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THE GENESIS OF KWAZULU

A Study of the Spatial Impact of State and Capital in South Africa, with Particular Reference to the Period between 1972 and 1975

By

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THESIS

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Wilfrid Laurier University

1977
It starts
as a murmur
from one mouth to another
in a rhythm of ribaldry
that rises to a crescendo
'Alelungu ngo'dam
Basibiza ngo Jim
Whites are damned
they call us Jim' Oswald Mtshali: The Roadgang's Cry

Cry, the beloved country, these things are not yet at an end. The sun pours down on the earth, on the lovely land that man cannot enjoy. He knows only the fear of his heart.

Alan Paton: Cry The Beloved Country

We do not want South Africa to be poor; but we do not desire any continuance of the system whereby our labour and foreign capital keep the present state of affairs indefinitely in existence.

Albert Luthuli: Let My People Go

Our fathers had their dreams: we have ours: the generation that follows will have its own. Without dreams and phantoms man cannot exist.

Olive Schreiner: The Story of an African Farm
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PREFACE

Development geography has traditionally concerned itself with describing regional economic disparities in a country and seeking normative remedies for the problem of uneven 'development'. Rarely was the problem perceived of as an historical process, or as a process which transcends national limits, or as an outcome of ideologically-based strategies. That is, development geographers ignored the structures of which underdevelopment is but a part. A departure from this orthodox type of approach is made here.

As an exercise in renovated development geography, this dissertation is by definition historico-political in nature. The notion of development may be equated, essentially, with progress toward a set of goals inherent in the ideology of a group or class of people. Oversimplified as this definition may be, it does help to explain why the development of the nation - national development - is often an arduous process whereby conflicting sub-national social groups pursue varying means toward different utopias. History is replete with the consequences of ideologically-based conflicts, and South Africa has not been spared. In that country, the search for happiness and security by a politically and economically dominant group has been unsuccessful, for that search has been at
the cost of unhappiness and insecurity among those excluded from the superordinate group. This study is concerned with aspects of the spatial impress of polity and economy in South Africa; or, put another way, it is concerned with the spatial expression of ideologies of the dominant group.

South Africa's population is categorised by its rulers into a number of groups on the basis of racial or ethnic differentiation. The economically and politically dominant group comprises whites (4.16 million in number in 1974), and it is at the hand of members of this group that segregation according to this categorisation is enforced. The numerically dominant group (numbering 17.75 million in 1974) is composed of Africans (blacks), exclusive of Coloureds (2.31 million in 1974), Indians (0.71 million in 1974), and other numerically less significant groups.

Africans, or blacks, are, in the dissertation, conceived of as constituting an internal colony within South Africa. Members of the African group, who are synonymously referred to as blacks in the dissertation, have been designated in the past as Natives and, in the nomenclature of today's rulers, as Bantu. Similarly, the locations and reserves of yesteryear, to which blacks have been relegated to varying degrees and under changing conditions, have undergone transformation in official notation. The terms location and reserve have been replaced by the term 'home-
land'. The latter concept complies with the development of apartheid, the ideology and practice of post-1948 segregation under the direction of the ruling National Party. In this study the terms Native, Bantu, and location are used only when contained in an official title (e.g. the name of a government department), or in quoted passages.

KwaZulu is the name attached to a complex of former reserves now constituting a 'homeland' which is situated in the South African province of Natal (see Map No. 1).

Besides introducing the objectives of the study and the research approach adopted, Chapter One also briefly sets KwaZulu in historical and spatial perspective. Thereafter, Chapter Two elaborates on the conceptual framework for the dissertation (i.e. internal colonialism) and attempts to illustrate the comparative applicability of different models for analysing the South African economy and society in their spatial and temporal dimensions. The third chapter returns to KwaZulu and attempts an analysis of KwaZulu's historical origins up to 1972. Whereas Chapter Three represents an outline of developments over more than one hundred years, the analysis is more detailed in Chapter Four where attention is concentrated on the years 1972 to 1975. It has been these years during which government has announced its partial consolidation plans for KwaZulu. Chapter Five specifies selected major
Map 1. Natal: Orientation
implications of the government's consolidation proposals. Finally, Chapter Six endeavours, as a synthesis of the study, to formulate some important questions about the future of development and underdevelopment in the Republic of South Africa. A number of maps, including one showing a selection of place names in Natal, are appended to the text and may interest the reader unfamiliar with Natal (Appendix A).
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I record my thanks to the following, and with apologies if my interpretation of the complexities of the South African situation is not as clear as their help and encouragement invariably was — to Professor R.J. Davies of the University of Cape Town and to Dr. Bruce Young, my supervisor at W.L.U. and formerly of the University of Natal(Durban). For their comments on an early draft of the thesis, I thank also the members of my thesis committee, Dr. Josephine Naidoo, of the Psychology Department at W.L.U., Dr. Barry Boots, of the Geography Department at W.L.U., and Dr. Ron Bullock of the University of Waterloo. A special word of thanks is due to the typist who so graciously cut short a sojourn in warmer climes to have the thesis ready in record time. Finally, I sincerely record the encouragement and assistance of my parents in Durban, who understood when I left to contemplate from afar and when I returned to Natal for several months in 1976 to collect data for this thesis.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The objectives and scope of the research project are defined in this chapter (1.2). A section briefing the historical geographical base of KwaZulu follows (1.3). Finally, the data sources and methods for the research are outlined (1.4) and the research intentions summarised (1.5).

1.2 Objectives and Scope

Despite the implementation of apartheid being fundamentally a spatial exercise, its implications have received limited attention in geographical literature (Smith, 1976), and there is a dearth of geographical work on the role of the state and of capital in moulding the South African space economy through its evolution. Remarkable too is the apparent disregard in the geographical literature for theories of colonialism and underdevelopment, currently applied in other social sciences, which might assist the geographer to comprehend the contemporary spatial pattern in South Africa, particularly in terms of its genesis.

The problem at hand, therefore, is a manifold one of conceptualisation and of establishing the empirical association between discernable economic and social forces in South Africa and the territorial makeup of KwaZulu.
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the creation and manipulation of the territorial base of KwaZulu, with primary focus upon recent attempts by South Africa's government partially to consolidate KwaZulu into ten non-contiguous segments. This action is explored with special attention being paid to the manner in which KwaZulu was arranged as a response to white economic and political interests and aspirations; to the part played by blacks in the establishment and sanctioning of the partial consolidation schemes; and, to the way in which the schemes promote or hinder peaceful change toward a system wherein the fruits of South Africa's labour and material resources are equitably distributed.

Conceptual foundations for the study originate from theories of colonialism and development and under-development, and are assembled and presented within the internal colonialism model (discussed in detail in Chapter Two).

1.3 KwaZulu in Brief

The territorially dismembered KwaZulu 'homeland' is encapsulated by Natal (see Map No.2). Natal Province was administered as a colony by Britain 1845 until 1910 (Zululand was annexed to Natal in 1897), when it became one of the four provinces in the Union of South Africa\textsuperscript{1}. Under British colonial administration and during the rule
MAP 2. KwaZulu: December 1971
of Union government various legislative acts laid the foundations for a system of reserving land for exclusive settlement by indigenous blacks within Natal and facilitated the territorial fragmentation of Zululand (see 3.3).

After 1948, when the current regime came to power, an ideology of apartheid (later termed 'separate development' by proponents of the ideology) moved government to work toward maintaining the system of reserves with a view eventually to giving these areas political independence from South Africa. Government clustered the original reserves in South Africa into ten fragmented complexes, which it called 'homelands', and allocated them to various tribal groupings (or 'national units') in the country. The end result of apartheid policy, then, would be a 'white' South Africa containing a number of politically independent 'black' states, of which a dissected KwaZulu would be one. Success thus far, from the apartheid perspective, may be measured in Transkei's attainment of political independence on 26th October, 1976 and indications that another 'homeland', Bophuthatswana, will acquire that status in December, 1977.

At present, KwaZulu consists of forty eight blocks of land and over one hundred smaller tracts ('black spots'), amounting to 3,155,000ha and carrying in 1970 a de facto population of approximately 4,018,000(Maasdorp, 1974).
Official policy would have it that all six million people classified by government as Zulu ultimately become citizens of an independent state of KwaZulu.

Government has, during the last four years, proposed plans to consolidate KwaZulu into ten segments. Such action demands large-scale resettlement of blacks, mostly from one rural area to another, and the granting of fiscal compensations to the relatively few whites whose land is delimited now as KwaZulu territory, and who are expected to migrate to 'white' territory.

While Black response to the implementation of apartheid has not been insignificant, government has proceeded apace in pursuance of its segregationist goals. Reaction from blacks has come as outright refusals to co-operate with the white government, in the form of violence; it has come in the form of worker strikes against conditions symptomatic of a discriminatory labour policy; and it has come in a form 'legitimised' by government, from those operating the government-designed KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. Black politicians are utilising the consolidation issue to parry government's attempts to give KwaZulu political independence, and their approach as well as the other voices of black opposition command some attention in the dissertation.
1.4 Data and Methodology

The data analysed in this study are largely empirical or empirically-based and were collected from primary and secondary sources in South Africa. Although most of the information was gathered during research in various libraries in Natal, information was also sought by correspondence with relevant officials and other individuals and organisations.

Primary material comprising descriptive and quantitative data was found in colonial and post-colonial Blue Books on Native Affairs, in census and other official statistical reports, and in Hansard reports on Parliamentary proceedings. Primary material reflecting official attitudes was derived from Hansard and from reports of officials to government, either in the form found in Blue Books or such as is found in official correspondence and in the reports of government-initiated commissions of inquiry. The latter reports contain also evidence submitted by witnesses to the commissions.

Secondary sources, including both published works and unpublished theses, provided much in the way of quantitative data, as well as assisting in the framing of the historical perspective of the dissertation.

Information pertaining to the post-1970 consolida-
tion issue and other recent developments originates mainly from Natalian press reports, other pertinent documents (especially critiques of the consolidation proposals), and personal observation.

Natal in its economic, social, political, and territorial dimensions is the structure, the composition of which is of interest here. Stating parameters as such is not to deny that the components mentioned belong also to a larger structure, the South African political-space economy, say; or that that larger structure is nested within other structures of economy and society, of development and underdevelopment, and so on. An exposition of the relationships within and among these structures is later seen to be fundamental to an explanation of international patterns of development and underdevelopment.

The relationships under scrutiny in the ensuing chapters are those between white owners of land (i.e. capital) and the state, between those landowners and the land, and between black occupants of the land and each of the other three elements.

Depth is sought in the level of reality exemplified by ideology. Ideology is taken to mean the body of ideas commonly shared by a social group or social class, and whereby group or class interests are rationalised. Insight
into the ideologies of landowners, of government, and of blacks, respectively, is vital to an understanding of the dynamics of the South African space economy, for these ideologies represent bonds of cohesion and motivation for group action.

1.5 Summary of Intentions

This study:

1) Examines the roles of government, white landowners, and blacks in creating, delimiting, and altering KwaZulu over time.

2) Outlines government's partial consolidation proposals for KwaZulu and analyses the roles of the abovementioned actors in formulating, defending, and opposing these proposals.

3) Posits some potential major problems arising from the consolidation proposals.

4) Offers, through synthesis, a contribution toward the development of the geography of development and under-development, particularly as it relates to South Africa.
CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE

2.1 Introduction

An analytical framework for the dissertation is erected in this chapter. Firstly, the bearing of ideology on the geography of development is discussed (2.2). Thereafter, the concepts of development, underdevelopment, colonialism, and dependence are considered (2.3) and this provides a springboard for the building of a model of internal colonialism through extrapolation from these concepts and from the work of Hechter (1975) (2.4). The model is contrasted with others (2.5), and a summary statement of its applicability to South African socio-economic structures is presented (2.6).

2.2 Ideology and Development Geography

A growing awareness of the negative repercussions of development and the impress of historical factors in underdeveloped regions has been accompanied by an abundance of publications reflecting changing theoretical and analytical tendencies in the social sciences. Within geography, the last five years have seen the emergence and growth of a school of thought founded during the 'social relevance' era of the early seventies and having now as frames of reference generally socialistic texts, often with a Marxist or neo-Marxist bent.
As noted by Santos (1974), a reliance on Marx is not a novelty in broader geographic traditions. However, the trend noted is certainly an innovation among Anglophone geographers. Santos (1974) also calls attention to the degree to which Marx provides a pertinent source for geographers, especially those concerned with underdevelopment. Following Santos' (1974) line of questioning, discussion in this section revolves around the contents of selected recent publications and seeks to clarify the relationships between ideology and analytical concepts in geographical studies of development and underdevelopment.

A number of geographers have been striving, since about 1973, to inform their confreres about the presence of ideologies which shape geographic research methodologies. They have suggested, furthermore, that geographers should change their ideological stances since the results of their research perpetuates the status quo; a societal condition (viz. capitalism) not conducive, it is argued, to social equity or egalitarianism. Examples of such ideas are found in articles by Anderson (1973), Slater (1973), Blaut (1974), Harvey (1974), and Olsson (1974). Blaut (1974) makes the point that while the values of many geographers in capitalist countries are rooted in an agreeable conception of the need for change to achieve social justice, their methodologies and thus research results are inappropriate contributions toward this goal. Attention may also be drawn to
the fact that much research is constrained by the elites of society who, directly or indirectly, finance and utilise social research and its results.

Ideological transformations have altered the direction of development geography, and the changing emphasis within this branch of the discipline is considered firstly by reference to a critique of orthodox development geography by Slater (1973). The contributions of de Souza and Porter (1974), Brookfield (1975), and Santos (1974; 1975) are then introduced as representatives of the van in a changing paradigm for development geography.

Slater (1973) cogently illustrates the weaknesses inherent in the three modes of analysis widely applied by development geographers. He links the three modes - spatial differentiation (duality and centre-periphery models); spatial diffusion (modernization theory); and spatial integration (models of national integration) - to a distinct ideology and argues that the ideology must be changed if sound theories of development and underdevelopment are to be established. Slater (1973) posits the opinion that the weak theoretical base of orthodox development geography may be traced to '...the capitalist ideology that conditions the choice of the problem, the type of data collected, the method of analysis employed, and the identification of conclusions for planning' (Slater, 1973). The remedy for this crisis, he maintains, is '...not just a reformist readjustment of some of the most
distorted tenets of capitalist ideology, but a total abolition of the ideology itself and the development of a Marxist-orientated geography, which...goes to the historical roots of underdevelopment as manifested at all spatial levels, incorporating explanations of internal spatial structures of underdevelopment into the framework of the political economy of imperialism' (Slater, 1973).

The views expressed by Slater (1973) are relatively new in the geographical literature but reflect ideas expounded for some years in other social sciences. Frank (1967; 1969; 1972), for example, has dealt with underdevelopment as a process concomitant with colonialism and capitalism. His works have been widely read and have received not a little criticism from economists and sociologists (see, e.g., the critiques in Oxaal, Barnett, and Booth, 1975).

Emmanuel (1972) also has recently supplemented his treatise on the distribution of capital and the unequal exchange of capital with labour on a global scale. In a recent article he reiterates the necessity of studying underdevelopment as a phenomenon related with development in other parts of the world, i.e. underdevelopment is seen to be a function of the development of international capitalism (Emmanuel, 1974).

de Souza and Porter (1974) propound a dialectical geography and cite Harvey (1973) as the protagonist of this approach in geography. While their book has some appeal as a review of an extensive range of literature on development, underdevelopment, and modernization, the authors fail
to distinguish clearly between modernization and development (a common failing among orthodox geographers). An early contribution to a changing paradigm in geography, the work is, as stated in its preface, only a 'starting point', and provides, as such, little insight into the current state of development geography.

Brookfield (1975), after a more thorough and more extensive review of geographical and non-geographical literature than de Souza and Porter (1974), professes the foundations for a theory of interdependent development. While accepting socialistic conceptions of imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism, and dubbing himself a neo-Marxist, Brookfield (1975) proceeds to state his disenchantment with the prospect of a purely Marxist geography. Besides his rejection of the authority of Marx, Brookfield (1975) also demonstrates non-acceptance of the Marxist image of class struggle. For his treatment of the notion of dependence, his work will be of interest to development geographers, although this does not necessarily imply their acceptance of his interpretation of global patterns of development and underdevelopment. He mentions the dependence of developed states on underdeveloped states and vice-versa, and tends thus to intensify the propagation of the concept of interdependent development. (This concept is dealt with again in the next section, 2.3.)
Santos (1974;1975) is cautious in his treatment of Marxism as a potential foundation for the study of underdevelopment and his apparent effort at vindicating Harvey (1973) is a demonstration of his dissociation from a dogmatic Marxism. He recognises in Harvey's (1973) work a Marxist methodology but, it can be inferred, does not regard Harvey (1973) as a 'pure' Marxist: 'It is fortunate that D. Harvey is speaking of a method and not a doctrine' (Santos, 1975). Santos (1975) is prepared to accept Marxist concepts but not unconditionally so; hence the caveat 'It is by studying the very notion of historic time, which is basic to the Marxist method, that one can understand why some of Marx's interpretations have become inadequate; the method therefore remains necessary. But it is important to avoid the snare of temporal myopia...' (Santos, 1975). Finally, in Santos' (1975) paper a global approach to the problem of underdevelopment through domination is discerned, along with his rejection of 'pure' Marxism for geography: 'The facts, universally acknowledged to be true for our time, are the following: an increased need to accumulate capital, attended by its concentration and the necessity for its circulation on a world-wide scale; the control of production and consumption by multi-national firms at the international level, through monopoly, research and all-powerful advertising. These new conditions, dating from after the second World War, invalidate any study which, taking Marx as its authority, seeks to reinterpret his ideas without taking account of the renewal of historical categories' (Santos, 1975).

Regardless of discord on certain conceptual issues, the combined appeal of Slater (1973), Brookfield (1975), and Santos (1974;1975), is for a geography of development and
underdevelopment freed from capitalist ideology. Perhaps the paramount feature then of the changed paradigm in development geography is that it has exposed the import of ideology in studies of the spatial consequences of any given socio-economic structure. Theory rooted in capitalist ideology evades the realities of the development of capitalism. The occurrence of underdevelopment in societies linked into the international capitalist economy is not recognised in orthodox development geography as an offshoot of the development of capitalism. It follows that the theories of orthodox development geography have tended to advocate 'development' in underdeveloped regions by the very means which originally gave rise to regional economic and social disparities.

2.3 Colonialism, Dependence, and Underdevelopment

The ideologies which have spawned the nascent paradigm in development geography have, besides revealing the strictures of orthodox development geography, introduced also to the discipline concepts which have hitherto been either eschewed or simply taken for granted. Particular emphasis is devoted in the present section to the concepts of colonialism, dependence, and underdevelopment.

Colonialism has received some, albeit scant, analytically critical attention from geographers. Robequain (1941) dealt with problems of colonialism in the Netherlands
East Indies. The first of his two papers threw light on the types of European colonisation; the second dealt with the indigenous economy of the Netherlands East Indies. Characteristic of colonialism was the concentration of European capital in enormous land tracts which changed hands among anonymous companies ('societes anonymes') by means of transactions in the stock exchanges of Amsterdam, London, New York, and Paris. Citing evidence from 1937, Robequain (1941) detailed how, in Java, almost a half million ha. of privately owned land was in the hands of 119 proprietors.

Five years later, the same author, in a more far-reaching study, asserted that 'Security on the seas and penetration into new countries were twin designs dictated to the Western nations by their hunger for raw materials to feed their industries and supply the demands of the swarms of workers' (Robequain, 1946:320). The fulfilment of these aims was provided by the Malay world of the East Indies.

Robequain (1946) aside, very few geographers endeavoured to explain the spatial processes of colonialism in any great depth until the 1970's when the search for 'relevance', social justice, and new theory encouraged analyses of the determinants of spatial inequities at all levels in society. An early work accompanying this new wave of interest was Brookfield's Colonialism, Development and Dependence (1972).
Brookfield (1972) writes of colonialism as '...a thoroughgoing, comprehensive and deliberate penetration of a local or "residentiary" system by the agents of an external system, who aim to restructure the patterns of organisation, resource use, circulation and outlook so as to bring these into a linked relationship with their own system' (Brookfield, 1972:1 ff). He remarks on the value of separating the economic, political, and cultural forces stimulated by the 'agents of the external system' and also enunciates an early critique of diffusionist theories of development, which neglect the potential negative repercussions of these forces. Brookfield (1972) suggests that modernization is a phase following in the wake of imperialism which may not auger well for development in a politically independent ex-colony.

These contributions by geographers notwithstanding, conceptual clarification is sought in this study outside of the discipline and recourse is made to works emanating from disciplines which have, until now, experienced closed familiarity with colonialism, dependence, underdevelopment, and internal colonialism.

Empire-building by the states of western Europe involved an expansion of political and economic authority and control over territories spatially separated from the metropolitan seat of empire. A plethora of meanings is attached to the concept of imperialism, the force which
germinated colonialism, and the scope of this study precludes a review of literature surrounding the term. What is of concern here is the theory of colonialism, which relates to the structures embodied in and sustaining the colony. Whereas a theory of imperialism would represent a form of explanation of the ideologies inspiring colonialism and the concomitant economic stimulus for territorial expansionism, a theory of colonialism encompasses an exposition of ideologies and manifestations thereof particularly within the colony. Of course, the relationship between metropole and colony may not be ignored for it is vital to an understanding of the evolution, transformation, or demise of colonialism. Of imperialism then, suffice it to state, following Barratt-Brown(1974), that 'At all times the concept of imperialism has been used to encompass the outward drive of certain peoples...to build empires - both formal colonies and privileged positions in markets, protected sources of materials and extended opportunities for profitable employment of labour' (Barratt-Brown,1974: 22).

Brett(1973) furnishes a lucid statement on the nature of colonialism and underdevelopment and their interrelationship. Colonialism, contends Brett(1973), can be traced to ideologies within the metropolitan country and in the colony, and he offers an analysis of the social, economic, and political structures of colonialism, relating them to the ideologies of the colonial ruling class.
Brett (1973) endorses the view that 'Capitalism had evolved organically in the areas of origin, but it was injected into the colonial world from the outside...' (Brett, 1973:34). The ideological impulse for this injection came from a colonial ruling class, whose values embodied the assumptions that '...the colonized peoples were not capable of governing themselves "under the strenuous conditions of the modern world", and that the relationship between the interests of colonized and colonizer was an essentially reciprocal and creative rather than an explo­itative and contradictory one' (Brett, 1973:41).

Capitalism was introduced into the colonies under political and economic conditions specific to each colony. This differential form of evolution of British colonies arose from '. . .the ideological presuppositions introduced into...(each)...situation by the new governing class, and those originating in the exigencies of the local social sit­uation which they had to bring under their own control' (Brett, 1973:43). Ultimately, however, colonialism relied on the continuing economic and political subjugation of the colonised. Institutionalisation to maintain this state of affairs restricted political repre­sentation of the colonised and encouraged pre-colonial modes of production among the colonised. The objective usually was to assure cheap labour for settler agriculture and industry, thus further entrenching expatriate power within the colony as well as motivating further capital investment from the metropolitan country.
Colonialism, in its political dimension at least, has not persisted and while many of its spatial characteristics have been retained in various independent states no longer under colonial administration, certain of its other inherent structures have left the ex-colonies in a state of dependence *vis-à-vis* some exogenous power. Brett (1973) outlines the connection between the legacy of colonialism, dependence, development, and underdevelopment in a number of succinct definitions. Development, for him, denotes "...a change process characterized by increased productivity, equalization in the distribution of the social product, and the emergence of indigenous institutions whose relations with the outside world...are characterized by equality rather than by dependence or subordination" (Brett, 1973:18). Conversely, underdevelopment denotes "...a condition of dependence - one in which the activities of a given society are subjected to the overriding control of an external power over which it can exert little direct influence" (Brett, 1973:18). Finally, "Colonialism can be accused of "the development of underdevelopment" if it can be shown that its impact upon local society was such that it created a situation in which the latter could only continue to function by continuing to accept dependence on the dominant external powers" (Brett, 1973:18).

The concept of dependence stems from the works of nationalist or socialist anti-imperialist theorists in Latin America (Chilcote and Edelstein, 1974). It has been utilised in many settings, including Africa (Amin, 1972) and Canada (cf. Levitt, 1970; Laxer, 1973). Dependence as a concept in development studies has profited much from the critiques of
Frank’s work (e.g. Oxaal, Barnett, and Booth, 1975); and although attempts have been made to condemn the validity of its use (e.g. Lall, 1975), no alternative more feasible concept has been advanced to describe the fundamental link between development and underdevelopment in integrated economic systems.

For Brookfield (1975), the concept of dependence underpins his theory of interdependent development. Regrettably, Brookfield’s (1975) discourse on interdependent development tends to cloud the precise nature of interdependence. It is assumed here that ‘...the continuing interest of metropolitan capitalists in the underdeveloped countries, where today this involves investment in manufacturing more than in primary production, implies some economic development, but dependent development...’ (Barratt-Brown, 1974: 284), and further, as Brookfield (1975) would agree, some interdependence too. However, the balance of benefits is not encompassed in the term ‘interdependent development’ and this deficiency gives rise to the notion of symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependence.

Chilcote (1974) clarifies the theoretical association between dependence and internal colonialism, in which case a peripheral society is dependent upon a society at the economic core of a country. He also draws attention to the new structures of dependence whereby foreign firms replace the colonial metropole in dominating the economy
of an underdeveloped state. These structures are dealt with in the following section and again in Chapter Five.

2.4 Internal Colonialism

Hechter (1975) formulates a model of internal colonialism and demonstrates its utility in his study of the disadvantaged Celtic 'fringe' in the context of Britain's development between the years 1536 and 1966. The postulates and conclusions of Hechter's (1975) analysis are enlarged upon and reinforced here by way of reference to other approaches to internal colonial structures; in particular to those dealing with internal colonialism in South Africa.

National development, according to Hechter (1975), may come about in the process '...by which a state characterized by sectional, or otherwise competing economies, politics, and cultures, within a given territory, is transformed into a society composed of a single, all-pervasive, and in this sense "national" economy, polity, and culture' (Hechter, 1975:17). Impediments to national development may thus be broken down into problems of cultural, economic, and political integration and/or separation. The overriding problem of integration is rooted in the existence of '...two collectivities or objectively distinct cultural groups: (1) the core, or dominant cultural group which occupies territory extending from the political center of the society (e.g. the locus of the central government) outward to those territories largely occupied by the subordinate, or (2) peripheral cultural group' (Hechter, 1975:18).
The dimensions of the model in spatial, economic, political, and cultural terms are postulated by Hechter (1975) as follows: "The spatially uneven wave of modernization over state territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage, there is crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. The superordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system. It attempts to regulate the allocation of social roles such that those roles commonly defined as having high prestige are reserved for its members. Conversely, individuals from the less advanced group are denied access to these roles. This stratification system, which may be termed a cultural division of labor, contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups. Actors come to categorize themselves and others according to the range of roles each may be expected to play. They are aided in this categorization by the presence of visible signs, or cultural markers, which are seen to characterize both groups. At this stage, acculturation does not occur because it is not in the interests of institutions within the core" (Hechter, 1975:9).

From these conditions (which aptly apply to the South African case) arises the internal colony, which Hechter (1975) equates with the periphery. Hechter (1975) asserts, furthermore, that when the periphery suffers economic disadvantages as well as being culturally distinct "...the likelihood of increasing regional equality appears to be even more remote" (Hechter, 1975:133). This argument he illustrates by way of reference to the consequences of industrialization in Britain (i.e. the 'spatially uneven
wave of modernization') for regional equity. He is able to conclude that: 'Group consciousness among the Welsh and Scottish in the nineteenth century arose around cultural symbols which differentiated these regions from England; whereas in the twentieth century such consciousness has been stimulated by an awareness of persisting regional underdevelopment. Bureaucratic administration seldom seems to enable less advantaged groups to achieve resources equal to those of the dominant groups. Hence disadvantaged groups are likely to demand that decision-making be "localized" so that their special problems might become appreciated and therefore taken into account in the allocation process' (Hechter, 1975:310).

Only a few salient aspects of Hechter's (1975) model have been extracted to provide the basis upon which to devise a model of internal colonialism pertinent to the South African situation. Clearly, Hechter (1975) has presented a conflict model of national development under given conditions. For him '...national development may be inhibited by the desires of the peripheral group for independence from a situation perceived to be exploitative' (Hechter, 1975:10). This feature of his model is worthy of special attention and is taken up again in the next section of the chapter.

As Hechter (1975) remarks, his model is yet imperfect and one significant point of ambiguity lies in the territorial expression of internal colonialism. When he writes of core and periphery he is applying the terms to conscious
collectivities and not necessarily to the spatial arrange-
ment of society, although he does imply that the core
(cultural group) and the core (spatial locus of capital and
power) may coincide - 'The core collectively practices dis-
 crimination against the culturally distinct peoples who
have been forced onto less accessible inferior lands' (Hech-
ter, 1975:32). Hechter (1975) pronounces his ambiguous stand
on the territoriality of internal colonialism in a reference
to Blauner's (1969) consideration of American blacks as an
internal colony. Casanova (1965) and Stavenhagen (1965)
offer no finite resolution to this problem although they
too imply a coincidence of spatial peripherality and econo-
mic disadvantage on the one hand and wealth generated by
the exploitation of the rural populace with economic and
urban cores on the other hand.

In the South African instance, Carter, Karis, and
Stultz (1967) analyse the Transkei as a 'domestic colony'.
Historical analysis leads them to equate the relationship
between Transkei and government in South Africa with
imperialistic forces from which originated colonialism.
In the latter case, colonialism was nurtured in a ter-
ritory divorced from the metropolitan colonial power,
whereas domestic colonialism signals colonialism with-
in the territory of the colonising state. Regrettably,
their theoretical formulations are somewhat limited.
Wolpe (1975) develops a stronger theoretical framework in his application of the internal colonialism model to South Africa. He establishes the association between territorial deprivation and spatial and cultural peripherality in noting that "...the "underdeveloped" (and "underdeveloping") condition of subordinate ethnic and racial groups and the geographical areas they occupy within the boundaries of the state, is produced and maintained by the same mechanisms of cultural domination, political oppression, and economic exploitation which, at the international level, produce the development of the advanced capitalist states through the imperialist underdevelopment of the colonial satellites" (Wolpe, 1975). Elsewhere, it is stated that "The convergence, albeit unevenly, of economic and political powerlessness with "blackness", together with the legitimating racial ideology, gives the society its unique internal colonial nature..." (Wolpe, 1970).

Wolpe (1975) contemplates the integration of labour from the black areas of South Africa into the 'capitalist circuit of production' and arrives at the conclusion that "This "crossing" of different modes of production modifies the relationship between wages and the cost of reproducing labour-power in favour of capital. It is precisely this relationship which is the foundation of "internal colonialism" in South Africa" (Wolpe, 1975).

2.5 Internal Colonialism versus Other Models

The problem of inadequacies of orthodox models of development is aggravated for the student of development in South Africa, where the subjugation of blacks by whites is accompanied by the territorial segregation of the population on an ethnic basis to forge a spatial pattern of
Geographers have contributed to a description of the spatial polarisation of the South African economy in a few dominant cores (e.g. Fair, 1975), and they have noted the authority-dependency relationship between core and periphery in South Africa (Schmidt, 1975). The level of understanding attained, however, has been impeded because development in South Africa has usually been conceptualised by geographers as a problem of economic integration, and this at the national scale. Thus, while the spatial pattern of economic concentration and regional spread of economic productivity have been described, there has been a failure to explain the processes of capitalist development and related underdevelopment. Theories of economic integration lead the analyst to the conclusion that development may be achieved by opening the way for increased capital investment from developed regions or countries in underdeveloped areas. That is, answers in the quest for development are being sought within the paradigm which inspires core development, and peripheral underdevelopment is not necessarily perceived as a function of core development, or in its relationship with the development of capitalism outside of South Africa. The actual mechanisms which gave rise to the economic core-periphery dichotomy in the first place are taken for granted and it is in these workings that the answers must be.
On similar grounds, there are those who suggest that the devices of modernization, if diffused throughout the space economy, will lead to the elimination of under-development. Criticisms of this view (e.g. Brockfield, 1973) generally point to the fact that modernization usually implies an introduction of capitalism into pre-capitalist society and functions to benefit development at metropolitan cores to the detriment of the periphery.

Criticisms which may be levelled at discourses on development through a process of modernization may equally well be posited against theories of development through innovation diffusion in space. Diffusion of innovations must be subjected to deeper analysis before it may be argued that the diffusion process is concomitant with development. The innovations need to be understood as modified or novel instruments either for the perpetuation or for the change of socio-economic structures. It may well be that an innovation, as it is diffused through space, works to accelerate development at the core and underdevelopment at the periphery. Expressed in these terms, it is not difficult to visualise a possible conformity between the notion of modernisation and that of innovation diffusion.

Integrationist and diffusionist theories may find more valid application in non-exploitative settings, but
so long as exploitative structures of economy and society survive, these structures must be analysed in terms of an alternative theory, namely conflict theory. Until the structures upholding core-periphery discrimination in the distribution of the social product are eradicated, conflict theory predicts confrontation within society.

Hechter (1975) summarises the distinction between diffusion models of development and the internal colonialism model as follows: 'Given similar initial conditions, the mutual isolation of core and periphery, these models...predict different outcomes for national development following the heightening of interaction between these regions. While the diffusion model predicts a lessening of regional economic inequalities, the internal colonial model predicts that these will persist or increase. While the diffusion model suggests the probability of peripheral acculturation, the internal colonial model suggests the likelihood of an assertion of the peripheral culture in reaction to domination of the core. Finally, while the diffusion model states that functional political cleavages should characterize political behavior in all regions of the society, the internal colonial model states that political cleavages will largely reflect significant cultural differences between groups' (Hechter, 1975:10).

2.6 Summary

Development geography is undergoing transformation. Redefinitions in the discipline are largely responses to shifting ideological commitments on the part of its practitioners. Among the repercussions of this evident change has been the elevation of certain theories to supersede
those currently applied in South Africa.

In this chapter, the internal colonialism model has been put forward as an appropriate substitute for models which are found to be wanting when it comes to isolating the problem of underdevelopment in South Africa.

The spatially uneven wave of modernization under the control of white settlers and capitalists; the racial division of labour and associated discriminatory wage structure; and the political subjugation of blacks in South Africa are criteria which denote blacks in South Africa as an internal colony. Theoretically, this places blacks in a position of dependence upon the core, and with increasing dependence blacks will seek to terminate the socio-economic structures of exploitation. These issues and the question of the territorial basis for the internal colony are addressed in the following chapters, in terms of the spatial impact of state and capital in Natal.
CHAPTER THREE
TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION OF NATAL

3.1 Introduction

The interplay among the parties concerned with the question of land partitioning in Natal is dealt with in this chapter. Discussion focusses on the relationship between state and capital and their combined role in implementing the fragmentation of Natal. The narrative begins with the origins of the reserve system in nineteenth century colonial Natal, and ends with a portrayal of the condition of KwaZulu in 1971 - sixty years after the establishment of Union and ten years after the Union had become the Republic of South Africa. The chapter exposes how the territorial fragmentation of Natal (3.2) was followed by the penetration and fragmentation of Zululand by white interests (3.3). Developments between 1910 and 1971 are then considered (3.4). Ideological transformations at the core before 1971 are dealt with (3.5), and peripheral responses are outlined (3.6). KwaZulu is then set in the perspective of the South African space economy in 1971 (3.7), before the partial consolidation proposals were made. A brief summary of the chapter is then presented (3.8).

3.2 The Reserves

Settlement of whites in Natal commenced in 1824
with the first English residents at Port Natal (Durban). Shortly afterwards, across the Drakensberg mountains in the west of the territory came Voortrekkers who established government over 'Natalia' in 1838, a year after their arrival. Under the Volksraad, farms of 2,500ha were generally allocated gratis to all white citizens of the Natalia Republic, some receiving two for services considered meritorious by the community (Christopher, 1971). An influx of thousands of Zulus into Natalia in flight from wars in Zululand alarmed the Volksraad and its members resolved in 1841 to pressure all refugees into the area between the Mtamvuma and Mzimvubu rivers (Welsh, 1971).

British intervention in the political affairs of the region prevented the Volksraad resolution from ever reaching fruition. Earlier refusals by British government to annex the settlement at Port Natal were reversed in an assertion of sovereignty over the entire colony of Natal in 1843 and the appointment of Henry Cloete as British Lands Commissioner in Natal (Welsh, 1971). Intervention culminated in the annexation of Natal as a British colony in 1845, after two years as a district of Britain's Cape Colony, and it was accorded the status of responsible government by the imperial government in 1893.

Within a few months of annexation in 1843, a Locations Commission was set up by the colonial government
Map 3. Natal: Magisterial Districts
to provide reserves for the blacks in Natal, whom by Cloete's estimates numbered between 80,000 and 100,000 in that year (Welsh, 1971). The establishment of locations, or reserves, was perceived as necessary '...because freehold ownership not only was an unknown concept to the tribal African but also would have exposed him to the danger of land-hungry Europeans' (Brookes and Hurwitz, 1957:1). In its report of March, 1847, the commission recommended that provision be made for about ten reserves interspersed among white farms and each accommodating 10,000 blacks so that individual black families would have about 40ha of land suitable for grazing and crop production (Brookes and Hurwitz, 1957). Although these conditions were not realised in their entirety, the creation of reserves had already begun with the demarcation in November, 1846 of the Zwartkop reserve for about 8,000 blacks (see Map No. 4). In March, 1847 the Umvoti, Umlazi, and Inanda reserves were demarcated (Brookes and Hurwitz, 1957). By 1849, with the addition of the Umzinyati, Impofana, and Kahlamba reserves, there were seven reserves in Natal (Brookes and Hurwitz, 1957).

The outcome of the 1849 Land Commission in Natal was an easing of existing constraints on land by government to whites and the immediate repercussion of the commission's recommendations was the division of over 300,000ha among 360 white claimants, amongst whom were many of Natal's leading land speculators (Slater, 1975). Slater (1975) establishes the association between land speculation in colonial
Map 4. Natal: Colonial Reserves, 1859
(Reproduced from Brookes and Hurwitz, 1957:7)
Natal and London-based capital as well as linking capital with political interests in the colony. Thus, the '...interests of the colonial merchant-landowners coincided with those of powerful interest groups in the metropolis' (Slater, 1975).

Among the means of extracting profitable returns on land investments was the promotion of settlement schemes in Natal which would give to British immigrants land and employment in an ostensibly thriving cotton growing region. The plots of land involved were sufficiently small for immigrants either to purchase further land from the speculators or to abandon farming and re-sell their land to the land-holding companies. So it was that by 1860, fifteen of the leading speculators in Natal owned 283,400ha of land (Christopher, 1969; Slater, 1975).

The Natal Land and Colonisation Company, the major firm engaged in land speculation, had 'powerful friends' (Slater, 1975) in London and some of the senior company officials were in Natal's Legislative Council. During a dispute following the stagnation of the colonial sector of the rural economy (due to labour and capital shortages), two of Natal's largest landowners campaigned in the Legislative Council to force blacks living on white farms to work for the whites (Slater, 1975). On the other side, many landowners, including the Natal Land and Col-
organisation Company, lobbied for a system by which landowners would extract rent in the form of cash or produce from black 'tenants'. A compromise favouring the latter group was achieved and this influenced the decision to introduce indentured labourers from India into the colony (Slater, 1975).

Virtually indiscriminate Crown-land disposal to whites under low rental conditions disturbed the imperial government which, in 1858, had the laws permitting these land grants repealed. The area of alienated land in Natal remained almost unchanged until twenty years later, in the late 1870's (Christopher, 1971). By 1874, roughly two-thirds of Natal colony's total area had been alienated. Of the alienated land, one sixth had been set aside as reserves for occupancy by blacks (de Kiewiet, 1937). By 1882 a total of 42 reserves and 21 mission reserves covered over 890,000ha (Brookes and Hurwitz, 1957).

Changing credit facilities affected changing patterns of Crown-land allocation to whites (Christopher, 1971), but the position of blacks vis-à-vis access to land remained untempered, following the 1882 report of the Natal Native Commission (Colony of Natal, 1882). The report, in which it was established that approximately 55% of Natal's 375,000 blacks lived on white-owned land (either private or Crown land), recommended that the
areal extent of the reserves should remain unchanged and that land sales to blacks in the reserves should still be prohibited. Outside the reserves, where some blacks held title to land, through the introduction of 'better modes of cultivation', progress might be made '...to elevate the owners in the human scale...' (Colony of Natal,1882:26).

Shortly before the annexation of Zululand to Natal in 1897, the distribution of blacks in Natal was reported to be as follows: locations and mission reserves - 254,381; private (white) lands - 258,854; Crown lands - 21,699 (Colony of Natal,1896). The proportion of blacks on white land was 52.4% of the total black population of Natal, showing little variation since 1882, and mirroring thus the minor changes in land alienation over that time.

Printed fifty years after the first white settlers landed in Natal, the figures illustrate how an exogenous influence had superimposed on the landscape a pattern based on monetary value, and with relative disregard for the local populace. Blacks simply acquired the title of squatter or tenant as boundaries were drawn about their traditional territory in response to market forces beyond their control. The successful territorial fragmentation of Natal relied heavily upon co-operation with or participation in government, also exclusive to the exogenous group.
3.3 Whites Penetrate Zululand

Penetration of Zululand by white settler farmers began after 1882, when Transvaal Boers started occupying land which was later set up as the New Republic in north-western Zululand (see Map No.1) (Keppel-Jones, 1949). This outpost of the South African Republic (Transvaal), and the land subsequently added to it and known as Proviso B, was, according to the Boers, a concession to them by the Zulu King Cetewayo whom they claimed to have assisted in an inter-tribal war. Confusion surrounds the conditions of the concession. Nevertheless, the area came under white control and was eventually annexed to Natal at the time of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902 (Keppel-Jones, 1949).

Whereas some Natalians had entertained the idea of using Zululand as a suitable place for blacks displaced from their colony, it was perceived by others as an exploitable hinterland. The latter group, comprising mainly farmers, had in the 1890's imposed much pressure on the Colonial Governor to allow white occupation of southern Zululand (Marks, 1970). Annexation served the ideals of these petitioners well and it clearly had the effect of extending into Zululand conditions of land partitioning similar to those in Natal.
On the 29th December, 1897, the Prime Minister of Natal signed the Act (Act No.37, 1897) for the annexation of Zululand to Natal. Earlier in that year, the Secretary of State for the British Colonies had detailed to the Governor of Natal, Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, the conditions under which he would advise Queen Victoria to assent to the annexation of Zululand to Natal. The primary condition was that the existing land tenure system in Zululand remain unaffected for a period of five years after annexation, and that no grants of land be made to whites during that time. In the interim, a joint Imperial and Colonial committee was to be set up to delimit reserves within Zululand. After the lapse of five years, the Natal Government would be free to dispose of the unreserved land at its own discretion and also to proclaim townships '...if such townships should become necessary in consequence of progressive mining enterprise' (Great Britain: Correspondence relating to Zululand, 17.5.1897).

In a minute to Prime Minister Binns on 8th October, 1897, Governor Sir Hely-Hutchinson suggested that it would be expedient that no changes be made whatsoever for about two years after the annexation, and 'In that case the Joint Boundary Commission would not be appointed after this interval...had elapsed, and should then proceed to carry out their work by degrees, allowing ample time for its performance so that there may be no cause for sudden or unnecessary excitement among the Native Population' (Great Britain: Corr. relating to Zululand, 8.10.1897). He also supposed that '...many
of the farmers who come into the country later on will be glad to let the Natives remain where they are, cultivating their small mealie patches, and to levy rent from them, treating them as servants. In any case the work of delimitation will be a matter requiring much careful handling' (Great Britain:Corr. relating to Zululand, 8.10.1897). In a subsequent despatch to Chamberlain, Hely-Hutchinson was able to claim that the announcement of the impending annexation '...has been favourably received by the Natives in Zululand, but without any particular enthusiasm' (Great Britain:Corr. relating to Zululand, 19.11.1897).

The two-man Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission conducted their enquiry over two years. Their recommendations, reported in October 1904, were accepted by the imperial government in their entirety. Twenty one reserves were delimited, covering an area of one and a half million ha. (Colony of Natal, 1905). These reserves were vested in the Zululand Native Trust under a deed of grant in 1909.

In a retrospective statement, a member of the above commission and former Chief Magistrate of Zululand from 1898 until 1906, Sir Chas. Saunders, stated that although the Imperial Government had accepted the commission's recommendations, the Natal Government had made objections because not enough land had been made available for whites. He felt that had he been aware of the fact
that blacks would be unable to acquire title to land in Zululand, he would not have agreed to the quantity of land that the commission proposed for white purchase (Union of South Africa, 1916(2)).

Sugar cane cultivation became the dominant practice of whites settling in Zululand and their economic success was given an impetus by the concessions offered by government to sugar cane growers and millers who would settle in Zululand. Tenders were called for the construction of sugar mills which would serve concession holders only. Sir J.L. Hulett submitted the successful tender and built his first mills at Felixton in 1908, and at Amatikulu in 1911 (Osborne, 1964).

The alliance established between government and white agriculturalists and early industrialists facilitated and legitimised the process of territorial fragmentation and economic penetration. Thus, at the time of Union in 1910, 75,710 of the 266,066 blacks in Zululand were on alienated land (Union of South Africa, 1911).

3.4 **Union and After**

Following Union, the South African government passed legislation enforcing racial segregation in all four of the country's constituent provinces. The 1913
Native Land Act made provision for 2,667,000ha of 'scheduled Native Areas' in Natal, in the form of 69 locations and 19 mission reserves, thus formalising the existing reserve system (Natal henceforth embraces Zululand, except where otherwise signified).

A commission was then charged with the task of delimiting further areas for black occupation '...so that future adjustments of land areas may not be necessary' (Union of South Africa, 1916:4) and submitted its report to Parliament in 1916. The Beaumont Commission recommended the addition of 1,595,000ha to the areas scheduled in the 1913 Act for the blacks of Natal. In seeking to lessen friction between blacks and whites through the consolidation of the reserves, the commission '...found it impossible to follow consistently this principle on account of the objections which were raised to the inclusion of European-occupied farms within proposed Native areas. The nature and extent, therefore, of the proposed Native areas have been largely determined by this objection' (Union of South Africa, 1916:4).

This stricture led to the selection of additional land according to an '...order of preference:-

1) Mission lands;
2) Native-owned lands;
3) Crown lands;
4) Unoccupied European-owned lands;
5) European-owned lands solely occupied by Natives, and;
6) Lastly, where this could not be avoided, land in actual occupation by Europeans' (Union of South Africa, 1916:11).
Giving evidence before the commission, whites displayed their concern with black-white territorial relationships in strong, if not often insular terms. A member of the Legislative Assembly advocated that 'Segregation is good for both races and better control can be kept of the natives in the locations' (Union of South Africa, 1916(2):423). Another member, in an expression of some foresight, suggested that appropriate steps should be taken '...in order that they (blacks) may work and govern themselves within certain limits as self-contained communities independent of the white population' (Union of South Africa, 1916(2):424).

There was common resentment shown for absentee ownership, as well as the expression of the opinion that the reserves were not crowded but that they were poorly cultivated and that this should not jeopardise white control over land. Senator Sir J.L. Hulett, industrial and agricultural capitalist, contended that 'If the natives cultivated and used the land in a civilised manner there would be more room for them in the reserves', and '...if any areas were declared "neutral" areas in which either whites or blacks could purchase land... In the long run the land would all fall into the hands of the Europeans' (Union of South Africa, 1916(2):433ff).

Another contentious issue was black urbanisation. Many whites opposed moves which might encourage this and often proposed that blacks be permitted to buy land.
outside the reserves, but only in rural areas. Contentious too was the fact that mission reserves allotted land, in some cases, to blacks converted to Christianity and admitted to the reserve. The magistrate of Verulam found this to be '...a rank injustice, and these Mission Reserves are rank humbugs' (Union of South Africa, 1916(2):444).

Tenants, that is blacks on white-owned property who were in the employ of the owners as a condition of being there since before its alienation, were the subjects of much debate. One sugar planter declared: 'The way that I get rid of obnoxious Kaffirs is as follows: I lease the land to a coolie and he cultivates all round and crowds them up so that eventually they go, and then I get rid of the coolie' (Union of South Africa, 1916(2):451).

The majority of black witnesses before the Beaumont Commission were tribal chiefs, although a few black landowners also gave evidence. Their opposition to the white viewpoint, by requesting more reserve land and permission to get tenure of land outside the reserves, is discussed later, in section 3.6 of this chapter.

The recommendations of the Beaumont Commission were rejected by Parliament in Cape Town and five separate local commissions were appointed on a regional basis to revise its findings and proposals. In 1918, the report
of Mr. Maurice Evans on the Natal reserves was submitted to Parliament (Union of South Africa, 1918). The two-man committee had inspected all the areas recommended by the 1916 Commission, travelling on horseback and on foot. Among its observations was that '...when one considers the fertile and profitable sugar belt of the coast, the rich agricultural portions of the Midlands, and the healthy stock-lands of the uplands, and compares these with the rough, stony, often precipitous native areas in the sub-coastal districts and the hot, dry, thorn valleys higher up country, it is perfectly certain that the prairie or unimproved value of the European lands are very much higher than those allocated to the natives' (Union of South Africa, 1918).

The recommendations of this commission were also rejected in Parliament and it was not until 1936 that provision was made for the addition of more land to the reserves as scheduled in 1913. The Native Trust and Land Act (Act No. 18 of 1936) added 450,000ha to the Natal reserves, mostly adjacent to the existing reserves so as not to further fragment white lands or to alter the white corridors and enclaves (Best and Young, forthcoming). Areas listed as Released Areas in this Act were released from the provisions of the 1913 Act and made available for purchase by the South African Native Trust.

When, in 1948, the National Party came to power, it appointed a commission '...to conduct an exhaustive enquiry into and to report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the
Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning' (Union of South Africa, 1955).

Appointed late in 1950, the Tomlinson Commission, named after its chairman Prof. Tomlinson, submitted four years later an eighteen volume report, almost 4,000 pages in length.

Dealing with the spatial configuration of the reserves, the commission recommended the consolidation of 'Bantu Areas' into seven blocks about 'historico-logical heartlands' (Union of South Africa, 1955(16):50). Within Natal, it was proposed, the Ingwavuma area should go to Swaziland and the 'Bantu Area' be consolidated about the Zulu heartland, north of the Durban-Pietermaritzburg line (see Maps No's. 2 & 3). Existing 'Bantu Areas' south of Durban were more closely tied to the Transkei. Crown lands should be used first in the consolidation of the 'Bantu Areas'.

Construed within the ideals of segregation and the termination of the migrancy of blacks to white cities, active decentralisation planning began after, and largely in spite of, the tabling of the Tomlinson Commission report. Arguing that agricultural output had to be improved and other economic activities introduced in order to develop the reserves, the commission called for the
establishment of industries within the reserves (Union of South Africa, 1955). This recommendation was rejected by government and decentralisation policy was designed to encourage industrial location in the border areas abutting the reserves.

Thus, '...security would be ensured for white civilization and opportunities created for both racial groups in all spheres, each in its own territory or among its own people - if after a period of fifty years an approximately equal proportion of whites and Bantu has been reached in European territory' (Union of South Africa, 1956:3). Furthermore, 'The Government regards the development of industries owned by Europeans but requiring large numbers of native labourers in suitable European areas near Bantu territory as of the utmost importance for the sound socio-economic development of the Bantu areas and intends to take the necessary steps gradually to create the desired conditions for attracting industries to such areas' (Union of South Africa, 1956:9).

Incentives to industrialists were first offered in 1960 by Prime Minister Verwoerd, who had, in his capacity as Minister of Native Affairs, voiced strong opposition in 1956 to the idea of promoting white-owned industry in the reserves. Evidently insufficient to attract private industry to the border areas, the inducements were supplemented by others in 1964.

Industrial decentralisation still did not accelerate and the Physical Planning and Utilization of
Act of 1967 instituted restrictive measures to limit industrialisation in the cities, thus effectively trying to force decentralisation. The Act also opened the way for white industrialists to locate plants within the 'homelands' with the Bantu Investment Corporation (first instituted by government to promote black industrialisation in the reserves) acting as agents and as a source of loan capital. Further incentives followed in 1968, among which were tax holidays of up to five years for decentralising industrialists [Financial Mail, 30.3.1973; Federated Chambers of Industries, 1973]. Studies have revealed the measure of success achieved in respect of these persuasive efforts to be minimal (Rogerson, 1974a; 1974b).

Paralleling attempts to promote economic growth in the reserves was the evolution of constitutional machinery to bring the reserves to eventual political independence from the rest of South Africa, through a series of phases. In 1959 the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act provided for the investiture of a black 'territorial authority' as the highest organ of internal administration for each reserve complex. Subsequently, a black 'legislative assembly' would be established to supersede the 'territorial authority'. Further legislation followed in the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 which allowed for the next phase whereby a 'homeland' with a 'legislative assembly'
would become a 'self-governing territory'. The final phase would be full political independence. Progression through these phases is controlled by the white central government and it is only when the final phase is reached that the black 'legislative assembly' may decide to accept political independence or not.

The antecedents of the territorial organisation of South Africa in general and Natal in particular have been considered above. Attention turns now to the transforming ideologies in which the forementioned developments were rooted.

3.5 Ideological Transformations at the Core

For the very reason that the core and peripheral 'conscious collectivities' in South Africa are historically divisible on racial grounds does the notion of accommodation between the two white groups imply a bond which transcends the nationalism of Afrikaners or the laissez-faire liberalism of the English.

Two factors predominate in the analysis on cohesion of the white core. Firstly, there is the aspect of white supremacy. Secondly, whether seen as a means or an end, a capitalist economy under white control is fostered by both white groups today.
The sources and manifestations of Afrikaner nationalism are extensively documented. Munger (1967) distinguishes in South Africa two nationalisms, Afrikaner and African, "...revolving around each other like a binary star and far outshining the weak light of a nebulous South African nationalism" (Munger, 1967:1). For Stultz (1974), the success of Afrikaner nationalism cannot be measured independently of the role of English-speaking whites in South African politics. A black view holds that 'It is in the Afrikaner's preoccupation with considerations of survival that the crux of South Africa's race problem lies. The solution is also there' (Ngubane, 1963:15); and an Afrikaner view has it that 'The apartheid idea is...pre-eminently peculiar to the Afrikaner...' (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959:17), and '...apartheid is not, as it is so often quite incorrectly alleged, a static state of affairs designed to keep the Bantu for ever subservient to the White man. On the contrary, apartheid is a dynamic process which holds the promise of complete self-determination in the future' (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959:vii).

The ideologies of the English-speaking whites constitute the other fundamental component of the core. British imperialism in South Africa left this group in control of a rapidly evolving capitalist economy. Although not discernably nationalistic in any sense, the English-
speaking whites are characterised, in South African history, by their pragmatic, liberal capitalism. This 'liberalism' catered for early segregation in South Africa which was, ostensibly, protectionism based on humanitarian principles (see Welsh, 1971:27, for example). In the transformation from imperially-dominated to locally-orientated capitalism in South Africa, the major impulses came from English-speaking ideologists. Bozzoli (1975), dealing with the ideological impetus for local manufacturing, illuminates this important facet of the development of capitalism in South Africa.

The place of capitalism in the core is significant for it represents the pervading bond between the two white groups at the core and it is toward this bond which transformations at the core have moved. That is, 'relations between capitalist development, apartheid policies and the core structure of white supremacy are essentially collaborative...' (Johnston, 1970).

After the mineral discoveries near Kimberley in 1870 and on the Witwatersrand in 1886, Afrikaners linked imperialism with capitalism and 'The notion of "Englishness" thus evoked for the Afrikaner the three great evils which threatened his separate existence - imperialism, capitalism, and egalitarian liberalism' (Moodie, 1975:15). Afrikaners combatted this perceived threat to their identity by assuming an increasingly important role in capitalist
development (De Klerk, 1975 writes of the Afrikaner as a 'new man'). For them, capitalism had to be '...transformed from its base in liberal individualism to an ethnic system which would work to the good of the Afrikaner People as a nation. This was to be achieved by Afrikaner control of both production and consumption. Afrikaner capital should thus be organized to support Afrikaner enterprise both by investment in Afrikaner business and by purchase of Afrikaner goods' (Moodie, 1975:204).

Welsh (1972) considers apartheid as a response to the threat of a growing class of acculturated blacks, and Hill (1964) asserts that 'The irreducible core of the policy is fear' (Hill, 1964:3). The net result of transformations at the core which gave rise to and which maintain white supremacy are interpreted by Adam (1976) as a 'de-ideologised power conflict' wherein the role of ideologies is merely to defend white privileges. Politically, the Afrikaner government of today is only codifying and legalising 'a well established custom' (Adam, 1975) of segregation started by the English. Economically, the Afrikaners have sought increased power in a capitalist system. The convergence of features of ideologies held by both white groups at the core pivots on the issue of white supremacy in the economic and political arenas of the country.

In Natal, the spatial impact of these ideological transformations reflected colonial penetration processes.
At first, the trekker republic of Natalia sought to offer its 'citizens' free access to land, in fulfilment of its sectarian, rather than capitalistic ideals. The land pattern inherited by the British was not radically altered during their period of dominion over the territory (1843-1910), although land was now associated with a perceived need to generate surplus value, be it by speculation, extensive farming, or the extraction of rent or labour from the occupants of the land. The annexation of Zululand extended the field of nascent capitalism. After Union (1910), when land alienation became the prerogative of the central South African government, and with the closing of the ideologies of capitalism and Afrikaner nationalism, the territorial segregation of blacks from whites persisted, and is entrenched now in legislation, in the continuing interest of white state and capital.

3.6 Peripheral Response

Imposition of government upon blacks by the white core prompted varying forms of response. Colonial government in Natal was confronted first by organised and violent force, which it repulsed\textsuperscript{10}. Opposition to the core then came from vociferous but mainly non-violent sources operating within and without the structure of legal authority upheld by the core. In 1960 peripheral response took on a new face after the core attempted to
quell opposition by recourse to the legal system. The outlawing of black organisations intent on altering the racially-based core-periphery structure was followed by the creation of a new outlet for black opposition within the core dominated system of authority, in the form of black 'homeland' governments. Black involvement with the territorial fragmentation of Natal by white interests is discussed in this section.

Incited by factors such as the diminishing land available (and necessary) in traditional tribal society, and their limited access to capital and their subordination vis-à-vis whites, blacks responded in a variety of ways. In Natal, the voice of black opposition came from the black press (John Dube founded the first Zulu newspaper, *Ilanga Lase Natal*, in 1904), from tribal chiefs petitioning government, from the literate blacks emanating usually from missionary schools (the kholwa class), and from black organisations such as the Natal Native Congress.

Welsh (1972) provides some insight into the opinions expressed by the black press. A common grievance in the early 1900's was the inability of literate blacks to participate in the political affairs of the colony of Natal. Tribal chiefs also lamented their subordinate status in the political decision making affecting their territorial claims. However, this class of blacks
usually defended traditionalism, something which many of the amakholwa did not subscribe to. Thus, in their evidence before the Beaumont Commission, for example, many of the amakholwa witnesses asked to be allowed to purchase land outside the reserves (Union of South Africa,1916(2)). It was also apparent that most blacks who did at the time hold title to land in Natal were from the kholwa class.

Chiefs usually expressed satisfaction with the reserve system but called for more land and less interference. A chief from the Umlazi division maintained that ‘The British came amongst us and we accepted their rule. The land that was occupied by our fathers they were ousted from, but they lived peaceably on the land on which we were born. We have never quarrelled with the Government that they may say to-day that the Europeans and the natives should be separated’ (Union of South Africa,1916(2):455). Another, Chief Stephen Mini, contended that ‘The particular method of land administration for natives which we prefer is the one that was followed by Sir Theo. Shepstone. He originated the locations which we have now, and that is what we like. What we wish is that the present locations shall be extended’ (Union of South Africa,1916(2):531).

A black land owner complained that blacks were troubled by ‘...a law which came about in 1843 from the late Queen, which provided that all races in this country were to be treated alike, and now to-day those orders have been broken without us black people being consulted’ (Union of South Africa,1916(2):514). This was a widely held view among the amakholwa.
The Natal Native Congress (NNC) constituted a branch of the South African Native National Congress (SANC) founded in 1912 by Dr. Pixley Seme (Karis and Carter, 1972(1)). The NNC actively opposed government and Martin Lutuli, representing the Congress, stated before a South African Native Affairs Commission sitting in Pretoria that 'The Natives look at it this way. Zululand was our own land, and although now it is under the Government, we ought to be the first. We ought not to be prohibited' (Karis and Carter, 1972(1):31). He was referring to the prohibition of land buying by blacks, in the Zululand town of Eshowe in particular.

At the national level, the SANC resolved in 1916 to call for a rejection of the report of the Natives Land Commission and for the repeal of the 1913 Natives Land Act. Also criticised was the penetration of Zululand by white interests, a breach of a Royal proclamation (Karis and Carter, 1972(1)).

Some thirty blacks from Natal, including John Dube, were among the 400 delegates to the All African Convention (AAC) in Bloemfontein in 1935 at the time of the 98th anniversary of the Battle of Blood River (1837). The meeting was convened by Pixley Seme, now as president general of the African National Congress (ANC)(until 1923 the SANC), and Prof. Jabavu of the Cape Native Voters.
Convention. Motions passed at the meeting opposed the 1935 Land Bill and Representation of Natives Bill (Karis and Carter, 1972(2)). An observation unanimously approved by the delegates was that "The true aim of land adjustment...should be to provide the bulk of the Native population, which is predominantly rural, with sufficient land to allow of their working a livelihood. The fact that this aim is ignored by the Native Land and Trust Bill can only be interpreted by the African people as a vague attempt to force them out of their reserves into a position of economic dependency" (Karis and Carter, 1972(2): 36).

Policies adopted later by the AAC included appeals to government to accelerate the process of 'releasing' land; to put an end to the eviction of blacks from white-owned farms; to prevent the fostering of conditions in the reserves which forced blacks to seek employment outside the reserves, on unjust terms; and, the abolition of restrictions on land purchases by blacks. These policies were reiterated at various ANC annual conferences too, although the AAC and ANC were never absolutely united. However, after the Sharpville affair in 1960 the ANC and AAC were outlawed and black opposition was forced to find expression through other avenues (Karis and Carter, 1972(2)).

It is apparent that the voices of black opposition to the land policies of white government went largely unheeded at the core. Peripherality of blacks constituted
the result of concerted efforts at the core to retain exclusive control over government, economy, and space.

Following the banning of the bodies most outspokenly critical of legislation affecting territorial matters the most significant expressions of discontent concerning land issues have emanated from the black territorial authorities or legislative assemblies of the 'homelands'. Their role is considered in the next chapter.

3.7 Contemporary Forms

Natal's black population is viewed in this passage in its relationship with the environment and with the labour market. At the outset it should be stressed that the dynamics of apartheid complicate attempts accurately to present the demographic characteristics of KwaZulu. Changing 'homeland' boundaries, census data of dubious quality, government's typology for human classification, dated or incomplete data about agricultural and other resources, are factors which militate against precision in the task of compilation.

Annual growth rates of the black population are noted to vary between 2.9% p.a. (Maasdorp, 1974) and 3.2% p.a. (Lombard and van der Merwe, 1972). Taking a 3% p.a. growth rate, it is estimated that the de facto pop-
ulation of KwaZulu at present exceeds 2.5 million. The environment in which these people live is 58% mountainous and about 70% of this is unsuited to crop production (Horrell, 1973). Another assessment notes that 13.9% of KwaZulu's total area is suitable dry arable land while 0.08% is suited to irrigation (Lombard and van der Merwe, 1972).

Although it has been suggested that the territory of KwaZulu could support a total population of 7.5 million (Grobler, 1972), it should be noted that this would require nothing short of an agricultural revolution. Maasdorp (1974) points to the 1970 excess (in terms of carrying capacity) of 300,000 cattle units in KwaZulu and the related burden on the land so that parts of KwaZulu are '...perhaps beyond rehabilitation' (Maasdorp, 1976). Apparent erosion and overstocking aside, agricultural production on arable land is limited in extent and efficiency. Less than 80% of KwaZulu's arable land is cultivated (Lombard and van der Merwe, 1972) and the incentives to increase and improve agriculture and agricultural productivity are restricted primarily by the limited access to capital in KwaZulu (Erwin, 1974).

Efforts at revising the agricultural sector have included planning and investment by state, private white enterprise, and KwaZulu authorities. So-called planned
areas in KwaZulu are those areas divided into arable lands, grazing camps, and residential areas. By the end of 1971 46.9% of KwaZulu had been planned in this manner (SAIRR, 1973), and by the end of 1975, 49.1% (SAIRR, 1976).

The extent of agriculture undertaken specifically for trade and the generation of surplus value is limited to 21,331.5ha in sugar cane production (Bantu, 7, 1976), 2,866ha to cotton, and 665ha to coconuts and cashew nuts (Anon, 1973). The afforested area of KwaZulu is 17,069ha (Anon, 1973).

In the early 1950's, there were 1,453 black sugar cane growers on 2,156ha of land, and it was proposed that the area given to sugar cane production be increased to 51,012ha (Union of South Africa, 1955). In the 1972/3 sugar milling season, 2.5% of South Africa's sugar production was accounted for by KwaZulu growers. Until 1972, when the limit was lifted, each 'genuine' cane grower qualified for 4ha of land (Bantu, 7, 1976). In contrast, white owned sugar farms are operated on a plantation basis with perhaps hundreds of black labourers on each farm. At present, all sugar cane is milled by white owned factories located outside KwaZulu.
The white-controlled South African sugar industry is providing R5 million through the Small Growers Financial Aid Fund for the development of 5,000ha of new sugar lands to support a population of 30,000 and with an envisaged annual revenue of R30 million. Also provided by the South African Sugar Association were three farmers’ centres to the KwaZulu government for the education of black sugar farmers (Financial Mail, 28.5.1976).

The location of manufacturing industry in or abutting KwaZulu is unlikely to offset the underdeveloped agricultural sector and generate the capital necessary to uplift the welfare of KwaZulu residents, as expected by government.

By the end of 1971, there were an estimated 15 industries at Hammersdale, 9 at Newcastle, 5 at Ladysmith, 1 at Richards Bay, and 2 at Isithebe (Lombard and van der Merwe, 1972) designated as potential decentralised generators of capital for KwaZulu, as well as providing employment for the increasing numbers of black workseekers. These industries, all white owned, provided direct employment opportunities for 10,654 blacks, including 84 at Isithebe in KwaZulu (Lombard and van der Merwe, 1972). Two years later Isithebe had 9 industries employing 400 blacks (Financial Mail, 9.11.1973) and
Richards Bay had, at the end of 1974, ten industries employing 316 blacks (Financial Mail, 17.1.1975).

Inferences about the spatial distribution of wealth in Natal may be drawn from Gross Geographic Product data released by government (Republic of South Africa, 1968). These data are illustrative of economic polarisation in urban cores; they reflect the abundance of wealth in white agricultural areas; and, they point to the concomitant economic deprivation in KwaZulu. However, only limited conclusions on the distribution of income by racial group may be arrived at as the data are aggregated by magisterial district.

In 1968, 68.9% of Natal's geographic product was accounted for in the magisterial districts of Durban, Pinetown, and Pietermaritzburg (see Map No.3). With the inclusion of the next most economically productive districts of Lower Tugela and Newcastle, 74.2% of Natal's geographic product was accounted for. At the other end of the spectrum, the five districts of Mapumulo, Ndawedwe, Ingwavuma, Mahlabatini, and Babanango produced 0.2% of the total geographic product. Further extrapolation shows the ten most productive districts to account for 83.6% of the total geographic product while 0.8% is accounted for by the ten least
Map 5.

KwaZulu (1975 Consolidation Proposals) and Gross Geographic Product: Ten Magisterial Districts with lowest GGP in Natal.


productive districts. Maps Number's 5 and 6 illustrate the association between geographic product and KwaZulu.

Spatial patterns of employment are intimately related with the pattern of geographic product. Of all the blacks employed in Natal, only 5.32% work in the Durban/Pinetown and Pietermaritzburg urban cores. The percentage of blacks employed in Natal working in white rural areas is 19.8% (Republic of South Africa, 1970). Clearly, black employment is not concentrated in the most economically productive urban cores and those employed in the most productive rural areas are mainly labourers on white farms.

Of all blacks in the common area, 22% are employed in the primary sector (white owned farms and mines, mainly); 7.4% in the secondary sector; and 17.8% in the tertiary sector. Within KwaZulu, the figures tell a different story for there 17.2% of blacks are engaged in the primary sector, in this case mainly in sub-subsistence, subsistence, and very limited 'cash crop' agriculture. Only 3.5% of KwaZulu blacks are employed in the secondary sector and 5.1% in the tertiary sector. The latter figure contrasted with the figure of 17.8% of common area blacks in the tertiary sector points undoubtedly to the extent of black servant employment and
other menial service positions for blacks in white cities, enterprises, and homes.

A clearer breakdown of black employment data for Natal is provided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Sector</th>
<th>Secondary Sector</th>
<th>Tertiary Sector</th>
<th>Unemployed &amp; not econ. active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KWAZULU</strong></td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMON AREA</strong></td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATAL TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KWAZULU EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF KWAZULU BLACKS**

|                      | 17.2           | 3.5              | 5.1             | 1.9                          |
|                      | 72.3            |                  |                 |                              |

**BLACK EMPLOYMENT IN COMMON AREA AS A PERCENTAGE OF COMMON AREA BLACKS**

|                      | 22.1           | 7.4              | 17.8            | 3.1                          |
|                      | 49.6            |                  |                 |                              |

Table 1. Black Employment in Natal
(Source: Republic of South Africa, 1970)
Of the 64.4% of Natal's blacks categorised as 'Unspecified and not economically active', over 70% are to be found in KwaZulu. This phenomenon must be related to the exact nature of the South African economy which perpetuates the system whereby KwaZulu is characterised as a relatively unproductive rural area whence comes the male labour in the common area.

In a recently completed thesis, Nattrass (1976) presents her findings on black migrant labour in Natal. Deriving her data from the 1970 census, Nattrass (1976) estimates the numbers of blacks from rural KwaZulu working outside of the 'homeland' to be as follows:

Table 2. Black Migrant Labour (Source: Nattrass, 1976: 134, 137)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>MALE MIGRANTS</th>
<th>% of Age Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 64</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>317,000</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>472,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 55,000 female migrants
Extrapolating further, it is estimated that the 317,000 male migrants earned R132,319,000 and remitted R25,103,000 back to KwaZulu (Nattrass, 1976:148). These remittances accounted for the equivalent of 41% of KwaZulu's gross domestic product in 1970 and 142% of its agricultural output (Nattrass, 1976:18). Fiscal implications of this system for rural dwellers in KwaZulu in 1970 are such that on the basis of a per capita black family of six, it is calculated that a family with land and one agricultural worker and one absent migrant worker would earn R41 p.a.. A black family with no land and one absentee worker would earn R30 p.a.. and a family with land and no absentees would earn R15 p.a.. As a contrast, the average income of an urbanised black family would be R124 p.a. (Nattrass, 1976:165).

These data lend credence to the simple push-pull model of migrant labour postulated by Wilson (1972) and display the forces which inhibit economic growth in KwaZulu. The skewed masculinity ratio of about 1:3 for the 19-64 years age cohort of KwaZulu residents (Nattrass, 1976:179) illustrates that most of the agricultural work in KwaZulu is in the hands of women, who provide for the rural family in the absence of males, whose remittances are possibly sufficient to offset poor agricultural performances in KwaZulu. The higher
incomes earned by the urban blacks would most likely be spent in the white-owned areas of the economic cores and, together, these forces oppose the accumulation of capital in KwaZulu. The most recent estimate of per capita net domestic product in KwaZulu, which includes the white share of approximately 23% and non-market production such as the gathering of firewood, is R53 p.a. (Financial Mail, 11.6.1976).

3.8 Summary

The delimitation of the reserves was a consequence of political and economic aspirations among members of the white 'conscious collective', that is, the core. Limited access by blacks to capital and their subordination on cultural grounds placed them in a position of societal and economic peripherality vis-à-vis the core. However, the coincidence of space - economic periphery and the peripheral social group is not absolute. Penetration of white interests into Natal and Zululand involved the superimposition of white land-ownership over already occupied territory and blacks are therefore distributed throughout the province of Natal today.

Ideological transformations at the core consolidated white control over state and capital and the spatial impress of the combined demands of state and capital
were manifest in spite of protestations by blacks.

Black employment in the white circuit of the economy binds the entire South African society into a single economic system. Segregation of blacks and whites, and related patterns of industrial location, enable blacks to participate in the industrial sector as workers only. Traditional agricultural practices in the 'homelands', extensive overstocking and soil erosion, and the disincentive of wage opportunities in the white areas perpetuate low agricultural productivity in the 'homelands'. The contemporary picture in KwaZulu is a territory restricted for black occupation only whence comes the labour for the white core areas. Capital is spatially concentrated in these areas and the only access which blacks have to that capital is as wage labourers. KwaZulu cannot, under these conditions, support its occupants without these people being subjects of the white-controlled capitalist circuit of production. For the creation of employment opportunities inside and outside KwaZulu, and for finance capital for any agricultural or industrial project, blacks depend on the capitalist circuit of production.

In the next chapter, the proposed manipulation of the territorial base of the dependent black internal colony is detailed.
CHAPTER FOUR
TOWARD CONSOLIDATION: 1972 - 1975

4.1 Introduction

The origins of the reserves in Natal and Zululand were noted in Chapter Three. In this chapter the government's proposals partially to consolidate KwaZulu are dealt with. The proposals were first officially announced during 1972. In 1975 revised proposals were announced. Events relating to the announcement of the proposals are chronologically accounted in the opening section of the chapter (4.2), and in lengthy detail. Thereafter, a preliminary analysis of the implications of the consolidation proposals is offered (4.3). The reactions of whites, with their varying degrees of allegiance to the apartheid ideology, are then reviewed (4.4), as are those of blacks (4.5). The chapter is then briefly summarised (4.6).

4.2 Government Proposals

White farmers' associations from the southern Natal districts of Richmond, Impedle, Ixopo, Polela, Underberg, and Umzinto were the first non-governmental group to see details of part of the consolidation plans, late in 1971. Early in February, 1972, the Natal Agricultural Union (NAU), an organisation representing
the white farmers of the province, had its Bantu Affairs Committee meet to co-ordinate reports from these associations on the issue of land exchanges between white farmers and the state, and for the purpose of consolidating KwaZulu. From the outset, the NAU provided the intermediary link between white farmers and government, by submitting the proposals of each to the other.

The early revelation of the plans to the NAU was acknowledged by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development, Mr. Haubenheimer, who also stated that the NAU had submitted counter-proposals for the Drakensberg region. Further consultation between his department and the NAU was to follow and government was prepared to allow the NAU to study the final consolidation plan before it was made public (Financial Mail, 2.6.1972).

Indications that the consolidation proposals would be publicised during the 1972 Parliamentary session were made by Haubenheimer in May of that year (Daily News, 10.5.1972). Within a week the Natal Provincial Council submitted a motion for the incorporation of East Griqualand (Map No. 1) into Natal. This move was instigated essentially by the National Party members of the Council (Daily News, 16 & 23.5.1972).
Although thwarted by the Executive Committee of Cape Province, the motion reflected a desire on the part of some white Natal politicians to consolidate white interests and to show solidarity with the whites of East Griqualand, who might become separated from the rest of Cape Province by Transkei. A few days later, the NAU also appealed to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development not to isolate white East Griqualanders altogether by surrounding them with 'homelands' (Daily News, 27.5.1972). This sense of protectionism shared by the white Natal politicians and agriculturalists stemmed from an insight into the yet unannounced consolidation proposals.

When, in early July 1972, government consolidation proposals for northern Natal were announced, reaction was sharper, more widespread, and somewhat detached from the concern with the impending isolation of white East Griqualanders. The plan to consolidate 24 blocks and 46 black spots into four areas called for a transfer of 530,000ha of white-owned land to Kwa-Zulu (Daily News, 6 & 7.6.1972). White farmers began organising a series of protest meetings.

Government temporarily appeased the situation when, in revealing its proposals for partial consolidation
of all of KwaZulu, it announced also that a Bantu Affairs Commission would hold public hearings whereby whites could air their grievances regarding the consolidation issue. KwaZulu would be consolidated into six areas totalling 3,364,000ha and, according to government, about 88,000 blacks and a few hundred whites would face resettlement as 668,000ha of white-owned land was exchanged for 554,000ha of black land (see Map No. 7). KwaZulu would, under these terms, receive 114,000ha of land in addition to the quota of 1936 'because of the difference in agricultural values of pastoral land involved in the exchanges' (Daily News, 12.6.1972). While the whites affected by these plans would have the limited opportunity of meeting with the Bantu Affairs Commission as it toured Natal, the Zulu grievances would have to be directed to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in Pretoria.

White agriculturalists went ahead and convened protest meetings. Southern Natal farmers criticised government for not having warned the 30 or so affected directly by the plans (Daily News, 13.6.1972). At a meeting in Dundee more than 100 affected white farmers argued that white land should not be given over to KwaZulu until the land already occupied by blacks was used to its fullest agricultural advantage (Daily News,

Protestations from various quarters of the white community became increasingly aligned with the NAU stance, and the Union played a distinctive role in its participation at dissentive meetings. The NAU president opposed the consolidation plans at a combined Boston Farmers Association and Impendle Agricultural Society meeting (Daily News, 27.7.1972); and at a public meeting in Eshowe, where the proposals were again rejected, the NAU announced that if its views on consolidation were ignored by government it would reverse its policy of consultation with government (Daily News, 19.8.1972). By September 1972, all but about one tenth of the white farmers' organisations in Natal supported the NAU rejection of government proposals (Daily News, 1 & 4.9.1972).

Meanwhile, other interest groups were also lobbying against the proposals, making counter-proposals,
or making recommendations supportive of the proposals. The chairman of the South African Wool Grower's Association called for a fence to be erected around KwaZulu territory to protect white-owned stock - a recommendation which the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development refused to honour (Daily News, 25.7 & 14.11.1972). At an Eshowe meeting various white farmers' associations, the Eshowe Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the South African Sugar Association, and the NAU proposed that a strip of land in Reserve 21 be incorporated into the white area so as to widen the white corridor between Ginginhlovu and Eshowe. This counter-proposal would include the allocation of compensatory land in Reserve 11 (proposed as future white land by government) to the 5,000 affected blacks (Daily News, 12.8.1972). The Zululand Chamber of Commerce and Industries also rejected the official proposals, as did the Dundee Town Council (Daily News, 17.8.1972).

Claims by KwaZulu for more land met with a firm refusal by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C.Botha; and the NAU received a negative response from government in its effort to delay the sittings of the Bantu Affairs Commission (Daily News, 8 & 11.8.1972). The Bantu Affairs Commission schedule was for a September 5th hearing at Dundee, a hearing at Eshowe the next day, a hearing at Pieter-
maritzburg on September 7th, and a final hearing at Harding later that month.

At the first session at Dundee, attended by about 200 people, the chairman of the Commission stated that the proposals should not be considered as those of government but as coming from the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. The NAU made an impact at the hearings by reiterating the opinions of white agriculturalists and proposing that land for KwaZulu should be taken from State land (formerly Crown land), and not from white farmers (Daily News, 5.9.1972).

The Eshowe session, attended by about 150, was characterised by another show of disapproval for the plans, and the southern division of the Zululand Chamber of Commerce and Industries publicly denounced the proposals (Daily News, 6.9.1972). The Eshowe Town Council proclaimed that local whites would rather remain in a 'white spot' surrounded by black land than conform with government proposals (Daily News, 7.9.1972).

The next phase in the procedure of planning for consolidation followed the tour of the Bantu Affairs Commission and preceded the report of its findings to a Select Committee on Bantu Affairs. As had occurred
previously, during this phase intimations regarding the 'final' consolidation proposals were made by government officials before the proposals were made public in their entirety.

During March of 1973, Deputy Minister Raubenheimer announced that almost all consolidation planning had been completed and that the 'final' plans would be made available to the 'homeland' leaders before the plans were presented to Parliament (Daily News, 23.3.1973). Days later, on 26th March, Raubenheimer met with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Executive Officer of KwaZulu, and the KwaZulu Executive Council at Nongoma to disclose the new plan which made six blocks of KwaZulu and required the displacement of about 300,000 people. The KwaZulu delegation rejected the revised plan (Daily News, 26.3.1973).

The leader of the United Party in Natal, Mr. R. Cadman, decried the imposition of secrecy about the revised consolidation plans (Daily News, 27.3.1973; Cadman, 1973), but it was not until April 1973 that Raubenheimer released any further information appropos the plans. The Deputy Minister revealed that the Umfolozi game reserve would, in terms of the revised plan, go to KwaZulu (Daily News, 11.4.1973). Immediate reaction to this statement came from the South African Council for
Conservation and Anti-Pollution, who disapproved of the dissection of the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi 'ecosystem' (Daily News, 12.4.1973). Raubenheimer made further announcements at a meeting in Cedarville to the effect that Harding would, contrary to the 1972 proposals, have a corridor link with the Natal south coast (Daily News, 25.4.1973). This statement received favourable reaction from the NAU (Daily News, 27.4.1973).

Alfred County Farmers' Association president approved of the consolidation plans for the Alfred district, which provided a corridor outlet from the hinterland to the sea and a buffer between KwaZulu and Transkei. A division of the NAU was now working to have the corridor altered so that the main road inland from the coast would not traverse 'homeland' territory (Daily News, 12.6.1973).

Pronouncements by the Deputy Minister drew a retort from the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development who, at a press conference, said that the Josini dam and Makatini flats below the dam would go to KwaZulu, as would the Ndumu game reserve. Furthermore, less than a third of the Umfolozi game reserve would in fact go to KwaZulu. These plans would, according to the Minister, imply the displacement of
133,000 blacks, an excision of 300,000ha from KwaZulu, and an excision of 463,000ha of white land in land transfers (Daily News, 27.4.1973). The NAU expressed its satisfaction with these latest recommendations, particularly with regard to the cession of the Josini dam and Makatini flats to KwaZulu (Daily News, 28.4.1973).

However, white agriculture responded differently when it learnt that the two Drakensberg reserves would remain in black hands, with additional land added thereto. This new information represented, to the NAU, a reversal of earlier government assurances. In 1964, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development had agreed, in principle, to the transfer of the two reserves to white control on the condition that the NAU could find compensatory land for the blacks who would have to be displaced. The NAU had duly traced white farmers in the Weenen, Colenso, and Kranskop areas from whom such land might be bought. It was argued by the NAU that their concern for the Drakensberg was not a political concern but related rather to the incapability of KwaZulu to conserve the Tugela catchment area (Daily News, 3.5.1973).

The reaction of white farmers in the Drakensberg area motivated the NAU to send a delegation to Cape
Town to put their case before the Parliamentary Select Committee on Bantu Affairs on 9th May, 1973. The Select Committee refused to hear the evidence of the NAU (Daily News, 5.5.1973).

Farmers in the Gourton area, near Winterton, also dismayed by the ministerial disclosures, were represented by their association chairman when he stated that 'At no stage could farmers be less prepared for disaster than the Gourton farmers who have been told for years by organised agriculture and from ministerial level that this area would never become a Bantustan as it is the watershed of the Tugela' (Daily News, 3.5.1973). The whites in Ingwavuma district and the Winterton and Bergville area farmers also protested, the latter group castigating government for the fact that they only learnt of the proposals, which affected them directly, indirectly through the media (Daily News, 4 & 5.5.1973).

Raubenheimer indicated that he supported the NAU opinion regarding the undesirability of having blacks remain in the Tugela catchment area. However, the NAU suggestion of moving blacks from the catchment area to the Makatini flats raised a problem, for this group of people had tribal links with the people of the Makatini flats (Daily News, 6.10.1973).
Raubenheimer showed further accommodation for the NAU when he spoke to its delegates in Pretoria. NAU demands that white farms be bought by government on a block-basis, wherever this was possible, were acceded to by Raubenheimer. He also assured the NAU delegation that consolidation would be completed within ten years of the promulgation of the consolidation plans (Daily News, 28.11.1973).

At a closed meeting of nine farmers' associations in the Estcourt, Winterton, and Bergville areas, the provincial plans for the deproclamation of the Upper Tugela reserve and the linking of the two Drakensberg reserves were released. Ninety per cent of the farm owners rejected the plans and a committee was elected to represent the approximately thirty affected white farmers in opposing the plans before 18th January, 1974, the deadline before which opposition was to be heard (Daily News, 12 & 14.12.1973).

Early in January, 1974, parts of Natal owned by whites in the Durban, Lower Umfolozi, and Eshowe magisterial districts were declared released areas available for purchase by the Bantu Trust (Daily News, 11.1.1974).
In March, 1974, Raubenheimer announced that the KwaZulu consolidation plans were still incomplete, with the future of the controversial flats undecided. He also suggested that the future of Eshowe as a white town was in the balance (Daily News, 20.3.1974). The resultant upcry drew a comment from Prof. O.P.F. Horwood, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Tourism, that Eshowe would remain a white town (Daily News, 28.3.1974). Nevertheless, a deputation from the Eshowe Town Council went to Pretoria where they received Raubenheimer's assurance on their continuing control of Eshowe (Daily News, 9.4.1974).

At the end of March, 1975, the consolidation proposals were disclosed in part in the media and on 2nd May, 1975, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Bantu Affairs had its proposals approved in the House of Assembly (see Map II: 6). 7

4.3 Behind and Beyond the Consolidation Plans

Parliamentary procedure shadowing the developments discussed above began with the establishment of Bantu Affairs Commission whose plans for consolidation were examined and revised by a Parliamentary Select Committee on Bantu Affairs (Republic of South Africa, 1975). Some of the revised plans received parliamentary approval in 1973 and, after amendments, the rest of the proposals were approved and adopted in 1975.
MAP 7. KwaZulu: 1975 Consolidation Proposals
Debated at length in Parliament, the consolidation issue magnified existing cleavages between the three white political parties represented in Parliament at the time. In mid-May, 1975, when the final reports were being considered, government policy on land allocation was reiterated in respect of the 1936 quotas. Reaction from opposition benches was strong, and reference to the 1936 Act was a point of contention for it was seen to be utilised merely to rationalise apartheid (Hansard, May 1975; 4 & 5.6.1975).

It was revealed in Parliament that the Select Committee based its reports on the un-recorded evidence of the Bantu Affairs Commission. Furthermore, at no stage were the victims of the removals (blacks), which would ensue from consolidation, ever consulted. Leaders of the 'homeland' administrative bodies were consulted only on an ad hoc basis by a few of the members of the Select Committee, belonging to the opposition United Party (Hansard, 14.5.1975; 4 & 5.6.1975).

The economic and social ramifications of the Parliamentarily-approved recommendations of the Select Committee (Republic of South Africa, 1975) demand some attention. In the first instance, the proposals organise white territory so as to provide for an almost completely integrated area with accessibility among
ports and cities in Natal and the hinterland provinces of Transvaal and Orange Free State. A white corridor extending northward from Durban links this city with Richards Bay, whence extend corridors to Swaziland in the north and Transvaal in the north-west. The Richards Bay - Vryheid passage is significant in the light of Richards Bay's development as a port. Although the major rail and road routes between these two towns will pass through KwaZulu, at Ulundi, the Richards Bay site will be conveniently linked with the Witwatersrand by a white passage. The white town of Eshowe is accorded access to this passage in the most recent proposals. Eastward from Durban, the arterial transportation route to the Witwatersrand is also straddled by white territory, as it passes via Pietermaritzburg and the northern Natal industrial complexes at Ladysmith and Newcastle (Republic of South Africa, 1975).

Social disruption in consequence of the implementation of the plans would be characterised by the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of blacks. Resettlement has received some attention in the literature (Desmond, 1971; Baldwin, 1975). Thus far, most resettlement has involved the removal of blacks from black spots to 'homeland' areas. The scale of resettlement would be augmented by the excision of larger reserves from KwaZulu in efforts at consolidation. Furthermore, the
proposed elimination of the labour tenant system, which has survived since colonial times, would affect an estimated 400,000 blacks (Horrell, 1973).

Selection of land in providing for additional territory and alternative territory to that excised from KwaZulu favoured the granting to KwaZulu of State land before white farmlands. This is noted in respect of the Makatini flats (including the Ndumu game reserve), and the Ngoya and Nkandla forest reserves. Towns now embraced by KwaZulu would be Impendle, Hlabisa, Nongoma, Ubombo, Ingwavuma, and Pomeroy, all minor service centres.

Territory excised from KwaZulu included the Upper Tugela reserves in the Bergville district and only small portions of the Drakensberg reserves contested by the NAU. A more detailed perspective on the implications of the proposals is furnished in the next chapter.

4.4 Consolidation and the Core

Critiques of the consolidation proposals have come from various quarters at the core. Beside criticism from persons closely allied with the ruling party in South Africa, opposition has come too from
other influential parties such as organised white agriculture in Natal. Commenting on consolidation, the NAU raised the following question: 'Can anyone seriously envisage the effects of, say 1,000 white Natal farmers, walking off highly capitalised, developed farms, with their knowledge, expertise and capital so that this land can be handed over to peasant farmers to practice subsistence farming, under communal land ownership?' (NAUNTU, Nov, 1976).

The English-language press, reputed for its constant attacks on the current regime, has taken issue with government over the consolidation proposals. Two examples of editorial stances on the proposals follow.

One Durban daily argued that 'White and Black have always, and will always, be utterly dependent on each other. Drawing lines on the map won't change that. The wealthy and the impoverished have never been good neighbours and the geographical nightmare which has now been concocted will perpetuate the stark difference. It holds the recipe for future friction, discontent and bitterness' (Daily News, 30.4.1973).

The other Durban daily perceived the proposals in a similar light: 'Experience has shown that few things are as un-final as the Government's protracted series of "final" proposals for the consolidation of KwaZulu - or to be more accurate, the fragmentation of Natal...the only sensible course (failing an "entirely new geopolitical dispensation") is to start planning the whole province on the assumption that its various regions are going to function as a single economic unit, whatever the ultimate political configuration' (Natal Mercury, 1.4.1975).
Within South Africa's party-political structure, the two major parties representing opponents of government among the all-white electorate in 1975 both proposed federal solutions to South Africa's territorial dilemma. The United Party stood for a race federation which would ensure white supremacy but not be based necessarily on territorial segregation. The Progressive Party solution would be based on a qualified franchise system for voters. Essentially, both parties rejected the consolidation proposals as irrelevant to their policies for they both rejected the idea of sovereign states being established within South Africa.

A number of academics have been involved in the debate too (Rest and Young, 1972b; de Clercq, 1973; Maasdorp, 1976; Blenck and von der Ropp, 197*). These involvements have not gone unnoticed by parliamentarians, particularly the analysis of alternative consolidation strategies made by Best and Young (1972b) which received mention in a House of Assembly debate (Hansard, 5.6.1973). de Clercq (1973) extends the former analysis and Maasdorp (1976) argues for more land to be given to KwaZulu. The paper by Blenck and von der Ropp (197*) represents an insensitive analysis of the situation, reminiscent of missionary strategy during the infusion of western European ideology into the colonial empires.
The critiques of four core élites sympathetic to apartheid are now discussed. Any action by government in relation to the spatial organisation of economy and society must be closely monitored, and these influential critiques should not be ignored. Future policy under this or another regime will be based upon the emergent patterns in the South African space economy which are rooted in the ideologies of the core.

The South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA), an organisation of Afrikaner intellectuals and academics, has had an intimate association with the development of apartheid. Contributions to its periodical publications epitomise apartheid ideology and the SABRA is also active in promoting cultural awareness among white, predominantly Afrikaner, youth by organising youth camps and the like.

One paper read before the SABRA 1976 annual convention received wide publicity in the South African media, including mention in a news broadcast of the recently installed SABC TV network. The paper, presented by Bruinette(1976), dealt with the question of consolidation in the broader context of the implementation of apartheid, and its salient features are notable.
Bruinette(1976) traces the precedents of the current stage of apartheid and justifies its existence in his observation that the western-capitalist-democratic model is ideal for whites, who have been acquainted with it for centuries, while blacks have only known it for decades. That is, argues Bruinette(1976), a political model for blacks which has stood the test of time is unknown in modern times and without major modifications the existing white model seems not to be the relevant alternative for blacks.

According to Bruinette(1976), the political system in South Africa makes for a state with more foreigners (i.e. blacks) than 'South Africans'. Coupling this phenomenon with the idea that the present pattern of minority versus majority in the country is unprecedented in history, the current political model can only be accepted by Bruinette(1976) as a non-permanent, transitory phase. A twenty-year task of border redefinition, population removals and resettlements, and great economic cost will provide the basis for the ultimate phase, where the majority of 'South Africans' will be white.

To this end, he argued, the governmental consolidation proposals are unsatisfactory, from the
perspective of defense and because of the multitude of corridors and fragmented tracts of white land. The solution lies for him in the delimitation of four territorial blocks which would accommodate blacks and thereby leave South Africa a white domain, while allowing blacks to develop their own nations. KwaZulu would constitute a block in this scheme, along with the Ciskei-Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and North East Transvaal blocks.

Implications of the scheme include, *inter alia*, the withdrawal of the 1936 Act, the transaction of land between white and black on an exchange basis, the provision for existing landowners to retain propriety over land and become citizens of another state as prescribed by border changes, the condition that all land not exchanged on a mutual basis must be paid for by the respective states even if it takes the 'homelands' a long time to do so, and, the necessity of expert management to study and monitor the interventionism required to implement the scheme (the SABRA has a committee to do this),

To facilitate commuting by blacks to white urban centres, suggests Bruinette (1976), the existing 'homelands' need to be expanded in the direction of these centres. Blacks working in the white cities should be
subjected to the obtaining system of discrimination in employment. Furthermore, ethnic integration among blacks is to be prevented by allocating different tribal groupings to different work zones (e.g. Zulus should work only in Natal). This is important for Bruinette (1976) because he holds that integration disintegrates the roots of national identity and culture, and a black mass is cultivated, without any cohesive national identity and without the security necessary for peaceful evolution.

The KwaZulu block, maintains Bruinette (1976), should be in northern Natal and consolidated so as to join Swaziland and the Swazi 'homeland'. Hammersdale and Umlazi present problems for him and blacks should be moved about 20km north to be in KwaZulu. Newcastle is seen to be ideally located and the part of KwaZulu near there could be consolidated eastward to adjoin the rest of KwaZulu. Richards Bay and northern Natal will ultimately fall within KwaZulu and the areas of the 'homeland' now between the Durban - Pietermaritzburg - Newcastle line and Transkei must be exchanged for that land.

The exigencies of the dynamic state of race relations in South Africa and the concern for the preservation of cultural exclusivity at the white core are clear.
instigators of the above critique, symbolising as it does the basic tenets of apartheid ideology. In the next critique similar concerns, although perhaps slightly less evident, are compounded by concern for the preservation of a capitalist mode of production in South Africa.

The stated aim of the Bantu Investment Corporation is "...to bring about, maintain and further economic viability in the Homelands" (Bantu Investment Corporation, 1976:3). Engaged as it is in fostering investment in the 'homelands', the BIC constitutes the primary instrument for the rationalisation of apartheid on economic grounds.

Speaking at a recent meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Port Elizabeth, the chairman of the BIC board of directors addressed the issue of political and economic decentralisation in South Africa. Viljoen (1976) emphasises that his speech is a personal rather than an official statement. This declaration cannot but reinforce the need to heed his opinions, which are critical of political structures in South Africa as well as of government's consolidation proposals for the 'homelands'. The speech by Viljoen (1976) represents another voice of dissent among the élite
proponents of apartheid.

Observations made by Viljoen (1976) at the outset of his talk relate to the ideal of maintaining in South Africa a 'favourable investment climate' for the realisation of South Africa's full economic potential. Internal strife could interfere with the attainment of this ideal and 'evolutionary outlets' must be provided to obviate conflict. That is, non-whites, who will constitute an increasingly large proportion of the country's population, with corresponding increases in their urbanisation and participation in industrialisation, '...will become better educated and more conscious of their place and role in our society' (Viljoen, 1976). These people will have to be provided with employment opportunities and rates of pay commensurate with their abilities and they should have an increasing share in governmental decision-making, within a federal structure of government.

Viljoen (1976) sees three impediments to the actualisation of decentralisation in the 'homelands': The problem of activating blacks '...to become a profit-orientated society so that it can run a modern sophisticated economy...' (Viljoen, 1976) over a short period; the fact that most of the income of the 'homelands' is
earned by migrant workers; and, the fragmentation of
the 'homelands'.

Following Malherbe (1974), Viljoen (1976) pro-
poses the consolidation of KwaZulu between the Tugela
and Pongola rivers. However, Richards Bay would not
go to the state of KwaZulu. Instead, Viljoen (1976)
advocates the establishment of a condominium over
Richards Bay and Empangeni by KwaZulu, Natal Province
(which would no doubt have a white government), and the
central (federal) government. The Richards Bay-Empangeni
complex would become a demilitarised zone so that none
of the above governments could use Richards Bay to
import or export arms and troops.

Another viewpoint is held by a former member
of the Tomlinson Commission, Moolman (1974;1975), who
is now a member of the Africa Institute, an ostensibly
impartial research organisation. Moolman (1974),
speaking at a South African Institute of Race Relations
annual council meeting, presented his view as a solution
(to the territorial problem in South Africa) somewhere
between the SABRA and SAIRK policies. Moolman (1974;
1975) demonstrates how blacks have not experienced the
same degree of political, ethnic, economic, and territorial
consolidation as whites have. It is not until these
(\* reviewed by Young (1975)).
interests are realised among blacks that consolidation can be said to be effective.

Just as in the previous critiques, Moolman (1974; 1975) is only seeking an alternative within the apartheid structure. All three of the above critiques call in fact for the drawing together of the existing peripheral group within a unified territorial base.

Taking 'homeland' policy for granted, Dr. L. McCrystal, an economist preparing a 'development' plan for KwaZulu, claims that 'We have a chance here to demonstrate how the development of underdeveloped areas can be promoted to the benefit of the entire community both developed and underdeveloped' (South African Digest, 25.3.1977). Advocating a capital investment of R400 million in the next seven years and the development of a transportation infrastructure to connect the parts of KwaZulu, McCrystal sees the remedy to the problems of KwaZulu in achieving a growth in KwaZulu's geographic product of 10% at constant prices (South African Digest, 25.3.1977).

4.5 Consolidation and the Periphery

This section deals with black reaction to the spatial impact of state and capital in Natal between 1972 and 1975. It should be noted that the question of land-claims is considered in Chapter 6 as being
Secondary to the greater problem of internal colonialism in South Africa.

Most recent land-claims came from office bearers of the KwaZulu Executive Council at the time of the announcement of the consolidation plans. These people are not regarded by all blacks as leaders, it should be remembered. Buthelezi, the officially recognised KwaZulu leader, has been dubbed in the past as a reactionary misleader of blacks (Daily News, 12.7.1973). This statement from the Black Peoples' Convention is not an uncommon one ascribed to black administrators in KwaZulu. Nevertheless, their views are significant for, at the time of the consolidation proposals announcements they were the only blacks to become imbued in the land debate. (See Appendix E.)

Apartheid and the consolidation proposals came under heavy attack by Buthelezi and other members of his government. Also, the proposed removals of blacks drew angry comment from other blacks in KwaZulu. Buthelezi has stated, for example, that 'Any solution worked out by Whites on their own will never give us satisfaction' (Daily News, 2.3.1973) and that 'The urban areas are blossoming because of the brawn of the Black man. Now that the time has come for the tree we have tended together to blossom, they want to claim it for themselves. This is why they hold pseudo-independence before our eyes' (Daily News, 12.3.1973).
On the question of consolidation, Buthelezi has repeatedly asked Prime Minister Vorster for more land to be added to KwaZulu (SAIRR, 1976; Daily News, 23.1.1975) and the KwaZulu government has also laid claim to Richards Bay, all the Zululand game reserves, and State land in Zululand north of the Tugela river (Daily News, 17.1.1973) and the Zululand coast and territorial waters (Daily News, 25.3.1974).

The issue of resettlement has drawn particularly sharp commentary from blacks. Mr. B. Dladla, the KwaZulu Executive Councillor of Community Affairs, announced that only the barrel of a gun would move blacks from the Drakensberg and Tugela reserves (Daily News, 6.6.1973), and chiefs and headmen in the Drakensberg reserves have stated also that they would refuse to move even under penalty of death (Daily News, 8.6.1973).

More recently, Buthelezi has directed his attention to the question of black subjugation in general rather than to the land question. He has received wide publicity for a number of public speeches in the past two years in which he criticised the apartheid regime. Calling for an elimination of apartheid and for the establishment of multi-racial government in South Africa, Buthelezi stated at a meeting with white
politicians that 'The choice for South Africa is clear - abandon apartheid or forego the cooperation of blacks' (*Natal Mercury*, 6.12.1976).

Buthelezi has also recently conferred with other 'homeland' leaders and a joint statement was issued to the white central government. A resolution therefrom follows: 'The leaders here assembled, excluding Bophutatswana and the Transkei, wish to reiterate that they have no intention whatsoever of opting for the so-called independence, as we do not want to abdicate our birthright as South Africans, as well as forfeiting our share of the economy and wealth, which we have jointly built' (*Africa Report*, Sep-Oct, 1976).

The core is taking increasing notice of such statements for the threat to its survival (and it is a growing threat) has perhaps never been as great as in the last year.

4.6 Summary

This chapter has outlined the spatial impact of state and capital in Natal between 1972 and 1975 and has pointed to white critiques thereof and to the voices of black opposition to the consolidation plans.

At the core there is dissatisfaction with the consolidation proposals. However, the most potentially influential opponents do not question the notions of
'homeland' development or segregation of the races. Their concern is with the methods of segregation, and their counter-proposals will not go unheeded by government.

Confusion surrounding the announcement of the consolidation proposals heightened criticism from the whites most immediately affected by the plans. A marked susceptibility by government to the comments of white owners of capital is recognisable throughout the 1972 - 1975 period.

Black reaction to the consolidation proposals was at first extremely critical. The relationship between the periphery and the core has become increasingly strained and blacks are now placing more emphasis on the socio-political structure of internal colonialism than on its territorial base.
5.1 Introduction

Apartheid in general, and the consolidation proposals in particular, have wrought, or may give rise to, a scheme of things which have thus far in this dissertation been described in mainly non-evaluative terms. In this chapter a selection of problems associated with the methods of apartheid under study are pinpointed and an evaluation of each is advanced. Initially, the implications of the consolidation plans for population removals are considered (5.2). The next area of concern is the pattern of urbanisation of blacks in Natal and industrialisation, as they relate to state planning (5.3). Two location-specific problems are then identified. Richards Bay is considered in view of its envisaged development as a port (5.4), and the rationale behind land allocation in the Tongaland region (Ingwavuma district) is questioned (5.5). The concluding section (5.6) summarises the chapter.

5.2 Consolidation and Removals

KwaZulu's territorial consolidation will be accompanied by mass removals of people from areas de-proclaimed for their ethnic or racial group. Desmond
(1971) has detailed the mental and physical impact of the removals upon the black victims in a provocative work emanating from years of intimate familiarity with 'the discarded people' (as he calls them) encumbered by resettlement. The anguish of being uprooted in compliance with policies devised solely by the white core is, for blacks, the most glaring and alarming social consequence of the issue of 'homeland' consolidation.

The process of resettlement has been going on since the delimitation of the first reserves in Natal. de Clercq (1973) suggests that approximately 800,000 blacks were relocated in reserves in colonial Natal. Since 1948 momentum has gathered and resettlement has embraced a broader spectrum of the population. In terms of present policy, not only blacks are being removed, but also members of other groups. Furthermore, the nature of black resettlement has taken on larger proportions with the official attempts at eliminating black spots and with the outlawing of labour tenants and squatters on white farms.

It is estimated that in 1948 there were 242 black spots in Natal, carrying a population of 67,100, and that by 1964 there were 199 black spots with 35,200 black occupants (Maasdorp, 1970). The largest
complex of resettlement areas absorbing resettled blacks in the 1960's and early 1970's was in the Tugela Basin between Dundee and Weenen (Maasdorp, 1970).

By the beginning of 1972 there remained more than 100 black spots in Natal (Financial Mail, 21.1.1972). During 1972, about 225 families were moved from a farm (black spot) near Waschbank to Ekuvukeni in the Limehill area, about 29km away (SAIRR, 1973). More than 400 black families from Hobsland and Vulandondo were removed to Ezakheni, those from Hobsland having been resettled there in 1963 and promised permanancy of residence (SAIRR, 1973). The 1972 consolidation proposals placed the resettlement figures at approximately 343,000 blacks, 8,480 Indians, 1,060 Coloureds, and 6,160 whites in Natal (Young, B.S., quoted in Daily News, 5.6.1973).

A recent estimate, which includes all forms of displacement, has it that 105,000 blacks will ultimately be moved in Natal (Baldwin, 1975).

5.3 Regional Policy, Urbanisation, and Industrialisation

What one pair of writers expose in South Africa as a case of 'contained urbanisation' (Fair and Schmidt, 1974), another pair refer to as 'a mechanically strange regional policy' (Mabin and Biesheuvel, 1975). Regional
policy in South Africa is dictated by apartheid ideology and revolves around the linked issues of 'contained urbanisation' and industrial decentralisation. As originally rationalised by Dr. H.F. Verwoerd (cf 3.4), regional policy strives to restrict the flow of blacks to existing cities and, by means of incentives, to encourage manufacturing industry, which is mostly privately owned, to locate adjacent to or inside the 'homelands'.

The constraints upon black urbanisation, namely '...the myriad regulations commonly referred to as "the pass laws" (by which) legal residence or continuous employment for specified periods, or since birth, in the relevant city or town' (Mabin and Biesheuvel, 1975), are incompatible with the pressure of negligible opportunities for wage-employment in the 'homelands' and demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the industrial centres. The attempted enticement of private industry to locate in the 'homelands' is not as successful as necessary to counter the impulses behind labour migrancy. Far more successful has been the removal of blacks from certain areas and the manipulation of borders so as to bring parts of the 'homelands' within commuting distance of industrial centres in white-owned territory, which have or have not been
proclaimed as zones for decentralised industry.

In any study of urbanisation in South Africa, two types of urban area need to be recognised. On the one hand there is urbanisation in the cities which existed before active decentralisation policies were pursued by government, and on the other hand are the emergent industrial centres which are manifestations of decentralisation policy or which are new cities designated as decentralised areas. In the case of Natal, Durban and Newcastle may be taken as representatives of the first mentioned class of city, while Isithebe, Hammersdale, and Richards Bay might be subsumed under the latter class.

The drawing of the above distinction calls for a diversion into the taxonomy of planning. The concepts growth centre and growth pole have been distinguished in terms of a hierarchy of central places (Allen and Hermansen, 1968; Misra, 1969; Fair, 1973); or as regions in geographic space or as loci in abstract economic space (Hermansen, 1972; Campbell, 1974). Elsewhere, growth poles have been conceptualised as regional development planning tools (Thomas, 1972); hypotheses (Parr, 1965); or theories (Misra, 1969) - in the last case assuming predictive and explanatory powers. Campbell
(1974) offers simplification by proposing that "...the term growth pole should be confined to polarization and growth processes in economic space, and the term growth center should be confined to concentration and growth processes in geographic space" (Campbell, 1974).

Ambiguities in the theory surrounding the concepts are magnified by official nomenclature in South Africa. The South African National Physical Development Plan (Republic of South Africa, 1975 b) defines growth poles as "...towns or complexes of towns which will, without much stimulus, command sufficient growth potential to develop and support a large population. These poles should be far enough from existing metropolitan areas to develop into independent cities in the future" (Republic of South Africa, 1975 b:18). State planning also fosters 'growth points' within or in close proximity to the 'homelands'.

The Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg complex is classified as one of four metropolitan areas by the National Physical Development Plan (Republic of South Africa, 1975 b). Planning within that area, the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission (NTRPC) enumerate the 1970 population thereof as almost two million of Natal's four and a quarter million total population (NTRPC, 1973). Metropolitan Durban alone had a population of over 900,000 in 1966, of whom over one third were blacks (NTRPC, 1973). Projections suggest that the proportion of blacks will increase
given the present rates of growth and migration.

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<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>250,390</td>
<td>384,900</td>
<td>527,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians &amp; Coloureds</td>
<td>335,278</td>
<td>528,400</td>
<td>705,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>350,024</td>
<td>509,930</td>
<td>729,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>935,692</td>
<td>1,423,230</td>
<td>1,932,180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Durban : Population Forecast
(Source: NTRPC, 1973: Appendix 2, Table 4)

A similar projection of employment numbers suggests that by 1990 almost one half of the envisaged 935,851 people employed in Durban will be blacks (NTRPC, 1973).

The extent and dynamics of black participation in the regional economy of the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg area point to the inextricability of black and white in the economic sphere. Industrial concentration about the port of Durban and associated tertiary development requires a concentration of workers and a dilemma arises for the segregationist government. Blacks are vital to the capitalist circuit of production, yet the need is seen to separate them from their places of work by a distance commensurate with the dictates of apartheid.

Umlazi and KwaMashu, black residential areas within the Durban-Pinetown metropolis, have been
incorporated into KwaZulu, the former having been one of the colonial reserves and the latter by border manipulation. Likewise, in the case of Newcastle decentralisation planning took into account local industrial expansion, particularly the erection of the third fully integrated steelworks in South Africa. Madadeni township for blacks is adjacent to Newcastle's industrial area and Osizweni is being developed 7.4km east of Madadeni (Newcastle Municipality, n.d.).

Sundumbili is the only residential area designated for black workers in decentralised industries in KwaZulu, at Isithebe. Other black townships in areas of industrial decentralisation are Empumalanga, near Hammersdale, and Ezikhaweni, near Richards Bay. Being outside KwaZulu, Hammersdale and Richards Bay serve only as employment sources for blacks and duplicate therefore the state of affairs in Durban and Newcastle, where maximum capital investment occurs in the white zones of the urban-industrial areas and thus where returns to capital are directed.

Strong appeals have been made by the BIC to foreign investors to locate plants in the 'homelands'. The participation of trans-national corporations in the development of South Africa's capitalist circuit of
production based on black labour notwithstanding, certain foreign investors have been attracted to KwaZulu. The indirect shareholdings of British investors in Isithebe firms (Financial Mail, 12.7.1974) and the decision of a Swiss industrialist to establish a R1 million plant in KwaZulu (SAIRR, 1974) are noteworthy. Also of interest is the investment of Bata Shoe Company in two KwaZulu plants. A R2 million factory to be opened near Estcourt in 1978 will bring the Bata investment to R3 million. The existing Bata factory at Keates Drift near Greytown employs 230 Zulus (Natal Mercury, 12.11.1976). KwaZulu may well attract further foreign capitalists which would steer returns to capital directly out of South Africa, rather than having the social product polarise in the South African cities. That is, the structure of the dependency of the black internal colony would face transformation but not destruction.

It is apparent that black urbanisation focuses on the major urban-industrial cores, and government's vision of industrial decentralisation as a means of constraining the influx of blacks in the larger cities remains unrealised (Fair and Davies, 1976). Growth pole or growth centre theory may be applied to the ends of social justice by decentralising industry (Santos, 1975 a). However, industrial decentralisation in
South Africa works to the ultimate benefit of the white core and foreign investors because the industries involved are dominated by interests at the core.

Should KwaZulu become 'independent', its administrators would find it difficult to restrain urbanisation, in the event that they revoked all the laws currently inhibiting black mobility. As it is, Maasdorp (1975) estimates the number of squatters to be about a quarter million in the Durban area alone. An obvious solution to the problem, it would seem, would be to encourage exactly the type of decentralisation that government is now trying to promote. This would run contrary to the suggestions made by Young (1972) and Maasdorp (1974) for industrial development to be initiated in KwaZulu at locations adjoining the existing industrial areas.

In the final analysis, it may be said that the maintenance of the urban-industrial cores and their contributions to the successful functioning of the capitalist circuit of production in South Africa (and in its international setting) rely absolutely on black labour. Any decentralisation attempts and even the question of an 'independent' KwaZulu need to be weighed against this fact. Solutions to the problem of
black urbanisation and industrial decentralisation rest in the relationship between workers and industry. Equity in terms of opportunity and mobility among all participants in the South African economy is a precondition for the solution of these problems. Another precondition relates to the control of capital flows within the economy, both locally and internationally. Industrial decentralisation is a meaningless task until these issues are addressed and settled.

5.4 Consolidation and Richards Bay (see Map No. 8) 

Selected by central government as the site for a deep-water port in 1965 (Financial Mail, 31.7.1970), Richards Bay is being transformed from a nature reserve and fishing resort into a harbour city which is to perform various functions within the South African space economy and within the framework of international patterns of trade. The port was opened to limited shipping traffic in April 1976, with the primary purpose of serving as a point of trans-shipment for the bulk exportation of coal and, later, other bulk cargo such as sugar.

The port and its corresponding city are planned to fulfil national and international economic imperatives rather than cater for clearly discernable social needs. This accords with the trend in the evolution
of other cities in South Africa (cf Anderson, 1958), namely the almost invariable association of industrial concentration and urban growth with natural resource location (An exception would be the creation of a new town primarily to fulfil political imperatives; e.g. Ulundi - cf Best and Young, 1972 a).

Besides offering deep-water port facilities and alleviating traffic at Durban, presently the main port serving Natal and parts of the Witwatersrand, Richards Bay will act as an industrial growth point drawing labour from KwaZulu (Republic of South Africa, 1972). At the national level then, Richards Bay is planned as a metropolitan port and point of origin for a 'development axis' to the Witbank/Middleburg coal-mining and industrial complex in the Transvaal (Republic of South Africa, 1975 b).

At the local level, urban planning for the new city progresses according to the master plan drawn by a private firm, Thorington-Smith, Rosenberg, and McCrystal, at the behest of government. Government has exercised maximum possible control over developments at Richards Bay by 'freezing' most of the land in the vicinity, much of which was appropriated through compensation from farmers and other private groups and
individuals, enabling the planners to begin with a 'clean slate'.

Map 8. Richards Bay

Industrialisation began when the Alusaf aluminium smelter was established at Richards Bay through state enterprise. Production began in 1971, providing the main materials for overhead cable manufacturer, Alcor, with its plant at the Alton industrial park at Richards Bay. Under a twenty-year contract, Alusaf buys its alumina from Gove in the Northern Territory of Australia. Beside such linkage effects
with Alusaf, it is expected by state planners that more industries will be attracted to Richards Bay by government's growth point concessions to industrialists locating there (Daily News, 4.2.1971; Financial Mail, 17.1.1975).

A major private industrial plant to have located at Richards Bay is owned by Triomf Fertilizer Investments and produces phosphoric acid. Deliveries have already been made to Brazil and a ten-year contract has been negotiated for the supply of 50,000 tons of phosphoric acid to Japan (South African Digest, 18.3.1977)³.

As previously alluded to, all planning has conformed to the principles of apartheid and residential areas are devised to maintain racial segregation, and this by means of a physical barrier. Ezikhaweni, the black residential area (designated on the accompanying map as reserve no. 10), lies south west of the bay and will provide the bulk of the labour required by industries located four or more kilometres across the flood plain of the Mhluzi river. The area designated reserve no. 4, on the other hand, is subject to re-designation according to the most recently announced consolidation plans and will ultimately fall under white ownership.
At this stage, mention should be made of a coastal mining operation in reserve no. 4, 7km north of Richards Bay. The deposit of heavy mineral-bearing sand in the coastal dunes will yield an assortment of minerals totalling 700megatons by 1980 (Financial Mail, 30.7.1976). The Bantu Mining Corporation will receive 10% of profits from the operation. The Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, Union Corporation, Quebec Iron and Titanium Corporation of Canada, and the Old Mutual will share the balance of the profits, with the Canadian concern receiving 36% of the total profits (Financial Mail, 30.7.1976). Canadian involvement is intensified by the R120 million loan put up by 12 Canadian banks toward the R250 million project (Financial Mail, 30.7.1976). A smelter is being constructed outside KwaZulu to serve the mining operation and will commence operation in 1978 (Financial Mail, 30.7.1976).

Indications are that the largest proportion of benefits to be derived from Richards Bay will accrue to the private proprietors of industry and commerce, to the state, and to foreign investors. Conclusions of this kind appear contrary to the ideals of Richards Bay's planners as expressed in the following passage:
'There are Bantu Homelands in the vicinity of the Bay, and the area therefore lends itself to development in accordance with the Govern-
ment's policy of Separate Development, whereby industrial employment areas are established at the interface of White Areas and Bantu Homelands, so that White and Black can benefit economically from modern technology, but can live in their own areas administered by themselves in accordance with their own culture and customs' (Thorrington-Smith, n.d.).

Naive or obfuscatory, whichever epithet is attached to this rationalisation for the means of exploiting Richards Bay, the fact that wealth generated by the new city will find its way to the white-owned cores of capital concentration within South Africa and in foreign economic cores cannot be concealed. While the level of social well-being among blacks is dependent upon development in the economic cores (given the capitalist mode of production), that level is also curtailed by the extent to which wealth polarises in non-black areas in South Africa or outside the country.

Richards Bay was part of Zululand appropriated by white interests during the phase of territorial fragmentation at the beginning of this century. The interests of state and capital today further alienate Richards Bay from the Zulu people. This is evidenced in the manner in which the consolidation proposals manipulate KwaZulu's borders to suit foreseeable growth at Richards Bay, and in the way by which returns to
capital are channeled to the non-Zulu investors in local development. The consolidation proposals clearly provide access routes between Richards Bay and the Witwatersrand, and also for the excision of reserve no.4. The motives for these particular provisions in the latest consolidation plans relate directly to the fused ideologies of apartheid and capitalism in South Africa.

5.5 Consolidation and Tongaland

The Tongaland block of KwaZulu (see Maps No's. 1 and 3. The block coincides roughly with Ingwavuma magisterial district) comprises the north-eastern region of Natal, which embraces Tongaland and shares some of its border with the states of Swaziland and Mozambique. Recently, in compliance with the conditions of the 1936 Bantu Land and Trust Act, this peripheral region was designated as one of ten blocks of land constituting KwaZulu. More recently still, on 25th June 1975, Mozambique achieved independence after centuries of domination by metropolitan Portugal. The new regime in Mozambique governs in accordance with an ideology vigorously antithetical to that of the South African government and the border common to both states is thus a distinct barrier in political space, separating two incompatible political systems.
In the interim between the two abovementioned manifestations of ideological assiduity, in South Africa and in Moçambique, lives were lost in the west of the region during inter-clan fighting over rights to domestic leadership (Daily News, 3.9.1974; Natal Mercury, 13.9 & 4.10.1974; Daily News, 4.10.1974). Cognisance was taken of the dispute by Swaziland officials (one clan mounted its offensive from Swaziland after moving there from Ingwavuma), and they reiterated their claims to the western part of the Ingwavuma district (Daily News, 3.9.1974). The Tongaland block represents a potential zone of conflict.

The western border of the Tongaland block coincides with the Ubombo mountains. In 1868 the Transvaal Republic annexed Swaziland and made claims to land as far as the coast. However, in 1869 the Ubombo range was settled upon by Portugal and Transvaal as the boundary between the latter republic and Portuguese East Africa. Although the Swazis were not party to these arrangements affecting their territory, they traditionally recognised Swaziland’s eastern limits as being closer to the coast than are the Ubombo mountains (Matselula, 1972).

Acting as arbitrator over the contest between Portugal and Britain for possession of Delagoa Bay,
Marshall MacMahon of France defined the northern border of the Tongaland block on 28th March, 1875 (Matsebula, 1972). One of the ramifications of this decision was that the Tonga tribe, who occupy a corridor of land stretching along the coast between Delagoa Bay and Lake Sibayi, had their historical territory dissected. The Tongas were at no time involved in the altercation which spawned the 'MacMahon Award'.

Sambaneland, the part of the Tongaland block to the west of the Pongola river, was annexed by Britain in 1895 and added to Zululand (Union of South Africa, 1955). Tongaland, east of the river, was declared a British protectorate in 1896 and annexed by Britain and added to Zululand in 1897 (Union of South Africa, 1955).

If the most recent KwaZulu borders are assumed as immutable (as well they might be while the National Party remains in power), and should KwaZulu opt for 'independence', the experiences of other African states with undemocratic border delimitation, irredentism, and resultant conflict become portentous for the citizenry-elect of KwaZulu and to the populace of adjacent states.
Moreover, the 1936 Act, by which token the National Party partitions and allocates land, stipulates the precise areal size of the 'homelands'. From this perspective, consolidation of the Tongaland block means that territory more appropriately related to the historical Zulu domain has been relinquished to white control. Of course, the pressures on government by white agriculture to place the Josini dam and Makatini flats in a part of KwaZulu (or, to fit a part of KwaZulu around these) should not be discounted.

The implications of this legacy are numerous and whatever the economic potential of the Tongaland block, its design needs to be viewed within the broader context of apartheid: a trade-off situation exists whereby government attempts to appease protestations by white capital and by blacks (within the constraints of an obsolete Act), and to maintain social, economic, and political dominance. The Tongaland block appears to partially satisfy this form of equilibrium while also conveniently providing a buffer zone in Southern African political space.

5.6 Summary

Economic, political, and social dimensions of the consolidation proposals and their implementation were encountered in this chapter. They indicated an
accentuation of disparity in Natal related to core ideologies and the two case studies signal a continuing state of dependence by blacks upon the local and international capitalist political economy, whether KwaZulu becomes 'independent' or not.

In the next, final chapter of the dissertation, the above conclusions and those from earlier chapters are elaborated.
6.1 Introduction

In this final chapter the salient findings of the research project are presented as a synthetical rather than a conclusive set of statements. Firstly, the internal colonialism model is briefly recapitulated (6.2) and then various significant relationships are drawn. State and capital are associated with labour (6.3), and with territory (6.4). Land and labour are then connected (6.5) and the question of territoriality and the South African internal colony is addressed (6.6). Some speculative scenarios of the future place of KwaZulu in the structure of development and underdevelopment are sketched (6.7) before a final statement is made concerning the spatial impact of state and capital in South Africa (6.8).

6.2 The Nature of Internal Colonialism

Postulated in the model of internal colonialism is a structure of intra-national relationships consequent upon certain recognisable socio-economic forms. Essentially, the internal colony is a societal group which is subservient to another group which has control over power and authority within a given state, and the
dichotomy between the two is manifest in the division of labour which favours the polarisation of capital among the dominant group. There is a tendency toward a spatial concentration of the political and economic core group, just as there is for the peripheral group, the internal colony. The internal colony may carry the additional feature of a distinctive production pattern which is inferior in capacity and output to that of the wider state economy; a distinction exacerbated by the continuing flow of capital into the core regions of the space economy in general, and the core societal group in particular. Finally, the internal colonialism model predicts a confrontation between the internal colony and the superordinate group with the internal colony seeking independence from the rest of the country.

6.3 State, Capital, and Labour

In South Africa, the relationship between state and capital revolves about labour, and this on a racial basis.

When the first vestiges of capitalist forms appeared in Natal, after British occupation, state and capital were indistinguishable in terms of their positions vis-à-vis black labour. After all, white capitalists, either agriculturalists or merchant landowners, were personally involved in government. Blacks
resident in the reserves comprised a potential labour pool for urban development while blacks endowed with the status of tenant or squatter provided a ready source of monetary or material income to white land-owners. Unable to enlist sufficient and willing local black manual labour for an emergent plantation economy, capitalists found an outlet in government's readiness to import indentured Indian labourers into the colony.

Because the implementation of apartheid has required stringent control over the location of employment for blacks, capital has not always responded favourably in collusion with apartheid. Apartheid's ideologues have of necessity then enacted legislation to direct capital into specified areas. Capitalists have, as shown by their actions, been unenthusiastic about apartheid's regional policies, but only in so far as the laws of segregation affect the extraction of surplus value from production based on black labour. The success of apartheid is decisively substantiated by a capitalist mode of production and government is prepared to seek strategies of political and economic decentralisation which accord with the demands for capital accumulation in the South African and broader economic structure of capitalist economy. Pressure is thus being brought to bear on government to adapt
segregationist policies to the structure of capitalism.

Exploitative relationships between capital and labour are abetted by apartheid. Capitalism in local and international settings thrives on a ready supply of cheap labour and in South Africa this situation arises directly out of apartheid legislation. Colonial and post-colonial government in Natal exhibited a compliance with nascent and developing capitalism by tolerating a racial division of labour favouring the accumulation of capital among whites. Apartheid government has made concrete these earlier relationships by legislating for a racial and spatial division of labour.

It would appear that the continuing subjugation of black labour is accentuated by the nature of rights to territory accorded blacks by the state and associated with capitalist penetration of Natal and Zululand during the period of colonialism.

6.4 State, Capital, and Land

In pursuance of ideologies at the core, government is faced with the dilemma of maintaining and increasing economic growth on the one hand, and territorially removing blacks from the urban cores and primary agricultural areas on the other hand. Economic
growth is sustained largely by white-owned enterprise utilising black labour, and, given a capitalist mode of production, the loci of economic growth correspond with the areas of most intense capital concentration.

KwaZulu is constellated about Natal's most economically productive urban and rural zones. The precedents of this arrangement are tied with the manner in which capitalism was infused into Natal. Initial settlement of Natal by trekkers and Britons involved the superimposition of private land-ownership over the pre-colonial organisation of territory. Reserves were set apart as a protective device to ensure partial sanctuary for indigenous blacks in Natal Colony. Under pressure from whites, government sanctioned the penetration of Zululand by capitalist interests. In this instance, reserves were demarcated in direct response to white agricultural interests which assisted in the establishment of the sugar industry in Natal (which by then embraced Zululand).

More recent developments at the hand of the apartheid government have included attempts to compact the original reserves to afford a basis for the envisaged nation state of KwaZulu. Proposals for KwaZulu's partial consolidation have by and large
reflected an alignment of governmental decisions with the interests of capitalist development in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Borders have been delimited to provide maximum possible accessibility by blacks in KwaZulu to the industrial centres in Natal. Inter-urban transportation routes follow distinct corridors which fragment KwaZulu. Where certain strategic resources and planned areas of urban-industrial development have in the past fallen in a reserve, these have now been excluded from KwaZulu.

5 Land and Labour

Black labour in Natal is dispersed throughout the province, within and without KwaZulu. Ideally, in terms of apartheid ideology, all blacks would ultimately be resident in KwaZulu, and would sell their labour in the white-owned areas. Blacks within KwaZulu practice limited agriculture in the main, and their labour there makes little contribution to capital accumulation in South Africa. Blacks working outside KwaZulu provide the bulk of Natal's workforce, and predominantly as manual labourers. The latter group of blacks have almost no prospect, under the current regime, of acquiring status as permanent residents at or near their place of work, and official policy would have them reside within KwaZulu.
Rural blacks outside KwaZulu fall into three broad categories: those in reserves of the past now deproclaimed as parts of KwaZulu; those employed on white farms; and tenants on white farms. The first and last groups face removal and resettlement within KwaZulu and members of the other group are considered only as temporary workers on white farms. Blacks to be resettled are victims of the superimposition of a pattern of land-ownership based on monetary values over the pre-colonial landscape.

Besides giving rise to the pattern of land-ownership which pressures blacks into territory reserved for them by whites, the penetration of capitalism into Natal has precipitated two 'circuits of production' within the province. Although both circuits are married into the capitalist mode of production, the lower circuit is confined to KwaZulu and represents an inferior sector of the economy as far as the generation of capital is concerned (cf Santos, 1973). For Sachs (1976), the lower circuit (which he writes of as 'the traditional sector') is, '...in extreme cases' (Sachs, 1976:139), in fact an internal colony.

6.6 Internal Colonialism and Territory

The division of labour on a racial basis is
regarded as the fundamental source for internal colonialism, and the internal colonialism model adequately defines the relationship between blacks in Natal and the white-controlled political economy.

In Natal, all blacks are considered in this study to constitute an internal colony, but this clearly on a provincial basis. Of course, all blacks in South Africa would, in terms of the approach and findings of this study, be an internal colony and Natal serves only as an exemplar.

In South Africa the internal colony is dispersed throughout the country and therefore territorially almost indistinguishable from the core conscious collective. The objectives of government in this regard are to furnish the internal colony with a territorial base and thereafter to 'decolonise' that territory.

The successful assertion of the internal colony's collective consciousness by seeking to divorce itself from the superordinate group, as predicted by the internal colonialism model, would require in South Africa a change in socio-economic structures of dependence rather than a territorial separation. The 'homelands' do not meet the territorial demands of blacks and are merely
creations of the core group.

6.7 Speculative Scenarios

It is significant, as a form of evaluation of the internal colonialism model, to extrapolate from the research findings and theoretical considerations and to pose speculations about possible outcomes of the current phase of internal colonialism in South Africa. Two scenarios are presented below and these on the assumption of a continuing white oligarchy in South Africa.

1) KwaZulu remains territorially fragmented and is accorded political independence from South Africa in terms of apartheid policy.

Should this eventuate, Zulus would retain their identity as an internal colony. The KwaZulu economy would remain dependent upon the embracing South African economy for at least two reasons. Firstly, migrant labour in the urban-industrial cores and white farms would still provide the major source of revenue for KwaZulu. Secondly, the fragmented nature of KwaZulu implies dependency on South Africa for the exercising of political rights in KwaZulu, as well as dependency in terms of trade and communications outside of South Africa. The consolidation proposals do not pretend to be aimed at absolute consolidation and for this reason there is little possibility for the elimination of
internal colonial structures under South Africa's
government of today. A fragmented KwaZulu compels
the Zulu people to remain bound into the South African
political economy.

2) KwaZulu is consolidated as a single area and is
accorded political independence in terms of apartheid
policy.

In this case, two possible outcomes are postulated.
a) If the KwaZulu authorities opt for an economic
system polemically opposed to that functioning in
South Africa today, it would be necessary for KwaZulu
to divorce itself from the South African political
economy to obviate dependence. This would, perforce,
involve the retraction of KwaZulu citizens from their
places of work in South Africa. The magnitude of
this task and the probable refusal on the part of the
workers involved (and South Africa would be reluctant
to encourage their departure) to carry it out would
present one problem, while the capacity for KwaZulu
to absorb them into its economy at once would be another.
Should the unlikely task be attempted over a long
period of time, blacks in Natal would remain an
internal colony until the completion of the task, and
even then underdevelopment may persist for other reasons,
such as a transformation of dependence from a local to
an international structure.
b) If KwaZulu remained within the capitalist structure, KwaZulu would remain dependent on South Africa and the international capitalist system, just as many ex-colonies have done (cf. Crush, 1977 for the case of Swaziland). Furthermore, this outcome would bring to the surface cleavages among blacks within KwaZulu in terms of relative access to capital and for some of the main reasons why blacks today are an internal colony in South Africa.

In both of the above instances it would appear that there is little probability of blacks freeing themselves from internal colonialism while the current South African political economy is sustained and while an assymmetrical interdependence between the internal colony and the core exists. This observation leads to the suggestion that the period of black internal colonialism in South Africa can only end with a changed relationship between labour with state and capital. This outcome lies outside the notion of 'homeland' development.

6.8 Conclusion

Internal colonialism in South Africa, as exemplified in this study of KwaZulu in Natal, is a
function of the combined interests of state and of capital.

Efforts by the state at confining the internal colony within specific territorial limits does not exempt the internal colony from subservience to or dependence upon the core and upon international economic structures.

The solution to the problem of internal colonialism lies not in the relationship between land and labour on the terms of capital and state, but in the termination of the existing conditions of the relationship of labour with capital and state. Only then will the problem of territorial rights be able to be dealt with effectively in South Africa.
PREFACE

1. Ideology is defined in Chapter One (1.4). Discriminate classes are recognised in South African society by an expanding social scientific literature, although consensus on the issues of isolating classes and explaining their structures of inter-relationship are uncommon in that literature (Trapido, 1971; Davies, 1973; Kuner, 1974; Mhiongo, 1975; Fair and Davies, 1976; Johnstone, 1976; Wolpe, 1976; Smith, 1977).

2. Estimates made by the South African Institute of Race Relations, 1976 yearbook.

3. This new term followed the 1955 report of the Tomlinson Commission.

4. Apartheid is the Afrikaans term for 'apartness' and it is now attached to the segregationist policy of the ruling National Party.

CHAPTER ONE

1. cf Thompson (1960).

2. The term applied to farms bought by blacks in colonial Natal, outside the reserves. They remain as small fragments of black territory outside the 'homelands'.

3. The de jure figure would refer to all blacks classified by government as Zulu, that is all blacks considered by government as citizens of KwaZulu whether they live there or not.

4. The University of Natal (Durban) and Don Africana libraries provided most of the data sought. The latter is contained within the Durban Municipal Library and is a valuable source of historical material on Natal, after the Killie Campbell Library in Durban. The South African Institute of Race Relations Library in Durban is small but contains some interesting material on recent history.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Other recent geographical works of interest are the papers by Ginsburg (1973) and Slater (1975)
CHAPTER THREE

1. Descendants of the Dutch who settled at the Cape of Good Hope after 1652 and who in the nineteenth century left the south western Cape to escape British colonial administration.

2. The Voortrekker government in Natalia Republic.

3. This area corresponds roughly with the Alfred magisterial district and the portion of the Port Shepstone district separating Alfred from the coast (Map No. 3).

4. Fynn, the resident magistrate of Isinga district, in 1894 commented on conditions in one reserve under his jurisdiction: 'More than half this surface is mountainous and rocky and cannot be cultivated. Water is also scarce, and in dry seasons great distances have to be travelled to fetch water by the Natives, and the stock have to be driven many miles to drink' (Colony of Natal, 1894:53).


6. The Natal Native Trust held the Deeds of Grant to the reserves in Natal during British colonial rule. The white trustees were required to '...grant, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the land, in such ways as they see fit, for the support, advantage of well-being of the said Natives, or for purposes connected therewith' (Union of South Africa, 1955). The Zululand Native Trust took on the same responsibilities and both trusts were put in the charge of the Minister of Native Affairs after Union.

7. The report of the Natal Lands Commission of 1902 contained the recommendation that '...in the case of rural lands, the essential of beneficial occupation is that a man of European descent should have his home on the land, and be bona fide endeavouring to make his living thereon. Any owner, of any colour or nationality, already registered, will, however, have to be regarded as capable of fulfilling occupation conditions on his own land' (Colony of Natal, 1902:12).

8. Border areas are the officially recognised zones adjacent to homelands which satisfy the requirements for industrial decentralisation policy and which qualify industrialists locating plants there to obtain certain stipulated incentive grants.
9. Because KwaZulu delayed its acceptance of the Legis{}ative Assembly status for its Territorial Authority, KwaZulu had an Executive Committee headed by a Chief Executive Officer. If a new Bill to amend the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act is passed, 'homelands' will be able to achieve the status of 'internally autonomous countries' (South African Digest, 8.4.1977).


11. It is interesting to note that Seme was the Swaziland national attorney who was instructing lawyer for the Swazi delegation which went to London in 1922 over the question of land partitioning in that country (Matsebula, 1972).

12. This applies to the releasing of land from the conditions of the 1913 Act for purchase by the Native Trusts.

13. A term widely used to denote non-'homeland' territory in South Africa; that is 'white' South Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. The ideology of the trans-national corporation is concisely stated in a booklet by the chairman of Unilever Limited (Unilever, 1976 Unilever and economic development in the third world, Unilever: London).

2. Maasdorp(1975) suggests that the figure could be as high as a quarter million for illegal blacks in Durban while as many as 300,000 blacks in the metropolitan area could be shack dwellers.

3. British financial houses participated in the accumulation of finance capital for the plant. The plant was planned when phosphoric acid prices were high. With a fall in the price, the French Gazocean corporation pulled out of the scheme (Economist, 9.3.1977).

4. The minerals to be extracted from the mine before 1980, it is anticipated, will be rutile(56,000 tons), zircon(115,000 tons), titania slag(399,000 tons), and low manganese pig iron(217,000 tons) (Financial Mail, 30.7.1976).
APPENDIX A

1. Map of 'Multistan' proposed by Malherbe(1974)
   and Viljoen(1976) - see p.99

   Taken from Desmond(1971) - see p.105

3. Map showing Tonga territory. Taken from
   Junod(1962) - see p.121

4. Map of Tongaland 1889. Taken from Matsebula(1972) -
   see p.122

5. Map showing selected Natal place-names
5. Selected Natal place-names
APPENDIX B

Comments on land consolidation by the Executive Council of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 21.7.1972 (Tabled at a special session in January 1973).
TO THE HONOURABLE THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL, MR. P.H. TORLAGE, COMMISSIONER-GENERAL FOR THE ZULU AND SWAZI NATIONAL UNITS.

1. When we met the Honourable the Prime Minister on the 28th June, 1971, in the Hon. the Commissioner-General's presence, the Chief Executive Councillor speaking on behalf of the Executive Council, made it clear to the Hon. the Prime Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster, that Consolidation of land in KwaZulu on the basis of the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act would, if pursued, place us as Leaders of our people in an invidious position. He explained that the quota promised by the Hertzog Government in 1936, was promised as additional land to existing Native Reserves long before present policies which envisage the setting up of Separate States were ever contemplated. The Chief Executive Councillor expressed the feelings of the Executive Council and of the majority of the Zulu people when he said that the 1936 land quota cannot be accepted as adequate to set up a Separate Country with any possibility of viability. In other words we cannot be convinced that the Republican Government seriously wants to set us up as a Country, if it can only do so on the basis of the 1936 quota promised by the Hertzog Government.

2. The plan for consolidation as presented to us by Mr. Peppler on behalf of the Hon. the Minister, on the 2nd June, 1972, we find it difficult to accept, in view of the above views clearly expressed to the Hon. the Prime Minister in the presence of both the Hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and Education, Mr. M.C. Botha, and the Commissioner-General for the Zulu and Swazi National Units, Mr. P.H. Torlage. That is if we have any say in the matter. It is unacceptable on moral grounds as we can hardly accept that what was promised by General Hertzog before
Separate Development was ever expounded as a policy, is good enough to
cover up for any failure to face up to the implications of seriously
setting up KwaZulu as a Country.

3. The Zulu people just like other Black people in the Republic still
expect to get the quota promised under the 1936 Land and Trust Act. They
can, however, hardly be expected to correlate the fulfillment of those
promises by the Hertzog Government in 1936 to the consolidation of KwaZulu
in terms of the present Government's policy under a completely new committment
of the Country under present policies.

4. The use of State lands for consolidation seems to be an attempt to
placate White voters by touching as little of their land as possible. We
have never doubted in our minds that State lands would automatically fall
into KwaZulu. It hardly seems fair that hectares from State lands should
be counted by the Government for the purposes of fulfilling promises under
the 1936 Land Act or for consolidation under the policy of Separate Develop­
m ent. This we state in view of the amount of land that is already owned by
the White minority in this Country and the little percentage that falls
under our areas.

5. The idea of splitting up land under irrigation near Jozini Dam between
Whites and us left us completely flabbergasted at what appears to us to be
White avarice gone mad. Whites are already so wealthy in South Africa that
we would have thought that it would hardly dent White wealth to give all the
lands under irrigation at Jozini to the Zulu people. We did not expect
Ubombo and neighbouring areas to be made White merely for the purposes of
sharing the Jozini Dam Scheme with us, who are starting almost from scratch.

6. The Game Reserves are an integral part of KwaZulu and just like
State lands we thought they would automatically fall into KwaZulu where they
belong. We were shocked to find them split up between Whites (Hluhluwe)
and Blacks (Mfolozi), as they are one complex. Since we have no industries we thought reserves could contribute towards the alleviation of our poverty as a Tourist attraction. We see examples of the great possibilities in this respect in the free African Countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. It seems more reasonable to keep Game Reserves as one complex and to give them to us as such, instead of destroying them by splitting up the complex.

7. If the Republican Government seriously wanted KwaZulu to be a viable State, then Richards Bay should be our port so that we can get an outlet to the sea and also give us a possibility of getting anywhere near economic viability. We are shocked at the idea of giving all the Coast to Whites and leaving us with hardly any beaches. This is more serious as it underlies White mistrust of Blacks to the extent of deliberately making them land-locked. If we are mistrusted in this way, what reason do we have to trust those who display such a mistrust of us?

8. The scheme involves the removal of too many of our people and very few Whites comparatively speaking. This even involves the removal of people who have fairly recently been removed to places like Paulpietersburg.

9. The idea of taking away places like Groutville, Ifafa and others, which have developed sugar cane farming, seemed grossly inconsiderate in terms of our general underdevelopment as a people. How can our most developed farming land be taken away and given to Whites who already have so much?

10. Stanger is to Zulus a National shrine as it is the resting place of King Shaka, the founder of the Zulu Nation. The Afrikaners have their own sacred places and this is our most sacred ground and one would have expected more sympathy from them in this regard.

11. The whole idea of having corridors of White territories cutting us apart, does not convince us that the Government wants to consolidate seriously. This position we find completely unacceptable.

12. We find it almost ludicrous if it was not so tragic, that all rich places that fall logically within a consolidation plan for KwaZulu from our point of view should not have fallen within KwaZulu to enable those Whites who wish to keep their land and fall under KwaZulu to do so. This is not such a horrible idea. We know many dedicated Nationalists who own land in Swaziland and Botswana, and who have not turned Black or changed their Citizenship except that they must abide by the laws of those Countries.

13. Even at draft-level, we wish we had been involved as a people most affected, to help in making proposals, and a joint Commission of both
Whites and Zulus should have been appointed.

14. To have an all-White Commission nominated by an all-White Government to decide on our future means that it is only the interests of the Whites which are well safeguarded. Anyone who contradicts this would only imply that Whites are Angels and not Humans like us, if they would not be influenced mainly by the interests of their own people.

15. As far as we are concerned Separate Development is a political operation. It is a political solution for South Africa's problems prescribed by the present Government. Therefore, with all due respect for considerations as to suitability of land for agriculture and other industries, all we are concerned with for the purposes of this policy for the moment, is a political map of KwaZulu, and once we have this, it will be for us to know what to do once we have a country with clear-cut boundaries.

16. In view of the foregoing we wish to repeat that the scheme for the Consolidation of KwaZulu as presented to us at present, is UNACCEPTABLE TO US. We recommend a Natal and KwaZulu Referendum of people of all races on this question.

1. Chief Executive Councillor
2. Executive Councillor (Agriculture and Forestry)
3. Executive Councillor (Roads and Works)
4. Executive Councillor (Community Affairs)
5. Executive Councillor (Education and Culture)
6. Executive Councillor (Justice)
NOTION ON CONSOLIDATION

1. On the 28th June, 1971 the Hon. the Prime Minister told the Executive Council that the Republican Government would consolidate the Homelands only to the extent of the quota promised under the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936.

2. On the 2nd June, 1972 the Hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, through his messenger Mr. Pepler, released to His Majesty the King of the Zulus, the Chief Executive Councillor and Members of the Executive Council, a Map of the proposed consolidation of Kwa-Zulu.

3. On the 21st July, 1972 the Executive Councillors presented their reactions to the Commissioner General, on the so called proposed draft map of Kwa-Zulu, in the form of a memorandum.

4. On the 19th of October, 1972 the Hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, met the members of the Executive Council of Kwa-Zulu in Pretoria, and attempted to hold discussions on the so called proposed draft map of Kwa-Zulu, which were not successful. This was on account of the fact that the Executive Council's attitude was as follows:-

(a) that the Chief Executive Councillor speaking on behalf of the Executive Council on the 28th June, 1971 made it clear to the Hon. the Prime Minister that consolidation on the basis of the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act, was not acceptable to the Executive Council as a basis on which consolidation in terms of the Government Policy of separate development, should take place.

(b) that the Executive Council had already expressed its reaction to the so called draft map of Kwa-Kulu, which reaction it presented to the Republican Government through the Hon. the Commissioner General on the 21st July, 1972 in the form of a formal Memorandum.
(c) In view of the fact that the so called draft map of Kwa-Zulu was prepared without any participation of the Zulu people, and the fact that it was based on the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act, which had nothing to do with the Policy of Separate Development, as adumbrated by the Nationalist Government since 1948, which basis we do not accept, and also in view of the Hon. the Minister's attitude, which left the Kwa-Zulu Government without any basis acceptable on both sides,

I move that in the opinion of this House, that whereas we appreciate the willingness of the present Government to deliver the full quota of 526 000 morgen promised by the Hertog Government in 1936, we cannot accept that such delivery of the said quota is sufficient to set up Kwa-Zulu as a country, that being the impression the present Government has given not only to us but to the whole world.

Further in view of the Hon. the Prime Minister's attitude as set out above, in fixing the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act quota as the only basis for consolidation of Kwa-Zulu, this House sees no point in creating a false impression that there is a scope for negotiation, when the Prime Minister's attitude makes it so clear that we have no such scope.

While we accept that we are powerless like all Black people in this country, we cannot accept being used to create the impression that we have scope for negotiation under these circumstances, when in point of fact, there is none at all.

We therefore wish it known that the proposed consolidation on the aforesaid basis is unacceptable to this House, and that we bow to it like all unilateral decrees which various White minority Government of South Africa have always imposed on us when ever it suited them without any prior consultation what so ever.

CHIEF EXECUTIVE COUNCILLOR
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