theory which will enable him to function as an objective, non-authoritarian figure in the classroom and out of the classroom.

The Mackay Committee's concept of education implies a value theory but it does not state it explicitly. The bibliography in the Report lists Values and Teaching, a book which was written by Raths, Harmin, and Simon, and which may have influenced the Committee's thinking in terms of its "implicit" value theory. Raths et al., are concerned not so much with the particular values a student holds as they are with the process he uses to obtain them. They speak of a "process of valuing" and indicate the seven criteria which may be used to determine values: (i) Choosing freely; (ii) choosing from among alternatives; (iii) choosing thoughtfully of the consequences; (iv) prizing and cherishing; (v) affirming; (vi) acting; and (vii) repeating. If a student goes through these procedures then he is likely to arrive at a value that is valid. The aim of education,

73 I have summarized the ideas of Raths, et al., in chapters 3 and 5 of their book, Values and Teaching.
Raths *et al.* contend, is to try to raise the level of values. To do this they introduce the "Clarifying Response".

The basic approach to value clarifying rests on a specific method of responding to things a student says or does. For instance, a student may say, "Miss Jones, I'm going to Washington this weekend." The teacher could say, "That's nice," or she could say, "Going to Washington, are you? Are you glad you're going?" To sense the clarifying power in that response, Raths *et al.* ask us to imagine the student saying, "Come to think of it, I'm not glad I'm going. I'd rather play in the little league."

In the pages that follow, the authors of the book outline thirty "clarifying responses" which teachers may use to help students clarify their values and thereby raise "value indicators" e.g., goals, attitudes, beliefs, etc., to values.

This "process of valuing" has implications for those engaged in the educative process. Teachers will need to be trained to use this process in order to be able to help students clarify their values. It presupposes a "fundament of values" which is basic to the student's choosing and prizing; it lacks the "balance" of an ethic -- Christian or other than Christian; and it does call for certain abilities in terms of those who will use it.

This brings us to our last point: the teacher will need to be thoroughly trained in the discipline she expects to teach. No amateur or semi-qualified history teacher will be rated as competent to teach the "program" in religious information and moral development. In addition, she will need to be objective, sensitive to the needs of others, non-directive, and non-judgmental in her relationship with others, and will need the inner
freedom to enter into a dialogical relationship with her pupils without imposing her own beliefs and convictions upon them.

We believe that the "program" of religious information and moral development which we have proposed in this chapter is geared to the "reality of our times." It is non-sectarian; non-authoritarian; it is based on a three-dimensional concept of child development utilizing the contributions of leading developmental psychologists; it is consistent with the best educational principles known today; and it is designed to meet the needs of young people living in a pluralistic society in the last third of the twentieth century.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of the thesis has been to show that there are some disparities between the Mackay Report and the concerns of youth today. Our study of contemporary writing has shown that young people have concerns — real "felt-needs" — which have deep religious roots, and which will not have been met until youth have been provided with a religious interpretation of life.

We analyzed the Report to see if its basic concepts mirrored the concerns of youth as we have come to understand them through a study of contemporary writing. Our analysis showed that the main concepts did not reflect those concerns. We found the underlying philosophy to be untenable because it is a broadly-based humanistic philosophy which results in a "program" which fragments the "whole person", pre-supposes an idealized view of man, and fails to understand the personal and inter-personal nature of the teaching-learning process.

When we compared the concerns of youth in the Mackay Report with those expressed in contemporary writing, we found that there were differences in terms of understanding the needs of youth, the nature of society in which young people are called upon to live responsibly, and the interpretation and expression of those needs. Since the main concepts of the Report do not reflect the concerns of youth as we understand them as a result of our reading, and since there are differences between the needs of young people as expressed in the Mackay Report and in contemporary writing, we
therefore conclude that there are some disparities between the Mackay Report and the concerns of youth today.

Throughout our study we have been articulating certain presuppositions which are basic to this thesis: (i) religion has to do with all of life—social, political, cultural, economic, religious—and, therefore, there is no dichotomy between the "sacred" and the "secular"; (ii) morality necessarily pre-supposes a "fundament of values" and moral development involves the "whole person" in the totality of his existence; (iii) the teaching-learning process is both personal and inter-personal in nature. In this process, the emotions and behaviour, as well as reason, can provide valid learning experiences. Further, enquiry—inductive-type learning has advantages over the academic type of logical reasoning because it can handle all sorts of input—emotional, dramatic, etc., as well as logical reasoning; and (iv) youth today have concerns, real "felt-needs" that touch the very depths of their human existence. They want to know who they are, where they have come from, what they are doing, and where they are going. They want to question the value systems of an impersonal society which is threatening to destroy them, and they want the freedom to opt-out of society if they feel it necessary. Our schools are the place where our young people are "reasoning" and "developing" and producing a concept of ethics which cuts across our fetid values.

With the advent of the Mackay Report, religious education in the schools of Ontario "has come of age". There can be no return to the old system. As an alternative to the Mackay Committee recommendations, we have proposed in this thesis a "program" of religious information and moral development which, we feel, is the direction religious education must take.
if it is to meet the needs -- the real "felt-needs" -- of young people
as they seek to live responsible lives in such a time as this.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources


Canadian Jewish Congress (Central Region), Statement to the Minister of Education of the Province of Ontario, Toronto, February 9, 1970.


Report of the Special Committee on Church and Public Education. To the Synod of Toronto and Kingston of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, Galt, Ontario, October 17-19, 1969.


Strommen, Merton P.  Profiles of Church Youth.

Teaching Religion in Public Education, a "Four-Way Consultation" Conference on Teacher Training in Religion, sponsored by the Ontario Inter-Church Committee on Public Education, Port Credit, Ontario, October 22, 1968.


Secondary Sources


Appendix to Brief.

Documents for an Educational Ministry.  The Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in Canada.  Toronto: April, 1968.


*The Foundations of Education, A Brief of the Ontario Inter-Church Committee on Public Education,* April 1, 1966.

