Towards an Understanding of Courage: An Exploratory Analysis of Changing Definitional Conceptions

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TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF COURAGE:
AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF CHANGING
DEFINITIONAL CONCEPTIONS

by

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B.A. Waterloo Lutheran University, 1970

THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The present paper was an exploratory attempt at examining changing definitional conceptions of courage. Traditional conceptions were found to abound in popular definitions and confusion with respect to both the meaning and origin of courage. Unconscious conformity to societal norms, symbolic attachment to national roles, a learning theory analogue and the broad conception of S-R (stimulus-response) behaviour were examined as possible explanatory frameworks. An analysis of courage and survival clarified the relationship between courage and hope. An interdependent rather than independent relationship between the two concepts was postulated. The S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) model was employed as a general explanatory framework for contemporary conceptions of courage. The moral courage of traditional models and the self-reliance found in survival situations were combined into a more comprehensive "personal involvement". Contemporary courage was defined further within the framework of a new culture and a freely chosen active adherence to its changing values, attitudes and belief systems. Cognitive and interactive risk taking hypotheses, attitude change studies and social and political activism studies provided indirect empirical support for the postulated definitional components of contemporary courage.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courage and War</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Courage</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Physical Courage of Sportsmen</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneer Contributions of Psychologists</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Explanations: Philosophical</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Basic Explanatory Model</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Illustrations of the Traditional Model</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II COURAGE AND SURVIVAL</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courage and Hope</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Explanations of Coping in Survival</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situations</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Learning Theory Explanation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF COURAGE</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Basic Explanatory Model</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Change: The &quot;stimulus&quot; for</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Involvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Courage and Personal</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement: Cognitive</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective: Commitment</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality Correlates</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV ACTION CONSISTENT WITH BELIEFS</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iii
LIST OF TABLES

1. Percentage Of Students Who Agree Or Mostly Agree With Items In Pacifism Scale ........................................ 107
2. Clergy Participation In The Vietnam Issue According To Position On The War .............................................. 120
3. Perceived Necessity Scores Of Activists For Selected Components Of National Role ......................................... 124
4. Protestors' Scores On Functional-Internal Scale Items ......................................................................................... 125
5. Protestors' Scores On Opposition To War Scales ................................................................................................. 126
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Schematic Representation of Traditional Conceptions of Courage</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Schematic Representation of Courage as a Basic Coping Mechanism in Stressful Situations</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Schematic Representation of Contemporary Conceptions of Courage</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Traditional conceptions of courage, although abundant in definitions, remain steeped in confusion. Speculation as to the origins of courage are enshrouded in a vague form of determinism (e.g., social, moral (Moran, 1945); climatic, ethnic (Slim, 1957); religious (Barrie, 1922)). A priori assumptions as to the nature of courage are often presented. Upon close examination, one can discern a multitude of contradictions. For example, Slim (1957) describes physical courage as both an emotional and a mental state.

In examining traditional conceptions of courage within the popular contexts of war, sports and religion, one begins to discern a definite evolutionary trend. Quite probably stemming from Stoic tradition (Tillich, 1952), early writers (e.g., Moran, 1945) stress the cognitive aspect of courage. While the presence of fear or the affective aspect of "feeling" (Clausewitz, 1968) was recognized, it was controlled by reason, understanding and will power. The ideal was the absence of fear. Writers in the religious tradition (Barrie, 1922; Bradley, 1934; Moore, 1951) provide some link with the affective when stressing the importance of the self in maintaining faith and passive endurance. Sportsmen emphasize physical courage and an active endurance of physical stress.
Pioneer contributions of psychologists appear to have accomplished nothing more than to reinforce the already predominant trend to value moral as opposed to physical courage. The positive moral or spiritual courage to live is preferred over the negative physical courage to die (Meerloo, 1944; Birnbaum, 1948). Birnbaum's (1948) conception of courage as "totaleinstellung" or as a total concept, and as an attitude which demands action in properly coping with life's problems, allows for a skeletal conceptualization of traditional courage.

The determinism inherent in traditional conceptions of courage allows for an explanation within the general framework of a Stimulus-Response (S-R) model. The notion of "compulsive masculinity" (Parsons, 1947) and social-psychoanalytic conceptions of internalization, and hence, unconscious conformity to societal norms (Atkin, 1971) also appear to be appropriate explanatory frameworks. The emphasis on war as the rite de passage to manhood is explained as a symbolic attachment (Katz, 1967) to traditional conceptions of courage.

Courage, when discussed within the context of basic survival situations (e.g., concentration camps (Frank, 1952; Pawlowicz, 1962); isolation experiences (Lilly, 1956; Noyce, 1962); disaster situations (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1973)) is viewed primarily as an affective construct. Self-reliance often emerges as a basic and necessary antecedent condition. The mediating variable and private nature of hope, with its future orientation and roots in a need for affiliation (N-Aff.) allows for a more complex and interdependent relationship.

Active and successful coping with stress and the maintenance of a courageous attitude towards suffering are based on a cognitive and
voluntary decision-making process. The decision to live or to die is more clearly defined as man's ultimate choice (Frankl, 1963). Thus, self-determination is an integral aspect of courage and survival.

Implicit in the decision to cope with stress in a courageous manner is the concept of a goal. This goal is defined not merely in the concrete sense of saving a physical life, but in the broader, existential and abstract sense of ultimate psychological survival. Emphasis is placed on the maintenance of personal autonomy, integrity, independence, dignity, self-respect and meaning in life (Frankl, 1963; Bettelheim, 1960). The decision to give up hope and hence, courage, seems to preclude the possibility of such abstract goal-seeking behaviour. The resultant behavioural response of successfully coping with stress might be interpreted as a form of risk-taking behaviour. One chooses to risk physical death in an effort to maintain self-respect and strive towards ultimate psychological survival.

The need for a changed conception of courage has been indicated by several writers (Mack, 1969; Markowitz, 1971; Kincaid & Kincaid, 1971). The moral courage of traditional conceptions and the importance of the self stressed in survival situations, are collapsed, in contemporary conceptions of courage, into a more comprehensive personal involvement. Implicit in more recent conceptions of courage is a sense of self-determinism and freedom of choice. The basic Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model serves as a general framework for contemporary definitions of courage.

Contemporary courage, as examined in this paper, may be defined as the voluntary acceptance of the risk inherent in a commitment
towards and active adherence to the attitudes, values, ideals and belief systems of the new culture. Cultural change, and the proposed emergence of a new culture, in direct opposition to the old, (Keniston, 1965; Slater, 1971) is viewed as being the precipitating factor for a changed conception of courage.

The uncertainty of achieving new culture goals and the possible negative reprisals from old culture adherents, suggests that a decision to actively adhere to such a system may constitute considerable risk. The voluntary nature of such a choice suggests that cognitive hypotheses which stress information exchange and behavioural decision theory (Vinokur, 1971) may be most appropriate as explanatory frameworks. The possibility that contemporary courage may be characteristic of those with a veridical self-perception as "risky" (Clark & Crockett, 1971) as well as indicating a general disposition towards risk (Jackson, Hourany & Vidmar, 1972) is presented.

Qualitative distinctions within contemporary courage may be isolated by examining the precise nature of one's attitude and commitment towards new culture belief systems. The use of concepts such as "bolstering" (Mann & Taylor, 1970; Mann, 1971) in combination with the isolation of choice difficulty (i.e., levels of commitment to action for change within the new culture) may indicate the presence or absence of dissonance. A closer examination of actions consistent with attitudes suggests that only a minority are actually actively involved in actions designated to produce positive change (e.g., Miller, 1970; Morse & Peele, 1971). The abstract nature of the expressed goals (i.e., change, peace, co-operation) and the loosely organized pursuit of these goals, in
combination with the low probability of immediate concrete success sug-
gests that contemporary courage may call for an External as opposed to
an Internal control orientation (Granberg & May, 1972).

Contemporary courage, as presented in this paper, is postu-
lated as being a general definitional concept. Theoretically, it should
be applicable to committed activists of whatever age and nationality.
The basic feature is the freely chosen and cognitively based decision
to actively commit oneself to working for change in a manner consistent
with new culture belief systems. The following effort is exploratory
in nature. The basic constituents of contemporary courage have been
examined theoretically and presented in a preliminary model. Future
research should concentrate on further operationalizing the various
aspects of contemporary courage, as presented, and subjecting them to
empirical test within the possible frameworks suggested.
A Noticeable Trend in the Development of Courage as a Total Concept

I Emphasis on the Cognitive Aspect

II Emphasis on the Cognitive Aspect, i.e., courage as a mental state plus: Affective Aspect, i.e., moral courage and the importance of the "self"

III Emphasis on Behavioral Aspect, i.e., physical courage plus: acknowledging moral courage as higher qualitatively

IV Emphasis on Behavioral (Moral/spiritual) Aspect, i.e., value placed on courage to live, positive courage

V Emphasis on courage as a Total Concept, i.e., courage as attitude which demands action Cognitive, Affective plus Behavioral

FIGURE I
Schematic representation of Traditional A Noticeable Trend in the Development of Courage as a Total Concept

COGNITIVE

self-control
reason
will power
mental state
mind (Neuer)
understanding

AFFECTIVE

the "self"
fear
feeling
faith
self-confidence
self-discipline

TYPES OF COURAGE
Conceptions of Courage

BEHAVIORAL

properly coping with difficulties in life and/or physical stress

e.g., social courage; positive courage or personal revolt; "mut" or positive courage

MORAL COURAGE

strong character passive faith, i.e., resisting temptation perseverance

(e.g., "fall-mut" - i.e., no fear, hazardous or negative courage; collective ecstasy or negative courage)

COURAGE AS ATTITUDE

Courage to Live

(higher qualitatively)

Courage to Die

(lower qualitatively)

PHYSICAL COURAGE

strong body active physical endurance

(e.g., money fame altruistic intentions conformity to social norms ethical/moral, i.e., to be of value)

Which Demands

Action

Natural Courage (no fear)

(higher qualitatively)

Motivation

Courage of Control

(lower qualitatively)
Courage and War

Traditional conceptions of courage are frequently closely associated with war and demonstrations of heroism therein (Moran, 1945; Slim, 1957; Crane, 1960; Clausewitz, 1968). Primary emphasis is placed on the response of bravery and the demonstration of physical courage in battle. Moral courage is mentioned only in passing as being a higher and ideal form of courage by all the above writers. When considering the origins of courage one finds a definite flavour of psychic determinism and a sense of social and moral élitism present (Moran, 1945). The data show a complete lack of empiricism and remain totally at the level of speculation. An abundance of contradictory comments, a definite ethnocentrism, and some elements of sexism (Slim, 1957) are also noted. Present-day symbolic adherence to such traditional conceptions of courage are still in evidence (Golden, 1971).

Moran (1945) defined courage within the framework of danger and war. He stated: "It is a platitude of war that the worth of no man, however able, is proven until it has been submitted to ordeal by battle, until his response to the havoc of war is known" (p. 53). Implicit in the above statement is Moran's conception of the courageous man as one of worth, and more specifically, as a man of good moral sense, and good character. Moran explicitly states that "courage...is the expression on the battlefield of character" (p. 147).
The traditional ideal for Moran was the fearless soldier. On an *a priori* basis Moran outlined four orders of men: 1) those who felt no fear, 2) those who felt fear but did not show it, 3) those who felt fear, showed it, but still managed to do their job, and 4) those who felt fear, showed it and ran. Concomitant with the above four orders of men were four degrees of courage. Thus, Moran established a qualitative distinction among men of courage in war. The ideal was the man who felt no fear. This was the real man of courage. Although men could move between the four stages, Moran spoke of the desire of men in war to remain on the "upper rungs of this ladder" (p. 22).

Moran differentiated between "natural courage" and the "courage of control". This distinction seemed to be based on his ideal of the courageous soldier who felt no fear. Moran contended that natural courage, the courage of insensibility, was almost extinct among officers in the army. He ascribed to natural courage the characteristics of lack of imagination, a vacant mind and fearlessness. He states: "the armies of long ago were recruited from men who did not feel fear. Their courage seems to have had its roots in a vacant mind. Their imagination played no tricks. They drew no pictures of danger for their own undoing" (p. 23).

Moran's talk of imagination seems to refer to some type of anxiety-reaction, of soldiers conjuring up in their minds fears not based in reality. His own expression for this anxiety was that they experienced "alternatives". Instead of dealing rationally with the task at hand, some men pondered over the dangers which might occur should they perform the task. In view of the many and varied religious beliefs of primitive peoples one might seriously question the natural courage, fearlessness and lack of imagination of "armies of long ago." The extensive
system of gods and spirits and adherence of primitive peoples to anim­
istic and pantheistic religious belief systems does not seem to support
Moran's contention that "their imagination played no tricks" (p. 23).
Moran is also extremely vague with respect to his meaning of "armies of
long ago". The armies to which he refers remain a mystery.

The courage of control seems to be a courage belonging to the
rational man who considers "alternatives". It is depicted as a forced
and unnatural courage and hence secondary in quality to the natural
courage of old. To the former Moran ascribed an imagination which was
controlled by character and reason. The thinking and self-controlled
man would not allow his imagination to run riot. Rather, he put his
imagination to his advantage by structuring the situation. All possible
dangers were considered. The soldier with the courage of control then
faced these dangers with his fear in control.

For Moran, the proper attitude in battle, the courageous atti-
tude, was a fearless one. His types (natural courage and courage of
control) may however simply reflect fanciful projections into the past.
They may be based on his obvious dissatisfaction with the quality of
fighting exhibited by the conscripted soldier. He idealized the soldier
who felt no fear. Moran is unable to substantiate this ideal via eye-
witness accounts. He therefore concedes to the fact that men may feel
fear and still be courageous. He resorts to an emphasis on reason and
self-control as a basis for this courage of control. His confused specu-
lations and unsound assumptions are summarized and left open to argument
when he states: "My very types are suspect...the existence of natural
courage (fearlessness) as opposed to the courage of control, in any age
may be challenged...it is open to argument whether there is or ever has been anyone who does not feel fear" (p. 23).

In categorizing his four orders of men Moran placed at the bottom of the list those who felt fear, showed it and ran. One might assume from this that Moran would also base his discussion of cowardice primarily on its relationship to fear. Moran, however, makes the statement that cowardice is not equal to fear. He defines cowardice in an almost totally behaviouristic context. He states: "The Army Act lays down that a man is guilty of cowardice when he displays 'an unsoldier-like regard for his personal safety in the presence of the enemy' by shamefully deserting his post or laying down his arms" (p. 24). Cowardice was viewed as something a man did. It was very narrowly defined by Moran as simply running away in the face of the enemy during battle. A further assumption was that cowardice, as operationally defined above, is a disgrace and a shameful form of behaviour.

Moran stated, the strength of the common, conscripted soldier, the "yokel" was based not primarily on real courage but rather, on his inability to perceive the situation as being really dangerous. He was more likely to be performing recklessly than courageously. Moran states: "He is so staunch in battle because he never stopped to reason, to measure the odds, or to reflect on his own chances of survival" (p. 71).

The courageous man is described by Moran as a man of good character and good moral sense. The coward is typically depicted as a common person, a "yokel", a weak man of poor character. A stance of social elitism might dictate that fear could not possibly describe both the courageous and the cowardly individual. It is perhaps this form of
reasoning which prompted Moran to make his distinction between cowardice and fear. His sense of social elitism may not have allowed him to ascribe similar emotions and similar emotional responses to two different classes of men. Thus, it could not be fear which makes cowards of men, for there are men who feel fear and still perform bravely and unselfishly in battle. Only the action of running away labelled a man a coward. Moran attempted to define and thus explain cowardice in the following manner:

By cowardice I do not mean fear. Fear is the response of the instinct of self-preservation to danger. It is only morbid, as Aristotle taught, when it is out of proportion to the degree of the danger. In invincible fear- 'fear stronger than I am' - the soldier has to struggle with a flood of emotion; he is made that way...cowardice, that is the label we reserve for something that a man does. What passes through his mind is his own affair. (p. 24)

Moran tried to define both courage and cowardice in primarily a cognitive framework. The definitive aspects of courage appear to be reason, will power and self-control. The unfortunate presence of fear is overcome in an honourable manner by the courageous man largely through use of his reasoning abilities.

The emphasis on reason and cognition as determinants of courage may explain Moran's contention that intelligence tests be employed in order to single out potential cowards by eliminating those whose minds are not developed enough. He states: "If these tests do not help to pick aces, they do help us to get rid of men who will not make soldiers" (p. 148). If such means are not employed to detect what Moran terms "latent weakness" in the young soldier (p. 147) then the final test of war must be employed.
Underlying Moran's treatment of courage is a strong sense of determinism. Implicit in this deterministic approach is a definite sense of social and moral elitism. Moran was adamant in his belief that courage is not a common entity, nor is it unlimited in quantity. Once a man's courage was used up, it was not restorable. Moran likened a man's courage to a bank account and stated: "A man's courage is his capital and he is always spending" (p. 17). There was a limit to the number of good men that any nation could furnish. In times of peace as well as in war, all fine things are the work of only a few men.

Moran fails to specify the exact origins of this limited quantity of courage which is extant in only a few good men. It is not born as a result of the war process, for war serves only to exaggerate or bring forth the qualities, courageous or cowardly, which exist in men in time of peace. War, Moran claimed, could not change a man. A man is either weak or he is strong and situations only elicit these inherent qualities. Physical hardships of war which may lead to nervous fatigue and boredom, will wear down only the man who is initially inclined to be cowardly and weak. Men who broke under the stress of battle were described by Moran as lacking in moral sense "without which no soldier can endure the stress and terror of the modern battle field" (p. 148).

Moran contends that fortitude in times of war has its roots in morality. Selection is the search for character and "war itself is but one more test, the supreme and final test...of character" (p. 154). A man of character in peace becomes a man of courage in war. He thought of courage as a moral quality, as self-discipline, which could readily be evidenced in times of peace. Although Moran mentions certain standards
of peace to which people pay scant attention, standards which could point out the courageous men, he never explicitly stated what these ambiguous standards are.

Moran's slight elaboration of his meaning of "character" leads us no further than the moralistic basis already ascribed to courage. He states that character is the habit of choosing right over wrong, the development of a strong conscience. This moral quality of choosing right over wrong grows to maturity in times of peace and is suddenly developed and brought out by war. War does not change our basic nature, it merely exposes it. "Man's fate in battle is worked out before war begins...his actions in war are dictated not by courage, nor by fear, but by conscience, of which war is the final test...if you know a man in peace, you know him in war" (Moran, p. 154).

Thus, courage, according to Moran, has its roots in some vague and undefined form of psychic determinism. This determinism is itself embedded in some form of Christian morality. To complicate further the issue of both definition and origin, Moran adds the prejudicial element of social elitism. He states that "good soldiers are not bred from bad stock" (p. 152). It is also not pure chance that in war some men are branded cowards and others courageous. Some men, Moran claims, were cowards before they ever became soldiers. For this reason they fail to stand up to the rigours of battle. A battle serves only to "carry out the weeding process a little further. It raises the standards of the test a little more and thus strengthens the bond between the 'elect'" (p. 125).
Courage then, appears to be a socially determined characteristic. It has its roots in morality and finds its recognized expression primarily through the channels of battle in times of war. If a man has been morally inadequate in the past, he will continue to prove himself so in the future. If he is inherently of weak character and conscience, then he will prove cowardly in war. Courage is the moral quality of the man of character, the virtuous man.

Courage is a moral quality; it is not a chance gift of nature like an aptitude for games. It is a cold choice between two alternatives, the fixed resolve not to quit; an act of renunciation which must be made not once but many times by the power of the will. Courage is will power. (Moran, p. 71)

Moran leaves one with three basic definitions of courage. It is a social quality, a moral quality and a cognitive quality. These are all somehow aspects of a man's character and seen in an absolute sense as being either present or absent. On this basis Moran judges men as exhibiting either courage or cowardliness in battle. He fails, however, to perceive the basic contradiction in his thinking. Ascribing qualities such as will power, self-control, moral knowledge of right and wrong and a social basis to courage implies that courage may be developed or learned.

The deterministic basis of courage, in addition to its religious overtones and an adherence to the ideal of the fearless soldier are also very evident in Slim (1957). Courage is defined by Slim as "the basic virtue in man or beast" (p. 3). Thus, he not only places courage in an ethical context but relates it to the animal realm as well. Slim never does explain this inclusion of animals in his discussion of courage. Anyone who possesses courage, he says, must automatically be good,
for "you can't be good without being brave" (p. 5). Furthermore, courage is not only the basis of all virtue, it is its expression." Courage is the virtue. Without it there are no other virtues. Faith, hope, and charity and other virtues do not become virtues until it takes courage to exercise them" (Slim, p. 5).

If courage is the basic virtue as Slim claims, then, following from his comment that you cannot be good without being brave, it might be possible to determine whether or not someone is courageous. One might procure measures of external religiosity and thus isolate the Churchgoers or for example, the philanthropists. Using Slim's definition as a criterion measure of courage, one might be able to deduce that these "virtuous" people would also necessarily be "courageous". By virtue of exclusion, however, the non-churchgoers and the poor who have no external means of demonstrating their charity, or their "goodness", would have to be classified as "non-courageous". The solution to defining courage and hence determining who the brave really are is not as simple as Slim's initial definition would make it appear.

Slim becomes entangled in one of his own contradictions. He also states that "you may be bad and brave" (p. 5). This leaves us virtually stranded as far as having a clear-cut ethical measure of courage available. We can neither define "virtue", "good", or "bad" and hope to arrive at a viable determinant of courage. Slim has thoroughly confused the issue. According to his two-sided, ethically based definition, all people have at least the sufficient if not the necessary condition for being brave. We could only assume that some people, the good people, may be more courageous than the bad people. Also, Slim's confusion of good,
bad and brave seems to be inherently illogical. If courage is a virtue and the basis of all virtues, then it should follow that if bad people can be courageous, then they should also be called virtuous people, or perhaps be classified as "good" people. In short, Slim's discussion of courage as the basic virtue leaves much to be desired in terms of potential for empiricism. His definition of courage is circular and sounds much like mere traditional rhetoric.

Slim also defines courage as "a mental state" (p. 5). The sources of strength for this mental state called courage are both spiritual and intellectual. Slim states:

The way in which these spiritual and intellectual elements are blended, I think, produces roughly two types of courage. The first, an emotional state, which urges a man to risk injury or death—physical courage. The second, a more reasoning attitude which enables him coolly to stake career, happiness, his whole future on his judgment of what he thinks either right or worthwhile—moral courage. (p. 5)

On the basis of the above definition, physical courage is obviously the lesser qualitatively, and a distinction is established. Man is a reasoning creature and it seems not at all unlikely that on this basis alone Slim would attach greater salience to moral courage. He states that "moral courage is a higher and a rarer virtue than physical courage" (p. 6). He appears to be employing the terms "spiritual" and "intellectual" in the sense of emotional and rational respectively.

One obvious contradiction in Slim's discussion of courage as a mental state is his description of moral courage, as noted in the brief quote above, as "a rarer virtue". Thus, courage appears to be a mental state, with its psychological properties of emotion and cognition creating a qualitative distinction between moral and physical courage. It is
also a virtue, thus attributing to courage a religious, ethical sense, one which forms the basis for a general good approach towards life. Slim not only fails to explain why he calls courage both a virtue and a mental state, but he also fails to provide adequate definitions of the terms he so loosely employs. His assumptions and definitions, as do those of Moran (1945) lack an empirical basis.

A more blatant and damaging contradiction occurs in Slim's discussion of physical courage. He claims that the buttress of physical courage is to have good control of your imagination, not to let your mind frighten you, not to allow fears of the unknown or undue anxiety take hold of you in a stressful situation. Physical courage can be taught. You can "train the man not to draw too heavily on his stock of courage. Teach him what to expect, not to be frightened by bogeys-by the unknown" (p. 9). The essence of physical courage seems to be expectation and the path to courage education with respect to what one might expect in any given situation. Physical courage could be summed up in the words: expectation, confrontation, skill.

Slim's definition of physical courage contains qualities very similar to Moran (1945) in that he attributes reasoning or cognitive components to courage. Slim, however, goes one step beyond Moran in that he acknowledges that courage, at least physical courage, can be taught. The contradiction lies in Slim's prior definition of physical and moral courage. In that definition he attributed reasoning qualities to moral and not to physical courage. The latter, Slim stated, had primarily an emotional basis.
Again similar to Moran (1945), Slim adheres to a vague and relatively undefined form of determinism. Slim states that all men are born with a certain amount of courage, "a certain capital". There are differences in initial amounts for different people. He states:

All men have some degree of physical courage, it is surprising how much. Courage you know is having money in the bank. We start with a certain capital of courage, some large, some small, and we proceed to draw on our balance, for, don't forget, courage is an expendible quality. We can use it up. If there are heavy, and, what is more serious, if there are continuous calls on our courage we begin to overdraw. If we go on overdrawing, we go bankrupt - we break down. (Slim, p. 6)

Like Moran (1945), Slim does not explain from where this initial amount of courage eminates; nor does he state why some are initially more gifted with courage than others.

Slim presents us with the confused definition of courage as a virtue, a quality, a mental state, which we all possess in varying amounts, and which is expendible. Using up all of our endowed courage results in an inability to function, a breakdown. The non-courageous are those who have expended their supply.

Slim does speculate as to the origin of courage in general, especially the "particularly practical and effective kind of courage" displayed by the British. Thus, a definite ethnocentrism colours Slim's conception of courage. He calls this courage of the British a "natural courage" and links it to their geographical origins. Somehow, having your ancestry stem from the Northern part of Europe and having roots in the peoples of the Mediterranean, accounts for this natural courage. Slim does not define this term. One might speculate that its meaning is close to that posited by Moran (1945) - who defined natural courage as the fearless courage of ancient armies.
Where a people had lived for the past five or six hundred years, Slim stated, was a determining factor of the stated racial difference in courage. He combines geographical background with social and economic prevailing conditions and thus determines the degree of courage possessed by a particular race. With the exception of brief references to the courage of the Japanese, Germans and the British during the war, Slim does not specify races and their degree of courage. He does state:

If it has been in a land where it did not take much effort to get enough food, clothing and shelter for an easy life, they will not be conspicuously brave.

If they have lived where life is so hard that it is a terrible struggle against nature to keep any standard of living at all, then they will be brave in a few things - dangers to which they are inured - but not at all brave in others.

It is the lands where nature is neither too easy nor too cruel, where a man must work hard to live but where his efforts and his enterprise can bring him great rewards, that breeds courage and is where it becomes a natural tradition. (pp. 10-11)

In the second paragraph, one detects the influence of Puritan ethics and the belief that life is a test. Within the third paragraph seems to lie the New World capitalistic tradition of competition.

In addition to his poorly defined racial and/or social-economic determinism, Slim completes his definition by attributing a definite religious basis to courage. Instead of merely defining courage as a virtue, he now claims that "we have based our natural courage on faith, a belief that we worked or fought for the things that mattered - a decent life" (p. 11). This addition of "faith" as a determining characteristic of courage only serves to confound further the issue. It is as dubious and meaningless as Moran's (1945) reference to character and conscience as the basis of courage.
Perhaps to justify his ethnocentric stance, Slim joins religious terminology with time and refers to courage as a "long-term virtue" (p. 10). He claims that "anyone can be brave for a little while...we the British, have our own special kind of courage, the courage that goes on, and endurance is the very essence of courage" (p. 10). Slim tries to say that the British soldier is not braver than other soldiers, he is only braver for a longer period of time and this is what counts.

With the introduction of "endurance" as being the very basis of courage and Slim's further description of this enduring courage as staying "where he is until he has won" (p. 49) one might derive a possible operational definition of courage. Courage could be defined as being equivalent to Endurance (E), which is a function of the time remaining at a specified task \( f(t(x)) \), divided by Time which is specified as a fixed value \( t(y) \) and equal to 1.

Equation: \[ C = E(f) \frac{t(x)}{t(y)} = 1 \]

One could speculate that endurance will increase with the proportional increase of time \( S \) remains at a specified task. The closer the resultant equation is to 1, the higher the degree of courage which might be attributed to \( S \).

To complicate the issue further, Slim attributes a definite gender to courage by referring to it as a "male attitude" (p. 5). This obvious sexism may be closely tied to the traditional conception of courage and bravery on the battlefield. Slim again introduces a basic contradiction. He states: "Whether women are braver than men I don't know, but I have always found them, when really tested, at least equally brave" (p. 10). He makes vague reference to the bravery of the women in India,
the refugees, who were "patient, uncomplaining, devoted, thinking only of their families, so very brave" (p. 10). This might simply be a token bravery, stemming perhaps from the traditional role conception of the devoted and uncomplaining mother. As for Slim's purported "tests" of courage, these are left unspecified. Employing sex as a variable in further research might clarify the issue.

Clausewitz (1968) also linked courage with danger in war. His definitions of courage concentrate on distinguishing moral and physical courage. He remains more the philosopher-soldier and does not confound his definitions with deterministic, ethnocentric and ethical factors.

Clausewitz distinguishes between physical and moral courage and further differentiates these two types of courage as follows:

Courage is of two kinds: first, physical courage, or courage in the presence of danger to the person; and next, moral courage, or courage before responsibility, whether it be before the judgement-seat of external authority, or of the inner power, the conscience. (p. 139)

Courage before danger to the person, again, is of two kinds. First, it may be indifference to danger, whether proceeding from the organism or the individual's contempt of death, or habit: in any of these cases it is to be regarded as a permanent condition. Secondly, courage may proceed from positive motives, such as personal pride, patriotism, enthusiasm of any kind. In this case courage is not so much a normal condition as an impulse. (pp. 139-140)

The two kinds of courage combined, Clausewitz states, make up the "most perfect kind of courage" (p. 140).

His treatment of courage and its definition, is however, by no means clear. He employs confusing terminology, in the tradition of writers such as Slim (1957) and Moran (1945), and proceeds to call courage a "moral quality" (p. 116), an "impulse" (p. 140) and "a nobler
instinct" (p. 187). His reference to courage as "a power in itself" (p. 187) does nothing to clarify the situation.

In his treatment of the possible origins of courage, Clausewitz seems to be combining both cognitive and affective elements. He refers to the former as some form of "understanding" (p. 142) and to the latter as a "feeling" (p. 187). Unlike Moran (1945) and Slim (1957), he de-emphasizes the role of cognition and places emphasis on the affective nature of courage. "The mind must, therefore, first awaken the feeling of courage and then be guided and supported by it, because in momentary emergencies the man is swayed more by his feelings than his thoughts" (p. 142). He states that courage is definitely not "an act of the understanding, but likewise a feeling, like fear" (p. 187). Courage is not simply a prescribed response to danger but an inner power which is concerned also with man's moral preservation.

Thus, Clausewitz defines courage as having its base within the individual. A combination of affective and cognitive elements interact and result in a behaviour termed courage. This behaviour is, however, still definitely tied to the battlefield and situations of combat danger therein. Although deterministic statements as to who the courageous will be are absent, the Stimulus is still war, and the Response bravery or courage.

Crane's novel The Red Badge of Courage (in Stallman, 1960) clearly illustrates the traditional conception of courage as perceived by Slim (1957) and Moran (1945). The incorporation of courage as defined by them, into novel form, suggests that these conceptions of courage may have been cultural values rather than simply isolated definitions of a specific behaviour.
Henry Fleming's (The Red Badge of Courage) desire to go to war and his wish for "a wound, a (little) red badge of courage" (p. 59) illustrates the need which existed to prove yourself a man in battle and to be able to demonstrate this to others. Of himself, Henry states:

He finally concluded that the only way to prove himself was to go into the blaze, and then figuratively, to watch his legs to discover their merits and faults. He could not sit still and with a mental slate and pencil derive an answer. To gain it he must have the blaze, blood and danger...so he fretted for an opportunity. (p. 21)

Courage appears to be an observable action, a visible demonstration of your manhood. This suggests that in order to maintain one's self-esteem a man has to prove himself in a dangerous situation. War is a socially approved mode of achieving this goal. Going to war may be a type of rite de passage. Predominant is a mysterious attraction to the field of battle and the accompanying myth of an unveiling or a sudden transformation. Henry Fleming "had been taught that a man became another thing in battle. He saw his salvation in such a change...to go into battle and discover that he had been a fool in his doubts and was in truth a man of traditional courage" (The Red Badge of Courage, in Stallman, p. 59).

The traditional ideal of the fearless soldier posed some problems for Henry. He could not bring himself to admit openly and discuss his own fear with others, nor was his fear acceptable to himself. The deterministic and elitist belief that "the boys come of good stock, and most of 'em 'll fight like sin after they oncet git shootin'..." (p. 120) may have, on a superficial level, helped to alleviate his distress. Psychologically, this conflict between the ideal and the real appears to be a case of cognitive dissonance.
Henry's personal experience of fear in battle and the ideal of the fearless, heroic soldier were not consistent. In order to maintain the ideal of courage in war he had to project blame onto the Government who had started the war and forced him to enlist. He viewed the government as plotting to put an end to his life by making him fight its battles. He had been coerced into a dangerous situation, for the explicit purpose of killing him! Thus, should he run away it would not be due to his own cowardice, lack of courage or submission to fear. "It occurred to him that he had never wished to come to the war. He had not enlisted of his free-will. He had been dragged by the merciless government. And now they were taking him out to be slaughtered" (p. 30). In reality, Henry had enlisted voluntarily.

In view of Henry Fleming's fear of death and injury and his subsequent flight from battle it might be appropriate to label him a coward according to Moran's definition. However, his fear of ridicule from others, his fear of the label "coward" and his desire to possess a wound, a visible sign of courage, led him back to the battle. Thus, in the same individual, we perceive the coward (Moran's definition) and the courageous lad who returned to successfully complete his duty (Slim's definition). This is definitely inconsistent with the notion of a predetermined courage. Moran's explanation of a possible "commotional shock" experience is not viable since Henry had made a definite decision to run and then to return. A more comprehensive definition of courage, one which incorporates the real as well as the ideal in a model with a more substantial basis seems necessary.
Traditional conceptions of courage and war appear to have their basis primarily in a priori assumptions and speculations. Their definitions lack an empirical basis and have failed to take into account the actual experience of the person in the dangerous or stressful situation. Courage is therefore viewed as being an "absolute" rather than a "relative" characteristic.

Religious Courage

Moral courage and a passive and enduring attitude towards life's struggles and temptations are stressed by writers in the religious tradition (Barrie, 1922; Bradley, 1934; Moore, 1951). The crucial test is not war and the activity of battle, but rather, life in general and a passive optimistic acceptance of its problems (Bradley, 1934). Courage is not determined by good character and conscience but is now described as being the basis for building a strong character (Moore, 1951). Reference to courage as a God-given virtue (Barrie, 1922) suggests a form of religious determinism. Some confusion arises from the fact that the self is also stressed as an important determinant of courage.

Barrie (1922) expresses views similar to Slim (1957) when he comments that courage is a virtue. He defines it somewhat metaphorically as "the lovely virtue...the rib of Himself that God sent down to his children" (p. 7). Like Slim, he also includes an apparently unrecognized and unresolved contradiction. Barrie compares courage to a staff which aids us in our journey through life. Courage is a strength which everyone must build for himself. It is unclear as to which takes precedence, the self-derived strength or the other-derived virtue. One might speculate that this self-derived courage is the basis of a quantitative
difference in degree of courage which may exist in men. That is, man may, through his own efforts, work towards increasing the basic amount of God-given courage which he initially possesses.

Barrie also supports the traditional ideal of heroism in war and the value of fighting for one's country. He emphasized the necessity of demonstrating one's manhood by proving oneself courageous in battle. Youth, he stressed, should be courageous and demand some partnership in decisions such as war which pertain to them. He states: "The end will have come to courage and to us when we are afraid in dire misfortune to refer the final appeal to the arbitrament of arms" (pp. 10-11).

Bradley (1934) emphasized the importance of courage as a strength arising from the self. Inner control, self-discipline, confidence and faith are the bases for building the inner strength which he calls courage. A courageous attitude towards hardships in life stems primarily from within and must always be assumed. A high value is placed on life which contains struggles and privations. For Bradley, the crucial and necessary test of courage is the difficult life. Only through facing and overcoming problems can we build courage and a strong character.

The origin of courage and its precise definition, other than being defined as some sort of inner strength which builds character, is left in a state of confusion. Courage is at once born out of hardship and struggle and stems primarily from within. A third source is vaguely defined as "poise", from which "all strength is born" (p. 184). This poise is viewed as an attitude of faith in oneself and is described as sowing the seeds for courage. Courage itself is then further defined as "a reservoir which can be utilized for power" (p. 183).
Bradley defines moral courage as following one's convictions, breaking with tradition, and dedicating oneself to humanitarian causes even though they may be unpopular. He attributes to moral courage a higher qualitative status than physical courage. Anyone, Bradley claims, can leap into the water to save a drowning friend or walk into the face of a cannon. Fewer people, however, possess real moral bravery, as he defines it. Unfortunately Bradley fails to define moral courage in a more specific sense. Anyone who puts up with all of life's vicissitudes without complaining to any degree would be categorized by Bradley as being highly courageous. Also, he gives no reason for valuing passive endurance of life's struggles over the physical activity of saving a life.

Moore (1951) distinguishes between the physical courage demonstrated in war and the moral courage which is employed to resist temptation. Physical courage is an occasional occurrence, while moral courage is constantly required of us. Any Christian who resists and believes in the existence of constant temptation throughout life will, according to Moore's conception of courage, possess a high degree of moral courage. Moore himself claimed that standing for the right when it is unpopular, being faithful to duty when your heart is broken, and remaining a Christian in a pagan world all require courage.

Moore further defines courage as "patience and long-suffering with joyfulness" (p. 35). The test of courage, a physical strength, is not activity but "the practice of passive virtues" (p. 35). Patience is the opposite of cowardice or despondency. Thus we are presented with a patient, long-suffering courage, a hopeful courage, a courage to faith, to turn the other cheek since "longsuffering contrasts with wrath and revenge" (p. 35).
Courage, as defined by the above writers, emerges simply as a strength. Further distinctions and definitions are largely coloured by the basic shared value placed on hardship and their Christian religious belief systems. Courage itself appears to lose all definitiveness. It could very well be ascribed to any Christian or uncomplaining sufferer.

The Physical Courage of Sportsmen

Frequent references to courage are made by sportsmen (Mantle, 1964) and sports commentators (Schoor, 1967; Barber, 1969). Courage is viewed as a quality belonging to the sportsman who has demonstrated "determination", "self-confidence", "guts", and possesses a general orientation towards the competitive success ethic of North America (Mantle, 1964). Some writers question whether courage exists within the realm of champions (e.g., Schoor, 1967). Interviews with sportsmen (e.g., Playboy, 1972) seem to indicate the absence of courage per se as a major component of the self-concept of sportsmen. Their behaviour might be better described as "zest" (Russell, 1930).

Mantle (1964) defines courage in an extremely broad context. His conceptions of courage are all closely aligned with physical action and strength, bravery and skill. Mantle's comment that courage is a "quality, not a thing whose physical dimensions you can describe" (p. 27) is as meaningless as the many types of courage he describes. He speaks of "the courage to try", "the courage of your convictions", "the courage of confidence", "instant courage", "the courage of toughness", "passive or quiet courage", "the courage to be yourself", "the courage to be honest, patient, to struggle on, to hope and to change". Mantle's comment that courage is also an everyday thing adds a definite universality to the
concept. Courage is conceived of as simply the man on the street, coping with day to day living, and doing his job. "The brave men are the ones who get the job done everyday" (p. 22).

A distinction made between physical and moral courage (Barber, 1969) is equally as vague and undefined. Barber comments: "Everyone has an obscure respect for courage in others especially if it is moral courage, the rarest and most difficult sort of bravery...it makes the very brute understand that this is more than a man" (p. 38). Moral courage is discussed primarily within the context of breaking the colour bar in sports. It is viewed as an ideal which somehow signifies that you are a man among men. Moral courage is placed by Barber primarily within the realm of interpersonal relations and battling prejudice. Mantle (1964) described this breaking of the colour bar in sports as a "passive" courage. Quiet acceptance of abuse (moral courage) by Blacks, seems to be a pre-requisite for the demonstration of successful activity (physical courage), in sports. Persistence also appears to play a major role in moral courage.

The operational definition derived in this writer's discussion of Slim (1957) might be useful in determining the sportsmen's degree of courage (p. 20). Distinguishing between physical and moral courage on the basis of this equation presents a problem. Barber's distinction would lead one to believe that, given the same outcome or proportion of courage, one would label the white man as "physically courageous" and the black man as "morally courageous". The assumption would be that both white and black Ss are new players and equated on other major variables such as size, experience and so on.
One might legitimately question the meaningfulness of the distinction between moral and physical courage as presented by the sportsmen cited. Should these two types of courage be differentiated on the basis of race, or should they be differentiated on the basis of active physical perseverance at a specific task. One might define moral courage as a general coping mechanism. Exceptional stress situations such as war and the stress of sports might be defined as physical courage. However, the realization that these very distinctions are merely a priori assumptions, thoroughly confounded with ethical and social values, places serious limitations on any efforts to discern an empirical basis for them. Both physical and moral courage could be defined generally as a method of successfully coping with stress.

Although Schoor (1967) makes the claim that "it's courage that makes the champion" (p. 20) there are others who dispute this fact. In his own book Schoor presents the contradictory opinion of a ballplayer, Red Schoendienst. Red felt that you could do anything, as long as you had the necessary determination to do it. Schoor remarks: "courage? Red wouldn't think it took courage to do the best you could at the game you loved" (p. 123). Again there exists a seemingly unrecognized and certainly unresolved contradiction. Courage may or may not be an element in achieving championship.

Sportsmen frequently speak of courage within the context of success and winning a game (Mantle, 1964). Courage, is however, also a characteristic attributed to the defeated sportsman. It is a label proudly assigned to the man who has lost, yet has persevered and preserved his pride by fighting to the end, by finishing the game. Schoor states that Barney Ross, a boxer, was still on his feet when the last
gong sounded. He had lost the championship, but he had not lost his pride. No one had witnessed a greater demonstration of courage in the ring. Thus, the concepts of time and endurance again emerge as crucial variables. Winning or losing is peripheral. It is how an individual wins or loses that counts. Of primary importance is keeping one's pride intact.

A symposium in Playboy (1972) on sportsmen isolates a variable which may be central in determining the nature of courage in sportsmen. Questioning as to "why" these men participated in sports suggests motivations which may be key factors. The self-concept of being courageous is, however, conspicuously absent in the answers. Stressed was the importance of skill, the desire to be the best and the need to drive oneself to victory. Monetary rewards as well as simply liking the sport and finding success satisfying to the ego were also mentioned.

Physical courage might, in view of the above, be operationally defined in the narrow sense, as a prescribed specific behaviour within a specified context. Thus, a home run or remaining in the boxing ring until the final bell could be defined as physical courage. The ideal of moral courage, expressed by both sports and religious writers, might be more appropriately investigated as a "courageous attitude". Interpreting moral courage as an attitude instead of a socially prescribed behaviour may lend itself to a more meaningful and viable investigation of courage outside the specific behavioural contexts of war, religion and sports. Within such a framework one could perhaps explain the presence of either physical and/or moral courage in different individuals. Attributing a label such as "physical courage" to a person's overt behaviour
and attributing an attitude of courage to the person performing the behaviour may be two separate processes. Determinants of the first might be defined as practice in developing a specific skill, physical endurance and active perseverance. Determinants of the attitude might be more difficult to extract and could lead to personality correlates of courage.

A major component of physical courage might be what Russell (1930) described as "zest". Zest connotes an interest in a great variety of things which life offers. Zest also implies a sense of adventure and a search for experience. Russell believed that zest was built on a sense of security, self-confidence and lack of fear. Some men, he claimed, exhibit this self-confidence and fearlessness by climbing mountains or conquering the seas. Russell also attributed zest to what this writer has termed a "courageous attitude". He mentions that some possess a general self-confidence towards life which is to be moreso admired.

The notion of a qualitative distinction between the behaviour called physical courage and the attitude called moral courage although frequently mentioned, lacks empirical basis. It appears to stem primarily from the inherent higher value placed on inner processes such as thought and feeling as opposed to outer behaviour. Attributing a higher qualitative value to one (i.e., moral courage) as opposed to the other (i.e., physical courage) seems to be an arbitrary decision.

Pioneer Contributions of Psychologists

Attempts of writers within the field of psychology (Neuer, 1936; Birnbaum, 1948; Meerloo, 1944; Adler, 1956) at defining courage have been
far from satisfactory. Several types of courage are discussed (Meerloo, 1944) and a feeble effort made to justify the ensuing qualitative distinctions. Adler's definition of "social courage" is vaguely linked to the psychologically non-neurotic individual. Neuer (1936) goes no further than merely defining courage as a social quality. The most comprehensive effort (Birnbaum, 1948) to discern the actual meaning of courage remains enshrouded in a quasi-philosophical approach.

Meerloo (1944) established a distinction between the courage to live and the courage to die. The former is ascribed a higher value qualitatively. Similar to all writers previously cited, Meerloo offers no concrete or empirical basis for this ranking. Again, one can only assume that this distinction is perhaps quite arbitrary and closely linked to the value preference of the writer (in this instance, for life over death).

Meerloo links courage with war and remarks that military decorations are symbolic of courage or bravery. He does not, however, limit himself to such a narrow conception of courage. Meerloo feels that courage is not of a simple nature. Calling certain deeds heroic is not sufficient to explain courage. He described the highest form of courage (to live) as follows:

(the highest form of courage is) that which springs from self-control. Here the individual dares to place himself in opposition to the mass, to break away from tradition, to assert his own personality, and is prepared to suffer for the sake of his convictions—such courage is creative. It attempts to overcome the boundaries imposed by man's animal nature; it is ready to break new ground, it is necessary to all growth, indeed to life itself...As a free people, we must choose the affirmative courage of life, not the negative sacrifice of death. (p. 61)
His conception of courage as arising from "self-control" provides an obvious link with writers of the war tradition. Speaking of the highest form of courage as one which involves "convictions" is also quite similar to religious writers' conceptions of the most valued form of courage. Thus, Meerloo's courage to live shares some similarities with religious conceptions of moral courage. Meerloo, however, further defines this valued courage by claiming that it is the necessary basis of all life and growth. As for knowing what this "basis" consists of, why it is necessary and why we should choose life, these are issues which Meerloo fails to confront and answer.

Meerloo also distinguished between the courage of primitive peoples and the courage of the Greeks. He described the attitude of some unspecified primitive peoples as being iconoclastic or simple revolt. He viewed such forms of revolt not as courageous but as a crime. Those who revolted against the early tribal gods and customs were punished by death or exile. Meerloo confuses the issue by calling this iconoclastic revolt "negative courage" and thus not to be honoured as being heroic. Outwardly, Meerloo remarks, it might have the appearance of heroism, but in reality it is destructive behaviour. Linking the term "courage", even if negative, to a form of behaviour which he denies is courageous, certainly does little to clarify the issue.

The Greeks, Meerloo states, possessed "hybris". This is defined in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College Edition, (Urdang, 1968), as "hubris, n. excessive pride or self-confidence; arrogance. Also, Hybris (Gk: insolence) (p. 644). Meerloo viewed this as being of a positive nature "which in disrupting established modes of
life might achieve progress" (p. 59). On what basis he views "excessive pride" or "insolence" for that matter, as being positive, is not clear. Meerloo may simply be expressing his own biased views.

Meerloo also distinguished between "personal revolt" and "collective ecstasy". The latter is characteristic of primitive bravery and of most army manoeuvres which are commonly termed heroic. Soldiers who perform great heroic deeds, Meerloo states, are in most cases simply exercising a form of collective bravery. Soldiers with nothing to live for no longer value their lives. As a result, they decide to give their lives for their country. He categorizes these soldiers as being primarily members of the underground. They are not interested in any applause for their bravery. They simply have nothing left to live for.

Meerloo defined "collective bravery" as "an ecstatic surrender to a suicidal impulse of the self". In primitive peoples this was exhibited as a type of "mass excitement" wherein the individual lost himself in the crowd. As a result, he "performs deeds which without this stimulus he would never have contemplated" (p. 59). Meerloo claims that personal courage characterizes a democratic environment as opposed to primitive cultures. On this basis it is to be rated as being of higher value qualitatively. Historically, Greece was considered a democracy. Perhaps therein lies Meerloo's notion that "hybris" is of a positive nature.

Meerloo does not explicitly state whether the courage to live, positive courage and personal revolt are one and the same form of courage. Also, this writer can only speculate that collective courage, negative courage and the courage to die refer to one type of courage.
Meerloo seems to use these sets of terms interchangeably. None of them have been adequately defined. Another criticism lies in his assumption that most soldiers of the underground are suicidal and have nothing to live for. He fails to support this contention with sound empirical data. This reflects negatively on his discussion of courage.

Neuer (1936) also takes recourse to the Greeks in support of his definition of courage. He defines "mut" or "courage" as the universal social quality of the human psyche. The courageous mind, or "soul" is defined as "the mind (spirit) that springs from, and lives in, community; that lives with and works for, community". He states that in the history of philosophy the word courage meant the same as "mind". Neuer also claims that the Greek word "Thymos" meant both courage and mind (or soul, spirit and emotion). It would have been extremely helpful had Neuer elaborated on his conception of "social", its relationship to "community", and hence the supposed origin of courage. As it stands, his definition is not very useful to a psychologist. At best, it can provide us only with the smallest hint that perhaps courage has some connection with social relationships or with the community within which we live.

Adler (in Ansbacher, 1956) in the treatment of neurotics with his technique of Individual Psychology, attempts to increase courage and decrease discouragement in the person. Adler defines courage as a social courage, one which involves a basic social interest as well as activity. Activity and courage, however, are not necessarily equated. Adler states: "Only the activity of an individual who plays the game, cooperates, and shares in life can be designated as courage" (p. 166). He frequently defines courage in terms of the activity involved in expressing one's
social interest, in striving to overcome feelings of inferiority and actively confronting the tasks of life. He links self-confidence and courage, stating that they are the basis of all constructive and creative activity.

Activity, as Adler speaks of it, appears to resemble healthy attitude towards life. He calls this attitude "courage". Thus, one might conceive of courage as a psychologically healthy, self-confident approach towards life. It does not seem to necessitate any specific overt behaviour other than a general social interest.

Also within the realm of the therapeutic, Birnbaum (1948) described "Fall-Mut" as "hazardous or bold courage". One might roughly translate this to mean "psychopathic courage". A person with this type of negative courage is indifferent towards any risk. According to Birnbaum, he feels no fear nor any anxiety. It looks like positive courage. It is, however, only a reflection of positive courage, just as the diabolic is only a reflection of the divine.

Both positive and negative courage, Birnbaum claims, have a common front, i.e., anxiety, or fear. Each individual's mode of solving this problem, of confronting fear, and dealing with it is different. The mode of positive courage is of more value. Birnbaum does not elaborate on these modes of coping with fear and/or anxiety. From his vague discussion of a criminal and a judge, the former possessing "Fall-Mut" and the latter, positive courage, one might assume that adherence to the law may differentiate these modes of coping with fear. This is however only a speculation.
Birnbaum concludes with a circular statement which leaves one extremely unenlightened as to both the meaning of courage and the treatment of "fall-mut". Fear, he says, will always be with us. Only courage will have an effect on courage. One can only conquer the "fall-mut" by the courage that is the will to ascend and to move upwards. He identifies this unique and seemingly miraculous transformation as a transformation from a copy to the original.

Birnbaum (1948) presents his conception of the meaning of courage in a second article. He remarks that since the days of Plato, courage has remained on the outskirts of psychology. He makes the statement that its decisive part in common life is known and assumes that the reader is well aware of this decisive role which courage plays in everyday life. He stresses the need for a psychology of courage which focuses its attention on courage and discouragement. Birnbaum then proceeds with a detailed, and somewhat repetitive treatise on courage. Discouragement is never again mentioned.

One could, Birnbaum claims, call courage a total attitude, which involves all aspects of the human being. This "Totaleinstellung" seems to encompass cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects of the person. Thus, courage can be understood as an active concept, one which demands action and change.

Birnbaum attempts to differentiate the active courage of the healthy person from that of the neurotic, who he claims, is also active. Self-confidence will not adequately differentiate the two. The courageous person fulfils the condition of solving problems or the "tasks of life" in the right manner. This definition of the courage of the healthy person is quite similar to Adler's social courage.
Birnbaum, by attributing to courage the status of an attitude, attempts to separate it from behaviourism. He states that behaviourists would define courage as "the impression of the behaviour of a human being who solves the tasks of life" (p. 16). The resultant activity would be courage. Such a conception of courage, Birnbaum claims, is almost too simple to be true. If pure activity were all that courage entailed, then he feels that we might also rightfully attribute courage to dogs.

To link courage with human beings he adds his "geistessenschaftliche Psychologie". Solving the tasks of life correctly involves placing value on your experiences. Action is the symbol of a man's value and herein lies the difference between animals and humans. Birnbaum states:

The courageous person is from the standpoint of 'geistewissenschaftliche psychologie' a responsible person who recognizes his deeds as symbols of his values and who does what is prescribed by an objective system of values. He obeys to a demand (like the animals do) but it is the demand to be of value. From here, courage is the enhancement of the value of the self, of one's values, or more precisely, it is the preservation of the value of the self.

(p. 18)

The three basic components of courage postulated by Birnbaum might be summarized as follows:

1) Courage is an attitude, a total experience or "totalein-stellung", founded on self-confidence.

2) Courage is the correct solving of the problems of living, facing and meeting the tasks of life.

3) Courage is the preservation of an objective value of the self which expresses itself in deeds. (p. 19)

Birnbaum's three components of courage might be labelled as "Cognitive", "Behavioural" and "Affective". Contemporary conceptions of courage will be considered within such a "total" framework.
Summary Explanations

Philosophical

Traditional conceptions of courage which place emphasis on manliness and strength in war, and value as an ideal moral courage and a general striving towards life, can be understood within the framework of early philosophical conceptions of courage. Tillich (1952) summarizes the early philosophers' definitions of courage.

The emphasis placed by Moran (1945) and Slim (1957) on reason and will power as being the primary component of courage strongly reflects the Stoic conceptions of the courage to be. Tillich states that Stoic courage was based on the control of reason. This reason refers to the person's core being, his center, and includes all mental functions. Still, Tillich states: "reasoning as a limited cognitive function, never could create courage" (pp. 12-13). Clausewitz's claim that courage is not an act of understanding, or a totally cognitive function, may also stem from the Stoic view.

Nietzsche's ontology of courage (Tillich, p. 30) relates to conceptions of courage and fear by writers of the war tradition. They acknowledged the presence of fear but stressed the power of reason and will in facing and thus overcoming fear. Nietzsche states: "...he hath heart who knoweth fear but vanquisheth it; who seeth the abyss, but with pride. He who seeth the abyss but with eagle's eyes, - he who with the eagle's talons graspeth the abyss: he hath courage" (in Tillich, 1952).

Stoic courage was also viewed as belonging to the élite. From this conception of courage may stem Moran's definite social élitism. The general élitism, the definite sexism, and the description of courage
within the context of war can all be understood in light of Tillich's discussion of the "aristocratic tradition" (p. 5). In this era war was the realm of the aristocracy. As a result, courage was also linked with the élite. This "heroic-aristocratic" conception of courage, which was revived by the knights of the Middle Ages, may be what Moran is referring to when he spoke of the fearless primitive soldiers. The greatest test of courage, Tillich claims, was a readiness to make the greatest sacrifice, one's life. The soldier was required by his profession to be always ready for this sacrifice. Thus, the soldier's courage was and somehow still remains, the outstanding example of courage.

The sexism inherent in courage can be understood on the basis of the words employed to connote courage. The Greek word for courage, andrēia, can be translated as "manliness" (Tillich, p. 5). The Latin word, fortitudo, means "strength" and thus may explain the military connotations of the word courage.

The death of the aristocratic tradition gave rise to what Tillich terms a "rational-democratic" (p. 5) conception of courage. Courage was now defined as the universal knowledge of good and evil. The value placed on mind over matter, on the ethical components of moral courage, and the religious determinism of courage all appear to reflect the dominant thinking of this era. Linguistic derivations of courage (Fr. "coeur" and Gm. "mut") suggest that courage is also a matter of the heart.

Aquinas, as did writers of the religious tradition, felt that perfect courage was a gift of "the Divine Spirit" (p. 8). Courage was united with the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. This relates
to Slim's conception of courage as the basic virtue. Faith and hope, Tillich says, reflect the ontological nature of courage, whereas love reflects its ethical component.

Aristotle's conception of the courageous man, Tillich states, is one who "acts for the sake of what is noble, for that is the aim of virtue" (p. 4). Courage does what is to be praised.

Tillich defines the early view of courage as an ethical concept, as a human act, as a matter of value (p. 3). This, in addition to the views presented of courage being a Divine Gift and a virtue, might explain the emphasis placed on moral courage as an ideal. This was especially evident in the religious writers cited.

The view presented by Meerloo as to the value of life and the emphasis placed on the mind or non-action characteristic of moral courage also appears to stem from early philosophers. For Aquinas, courage was a strength of the mind and was united with wisdom. Courage was a virtue representing not only the unity of the four cardinal virtues, but was also subordinate to reason (Tillich, p. 7). Nietzsche's "will to power", Tillich states, connotes a striving towards life. A life which is willing to surpass itself is the good life. The good life is also the courageous life (p. 27).

Birnbaum's emphasis on the human aspect of courage is quite probably linked with Plato's rejection of animal courage (Tillich, p. 80-81).

Psychological

The literature reviewed seems to indicate a definite and widespread attachment to traditional conceptions of courage. This belief in
specifically defined modes of demonstrating one's courage may be explained within the context of several psychological theories.

Atkin (1971) examined the individual's motivations for participating in what he terms the "ritualized behaviour" (p. 579) of the war institution. This war institution, he claims, is "ego-syntonic" (p. 561) and thus quite acceptable to the individual's morality. Thus, patriotism, or the exaltation of one's group, may be viewed as a "legitimate, acceptable, rationalized displacement of the individual's narcissism" (p. 561). He speaks of a "socially determined character formation" (p. 569) wherein most people will comply with the demands of the state. They will respond readily to orders given by the state.

The process of identification with one's peers and internalization of social ideas and values, Atkin claims, results in the individual's identification with the values of his culture (p. 572). The resultant conformity is largely unconscious. The individual obeys cultural demands with relatively little awareness.

Atkin's social-psychoanalytic theory and the concept of internalization could therefore explain the need to express one's courage, or to prove one's manhood via specific and perhaps ritualized forms of behaviour. He describes this process of internalization as "a restructuring and a synthesis of the social, cultural, and moral ideas into the individual's ego...they become a part of the 'me'" (p. 578). Thus the need to prove yourself courageous may be an integral and unconscious aspect of the social self. Courage, as a cultural value, may reside mainly within the unconscious. Courageous behaviour could be likened to a social role to which the individual conforms.
Traditional courage, especially within the context of war, may be primarily a function of conformity. Statements by soldiers that they are "only following orders" (p. 73), Charny (1971) claims, indicates a definite lack of personal convictions. This may suggest a lack of personal involvement or conscious self-determination when conforming to culturally-defined modes of exhibiting courage. In fact, traditional courage may not involve a real decision. Conformity would suggest agreement with the majority. Courage within this context may simply be the understood or implicit manner of behaving. The emphasis placed on courage as being primarily a prescribed response, would seem to render traditional courage the status of a relatively "riskless" decision.

Traditional conceptions of courage and its expression in war may be understood within the framework of Tomkins' "Ideo-affective resonance theory". Eckhardt and Alcock (1970) were successful in their efforts to establish an empirical link between ideology and personality for war/peace attitudes. Their results indicated the following:

Ideological conservatism at home and militarism abroad were largely associated with personal extraversion, which may be interpreted as thoughtless conformity or acting without thinking. Political cynicism was largely associated with neuroticism and social irresponsibility. Both factors shared an ideological lack of internationalism and personal misanthropy, strict childhood discipline (as recalled) and lack of empathy... (p. 109)

The general factor of "compulsion" was isolated as the underlying explanatory value for the link between ideological and personality factors. The authors hypothesized that this general value may be culturally determined.

The "love affair" (p. 105) between the idea (war) and the feeling (courage) may be a matter of values. The underlying value of
"compulsion" was defined by Eckhardt and Alcock as "a readiness to use force or the threat of force, punishment or the threat of punishment, as a means of controlling human behaviour and of resolving conflict situations" (p. 107). This might lend support to the assumption that courage and its traditional relationships to war and to religious beliefs may have their basis in a common value. The correlation of "thoughtless conformity or acting without thinking" may lend support to the assumption that traditional courage is primarily response-oriented. The self may play only a minor role.

The concept of "national role" (Katz, 1967, p. 16) and conceptions of "symbolic", "normative" or "instrumental involvement" (p. 17) might serve as explanations for the expressed adherence to traditional courage. Given that an individual is a formal member of a national system, declaration of war, or involvement in a war by the nation would necessitate the activation of the national role of "soldier" (Katz, 1967). Thus, necessarily placing the role of courage within the context of war would imply that courage may also be related to the concept of national role. The emphasis on conformity and the consequence for deviancy from one's national role is explained by Katz. He states: "As a member of the national system, the individual must either assume his national role or leave the system. And there are no places to go save prison or exile" (p. 16). Traditional courage may therefore be viewed as a necessary by-product or result of the automatic conformity to or assumption of one's national role.

Katz further defines symbolic attachment to a bureaucratic system as "emotionally held attitudes in which the symbols represent
absolute values and have a life of their own" (p. 17). An individual
who views courage or heroism in war not only as a means towards victory
but as a value, as an end in itself, could be regarded as having a
"symbolic attachment" to traditional conceptions of courage. The physi­
cal courage of sports and the honour and fame attributed to sports heroes
might indicate or imply such a symbolic attachment. Katz suggests that
such symbolic attachment has its basis in the emotional conditioning of
children to these symbols.

Adherence to traditional religious conceptions of courage as a
patient and persevering attitude towards troubles in life might be ex­
plained by Katz's conception of "normative involvement". He defines this
as "the acceptance of specific legitimate requirements of the system nec­
essary for system membership" (p. 17). People may not be totally attached
to religion per se, but they fulfil the requirements of attending church
and labelling themselves as one sect or another. Official commitments
may be limited to specific rituals such as the marriage ceremony. The
general optimism of their lifestyles and the belief that struggles are
necessary in order to build character (e.g., Moore, 1951) suggests a
"normative involvement" of sorts. People may adhere to traditional relig­
ious norms without symbolic attachments to the symbols of church and for­
mal religion. With regards to courage and war, normative attachment
would describe the man who may not totally agree with the war but serves
his time regardless. Glasser (1971) comments in 365 Days:

If they had to they'd go again and again. It wasn't because
they wanted to or even believed in what they were doing, but
because they were there and someone told them to do it.
Strange war. Going for something they didn't believe in or
for that matter didn't care about, just to make it 365 days
and be done with it. (p. 26)
A Basic Explanatory Model

The S---R or Traditional Model

Within the framework of this model, primary emphasis is placed on the Response, the courageous action. Physical courage, as demonstrated on the battlefield or the sports arena, in addition to a blind adherence to a religious normative lifestyle, may be explained within the framework of the traditional model. Psychoanalytic theory suggests that adherence to this model may be largely unconscious. Social-psychological theories explain the traditional model in terms of conformity behaviour.

Implicit in conformity to traditional conceptions of courage are positive reinforcements such as being labelled a "hero" or "courageous", having your overt behaviour viewed as "right" or "good" and generally being accepted by the social majority. The exemplar of this model may take few genuine risks with respect to social behaviour. He is courageous because he is a carbon copy of what society would like him to be.

A Schematic Summary

Stimulus (external to the Response (a socially prescribed overt behaviour)

e.g., war, sports, hardships in life

e.g., obey the draft, be a champion, patient perseverance, etc.

Origin: primarily external, i.e., social class, race, God, religion

Operational Definitions: to remain with your Company, your team or at your post at all costs, and to the dire end
Contemporary Illustrations of the Traditional Model

In newspapers we read frequently of people being awarded metals for their heroism. The following was noted in the K-W Record (Thursday, July 6, 1972):

Five Canadians, three from New Brunswick and two from Ontario, have been awarded bronze medals for heroism in saving lives, the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission announced Wednesday.

This suggests that courage might also be explained within the framework of prosocial behaviour or altruism.

In the land of the Israelis, the Pillar of Heroism firmly attests to the traditional conception of courage:

a simple severe triangular shaft of stainless steel which rises 70 feet high on this Judean Hill. Deeds of Jewish valor are carved into the surrounding stones. (Golden, p. 83)
FIGURE 2

Schematic Representation of Cour Coping Mechanism in Stressful

AFFECTIVE
- attitude of courage;
- public nature;
- realistic orientation;
- total time perspective

AFFECTIVE
- attitude of hope;
- active hope;
- future orientation;
- private nature of hope

COGNITIVE
- a voluntary choice, a decision-making process
- practical forethought
- self-reliance
- awareness of a caring other, need for affiliation (N-Aff.)

(higher qualitatively)

(low qualitatively)
- attitude of hopelessness;
- dependency;
- "deformed inner time";
- passive hope

Solid line would denote traditional conformity

Pathological isolation
Courage as a Basic Survival Situations

(Present)

**BEHAVIOURAL**

- coping mechanisms, e.g., humour;
- hallucinations;
- "saviour type" defense mechanisms;
- will to live - would risk physical death;
- endurance;
- self-help;
- preparedness to act

(Future)

**GOAL**

- maintain life,
- meaning, dignity,
- personal integrity,
- self-respect,
- independence,
- autonomy,
- a purpose;
- ultimate psychological survival

Create a Past by concretizing memories through action in the present

**BEHAVIOURAL**

- e.g., "Moslems" who ceased to react in concentration camps;
- live totally in the present;
- lose reality contact;
- maintain false optimism;
- use of drugs in war zone;
- "destroyer type" hallucinations

No Future Goal.

Psychological and/or Physical Death Results
COURAGE AND SURVIVAL

Traditional conceptions of courage conspicuously minimize the role of the inner self, or the personal involvement aspect of courage. References to courage within the context of survival, to the contrary, appear to place considerable emphasis on the central role of a strong self, a hopeful attitude and the maintenance of dignity and autonomy in life-threatening situations. Emphasis on the conscious and purposeful nature of courage (Frankl, 1963; Bettleheim, 1960), the concept of self-reliance (Frank, 1952; Schnabel, 1958; Leboucher, 1969; Munden, 1973; Brantner, 1971; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1973), and the necessity of interacting with others (Pawlowicz, 1962), suggests that courage may be a more complex psychological process than traditional conceptions would imply.

Frequent references are made to the concept of hope by all of the above authors. The resultant confusion as to the relationship between courage and hope further complicates any attempts to define courage adequately within the context of survival. The great variety of survival situations and discussions of the multitude of coping mechanisms found therein (Noyce, 1962; Evans & Cody, 1969; Hansell, 1970; Bloch, 1969, 1970; Chodoff, 1970; Glassman & Siegel, 1970; Hinton, 1973; Lilly, 1956; Colbach, 1971), also suggests the need for a more adequate definition of courage and its specific role in survival and other stressful situations.
Frankl (1963), on the basis of his experience in a concentration camp, spoke of the courage to suffer. He described this courage as an attitude, a state of mind and a choice. Of primary importance was the manner in which one survived the ordeal of the concentration camps. Frankl emphasized the ultimate decision each individual could make in accepting suffering and the probability of death in a dignified and hopeful manner.

Speaking of the necessity of a sense of humour for survival (Frankl, 1963) suggests that some basic personality pre-dispositions may also be essential. One might conceive of "humour" as a mediating variable which may serve to explain the existence of courage and hence the survival of some individuals. "A sense of humour", Frankl remarked "was another of the soul's weapons in the fight for self-preservation" (p. 68). It provided a brief spell of freedom from suffering.

The ability to choose one's attitude in any given situation, Frankl claimed, comprises man's ultimate freedom. Thus, the decision to live or die in the concentration camp and the subsequent maintenance of personal dignity, resides ultimately within man himself. The decision to cope with one's situation in a hopeful frame of mind does much to strengthen one's physical and mental endurance capabilities. Thus, implicit in the courage to suffer is not only the endurance and perseverance found in traditional conceptions of courage, but, a more basic self-determination.

The general hopelessness of the concentration camp and the constant presence of death, led many to entertain thoughts of suicide. In order to survive, it was necessary to maintain a belief in the future
and never to lose hope. Implicit in hopelessness was the ultimate suicide of the "Moslems". They were not merely apathetic and hardened emotionally to their environment, as were the majority. Rather, Frankl described them as completely lifeless and without hope. They were mere shells of the beings they once were and had ceased to react even to the basic necessities of life.

Suffering was regarded by Frankl as an intricate and meaningful aspect of life. The decision to suffer courageously, and to die with dignity if necessary, is presented almost as an imperative. Frankl states: "They must not lose hope but should keep their courage in the certainty that the hopelessness of their struggle did not detract from its dignity and its meaning" (p. 130).

Basic to Frankl's notion of successfully maintaining hope and courage is a strong sense of optimism and future time perspective. "It is a peculiarity of man", Frankl claims, "that he can only live by looking to the future" (p. 115). Any man who loses faith in the future is doomed. It is this belief in the future, and man's striving towards some goal, which gives man his inner strength, his capacity to endure.

In the concentration camps, some men began to suffer from what Frankl termed a "deformed inner time" (p. 112). They began to live from day to day, totally in the present. They ceased setting future goals and looked retrospectively into the past for comfort. Others began to concentrate exclusively on the past. This provided them with a source of relief. The danger inherent in this mode of coping was that they overlooked the reality of their situation and missed the opportunity to grow spiritually and experience something positive from their ordeal.
The false hopes maintained by some optimists was equally as destructive. Some would set a date for their liberation or remain convinced that they would be home again for Christmas. Nonfulfilment of such false hopes resulted in a loss of courage and subsequent suicide.

Frankl clearly emphasizes the important role of the self in maintaining courage. He fails, however, to clearly define the interaction, or to distinguish, should that be the case, between courage and hope. Both appear to be necessary for survival and the establishment of a purpose, a future goal, in one's life, even if that life is filled with suffering. Frankl states:

Those who know how close the connection is between the state of mind of a man - his courage and hope, or lack of them - and state of immunity of his body will understand that the sudden loss of hope and courage can have a deadly effect. (p. 120)

Also, both courage and hope appear to stem from a belief in the future and a personal decision to render one's present suffering as somewhat meaningful. This confusion leads one to wonder whether courage and hope are not one and the same.

Bettleheim (1960) spoke of the concentration camp as a dehumanizing situation. His conception of courage emphasizes the necessity of actively maintaining a strong, independent, dignified and psychologically autonomous self. Courage involves the conscious decision to maintain one's self-respect. Bettleheim's emphasis on the self-determined aspect of courage is very similar to Frankl (1963). From a strong self will arise the courage to face the reality of one's situation, however grim it may be. The key to survival was to "join reason with the heart", to decide that one was going to maintain his personal integrity.
Bettleheim's conception of courage and survival in the concentration camp situation adds to the basic distinction made by Meerloo (1944) between the courage to live and the courage to die. Bettleheim claims that a dignified death, wherein the life of the personality is retained, is far superior qualitatively to the undignified death of those "Moslems" whose already dead personalities constituted virtual suicide.

Pioneer contributions of psychologists described the courage to live as merely a preferred value. This value, in turn, led to the specific response of living as opposed to dying in battle. Bettleheim, in discussing the courage to live within the context of extreme survival situations, stresses the role of the self. Emphasis is placed on the psychological process of choosing life over death and assuming a dignified courage. One readily risks the probability of physical death in order to ensure the psychological life of the personality. Courage involves the maintenance of some semblance of independence in the midst of control.

Again, as in Frankl (1963), endurance and perseverance involve much more than simply remaining in the situation. In fact, defying the authoritarian control of their captors by attempting to escape from the camp, was indicative of courage. It was a sign that the personality was still alive. Implicit in courage is the execution of a conscious decision to survive psychologically, at all costs.

The importance of self-reliance in producing and sustaining the necessary courage to withstand the stress of war is exemplified in the story of Anne Frank (1952). She was constantly striving to increase her inner strength through her own efforts. Anne felt that she must become good through her own efforts without examples and without good advice.
Then, later she would be a stronger individual. She renewed and strengthened her courage by writing and continuously telling herself: "I must, I must, I must" be brave (p. 177). Anne felt the need to grow in spite of her restricted confinement. She was aware of the need to be strong, to be brave and to never give up. All this she felt was dependent on her own self. Anne stated: "alone I had to face the difficult task of changing myself" (p. 155).

The importance of self-reliance in coping with stress is also emphasized in areas where courage is popularly ascribed the leading role. Quarantelli and Dynes (1973) state that self-reliance and the ability to cope with a disaster situation are more prevalent than is generally realized. Relief agencies and outside assistance, except for cases where specialized equipment or medical care is necessary, are not a central requirement. Heroism in disaster situations is not as dramatic as people imagine it to be. In spite of these facts, traditional conceptions of courage are still the ideal. An example provided by Quarantelli & Dynes is the undue stress placed on the superhuman efforts of a particular person in a rescue operation. The authors found it ironic that disaster victims were usually the first to believe such dramatic accounts of their suffering and heroism. They took pride in thinking of their own experience as typical and heroic.

Quarantelli & Dynes conclude with the thought that perhaps heroism is not the wrong word to describe disaster behaviour. Their conception of courage, however, involves much more than the ideal, over-publicized, and perhaps mis-represented notion of heroism in disaster situations. Their definition of courage involves a quiet determination, practical forethought, and a self-reliant coping with stress.
The central role of the self in courage is also noted by Munden (1973). Courage he feels, belongs within the realm of the psychologically healthy individual. He presents the interesting view that "mental illness is an expression of individual cowardice" (p. 71). Courage and hence mental health, must be freely chosen. He confuses the issue somewhat by introducing the concept of hope. Those patients who undergo positive personality changes, he claims, "do so out of despair...the fear of losing all hope in life" (p. 70). Thus, one wonders whether the basic mechanism for psychological survival is a self-determined choice of courage or a fear of losing hope.

In addition to the seeming interchangeability of courage and hope, accounts of courage and survival introduce another source of confusion. Frequent reference is made to the role of an other, an external aid or influence, in the maintenance of courage and/or hope in times of stress.

Sala Pawlowicz (1962) attributes her ultimate survival of the concentration camp experience to the renewed strength and hope which another's caring produced. Her own courage and active hopes for the future seemed almost totally depleted. All hope seemed gone and Sala found herself simply surviving from moment to moment. She blotted out the past because it hurt too much to remember. She did not think of the future because it seemed that there was no longer any hope for a future. Sheer endurance and survival in the present were her modes of coping.

In the midst of this hopelessness and of ultimate fatalism, she found a renewed sense of worth, of being, and a renewed courage. A stranger had left her a message, carefully concealed, a small crust of
black bread, a symbol of hope. This in turn gave her the will to endure and the courage to defy. She no longer felt alone.

Of note is the fact that Sala attributed the source of this renewed courage and hope not to her secret benefactor, but to God, a Divine source. She remarked: "At just the right time Divine Will had intervened. I prayed to have the strength to bear the burden of responsibility that this note had placed upon me. I could not lose myself..." (p. 142). Careful analysis of the environmental conditions surrounding her may provide a clue.

Sala experienced her oppressors as being totally bent on destruction. She herself was experiencing a slow yielding to this destructive force. Her self-image as a human being, one with dignity, self-respect and freedom to determine her own destiny, was slowly being undermined. Sala states:

I reflected that my degradation was probably exactly what the Nazis wanted. The hunger, humiliation and constant beatings made us begin to believe that we actually were sub-human. We had no human rights, and were treated like so many animals. With the loss of dignity, came the loss of a will to live. We behaved like sheep, I thought, because we had lost the sense of pride and dignity that normal people had. The Nazis seemed to control our lives so completely that there was never any hope of escape. (Pawlowicz, p. 146)

Attributing her renewed courage and hope to a human source was not possible. The Nazis were no longer regarded as human and the self-image of the Jews also approached that of being sub-human.

This confusing definition of courage and hope as both primarily self and other determined is also found in other accounts of concentration camp and war experiences (Frank, 1952; Leboucher, 1969). Both inner determination and the resolution to help a loved one provided the necessary
strength for Mme. Leboucher. Father Benoit's formula of "work and pray" (p. 27, Leboucher) also seems to place equal emphasis on the role of God and man as sources of inner courage and hope. Anne Frank, who placed such great emphasis on self-reliance, also is noted as saying: "We stayed together – that much good fortune we still had. Perhaps that is why we endured longer than the others who were all alone...we now began to see that misery is not doubled when it is shared" (Schnabel, 1958, p. 164).

To further complicate the issue, Bettleheim (1960) claims that the attempt made by the Frank's to remain together in such abnormal circumstances resulted in their deaths. He feels they made a mistake in attempting to continue life as normal. Anne's death followed shortly after her sister Margot's in the concentration camp.

Issues of survival from a slightly different perspective (Hinton, J. "Bearing Cancer", 1973; & Brantner, J. P., "Death and the Self", 1971) also make reference to courage and hope, self-reliance and the necessity of others. Hinton views courage and hope as one of the many factors which contribute to a person's ability to cope with cancer. Approximately one-third reacted to the diagnosis of cancer by maintaining hope and striving towards establishing limited goals towards independence. The rest spoke of "acceptance" or "despondence" and some chose to completely ignore their burden. Hinton speaks vaguely of patients bearing the experience with a "quieter courage". One gains the vague impression that perhaps courage and hope, as modes of coping with a possibly terminal illness, may be somewhat superior qualitatively to other modes of coping.
Brantner maintains that certain attitudes may promote survival and could, in some instance, prolong life. He quotes Troebst with respect to disaster and emergency situations and states that survivors more often considered the possibility of a disaster in advance. They were also quite prepared to do something about their situation. Thus, cognitive forethought and subsequent self-reliant action appear to characterize courage. Of the survivors, Brantner states: "they refuse to let themselves be depressed or discouraged or hopeless or despairing" (p. 22).

Brantner also predicted that the presence of certain conditions in women with non-cancerous pap smears would result in cancer of the cervix. "Hopelessness" as well as "recent death or separation" were among the variables. His predictions distinguishing those who developed cancer from patients who remained in good health were approximately 75% accurate. Thus, hope and the presence of another person may be central for survival.

Brantner refers to hopelessness and discouragement as dangerous conditions which can be dealt with and overcome "by our own efforts and with the help of professional people" (p. 24). The development of the self, he feels, should be our main goal in life, and "this is accomplished only in relationships with other persons" (p. 25). His comment that "hope is necessary for life" (p. 24) does little to clarify the definitional dilemma.

**Courage and Hope**

To differentiate courage and hope seems a difficult yet necessary task. Hope more often appears to designate a mental disposition or attitude. This is somewhat confusing, since courage has also been defined as a mental attitude by many of the authors mentioned. The
difference, however, appears to lie in the action component which appears necessary in order to distinguish courage as such.

Hope does not necessarily require action to demonstrate to others that it exists. Take the example: "I hope I have the courage to go back". One could spend the rest of one's life hoping and due to unmitigating circumstances, never actually return. Yet, actually going back would demonstrate that one had the courage to do so. Similarly, public voicing of one's opinions would demonstrate that one had the courage to act on one's convictions. It would demonstrate that one really wanted to be a part of change rather than merely hoping that someday things would be different. Courage implies committing oneself to action whereas hope may serve as an attitude which sustains that courage.

Hope also appears to be more of an intensely personal phenomenon whereas courage frequently appears to involve others. For example, a person may hope to be wealthy someday. While this hope may indeed require action on his part in order to materialize, it need not necessarily be verified or publically observed by others in order to be termed as a hope. Courage is more other oriented, more external. For example, actions such as jumping into a river to save a drowning child, or voicing one's opinions publically, are often labelled as "courageous". Courage implies publically observable actions. A person can hope, and no one need agree with him in order for him to be certain that he is indeed hoping for something. Yet, in order to believe that he is courageous, it is necessary for him to conform to others' conceptions of heroism and hope to merit the label. Courage appears to require public support. Hope appears to require only private, personal support.
A further distinction stems from the above. Due to the seemingly private nature of hoping, one could hope theoretically for anything one wished. It would still be termed a hope. Yet, due perhaps to the public nature of courage, only certain prescribed actions are generally labelled as courageous. Heroic actions in war or disaster situations are an example. Other behaviours, such as draft-resistance, might not be considered courageous by the prevailing majority. Society has created the label of "coward" for such deviance.

Fromm, in speaking of courage and hope (1968) stressed the importance of activity in both courage and hope. He conceived of passivity as pathological. Hope and courage thus appear closely linked and related to change and action in the world. Passive hope, where nothing is done, says Fromm, constitutes no hope. What is needed is an active hope and an active courage, since courage is regarded by Fromm as being the necessary component to life.

Personal accounts of concentration camp experiences readily illustrate the distinction between passive and active hope. Sheer endurance in the present, while still maintaining some small semblance of a will to live, with minimal reliance on the past or future, could be viewed as passive hope. An active hope, in view of its future-orientation, goes beyond simple physical endurance.

This conception of time perspective again creates a distinction between courage and hope. Hope appears to involve a more limited and narrow time span than courage. Active hope has a well defined future orientation. Passive hope centers mainly on the present. Courage encompasses a wider time span. It incorporates past, present and/or future
time perspectives, as the situations require. Courage can draw the future into the present by realizing hopes. Courage can project the present into the future, in terms of actualizing potentialities, in acting out hopes. Also, courage can create a past, figuratively speaking, by concretizing memories through action in the present (Frankl, 1963).

Hopelessness appears to entail ending the struggle for life in the midst of stress or suffering. Giving up hope may be a type of suicide. Courage also appears to be implicitly involved in the maintenance of both life and hope in survival situations. Hope, a more private phenomenon, at once sustains courage and appears to be bolstered by it. The two concepts may be better viewed as exemplifying an inter-dependent rather than an independent relationship. They both appear basic to the continuing life process. The distinction between courage and hope may be more legitimately expressed on the basis of emphasized origin, that is, external or other, versus internal or the self.

The following theoretical model may illustrate more clearly the above conceptions:

**Courage-Hope Model**

**Solid Lines**: These denote the necessary links in the model. They exemplify the important factors for ultimate survival and the existence of courage and/or hope.

**Broken Lines**: These denote sufficient but not necessary links in the model. These factors, while important, are secondary. They are always present to some extent. This stems from the fact that we can be autonomous
individuals, but only in a relative sense, since we can never be totally isolated from others. Their influence is not of primary importance for maintaining courage and/or hope.

Changing the secondary link between Other and Courage to a solid line, or a necessary condition would exemplify traditional conceptions of courage. Relegating to the Other a position of primary importance would clearly indicate the necessity of conformity behaviour.

Relegating primary importance to the Other with respect to hope implies not conformity but the presence of the necessary support or incentive crucial to hope. In order for hope to be active, and hence non-pathological and constructive, it requires a link with the outside world. Given this link, it can actively support courage. The notion of personal responsibility to sustain this courage through a basic hope and self-reliance completes the cycle.

Maintaining a weak link between hope and the other, and strengthening the link between self and hope would only serve to isolate the individual. Such a configuration would merely strengthen the already private nature of hope and reduce contact with the outside world. The conceptions of courage, survival and mental health would apply here.

Alternative Explanations of Coping in Survival Situations

Discussion of the role courage and hope play in coping in survival and stressful situations have centered generally upon the necessity for maintaining a basic will to live. There are, however, studies ranging across the same survival categories (i.e., mental and physical health, the stress of war and concentration camps) which make no mention of courage or hope as primary coping mechanisms.
Evans and Cody (1969) and Hansell (1970) discuss coping with stress in the field of mental health. The technique of decision counselling is primarily a cognitive approach. Immediate intervention by professional counsellors and treatment within the crisis situation where possible is the ideal approach. Stress is placed on carefully assessing the crisis situation and teaching new problem-solving skills to the patient. Allowing the patient to remain within his normal environment and employing those already interacting with him in his problem-solving task, the authors feel will enhance his sense of dignity.

Psychological survival, as described above, appears to be primarily dependent upon the individual's capacity to learn new coping techniques. Both the expectation of others that he will succeed and the specific coping mechanisms taught are external to the individual. Self-reliance and courage does not really appear central in decision counselling. Even personal hope appears subsumed under others' expectations of success.

Considerable attention has been given to the soldier's adaptation to the stress of war. Bourne (1970) maintains that "A state of psychological and even physiological homeostasis can be maintained despite repeated exposure to objectively high-risk situations" (p. 186). Extensive psychological defenses, rather than courage or hope, are provided as explanations for survival. Bourne includes factors such as religious beliefs, and careful cognitive calculation of the risk involved, as being characteristic of survivors. The mention of "independent, self-reliant individuals with inordinate faith in their own abilities" (p. 186) seems to approach the definition of courage thus far evolved in this paper.
Bourne claims that the symptoms exhibited by soldiers or their particular modes of coping are not of primary concern. Of importance is the end result. Bourne states: "to a certain extent the actual presenting symptoms became irrelevant: the critical issue is whether or not the man has ceased to cope with or function in the environment of the combat zone" (p. 187).

Treatment of psychiatric casualties within the war zone centered upon the concepts of "immediacy, proximity and expectancy" (Bloch, 1969; Hayes, 1969). The use of drugs such as marijuana as a coping device (Colbach, 1971) was viewed as being of minimal concern since it had not yet presented itself as a pressing problem in combat.

The efforts expended to keep the soldier in battle very clearly exemplify traditional conceptions of courage. Discussion of how the individual soldier copes with the stress of war seems to indicate a need for a qualitative distinction with respect to the courage of those who externally fit the traditional definition.

Bloch (1970) in discussing the adaptation, psychologically, of normal individuals during a term in Viet Nam indicates that fears of death and injury were predominant. In cases where a man's ability to cope with these fears is questionable, Bloch states: "the quality of his relationship with his peer group can often be the determining factor in whether he 'makes it' (functions effectively) or doesn't" (p. 620).

Due to the nature of the Viet Nam tour, however, such group cohesiveness or support is not as strong as it was in previous wars. A soldier knows that in 365 Days his time is up. Thus he concentrates on maintaining ties at home and does not become as closely affiliated to his
combat group. One might predict, on the basis of the postulated theoretical courage-hope model (p. 62), the quality of an individual's adjustment in war.

Given lower group cohesiveness, one might expect that the person who copes best might be high in self-reliance. This would foster a self-determined courage to survive. The necessary hope, to sustain this courage, can readily be satisfied through relatively tenuous or infrequent emotional support from significant others. These others may be loved ones at home. In order to sustain an adequate level of hope, it might also be predicted that the individual has a relatively low Need for Affiliation (N-Aff.). In World War II, where time to be spent in combat was indefinite, and hence, attachment to one's group more important, other factors may have been primary. In the latter situation, a high N-Affiliation might have provided the necessary hope for survival. The highly self-reliant individual, in such a situation, isolated both from home and immediate affiliation with his peers, might experience minimal hope and hence the faltering of courage.

Thus, the theoretical courage-hope model, a careful examination of situational variables and measures of self-reliance and N-Aff. combined, might provide a fairly accurate prediction of a person's survival potential.

Psychological adaptation to extreme stress as experienced in the concentration camps was examined by Chodoff (1970). He indicated that a person's basic personality strengths and weaknesses play a major role in subsequent adaptation to the post-war period. With respect to immediate survival within the camps, Chodoff maintains both that he has
no real answers and that defense mechanisms played a major role. He claims that chance and the "adaptability of the human species" (p. 82) accounted for life or death in the camps. The primary defense mechanisms were apathy, denial and isolation of affect.

Chodoff makes no mention of courage and refers to hope only indirectly. He relegates the post-war "concentration camp syndrome" (p. 84) with its characteristic psychological problems, in part to "the disappointment of their idealistic hopes that a better world would now arise" (p. 83). This may imply that hope and courage could be relevant variables to investigate, even though they are not directly mentioned as primary adaptive factors.

The courage of those in the concentration camps often indicated a high degree of self-reliance. Also, while some affiliation with another was necessary for survival, to provide hope, too great an attachment resulted in death. Chodoff states: "some form of companionship with others was indispensable, since a completely isolated individual could not have survived in the camps, but the depth of such companionship was usually limited by the overpowering egotistical demands of self-preservation" (p. 83).

Again, on the basis of the courage-hope model, it might be assumed that given extreme stress situations, a high N-Affiliation could prove destructive. It may produce a hope which is overly dependent on the physical closeness of others. In situations of extreme stress or isolation from others, mere knowledge that the other exists should be sufficient to provide the necessary degree of hope. A high degree of self-reliance in turn, would lead to the courage needed for survival.
Accounts of isolated individuals struggling for survival (Noyce, 1962) suggests that in the absence of a living companion, as in the case of Tiiro, a stranded sailor, the person will create such a presence. Tiiro had been lost at sea for approximately thirty days. His partner, Ericson, was dead and lying in the raft. Thus, in situations of extreme stress and isolation, where a person is unable to personally contribute significantly to his ultimate survival, he may project his need for another and sense it as a presence. This projected presence might in turn, provide the necessary hope to sustain the courage derived from his own self-reliance. Thus, a mere desire for an other may be sufficient to sustain the will to live.

Experimental support for the above contentions may be obtained from a study of isolation and its effects on the individual (Lilly, 1956). On the basis of autobiographical studies of isolation, Lilly concluded that all survivors possess the inner conviction that they will live. Another equally important factor for some is the knowledge that others are attempting to rescue them. Hallucinations and delusions are quite characteristic of strong egos who survive. These hallucinations appear to reflect their will to live. He refers both to "destroyer type" and "saviour type" hallucinations. Lilly hypothesized that the brain remains active in such stress situations. Instead of remaining reality-bound, the brain is left free to fantasize and experience hallucinations.

In his isolation study the absolute intensity of stimulation was reduced by submerging S in a tank of warm and even-flowing water. The longest exposure for each of the 2 Ss in the experiment was 3 hours. They were instructed to inhibit movement and report their experiences
immediately after the experiment. Results indicated experiences similar to real life situations. If a person is alone long enough and if the level of physical and human stimulation is low enough, the mind turns inward and projects outward its own contents and processes. The brain, Lilly concludes, remains active. Lilly states that even healthy minds act in this manner when experiencing the stress of isolation.

A Learning Theory Explanation

Mowrer (1960) presents an experimental analogue of courage which might serve as an explanatory basis for traditional (S-R) conceptions of courage and courage in survival situations. Mowrer employed rats as Ss and a maze apparatus with an electrical grid on the runway. Electrical shock, a painful stimulus, was the barrier to the reinforcement or goal at the end of the maze.

Courage is defined by Mowrer as an acquired characteristic. Describing behaviour as either cowardly or courageous is a function of how the opposing forces in a conflict situation are balanced. These opposing forces are defined by Mowrer as being fear and hope. This balance of fear and hope is described by Mowrer as follows:

If much fear and little hope are associated with stimuli which a given action produces then, with respect to that action, the individual is "timid", "cowardly".

If little fear and much hope are associated with stimuli which a given action produces then the action will be boldly executed. (pp. 434-435)

Mowrer cites experiments by Muenzinger (1936; 1952; 1954; 1957) which indicate that at times punishment of a correct response may lead to marked facilitation in learning. Some groups of Ss (rats) continued to choose the alley marked "fear coming" after having crossed the electrical grid.
Although not attributing the term "courage" to rats, Mowrer claims that such behaviour in humans would be called courage. He postulates that courage may simply be the absence of fear in situations where it might well be expected to be present.

Traditional conceptions of courage popularly define stressful situations such as going to war or participating in competitive sports as tests of one's courage and demonstrations of manhood. The possibility of death or physical maiming when undergoing such feats might be defined as painful stimuli. The ideal of the fearless soldier, however, indicates that fear will be minimal. The courageous person, in the traditional sense, is one who through will power (Moran, 1945) and conscious expectation (Slim, 1957) always has his fear in control. Thus, the psychological set is to endure the necessary pain associated with actions designed to achieve the ultimate goal of manhood. Mowrer might define war as a painful stimulus which is associated with a high degree of hope and little fear. Inherent in the resultant goal-seeking behaviour is a strong sense of determinism. Learning theory and the balance of forces in a conflict situation (a balance which is in this case, socially prescribed) replaces the vague and unscientific religious, climatic and ethical determination of popular writers.

Mowrer also introduces the concept of "effort" and perseverance as an important aspect in overcoming painful barriers to a goal. He gives the example of placing a rat in a Skinner box and setting the ratio of bar presses to food pellets (positive reinforcement or goal) at 200:1. Mowrer states that, given such experimental conditions, the rat would probably die. However, setting the ratio initially at 20:1 and then gradually increasing the required bar presses (or effort) would result
in continued effort and increased output for the reward. Mowrer claims that such a conception of survival would broaden the psychology of work, sacrifice and character. Intermittant as opposed to continuous reinforcement should allow for greater resistance to extinction of the learned response and hence, greater survival potential.

The conception of courage by traditional religious writers (e.g., Moore, 1951) as the passive endurance of the necessary hardships and difficulties in life could readily be explained within Mowrer's learning theory framework. The constant temptations with which a Christian is confronted and general misfortunes of life could be defined as painful stimuli. The good Christian is psychologically prepared to expect such hardships and to expend the necessary efforts enduring them. Such behaviour is linked to the hope of salvation. Good luck or success in life could be defined as intermittent reinforcement, since the general belief would be that life is a struggle. The emphasis on optimism would allow for a "low fear" definition of the situation. The gradual exposure to the harshness of reality provided for children in North American society would explain survival amidst such difficult conditions as life provides.

Learning theory analogues of courage and survival do not fit as well with the conceptions of courage and survival presented in this paper. The constant danger and actual presence of death and suffering in the concentration camps (the painful stimulus) presents some difficulty in assuming that this was a "low fear" and "high hope" condition. The presence of false hope or optimism in some and their eventual suicide when these hopes (e.g., freedom and an end to the holocaust at Christmas)
were not realized cannot be readily explained by Mowrer's model. These false hopes were obviously not conditioned to the endurance of pain associated with survival in the camps. Their hopes were conditioned to the reoccurrence of a familiar event, such as Christmas or re-uniting with their family.

The notion of gradual habituation to the requirement of increased effort for one's reinforcements also presents a problem. Although the existence of prejudice against the Jews may be perceived as a gradual conditioning to a courageous endurance of pain the exposure to severe conditions in the concentration camps might be considered a fairly sudden occurrence. Still, the victims of the holocaust did not all lose hope and die immediately.

The distinction between psychological life and physical survival posited by Bettleheim (1960) and the value placed on risking the latter in order to preserve one's self-respect and autonomy implies freedom of choice. Frankl (1962) considered this choice, of life over death, an ultimate one belonging to man. Thus, instead of Mowrer's postulated balance of hope and fear explaining survival in the camps, the concept of a necessary and ultimate choice, or decision-making, serves as an explanatory basis. The notion of exercising one's freedom suggests that a less highly deterministic model would be more appropriate.

Mowrer cites Brown (1955) who states that all goal-seeking behaviour involves a detour through pain to some extent. This pain may be interpreted as effort, apprehension and so forth. Confusion arises when the "punishment" is large and obvious while the rewards are subtle and obscure.
Traditional conceptions of courage could readily be described by the condition where an individual's goal is known and socially approved. That is, suffering the physical stress involved in competitive sports is acknowledged as a *rite de passage* to manhood. Thus, the ostensible reward rather than punishment by pain which is experienced by the individual, is not defined as "masochism" or pathological. Rather, one speaks of "determination", "persistence" and "gumption" (Mowrer, p. 436).

The punishment suffered by some new culture adherents could be defined as fairly severe (e.g., imprisonment, large fines, future financial insecurity). The goal, however, is covert, e.g., realizing one's ideals. The goal of societal change may be threatening and could technically be defined as being non-approved. The rewards for activists, e.g., inner satisfaction, remain obscure to most onlookers. Thus, draft-resisters are characterized as "cowards" and deserving of the punishment they receive. The following letter was received by Osborne (I Refuse, 1971):

Your kind of chickenhearted scum is what makes America look ugly. Just a prison sentence is too good for you. You and your kind should be put before a firing squad, just like all traitors should be. No one who calls himself a Christian would even want to look at you. The Christian is a guy who will gladly kill any Communist or foreign enemy to protect his country. You're probably a foreigner yourself. I hope you get it good. (p. 27)
Stimulus (S)

Cultural Change

emergence of a "new" culture;
an optional Youth stage of psycho-social development;
questioning of "old" culture values by Youth; e.g., competition;
emphasis on change,
  human concerns,
  openness;
parental encouragement of
  social criticism,
  curiosity, and
  pursuit of individualism;
emergence of a genuine Peace Movement

COGNITIVE

voluntary acceptance
  of risk inherent in
decision to adhere to
  new culture belief
  systems;
  uncertainty and chance
  characteristics of
  outcome;
  veridical self-perception as "risky";
  possibility of risk
  as a general disposition;
group influence

Rela

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Conceptions of Courage

"0" Initial Involvement

AFFECTIVE

Commitment

adds definitiveness;
defines within adult realm;
irreversibility of decision

Attitude

e.g., "dovish";
held by a minority of population;
a general attitudinal component

Anti-Involvement

Partial commitment;
little need to defend publically;
difficult choice, no commitment condition;
expect bolstering and need for dissonance reduction

total commitment;
public defense necessary;
difficult choice, commitment condition;
expect no bolstering and no need for dissonance reduction;
a cognitive process

Pro-Change

Personality Correlates

e.g., low in Dogmatism and Authoritarianism; a possible External Control orientation

GOALS

abstract in nature;
e.g., change, mutual aid, egalitarianism, international peace, re-structuring of belief system
CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF COURAGE

Although psychological literature indicates the need for a changed conception of courage (Mack, 1969; Markowitz, 1971; Kincaid & Kincaid, 1971), a clearly defined and contemporaneous conception of courage is still conspicuously absent. Concomitant with assertions that courage should be removed from the realm of warfare and the heroic feats therein are studies which attest to the enduring cultural value of heroism (Ermalinski, 1972) and the need to prove one's manhood through personal physical risk (Moore, 1972).

Mack (1969), in his discussion of the "hero", T. E. Lawrence, states: "In Lawrence's case we are concerned with such intangibles as shifting conceptions of heroism" (p. 121). Mack scorns the persistence of the British in glorifying the image of the "romantic hero" (p. 119) as a personally uninvolved and mythically staunch individual. Mack emphasizes the role of important psychological factors in determining resultant heroic action. In Lawrence's case, Mack states that heroism was primarily a function of his need for an increased self-regard. He interprets Lawrence's heroism in psychoanalytic terms as a "displacement" (p. 126). By helping others, Lawrence enhanced his own self-esteem.

Aside from stressing the importance of the personal involvement of an individual, Mack provides no further definitions of heroism. Mack does state definitely that the glory and glamour attached to military heroism is outmoded. Only a vague conception of this "shifting
conception of heroism" (p. 127) is provided. Psychological involvement, responsibility for resultant public actions and the notion that courage may involve ethics are the only clues provided by Mack.

Markowitz (1971) links the need for a new conception of courage to personal integrity, belief systems and the pursuit of peace. He claims that peace is an impossibility as long as men continue to believe that "traits developed in war are desirable and that only in war does man exhibit true courage and deserve the highest medals of honour" (p. 448). He states that the altruistic acts of heroism in war are at best only a public relations stance. Inhumanity to others in war has been aggrandized as an indication of "stamina and conviction" (p. 445). Also, social value has been attached to the masochism of the soldier and the ethics of competition and warfare. Markowitz comments:

Recklessness and compulsive martyrdom are not courage. True courage is based on integrity of belief and on the willingness to be flexible in these beliefs, to expose beliefs to criticism and to change them as necessity requires. Formalized thinking diminishes integrity and in consequence discourages courageous activity. The Yes Man, often praised for courage in warfare, would in many civilian situations be scorned for cowardice. (p. 443-444)

Kincaid and Kincaid (1971) stress the necessity of counselling for the purpose of peace. No counsellor, they claim, would encourage a person to commit murder or suicide. They will, however, still "encourage military enlistment or even advise it as a way of maturing into manhood" (p. 732). Furthermore, they claim that freedom, autonomy, individual identity and self-actualization are abrogated by war and militarism. Counsellors need to change the social attitude which regards pacifists and resisters as "cowards" (p. 734). They recommend that counsellors attempt to present alternative images of man. Courage, bravery and
masculinity should be re-defined outside the realm of war. Healthy human development necessitates co-operation and freedom, not warfare and coercion.

Thus, a new conception of courage would seem to entail several important factors. The changing emphasis on peace as opposed to warfare as a societal value appears to provide the stimulus for a cognitive reassessment of courage and heroism. Attitudes, values and belief systems appear to comprise an important affective component of contemporary courage. Resultant behaviour which is consistent with these new ideals seems to complete the basis for a new conception of courage.

A Basic Explanatory Model

The S-O-R or Contemporary Model

Implicit in the above model of courage is the notion of relative freedom from traditional role definitions and the behavioural expectations inherent in societal norms. Emphasis has shifted away from the specific, prescribed nature of the response evident in the traditional model. Contemporary conceptions of courage stress not the specific nature of the response, but rather, the consistency inherent in this response with one's attitudes, values and/or ideals.

Personal involvement, both cognitive and affective, provides the basis for subsequent action. These components of courage could be viewed as mediating variables. Since Responses which are labelled as "right" or "good" or "heroic" by the majority or ruling strata of society are being challenged, a certain amount of risk is involved in behaviour which is consistent with contemporary ideals. Thus, the cognitive component of courage might be understood within the framework of risk-taking behaviour. Commitment to changing attitudes and the possibility of
personality correlates of contemporary courage comprise the affective component of personal involvement.

The initial stimulus, while still technically external to the individual, no longer suggests the determinism of the traditional model. Rather, it functions as a crucial precipitating factor, a pre-requisite condition for change. The emphasis on personal involvement in the contemporary model and the relative freedom in the subsequent decision-making process precludes the possibility of a socially-prescribed response. The person rather than the external stimulus, determines the response.

A Schematic Summary

S ------------------ O ------------------ R
(external to the individual) (cognitive) (affective) (overt behaviour consistent with attitudes, values and/or ideals)

e.g., war
changing cultural norms

Origin: specific events external to the individual such as American involvement in the Viet Nam war, the emergence of a "Youth Culture" (Keniston, 1965), conceptions of a changing culture (Slater, 1971 - "new" and "old" cultures)

Operational Definitions: actively working towards change in a manner consistent with beliefs e.g., resisting the draft, signing an anti-war petition, joining a protest march, etc.

Thus, implicit in contemporary courage are conceptions of change, consistency and a cognitive re-assessment of one's attitudes, values and ideals. Some risk is inherent in the decision to act. Relative freedom, as opposed to traditional determinism is the defining characteristic of this model.
Contemporary conceptions of courage combine the moral courage of traditional models and the notion of self found in courage and survival into a more comprehensive personal involvement. The narrowly defined ethical dimensions of traditional moral courage now find expression as value commitments to changing attitudes and ideals. The conformity inherent in the traditional model is replaced by the relative freedom of choice between disparate life-styles. Underlying this choice is a cognitive assessment of the existing culture. The decision to risk personal involvement through action completes a definition of contemporary courage.

Cultural Change: The "stimulus" for Personal Involvement

Kincaid & Kincaid (1971) discuss the significant impact of the Viet Nam war. The escalation of the war during the period of 1964-1966, in conjunction with the rise of Black Power which the authors claim forced white activists to concentrate on their own community concerns, produced more than a specific anti-war movement. A genuine peace movement emerged. Public political action was translated into private life-styles and a generalized revolt against society. The emphasis was on "personal morality and individual responsibility, mutual aid and cooperation, ecology and structural decentralization" (p. 732). Young people were demanding an end to all war. Their ideal was international peace.

Markowitz (1971) also comments on the idealism of youth and their striving for peace. In contrast to the older generation, he claims that youth are much more idealistic about the possibilities of peace and cooperative efforts. He states that they insist on taking seriously their search for peace and good will in the world.
The phenomena of activism and student revolt are viewed by Kasin (1971) as being "a tragic waste of good human potential" (p. 49). He discusses the problem of Youth within the context of Sullivan's Interpersonal Theory and his 6 stages of development. Youth's dream of utopias, its striving for a better world and search for human dignity is understood as the desire for "need fulfillment" (p. 57). The permissiveness of liberal, middle class parents as well as encouragement of social criticism, curiosity and the pursuit of interests which support individualism, have left these young people in a type of limbo or unfilled existence. Youth is not viewed as being a distinct stage of development. Rather, Youth is the result of permissiveness in the Childhood Stage.

Youth experiences a conflict between ideals and the need to become adults and fit into society. Underlying this conflict is a state of tension and fear. Conformity to society's norms and amalgamation into the mainstream of society are viewed as necessary and inevitable events. Those who seek to realize ideals of peace are viewed as postponing the inevitable or simply escaping and ignoring their basic fear.

Contemporary courage, if explained within the framework of Sullivan's theory, would be nothing more than a temporary maladjustment. The strivings of young people would merely reflect their basic fear of abandonment by a society which they need in order to fulfil "mutuality needs". Thus, youthful expression of ideals would be rooted in fear and a search for stability, rather than being indicative of courage and the pursuit of change.

Keniston (in Holme, 1971) does attribute to Youth the status of a separate stage of development. Youth have passed through the
adolescent stage of development (e.g., rebellion) but are not prepared to commit themselves to the tasks of adulthood (e.g., marriage and a stable career). Emphasis is placed on commitment to values such as change, and openness. Youth questions the values of society and chooses to remain disengaged from an active and committed involvement with established institutions. Focus is placed on the obvious lack of consistency between value and practice in adult society.

The definite sense of commitment and the ensuing action, consistent with one's values, inherent in contemporary conceptions of courage, suggests that Youth, as a stage of development, is not an adequate explanatory framework. Ambivalence, a psychological characteristic of Youth, gives way to the sense of commitment characteristic of Adulthood. The pursuit of a definite role in life, regardless of whether it conforms to the prescribed roles of the prevailing majority, indicates that one has entered the Adult stage of development.

As soon as a more definite engagement with society occurs—whether this engagement takes the form of a more enduring commitment to revolution and social change, a more enduring acceptance of the existing society, or an intermediate position—youth is over. (Holme, p. 439)

Thus, contemporary courage might be defined as the commitment, in Adulthood, to values and ideals originating in Youth. Youth are allowed, not only the freedom, but the time to seriously question the values and practices of their society. They choose a life-style involving an active commitment towards change. This activism of young Adults may find expression both within the system (e.g., Civil Rights Movement) or outside the system per se (e.g., Peace Movement) (Katz, 1967).

Relevant comments on the characteristics of contemporary youth are found in Slater (The Pursuit of Loneliness, 1971). He states that
youth feel the need to attribute a moral basis to their actions. They are characterized by a "diffuse moral absolutism" (p. 80) and thus render every act the status of a moral act. An "ideological justification" (p. 80) underlies their behaviour.

Slater's distinction between the two cultures extant in America today may serve as an explanatory framework for the emergence and/or existence of contemporary conceptions of courage. The values of cooperation, sharing and equalitarianism which characterize the new culture are taught in early childhood. Children of protective, child-oriented middle-class parents are allowed to preserve these values for a longer period of time than the offspring of working class parents. Furthermore, Slater states: "His intellectual precocity makes it possible for him to integrate them into an ideological system with which he can confront the corrosive, life-abusing tendencies of the old culture" (p. 113). Rather than root this consequence of early childhood training within the rubric of fear and a need to return to the stability of the old, Slater attributes to it the status of a stimulus for future positive change.

For the older generation, adherents of the old culture, the "ultimate moral reference group is the far right - authoritarian, puritanical, punitive, fundamentalist" (p. 98). Middle-class college students, adherents of the new culture, employ as their reference group the New Left. The emphasis for new culture adherents are values such as "equalitarianism, radical democracy, social justice and social commitment" (p. 98). Priorities of the old culture, such as competition, secrecy, a preference for property rights and an emphasis on technology, are reversed by the new culture. The latter value cooperation and openness.
They emphasize personal rights and place considerable value on human needs.

The values to which these opposing cultures are committed and the specific nature of the change their interests are focused on serves to differentiate contemporary conceptions of courage from more traditional notions. Old culture commitments are to stability. Old culture conceptions of change involve technological progress. New culture commitments are to changing norms and life-styles. New culture conceptions of change have an ideological basis. The focus is on changing values, attitudes and modes of human interaction. Thus, commitment, change and consistency alone do not characterize contemporary courage. Rather, it is the specific nature of these characteristics which defines contemporary courage. They have their basis in the new culture Slater describes.¹

Contemporary Courage and Personal Involvement

Cognitive

Risk-taking theories may provide an explanatory framework for the cognitive component of courage. Implicit in definitions of risk is goal-seeking behaviour. Real-life situations invariably involve a choice among various goals. Awareness of the decision-making process and of the differing utilities attached to alternative goals renders the process a cognitive one. Uncertainty as to the probability of success when deciding upon a specific goal defines the decision as risky.

Contemporary conceptions of courage which involve commitment to changing values of the new culture imply the necessity of decision

¹For a further description of the new culture, refer to Keniston, 1965.
making and cognizance of risk. Conformity to the values and roles characteristic of the old culture would appear to involve relatively riskless decisions. Specific behaviours and/or decisions such as becoming established in a career, joining the army, or "settling down" to family life are approved by old culture adherents. The alternatives available are all relatively clear-cut and safe in that they merit definite acceptance by the majority. The decision to continue involvement with the new culture, on the other hand, is a risky one. The probability of succeeding in the old culture sense (i.e., material success) is relatively low. The possibility of rejection along with criminal indictment and/or exile must also be considered. The probability of effectiveness of the individual's actions must be weighed.

The decision to follow the risky course of action inevitably involves some costs. Rejection by the majority of the old culture may however, be offset by the greater self-esteem and sense of autonomy which might accompany action consistent with values of the new culture. Willingness to incur costs such as possible imprisonment or exile rather than compromise one's values suggests that considerable forethought is involved.

Recent studies (Ermalinski, 1972; Moore, 1972) attest to the cultural value of heroism and discuss it within the context of risk-taking behaviour. Ermalinski (1972) investigated the level of risk Ss were willing to take when death was at stake as opposed to the risk Ss were willing to incur when their time, money or effort was at stake. He hypothesized that choosing survival and self-interest over heroism and unselfish behaviour would both invoke guilt and result in Ss
over-compensating on the time–money–effort questionnaire. Results confirmed the hypothesis.

Moore (1972) questioned whether adolescents feel the need to prove their manhood by demonstration of some degree of competence at personal physical risk. In primitive societies, Moore claims, survival was dependent upon physical strength and courage. Manhood was synonymous with the ability to endure pain and the capacity to demonstrate great strength. In modern societies, survival is no longer as dependent upon physical strength and courage. Formal initiation rites involving physical risk are absent. In the absence of such formal *rites de passage* Moore hypothesized that adolescents, by means of the "dare phenomenon" (p. 249) would create their own challenges and initiation rites into adulthood. Results confirmed the hypothesis.

The cultural value of heroism and the definite connection with risk in the above studies suggests that perhaps Brown's risk-as-value hypothesis might serve as an explanatory basis for courage. Brown's hypothesis states that a person usually views himself as being riskier than his peers. When in a group the individual realizes that he is not as risky as he initially perceived himself to be. As a result, he shifts towards the greater risk advocated by the group. When the value expressed by the group is a cautious or conservative one, as opposed to a risky one, the shift should be in the cautious direction.

Ermalinski's study (1972) involving two conflicting values (heroism vs. personal survival) seemed to indicate that caution and self-interest was the preferred value. Although risk was connected to both values, results indicated that the overall preference was for the relatively "cautious" risk. Thus, explaining courage, either traditional or
contemporary, within the context of "risk-as-value" would of necessity have to account for the specific type of courageous action involved. If heroism-as-risk were the preferred value there should have been a greater willingness to risk death as opposed to time, money or effort in Ermalinski's study.

The paper-and-pencil method employed by Ermalinski has definite limitations. One might conjecture that within the context of an actual group situation, where action is necessary, the value of heroism and the risk therein might allow for an explanation of "risk-as-value". Courageous behaviour such as risking one's life for another could be found within the context of altruism. The classic case of Kitty Genovese, however, again illustrates that although risk may be a value, this risk may be limited to monetary or otherwise relatively safe risks. Resorting to the explanation of a group cautious value expressed within that situation would necessitate a very loose definition of "group".

Moore's study (1972) of delinquent and non-delinquent boys and the "dare phenomenon" appears to lend itself better to an interpretation of "risk-as-value". The non-delinquent group most often accepted a dare in order to prove that they were men. Over half of the delinquent group also indicated acceptance of a dare in order to prove they were men. A large percentage, however, also accepted the dare both to experience the thrill and excitement of the risky activity and to be accepted by the gang. Thus, the value placed on courage, and the risk involved therein, does not appear to be a sufficient explanation.

Other studies indicate that stress and conformity may explain risk-taking behaviour. Lieblich (1968), using electrical shock to
create a stress situation, found that both relevant and irrelevant stress situations resulted in greater risk-taking behaviours. The necessity to prove one's manhood, or one's courage, through acceptance of personal physical risk would seem to create a relatively stressful situation. Fulfilling the requirements of manhood through risky, courageous behaviour could just as well be a function of stress.

Conformity may also explain courage in Moore's experiment. Utech and Hoving (1969) found that "conformity to the advice of parents is a decreasing function of age when parents and peers offer conflicting advice" (p. 271). Thus, accepting the dare phenomenon and demonstrating one's courage may be a function of conformity to peer-group norms. Likewise, courage, within the context of risk-taking behaviour, may be explained as being a function of conformity.

The risk inherent in contemporary conceptions of courage involves not only the physical risk of death or injury but also the psychological risk of rejection and uncertainty as to the success of one's efforts. Both risk-as-value hypotheses and conformity interpretations of risk (Castore, Goodrich & Peterson, 1970; Clark & Crockett, 1971; Roberts & Castore, 1972) only partially explain contemporary courage.

The basic values which middle-class college students espouse were initially taught to them by their parents. One could assume that parents, or members of the old culture, still have knowledge of these values (e.g., cooperation) and perhaps practice them at times. Given that these same values are basic to members of the new culture, which in turn provides the stimulus for contemporary courage and the risk of change therein, one could seriously question the relevance of
risk-as-value to real life situations. Only under the broad assumption that parental groups primarily lean towards cautiousness and student groups lean generally towards riskiness is Brown's hypothesis appropriate as an explanation of contemporary courage. Yet, risk-as-value cannot account for the return to traditional commitments made by many students upon graduation.

Conformity, as an explanation of risk and contemporary courage, also is far from adequate. Whereas it might account for college students' participation in for example, anti-war demonstrations, it fails, as did the risk-as-value hypothesis to account for the return of students to old culture values upon completing their education. Roberts and Castore (1972) exposed Ss to prerecorded tapes with various levels of risk and caution. The significant shift toward risk when the tape was oriented towards risk and the shift towards caution with the cautious tape suggested a conformity effect. The significant change toward greater certainty in their decisions after listening to the tapes led the authors to suggest that an internalized attitude change had occurred. One might speculate, with respect to students' return to traditional roles upon graduating, that exposure to the real world and its ethic of competition may have produced another "internalized attitude change". If one were to accept this as an explanation, then mere exposure to the various groups with which we come into contact would result in a continual switching of internalized attitudes. This seems highly unlikely.

Castore, Goodrich and Peterson (1970) also interpreted the risky shift as conformity "or an attitude change motivated by social comparison processes" (p. 322). They found that it was not Ss who
initially perceived themselves as being either Risky or Cautious, but
those who perceived themselves as being the Same as their peers who switched their preferences. The authors argued that those who viewed themselves the Same as their peers may not have relied as heavily on internal standards in making their judgments. Those whose self-perceptions were nonveridical may not have been as committed to their positions as those whose self-perceptions were veridical.

Thus, it might be assumed that conformity explanations may be adequate for those who view themselves as being similar to their college peers. Upon entrance into the world of work they may realize that they are, in actuality, more cautious and traditional than they had thought themselves to be. Those who are initially more militant, and committed to the values of the new culture, and those who perceive themselves as being traditional and committed to old culture values may be veridical in their self-perceptions and hence remain with their respective commitments after college. The presence of risk-related considerations per se do not determine a person's response. Rather, commitment to his position, which is veridical, and reliance on internal as opposed to external standards determine a person's actions. Thus, a veridical self-perception as risky and self-reliant may explain contemporary courage.

Clark and Crockett (1971) also provide support for the conformity or reference group interpretation of the risky shift. While high risk-takers shifted towards the cautious norm, as did initially low-risk-takers, upon hearing the cautious tape, they still managed to remain on the risky side. The author suggested that high-risk takers are less susceptible to group influence than low risk-takers.
The hypothesized greater self-reliance and veridical self-perceptions of Ss as risk-takers in addition to their low susceptibility to the pull of the group could explain contemporary courage. The fact that some small shift towards caution does occur might explain the acceptance of some traditional roles upon leaving college. These may be the less visible adherents of the new culture. They might also be defined as those working towards change "within" the system, as opposed to the activists operating outside the system proper (Katz, 1967).

The risk implicit in contemporary conceptions of courage also involves the aspect of uncertainty. The probability of short or even long-range success of one's efforts is difficult to determine. Actions consistent with values of the new culture (e.g., cooperation and peace) of necessity, possess uncertain outcomes. Contemporary courage involves not merely concrete objectives such as changing laws, but abstract goals such as attitude change and a general re-structuring of the basic values underlying our life-style. Adding to the uncertainty is the questionable amount of time and effort which needs to be expended before and if ideals are to be realized.

Marquis and Reitz (1969) describe "pure risk" as "the situation in which the decision maker knows all possible outcomes and can assign definite probabilities to each outcome" (p. 281). "Uncertainty" is described by the authors as "the situation in which the decision maker is unable to assign definite values to outcomes and/or is unable to assign definite probabilities to each outcome" (p. 281). Life situations, as opposed to the gambling games most often employed in risk-taking experiments, are characterized by uncertainty. The authors constructed problems
involving pure risk, small uncertainty and large uncertainty. The hypothesis that individuals would risk more on the pure risk as opposed to the uncertain items was confirmed.

The uncertainty involved in contemporary courage when viewed in light of the above results may explain the relatively small number of adherents to the ranks of the militants. Individuals may be quite hesitant to stake considerable involvement in activities or life-styles which have dubious probabilities of success or effectiveness. Further results reported by Marquis and Reitz however, state that group involvement significantly increases willingness to take risks on problems involving uncertainty. They speculate that "group discussion not only magnifies expected value, but also achieves clarification (reduction of uncertainty) with a consequent shift to a more risky choice" (p. 288). Thus, the seeming greater involvement of college students with values characteristic of the new culture and their active radicalism may in part be a function of group involvement. Leaving college may result in a dispersion of the group and the consequent shift to a less risky and more traditional life-style.

Higbee and Streufert (1969) note a discrepancy between results obtained in laboratory and real life situations. They report that experimental studies indicate a greater willingness to take risks for Ss who feel that they have control over the outcome of their decisions. Chance orientations, on the other hand, appear to result in a lower willingness to take risks. Higbee and Streufert claim that many real life situations produce opposite results. Individuals in control are less risky than individuals not in control of their environment. They state:
The conditions producing risky decision making in the kinds of real-world situations described above [politics, war, competitive sports] may differ from the psychological laboratory studies in several ways: 1) most such real-world situations involve conflict - the people not in control want to gain control; 2) potential loss and gain is likely to be greater in the real world; 3) there is probably greater personal involvement of the decision makers in the real world (since careers, fortunes, and lives are often at stake); and 4) outcomes of decisions in the real world are more complex, based on interacting multiple determinants rather than on a single determinant (such as the roll of a die). (p. 105)

Higbee and Streufert employed the "tactical negotiations game" (p. 106) in an effort to study risk-taking in a simulated real-life situation. Results indicated that Ss with less control over their environment were significantly riskier than Ss who were in control. The authors studied economic decision-making in their experiment.

Malmuth and Fesbach (1972) investigated the risky shift in a naturalistic setting. They questioned whether the risky shift could be demonstrated in a realistic choice situation where the expected values were not constant. The situation was designed so that choosing the risky alternative was contrary to rational decision making. They found that, contrary to the Individual Condition, decisions of individuals were "riskier from the first trial within the Group Condition" (p. 45). They postulated that the lack of finality and the uncertainty of their individual decisions, coupled with the value of risk may have accounted for the results.

Thus, the uncertainty or "chance" nature of contemporary courage, coupled with the likelihood of a group situation, at least on the level of discussion, may lend itself to interpretation by risk-taking theories. The generality of risk-taking across different situations, however, must be taken into account. All of the studies cited involved
economic risk-taking situations. Contemporary conceptions of courage involve non-economic and abstract conceptions of risk. Values, ideals, attitudes and change are at stake as opposed to money which may be hypothetical or if real, may not belong to the individual. A general disposition towards risk which is valid in various situations is necessary if contemporary courage is to be adequately explained within the framework of risk-taking theory.

Jackson, Hourany and Vidmar (1972) state that although risk-taking is assumed to be a general psychological disposition, and hence generalizable across situations and various types of risk, "attempts to find convergent validity among various risk-taking measures have yielded discouraging results" (p. 483). A number of hypotheses have been generated to explain this lack of generality. The authors suggest that the multi-dimensionality of risk-taking may account for the failure by previous studies to establish positive correlations between various risk-taking measures and objective measures of risk. Most risk-taking studies have concentrated on a single dimension of risk, that of monetary risk taking. The authors hypothesized:

risk-taking may be conceptualized in terms of an hierarchical model. In this model the dimension of risk-taking is a higher order construct with four constituent facets. These facets will be reflected in consistent and to a certain extent independent behaviour across diverse methods of measurement. (p. 487)

Thus, risk-taking may vary across four categories of situations: monetary, physical, ethical and social. Four methods of measurement were developed for each facet: a Self-rating scale, situational dilemmas, Vocational choice and a Personality Scale. Correlational and factor analytic data supported hypothesis cited above. Although four independent
factors were obtained, they were able to isolate a generalized risk-taking factor at the second order.

The above study has implications for future meaningful research concerning courage. Results suggest that we might explain both traditional and contemporary courage within the framework of a general risk-taking disposition. Furthermore, the two types of courage isolated in this paper, traditional and contemporary, appear to correspond with the two facets of risk-taking entitled physical and social, respectively. It might, therefore, be possible, by constructing a multi-trait, multi-method matrix similar to that suggested above, to verify assumptions as to the self-image, behaviour, life-style and personality of individuals who appear to demonstrate a specific form of courage.

The decision-making process and risk inherent in contemporary courage was not adequately explained by risk-as-value or conformity explanations of the risky-shift phenomenon. A theoretical organization of viable explanations of the risky-shift (Vinokur, 1971) concludes that Brown's hypothesis which states that information about others' choices should be sufficient to produce the risky shift, must be rejected. Vinokur claims that the crucial factor responsible for either risky or conservative shifts appears to involve "the flow of information relevant to the issue being decided upon" (p. 236).

The overt decision change, according to cognitive explanations of the risky shift, is a result of "a covert cognitive opinion change" (Vinokur, p. 236). One's cognitive assessment of the situation being evaluated determines the decision change, not the direct influence of the situation per se. Contemporary conceptions of courage, which stress
cognitive assessment of the values of the old culture, appears to be more amenable to an explanation which emphasizes decision making within the context of content assessment. The decision to risk adherence to new culture values and life-styles does not appear to be a result of mere exposure to college reference groups. The shift toward risk, or the active commitment to change, might be a result of the information obtained and the arguments which are generated during discussion of values and ideals with one's peers. Vinokur describes this cognitive hypothesis as "Risk-as-Value Hypothesis: Information Relevant to the Task" (p. 236).

The "Rationality: Expected Value and Subjective Expected Utility Hypotheses" (p. 237) are also postulated by Vinokur as viable explanations of the risky shift. Behavioural decision theory, the basis of this cognitive hypothesis, concerns itself primarily with choices among alternative outcomes. The values and utilities (personal subjective value) placed on outcomes of alternative actions, in addition to the probabilities and subjective probabilities that outcomes will result from a specific course of action, constitute the basic variables in this theory. When subjective average gain is the criterion for choosing an alternative course of action, the subjective probabilities (sp₁) are multiplied by the utilities (u₁). The formula states:

$$SEU = \sum_{i=1}^{n} sp_i u_i$$

Contemporary conceptions of courage could be explained and possibly subjected to experimental research within the context of the Subjective Expected Utility Hypothesis. The above formula could be roughly defined within the framework of choosing the life-style of the
new culture as a preferred action. The basis for making this decision would be the greater SEU of this choice. Although the utilities would be perceived as being quite high, the short term subjective probabilities may be quite low. This, however, might be offset by the long term subjective probabilities. In other words, active adherence to new culture values may not result in immediate positive outcomes. In fact, draft evaders or active civil rights workers may face not only objective negative outcomes but also subjective negative outcomes. The latter may take the form of exile, imprisonment or perhaps assassination. The long range goals and belief that utilities (subjective values) will be realized would increase the subjective probability that their actions will result in the hoped for outcome.

Cognitive hypotheses assume that information exchange is the crucial factor responsible for the risky shift. Interactive hypotheses, on the other hand, stress that interaction among group members is necessary for the shift towards risk to occur. The "Extremity and Influence" (p. 239) hypothesis states that the risky shift is a function of an extreme position taken by a member of the group. Concomitant with this extreme position is greater confidence in his position. The "Commitment-to-Risk" (p. 240) hypothesis argues that the more confident members who take an extreme position are also more committed to their position. This greater sense of commitment may simply be the result of the greater post-decisional dissonance following the decision, based on extensive prior thought, to choose the risky alternative. Conservative shifts are explained by the "influence through commitment hypothesis" (p. 240). Members who prefer the more conservative alternative with a high
probability of success influence those who prefer the risky choice but are not as confident of their decisions.

Although seemingly incompatible, Vinokur claims that together they may explain the risky shift in its full strength. Taking the more extreme position in the group may reflect the level and quality of the information he holds. The more persuasive he feels his arguments are in favour of a certain alternative, the more confident he will be in holding his position. Actually engaging in group discussion should produce the strongest shifts. The less extreme members will have the opportunity to ask direct questions of the more extreme members and thus clarify most points.

Whereas the specific nature of the interaction and information exchange has been theoretically outlined, Vinokur remarks:

So far, nothing has been assumed about the nature of the persuasive arguments. It remains to be seen whether the persuasive arguments are those appealing to cultural values of riskiness and caution in given situations, as Brown's value hypothesis implies, or whether they are merely informational arguments bearing more specifically upon the desirabilities (utilities) of the various possible outcomes in each situation. (p. 245)

Contemporary conceptions of courage, while at once explainable within the framework of the postulated combination of cognitive and interactive hypotheses, may serve to clarify the nature of the persuasive arguments involved. The poor fit of Brown's hypothesis and conformity explanations of contemporary courage suggests that the confidence of activists in their extreme positions and their commitment to new culture life-styles may be based upon a striving to achieve valued goals rather than upon a need to view themselves as similar to their peers.
Affective Commitment. Central to contemporary conceptions of courage is the affective aspect of personal involvement defined as "commitment". Committing oneself to a definite course of action both defines contemporary courage within the adult realm and adds some degree of definitiveness to the decision. The aspect of commitment also serves to further specify the precise nature of one's decision as relatively irreversible. Concomitant with this notion of possible irreversibility is the possibility of post-decisional cognitive dissonance and the necessity of defending one's choice.

Most commitments within the context of contemporary courage, one might assume, are irreversible only in a relative sense. For example, active involvement and adherence to values of the new culture may be only temporary or part-time in nature. Involvement in these activities may not be total in terms of time, effort or life-style. Writing a letter to an M.P., donating spare time to peace movement or civil rights efforts, while necessitating some commitment, is not final and binding. The need to defend publically such involvement may also be minimal.

Other commitments inherent in contemporary courage may involve a more absolute concept of irreversibility. The decision not to obey the draft, for example, could involve permanent exile, a period of imprisonment and/or a heavy monetary fine. Such commitments to active adherence to new culture values often necessitate the public statement and quite probably, defense, of one's decision to the courts and/or family members. One assumption might be that failure to realize one's
goals, in view of having made such a binding commitment, may result in dissonance and the need to justify one's actions.

Watts (1966) studied commitment under conditions of risk. He suggested that a person's perceived estimate of the probability of occurrence of an event was "an important variable mediating the cognitive effects of the decision by determining whether the individual feels a need to defend his prior act" (p. 507). He stated that cognitive dissonance reduction need not occur in the case where a person had made the decision to prepare for an event which, although almost certain to occur, fails to materialize. Regret, anger or frustration would most likely be the result. If a person decides to prepare for an event which is uncertain to occur, and indeed, does not occur, dissonance reduction should follow. Watts stated that the latter is consistent with self-esteem theory and notions of "inadequate justification".

Results (Watts, 1966) indicated that the Main Effect of Choice was significant in the low probability condition. Ss having high choice indicated greater manifestations of dissonance reduction. The second-order interaction involving probability of outcome, choice and obtained outcome was also significant and in the predicted direction. In the dissonant condition (event not occurring) Ss who chose to prepare for the event, in spite of its low probability of occurrence, rated the preparation as less unpleasant than Ss who had no choice.

The risk and uncertainty implicit in contemporary conceptions of courage would seem to justify attributing a relatively low probability to the actual occurrence of the hoped for outcome. The choice to adhere actively to "new" culture values and suffer the consequences of working
towards change may be rated as high. The poor fit of conformity and risk-as-value hypotheses suggests that people are not pulled towards active acceptance of new values and a new life-style involuntarily. The decision to accept the commitment to risk is a rational choice.

The slow process of cultural change suggests that new culture adherents might accept either no change or even small setbacks in their efforts for some time. They might remain fairly committed to their cause, accepting the negative consequences of perhaps exile or imprisonment, for several years without cognitive dissonance. However, with the passage of time, and with new wars starting in various corners of the earth, these individuals may begin to perceive that the hoped for change has not and possibly will never actually occur. Still, they have suffered the rejection and the lowered self-esteem which might accompany imprisonment and exile with a very low probability of amnesty.2

The new culture adherent may begin to feel that all of his time, efforts and hopes have been for naught. He may, as Watts states "perceive that he has made an irrational decision in a rational world... feel foolish or dissonant, and attempt to defend his decision if it comes to naught" (p. 515). The positive acclaim for new culture values, and the expressed dislike by those exiled for war and the United States, may merely be justifications which serve to reduce their state of dissonance.

Studies which examine the effect of commitment warnings on predecision (Mann & Taylor, 1970) and postdecision (Mann, 1971) bolstering suggest that perhaps dissonance reduction is not an entirely adequate

2President Gerald Ford has granted conditional amnesty to American war deserters and draft resisters, September, 1974.
explanation of commitment and contemporary courage. Theoretically, the choice involved in contemporary conceptions of courage has been defined as largely a cognitive process. New culture activists may feel, as Watts states: "that (they have) made a rational decision in an irrational world" (p. 515). Should this be the case, dissonance reduction would not be the result. Rather, simple regret, anger or frustration would be experienced and expressed.

In an objective sense, the probability of the specific outcomes of peace and cooperation occurring may be quite low. The continuance of wars and the competitive ethic may indeed be interpreted as the outcome not being realized. Yet, subjective experience of the probability that the goal one is striving toward will be realized may render the individual's perceptions of his decision as rational. Short-term negative events may not be interpreted by new culture activists as non-occurrence of the outcome.

In relation to contemporary conceptions of courage, the concept of "bolstering" may be employed to determine whether cognitive dissonance reduction as opposed to a rational preference for new culture values is operating. Mann (1971) defines postdecisional bolstering as "a 'spreading apart' in the attractiveness of the alternatives such that the chosen alternative increases in value and the unchosen alternative decreases in value relative to each other" (p. 76). If, under conditions of commitment, bolstering should occur, then one might assume that new culture activists are merely justifying their actions by enhancing the attractiveness of their chosen alternative.

Mann and Taylor (1970) studied the effect of commitment, in combination with choice difficulty, on predecisional processes. The
authors postulated that commitment, which would render a choice as irreversible, may evoke greater sensitivity to the possibility of postdecisional regret. As a result, the alternatives may be more carefully appraised in a rational and unbiased manner. No commitment under difficult choice situations should produce bolstering since the choice is viewed as being reversible. When the choice is easy (that is, alternatives are disparate rather than close in value) then relatively little bolstering should occur regardless of commitment conditions.

The above conditions of commitment/no commitment and easy/difficult choice could readily be employed to describe contemporary courage. Using Mann and Taylor's definition of alternatives being either close or disparate in value and hence defining the subsequent choice as difficult or easy, one might postulate that choosing new as opposed to old culture attitudes and life-style might be termed an "easy" choice situation. The value differences are quite clear-cut (e.g., peace versus war). Commitment to new culture values should, therefore, produce little bolstering.

The previous assumptions made as to relative and absolute irreversibility of commitments within the new culture could provide the basis for a "difficult choice" situation. The decision to follow one particular course of action as opposed to another in the pursuit of one's goals is based on a common set of values, ideals and/or attitudes. The consequences of commitment to one course of action, such as draft resistance, may be considerably more binding and irreversible than the consequences of another alternative, such as participating in a protest march. Choosing the latter alternative might, in view of Mann's definition of commitment as an irreversible choice, be regarded as a "no commitment
condition". In line with Mann and Taylor's predictions, one might expect systematic bolstering to occur in the difficult choice, no commitment condition.

Initial results (Mann & Taylor, 1970) indicated systematic bolstering regardless of commitment under difficult choice conditions. Strengthening the commitment by requiring Ss to publically defend their choice eliminated the bolstering in the difficult choice, commitment condition as predicted by conflict theory. Thus, the different levels of commitment within the new culture life-style might be interpreted within the framework of different pre-decisional processes. In line with risk-taking theories, the more active militants may be the more committed members of the new culture. In line with predictions of conflict theory, these more committed activists may also be basing their decisions on objective cognitive processes as opposed to subjective evaluations.

Mann (1971) examined the effects of a commitment warning on children's decisions. He stated that previous research has revealed postdecisional bolstering in the commitment condition. His study failed to confirm previous predictions. Mann's explanation for the lack of postdecisional bolstering centered upon the possible lack of postdecisional dissonance in the commitment condition. The possibility that the decision may have been binding and irrevocable may have elicited a careful, well-thought out decision. He speculated that noncommitment Ss may have made their decisions in haste and then felt some dissonance, hence motivating them to bolster their decisions. Mann states:

If, indeed, time taken to announce a choice in the commitment condition is devoted to cognitive work aimed at preventing postdecisional dissonance, then subjects with the
longest decision times should be least likely to bolster postdecisionally. (p. 77)

One should expect a negative correlation between time spent in scanning the alternatives and the magnitude of postdecisional dissonance reduction. The correlation between decision time and bolstering ($r = - .28$) supported Mann's expectation (p. < .05). There was no association between time and bolstering in the noncommitment condition.

In relation to contemporary conceptions of courage, one might speculate that commitment to a decision whose consequences are substantial, and perhaps irreversible, is indicative of a well thought out decision. The presence of pre and/or postdecisional bolstering, in combination with the level of commitment to new culture values, may serve to establish a qualitative distinction within the realm of contemporary courage. Those who are merely conforming to their present reference group and are not fully committed may experience dissonance. Their resultant acclaim of new culture values and life-style may simply be a need to justify their actions and thus reduce their dissonance.

Attitude. Inherent in the distinction between the old and new culture has been the notion of attitude change. More specifically, active adherence to the values of the new culture and contemporary conceptions of courage have been examined within the context of a general striving for peace and an attitude of pacifism. The specific nature of the attitude change implicit in contemporary courage may, in part, be explained within the framework of changing attitudes toward war.

Since proponents of the new culture have been described as young, college age persons one might assume that changing attitudes towards pacifism are characteristic primarily of the younger generation.
Public Opinion Polls provide somewhat contradictory evidence. Erskine (1970) claims that opposition to the Vietnam war seems to be more widespread among the older generation. When asked, in October 1969, whether the war was a "mistake", 63% of the respondents aged 50 years and older replied in the affirmative. A somewhat smaller percentage, 58%, of those aged 21-29, also considered the war a mistake (p. 134). The author calls this consideration of war as a mistake a "most inexplicable mystery" (Erskine, 1972, p. 616).

However, when the issue involves active protesting of the war and public acknowledgement of one's position, the differing attitudes of old as opposed to young become more apparent. A Harris survey obtained in November, 1969, revealed that 52% of those under age 35 sympathized with the goals of those actively demonstrating, marching or otherwise protesting the Vietnam War. In contrast, only 28% of those over age 50 sympathized with such active demonstrations of attitude towards the war (Erskine, 1970, p. 134).

A further analysis of 185 poll items, dating from 1936 to late 1970, indicated that the shift towards pacifism is indeed more widespread among the young. Before 1965, the young exceeded the old in pacifism on only 38% of the items. After 1968, the young exceeded the old in pacifism on 75% of the items. Thus, from being -2.3 average points less pacifistic than the old before 1965, the young have moved to a position where after 1968, they were +6.0 percentage points more pacifistic, on the average, than those aged 50 and older (Erskine, 1972, p. 616).

Handberg (1972) compared the answers of college students to items on the pacifism scale developed by Putney and Middleton, obtained
in 1962 and 1972. Results are presented in Table 1. The most extreme pacifistic statements on the scale (questions 2 and 5) were accepted in 1962 by only 6 and 17% respectively. In 1972, 31% as opposed to 6% ten years earlier felt that the U.S. should begin gradual disarmament whether other countries do or not, should disarmament negotiations fail. Also, 49% in 1972 as opposed to 17% ten years earlier, felt that it was contrary to their moral principles to participate in war and the killing of others. A substantial percentage (67% in 1972 as opposed to 31% in 1962) also felt that the real enemy was war and not Communism. Support for pacifism as a practical philosophy also increased.

The over 30 group were less pacifistic on all items than the younger students with the exception of #6 which dealt with pacifism as a practical philosophy. Social science and science majors were more prone to pacifism. Business majors were the least pacifistic.

Handberg suggests that his results, obtained in a very conservative and militaristic section of the United States, are indicative of more than a situational response to the Vietnam war. Rather, a more generalized response which might be called "the Vietnam analogy" (p. 615) may have emerged. He described the essence of this response as being "an aversion to the use of force in international politics at any level, for any reason other than perhaps self-defence" (p. 615).

Opinion Poll results provide general statistics which may aid in further defining contemporary conceptions of courage. The active adherent to new culture values and attitudes is likely to be a member of the young adult age group. The committed activist is also likely to be a student of the social sciences and perhaps belong to the upper class.
### TABLE 1

**Percentage Of Students Who Agree Or Mostly Agree With Items In Pacifism Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items in Pacifism Scale</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The U.S. must be willing to run any risk of war which may be necessary to prevent the spread of Communism</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If disarmament negotiations are not successful, the U.S. should begin a gradual program of unilateral disarmament, i.e., disarm whether other countries do or not</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pacifist demonstrations—picketing missile bases, peace walks, etc.—are harmful to the best interests of the American people.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The U.S. has no moral right to carry its struggle against Communism to the point of risking the destruction of the human race.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. It is contrary to my moral principles to participate in war and the killing of other people.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The real enemy today is no longer Communism but rather war itself.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pacifism is simply not a practical philosophy in the world today.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: (697) (109) (502) (41) (1199) (150)

*Reverse-scoring items on Pacifism Scale.*

*Data Table from Handberg, 1972, p. 612.*
A complete definition of contemporary courage, however, entails commitment to action as well as attitudes. Opinion Poll results indicate that the older generation, although perhaps as pacifistic in attitude, are not nearly as willing to risk or condone active striving for change.

The suggestion that changing attitudes towards pacifism are indicative of a general response to war may also lend some validity to a definition of contemporary courage as the active expression of changing attitudes and life-style. Defining contemporary courage as a situational response to, for example, the Vietnam war, might suggest that active personal involvement would cease with the war. The new culture framework of contemporary courage, with its necessary component of active commitment consistent with its values and attitudes, provides for an ongoing phenomenon which, at least theoretically, should know no temporal boundaries.

Rosenbaum and Rosenbaum (1973) investigated attitude changes of college students for three areas of international conflict. Attitude measure results showed a statistically significant interaction between Age and Issue (p. 168). The most dovish attitudes towards United States involvement in Vietnam were held by those aged 23 and younger. In contrast, students aged 24 and older were least dovish with regards to United States involvement in Vietnam and more dovish than younger students with regards to the Arab-Israel and India-Pakistan conflicts.

Personal importance ratings showed statistically significant Age and Issue main effects. The resolution of international conflicts was of greater importance to younger students. The resolution of the Vietnam conflict was also of greater significance than resolving other
international conflicts. A significant Time main effect, however, suggests an increase in apathy. Regardless of sex, Ss in 1971 rated the issues as being of less personal importance than did Ss in 1969. This might, at first glance, suggest that contemporary courage is indeed situational. With the passing of time, and the official end of the Vietnam war, the importance of war-related issues and the concomitant need felt by young students to actively strive for peace, may disappear.

The significant interaction between Issue and Time lends some support for a general, rather than situational, attitudinal component of contemporary courage. Although Vietnam was perceived as being less important in 1971, the India-Pakistan conflict increased significantly in personal importance. Thus, contemporary conceptions of courage might be defined as the voluntary and active commitment to the general goal of peace in the world. The important factor appears to be the "reluctance on the part of the American college students studied to have the United States involved in any of these areas of international conflict, and that this reluctance has become more pronounced with the passage of time" (Rosenbaum & Rosenbaum, 1973).

Implicit in contemporary conceptions of courage is an active commitment to an attitude of pacifism. Studies which indicate that anti-involvement is the rule do not necessarily fulfil the requirements of this definition. Jones (1970) grouped the 22 items on the Droba Attitude Toward War Scale into four types. Type 1 (4 items) were prowar or militaristic in nature, measuring primarily attitudes towards human engagement in war. Type II (5 items) were antiwar or pacifistic in nature and measured attitudes toward human suffering and personal commitment in
characterized as Authoritarian. New culture proponents question the dictates of authority. They value openness and change. Studies which link degrees of Authoritarianism and Dogmatism to varying attitudes towards war may provide some evidence for personality correlates of contemporary courage.

Karabenick and Wilson (1969) state that Hawks (pro Vietnam War-VW) as well as Doves (anti Vietnam war-AVW) "have been characterized as closed-minded and intolerant toward others not sharing their beliefs" (p. 419). If this were the case, Doves as well as Hawks should not differ in their scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (D-scale). In addition, both Hawks and Doves should score higher on the D-scale than those with more moderate beliefs towards the Vietnam war. To test whether Rokeach's scale was independent of belief systems, the authors constructed and validated a scale measuring Vietnam war attitudes (VW Scale). This VW-scale was correlated with the D-scale.

Results indicate a significant positive correlation between VW- and D-scales (p. 420). Bailes and Guller (1970), in a similar study, also found a small but statistically significant correlation between D and V scales. Thus, open and closed mindedness, as measured by the D-scale, is not unrelated to belief systems as signified by attitudes for and against the Vietnam war. Further results (Karabenick & Wilson, 1969; Bailes & Guller, 1970) indicate that an inverse relationship exists between Dogmatism and opposition towards the Vietnam war. Doves were significantly less dogmatic than both Moderates and Hawks.

Proponents of the new culture might, in view of the above results, be described as possessing cognitive structures characterized by open-mindedness. These low-D persons tend to evaluate information on
war. Type III (7 items) were concerned with theory about war and peace. Type IV was comprised of six miscellaneous items (p. 55-56). Of significance for contemporary courage are changing trends in answers to Type I and Type II items from the 1950's to 1967.

For the militaristic items there was an increase of 14 percent in the direction of pacifism, or nonacceptance of these items. For the pacifistic items there was a decrease of 10 percent in the acceptance of these items. Thus, the changing attitudes toward pacifism appear to stem more so from changing attitudes toward what Ss were against (i.e., militarism) than what Ss were for (i.e., pacifism). The decision not to fight cannot be interpreted as a decision to commit oneself and work for peace.

Contemporary conceptions of courage, in view of Jones' results, might be validly applicable to only a small minority of those who appear to hold pacifistic attitudes. Rather than simply condemning what exists the ranks of the courageous would consist of those actively committed towards positive change. Jones speculated that this "minority may be in its impact greater than its size. In its extreme and activist methods it may attract enough attention from the mass media and from uncommitted youth liking excitement to magnify its force far above its numerical strength" (p. 78).

Personality Correlates

The aspect of personal involvement, both cognitive and affective, has served to distinguish contemporary from traditional conceptions of courage. Underlying the cognitive decision to accept risk and an active commitment towards changing attitudes may be personality correlates of contemporary courage. Old culture adherents have been
the basis of its own merits, rather than its source. Open-mindedness also "implies the capacity to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty until 'sufficient' data are available to justify a conclusion about an issue on more or less intellectual grounds" (Bailes & Guller, 1970).

The above authors also note that Authoritarianism as measured by the F-scale correlates positively with Rokeach's D-scale. Thus, individuals scoring low on the D-scale might also score low on the F-scale and hence not be as responsive to authority. Contemporary conceptions of courage, however, would require that results indicating low F- and D-scores would be applicable to Dovish actions as well as attitudes.

Izzett (1971) obtained both self-report and behavioural measures of attitudes towards and support for the Vietnam war. He hypothesized that students not attending class on the day of the October 15, 1969 Moratorium on the Vietnam war would have significantly lower F-scores than those who did attend class. Paper and pencil attitude measures should also reflect greater anti-VNW attitudes for those not attending class. Results confirm the predictions. Although neither group of students were proponents of the Vietnam war, those who did not attend class on October 16, 1969, expressed significantly stronger disagreement with two out of the three items reflecting pro-war sentiments. Izzett concludes that a lower F-score most likely reflects greater opposition towards the Vietnam war.

Granberg & Corrigan (1972) found that both A and D were inversely related to Dovish attitudes towards and fewer protest actions against the VNW. A significant positive correlation between A and D and between attitudes and actions was obtained for their sample. Results indicated that "higher authoritarianism was significantly related with
more favourable evaluations of U.S. military actions in Vietnam and fewer actions taken in protest against the war" (p. 472). The more stable and pervasive correlations between A and VNW orientations led them to conclude that the D-scale is not as ideologically correlated with VNW attitudes as the A-scale.

The above studies appear to provide some support for a description of the active new culture adherent as significantly more open-minded and less readily accepting of the dictates of traditional authority than the old culture proponent. Yet, to link these characteristics more conclusively to contemporary conceptions of courage would require a more detailed delineation of the type of protest action involved. Those merely supporting a policy of anti-involvement by attending a moratorium would have to be compared to those more active in working towards positive change. One might speculate that those committed towards a course of positive change might represent the lower extreme with respect to A- and D-scale scores. The broad categorization of Doves, in view of contemporary courage, could appropriately be subdivided into "committed" and "uncommitted" Doves.

Granberg and May (1972) investigated the relationship of Internal-External control and orientations towards the Vietnam war. They state that previous research has shown non-violent civil rights workers to be primarily internal whereas violent activists were significantly external in beliefs. They hypothesized that Dovish attitudes and actions should be positively correlated with internal control. Results failed to support the hypothesis. They found "a slight but significant trend... for externality to be positively related to more dovish attitudes (r = .12) and to more protest actions (r = .13). Partialling out attitudes, however,
reduced the externality-protest action correlation to nonsignificance. With protest actions considered as the dependent variable, they found that only four of the eight independent variables ("attitudes toward the war (.39), year in school (.21), authoritarianism (-.20) and religiosity (-.16))" (p. 158) contributed significantly to variations in the dependent variable. Of interest is that I-E control and dogmatism were not significantly related to number of protest actions in their analysis.

Granberg and May conclude that throughout the course of the war the beliefs of those involved in social action may have changed from a position of internality to one of externality. They speculate that internals may be present in the early stages of a reform-oriented movement. The assumption would be that one's efforts would result in positive reinforcement or achievement of desired goals. They speculate that it might be more appropriate to view the I-E control dimension as the dependent rather than an independent variable.

When viewed within the framework of contemporary conceptions of courage, the above results are not at all surprising. Regarding I-E control as a dependent variable would mean that the nature of the situation would determine which belief system would be predominant. Contemporary courage has been defined as social action which is based on a voluntary acceptance of risk. Implicit in this risk is the notion of chance and uncertainty of outcome. On a superficial level, one might interpret contemporary courage within the framework of Internal control. This would be based on the assumption that new culture adherents believe their goals or reinforcements to be directly related to their efforts. The reinforcements involved in contemporary courage, however, are
long-term in nature. Activists striving for positive social change may experience many setbacks and possible negative reinforcements for their efforts. The individual striving for the goals of peace and cooperation among peoples may indeed begin to perceive that his efforts and his reinforcements are unrelated. Such a situation, wherein the realization of one's goals are highly uncertain, may call for an External control orientation.

Heilizer and Cutter (1971) investigated personality correlates of risk-taking. Their data indicated that Ss with External beliefs "take more extreme risks in chance-determined risk-taking than do low I-E Ss - low "externals" or high "internals" (p. 276). In a study investigating risk-taking in Negro and White adults, Lefcourt (1965) notes that Whites behave in an External manner when confronted with a chance (gambling) situation. Whites were less cautious, wagered more money on less probable bets and showed a preference for lower probability choices than Negroes.

One might speculate that the old culture, which values competition and skill orientations as well as the ethic of hard work leading to eventual success, would foster an I-control approach towards life. Striving after values of the new culture, however, no longer involves traditional reinforcements nor socially prescribed modes of obtaining goals. Contemporary courage involves leaving the safety of the old culture and risking failure by choosing short-term low probability outcomes. In the absence of a highly organized and structured new culture, an External control orientation, where luck or fate might determine success, seems most logical. The civil rights movement, which works within the system
proper (Katz, 1967) in striving for concrete success in the form of changing laws, and which has in fact seen some advancement in its goals, might foster an I-control orientation.
ACTION CONSISTENT WITH BELIEFS

A comprehensive explanation of contemporary conceptions of courage necessitates an analysis of its behavioural components. The response or action implicit in contemporary courage has thus far been referred to generally as a form of activism or striving towards goals inherent in the new culture. More specifically, involvement in the peace movement has provided the context within which the behavioural component of contemporary courage has been defined. Action, which completes the definition of contemporary courage, may take many varied forms and could be applicable to concerns other than peace in the world. Active involvement in community action programs, the civil rights movement or political interest groups might also be defined as action components of contemporary courage.

Miller (1970) defined "social activists" as those "spearheading movements to implement liberalized social changes" (p. 94). His study focused on those arrested while actively protesting the Democratic national convention in Chicago, in August 1968. Questionnaire results (N = 107) indicated that activists possess social and political orientations characteristic of the new culture. Ninety-nine percent supported the peace movement, 93 percent supported draft resistance, and 83 percent, the New Left. In terms of nonviolence, 48 percent favoured it as a universally applicable principle, 23 percent felt they would apply it
situationally for themselves, while only 29 percent did not believe in nonviolence. The majority of arrested demonstrators (88 percent) were charged with nonviolent acts.

There remains, however, a noticeable reluctance to explain activism within the framework of adulthood. Miller states that activism, with its unique characteristic of "explicit congruity" (p. 100) can be most readily explained by the newly emergent Youth Culture. Also, lack of commitment to the adult roles of marriage and career allows for "fewer responsibilities and less vulnerability to coercion than the adult, so he is freer to take the risks of activism" (p. 101).

Defining contemporary courage (its behavioural component) within the context of a Youth Culture would not only limit its scope, but would also render it relatively riskless. Public expression of one's beliefs would be safely condoned and tucked away within the boundaries of a new and optional stage of psychosocial development. This would necessitate defining contemporary courage both temporally and spatially within the ranks of high school graduates and college students between the ages 18-30. The broader conception of Slater's "new culture" as one directly opposed to the old, rather than being merely an optional phase in one's development, would seem to allow for a definition of contemporary courage within the adult realm as well.

Miller states that 75 percent of his sample were "youthful" (i.e., between age 18-25). By including high school graduates under age 18, full-time university students aged 26-30, and "a full-time worker with youths (such as a social activist, lawyer, minister or college teacher) between ages 26 and 30" (p. 100) he raised his "youthful"
sample to 82 percent. Seven percent of his sample, however, also listed "social activism" as their career choice. Thus, technically we have activists who, through choice of a career, may be defined as adult adherents of new culture belief systems.

Quinley (1970) indicated that active support of the Vietnam war is also to be found among Protestant ministers. The "new breed" (p. 43) clergymen, neo-orthodox and liberal in religious orientation, stress that salvation is achieved by doing good for others. They appeared to possess "an activist social ethic" (p. 46) and were predominantly "dovish" in their attitudes towards the Vietnam war. Ministers following fundamentalist and conservative schools of religious thought were primarily "hawkish" in their attitudes towards the war.

Results for clergy participation in the Vietnam issue according to position on the war (Quinley, 1970) are presented in Table 2. Consistent with their attitudes, "new breed" clergymen who favoured complete withdrawal from the war were more likely to express publically their views both to the general population and to their parishioners. Whereas almost all ministers had discussed the war with their parishioners and had delivered a prayer before their congregation centering on the war, "doves" were more likely to deliver a sermon on the topic and organize study groups as follow-up. Forty-six percent of the most "dovish" ministers had attended a protest meeting as opposed to only 4 percent of the most "hawkish" ministers. Of those advocating complete withdrawal, 19 percent had participated in an anti-war protest march and 7 percent had risked arrest in anti-war civil disobedience.

Further data indicated that all ministers perceive the attitude of their parishioners to be more "hawkish" than their own. Negative


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Clergy Participation in the Vietnam Issue According To Position on The War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position on the Vietnam War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase Military Efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clergy participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Made a public statement (N = 1,504)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wrote a public official (N = 1,499)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signed a petition (N = 1,499)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Church Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussed with parishioners (N = 1,511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivered a prayer before congregation (N = 1,504)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivered a sermon (N = 1,507)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organized a study group (N = 1,505)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protest Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attended a protest meeting (N = 1,512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joined a peace organization (N = 1,502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in an anti-war protest march (N = 1,511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participated in anti-war civil disobedience (N = 1,508)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Table from Quinley, 1970, p. 48.
sanctions such as verbal reprisals, loss of parishoners' financial support, loss of members and attempts to have them removed from their positions corresponded directly with the "dovishness" of the minister. Of note is the fact that the most "dovish" ministers who were also most active publically (e.g., risking arrest) generated the most active support from some of their parishoners.

A sample of nonstudent demonstrators (N = 91) en route from Chicago to the anti-Vietnam war rally held in Washington, D.C., on October 21, 1967 were among those studied by Morse and Peele (1971). Very high educational levels (84 percent had attended college, graduate or professional school) in combination with varied income levels (a third were earning more than $10,000 and a third less than $5,000 in the previous year) suggests that nonstudent demonstrators could be divided into two groups. The authors speculate that the low income group may be comprised of those who have either dropped out or recently have graduated. The higher income group may be older and better established.

Nonstudents were more radical, politically, than students. Seventy-eight percent of nonstudent males as opposed to 70 percent of student males stated that they would either leave the country or refuse induction rather than serve if drafted. Nonstudents had also participated in more civil rights and Vietnam activities. Coding these activities for radicalism indicated that nonstudents again scored higher on radicalism. Results also indicate that nonstudents feel significantly more alienated from the political system (p. < .001). Although generally possessing a moderate level of optimism for change, nonstudents felt significantly less politically efficacious (p. < .025) than did student demonstrators.
The behavioural component of contemporary courage and the social and/or political activism implicit therein, might allow for an explanation within the context of national role conceptions. Katz (1967) states that one's national roles are latent ones in times of peace. The existence of war, whether or not directly declared by the nation, requires that "the individual must either assume his national roles or leave the system. And there are no places to go save prison or exile" (p. 16). Contemporary conceptions of courage, however, rest on the assumption that, aside from prison or exile, an individual who does not wish to assume the role of "soldier" does have an alternative.

The new culture, by virtue of its separateness and opposition to the established old culture, could be defined as an alternative, though loosely organized, "system". If the notion of voluntary and active adherence to a new culture system is to carry any validity, then some evidence for a changed conception of national role should exist. This should, furthermore, correspond closely with the changing values, attitudes and belief systems of the new culture.

Katz states that there has been a relative decline in symbolic attachment to national roles. Concomitant with this decline has been a rise in normative and functional commitment to national roles. This allows for greater freedom of action and could result in cooperative rather than military solutions in situations where symbolic attachment and the patriotism therein would call for war. These new and more prevalent forms of national role involvement, however, are still explained within and assume continued adherence to the old culture system. Katz merely describes a different attitude individuals may take towards serving in war.
The activism inherent in contemporary conceptions of courage could be defined as a functional involvement with a national role conception characteristic of the new culture. The new culture system demands an ideological commitment to its values (e.g., peace). The functional nature of this commitment translates these values, of necessity, into specific programs of action. Thus, when viewed in terms of a functional commitment, contemporary conceptions of courage cannot be complete without an action component.

Morse and Peele (1971) define "national role" as "an individual's conceptualization of his relationship to the political system" (p. 115). They state that some individuals, and most likely the majority of political activists, are almost continuously conscious of their national role. They involve themselves with political activities, remain informed, and work towards changing policies with which they disagree. In contrast, politically passive or apathetic individuals de-emphasize the aforementioned traits. They stress "buying savings bonds, being law abiding, and volunteering to fight in wars in which the nation is involved" (p. 116).

The above distinction which is made between politically active and passive individuals might be viewed as corresponding with contemporary and traditional conceptions of courage. Thus one might conceive of the new culture activist (both political and social) as being more often consciously aware of his national role.

Evidence that activists' conceptions of their national role is changing and is no longer as tied to the old system is provided by Morse and Peele. Results are presented in Table 3. Although protestors are still functional members of the old system in view of their socio-economic
TABLE 3
Perceived Necessity Scores Of Activists For Selected Components Of National Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Component</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conformity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be law abiding</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>always support current policies of government, although may work to change them if disagree</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support Supreme Court decisions</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Patriotism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be patriotic</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buy U.S. Savings Bonds</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volunteer to fight in war like World War II</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>become angry when people criticize U.S.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be critical in approach to public issues</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be informed about current events</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work to change policies with which disagree</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be involved in political activities</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—Highest possible item score is 6, indicating that the given trait was considered "absolutely necessary".
Other items on this scale were: volunteer to fight in a war like the Korean War, support strikes by labor unions, and refuse to fight in wars of any kind.
N ranges from 371 to 398.

Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 125.
and educational background, their cognitive commitment to the old system indicates otherwise. Table 3 indicates that conformist and patriotic national role components are given low priority by these activists. Political participation, however, is seen as being of primary importance. Their conception of the good citizen is one who is critical, informed and involved in working for positive change.

The behavioural component of contemporary courage appears to be closely linked with the activist's changed national role conception. A comparison group of nonparticipating citizens indicated a greater tendency towards conformity and expression of loyalty in traditional symbolic ways. They were more accepting of demand such as serving in the armed forces, which government could make. Stressed by activists was the individual's right to refuse such demands.

TABLE 4

Protestors' Scores On Functional-Internal Scale Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concern for Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war is undermining many American's faith in their government.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal of conflict is being generated within the U.S.</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concern for People</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The resources used to fight the war are more urgently needed at home.</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American boys are being killed for nothing.</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—Highest possible item score is 6. Zero indicated "not important reason" for opposition, 6 indicated "extremely important reason".

Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 123.
Table 4 shows that activists' concerns are also more directed towards general human interests. They view themselves as being "citizens of the world" (p. 124) and are not as oriented towards a specific national system.

Morse and Peele also provide data which suggests that the refusal of activists to participate in war is predicated both on internationalistic and moral concerns. Answers to questions measuring an internationalistic versus a nationalistic orientation showed a definite skewing towards the internationalism pole. They found that "slightly more than a quarter of the sample (N = 410) (was) at the 80 (percent) or above mark" (p. 122). Opposition to the war because it "is offensive for moral reasons" (p. 123) was rated highest over other functional national or world concerns as shown in Table 5.

**TABLE 5**

Protestors' Scores On Opposition To War Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional-Internal</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional-External</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional-World</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.-Highest possible scale score is 100; N ranges from 391 to 399.

Data Table from Morse and Peele, 1971, p. 123.

In view of the strong leaning towards a general and largely moral concern for the peoples of the world expressed by activists, it might be appropriate to define contemporary courage within an international as opposed to a national role context. The common and most salient feature would be the voluntary decision to accept the risk inherent
in social and/or political activism in an effort to advance new culture belief systems. Subsumed under such a definition would be the active, yet nonviolent resistance or "satyagraha" preached by Ghandi (Feuerlicht, 1965), decisions to resist the draft and accept penitentiary sentences by Americans (e.g., Osborne, 1971), or the social activism of Canadian Dr. Henry Morgentaler in his efforts to legalize abortion (Weekend Magazine, 1974).

Stage 6 of Kohlberg's moral development conceptualization would appear relevant. This stage of moral development, found at the postconventional, autonomous or principled level, concerns itself with universal ethical orientations. Within this stage:

Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles, appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of the human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. (in Holme, p. 307)

New culture activists who strive towards change and oppose the authoritarian dictates of the old culture might be exemplars of Stage 6. Traditional conceptions of courage might be explained within the conventional level of Kohlberg's moral development schemata. The "law and order" orientation (in Holme, p. 307) of Stage 4 with its emphasis on fixed rules and respect for authority appears to characterize nonactivist or more conforming members of the old culture.

Studies which examine draft-resistance, and more specifically, the variable of signing versus not signing an antidraft pledge (their criterion measure of actions consistent with attitudes) provide data which appears to support the definition of contemporary courage developed
in the present paper. An antidraft petition called the "We-Won't-Go" pledge was the criterion measure employed by Janis and Rausch (1970). They found that only a small minority, 2 percent, of the students surveyed (N = 200) had already signed the pledge. Those who were considering taking such action comprised 25 percent of their sample. Names of the signers and the text of the pledge was regularly published in the local newspaper. Thus, signers were aware of the strong personal commitment they were accepting in addition to the serious personal consequences (i.e., 5 years in prison and a $10,000 fine) they were risking.

In spite of admitted feelings of "considerable conflict, anxiety and uncertainty about their decision" (p. 53) 12 of the 62 Ss in the study chose to act publically in a manner consistent with their beliefs. Furthermore, when questioned as to their willingness to participate in other protest actions the authors found a strong significant positive linear relationship (p. < .01) between Ss stand on the antidraft pledge and their willingness to engage in other protest actions. This suggests that activism and engagement in a life-style which demands striving for positive change is not restricted to one specific and isolated event.

Pro and antidraft articles were also presented for Ss to read. A significant main effect for type of article showed higher interests for propledge articles for all Ss. A significant interaction effect between type of article and signers versus nonsigners was also found. Interest ratings did not differ for the propledge articles. For the antipledge articles, however, those opposed to signing the pledge expressed significantly less interest in reading the articles. These results are the reverse of what would be predicted by the selective avoidance hypothesis.
The minority who act in a manner consistent with their beliefs appear more ready to expose themselves to information relevant not only for but also against their position. Among the explanations provided by Janis and Rausch is the possibility that "some important predispositional attribute—such as a personality or ideological variable that makes for marked differences in open-mindedness—might be the underlying determinant both of attitudes toward the We-Won't-Go pledge and readiness to expose oneself to the pro or anti communications" (p. 53).

Cowdry, Keniston and Cabin (1970) defined consistency in their study as "taking public action on one's private antiwar attitudes by signing the MSR (Military Service Resolution)" (p. 522). Their main comparison group was between groups with equally strong antiwar attitudes who either did or did not sign the MSR. They designated these groups as "signers" and "antiwar nonsigners" respectively.

With regards to social change, signers indicated a stronger personal commitment to social action which they hoped would improve American society. Antiwar nonsigners, moderates and pros showed only a moderate commitment to social change. Signers were also more likely than antiwar nonsigners to favour action outside the established social channels in order to effect change. The authors also found signers to be "the most active group in all spheres of political activity—not only in protest activity...but also in constructivist and traditional activity" (p. 539). With regards to draft induction, significantly more signers planned to refuse induction.

In contrast to the sociopolitical activities of signers, moderates and pros showed a significant preference for conformist activities such as being in good standing at Yale and dressing in the "Yale
manner". Future professional plans of signers also indicate less rigid ties to the old culture and its institutions. A significantly greater proportion planned to enter the teaching profession as opposed to the legal, professional and political choices of antiwar nonsigners.

Keniston's 13 alienation scales were also administered to all Ss in the above study. Results indicated that with the exception of cultural alienation, all the remaining scales failed to distinguish significantly between the groups. Cowdry, Keniston and Cabin conclude:

Today's student activists are not alienated in a general way from their fellows, from group involvement, and so on. The high observed correlation between antiwar attitudes and 'cultural alienation' points instead to a more focal rejection of the existing institutions, policies and values of American society...activists are alienated from present American culture. (p. 545)

The above findings, in conjunction with evidence suggesting that not only students but adults are also actively involved in socio-political activities in an effort to change existing policies, adds some validity to the existence of a new culture and the contemporary conception of courage explained therein.
CONCLUSION

An exploratory attempt has been made, in the present thesis, to obtain a more precise and hopefully scientifically useful operational definition of the concept "courage". Such a task has been very descriptively and perhaps aptly referred to as that of "opening a can of worms". Initially, such a conglomeration of definitions was uncovered that courage seemed, at least superficially, to have lost all meaningfulness and definitiveness.

The primary contribution of this thesis has been to isolate the existence of not one but two major and radically different conceptions of courage. These have been termed "Traditional" and "Contemporary" by this author primarily for the purpose of clarity and distinction. Employing the term "traditional" for one conception of courage was not to connote that it was perhaps outdated or obsolete in modern society. Traditional courage was, in fact, found to abound contemporaneously.

Historically and in present times, traditional courage remains a symbol of physical strength and prowess, as well as moral fortitude and perseverance. The highly deterministic nature of traditional courage suggested that conformity theories may serve as an appropriate explanatory framework. Very evident was the notion that one earned the title or label of "courage" through performance of various and almost ritualistic socially prescribed deeds (e.g. valour in battle, honour in sports, perseverance
in hardships).

The highly subjective nature of the many definitions uncovered and their quasi-philosophical basis made analysis on a psychological level (i.e., operational definition) rather difficult. Physical courage it was concluded could most appropriately be examined within a behavioural context as a socially prescribed response to a specified stimulus. The physical courage attributed, for example, to saving a drowning child, suggested also that Altruism may be a potential research framework for traditional courage. Moral courage was found always to be more highly valued than physical courage. This author concluded that moral courage might be researched as an attitude (e.g. optimism in the face of tragedy, perseverance and patience in the face of prejudice).

The conception of a new definition of courage seemed to evolve with the emergence of the "new culture" (Slater, 1971), a genuine Peace Movement (Kincaid and Kincaid, 1971) and the acknowledgement of Youth as a separate stage of psychosocial development (Keniston, in Holme, 1971). These factors were examined in this thesis primarily as stimuli serving to precipitate the need for a new and changed conception of courage. The basic tenets of contemporary courage were found to be in direct contrast to traditional conceptions. Relative freedom of response and personal involvement of the individual, both on a cognitive (risk-taking, rational decision-making) and affective (commitment, changing attitudes) level, replaced the deterministic, non-personally oriented emphasis of traditional courage. Primary emphasis in contemporary courage is no longer on coping with stress in a socially-prescribed fashion in order to merit being called "courageous" or "a man". Rather, action towards positive
change based on a freely chosen cognitive commitment to risk becomes of primary importance.

Contemporary courage has in this thesis been discussed within the framework of a Peace Movement. This, however, must be viewed merely as a frame of reference for isolating possible viable definitional components and providing theoretical support for contemporary courage. Studies of activists (e.g., Morse and Peele, 1971) suggested that their concerns were not limited to one specific realm but were fairly widespread. Any form of social and/or political activism which is directed towards positive and constructive change as opposed to merely voicing privately one's negative opinions (Jones, 1970) was defined in this thesis as characteristic of contemporary courage. A definite commitment placed the courageous action within the Adult realm of experience (in Holme, 1971). Emphasis on moral concerns for humanity and an internationalistic role conception (Morse and Peele, 1971) appeared to support the new culture allegiance of contemporary courage.

The present thesis and the definitional components of contemporary courage outlined therein remain purely theoretical in nature. Further research is required both to empirically assess this author's contentions and hopefully to substantiate and enlarge upon the basic speculations proposed. A new dimension could in the process be added both to risk-taking theories and activism research.
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134


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