Hope: A General Meaning Analysis

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HOPE: A GENERAL MEANING ANALYSIS

by

PETER L. LAVALLEY

A Thesis
Submitted to the Council of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
of the Master's Degree in Psychology

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The process of formulating and writing this thesis has been self-edifying and personally meaningful. I am pleased with the final product and, at the same time, I am aware that this thesis, like all others, can only be an approximation of a more complete or ideal state of knowledge and understanding. This thesis, nevertheless, reflects many valued experiences and, more generally, my personal development during the last few years at Waterloo Lutheran University. Most importantly, this thesis is a product of many valued associations with other persons.

I am grateful to Dr. Vernon Schaefer, my Committee Chairman, whose personal appreciation and understanding of the subject matter has made this thesis possible. I extend my thanks, as well, to Dr. Donald Morgenson, Dr. Donald Ashley, and Dr. Edward Grant, whose interest in the topic has helped to make the process of writing this thesis enjoyable. On certain occasions, their insights and modes of approach to the subject have contributed significantly to the form and content of this paper. There are many others, too numerous to mention, who have taken the time to express their thoughts and feelings about hope, and I am extremely grateful for their contributions. Finally, I would like to thank Mrs. Doreen Armbruster, my typist, who has maintained the highest standards of excellence in this work.
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Introduction

Talk of hope and the future is in the air and very much a part of the world of twentieth-century man. At the same time there is the awareness that the actions of men today often belie the expression of their hopes for a better way of life. The resolution of this conflict is no simple matter, but may be assisted through a more complete understanding of the meaning of human hope. It may then be possible to translate that meaning into individual, social, and national realities. This paper will attend primarily to the former question—that of attaining a fuller understanding of the meaning of human hope.

An appreciation of historical and contemporary contexts gives us sufficient reason to take the quest for human hope seriously, and strive for a fuller understanding of the meaning of hope and the dynamics of hoping. In the course of evolution man has demonstrated an increasing capability to control this world and influence diverse life environments. He has now achieved the status of being able to determine the qualitative character of all life forms known to him. One reality of the contemporary emphasis on man-as-effector points to the fact that his relationships with nature, society, and other individuals are often unilateral, oppressive, and destructive. There is quite enough evidence to suggest the future of many, if not all life forms, lies in the hands of man.
Since hope is a concept that is future oriented in a positive sense, the quest for human hope is a timely endeavour in the world of man. Although hope is not a new idea and it is not uncommon to hear people express hope in their conversations, there remain many for whom the reality of hope may constitute a new experience. A better understanding of the meaning of hope may lead to greater opportunities for experiencing hope.

It is my preference to forego the task of providing a preliminary definition of hope. It would be inappropriate and unfair to the reader if a definition of hope was provided at this point. No simple or single definition could adequately encompass the range of meanings that arise in the present analysis of different contexts and varied levels of abstraction. Furthermore, an initial definition might only curtail the reader's involvement and the development of his own understanding of hope as he reads what follows, evaluates it, and relates it to his own experience.

It will be helpful, however, to depict the general areas to be considered in the present analysis of hope. Some of the perspectives of the historical treatment of hope are especially relevant to an adequate formulation of human hope, and will provide a starting point for this paper. These perspectives will emphasize man's appreciation or non-appreciation of hope and the reasons he has offered for these viewpoints. This will be followed by a presentation
of ideas about hope in theological and other contemporary contexts.

There is an obvious distinction between these conceptual perspectives and the phenomenon of hope as an individual experiences it or is thought to experience it. The latter part of this paper will attend primarily to what is known about the meaning of hope in phenomenological terms.

The present formulation of hope may thus be understood to encompass (a) a picture of the content of hope and its conceptual application in historical and contemporary milieux, and (b) the phenomenon or experience of hope. This breakdown is intended to emphasize the important point that ideas about the content and concept of hope do not necessarily describe the personal experience of hope. The present analysis will attend to each of these aspects of hope. It is appropriately entitled "Hope: A General Meaning Analysis."

The question of the relationship of human hopes and human deeds is especially intriguing in itself. I have already pointed to the observation that human hopes and human actions are often conflicting, but this relationship is obviously more complex. The ambiguity surrounding this relationship is particularly interesting since the future of mankind ultimately depends on both his hopes and his actions, not as they conflict, but as each supports the other. This issue will be treated as a sub-theme.
Some Perceptions of the Value of Hope

A sampling of our literary heritage suggests that hope and hoping have been issues of concern to writers from many literary eras. The perspectives that arise in this cursory review point to an awareness of the reality of human hope, a reality that is viewed as having questionable merits. Specifically, there is a great deal of ambivalence associated with the value of human hope and hoping. The following review exemplifies this issue.

Virtually all early Greek writers provided a concept of hope that reflected a prevailing philosophy of life. The nature of ἔλπις, the Greek word for hope, was generally a result of the perspective the Greeks held toward life and religion. Nevertheless, the early Greek writers expressed different opinions regarding the value of hope and hoping. This was a reflection of changes in life philosophy and certain individual impressions of hope (Williams, 1927).

The ἔπις of Greek literature was etymologically connected with voluptas, the Latin word for pleasure, and hope had the meaning of a pleasurable affective state. However, this meaning was not evident in the early writings of Homer and Pindar where hoping was understood only in the loose sense of 'expect' or 'suppose.' This latter meaning was short-lived and replaced by 'to desire confidently,
often at one’s own cost.’ These different meanings can be understood in the context of Greek religious beliefs in early times (Williams, 1927).

Olympian theology emphasized the superiority of the Deities over mortals, their capacity for jealousy and envy, and their vengeful actions directed at men. Punishment by the Gods was attributed to either the strivings of men to liken themselves to the Gods by attaining material prosperity, or the insolence and sin that accompanied prosperity. As material gains accrued men were provided the hope of further successes only to be thwarted by the vengeful actions of the Gods.

It was this frustration of men’s hopes that provided hope with a somewhat sinister meaning and led Hesiod to write of it as an evil that belonged to the same class of events as death and diseases that cause havoc among mankind. This viewpoint was evidenced in the writings of Homer, Theognis, Pindar, Bacchylides, Herodutus, and Prometheus, and clearly expressed by Aeschylus in the Agamemnon:

The great gods heard our cause, and in one mood
Uprising, in the urn of bitter blood,
That men should shriek and die and towers should burn,
Cast their great vote; while over Mercy’s urn
Hope waved her empty hands, and nothing fell
[in Williams, p. 213].

At the same time not all writers were blind to the possibility of a favourable hope. Theognis stated in his elegies:

Elpis is the only good deity left to men: the others have forsaken them, and gone to Olympus.
Faith, Temperance, have gone. The graces have left the earth. No longer are just oaths observed among men, nor does anyone reverence the immortal gods. . . . But as long as man lives and beholds the light of the sun, let him worship the gods and wait upon Hope. Let him pray to the gods, and, as he burns goodly thighs, let him sacrifice first and last to Hope [in Williams, pp. 209-210].

Sophocles also acknowledged a good hope, but recognized a danger in the activity of hoping:

For that far-roving Hope, though many men have comfort of her, to many is a Delusion that wings the dreams of Desire: and he whom she haunts knows nothing till he burn his foot against hot fire [in Williams, p. 213].

This passage indicates that Sophocles saw hope as a source of gratification, but also saw the element of delusion in hope, leading man away from reality and resulting in his disappointment and destruction.

The writings of Euripides and Thucydides brought the awareness of a transition in religious outlook and the beginning of a change in the outlook on hope. This change continued under the influence of Orphism and the spread of the Dionysiac and Pythagorean cults in the next century. These religious movements held that God was a deified man, and with this breakdown in the barrier between deity and men, elpis was no longer viewed as a curse to human strivings. Plato and Socrates emphasized the divine origin of the soul and the belief that man was good by nature. With their view of a good God and a generally optimistic view of life there was a favourable use of the word hope. This view
of hope evolved further in the writings of St. Paul. In Pauline theosophy the Christian was considered a child of God, and was expected to look forward to eternal happiness. He had every reason to hope (Williams, 1927).

The poetry of more recent times shows the persistence of a favourable orientation toward hope and hoping. Samuel Johnson stated: "where there is no hope there can be no endeavor [in Menninger, 1959, p. 483]." Emerson wrote: "it is by hope that we judge a man's wisdom [in Menninger, p. 483]; Bliss Carmen: "An open hand, an easy shoe, And a hope to make the day go through [in Bartlett, 1953, p. 63]; Robert Bridges: "I live on hope and that I think do all who come into this world [in Bartlett, p. 37]; William Shakespeare: "True hope is swift, and flies with swallow's wings; Kings it makes Gods, and meaner creatures kings [in Bartlett, p. 346]."

Others have maintained the pessimistic position held by the early Greeks. For example, Shelley wrote: "Worse than despair, worse than the bitterness of death is hope [in Menninger, p. 483]; and Nietzsche: "Hope is the worst of evils, for it prolongs the torment of man [in Menninger, p. 483]."

The pessimism surrounding the idea of hope may be given several interpretations according to the different contexts in which hope has been considered. The early Greek conception of hope as a state of negative affairs can be
attributed to their fatalism regarding the course of life events (Menninger, 1959). Man's lot was determined according to the whims of a deity who consciously and successfully opposed the actions and desires of men. There was a prevalent feeling that all events were predetermined by the deity and, should man hope, he had no reason to expect to see his hope fulfilled. According to Metz (1963) the world of the Greeks appeared as a consistent and closed cosmos.

The more recent pessimism concerning hope seems to be associated with a more complex attitudinal configuration. It is linked to two profound questions raised by secular existentialists: "Can there be a moral order for man of the twentieth century?" and from this "Can human existence be meaningful?" Precipitated in part by the intellectual awareness that God might be merely a projection of man's mind, the thought quickly followed that without a God there could be no right or wrong, there could be no moral process with which man could identify and upon which he could base his life activity. The question was: "Could there be a moral order without God?" We can imagine the pain and suffering of those who, steadfast in their belief in a God, were forced to examine this possibility. In a world where there was no reality of good or evil, where there was no reason to value one event over another, it was thought that there could be no reason to hope (Evans, 1971).
considered an alien in a world without morality, a world where all was permitted to man.

The question of a moral reality was intimately tied to the issue of meaning in the lives of men. If there was no reason for morality and all things were perceived as having equal or neutral value, then life presented itself as nothing more than a series of meaningless events. From this perspective, man's ability to make choices was seen as irrelevant. And, as hope expressed a conscious tendency toward a particular state of affairs, it was considered an absurdity in a world of total and encompassing meaninglessness (Evans, 1971).

It is important to recognize that the intellectual perspective that denies morality, meaning, and the value of hope is not, in itself, sufficient grounds to deny the experience of hope. One cannot assume that individual preferences die even in a world which is 'thought' to be meaningless. As long as one desires a particular state of affairs, he may have grounds for hoping that the state of affairs will be realized. Even those who accept the intellectual denial of meaning may have desires for a different and meaningful life and experience this hope.

Although the fatalism of the Greeks and the despair over morality and meaning in the twentieth century are not sufficient grounds to deny the experience of hope, both attitudinal frameworks deny the value in hope. It is both
necessary and helpful to question whether those who deprec­
atated existence first experienced it as meaningless, or on
the basis of the idea that life is meaningless, then found
it so. To some extent the idea that life was meaningless
may have precluded the possibility of finding or being
receptive to meanings. In this sense, an attitude of mean­inglessness is distinguished by its functional impoverish­ment.

This issue is particularly significant in the pres­
et context since it points to the realization that atti­
tudes toward life may curtail thoughts about hope, and may
even preclude the experience of hope. This issue is
extremely relevant to the life of twentieth-century man
whose exposure to existential pessimism would seem to have
been both intensive and extensive. The essence of this
point of view was aptly expressed in Romans IV.18.: "Who
against hope believed in hope?" We may take this a step
further and ask "Who against hope experienced hope?"

Even though there are sufficient reasons to take the
idea of hope seriously and attempt to understand its meaning
more fully, we may expect that there will always be those
who either deny the value of hope or describe hope as a pro­
jection or a fabrication of man's mind, and relegate it to
the category of an 'opiate of the people.' In response to
those who do see hope this way, it is only necessary to
point out that many value hope as a phenomenal reality and,
for this reason, it warrants our attention and understanding.

It is obvious, as well, that hope is surviving the attack that negates its value. It may even be the case that contemporary concern for hope has been fostered by its previous depreciation. There are those who see hope or would like to see it in the world, those who believe in hope, and those who have experienced hope. It is the author's feeling that hope is a positive reality. The following section acknowledges this reality and describes one context in which contemporary man is describing a role for hope.
Selected Aspects of a Theology of Hope

Man's hopes burst open his present, connect him with his past, drive him toward the horizons of a yet unrealized future [Braaten, 1968, p. 97].

The hope school\(^1\) of thought has been organized by those theologians who have looked beyond dogmatic constraints in an attempt to clarify man's existential position and his potential for becoming other than what he has been in the past. This represents a radical departure from some forms of traditional theology and a movement toward an alternate, more accurate, and more complete picture of the human being as an 'eschatological being'—one who is future oriented. Hope theologians do not discard the past and present in favour of the future. Importance is placed on the future as it relates to the past and present. It is the synthetic conception of these temporalities that marks the activity of the hope school as a significant movement.

The theology of hope is grounded in the recognition that change is the substratum of all human experience. "More radically than earlier generations we know that we live in history where everything changes and nothing remains in its place [Moltman, 1970, p. 102]." In like manner, \(^1\)The author recognizes that there are many different theological perspectives on hope, and further, there may be more than one 'hope school.' The present analysis, however, is limited to aspects of the hope school of theology that has been described in Capps (1970) and in Marty and Peerman (1968).
Bloch (1970) points out that reality is a category which is exposed to flexibility and obligated to change. This view was expressed differently by Lawler (1968): "The only absolute truth is that there is no absolute truth . . . [p. 188]."

The overall orientation of the school of hope may be described as a theology based on change and time rather than on notions of staticity and permanence that characterized earlier theological thought. This orientation may have many positive implications for a new theology and the practice of a new religion.

The recognition of change and the importance placed on it in some theological circles seems to have evolved from the ground level of experience, that is from man's experience of himself and others in the real world. The hope theology is distinguished by the fact that it focuses on man in relation to his worldly future, rather than man striving for other-worldliness. Novak (1968) points out the theology of hope is growing out of man's experience in the world, that is his experience of change.

The historical dialogue between Marxists and Christians exemplifies the transition from a theology that based its activity on dogma to one concerned with the dynamics of change and man's experience in this world. Marx saw the organized Christian religion as the consolation and justification of the status quo:
Religion is the illusory realization of man's essence because man's essence possesses no genuine reality. . . . Religious suffering is at once an expression of man's real suffering and a protest against that suffering, but it is the latter only in the same way that the Chinese coolie reaches for his opium pipe, it is the opium of the people [in Calian, 1969, p. 434].

Marx recognized Christian dependency on a creator and that Christian hope was contingent on the belief of a promised and better life to be provided by the Deity. Marx viewed this form of dependence as antithetical to full human development and autonomy. The Christian form of transcendence was other-worldly. He proclaimed a new heaven, but forgot about a new earth. In contrast, the Marxist longed for the humanization of man by man and not through idle worship in a God who may or may not exist. While the Christian was content to hope through his beliefs, the Marxist looked to a worldly future and placed his hope in man (Calian, 1969).

Theologians of the hope school work with the awareness that other-worldliness has been an obstacle to human progress, that the perpetuation of the heaven syndrome has served to keep men poor by reconciling them to their earthly poverty. In part, this awareness seems to have grown out of a closer identification of Marxist and Christian goals and the realization that secular man is now more unwilling to be inserted into a framework that is other-worldly. Marxists and some Christians agree that restriction of salvation to
the grave beyond implies the obviation of human hope. With the diminished importance of vertical transcendence and dependence on absolute theologisms, it becomes less possible to subordinate this world to some more permanent and more valued domain (Capps, 1970). This world no longer depends on another for its reality and significance, it depends on man.

On this basis, the hope school determines to:

. . . reduce the transcendent hopes of Christianity in order to bring them into life and an active alteration of the world; it is able to stimulate that aspect of hope in Christ which is concerned with the changing of this world. The Christian hope for the justice and kingdom of God in Christ must enter into partnership with those who work for the economic relief of the "heavy laden," and who work politically for the freedom and dignity of man [Braaten, 1968, p. 107].

The theology associated with the school of hope attests to a reality of objectively real possibility, and is directly oriented toward realizing possibilities that would benefit man. Among the hope theologians there is widespread acceptance of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have merely interpreted the world in different ways; now, however, it is a matter of changing it [in Bloch, 1970, p. 61]."

The recent and growing awareness that men have the capacity to influence the direction of the evolutionary process has led some hope theologians to posit a theology by design rather than by reaction to a given state of cultural
affairs. The hope school favours a stance where theoretical categories are to be supplanted by actional ones. The relationship to the future is viewed as operative, that is man will have access to the future he wants only through creative action (Capps, 1970).

Hope theology argues that the novum cannot be reduced to a component within an already existing system. The future cannot be registered within schemas that are devised for what is. Theory cannot account for the future, nor can any interpretative explanatory conceptual scheme adequately take note of it. The theological form of coherence in the past cannot represent that which is not-yet-existent. In hope theology the contemplation of 'what is' is replaced by 'what ought to be,' and the emphasis is on 'what form change shall take' rather than on the 'why' of past or existent states of affairs. Man is no longer exclusively concerned with 'what was,' but with a reality that has 'not yet been,' a reality that will come into being as a result of man's activity (Capps, 1970).

The hope school is not concerned with restoration or with what has been lost, but with the establishment of a reality that has not yet been. Moltmann (1969) points out that in the past "Christian faith was proclaimed not as exodus out of the bondage of the past and through the boundaries of the present into the freedom of a new future, but as a turning back to sacred sources [p. 104]." History or
the past ways of life were viewed as paradise lost, and salvation meant that paradise was regained. In this framework, hoping was equivalent to the mythical faith of remembering. Both the myth of eternal return and the hope for the return to the primordial state of man are still evidenced in contemporary contexts. In contrast to those who seek their futures in the past, hope theology turns to the reality of the yet unknown, and attempts to create in that unknown the possibility of a better future. The real contemplation of the novum replaces a turning to the past, and a new dimension of experience is recognized in which features of existence that had not been looked at before become prominent. With the recognition that there are no adequate prototypes for such a future, man becomes the agent who will create and control history.

We have seen that the theology of hope is designed to activate movement and energy in the present. We may well ask what other functions will the 'to do' theology take upon itself. Theologians are aware of this question and point out that the task of hope theology is to determine anew the relationship between religion and society, between the church and social publicness, and between eschatological faith and life in society (Metz, 1970). Hope theology suggests the growing awareness that the development of human beings is intimately entangled in the vicissitudes of society, and theology must now interpret and understand
existence as a social-political problem in its broadest sense. The theology of the hope school will be concerned with important issues in the lives of secular men. There is a strong emphasis on the need for cultural contact and a hope that relates Christians to a worldly future.

In one sense hope theology may be defined as a social theology. Some hope theologians have interpreted the personal religious quest of past decades as representing a withdrawal from society.

The importance and the insistent emphasis of modern theology on the subjectivity of the believer, on his need to say a personal "Yes" to salvation, brought with it at the same time a dangerous tendency to turn salvation into a private reality, and this affected the understanding of salvation in general. This transformation of salvation into a private matter through transcendental, personalistic or existential factors, must be overcome through the working out of a theology which we have characterized with the phrase "political" theology [Metz, 1968, p. 139].

Hope theology repudiates the benefits of the privatization of religion, and true salvation is associated with overcoming corporate alienation. This same point of view is expressed by Garaudy (1968): "The future of mankind cannot be built in opposition to those with a religious faith, nor even without them . . . [p. 212]." Christian hope is no longer seen solely in terms of the salvation of the individual, but that of the covenant, of the people, of the many.

The church of the theology of hope is viewed as a place where everyman may articulate his hopes.
the church will provide the occasion and the place for vision, imagination, fantasy, and utopian thought. It should be a place in which one can really imagine the kind of society, city, university, family, or a world quite different from the way it is now [Cox, 1970, p. 135].

As Capps (1970) points out, the hope theology recommends a movement from logos to mythos. This is similar to Bloch's (1970) notion that the future is accessible through daydreaming and imagining, that is through activities which have always been a part of the mythological approach. As myths are elements in which the future can be represented, the mythologizing of the hope school will take the form of pro-mythology which is creative and pushes ahead to include the novum.

The church will also provide a basis for criticism and reform in the present. The future is conceived not only in terms of projection, but also in the context of present sufferings. Through the awareness and experience of present miseries and the criticism of the conditions that support these miseries, man engages in the process of seeking a better future. Christian messianism gives the church a critical perspective and loads it with the potential to act and change present suffering. Novak (1968) describes the role of the church as that of being able to question on the basis of a projected future:

... a merely projected future is limited and does not represent the complete realization of historical possibility. Man is gifted with an imagination and a skeptical attitude which makes it possible for him
to alter the conditions of the future, to change the
world. Consequently, the human animal "transcends"
even his own empirical projections: he calls them
into question [p. 208].

The power of the past that addresses the present
from the position of burdensome authority is broken by hope
that draws the future into the sufferings of the present.
Freedom from the past does not mean that the past is for-
gotten. The past leads to the future and the appropriation
of hopeful tendencies from the past helps to define future
content.

Since the category of 'what ought to be' receives
special emphasis in hope theology, it would seem that the
meaning of hope can be related to issues of morality.
Through the processes of criticizing the present and imagin­
ing future content man may involve himself in moral decision­
making by which certain end-states and actions to attain
those end-states receive moral justification. Therefore, it
may be said that the hopes of men or, more precisely, the
content of hope can be a reflection of man's moral decisions.
It would be incorrect, however, to see all hopes this way.
As man has the capacity to make moral decisions and act upon
these, likewise he has the capacity to be amoral, immoral,
and merely prudential. The content of his hopes and his
actions to attain that content are not always based on moral
decisions. However, to the extent that man's hopes are
based on the criticism of existing states of affairs and the
identification of 'what ought to be' or a morally desirable future, it would seem that moral decision-making can be understood as a process that leads to hope. This suggests that hope may occur as a function of man's ability to make moral decisions, and points to the practical value in education for moral decision-making.

The importance placed on the concept of futurity and 'what ought to be' goes hand-in-hand with a modification in the images of both God and man. There is the recognition that the classical concept of God can no longer be integrated in the lives of believers (Dewart, 1968), and that it has often stimulated Christian contempt for this world (Lawler, 1968). The new God appears as the power of the future to contradict the negative moments of existence that we now experience. The divinity of God is seen as a dynamism of the future before man and not above him. The subordinates in the previous God-world polarity are reversed, and transcendence is meaningfully related to the realities of time and change.

Reality is now seen to include that which has not-yet-come-into-being and must be realized. Understood as God the creator, or pantheistically as World Spirit, it is likewise man himself. God becomes the one whom man will be (Capps, 1970). Bloch (1970) suggests that the concept of becoming is in itself hope, and the process of becoming is hope fulfilled. Man is the focal point of hope in the
present and the culmination of life in the future. The steps taken to realize this culmination are those of man himself as he mediates, directs, and effects the course of his development. Man is viewed as both the essence of the future and the means by which the future will be realized.

The emphasis on change in the position articulated by hope theologians may be described more precisely at this point. First, it would seem that change, in itself, is not necessarily advantageous and, on some occasions, it may be overwhelming to the extent that hope is eclipsed. Change is important, however, from the point of view that man is able to select a desirable future out of the ingredients of change and act to bring about that future. In this way, man's hopes can serve a regulative function, inasmuch as they give direction to the course of change and the actions of men.

The theology of hope articulates a position for man in which he is able to imagine and plan his future, criticize his past and present on the basis of his conception of the future he wants, and act to attain that future. These processes are centrally involved in his hope for a better way of life and a more complete realization of human potential. As hope can be based on criticism, imagination and action, that is, on activities by which desirable changes are identified and sought after, it would seem that hope can be basically understood as a form of transcendence. All
hoping may be understood as transcendence, and the activities which precede hope as transcending activities. In the sections that follow the nature of transcendence in hope and the activities that lead to hope will be given further and more detailed consideration.

There are striking similarities between many aspects of hope theology and secular man's appraisal of the role of hope in contemporary contexts. The next section examines the role of hope in the lives of groups of people who are actively engaged in changing their worlds.
Applications of Hope in Some
Contemporary Contexts

The meaning of hope in this section is organically related to the form and content of man's activity in-the-world. The changes he desires, his actions to effect change, and his reasons that indicate the possibility of change are all formative elements of the development of hope in this context. The hopes we examine are those of aggregates of human beings, of societies and nations. Their hopes are described by individuals who have analyzed various social and political patterns of events, and have pointed to a position and a role for hope.

Black America's struggle toward independence is a striking example of the relationship between human hope and man's activity in-the-world. Dr. Martin Luther King's (1969) final published statement, entitled A Testament of Hope, will be considered here because it represents one of the better articulations of the heartfelt hopes of the American Negro. Dr. King introduces his testament with the memory:

. . . that only yesterday Negroes were not only grossly exploited but negated as human beings. They were invisible in their misery. But the suffering and silent slave of 110 years ago, an object of scorn at worst or of pity at best, is today's angry man. He is vibrantly on the move forcing change rather than waiting for it to happen [p. 174].
Dr. King contends that Negro agitation is causing America to examine all of its interrelated flaws since all are embodied in the lot of the American Negro. Violent eruptions and revolutionary actions force a face-to-face confrontation with poverty, prejudice, militarism, and materialism, and on some occasions, these actions lead to meaningful successes. When violent upheaval is followed by something positive, when some aspect of the treatment of Negroes in America is re-evaluated, and meaningful modifications result, then there is hope for a better way of life for the American Negro.

From King's perspective hope was contingent on the ability of the Negro to see himself as having the capacity to participate in the determination of his own destiny. His actions, violent or otherwise, that led to some positive social reform, were the basis of his hope. "As long as there was some steady and measurable economic progress, Negroes were willing and able to press harder and work harder and hope for something better [King, 1969, p. 233]." The hope of the American Negro may thus be viewed in the context of actions that lead to changes. The changes that occur stand as reasons why the objects of his global hopes (a more equitable use of political power and a sharing of opportunities) may be realized, and are reasons that support a hopeful outlook for the future.
Formulations that explain the actions of the American Negro in terms of either 'striving to attain some identifiable goal' or 'learning to be aggressive' may be too simple or incomplete. Berkowitz (1972) provided this criticism of the more rational theories and pointed to frustrations and other factors as more plausible explanations for some of the aggressive actions of the American Negro during the last ten years. In Berkowitz's terms frustration was understood to occur when one had been anticipating or expecting a certain pleasurable state of affairs and then found that the object of his expectation could not be realized. Berkowitz suggests that because the Negroes in the Northern States had experienced better living conditions than Negroes raised in the Southern States, the Northerners had learned to hope for and expect many of the social goods that society can provide. However, these expectations were often thwarted, and the Northerners were actually more frustrated than their Southern counterparts. As a consequence, the Negroes raised in the North were more likely to initiate and take part in riots.

Berkowitz also suggests that a person's sense of self-control is a major factor determining how he deals with his frustrations. Specifically, there are indications that a sense of personal efficacy leads to a greater willingness to initiate and maintain action as one means of fighting frustrating conditions. With reference to the American
black he states: "this sense of personal control contributes to their militancy, and enables them to do something about their frustrations, if only to take violent action [p. 85]." Other factors thought to account for some of the aggressive actions of the American Negro included the experience of painful stimulation from the environment and situations where the Negro perceived himself unfavourably with respect to certain reference groups.

Undoubtedly there are many situations in which the factors pointed to by Berkowitz lead to Negro agitation and action. Besides these interpretations it seems equally likely that on some occasions their actions were based on their conscious evaluation of situations in which they found themselves and their choice to change those situations. Their actions could be understood as the result of a moral decision and the courage to act upon that decision.

Even though there are many different conditions that would seem to give rise to action, there is strong agreement with respect to the value of action as a basis of hope. Robert F. Kennedy viewed greater citizens' participation as the only way to check the creeping corruption in America and foster hope for a better way of life. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1969), a friend to the late Senator, pointed out that "Robert Kennedy . . . evolved sort of a Christian stoicism and existentialism that gave him both a fatalism about life and an understanding that man's destiny was to struggle
against his fate [p. 176]." In this struggle, Kennedy saw the actions of men, the actions of the poor, the oppressed, and the impoverished as the basis of the hope that they would become part of the mainstream of American life. For Robert F. Kennedy the future lay beyond the vision of men but not beyond their ability to control it and influence its outcome.

Man's acting to change his worldly status was a central ingredient in the concept of hope articulated by both Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Both men acted in behalf of those who expressed the desire for a better way of life, and since that time, each has been looked upon as a martyr of that hope. Their activity symbolized and brought sustenance to the hope for a new America.

Erich Fromm (1968) has championed the cause of hope in his most recent attack on the technological society as the epitome of a social condition that negates all values of the humanistic tradition. He states that the tendency to install technical progress as the highest value has made man an appendage of the machine, dependent on it and submissive to it. Man's sense of alienation and his passiveness are the symptoms of his acceptance of the Technological Deity. He is passive, he does not relate to the world actively and is forced to submit to his idols and their demands. Fromm points to a widespread hopelessness with respect to man's
feelings about being able to change the course of events in American life.

The Revolution of Hope (1968), one of his latest works, is a major attempt to describe the means by which a hopeful outlook may be instilled in the American people and the objects of hope may be realized. He sees violence and continued passivity as having no positive effectiveness, and specifies his hope for humanization in terms of the following activities:

1. planning which includes the system man and is based on norms which follow from the examination of the optimal functioning of the human being;
2. activation of the individual by methods of grass roots activity and responsibility, by changing the present methods of alienated bureaucracy into one of humanistic management;
3. changing the consumption pattern in the direction of consumption that contributes to activation and discourages passivation;
4. the emergence of new forms of psycho-spiritual orientation and devotion, which are equivalents of religious systems of the past.

Clearly, Fromm sees hope in terms of the positive actions of men, where such actions make use of all available resources to rebuild the system. He attests to a consistency of means and ends, i.e., positive actions leading to
positive outcomes. Fromm's position is based on Albert Schweitzer's idea of 'reverence for life' which may be understood to mean that those conditions that help man satisfy his needs and realize his potential in a positive sense are valued and sought after.

Fromm depicts the meaning of hope in the context of a planning process that is designed to bring about the hoped-for changes. Besides man's potential to act and assert himself, hope depends on the real possibility of change in the system. In Fromm's terms a real possibility of change means that there are psychological, economic, social and cultural factors which can be demonstrated—if not in their quantity, at least in their existence—as a basis for a possibility of change. Fromm's model of hope points to the necessity of reasons that suggest that the changes implied in one's hopes are possible. From this point he has developed a plan that will lead man to realize the global objects of his hopes. The creation of this plan is itself an additional reason which supports the possibility that hope's objects will be realized and, further, it is a reason to adopt a hopeful orientation toward the future.

The perspectives provided by Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy, and Erich Fromm attest to a similar understanding of hope. Their hope for a better way of life encompasses freedom, equal and better opportunities for all, and greater participation. These are the global objects of
their hopes. Since greater participation is one of these objects, the relationship between man's actions and hope is especially interesting. Besides leading to a hopeful outlook, the actions of men also represent a partial realization of hope's global object, that is the actions of men are exemplars of the hoped-for greater participation in American life. As incidents of the object of hope, they are reasons (in the sense of direct and unequivocal evidence) that the global hope may be realized. The changes resulting from actions (as for example the changes in the treatment of the American Negro) are additional reasons to hope for the global objects such as an equal sharing of political power and opportunities to lead better lives. As exemplars of a global object of hope, these reasons also take the form of direct evidence.

The present picture of hope deserves some qualification. Hope has been described in situations where people are striving to attain identifiable goals. In this context the nature of hope is closely allied with a well articulated social-organizational process in which man acts to attain his goals, identifies reasons why those goals are attainable, as well as a rationale for how they may be obtained. At this level of conceptualization man's actions and reasons determine the meaning of hope and provide the basis for a hopeful outlook for the future. They are, as well, the means by which the contents of the hoped-for future will be
realized. This view of hope is consistent with the picture of twentieth-century man provided by the hope school of theology and many other contemporary characterizations of man's ability to plan, act upon his world, and so determine his future.

The foregoing examples represent only a small fraction of instances where the concept hope has been applied in contemporary social contexts. To the best of the author's knowledge there is a consistent orientation toward an idea of hope that is based on action and reasons. Furthermore, there is a strong similarity between these conceptualizations of hope and the psychological treatment of expectation described by Tolman (1948), Rotter (1954), and Atkinson (1964). A precise formulation of hope in terms of expectation has been provided by Stotland (1969) who defines hope as 'an expectation greater than 0 of achieving a goal.' The degree of hopefulness, then, is the level of this expectation or the person's perceived probability of achieving a particular goal.

Stotland (1969) provides considerable evidence to support his theory that individuals develop hopeful schemas (cognitive frameworks) regarding the efficacy of their own actions to attain identifiable goals. Hopeful schemas are invoked as the result of an individual perceiving an event or events similar to a concept of the schema or by the individual's receiving a communication from another directing
him to invoke the schema. The probability that the hopeful schema will be invoked and remain aroused is thought to be a positive function of (a) the number of times it has been invoked previously, (b) the number of events previously perceived as consistent with the schema, and (c) the importance of the person, if any, who directs the individual to invoke the schema. The process of arousing and maintaining a hopeful schema implies that the individual have some rational basis to do so. That is, on the basis of his experience he identifies reasons that support a hopeful schema about his ability to attain a certain goal.

These reasons may refer to experiences where his own actions have been effective in attaining goals. In other words, an individual may become hopeful about attaining a certain goal on the basis of the reasoning that his own actions have been effective in attaining goals in the past. From Stotland's treatment of hope in terms of expectation it is easy to understand why actions and reasons were viewed as primary elements leading to hope in the situations described by Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy, and Erich Fromm.

The present meaning of hope would seem to be related to White's (1959) notion of 'competence,' which may be understood as an individual's sense of being able to effect, control, and cope with his environment. An individual's hopefulness (expectation) about his ability to achieve
certain goals may be based on his sense of competence which, in turn, is the result of the success of his actions to attain goals in previous situations. Farber (in Lester & Lester, 1971) has suggested that an individual's hopefulness about life will increase or decrease as a function of increases and decreases in his sense of competence. If an individual's life conditions are threatened, a decrease in his sense of competence and his hopefulness will result. Farber suggests that if the threatening conditions are sufficiently strong, then the resulting loss in competence and hopefulness will be accompanied by an increase in the probability of suicide.

The development of hopeful expectations on the basis of man's actions can be easily integrated with the concept of reinforcement. More specifically, when an organism's actions are reinforced by the attainment of some goal, he then has a basis for the hope (expectation) that he will be able to attain other goals in future situations. In this way, an individual's hopes can be viewed as a function of positive reinforcement. There are many utilitarian implications to this view of the conditions that lead to hope, but, obviously, the application of positive reinforcement would have to be adapted to the specific characteristics of particular situations.

The relation of positive reinforcement to hope has been considered from another point of view. Mowrer (1960)
described the process of learning in terms of the organism's learning to hope or, more specifically, learning that a particular event signals oncoming reinforcement. He argued that hope is a prerequisite for action. Similarly, Stotland (1968) saw hope as a basis for action, and cited evidence from studies in instrumental learning to support this hypothesis. He identified hope as a construct which has motivational properties, such that greater expectation of goal attainment would lead to (a) more thought about how to attain the goal, and (b) more selective attention to aspects of the environment relevant to attaining the goal. As hope seems to occur as a function of man's actions, it would also seem that action occurs as a function of hope.

The description of hope in terms of an individual's expectation about the efficacy of his own actions to attain a certain goal represents a singular and especially fashionable approach to understanding the meaning of hope. Besides this view of hope there is an alternate perspective that is grounded in phenomenology, and will be treated at length in the following section.
A Phenomenological Analysis

Preliminary Clarification of Terms—Hope, Optimism, and Wishing

Prusyer (1963) indicated that hope has been used as a wastebasket term, and often confused with wishing or optimism. A blurring of the meaning of either or both terms has occurred where hope has been used interchangeably with wishing or optimism. Few writers have attempted to distinguish hope from wishing or optimism, and where clarification has been attempted, there are frequently different distinctions. A survey of some of these differences of opinion will be helpful in arriving at a clearer understanding of the phenomenological nature of hope and hoping.

The difference between hope and optimism seems to be more clear-cut and subject to greater agreement than the difference between hope and wishing. Before identifying the former distinction it may be helpful to examine the positions of those who have viewed hope in terms that would seem more appropriate to a definition of optimism.

Max Hammer (1970) saw hope as a camouflage for the apperception of what really exists in the world.

We are encouraging a pathological process when we encourage a person to reject and deny the reality of what is and instead encourage him to pursue what ought to be. And this is exactly what hope does [p, 15].

Hammer thought that there is the inherent suggestion in hope
that light will come even if it involves circumventing the darkness of despair. He concluded that there can be no legitimate role for hope in the process of psychotherapy. With his dismissal of hope, he also discarded the value of a future time perspective in psychotherapy, an omission that is both psychologically and philosophically unsound, and one that few psychotherapists would be likely to make.

Waterman (1970) described the state of excessive or blind optimism in terms of unbounded hopefulness. This form of hope was said to occur when one person is extremely optimistic about another's situation and tries to cheer him or pressure him to likewise be optimistic. This hope is expressed as a way of avoiding conflict, maintaining the status quo, and feeling secure in ongoing relationships even though they may really be unsatisfactory. The expressions of this form of hope lead to a hopeless situation because no real change in relationship is possible.

... certain expressions of hopefulness become stereotyped and are repeated in the same form much as a record that plays over and over again for hundreds or thousands of times. The response to the hopeful statement is also repeated with little variation. No new information is given and nothing changes [p. 45].

Waterman appropriately called this form of hoping 'a Pollyana Ritual.'

Others have expressed the view that hoping implies the rejection of reality. Menninger (1959) pointed out that some have seen hope as a counter-phobic denial of the horror
and despair born of self-destructive trends or the imminence of existential doom. Similarly, Aronov (1970) ascribed the role of a defence to hope. More specifically, hope was seen as a means by which a child defends against painful feelings related to a very uncomfortable life situation.

... the child's fantasy is that things will be better when he's older, as he will be able to do things now forbidden to him but allowed older siblings, or he will be allowed freedoms allowed to older children generally [p. 43].

Aronov describes this type of hoping as basically only a flight into the future, an escape from living with the realities of the present. This form of hope is again consistent with the idea that in hoping one rejects a portion of reality.

It is interesting to note that those who have attempted to describe the activity of hoping more precisely have made the degree of reality contact that which principally distinguishes hoping from optimism. Marcel (1965) understood the optimist as one who takes a position some distance from reality so that certain obstacles that previously seemed insurmountable then seemed attenuated. Keen (1968) suggested that optimism is based on illusion—in the Freudian sense—in that it arises out of a drive for wish fulfillment which ignores evidence to the contrary. Optimism seems to imply the selective perception of reality, the ignoring or denying part of reality because the facts would force an interpretation that the optimist would not want to make.
In contrast, hoping has been identified with precisely those situations where one accepts all the evidence, good or bad, that relates to the possibility that one's hope will be realized. The experience of hope is thought to acknowledge a plurality of facts, including those aspects of reality that are not conducive to the realization of one's hope. It is this acceptance of reality that is supposed to provide the basis for hope (Fromm, 1968; Marcel, 1965; Menninger, 1959; Prusyer, 1963). This distinction between hope and optimism is accepted here and will be subject to further elaboration in the course of the development of the phenomenal nature of hope. This elaboration will consist in a more detailed analysis of the reality encompassed in the experience of hope.

Hoping has also been defined in terms of the activity of wishing. For example, French (in Prusyer, 1963) identified hope as wishes for something and Menninger (1959) described hope as the consciousness of a realizable wish. Others have provided distinctions between these terms. For example, while French ascribed the activity of hoping to circumscribed goals (specific objects), Marcel saw wishing in terms of certain specific objects, but not hope. For Marcel, hope was supposed to refer to global objects alone, to states such as freedom, justice, and salvation.

While there is a difference between specific and global objects, it is also the case that where one hopes for
a global object he may be able to describe some of the particulars encompassed by that object. Limiting hope's objects to global states may well be a function of Marcel's metaphysical orientation and the close association of hope with theological contexts for which there has been no concretization. But man does express his hope in both concrete and abstract terms. The object level distinction may not be the best way to differentiate hoping from wishing. This does not deny the value of a metaphysical approach to or understanding of hope. It does seem to point, however, to the possibility that as there are many meanings of hope, there may also be different forms of the experience we call 'hope.'

Marcel further distinguished wishing from hope on the basis that wishing is closely associated with an urge toward tension discharge while hoping is not. He thought that wishing was followed by action, internal (as in hallucinating) or external (as in motor behaviour). In contrast, hoping was viewed as a state that is connected with patience, forebearance, waiting and awaiting; and not with action, but with receptivity.

An alternate distinction has been provided by Prusyer (1963) who suggested that wishing leads to magic, while in hope the magical elements are replaced by reality testing. He states: "It [hope] presupposes that a person have maximal orientation to all aspects of his . . .
situation, including the barriers and obstacles he finds ... [pp. 91-92]." This difference between hoping and wishing, of course, is the same distinction that has been drawn between hope and optimism.

In drawing distinctions between hoping, wishing and optimism, sometimes there is a tendency to see one activity precluding the possibility of others. It is realistically possible that a particular individual will hope for, wish for, and be optimistic about a certain state of affairs. On the basis of the degree of reality contact one might think that wishing and optimism could precede hoping, and lead to hope as more of reality was encompassed; or, the shattering of hope might be followed by a form of resigned optimism. If wishing and hope or hope and optimism occur in close temporal relationship, it might be said that either pair form an experiential complex. Lynch (1965), for example, attested to this view and saw in hope the element of wishing itself.

The recognition that wishing and hoping may occur as a complex is important from the point of view that in trying to understand one concept (hope) more clearly, one may tend to over-isolate it from similar concepts (wishing, optimism). It remains, however, that human experience is not always as fractionated as we might like to think, or as our thinking allows us to make it. Although the present analysis accepts the general distinction that in hoping one is in closer
contact with reality than in wishing and optimism, it also recognizes that wishing and optimism may be important elements in the experience of hope.

It is the author's preference at this time, however, to delve more deeply into other aspects of the experience of hope. It is clear that the thoughts and experiences of some individuals have led them to ascribe to hope a variety of features that constitute the phenomenal reality to which 'hope' refers. The following sections examine that reality.

**Despair and Hopelessness**

The many forms of the experience of darkness may be thought to include exhaustion, despondency, depression and demoralization (Harper, 1968). Although the alternatives to hope may be any of these, despair and hopelessness are thought to be the most intimate companions of hope. First, there is a theoretical connection between these concepts since despair and hopelessness are thought to point to some of the qualities of hopefulness. Second, there is an experiential connection since hopelessness and despair are often viewed as antecedent conditions to the experience of hope.

Fromm (1968) identified some of the behavioural consequences of hopelessness at the social level of function. As examples, he points to the bored expressions of the average person, the lack of contact between people, and the lack of the capacity to plan seriously for overcoming the ever-
increasing pollution of our natural ecology. From Fromm's perspective loss of hope is typically followed by (a) resigned optimism which hopes for the best without bothering to recognize that not even the good, but perhaps the worst may occur, (b) hardening of the heart or loss of compassion or empathy, and (c) destructiveness and violence. Besides these effects of the loss of hope, man also expresses his hopelessness in phrase making and adventurism, in forcing what cannot be forced, and in his nihilistic philosophies. Raskin (1970) stated that such symptoms may be increasingly observed in the behaviour of twentieth-century youth. He states that young people who formerly seemed to be on the brink of having it made now seem gripped with despair. Both Fromm and Raskin see hopelessness and despair in a great variety of activities that constitute the substance of twentieth-century life.

The individual experiences of hopelessness and despair are thought to be characterized by alienation from those relationships that man needs and desires to feel at home in the world. Despair and hopelessness entail a sense of loss of mutuality, where mutuality is understood in terms of positive relationships between man and the world, person and person, or man and himself. This experience may be accompanied by feelings of the 'too muchness of life,' the feeling of overwhelming futility, and a sense of the impossible (Lynch, 1965).
It has been said that the despairing person cannot perceive any goals that are worth striving for. Despair seems to be very similar to the state known as existential frustration and some forms of depression in which man cannot envision any meaning possibilities to be fulfilled and the environment is experienced as impoverished (Frankl, 1959). In despair there do not appear to be any resources (internal or external) that the individual can call upon and, even if there were, he could not find reason to take advantage of them. Despair seems to entail the phenomenal absence of valued end-states as well as the means to attain such end-states. Despair can be viewed as a form of entrapment in which the individual's temporal perspectives are exclusively past and present. There are only those past experiences that led an individual to despair and the present moment of despair itself. Man experiences himself as trapped in an endlessly painful present on the basis of his past experiences. His structures of thought, imagination, and feeling are rigid and inflexible. They are absolutized as the only reality--as the only possible reality.

Marcel (1965) suggests that despair is a form of enchantment whose action has a bearing on all that goes on to form the very substance of a person's life. The despairing man accepts only the perspective of established experience and believes that time will bring nothing new.
The despairing man not only contemplates and sets before himself the dismal repetition, the externalization of a situation in which he is caught like a ship in a sea of ice. By a paradox that is difficult to imagine, he anticipates this repetition [Marcel, 1965, p. 182].

Loss of hope, hopelessness and despair have been associated with situations where the inability to adapt to environmental factors sometimes leads to death. The terms 'sudden death' have often been used to describe situations in which death occurs shortly after organisms have been exposed to some threatening stimulus. In situations like this death is thought to be precipitated by the psychological effect of threat that serves to reduce bodily resistance and allows pathology to take over and, sometimes, death is thought to occur as the direct result of psychological factors themselves. Meerloo (1959) stated that in some situations death may be purely the result of overwhelming fear and mental shock, as experienced in World War II after tremendous fright, and as seen for example in voodoo death.

Besides death from obvious fear there seem to be other psychological states that are equally dangerous and debilitating. More specifically, hopelessness has been identified as a precursor of death in a wide variety of situations. In the case of apathy deaths or 'give-up-itis,' in particular, death would seem to be closely related to the dynamics of hopelessness and despair. The form of
reaction where an individual seems to give up, then pines away and dies, contrasts with the reaction of those who panic and literally seem to die of fright. In the case of apathy death the individual actually seems to accept the idea of death and dies without any apparent panic.

Physiological interpretations have been provided to help us understand both types of death. Cannon (1942), for example, interpreted death from fright as a consequence of prolonged over-stimulation of the sympathetico-adrenal system. When an individual is threatened by some aspect of the environment and reacts in panic or fright, he mobilizes bodily resources for action that will enable him to deal with the particular threat. If action is not possible and a high level of bodily activity is maintained, death is often quick to follow. Victims are expected to breathe very rapidly, have a rapid pulse, and show a hemococoncentration resulting from loss of fluids from the blood to the tissues. The heart beats faster and faster leading to a state of constant contraction and, ultimately, to cardiac arrest and death.

Apathy deaths or give-up-itis have been attributed to a different physiological reaction on the basis of Richter's (1957) experimentation with rats. Richter found that shortly after immersion in a tank of water some domesticated rats would swim to the bottom and die. The incidence
of this form of death increased when the rats' whiskers were clipped, depriving them of important orienting information. Some rats died before immersion during the time that they were constrained in a pouch used to deliver them from their cage to the water tank. Suspecting over-activity of the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, the investigators measured heart rate by electrocardiographic procedures. The recordings showed an initial high rate and then a slowing to the time of death. Slowing of respiration and a lowering of body temperature were also observed.

Ultimately the heart stopped in diastole after having shown a steady gradual decrease in rate. As expected, autopsy revealed a large heart distended with blood. These findings indicate that the rats may have died a so-called vagus death, which is the result of over-stimulation of the parasympathetic rather than the sympathetic adrenal system.

It should be pointed out that the first response to stress, whether that of restraint in the hand or confinement in the water jars, was often an accelerated heart rate; only subsequently, with prolongation of the stress situation, was this followed by slowing. In some rats the latter response developed very promptly, in others not for a few minutes [p. 196].

It is especially significant that the sequence of reactions from apparent panic to an acceptance of the situation and giving up is paralleled where humans have found themselves in situations where escape is perceived as impossible, i.e. hopeless situations. Basedow (in Barker, 1968) has presented a vivid picture of this reaction as the result of bone-pointing.
The man who discovers that he is being boned by any enemy is, indeed, a pitiable sight. He stands aghast, with his eyes staring at the treacherous pointer, and with hands lifted as though to ward off the lethal medium, which he imagines is pouring into his body. His cheeks blanch and his eyes become glassy and the expression on his face becomes terribly distorted. . . . He attempts to shriek but usually the sound chokes in his throat, and all that one might see is froth at his mouth. His body begins to tremble and the muscles twist involuntarily. He sways backwards and falls to the ground, and after a short time appears to be in a swoon; but soon after he writhes as if in mortal agony, and, covering his face with his hands, begins to moan. After a while he becomes very composed and crawls to his hut. . . . His death is only a matter of a comparatively short time [p. 21].

In situations such as the one described above, the social behaviour of the tribe would seem to have a strong influence on how a native reacts to bone-pointing and, for that matter, to any form of voodoo that is supposed to result in death. The immediate family, relatives, and friends of the native often withdraw their support. The bone-pointed native is left alone, regarded as taboo, and even treated as if he were dead. At a later point the tribe may perform funeral rites where the native's next of kin sever his remaining contacts with the world and place him in the proper position for dying. The suggestive power of these activities, to a person who already believes that he will die, would surely serve to maintain and/or increase his hopelessness over his situation and, ultimately, hasten his complete giving-up.

The phenomenon of giving up under conditions of despair and hopelessness has been observed in diverse
contexts. The effect of hopelessness and despair may also vary in degree, from death in extreme situations to apathy and passivity in less extreme situations. Meerloo (1959) has indicated that persons starving during a famine often exhibit a cataleptic passivity and a surrender to death. It has been observed that children excluded from the home, community, or separated from the parents, sometimes exhibit a cataleptic reaction, that is a sudden immobilization and passivity. In the catalepsy of catatonia patients often describe their inner experience as being dead and waiting for rebirth. "Before their complete withdrawal from the world, these patients have sudden feelings of dying, the delusion of being crucified or drowned, or the feeling of a catastrophic decline in the world [Meerloo, 1959, p. 385]." The author is also aware of incidents where boats have capsized and their occupants simply sink and drown with no apparent effort to stay afloat or save themselves. It seems that there are a great variety of situations where individuals tend to give up, become passive and motionless when they have been confronted by a threat. Such phenomena have been observed in animals, and in men in both primitive and more sophisticated cultures.

The experiences of inmates in concentration camps provide many clear examples of what appears to be despair. Frankl (1959) has described what he saw as a typical reaction to incarceration:
Usually it began with the prisoner refusing one morning to get dressed and wash or go out on the parade grounds. No entreaties, no blows, no threats had any effect. He just lay there, hardly moving. If this crisis was brought about by illness, he refused to be taken to the sick-bay or to do anything to help himself. He simply gave up. There he remained lying in his own excreta, and nothing bothered him anymore [p. 118].

Frankl stated that many men in the concentration camp believed that the real opportunities in life had passed. Those who saw no sense in life, no aim, and no purpose, saw no reason for carrying on. Their lives seemed to be absolutely without a future. Some regarded their lives as over and done, as if they had already died. The effect was to rob the present of its reality. It was easy to overlook opportunities to make something positive of camp life, to take advantage of opportunities that really did exist. There was no hope for those who did not see a future.

Frankl points out that any attempt to restore a man's inner strength in the camp had first to succeed in showing him some future goal. This idea has essentially the same meaning as the often-quoted phrase by Nietzsche: "he who has a why to live for can bear almost any how." In other words, the individual who sees some purpose or goal in his life is more able to endure the pain he encounters on the road to fulfilling that purpose or attaining that goal. From Frankl's point of view, having a future goal or purpose made the crucial difference; it was their salvation in the most difficult moments of existence; it gave them hope.
The accounts of concentration camp experiences, apathy deaths, and other phenomena in this section provide a basis for drawing a tentative distinction between hopelessness and despair. On the one hand, hopelessness may be a state where a person feels that a certain goal cannot be attained, though he remains aware of that goal, desires and values it. In despair, on the other hand, there may be an actual devaluing of goals, leading to an absence of goals and the phenomenal experience of meaninglessness. The person who gives up may actually give up a goal or goals that were once very important.

Hope and Reality

From the meanings attributed to hopelessness and despair it would seem that the experience of hope is closely associated with the notion of possibility. Possibility may be understood to mean that reality cannot be exhaustively defined or predicted. Keen (1968) suggests that hope begins here, that is, with the realization that human experience is inadequate to deal with all the possibilities that reality harbours. One might say that in hope there is the implicit recognition that reality is not fixed or crystallized, but open-ended and contains resources that have not been discovered. Resources may refer to valued end-states or goals, as well as the means by which goals can be realized.

This element of possibility in hope is closely related to our view of the past. Marcel (1965) stated that
in hope there is the realization that "the more the real is real the less does it lend itself to a calculation on the basis of accepted experience [p. 191]." In hope one adopts a different orientation than those who adhere only to the realm of past experience and the knowledge accrued from such experience. The acceptance of past reality as the only reality brings with it the "... supposition that time will bring nothing new beyond an illustration or an added confirmation of the pronouncements engraved on the tables of universal wisdom... [Marcel, p. 191]." This is the same as saying that we live in a world where time no longer passes or where time passes but does not bring anything new.

Although past life may be the surest and the most certain life lived, it is obviously not the only life. Hope attests to alternate life—more enigmatic, uncertain, and at first only contained in the notion of possibility. Hope seems to have little bearing on the realm of rights and certainties based on past experience. It encompasses a broad reality which includes yet goes beyond what established experience has to offer.

It has been said that the process hoping entails two views of one world, two views that encompass contrasting qualities of experience. On the one hand, there are the ingredients of experience that give reason to despair or become hopeless; on the other hand, there is the realm of possibility within which there is room for something positive.
to occur. This viewpoint has been expressed by Marcel and others. Raskin (1970) depicted hope as encompassing pain and tragedy as well as beauty and joy. In reference to his personal development, Doraff (1970) talked of how he had moved from an unfeeling state to a place where he experienced both greater pain and a positive feeling he called hope.

The acceptance of contrasting qualities of experience suggests that in hope one moves toward an integration of reality's contents. This view was expressed by Kierkegaard who saw in hope the attempt to resolve the contradictions of life through a synthesis of necessity and possibility (in Prusyer, 1963). Similarly, Stern (1970) saw hope as a unifying factor which draws disparate elements together within the cognitive field. In hoping one may be said to attempt to integrate past experience with vital here and now moments and an openness and viability in the face of the future (Morano, 1970).

There is a certain similarity between the view that hope serves an integrating function and Allport's (1955) notion of the 'proprium,' or those aspects of the personality that are central to existence and make for inward unity. It was Allport's position that propriate functioning includes conflict and is basically opposed or resistant to equilibrium in human life, i.e., tension between the actual
and the possible is maintained rather than reduced. It is interesting to note that Stern (1970) thought that to truly entertain hope one must disregard the terms resolution of conflict, since hope exists within an ever-expanding organismic tension system. He saw the therapist's most important task as that of providing reverence for the dynamic tension that is found in hope.

As hoping seems to entail an awareness of the possible, the hoper may be understood to experience a sense of futurity in the present (Stern, 1970). In hope there seems to be a sense of affirmation of what the future holds in store, that which represents an alternative to past and present negative states of affairs. This sense of affirmation may be closely associated with the element of belief. Although the relationship between hope and belief has not been thoroughly examined to the best of the author's knowledge, there seem to be good reasons to identify belief as a central element in the experience of hope.

**Belief, Hope, and the Resources of External Reality**

The idea that belief is sometimes an important aspect of the experience of hope is supported by some preliminary data. A number of students who were asked to describe what hope meant to them responded with meanings such as "belief," "belief in the future—for the good," and "a total personal commitment to believing that something
will or will not happen." Several theorists have also pointed to the role of belief in the experience of hope. For Wheatley (1958) hoping entailed 'belief in possibility' and Lynch (1965) stated that hope "... is energized by the belief in the possibility of getting somewhere, in the possibility of reaching goals [p. 31]." Baumm (1970) defined hope as "... knowing where you are inside yourself and with the world ... then truly believing in both [p. 62]." Day (1969) felt that the belief in hope was rational or based on evidence. Since the hoping person was understood to believe in a probability estimate that was based on evidence indicating that what was hoped for would be realized, his belief, therefore, was based on evidence and a process of reasoning.

It is important to recognize that the absence of evidence or reasons in support of a belief does not preclude the possibility of believing. As Tillich (1957) points out: "Sometimes ... one believes something which has a low probability or is strictly improbable, though not impossible [p. 31]." Sargant (1968) has described numerous instances where people have suddenly and uncritically accepted ideas, thoughts, and happenings which make nonsense and contradict all the rest of their ordered and computed knowledge. He states that under conditions of stress new impressions, commands and ideas often become imperative in their need for acceptance and ring absolutely true; they are believed.
Tillich and Sargant have identified a form of belief that has been more explicitly defined by Meissner (1969) as: "... an assent to and acceptance of a truth and a reality without the usual props of intellectual conviction [p. 50]." ^2

In this kind of belief one cannot ascribe reasons or provide arguments or point to compelling evidences. The belief is set off from reason, and sometimes opposed to it. The believer is rationally vulnerable. While in reasoning one arrives at his convictions and certitudes by a process of investigation and argument, in this kind of belief one does not.

It is generally understood that beliefs are psychological necessities throughout the course of life; they stand as positively adaptive elements within the psychic economy. Beliefs help to maintain and elaborate one's self-identity as it acknowledges an identification with meaningful institutions and ideologies. It is not an oversimplification to say that beliefs, like hopes, often attest to the reality of a meaningful world.

Hope and belief seem to be related at another level of analysis. If hope is understood as an assent to, and

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^2Although many theorists would draw a distinction between faith and belief, Sargant (1968) and Meissner (1969) use the two terms interchangeably. To avoid confusion in the present analysis, the word 'faith' should be understood to refer to the definition of belief provided by Meissner. Any other meaning of the word faith is beyond the scope of this analysis.
acceptance and affirmation of the possible or a specific possibility in situations where past and present experience suggests a highly negative state of affairs, then hoping would sometimes seem to involve an act that transcends or contradicts the content of established experience. If this is so, then an act of belief, that is belief in possibility, would seem to be one way in which an individual could accomplish this transcending act. The hoper may acknowledge the truth and reality of a possibility or a specific possibility solely through an act of belief, without being able to offer intellectual support for that belief.

The role of belief in the experience of hope may be further described in theoretical terms. It has already been pointed out that in hope one may affirm a possible good to come in spite of evidence to the contrary. As Prusyer (1963) has noted, however, in hoping one does not predicate that such and such will happen, nor does one claim that such and such must happen. Hope is outside the realm of rights and certainties. Likewise, most beliefs do not entail perfect certainty. Beliefs are rarely perfect, and although a person can affirm in belief, that belief is always being challenged by reasons to the contrary, all the finite evidence of which the believer is aware. Beliefs can never be static or complete. They are dynamic and their realizations are never total or final (Meissner, 1969). Although belief does consist in an affirmation, the process of believing
includes doubt and uncertainty due to contradictory elements in the field. This understanding of belief would seem to be a further reason to see belief as part of the dynamics of hoping. This is essentially what Calian (1969) seemed to understand when he stated that it is the elements of affirmation and contradiction which allow for hope and serve to maintain it. Similarly, this would seem to be what Prusyer (1963) meant when he said that certainty and uncertainty must both be present in order for hoping to occur.

The uncertainty of a hope based on belief is reflected in statements which attribute a certain fragility and delicacy to hope. The following examples illustrate this point.

(1) Hope is like a harebell trembling from its birth—

(2) Hopes may be frail but fond—

The fragility of hope again attests to what is understood about the dynamics of belief, where one has the capacity to acknowledge a positive possibility in spite of evidence to the contrary and, at the same time, is subject to moments of doubt and uncertainty on the basis of that very evidence.

The role of belief in the experience of hope is further supported on the basis that the conditions which precede belief and hope are frequently the same. Sargent (1968) has indicated that there are many instances where total despair and deep depression have been followed by feelings of salvation and faith:
The sudden and desired change, with the acquisition of a 'saving' faith, generally took place only under tremendous emotional pressures of guilt, anxiety, and feelings of personal helplessness and impending disaster [p. 508].

Sargant pointed out that absolute passivity and giving up in battle are often followed by the acquisition of a faith or belief. Madame Guyon, a great Quietist, also expressed this opinion: "... perfect souls are those without action, without inclination ... and 'in a state of complete death' until sudden breakthrough to faith occurs [in Sargant, 1968, p. 512]." The similarity of the conditions that precede the acquisition of a belief and the experience of hope would seem to further support the possibility that belief sometimes plays an important role in the experience of hope.

The present analysis suggests that hope may be experienced without the aid of reasons that suggest that the possibility to which hope refers will be realized. On this basis, it is possible to speak of an experience of hope that depends on only the symbolic representation or image of a certain possibility that is initially accepted without analysis or criticism through an act of belief; or, in a more general sense, depends simply in belief in possibility. This approach to the experience of hope clearly contrasts with the earlier and more cognitive view of hope as expectation, involving a process of reasoning and an estimation of probabilities.
The individual who hopes for a specific possibility may be understood to be living in a state where inconsistent perceptions co-exist. Although he accepts a certain possibility as real, he remains aware of information that contradicts the possibility of his hope being realized. On the basis of the previous distinction between wishing, optimism, and hope, the person who wishes or is optimistic would probably be more likely to deny contradictory evidence rather than accept it.

The sense of affirmation experienced in hope is consistent with the view that hope helps man endure his trials and sufferings, all the negatives of life to which he is exposed. Menninger (1959) looked at hope in terms of its sustaining function in life, and Prusyer saw in hope the determination to stick with the scheme of things. The same thought was expressed differently by Raskin (1970): "Hope provides the spirit for going on with life, the knowledge that life is a struggle, the acceptance of it being a struggle [p. 38]." The sustaining effect of hope can be associated with the idea that hope is a 'comforter' (Stern, 1970), that the affirmation of possibility in hope attenuates painful conditions in the present. Emily Dickinson also saw this aspect of hope. In a poem entitled Hope she wrote:

And sweetest in the gale is heard;
And sore must be the storm
That could abash the little bird
That kept so many warm.
The view of hope as a comforter and a sustainer is consistent with the idea that the experience of hope is antithetical to death and human depotentiation and closely tied to the workings of the life instinct. This latter view was expressed by Fromm (1968) who viewed hope as a psychic commitment to life and growth. It was similarly expressed by Morano (1970): "... hope is a creative force, the directed energy of being which originates, touches, moves, inspires and builds [p. 56]."

Marcel likened the experience of hope to a feeling of trust in the process of continual creation. To hope meant first accepting the pain as real and, while doing so, seeing it as capable of being absorbed and transmuted by the workings of a creative process of growth and development. Marcel thought that hoping actually required some degree of surrender to forces external to oneself, to the power of nature and the reality of yet unrealized possibility. This act of dependence seemed to acknowledge that hope may not bear only on what capacities the hoping individual has for self-initiated action, but also on what arises independently of his action. The locus of responsibility moves to external forces because Marcel thought that despair always preceded hope, and the despairing person could not perceive himself as able to change his situation.

In situations where an individual does accept a certain possibility and thus experiences hope, an important
organismic variable may be the individual's susceptibility to suggestion as this allows him to accept and believe in a certain possibility, and thus experience hope. The importance of suggestion is probably most relevant to hope based on belief where belief involves trusting someone else. Besides that form of belief in which someone acknowledges something to be true without being able to offer sufficient reason, there is also that form of belief where someone is trusted without being able to offer sufficient reasons for that trust. The individual who trusts someone else would be likely to accept their suggestions with regard to the possible or specific possibilities, and hence could experience hope through someone else.

In this form of hoping the individual would seem to acknowledge that his personal resources are not enough or sufficient in themselves, that they must be added to from the outside. To experience hope in this way, one would not need to perceive himself as being able to bring about what he hopes for; rather, he may perceive himself as having to depend on someone or something else in order to achieve the object of his hope. This led Lynch (1965) to posit the element of mutuality in hope—that is hope depends on an interacting relationship, an interacting contribution that occurs between man and the world, or between person and person, out of which something new and free is born. "As it [hope] occurs . . . it means nothing less than that men can depend
on one another [Lynch, 1965, p. 24]."³ He subsequently
defined hope as "... an interior sense that there is help
on the outside of us [in Stein, 1971, p. 221]."

A Note on Metaphysical Hope--Gabriel Marcel

The dynamics of hoping are often depicted in set­
tings where the content of hope refers to identifiable end­
states or objectives. This form of hoping is characteristic
of locutions such as "I hope that . . . " or "There is hope
that . . . ." Many of those who describe hope refer its
contents to specific and meaningful possibilities. Marcel's
position is an exception to this orientation since he
describes hope at a different level of human experience. In
Marcel's terms one does not hope for specific possibilities,
but for global and, sometimes, for unspecifiable states.
The objects of hope are vague and diffuse. Marcel provides
a metaphysical perspective characterized by the expression
"I hope" rather than "I hope that . . . ."

Marcel viewed the hoping person as transcending both
the specific objects to which he might initially be attached
and the desire for such objects. His understanding of hope

³Although it represents a departure from the present
phenomenological analysis, it is worthwhile to point out
that Stotland (1968) has treated the experience of hope
where hope is contingent on others in terms of the concept
of expectation. More specifically, Stotland indicates that
communications from others or the mere perception of others
in certain situations are events that can arouse hopeful
schemas (expectations). Such schemas may apply to either
the individual's personal ability to achieve certain goals
or the ability of others to aid him or achieve those goals
for him.
was bound up in what he termed "... a method of surmounting, by which thought rises above the imaginings and formulations upon which it had first been tempted to depend [p. 185]." He describes his position as super-rational and untechnical, i.e., not concerned with how the content of hope will be realized. He saw hope as an absolute quality, free from all the limitations of specific circumstances. He stated:

We can imagine the inner disposition of one who, setting no condition or limit and abandoning himself in absolute confidence, would thus transcend all possible disappointment and would experience a security of his being, which is contrary to the radical insecurity of Having [p. 186].

... only those beings who are entirely free from the shackles of ownership in all its forms are able to know the divine light-heartedness of life in hope [p. 200].

As Marcel understood hope to be a transcendent reality and a quality of spiritual life, it did not involve any process of reasoning. For Marcel, the placing of one's confidence in reasons and the holding to a specific object orientation could only result in a distortion of what he considered to be the true nature of hope. If one did so, Marcel felt that he would lose the aptitude for hope, as well as the ability to believe in its possibility.

Marcel's idea that the hoping person is oriented toward valued states of 'being' rather than material states deserves particular emphasis. This position is similar to Allport's (1955) concept of 'becoming' where human values
may be understood as the termini of our hopes, though never
to be fully realized. Stern (1970) also expressed this view
of hope when he defined it as "... man and his world in
their becomingness. It is a never-ending process of finding
the authentic task which may never be fully found [p. 20]."

The metaphysical understanding of hope represents a
meaningful extension of the range of meanings encompassed by
the concept of hope. That there are many meanings of hope
would seem to suggest that what we call 'hope' may be
experienced in different ways and in varied contexts. Hope
may be one concept that meaningfully reflects the vicissi-
tudes and complexities that characterize human life.
Overview and Commentary

The present analysis of hope has drawn from a wide variety of sources to provide a multi-meaning perspective, as well as an outline of some of the conditions that seem to be involved in the experience of hope. Apart from the numerous meanings ascribed to hope and the varied levels of abstraction at which hope can be viewed, there appear to be two major trends of thought concerning the conditions that pertain to the experience of hope.

First of all, there is a contemporary model that depicts the experience of hope in situations where an individual's ties to reality are rational and he is perceived as an action-oriented being. His hope is based on his personal abilities to achieve whatever he hopes for and the reasons he has for seeing himself as able to do so. This view of hope would seem to be most closely associated with the concept of expectation and the estimation of probabilities that certain goals will be attained. A primary value attributed to hope in contemporary contexts is its functional utility, that is, how hope helps man attain his goals.

The alternate picture of hope is grounded in phenomenology and emphasizes (a) man's receptivity to and dependence on the resources of external reality, and (b) the awareness of possibility generally and/or the acceptance of
a particular possibility as these entail an act of belief. The role of belief in the experience of hope is especially significant since there are many situations in which reasons to hope may not be available, and even if they are, they may not be sufficiently strong to counteract reasons that suggest that what one hopes for is unlikely or impossible. Besides these characteristics, the value of hope in the phenomenological context seems to lie in its sustaining and comforting effect rather than the actualization or attainment of specific goals.

Although there are two fairly distinct formulations of hope in the literature, it may be unwise to think of the experience of hope only in terms of one form of the experience or the other. On some occasions, it would be more realistic to think of hope in terms of the intermingling of the elements of each formulation. Man reasons and he believes, he makes use of his own abilities to attain goals, and he often depends on resources external to himself to attain the same goals.

There is a certain intellectual appeal to the idea that reasoning, belief, action, and dependency on the resources of external reality intermingle in the experience of hope. Whether this always happens in reality or to what extent it does remains questionable, and there are reasons that suggest that one form of the experience of hope is more likely to occur in some situations than others.
Within any one cultural or societal context, the values of that setting often influence whether a person will be action-oriented or more passive, whether he will be a believer or a more reasoning person. Man often finds himself in a position where he is requested to polarize himself, to accept one way of functioning rather than another. To some extent the environmental conditions will determine which form of hope he is more likely to experience. To the extent that one setting emphasizes the conditions pertaining to a particular model of hope, it may limit the possibility of experiencing hope where hope is based on the conditions of an alternate model.

This point may be illustrated in relation to one discernible trend in North American life. With the reversal of the man-God polarities in the twentieth century, it is expected that man will do what God was once expected to do. That is, some see man as having to create ex nihilo, to improvise value and meaning out of unlimited freedom (Keen, 1970). The current values and meaning often flow one way—from man to the world. Man is often perceived as a giver and a creator of meaning rather than a recipient. His actions play a central role in the creation of meaning; they are viewed as the means by which such meaning is attained.

This perspective is sometimes manifested in a cultural emphasis on independent activity:
We are often forced by our culture to deny dependence, passivity, the wish and ability to receive. We do not seem to be able to rest. We have the greatest difficulty in being passive in doing nothing. We are afraid of the gentler emotions. We misinterpret the wishes we have in these directions, and the wishes to be received and be loved, as though the wishes were wrong and had to be suppressed like the plague. As though, according to our culture . . . there came a point where we are supposed to be grown up and not have such thoughts; as though at some initiated age of twenty-one we are no longer beings who have been created and received at all; as though we must no longer use help of any kind [Lynch, 1965, p. 236].

To the extent that man acts in accordance with this cultural bias, his experience of hope may be more or less restricted to those situations where he can perceive himself to be effective in attaining goals, rather than being able to depend on resources external to himself. Furthermore, where he cannot perceive himself as being effective, he may not be able to experience hope.

The possibility of experiencing hope in some situations may well depend on the realization of some of the limitations of human existence and abdication from pretensions of omnipotence where such attitudes are part of the cultural background. Where one does not perceive himself as the centre of reality, the world is perceived differently. It becomes possible to enjoy rather than exploit, to accept rather than grasp. Unlike the omnipotent being, man is threatened by extremities, and he is sometimes in need of hope as this attests to a dependence on what lies outside himself.
Likewise, a cultural emphasis on rationality may curtail the possibility of experiencing hope in some situations. This is based on the view that twentieth-century man's primary modus operandi consists of thought that is rationalistic, empirical, pragmatic, and operational. To the extent that this is man's exclusive orientation, it may be impossible for him to acknowledge anything that transcends the categories of established experience. It may be impossible for him to hope where hope is based on belief. This is what Marcel (1965) understood when he stated that a cold blooded approach to reality leads neither to hope nor despair.

The need to control the realm of possibility may be viewed as an additional factor that limits the chance of experiencing hope. It seems to have become increasingly necessary to adopt every means to eliminate possibility. Many want reasons, proof, and certitude in the form of perfect predictability before they will take any hope seriously (Fromm, 1968).

This commentary is not meant to deny the importance and value of self-initiated and independent forms of activity or processes of reasoning as these may lead to hopeful expectations. It is only meant to point out that action and reasoning may not always be a sufficient basis for hope, and to the extent that these ways of behaving are adopted as an exclusive reality, they may curtail the possibility of
experiencing hope in some situations.

There are also many situations in our culture which involve dependent forms of relationship and believing without reasons, and where these ways of behaving are over-emphasized, there is likely to be an absence of hope based on action or reason. Beliefs would reduce the chances of experiencing hope particularly in situations where the beliefs are antithetical to hope or where the content of a belief discourages man from acting or reasoning. Furthermore, it is often more realistic that man act in his own behalf, and to do so would be a more valued form of activity. A more dependent orientation would reduce this possibility.

It is obvious that man has complex needs and desires, and it can be said that he sometimes has hope that his needs will be fulfilled and his desires realized. At this stage in his evolution, one of his most important hopes may well be that he grow in insight to understand which model of hope is more valuable and appropriate for both himself and others at any one time and place. We may also hope that he will have the courage to act and reason if these activities are needed, and depend on others and believe in the 'possible' in situations that are clearly beyond his ability to influence.
References


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Additional Readings on the Subject of Hope


