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Defence Policy and the Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces: An Analysis

by

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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE REQUIREMENTS

Wilfrid Laurier University

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Abstract

This thesis paper is an analysis of the relationship between defence policy and the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces. While much of the literature and commentary in recent years has centered upon the 'management' aspects of unification, this thesis argues that unification was devised in order to re-assert civilian control and direction over the services. Unification then, affects not only the administration of the services, but also, the 'structuring of influence' between the civilian authority and the defence establishment, which in turn contributes to the method through which defence priorities are determined.

The thesis also examines the congruence between the 'structuring of influence' as it pertains to defence policy and the transition in the policy-making process, which was to become evident as the avenues of political input expanded, differentiated and centralized. To this end, the thesis shall discuss the transition in the policy-making process during the tenure of Prime Ministers Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau in relation to the corresponding re-definition of defence priorities.
Acknowledgements

Although unification of the Canadian Armed Forces has been subject to a great deal of analysis and criticism since its inception in 1963, such research has tended to provide evidence as to the issues and events which ensued, without however, paying sufficient attention to the interpretation of such evidence. The need for such an analysis is particularly acute because the ramifications of unification are still being felt. The Canadian military in recent years has undertaken a concerted search for a professional identity within the parameters prescribed by a re-orientation of defence priorities and by the 'civilianization' of the defence establishment. In more recent months, the introduction of a separate Air Command has clearly presaged de-unification and the return to elemental, that is, land, sea and air command structures. This thesis then, examines unification within the context of defence policy and the policy-making process.

While little effort is expended in an evaluation of unification per se, that is, in terms of its stated objectives, the author's bias is most favourable to unification. While recognizing that unification may not be applicable to considerably larger and more complex military establishments, unification is most
amenable to Canada, given our defence requirements and national objectives.

* * * * *

It is certainly appropriate at this time to express my gratitude to the thesis supervisors: Prof. N. Nyiri, Wilfred Laurier University, the principal supervisor, who introduced me to the theoretical concepts employed within the thesis and who regularly made himself available for discussion and criticism of the thesis as it progressed; Dr. John Gellner, University of Toronto, whose comprehensive insight into Canadian defence problems was an immeasurable asset; Dr. Rod Preece, Wilfred Laurier University, whose expertise in the English language rescued the author on numerous occasions.

J.C.H.
Introduction

The unification controversy which erupted during the tenure of Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence, has created a crisis in Canadian civil-military relations. The severity of the crisis was revealed through the premature 'retirement' of several senior officers, and the outright dismissal of Rear Admiral Landymore(1), for opposition to Mr. Hellyer's agenda for unification. Superficially, the conflict between the Minister and the service chiefs arose because of Mr. Hellyer's proposal, not only to integrate, but to unify the forces, effectively eliminating the separate service branches. The implications of the debate however, had far more serious connotations, because what was fundamentally at issue was the sovereignty of the civilian authority over the military. This obviously did not mean that the military in Canada cherished aspirations to imitate the Seven Days in May(2) syndrome and usurp the constitutional government, but

(1) Landymore was fired because he sought to organize political opposition to unification through actively soliciting support for his views from the Navy. Hellyer argues that since unification already had the approval of Pearson and the Cabinet Defence Committee, Landymore's actions were inexcusable. Interview with Paul Hellyer, August 29, 1975.

(2) Seven Days in May A movie produced during the mid-1960's, in which a U.S. Army general, reminiscent of General Douglas MacArthur, plotted to overthrow the U.S. government because of the indecisiveness of its President.
it did nonetheless indicate that the military had intruded into the policy sector, which Mr. Hellyer considered intolerable and hence, set out to rectify.

Of critical importance is why Mr. Hellyer was so adamant in his refusal to curtail the reorganization process at the integration stage, pursuant to the recommendations of the Glassco Commission(3). Had he done so, he would have avoided the painful schism which inevitably emerged between the government and the military, and in addition, the dismissal of malcontents in the navy need not have occurred.

Integration, to the military, was reluctantly palatable, whereas unification was decidedly not. Even General Foulkes, who had long been a supporter of integration, balked at unification and subsequently became one of its most vociferous opponents. Lieutenant-General Moncel, one of those 'retired', voiced the opinion that Mr. Hellyer; "appeared to be moving on an uncharted course, at very, very high speeds towards a very dim destination."(4) Nevertheless, despite his critics, and a chorus of resentment against the eradication of service traditions, Mr. Hellyer's message was unequivocable: Nelsonianism had belatedly met its


(4) Moncel, Lieutenant-General R.W., "Integration", in Snowy Owl. (Kingston: Canadian Army Staff College, 1965) p. 23.
demise and henceforth the military were to be supplicants to, not protagonists of, government policy.

This research paper examines the relationship between defence policy and the policy-making process during the tenure of the Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau governments. The emphasis is placed upon how defence priorities are defined and to what extent civilian control and direction of the military is effected relative to the transition which has occurred in the policy-making process. The thesis contends that prior to unification, there was a decided absence of civilian control over the military, that defence policy had been surrendered de facto to military influences, and that unification had been imposed by Paul Hellyer to ensure the prerogative of the civilian authority to determine defence policy, a prerogative, which he considered to be in jeopardy. It is also asserted that the changes in defence priorities and in the extent of civilian control are representative of the transition in the policy-making process itself.

Mr. Diefenbaker was unable to extricate himself from the morass created by alliance commitments and equipment purchases which he had inherited from the previous Liberal government because his concept of policy-making would not permit any departure from incrementalism. Because policy-making to Diefenbaker
was personalized, he failed to utilize the sources of policy input which could have been available to him; instead, he preferred to rely upon like-minded political friends. Since one of these was General Pearkes, whom Diefenbaker appointed as Minister of National Defence, the military was to have, in the absence of an authoritative civilian voice, excessive influence in the promulgation of defence policy.

The Pearson years were characterized by the attempt to cultivate new sources of policy initiative and by allowing the input potential of executive policy apparatus to develop; such measures being conducive to innovative rather than incremental policy changes. The implications for defence were revealed through a reconfiguration of defence priorities while at the same time maintaining alliance commitments, and through a determined effort by Paul Hellyer to ensure, by means of unification, that defence policy would have as its genesis government policy, not military policy. Although the measures introduced by Mr. Pearson into the policy-making process and by Mr. Hellyer into defence did not come to fruition until Mr. Trudeau took office, the calamitous events from 1963 to 1968 set the stage for a radical conception of policy planning of which defence policy became an integral part.
The innovations in policy-planning begun under Pearson were expanded and formalized under Prime Minister Trudeau. Many of the previous tenets of policy-making were discarded, and instead the premises of policy were to be based upon 'rational planning' and 'functionalism', rather than 'departmental' objectives. Trudeau launched a strident criticism against the basis of defence planning and insisted upon defence policy being in conformity with the fulfillment of national objectives. As many of the defence priorities Trudeau prescribed were 'civilian' in nature, in co-ordination with other departments, the civilian direction of the Department of National Defence became more apparent.

The thesis will conclude that unification did indeed involve a competition between the civilian authority and the military in the development of Canada's defence policy and that unification was the method through which the government asserted its supremacy. Yet, as time went on de-unification emerged as a detectable sign indicating that after all, civilian supremacy cannot be as total as the government wishes it to be. The degree of civilian control which the Trudeau government sought to effect, namely civilian participation in virtually all aspects of military policy, has in fact led to the breakdown of the unification process.
De-unification illustrates the point that particularly in a technology-orientated society, government cannot hope to know and control everything without jeopardizing the same functions it has sought to expedite or improve. Excessive concentration of authority leads to the deterioration of the roles to be performed, as witnessed by the perceived decline in military professionalism, or, to the failure to recognize the necessity for 'special skills' which cannot be assimilated by a central hierarchy. Such attributes can be most deleterious to the discharging of Canada's defence responsibilities.
Chapter I: Unification and the Policy Process in Canada

(1) Scope and Methodology

To examine the relationship between defence policy and the policy-making process, this research paper employs the typology of policy-making devised by G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin. Doern and Aucoin focus upon the policy-making roles performed by policy organizations at the executive level. These organizations are the Prime Ministers Office (P.M.O.), the Privy Council Office (P.C.O.), the Treasury Board, the Department of Finance and other sources of policy input including advisory councils, White Papers, and Royal Commissions. Doern and Aucoin have concentrated upon the sources of policy input because they express the concern that policy analysts have tended to pay excessive attention to policy 'actors' and policy 'outputs' rather than focusing upon the affect of the policy process itself upon policy, that is, they are ultimately concerned with the 'conversion' of policy inputs into outputs. The implications of Doern and Aucoin's research is that policy cannot be considered simply as the 'allocation of values' but rather that policy is


affected by the characteristics of the structures in which it is developed.

The second and third sections of this chapter then, are devoted to the models of policy-making outlined by Doern and Aucoin and to the typologies of policy-making which they ascribe to Messrs. Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau.

The fourth section in this chapter critically appraises other research and explications of unification. The approach therein is to assess three papers on unification which have largely focused upon the 'integration' aspects or upon the 'rationalization of management'. The paper will also consider other factors such as operational efficacy and nationalism to determine what effect they may have had on the decision to unify the armed forces. In addition, the observations and recommendations of the Glassco Commission shall be cited, particularly with reference to the civilian control and direction of the services.

Implicit to such an appraisal is the recognition that unification has been commented upon extensively in the press, and in both military and academic circles. However, it is the contention of this paper that such analyses, while undoubtedly providing some insight into the complexities of unification, do not provide a satisfactory explanation of it. Nor do operational
efficacy or nationalism provide appropriate categories for examination, although they may have been contributory factors. Even the Glassco Commission's recommendations were predicated on integration.

The Glassco Commission however, did touch upon a very significant point, that of civilian control. The issue of civilian control and the Canadian experience with it remain critical to an understanding of unification. Civilian control, which is discussed in sections five and six, has had a particularly unflattering legacy in Canada since the Second World War, and it becomes of paramount importance in an age of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems. It is the purpose then, of these sections to establish that there have been in fact, many precedents to illustrate that civilian control over the Canadian military is something less than inviolable.

Having examined the evidence to support the thesis that civilian control had been impaired by the military, Chapters II, III and IV will analyse the relationship between defence policy and the policy-making process in the Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau governments, respectively.
The neglect of the conversion stage in policy analysis is attributed, according to Doern and Aucoin, to the assimilation of research methods which are more readily applicable to American political institutions. The incongruity of such American models for the Canadian policy process is made evident through the comparison of the President and his non-elected advisors and the policy role of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. In addition, the American policy system exhibits a 'greater visibility of conflict' due to the early differentiation of roles brought about by the constitutional separation of power.

(3) As a consequence, the American policy analyst perceives policy through 'decision-making' models subject to the vagaries of pluralism. Because of such ambiguities between Canadian and American political systems, Doern and Aucoin set out to critically examine the shortcomings of such theoretical constructs in order to emphasize the need to study the 'conversion' process.

Charles Lindblom's 'disjointed incrementalist' model seeks to describe how policy actors 'muddle through' a number of incrementally different policy alternatives, while at the same time failing to relate

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various policy types to one another. By way of example, defence policy would be derived from prior commitments without necessarily attempting to relate such policy to the requirements of foreign policy. Such a model however, does not allow for the value assumptions of a particular policy to be questioned, thus fostering conservatism, nor does the model account for innovative policy. Policy is therefore seen as an attempt to "alleviate disruptions in the social and political system without promoting a 'fundamental' value change."(4)

Since the incrementalist model does not account for innovative policy, and the rationlist model is 'highly prescriptive', that is, policy-makers proceed in sequential steps to rank and evaluate both quantitative and qualitative alternatives, the 'mixed scanning' model of Amitai Etzioni is seen to incorporate aspects of both models. He suggests that the policy-maker will 'scan' alternatives when the 'incrementalist' approach is not satisfactory. This 'scanning of alternatives' implies a search for 'fundamental' policy changes through the ranking of high priority items, the choice of alternatives being even more circumscribed than those of the rationalist model.(5)

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As opposed to first examining the policy process and then the policy outputs, Theodore Lowi argues that the outputs of policy must first be categorized as to type, and then related back to policy processes, that is, differing types of policy correspond to different policy-making scenarios. 'Distributive' policies are those directed to particular groups which are not in competition with others for the allocation of resources. This typology of policy-making is labelled 'mutual non-interference' (and could just as easily be called pork-barrelling) and would include such items as the awarding of government contracts, tax concessions or government grants. Distributive policy then is carried out between relatively few policy actors and a particular interest group. 'Regulatory' policy refers to policy through which through the allocation of resources would 'indulge' one group and deprive another. This would correspond to the 'pluralist' conception of competing group interests whereby policy becomes 'the residue of group conflict'. 'Redistributive' policy is similar to the regulatory type but in this instance concerns broad social issues or class issues, requiring relatively permanent coalitions and the participation of large social or political groups in the policy-making process.(6)

The significance of Doern and Aucoin's analysis of policy-making models is that those models which concentrate on decision-making, that is, the 'disjoined incrementalist' and the 'mixed scanning' models, cannot account for the actual nor unintended policy outputs, nor for the perceptions of the policy-makers on policy outputs. The 'rationalist' approach, emphasizing 'pre-decision-making' factors; "explicate the logical sequences that should occur and by so doing...establish a strategy for approaching policy problems".(7) Policy-making is thus reducible to a 'micro' concept focusing upon 'decision'. This is of course unacceptable to Doern and Aucoin because such conceptualizations do not account, nor attempt to account, for policy-making being anything other than a dependent variable. They do recognize however, that Lowi's work, through developing a relationship between substantive policy and policy-making, at least releases policy from its dependence upon decision. To Lowi, policy-making is a micro concept which results from the 'coercive' aspect of politics, and therefore policy becomes 'something other than undefined outputs differentiated only by subject matter.'(8)

Doern and Aucoin's departure from Lowi's typology commences by suggesting that not all policy is of the 'distributive', 'regulatory' or 'redistributive' type; rather, that an analysis of policy-making must include a consideration of the 'conversion' process which policy must pass through prior to becoming a policy output. Policy-making analysis then, must examine not only substantive policy but 'positional' policy as well.

"Positional, as opposed to allocative, policies refer to those outputs which affect the structuring of influence in the conversion system. A good deal of policy activity by individuals and groups is related not so much to securing (at least in the short run) an allocation of desired values but rather the attainment of desired positions vis-à-vis other individuals or groups. What is sought is a share of the coercive abilities of the government." (9)

This does not imply that 'allocative' and 'positional' policies occur independently of one another, rather that positional policies often determine the outputs of allocative policy. As positional policy affects the "structuring of influence", "coercion" as pointed out by Lowi, becomes an integral "characteristic

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(9) Ibid. p. 25.
of those policies emanating from government structures."(10)

(3) **Policy-Making Structures**

Having established the validity of positional policy for policy analysis, Doern and Aucoin proceed to examine the characteristics of policy-making structures in the Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau governments. They contend that the preponderance of positional policy, characteristic of the Trudeau period, has not been an abrupt change in the policy process but rather that there has been a gradual transition which has occurred concomitantly with innovative policy and programme management, as opposed simply to incremental policy changes. Doern and Aucoin hasten to point out however, that while the functions performed by the Prime Minister's Office, the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board and the Department of Finance have expanded and differentiated, the roles of such executive policy organs have not in themselves altered to a significant extent. The transition in the policy process is indicated by the expansion, differentiation and bureaucratization of the roles performed by these offices in policy development.(11)

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The roles performed by the executive organs of policy-making during the Diefenbaker government have been categorized as 'fused', 'passive' and 'personalized'. The 'fused' aspect was a carry-over from the MacKenzie-King period in that policy roles were largely accomplished by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, who was also the Chairman of the Treasury Board. The Prime Minister's Office was largely confined to housekeeping tasks for the Prime Minister, although to the extent that these partisan logistic activities affected some policy, a P.M.O. "policy" role can be said to have been evident. (12) The Privy Council Office played a relatively "passive" function because staff shortages necessitated that their activities be relegated to co-ordination and secretarial roles in the service of the Cabinet. Nonetheless, from time to time, the Secretary to the Privy Council Office was consulted on policy matters, if only infrequently. The 'personalized' nature of policy development was evidenced by the relationship between Mr. Diefenbaker and R.B. Bryce as Secretary to the Cabinet. Bryce is described as a 'one man administrative gang' (13) who enjoyed the flexibility and fusion of policy roles, which characterized the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy

Council Office. Bryce's position was implemented by the strongly control-oriented approach of the Deputy Minister of Finance. Thus financial matters were; "not backed by the hand of fiscal philosophy that would produce active initiative..."(14)

The Pearson era witnessed the 'structural differentiation' of policy-making organs. The separation of the Treasury Board from the Department of Finance, the addition of Tom Kent as Mr. Pearson's policy adviser, and the introduction of the committee system in the Privy Council Office, were a reflection of the new managerial techniques advocated by the Glassco Commission. The Pearson government also introduced the Science Secretariat and the Special Planning Secretariat into the Privy Council Office to deal with policy reviews and innovative social policy. The significance of such structural changes resulting in increased differentiation and specialization of policy inputs was that such positional policies laid the groundwork for the programming, planning and budgeting (P.P.B.S.)(15) approach of the Trudeau government.

The role of policy-making organs in the Trudeau government is viewed by Doern and Aucoin as differentiated,

(14) Ibid. p. 44.
bureaucratized and active. Such a characterization emerges because of the rapid absorption of policy advisors into the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office. During Mr. Diefenbaker's tenure in office and, to a lesser extent, during that of Mr. Pearson, policy matters were brought to a full Cabinet, whereas under Mr. Trudeau, the Cabinet is presented with policy which has already been subject to scrutiny by one of the sub-committees appended to the Privy Council Office. Furthermore, the introduction of policy specialists, under Pearson, has matured into a P.P.B.S. system under Trudeau.

(4) Unification of the Armed Forces: Reasons

As stated in the introductory chapter, the issues of unification have been dissected from numerous sources, yet the greater proportion of such research has failed to provide a satisfactory justification for unification, at least within the context in which it occurred. The survey research conducted by Roddick Byers(16) is however, a notable and illuminating exception to this trend. Byers has focused upon the perceptions of

civilian control held by senior military officers and has documented Mr. Hellyer's trepidation as to the reality of civilian control. By and large however, both proponents and adversaries of unification have tended to concentrate upon essentially the same issues; military efficiency, cost-effectiveness and service tradition. The intention of this section therefore is critically to examine such arguments in order to determine whether such explications are a sufficient rationale for unification.

(a) Allan, Kronenberg, Sherman

Gordon Allan's thesis, The Bending of the Sword (17) is, as the title would indicate, very much opposed to unification. Allan, while developing a history of the structure of the Canadian forces from Militia days, relies predominately upon the papers, unpublished manuscripts, parliamentary testimony and interviews with General Charles Foulkes. This undoubtedly would explain, to some extent, the fact that Allan's thesis is generally consonant with the views held by General Foulkes, particularly with reference to the endemic frailties of a tri-service organization, but nonetheless rejecting unification as the panacea for such difficulties. In delineating his thesis, however,

Allan adheres to the criticisms of unification in the U.S. offered by Samuel Huntington that:

"Experts in military organization, often argued that 'unification' required either the merger of the four services into a single uniform or the abolition of the service and the organization of the Pentagon on a purely functional basis. The former proposal however, was blindly utopian in rejecting the inevitability of pluralism, and conceivably the latter could intensify conflict to the point where it was unbearable."(18)

Curiously, Allan appears not to have recognized that Huntington was referring, not to 'unification' but to 'integration' in accordance with the U.S. Reorganization Act of 1958. The unification to which the American forces objected to so strenuously was not so much a disagreement as regards policy-making among the defence establishment, as it was a rejection of the service priorities and resource allocations dictated by the civilian administration. Unification in the American context then, was perceived as an infringement by the civilian authority upon the military's ability to determine its own priorities according to separate service requirements. Huntington further commented in a seeming lament for pluralism and the demise of cherished traditions that:

"Organizational permanence is the partner of strategic flexibility...that the castles of the services, like many of their medieval counterparts, will remain in existence, battered but unshaken, long after the decisive battles, both political and military, have shifted to other fields."(19)

Vernon Kronenberg's paper *All Together Now*(20) is not so preoccupied as is Mr. Allan's, with the precursors to unification, but rather is concerned, and quite justifiably, with pre-judgments of unification that were predicated upon previous attempts at integration among support services. The failings of integration among support services were used as evidence to argue against unification. This was pursued however, without giving sufficient recognition to the varying contexts and requirements of headquarters, field and support personnel.(21)

Kronenberg's purpose was not to evaluate unification *per se* but to consider the basic issues involved and to trace the evolution of the programme at the headquarters level. In so doing, he has noted that

unification has proceeded through three distinct stages; integration, functional command and unification. The elimination of the separate service chiefs, the establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff and the integration of support organizations resulted in force integration, but the question remained as to how the commands would become operational.

'Functional' command(22) was originally introduced into the services, but because Canada possessed relatively few military personnel to protect an immense territory, functional command was necessarily tempered with geographical considerations. Interestingly enough, the nature of the functional-geographical debate gave rise to disagreement among the land, sea and air elements as to their particular requirements. The army's position was that neither a strictly functional nor regional command structure was appropriate and therefore sought a compromise solution. Later however, they preferred functional command while allowing certain regional modifications, for example, control over militia contingents. The Royal Canadian Air Force (R.C.A.F.) insisted upon strict functional command because they felt that geographical organization under

(22) Functional command refers to a task-orientation of service roles, which may combine all three service elements under a single hierarchy.
a single commander responsible for all services would hamper flexibility and be economically deleterious. The navy appeared unusually quiet throughout these events, presumably content in the knowledge that Maritime Command would remain relatively unmolested. After several changes in organization, the eleven service commands were reduced to six functional commands, and the NATO contingents brought directly under headquarters. (23)

Those who opposed unification were seen by Kronenberg as belonging to one of two groups. The 'traditionalists' bemoaned the loss of their identity and their uniforms which, so it was said, would make them the laughing stock and 'virtual pariahs' (24) in naval circles. They also argued that this arrangement would prove difficult during combined allied operations. Those who presented their case from the strategic point of view however, could make a solid case against unification in that operational roles (management, logistics, training and actual combat) among the services have distinct characteristics. Kronenberg correctly states however, that such arguments:

"were largely beside the point...The aim of unification was not to sweep aside these facts of operational life, but to

(23) Ibid. pp. 68-70
(24) Ibid. p. 81."
organize the forces so that operations could come under unitary control." (25)

Michael Sherman, currently with the Hudson Institute, has critically examined unification relative to its espoused aims in 1964. Sherman states that while the integration phase has undoubtedly produced economic advantages, Hellyer's much heralded 25 per cent budget allotment for new capital equipment fell short of its objectives. In addition, he questioned the wisdom of administrative efficiency which posited the Chief of Defence Staff as the sole, formal military channel to the Minister. In essence, however, Sherman's appraisal of the integration phase is positive, but he retains misgivings about unification, citing the concerns of senior staff about the pace at which unification was being pursued. Through the examination of Canada's defence commitments, Sherman argues that the benefits of integration are themselves sufficient and that unification is unnecessary and possibly damaging to the services. He concludes that:

"the single-service conclusion would seem to follow only if the nation's military responsibilities were so specialized that all fighting elements were related to all others...some combat functions will have as little to do with others, as say, anti-submarine warfare and peacekeeping." (26)

(25) Ibid. p. 80.

The difficulty with the fore-mentioned studies is that they concentrate almost exclusively upon unification, its merits and demerits, in the absence of perceiving unification as a part of the political process; it is therefore necessary to explore other factors which may have influenced unification.

(b) **Operational Effectiveness**

While the detractors of unification have argued that the elimination of the three services has had undesirable effects, there is nonetheless, agreement that 'combined operations' composed of land, sea and air elements, are fundamental to modern military strategy. Unification would as a consequence, bring about equipment standardization and 'support' service integration. These factors would uphold the thesis that modern 'conventional' warfare is indivisible and that it is both anachronistic and redundant to allow for the existence of three services, at least, at the headquarters level. It could therefore be reasoned that unification, not just integration,\(^{(27)}\) would be the only logical conclusion. John Gellner has stated that the separation

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\(^{(27)}\) Integration unifies the services at the Chiefs of Staff level while retaining separate services; unification merges the services into one unit having a single hierarchy throughout the command structure.
of service elements was self-defeating beginning with the advent of steam power. (28)

"There can be little doubt that theoretically one service is best. It is also the obvious solution because the historical reasons that did exist for a division have either disappeared, as in the case of the separation of sea and land warfare, or have never been valid, as is the separation of air from sea and land warfare." (29)

The concern of Canadian officers over the condition of the armed forces after World War II and over management by committee was exemplified by the scathing criticisms of Major-General W.H.S. Macklin:

"Canada's armed forces are completely uncoordinated and incapable of providing this country with an adequate defence. The overall defence organization is chaotic. The armed forces cannot act in any operation of war, there is no policy or plan to use them in combination." (30)

Citing the reorganization of the Canadian forces in 1946, Major-General Macklin stated that:

"the principle of unity of direction was thrown out with the garbage. The dead weight of outworn sentiment masquerading as tradition, and the influences of vested interests within the services

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and in the civil service and industry carried the field."(31)

In 1958, an editorial in the Halifax Chronicle Herald summed up the issue of committee rule fairly well:

"there must be one military man who wields absolute military authority. Co-operation works only when there exists a competent commander willing to knock the heads together of those who do not co-operate."(32)

There were thus sound military reasons for unification or, at least for the abolition of the totally unwieldy committee system, which integration would accomplish. Many officers of course, recalling the difficulties incurred through previous integration attempts were reluctant to pursue with unification but the adherents of unification replied with the observation that:

"integration has been tried before and has not worked. Co-operation has been continually called for, but so many examples exist of attempts at integration failing that the obvious conclusion is that it is a delusion... What is called for is a formal marriage... the centrifugal influence apparent in all members of a group of sister services


sooner or later to the collapse of attempts at integration" (33)

(c) (Nationalism)

Canadian resistance to domination by Imperial fiat has left an indelible imprint on the seemingly relentless Canadian passion for affirming her identity. In a military context, nationalist aspirations became particularly acute in two situations, the Army of Occupation in Europe, and the Suez crisis.

As early as 1943, the Canadian government was approached by the British as to Canada's participation in the post-war settlement and policing duties. External Affairs insisted that Canadian participation be linked directly to a voice in post-war decision-making. It was felt that Canada's participation should depend not only upon her potential role in occupation but also upon her actual contribution to the defeat of Germany. The opinion of the British was expressed by Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington, that contrary to Canadian

desires, Commonwealth policy must be a policy of unity. (34)

Prime Minister Mackenzie King sharply disagreed with Lord Halifax, asserting that his statements came:

"like a shot out of the blue, like a conspiracy on the part of the imperialists to win their own victory in the middle of the war." (35)

Mackenzie King strongly urged that colonial policy be replaced by 'functionalism' through which:

"those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance of peace should be most frequently selected for positions on international organization." (36)

General MacNaughton, the Minister of National Defence, emphatically supported Mackenzie King in his opposition to Canadian troops being used as a colonial force. Such support as General MacNaughton's was widespread, including that of the Canadian Institute of International

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(34) Kasurak, P.C. "Pawn in the Game of National Politics: Origins and Fortunes of the Canadian Army Occupation Force 1943-1946" in Canadian Defence Quarterly (Toronto: Defence Publications Ltd., 1975). Fall 1975. No page references are available since the quotations were taken from the publisher's galley sheets. Kasurak's article will be published in October, 1975. This applies to footnotes 34-38.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Ibid.
Affairs and Lester B. Pearson, who stated in reference to Canadian control of defence and foreign policy that:

"in fact...we have no such powers and so far as policy and planning in this war are concerned, our status is little better than that of a colony."(37)

Canada's aspirations continued to be rebuffed at the San Francisco Conference and at the United Nations Commission for Europe. Field Marshall Montgomery's statement that a Canadian brigade could serve as Commonwealth 'window dressing'(38) hardly served to popularize pro-British sentiment. Canadian troops were subsequently returned to Canada.

The Suez crisis provided a second strident example of Britain's refusal to acknowledge nationalist sentiment in Canada. The British and French had simultaneously informed their allies of their intention to issue an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, meanwhile the ultimatum itself had already been delivered. The invasion which followed shortly thereafter created an embittered response from Canada. As James Eayrs has indicated, Britain did neither inform nor consult with her allies because:

"to invite such opinion would be to invite disapproval so stern as to

(37) Ibid.
(38) Ibid.
make it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out the policy". (39)

While stated government response was not nearly so vociferous as might be anticipated, Mr. Pearson stressed that, Canada was not, "a colonial chore-boy running around shouting ready, Aye ready." (40)

Further embarrassment for Canada, and particularly for Mr. Pearson, occurred when the Canadian contingent for the United Nations Emergency Force was rejected by the Egyptians. They apparently were perplexed as to the reason why the Queen's Own Rifles were replacing the Queen's own troops in Suez. As Pearson has noted, however, the Queen's Own Rifles were the only choice because:

"it appeared that our only alternative to the regiment in question was The Black Watch! What we needed was the First East Kootenay Anti-Imperialistic Rifles." (41)

The significance of the Suez crisis for unification was that, firstly, the identification of the Queen's Own Rifles as 'British' troops by the Egyptians was humiliating to Pearson, under whose administration unification eventually came about. As Galloway has

(40) Ibid. p. 185.
observed:

"Lester Pearson's offer was rejected, and in this rejection was born the idea of a need for a Canadian military machine which would be unmistakably Canadian."(42)

Secondly, Suez signalled the end of the anachronistic concept of 'colonial troops' as Canada sought to define her own defence priorities, that is:

"the Pearson vision of a highly mobile group of Canadian peacekeepers cracking around the world like Superman."(43)

Thirdly, Suez demonstrated that if Canada was to have such a highly mobile force, the three services could not hope to accomplish the task.(44) Furthermore, it has been argued by Richard Ross that indeed the desire for a highly mobile force was Hellyer's fundamental intent in unification as well as rendering the forces less likely to be 'appendaged' by the British.(45)

(d) The Glassco Commission

The Glassco Commission was the catalyst for the reorganization of the Canadian forces. It revealed, in


(43) Ibid. p. 290.

(44) Ibid. p. 290.

addition to a reappraisal of Canada's defence commitments, three areas of concern, (a) the ratio of manpower to equipment purchases, (b) the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and (c) civilian control over the services. Consequently, it provided for the forthcoming White Paper on Defence under the directorship of Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence.

For several years prior to 1963, Canada had been able to maintain a virtual ceiling on defence expenditures, however, this had been accomplished through the adjustment of manpower to equipment purchases. It was observed that if this trend continued, by the late 1960's all of the defence budget would be absorbed by manpower costs alone. As Air Marshal Sharp pointed out:

"Unless something was done we would price ourselves out of existence."(46)

The Glassco Commission therefore sought to reduce expenditures in manpower. It was recognized that since Canadian defence commitments were linked operationally to collective security measures, and would hence be under control of these commands (SACLANT, SACEUR, NATO), the situation would be that:

"the principal function of the headquarters organization...(would be) one of support

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rather than operational command; to direct and regulate the manning, training, arming, supplying and accommodating the Armed Forces." (47)

While the commissioners recognized that the forms of support activity would vary among the services, they also realized that the growth of technology common to all three services made division among support services redundant. (48) In research and development also, the commissioners reported that:

"In this area, as in many others, the traditional independence of the three services gives rise to duplication and waste." (49)

The Glassco Commission found serious fault with the organization of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) and with the severely circumscribed role of its Chairman (CCOS). The C.S.C. was governed by unanimous decision since proposals were not voted upon, nor did the C.C.O.S. have any overriding authority. Hence:

"the effectiveness of the Chiefs of Staff Committee is, to a large extent, dependent on the personal qualities of its members, each of whom has a virtual veto in its deliberations." (50)

Decision-making was further complicated by the fact there already existed 200 standing tri-service committees and

(48) Ibid. p. 66.
(49) Ibid. pp. 67-68.
(50) Ibid. p. 70.
approximately 400 committees of a temporary, task-oriented nature. The Glassco Commission quite correctly stated that the committee system:

"permits procrastination, and the absence of a single commanding voice may spell the difference between success or failure in any matter of joint concern to the three services."(51)

In reference to the C.C.O.S., the commissioners recognized that if executive authority were placed squarely on the shoulders of the C.C.O.S., there was the possibility of 'excessive concentration' of authority within his advisory task. This could have had dangerous implications in light of the C.C.O.S.'s responsibility as the Canadian representative to N.A.T.O., as chairman of the Ranks Structure Committee, and as a member of the Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence and the Cabinet Defence Committee. Nonetheless, the C.C.O.S.'s lack of authority was viewed as an explicit liability in his functions pertaining to the coordination of training and operations conducted by the services.

Under such conditions, each service chief was responsible for the control and administration of his service branch; thus, the C.C.O.S.'s only resort was his persuasiveness with the service chief involved or, failing this, his influence with the Minister.(52)

(51) Ibid. p. 70.
(52) Ibid. p. 73.
The third aspect of the commissioners study to be found wanting, was in relationship to the role of the Deputy Minister and the extent of civilian control. While a Minister's powers enable him to delegate whatever authority to his Deputy as he may desire, established practice, since the Deputy is not accountable to the House, is that the Deputy Minister's will 'affect' the carrying through of established policy, during the course of which he may exercise his discretion. This meant that the Deputy Minister's role in policy development was very limited by virtue of the fact that necessary manpower was not available to adequately assess proposals submitted to his office. The Glassco Commission concluded that the role of the Deputy Minister be expanded, so as to assist the Minister and participate more actively in the administration of the armed forces. As indicated by the Glassco Commission, the absence of such civilian advice imperilled civilian control.

"The Minister may rely primarily on the Chiefs of Staff Committee for advice and on questions of military effectiveness it is natural that he should do so; but the military character of this group raises doubts as to the reality of civilian control if the minister places excessive reliance upon it. There is a need for a strong staff group which is essentially civilian in character, outside the framework of management of the Armed Forces." (53)

(53) Ibid. p. 76.
Because of the sprawling complexity of administration and the plethora of committees within the Ministry, the Glassco Commission also noted that the multiplicity of channels to the Minister meant that it was an extraordinarily difficult task to exercise effective control over the services. It was therefore implicit in the commissioner's recommendations that an essentially civilian organization, through the Deputy Minister's office, be available to ensure such control over administration policy.

Undoubtedly, the growth of nationalism and the concommitant rejection of colonial fiats, the imbalance between manpower and equipment costs, the multifarious organizational iniquities of the tri-service system and the necessity for operational efficacy were all contributory justifications for the reorganization of the Department of National Defence; but were they sufficient justification to proceed with unification? Operational efficacy, while it was argued that unification was the irrevocable corollary to integration, may well have suffered because of the schism produced between the military and the civilian authority. The high cost of manpower relative to the resources available for new equipment could have been adumbrated through more stringent procurement and accounting procedures or by
further attempts at logistics integration.\(^{(54)}\) The nationalist aspect, could surely have been appeased by far less controversial measures, perhaps by emphasizing the realignment of defence priorities and the global peacekeeper role. The Glassco Commission's findings, provided not so much a rationale for unification as they did for integration. The commissioners had indeed explicitly rejected unification because of the diversity of operational roles.\(^{(55)}\) If such explanations are unsatisfactory, what then, of civilian control?

\(^{(5)}\) Civilian Control as a Concept

When analyzing civil-military relations in a nation having strong, democratic institutions such as Canada, surrealistic images of despotic military juntas can be dispensed with; civilian control over the military is not described in terms of a threat to constitutional authority. As Michael Howard has pointed out, in a both

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\(^{(54)}\) Paul Hellyer stresses that because of the lack of executive authority in the C.S.C. and because of the multiplicity of channels to the Minister, the Chiefs of Staff would refuse to make priority judgments. Interview with Mr. Hellyer \textit{op. cit.} August 29, 1975.

\(^{(55)}\) Glassco Commission, \textit{op. cit.} p. 64.
'orderly and peaceful' society:

"military leaders are no longer suspected of nurturing Caesarist ambitions. Indeed, the armed forces constitute only a part of the national organization for defence and are entirely dependent upon the civil, industrial and scientific organization for their power."(56)

Furthermore, Howard argues that the degree of empathy between the civilian and military authority is dependent not upon the acquisition of power, but rather upon priorities defined in terms of resource management.(57)

Howard's contention is an obvious one; the accelerating costs of increasingly sophisticated weapons technology and the expansion of the defence budget relative to the Gross National Product, result in competition with civilians for resource allocations.

This competition for resources (particularly in the United States) contributes substantially to the character of civil-military relations. Howard's thesis however, is so readily apparent that it becomes axiomatic, and consequently does not offer a sufficient explanation of the exigencies of civilian control over the military. Civilian control does not refer merely to the potential for the usurpation of democratic processes nor to the avaricious consumption of resources.


(57) Ibid. p. 13.
Samuel Huntington's analysis of civilian control is more fruitful; he suggests that military policy is comprised of three elements: military security (external threat); internal security (subversion); situational security (long range estimation of economic, social and demographic changes potentially damaging to the state). Each policy type has both an operational and institutional component. The operational element he describes as pertaining to the size, organization and utilization of the armed forces, while at the same time being responsible for the resources required for military purposes. (58) 'Operations' policy then, upon which Howard had concentrated his attention, consists "of the immediate means taken to meet the security threat," (59) whereas 'institutional policy' deals with the manner in which operational policy is formulated and executed. (60) The 'institutional' element then, becomes of paramount importance, for while, as Huntington states, public debate usually emphasizes the 'operational' aspect: "in the long run the nature of the decision on these issues is determined by the institutional pattern through which the decisions are made." (61)

(59) Ibid. p. 1.
(60) Ibid. p. 1.
(61) Ibid. p. 2.
Huntington's study was predicated on his insistence that ideally, civil-military relations be constructed so as to allow for the maximization of security without jeopardizing prevalent social values. He is thus arguing for what he has termed 'objective civilian control' through permitting optimal military professionalism, while restraining 'subjective civilian control', or the 'civilianizing' of the military. (62)

In brief, he stated that the:

"essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of an autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere. Historically the demand for objective control has come from the military profession, the demand for subjective control from the multifarious civilian groups anxious to maximize their power in military affairs." (63)

Huntington's argument does not suggest the desirability of the military clamouring for political participation, rather he argues that the more professional the military becomes, that is, the greater their autonomy, their credibility as a political force is dissipated because they would have been neutralized. Subjective civilian control conversely, would presuppose a conflict of interest between civilian authority and military security resulting in a situation where the prerequisites

of military security are deemed to erode civilian control. (64) Thus Huntington, both in his attitude towards unification (which was entirely negative) and in his preferences for an 'autonomous military sphere', has underlined his pluralist conception of policy-making and the military establishments role in it.

(6) **Civilian Control and the Armed Forces in Canada**

In Canada, however, successive governments have been reluctant to allow for such an autonomous military prerogative; in fact, the Canadian military has repeatedly paid homage, at least verbally, to the sacrosanct tenets of civilian supremacy. Air Vice Marshal M.M. Hendrick has stated that:

"We are by tradition an anonymous group... It was not our business to worry about politics; we left that to our Minister, and to our civilian heads. We also had a feeling...of confidence that our judgments, our advice and our technical know-how would be given due consideration by our political masters... If it was overruled...it was for reasons of economy, economics, politics, strategy or some other overriding reason for which the military factors had to be subordinated. Of course, none of us would take any quarrel with this whatever." (65)

The seeming acquiescence of the military to the concept of civilian supremacy has led some defence commentators,

(65) Byers, R. *op. cit.* pp. 3-4.
such as James Eayrs, to conclude that the; "principle of civilian supremacy has been firmly built into the institutions of which post-war defence policy is made." (66) Roddick Byers notes that:

"it has generally been accepted that a fairly high degree of civilian control operated in Canada. Furthermore, the prevailing pattern of civilian-military relations seemed to approximate the anti-military ideology, low political powers, and high military professionalism ideal type suggested by S. Huntington." (67)

The ostensibly halcyon days of civil-military relations in Canada however, were periodically shattered when the military exceeded its jurisdiction in the determination and carrying-out of defence policy. Such events could occur because governments, while exercising civilian control defined in terms of institutional supremacy, did not sufficiently undertake civilian direction except on those occasions when they sought to retrieve their authority after the military had exceeded theirs.

Civilian control therefore has two aspects: (a) the government as final arbiter of defence policy, and (b) as active participant in the military establishment. As Professor Byers has stated; "without some civilian direction, the degree of control is bound to suffer." (68)

(66) Ibid. p. 1.
(67) Ibid. p. 10.
(68) Ibid. p. 5.
During the Second World War, the established practices of Canadian civil-military relations were demonstrably at odds with those of the Americans. As James Eayrs has emphasized, the American military was largely responsible for the conduct of their own policy and strategy, whereas, in Canada, Mackenzie King was inexorably absorbed in the Canadian war effort. (69)

Although Mackenzie King was confident in General MacNaughton's military capabilities, General MacNaughton's discretionary powers were nonetheless limited by the Prime Minister. Mackenzie King was most indignant when informed that General MacNaughton had committed troops to take part in a British operation in Norway without his prior consultation or consent. During the preparations for Operation Husky in the Italian campaign, Mackenzie King's decision to send troops was due in part to his concern that unless Canada participated directly in the campaign, the nation would have less influence in post-war deliberations. (70)

A striking example of the differences between the Canadian and American civil-military relations occurred when the Americans requested Canadian troops for an assault upon Japanese positions in the Aleutian Islands. U.S.

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(69) Eayrs, James. The Art of the Possible (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961) pp. 75-76.
(70) Ibid. pp. 81-82.
General DeWitt approached Major General Pearkes (later destined to be Defence Minister under Mr. Diefenbaker) as to the possibility of Canadian assistance. General Pearkes did not report this discussion to the Prime Minister. Later General Pope (Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington) discussed the proposal with U.S. Secretary Hickerson. General Pope then raised the issue with Lieutenant-General Stuart who advised him to contact U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. Subsequently, General Marshall dispatched General DeWitt to confer with General Pearkes as to the necessary arrangements for the invasion. All of this was carried out by General Pearkes without communicating his intentions to the Prime Minister. This then, was a conspicuous violation of established practice. General Pearkes was particularly adroit in this regard(71) and before Mackenzie King knew what was happening, Pearkes had not only agreed to the proposal but had already despatched troops to the Aleutians.(72)

Mackenzie King was furious that Canada was involved in any military operation with the United States without his consent. He insisted that any such involvement

(71) During the interview with Mr. Paul Hellyer he claimed to be unaware of the Aleutian incident. Hellyer Interview op. cit.
(72) Eayrs, James. op. cit. p. 94.
must be preceded by overtures from the State Department to himself, the War Committee of Cabinet, and the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralston.

General Pope was then sent to see Mr. Hickerson to express the Prime Minister's criticism of the way the military had proceeded. Upon his arrival in Washington, General Pope was promptly informed that if:

"Canada wanted a Stimson to Ralston invitation to collaborate... (Pope should) forget whatever Calvinistic tendencies there might be in (the Canadian) system and not set out in an attempt to reform U.S. Army procedure." (73)

Such incidents as those in Italy and the Aleutians serve to indicate the greater degree of supervision actively undertaken by the Canadian government in the conduct of military operations. Yet another crisis arose which was of even greater political significance. Mackenzie King had always regarded the conscription issue with some trepidation, because of the strongly anti-conscriptionist mood of Quebec. The rate of attrition in Europe however, meant that voluntary enlistment would no longer sustain the strength of the forces required. This led to a breach of confidence, between the government and the military officers, during which General Pearkes was again to become a central figure.

(73) Ibid. pp. 84-85.
Upon learning that Mackenzie King fully intended to continue with volunteer recruits rather than conscription, General Pearkes attempted to pressure the government, releasing his opinions to the press. Mackenzie King warned that:

"That looks like the Army against the civil power. These men in uniform have no right to speak in ways which will turn the people against civil power." (74)

Shortly thereafter, several senior officers delivered a memorandum to General MacNaughton, now the Minister of National Defence, declaring that voluntary recruitment was insufficient. In effect, this was an ultimatum to the government, that unless conscription was immediately set in motion, mass resignations would occur among the Army High Command. In the face of such desperate events as having the resignation of officers during wartime, Mackenzie King yielded to military pressure and conscription began. (75)

(7) Summary

The implications of such instances of civil-military conflict were firstly, during the course of war operations the military had exceeded their discretionary powers, whereas during the Aleutian Islands issue, the

(74) Ibid. p. 93.
(75) Ibid. p. 94.
military had entered into defence agreements without the prior consultation with the government. During conscription, the military had premeditatedly sought to impose their will upon the civilian authority. Dangerous precedents indeed, at the threshold of the nuclear era.

In the years following the war, the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and the subsequent introduction of long range delivery systems, coupled with the cold war and the realignment of collective defence measures meant that in future the distinction between military and civilian strategic decisions could not be so clearly differentiated. As Eayrs has pointed out:

"The result in Canada, as in all Western nations, was to compel senior military officers to exercise judgment in areas far beyond their traditional competence."(76)

Interestingly enough, Eayrs remains convinced as to the reality of civilian control and argues his case by means of illustrating the extent of civilian membership within the defence establishment. To support his view he cites the composition of the Chiefs of Staff Committee; this would include the Deputy Minister for National Defence, the Chiefs of Staff, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, a member of the Defence

(76) Ibid. p. 94.
Research Board, and periodically, the attendance of External Affairs people on the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Planning Committee. Eayrs incorrectly assumes that such a 'body-count' of civilians would illustrate adequate civilian control. It was however, precisely the composition of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the effectiveness of the Deputy Minister's role which caused such grave concern to the Glassco Commission as to the reality of civilian control. Furthermore, despite the civilian membership within the Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was the military's influence which had prevented the European members of N.A.T.O. from participation along northern radar positions, (77) and General Foulkes, who as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was instrumental in 'stampeding' Canada into NORAD.

Despite Professor Eayrs assurances to the contrary, the extent of civilian control over the military cannot be determined merely by a cursory enumeration of participants. What is required is that those participants have sufficient capability, through access to civilian sources of policy advice, to evaluate the proposals before them so as to provide not only civilian control but also direction over defence policy.

(77) Ibid. p. 97.
The implications of this chapter are that
(a) policy outputs are not necessarily dependent
variables differentiated only by subject matter,
(b) policy both affects and is effected by policy-
making apparatus itself, (c) policy affects the
structuring of influence within the policy-making
process. With reference to defence, there existed a
demonstrable need for the assertion of civilian control,
that is, for a restructuring of influence, which
integration, while ameliorating the substantive issues,
could not accomplish. Only through unification, with
the imposition upon the military of an authoritative,
unified central hierarchy having expanded sources of
civilian input, could the civilian authority ensure
civilian control and direction of the armed forces.

The following chapter, utilizing Doern and
Aucoin's typology of policy-making, explores the
relationship between the policy-making process and the
determination of defence policy during Mr. Diefenbaker's
term of office. The research suggests that the sterility
of the policy-making apparatus, that is, the absence of
civilian input into defence issues coupled with the
Prime Minister's reluctance to develop long-range policy
objectives, undoubtedly led to the defence debacle in
which Mr. Diefenbaker found himself.
Chapter II: The Diefenbaker Period: Incrementalist Policy Inputs

As G. Bruce Doern has stated, the roles of policy-making organizations, "are derived from the logic of their functional input into policy"(1); the same criterion applies to the utilization of other policy inputs such as royal commissions, White Papers, task forces, and advisory councils. As noted earlier, the expansion and differentiation of policy-making organizations; "has transformed the central machinery from a fused, personalized and primarily passive instrument of policy development to that of a relatively more differentiated bureaucratized and active one."(2) In essence, the characterization of policy-making organizations within the Diefenbaker government as 'fused, personalized and passive', means that innovative, programme-output oriented policy did not develop and as a consequence policy was determined incrementally. This condition was evident not only at the executive level, but was also descriptive of the uses to which additional forms of policy inputs were applied, such as royal commissions.

The implications for defence policy were of great

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(2) Ibid. pp. 41-42.
significance as well because such an incrementalist approach, in the absence of definitive, innovative policy resulted in Diefenbaker being unable to cope with the pressing issues of defence. His vacillation on the matter of acquiring nuclear armaments led to the collapse of his government. Such defence policy quandaries however, were not endemic solely to the Conservatives, rather they were, as John McLin has argued, inherited from the Liberals. Mr. Diefenbaker therefore is not entirely culpable for creating such critical issues for defence policy as he was for his inability to make significant departures from on-going policy.\(^3\)

Not surprisingly, the absence of sources of policy initiative, coupled with an incrementalist and 'redistributive' policy orientation could, and in fact, did result, in the military exercising excessive influence in the determination of defence policy. This was accomplished largely through the efforts of General Pearkes, Minister of National Defence and General Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who embarked upon policy initiatives clearly beyond their jurisdiction due the absence of adequate civilian direction.

\[\text{(3) Doern, B. Bruce and Aucoin, P. } \textit{op. cit.} \text{ p. 7.}\]
(1) **The Machinery of Policy**

As a policy-maker, Diefenbaker sought to identify himself in the mould of a contemporary MacDonald, reconciling disparate regional groups and fending off the encroachments of Bay Street and bureaucrats in the civil service. As a result, communications between executive and the civil service ground to a halt and the Prime Minister gathered around himself not skilled administrators but instead, as Newman has described, a "feckless crew of political hangers on"(4) whose sole purpose was to indulge the Prime Minister's political aspirations.

Policy-making was reduced to a 'brokerage incrementalism' (5) as a reaction to the G.N.P. approach of the Liberals. Redistributive policy was the order of the day as Mr. Diefenbaker:

"tried to appropriate to himself the cry from every underdeveloped sector of the country's population, a cry not for charity or special privileges, but for an equalization of opportunity within the Canadian Confederation."(6)

When questioned as to his opinion of the Glassco Commission's recommendations, he retorted; "That's wrong. We're not running the government like a big business corporation." (7) Policy outputs then, were not programmes but rather government handouts designed to cultivate electoral support. (8)

As indicated earlier, the policy input of the P.M.O. and the P.C.O. were relatively benign, preoccupied as they were with housekeeping under the tutelage of the 'chief'. Newman states flatly that the Cabinet was "a mixture of patriotic radicals and weak-kneed reactionaries," (9) and "waiters on Providence, men who shared his tastes and prejudices, but not his breadth of outlook or patriotic zeal." (10) There were of course exceptions, notably Davie Fulton and Donald Fleming, but Fulton as Minister of Justice resigned when it became clear to him that Mr. Diefenbaker was much more adept at chastizing the Liberals rather than developing concrete policy objectives. The final blow came when Mr. Diefenbaker reversed his position in the Columbia River Treaty. (11) Fleming, as Minister of Finance, vainly attempted to balance the budget amidst

(7) Ibid. p. 193.
(10) Ibid. p. 97.
(11) Ibid. pp. 118-120.
the overtly political spending of his peers. He was often not even informed of forthcoming important expenditures and was frequently overruled in Cabinet. (12) The plight of Fleming and Fulton was the rule rather than the exception; in Cabinet, Mr. Diefenbaker:

"acted as if he were the silent partner in every cabinet minister's office. He ignored the normal delegation of authority and attempted to operate the federal administration through personal prerogative." (13)

Consequently, the potential for policy inputs were sharply curtailed, with the Prime Minister regarding expert opinion as incursions into the sanctuary of his office.

In matters of finance, the Treasury Board was directly under the auspices of the Department of Finance, there was no appreciable differentiation of roles. If, as Doern suggests, the classical budgetary system was control-oriented and concerned with the overall effects of government spending, (14) this characteristic was even more acute under Fleming because he approached the budget as a clerk, rejecting the Keynesian thesis and failing to comprehend how the

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(12) Ibid. p. 92.
(13) Ibid. p. 92.
economy could be manipulated or stimulated through government taxation and spending. (15) As Doern points out, the classical budgetary process meant that "future policies and budgets became mere linear extensions of the past", (16) devoid of either outputs or programmes which were anything but incrementally derived handouts. This was of course of critical importance during debates over the A.V. Roe Arrow.

Significantly, other sources of policy input, apart from those at the executive level, were also of limited impact. White Papers, which had already demonstrated their utility in Britain by 1945 for testing Parliamentary opinion, were used in Canada primarily as an information tool, that is, they were used to provide information on government policy which had already been established, rather than for policy development. The roles of White Papers were changed considerably during Pearson's tenure as a means to facilitate discussion on future policy. (17)

The extensive use of "Royal Commissions" (sixteen in all) by the Diefenbaker government can be attributed to a variety of reasons, not the least of which may be that they were instituted because the government had no policy of its own. The use of "royal commissions" in

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such diverse areas of public policy as taxation, health, energy, and government organization indicated the very weakness of the government policy-making apparatus. (18) In addition, as Wilson has stated, the "Royal Commissions" were not only a policy input but an output as well, because they illustrated the government's concern with a particular policy area as well as being a means of buying time. (19)

The roles of advisory councils such as the National Research Council and the Medical Research Council, were also circumscribed in terms of policy input because they were not centrally integrated into the policy process. Such councils were not only advisory, but they carried functional programmes whose investigations are reported to the Cabinet through the ministers of the appropriate department; therefore, their findings were not only 'allocative', but 'positional' in that they must compete with other such councils for resources. While these councils operate within several departments, they do not interfere in specific research and are subject to the whims of the pet projects of particular departments. Consequently, as discerned by the Glassco

Commission, the councils did not fulfill their intended purpose of advising the government on broad research questions and instead focused on regulating its own affairs and becoming enmeshed with departmental projects.

Although the failure of the councils could be as easily attributed to the nature of their activities or their personnel, this was but another instance of the Diefenbaker government failing to use potential policy input by leaving the councils decentralized, self-regulating and autonomous. (20)

In conclusion then, the Diefenbaker government, through its preoccupation with electoral prowess, failed to utilize or did not comprehend the machinery of public policy whether at the executive level, government sponsored White Papers and "Royal Commissions," or advisory councils comprised largely of non-governmental personnel. Policy was therefore nothing but a succession of electioneering hand-outs, reaction and brokerage-incrementalism bereft of planning or insight.

2. Defence Policy

Since Diefenbaker had insulated himself from conventional sources of policy inputs, he relied upon

his political friends; in matters of defence policy, his advisor was Major-General George Pearkes, Minister of National Defence. General Pearkes was a consistent supporter and friend of Diefenbaker; in the 1948 Tory leadership convention, Pearkes nominated Diefenbaker for party leader declaring, "It is the prayer of the common people of this land that John Diefenbaker be their leader."(21) Again in 1956, Pearkes nominated Diefenbaker stating that he;"was the greatest living Canadian - a cross between Simon de Montfort and Benjamin Disraeli."(22) General Pearkes was a holder of the Victoria Cross, and the Conservative defence critic during St. Laurent's government. He had also distinguished himself however, through his role in the somewhat unsavoury incidents pertaining to civilian control during and after the war. Pearkes, in conjunction with General Foulkes, was to have profound influence upon the determination of Mr. Diefenbaker's defence policy, the implications of which were to be felt a few years hence during the unification debates.

In fairness to Mr. Diefenbaker, the issues of defence, N.O.R.A.D., N.A.T.O., the Arrow and the Cuban missile crisis, were not entirely his responsibility;

(22) _Ibid._ p. 46.
doubtless they were compounded by his inept response to such issues, but the cost of sophisticated weaponry, Soviet developments in I.C.B.M.'s, the confrontation between Kennedy and Krushchev, were clearly external to his capability and responsibility. (23)

In addition, many defence issues arose during previous Liberal administrations which were shelved pending the outcome of an election. Many tentative agreements had already been initiated when the Conservatives took office and in fact criticism often centred not upon the issues themselves but upon Diefenbaker's method, or lack of it, in resolving them.

It is doubtlessly true that Canadian defence policy since the last war has been predicated upon collective defence, acting in concert with Canada's allies. To this end, Canada was engaged in a number of collective defence measures aimed at co-operation with the U.S. Informal agreements were drawn up for Canada and the U.S. to exchange intelligence, weapons and research developments. Plans provided for joint naval exercises, L.O.R.A.N. navigation stations, the Pinetree Line, McGill Fence, and the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) to detect Soviet aircraft penetration of northern

defences (such devices were to protect the Strategic Air Command (SAC) rather than Canadian soil). The principles of co-operation in this bilateral defence effort however, were emphatic that Canada retain control of U.S. bases in Canada. (24)

At the same time, Canadians were becoming increasingly concerned about the dependence of Canada's defences upon U.S. strategy and requirements, and thus welcomed participation in N.A.T.O. as a means to offset U.S. influence. Canada was, according to McLin, particularly enthusiastic for the opportunity to purchase influence through contribution to European defence. Such commitments involved one infantry brigade and twelve squadrons of interceptors which were to be brought home after European military strength was less fragile. Concern was also expressed, especially by Lester Pearson, as to the extent of consultation which would occur between the U.S. and her allies in the event of an emergency. Pearson warned against 'entrenched continentalism' (25). Such issues however, were left unresolved until after the election.

(3) N.O.R.A.D.

In response to already existing joint co-operation

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(24) Ibid. p. 28.
(25) Ibid. p. 25.
between Canada and the U.S., in 1956 a joint U.S.-
Canadian study group began to examine the feasibility
of joint command in continental defence. The U.S.
Chiefs of Staff were anxious to pursue the recommend-
ations of the study group that a joint headquarters for
air defence be established. Ralph Campney, Minister
of National Defence in the St. Laurent government,
urged the Cabinet Defence Committee to agree with the
recommendations of the study group; however, Campney
later informed the U.S. Joint Chiefs that the decision
would be delayed pending the June election, which the
Liberals were confident of winning. After the Liberals
were defeated, Lester Pearson denied that the Cabinet
Defence Committee, or the Cabinet, had given consent to
the agreement, however, it was revealed that in fact
External Affairs had been engaged in negotiations for
two years and the military aspects had already been
worked out by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

General Foulkes, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, approached General George Pearkes to
expedite the government approval of the N.O.R.A.D.
agreement. General Pearkes was then able to convince
Mr. Diefenbaker, who was acting as his own Minister for
External Affairs, to express his consent to the agreement
when U.S. Secretary of State Dulles arrived in Ottawa.
Five days after this meeting, General Pearkes announced the N.O.R.A.D. agreement.(26)

The substantive agreements of N.O.R.A.D. were not, at this time, at issue; Diefenbaker acted solely on the advice of Pearkes and Foulkes, and gave his verbal assurances to Dulles without consulting the Cabinet, External Affairs, or the Cabinet Defence Committee.(27) His failure to do so was later confirmed by Sidney Smith, whom Diefenbaker had placed as head of External Affairs. General Foulkes, in his testimony before the Special Committee on Defence stated;

"Unfortunately - I am afraid - we stampeded the incoming government with the N.O.R.A.D. agreement."(28) As McLin states:

"It seems highly probable...that neither the Cabinet Defence Committee nor the full Cabinet was the agency of decision; the implementation of the agreement preceded not only its discussion by Parliament but antedated by some eight

(28) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, 1963, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1963). Testimony of General Foulkes, p. 510. Hereafter referred to as General Foulkes testimony. General Foulkes also testified that the N.O.R.A.D. decision was taken in the absence of the Cabinet Defence Committee because at that point, August 1957, no such Committee had been set up. "The Minister of National Defence took the paper and got it approved. I have no knowledge and if I had - it would not be wise to reveal it - whether it went to the Cabinet or not. p. 527."
months the signature of a formal agreement between governments." (29)

Although Pearson chastized the government for its flagrant disregard for procedure in failing to bring the agreement before Parliament, (30) the N.O.R.A.D. agreement also came under scrutiny concerning command relationships, consultation, and the relationship between N.O.R.A.D. and N.A.T.O. Despite Diefenbaker's attempts to describe joint command, that is, operational command in the event of an emergency, as 'operational control' to placate his critics, (31) it was obvious that unless the commander of N.O.R.A.D. had the authority to use Canadian forces, N.O.R.A.D. would have been a sterile agreement. 'Consultation' created some trepidation among Opposition critics who feared that Canada might suddenly be involved in an American war. (32) In fact, consultation was to be an on-going process with formal lines of communication presumably so that Canada would not be caught unawares. On the matter of N.A.T.O./N.O.R.A.D. relations, the government, for overtly political purposes, sought to leave the impression that they were interdependent. This, however,

(29) McLin, J.B., op. cit. p. 49.
was completely erroneous. (33)

(4) **The AVRO-Arrow Issue**

The debates over the AVRO-Arrow focused upon the objectives of defence policy, which the Diefenbaker government was most ambivalent on.

The Arrow was an all-weather interceptor, capable of speeds of Mach Two, designed to counter anticipated Soviet turbo-jet bomber aircraft. (34) The initial proposal of the service chiefs was that the airframe be developed in Canada, with the engine, fire control system, and weapons systems to be purchased elsewhere. It was hoped that the Arrow, with the requisite equipment, would have a production run of close to six hundred, at a cost under $2 million each. Although the A.V. Roe Company originally intended to use Rolls-Royce engines, or the U.S. Wright engines, they began, through Orenda Engine, to develop their own engine, thus adding to the unit cost of the aircraft. The contract for the fire-control system was to have been developed by Hughes Aircraft, but they declined the contract, which was passed on to R.C.A., at a considerably increased cost due to the modifications

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required in the aircraft. (35) The Velvet Glove air-to-air missile, designed in Canada, was obsolete before its completion and hence the government elected to use the U.S. Navy Sparrow II. The U.S. Navy however, had decided to phase out this programme and suggested that if the Canadians still desired this system, they should complete its design and production themselves. (36) By early 1957, estimates of per unit cost had risen to $8 million and the Liberals were of course cautious not to raise the issue before June. (37)

After the election and the Conservative victory, the development of the Arrow suffered further setbacks. Among the most destructive of these was the recognition that of the nine regular and eleven auxiliary squadrons which were to have the aircraft, only the regular forces would receive sufficient pilot training to man such a sophisticated weapon system; consequently, the production run was reduced to 100 units at an approximate cost of $12.5 million each. To compound matters further, production delays underlined the shift in strategic requirements for manned interceptors in the light of

(35) McLin, J.B. op. cit. p. 64.
(36) Deputy Minister of National Defence Miller stated that the Sparrow was dropped by the U.S. Navy because they wanted a lower altitude weapon. Halpenny Committee, May 17, 1960, p. 87.
(37) McLin, J.B. op. cit. p. 69.
Soviet missile developments. (38) The government was therefore confronted with two alternatives to increase production so as to reduce unit costs: first to append the Arrow to Canada's N.A.T.O.'s contribution in Europe, which was not practicable because of the absence of S.A.G.E.; (39) secondly, to sell the aircraft to the U.S. which was reluctant to acquire an unproven system and had conflicting interests with its own aircraft industry.

Diefenbaker consistently refused to admit that the exorbitant costs of such equipment was too high and instead announced that while production of the Arrow would be curtailed, development would continue for six months, and in the interim, Canada would acquire Bomarc missiles. Such vacillation on defence policy created another dilemma. Diefenbaker sought to explain the cancellation of the Arrow in terms of strategic requirements, namely, that I.C.B.M.s eliminated the need for manned interceptors. Meanwhile, he had accepted Bomarc missiles, whose strategic designation was clearly anti-bomber. (40)

General Pearkes, under the aegis of Diefenbaker, maintained that the Arrow was being discontinued for strategic reasons; but argued too, that manned

(39) McLin, J.B. op. cit. p. 70.
(40) Ibid. pp. 74-75.
interceptors would still be needed.(41) In this contention, General Pearkes was supported by the Chiefs of Staff Committee who insisted that if the Arrow were discontinued, it must be replaced, preferably by a cheaper U.S. aircraft.(42) He later admitted that the Arrow was scrapped largely for reasons of cost. 'Scrapped' is particularly appropriate because Diefenbaker insisted that the existing prototypes be destroyed and were subsequently sent to Waxman's junk yard in Hamilton.(43)

(5) The Bomarc Missiles

General Pearkes, again, had considerable influence in the Bomarc issue; he asked the U.S. authorities if Bomarcs could be placed in Canada to protect population centers.(44) It was feared that unless some form of air defence system was placed in Canada's northern regions (North Bay) that a hypothetical atomic war would have as its battleground

(41) Ibid. pp. 80-84.
(42) General Foulkes stated that: "it did not make military sense to purchase aircraft at a cost of $8 million each when we could maintain aircraft with similar performance from the end of an American production line at something about $2 million." Foulkes testimony, October 22, 1963, p. 510.
(44) McLin, J.B. op. cit. p. 86.
major population centers in the south. At a meeting in 1958 between U.S. and Canadian delegations headed by U.S. Secretary McElroy and General Pearkes, the Canadians were informed that unless the Bomarc was accepted, the U.S. would establish a site south of the Great Lakes, thus assuring the incineration of the Toronto region, in the event of nuclear war. This veiled threat was mitigated somewhat because the U.S. service chiefs, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, and General Pearkes were convinced of the Bomarc's utility: all that remained was for Diefenbaker to acquiesce.

Confusion arose because there were in fact two Bomarcs: the A model, which could carry either a nuclear or a conventional warhead; the B model was capable of greater range and would carry only a nuclear warhead. Both versions of the Bomarc were essentially unmanned aircraft using jet fuel. Diefenbaker, initially, did not appear to be cognizant of such distinctions, but later stated, in 1959, that: "the full potential of these defensive weapons is

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(45) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, June 18, 1963, p. 17. Hereafter referred to as the Sauvé Committee.
achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads."(48)

Having committed Canada to the acquisition of Bomarcs, the government was rudely shocked when the U.S. House Military Appropriations Subcommittee wanted to eliminate the Bomarc programme. Although the U.S. administration decided to continue its development concurrently with the Nike-Hercules programme, Canada's air defence policy was again in jeopardy. Pearkes attempted to conceal the inter-service controversy in the U.S. by claiming that the criticism was directed at the Bomarc A. The fat was in the fire however, when the U.S., following a study conducted by the U.S.A.F., decided to cut back the production of Bomarcs.(49) The House Appropriations Committee then recommended that the Bomarc programme should be eliminated altogether. Appropriately, Representative Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania pointedly remarked, "I would rather be a congressman from Cuba this week than the Secretary of Defence in Canada."(50)

Certainly the most irritating aspect of the cancellation of the Bomarc was that Canada, having only

(49) Ibid. p. 91.
(50) Ibid. p. 95.
recently signed the N.O.R.A.D. agreement which included provision for 'consultation', was not in fact consulted at all, but rather informed of the American's intentions.

Although in June, 1960, the Senate Military Appropriations Subcommittee recommended to the House of Representatives that the $294 million cut from the Bomarc project be returned,(51) Canadian Opposition members were extremely critical of the plan to deploy the Bomarcs in Canada, due to, firstly, their vulnerability, and secondly, that the government agreed to accept them without having resolved the issue of nuclear warheads. The Liberals, in particular Mr. Pearson, argued that the use of such warheads be renounced, as well as their delivery system; they re-iterated the need for a manned interceptor.(52) The significance of such debates however, is, as McLin points out:

"the Bomarc dispute produced somewhat clearer lines of disagreement between the major parties, and thereby opened

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the way for a thorough debate on defence that was needed."(53)

Secondly, since Diefenbaker had accepted the Bomarc but had refused nuclear warheads, "the Bomarcs remained headless and totally useless."(54)

(6) Nuclear Weapons

The case of the Bomarc was illustrative of the dilemma faced by the Diefenbaker government, for while Diefenbaker adamantly refused to accept nuclear capability, he persisted in acquiring weapons systems which were either explicitly designed for nuclear weapons or those which could utilize either nuclear or conventional armaments, which, in the latter instance, were of highly questionable value. Although the R.C.A.F. wanted nuclear armaments for the Arrow they were relatively content, even though both the Sparrow II and Falcon missiles were equipped conventionally.(55) Nonetheless, the Arrow could have been equipped with nuclear armaments. The Bomarc B, designed for antibomber defences, could, if equipped with atomic warheads, 'cook' Soviet bombs, rendering them harmless, whereas conventionally armed missiles, though destroying

(53) Ibid. p. 100.
(55) McLin, J.B. op. cit. p. 130.
enemy aircraft, could result in the detonation of their payload upon ground impact. The Lacrosse and Honest John rockets (delivered to the brigade in Europe) could have been armed either by nuclear or conventional means, however, the Honest John was considered 'most inefficient' if armed conventionally. The F104's delivered to the air division in Europe were similar to the Bomarc and Honest John rockets, completely unarmed, although they were designed to carry nuclear weapons. The Voodoos acquired from the U.S.A.F. in return for Canadair CF104 contracts were conventionally armed although while in U.S.A.F. service they were nuclear equipped. The net result of such purchases, quite apart from the unceremonious junking of the Arrow prototypes meant, as Newman has observed, that:

"Canada, under John Diefenbaker's management had spent $685 millions for the most impressive collection of blank cartridges in the history of military science."

(56)

The issue was not that Diefenbaker held an unequivocable, clearly delineated non-nuclear policy; rather, it was that:

"All this military hardware had been acquired and then became useless for one reason: John Diefenbaker could not

make up his mind to arm the weapons. He seemed to fear the political consequences of decision. His cabinet was hopelessly split on the issue."(57)

Two events precipitated the disintegration of Diefenbaker's defence policy; the Cuban crisis and the remarks of former N.A.T.O. Commander General Norstad. Following the realization that Soviet ships were transporting missiles to bases in Cuba, U.S. President Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine; N.O.R.A.D. went on alert at Defcon 3. (Defence Condition 3, a N.O.R.A.D. state of readiness with Defcon 5 being 'normal' and Defcon 1 being 'nuclear attack'). Canada, through N.O.R.A.D. Deputy Commander R.C.A.F. Air Marshal Slemon, was requested to respond accordingly. Such a state of readiness had received the support of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Minister of National Defence Harkness, but required Diefenbaker's approval.

Diefenbaker delayed his decision for one day, ostensibly to co-ordinate civil defence efforts, but was in fact simply avoiding the decision. When Howard Green of External Affairs, cautioned that Canada should not

(57) Ibid. p. 341.
plunge into action, Diefenbaker took up the clarion call and persuaded the Cabinet to reject Harkness' demand for alert. Pressure from N.O.R.A.D. and the military however, could no longer be withstood and, forty-two hours after N.O.R.A.D. had requested a state of Defcon 3 for Canadian units, the request was finally heeded. (58) As Newman observed:

"It took the Cuban crisis to show the Canadian people that John Diefenbaker's state of indecision had passed the point of responsible statesmanship. The Cuban affair also destroyed any remaining illusions Canadians may have had that the Diefenbaker government had a national defence policy... Diefenbaker had led Canada into military undertakings which he had then prevented from being met." (59)

Four months later in January, 1963, General Norstad held a press conference in Ottawa, where he announced, in response to a series of questions about Canada's role in N.A.T.O., that if Canada did not accept tactical nuclear strike squadrons, her N.A.T.O. commitments would not be fulfilled. (60) Three weeks later Diefenbaker was still procrastinating about providing the CF104 Starfighter with nuclear weapons; instead he declared that; "More and more the nuclear

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(59) Ibid. p. 333.
deterrent is becoming of such a nature that more nuclear arms will add nothing material to our defence." (61) Curiously, Harkness attempted to interpret the Prime Minister's remarks as being favourable to nuclear armament. It soon became evident, however, that such was not the case. Later that week, during a Cabinet meeting, Harkness, formerly a Lieutenant-Colonel, attacked Diefenbaker for failing to make a clear decision on defence policy. Since the Prime Minister would not, Harkness resigned, thus setting in motion the chain of events which was to bring down the Diefenbaker government. (62)

(7) Summary

Doern and Aucoin's description of policy-making in the Diefenbaker government as 'fused, personalized and passive' is particularly pertinent to defence policy. Prime Minister Diefenbaker's failure to utilize sources of policy input other than that tendered by a coterie of political allies, his persistently incremental approach to policy, his deliberate confusing of defence issues and his excessive reliance upon General Pearkes and the Chiefs of Staff Committee resulted in a defence policy devoid of any coherent, long-range

(61) Ibid. p. 361.
programme. The absence of civilian control and direction over defence policy, since it had already been surrendered to General Pearkes and the Chiefs of Staff, coupled with the revelations of the Glassco Commission, led inevitably to unification.

The third chapter, on Mr. Pearson's government, discusses innovations in the policy-making process, and the restructuring of influence which occurred as a result of unification leading to the assertion of civilian control and direction over the military. This chapter shall also describe the principal opposition to Mr. Hellyer's programme to eliminate the three service elements.
Chapter III: The Pearson Period:

Programme Management

The Pearson administration was the transitional period between the fused and passive policy structures of the Diefenbaker government and the output-oriented, activist organizations of the Trudeau regime; that is, there were several innovations in policy structures which functionally performed similar roles as they had during Diefenbaker's tenure, but came to fruition under Trudeau. Most notable among these changes were the relative independence of the Treasury Board vis à vis the Department of Finance, which later resulted in the Treasury Board being responsible for the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (P.P.B.S.) and the expansion and differentiation of the P.M.O. and the P.C.O. Thus, the Pearson administration was the progenitor of what George Szablowski has called the 'optimal' policy-making system.\(^{(1)}\)

\((1)\) New Sources of Policy Inputs

In Doern and Aucoin's assessment of policy-making under Pearson's leadership, it is suggested that such

innovations occurred largely because of the Prime Minister's expertise in compromise and negotiations, that such new policy-making machinery was; "instinctively encouraged as being sensible and useful additions."(2). No doubt, however, that the willingness to experiment was complemented by the optimistic expectations for the economy and the contention of Walter Gordon that new programmes could be initiated and financially absorbed without substantial tax increases.(3) While new sources of policy input were encouraged, they arose on an ad hoc basis rather than being both programme oriented and cross-departmental,(4) as would be suggested by optimal-P.P.B.S. management.

There were however, two significant factors which contributed heavily to the development of policy-making organizations; the first of these being the recommendations of the Glassco Commission, and secondly, Pearson's attitude towards the civil service. In respect to the civil service, it has been alleged by Schindler, that the civil service attained its pinnacle of power during the government of St. Laurent

(3) Ibid. p. 53.
(4) Ibid. p. 57.
and Pearson.(5)

"Policy was initiated in a given department...and only when the senior civil servants had a firm proposal to make did it come to the attention of the appropriate Minister who then presented it to the full Cabinet. Having had little or no opportunity to evaluate the merits of the proposal before it was presented to Cabinet, the other members of the Cabinet usually confirmed the recommendation."(6)

Although Pearson did not distrust the civil service as does his successor,(7) nonetheless, as Maurice Lamontagne has pointed out, the Liberals under Mr. Pearson, having used non-governmental advisors in the formulation of policy while as members of the Opposition, were likely to employ the same methods when forming the government.(8)

"Thus a new period is emerging in our country. I would describe it as the twilight of civil servants...I mean...that the Establishment will play a more limited role than in the past twenty-five years and that it will have to share its privileged position near Ministers with new sources of political influence."(9)

(5) Schindler, F. "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet: History and Development", in T.A. Hockin, op. cit. p. 27.
(6) Ibid. p. 27.
(9) Ibid. p. 266.
Certainly, analysis of the Pearson government would be incomplete without due consideration being given to the Glassco Commission, with particular attention focused upon the Treasury Board, and, as shall be described later, the Department of National Defence. The Glassco Commission:

"recommended that departments and agencies be given the necessary authority and be held responsible for the management of money and staff... In the process, the Civil Service Commission and the Comptroller of the Treasury would be divested of various controlling powers they now possess, and much of the scrutiny by the Treasury Board of the details of departmental administration would be discontinued."(10)

Further:

"The new Board should...concentrate on the essential functions of administrative co-ordination and leadership: balancing programmes and defining priorities..."(11)

One of the most important results of the Glassco Commission was, as Doern points out that:

"The influx of accounting and financial personnel brought in to implement the Glassco recommendations on departmental accounts and control practices soon produced a cadre of experts who became concerned about

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(11) Ibid. p. 81.
the wider, central processes of source allocations." (12)

In 1966 S.I.M.P.A.C., (Systems of Integral Management Planning and Control) was beginning to collect information from both the private and public sector to assist not only the calculations of programme costs but also to estimate their potential output. (13).

Pursuant to the Glassco Commission's recommendations, the Treasury Board acquired its own President and thus became, particularly with the advent of P.P.B.S., increasingly independent relative to the Department of Finance. Nonetheless, the Treasury Board continued to think of P.P.B.S.:

"in relation to government expenditures and programmes rather than in terms of the impact of that philosophy on the relationship among the main central policy organizations." (14)

Whereas under Diefenbaker the policy roles of the P.M.O. and P.C.O. were fused, the addition of Tom Kent as Pearson's policy advisor meant that there was both a definite and 'visible' political presence.


(13) Ibid. p. 255.

representing the Liberal party. Through Kent's effort, the political role of the P.M.O. became more clearly differentiated from the P.C.O. The P.C.O., rather than being an anomalous entity confronting diverse policy matters, was subdivided under four assistant secretaries having their own particular areas of concern. While such division of responsibility was not sufficient to allow for policy activists, nonetheless the structural differentiation of the P.C.O. under Pearson did provide the basis for further sources of policy input under Trudeau. (15)

Although Pearson, like Diefenbaker, relied heavily upon Royal Commissions (an average of four per year), such commissions were of generally an incremental orientation, although some, like the Hall Commission on Medicare, did to some extent suggest innovative policy. (16)

The Pearson government however, did introduce the "task force" concept which had been utilized by U.S. President Kennedy. Such task forces were relatively inexpensive, quick, and relied largely upon extra-governmental sources in order to circumvent the sluggishness of the civil service.


service. As Wilson has observed however:

"It is difficult to determine the policy effectiveness of the extra-governmental task forces, because as Lloyd Oxworth has noted, 'under Lester Pearson, the Canadian Cabinet behaved in the fashion of a modified confederation of Chinese war lords...'. Nonetheless it remains true that no hard thinking was devoted to the manner in which task forces fitted into a federal policy-making system..." (17)

In 1963, the Economic Council of Canada was established. It was felt, and Pearson concurred, that having such a Council outside of government bureaucracy, would contribute to a 'consensus' of economic planning within both the public and private sectors, without being constrained by government-inspired policy decisions. Thus, the Economic Council, through research and conferences on economic matters, played an advisory role to government as well as to the private sector; it has therefore been an important input into the formulation of economic policy. It should be pointed out that the Conservatives had also initiated the Productivity Council which reported to the Departments of Labour and Industry. It was not however, endowed with the independence and scope of the Economic Council, in fact, the Economic Council was permitted to publish its findings without necessarily having government

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(17) Ibid. p. 123.
With regards to the functional advisory Councils, both the Glassco and Hall Commissions determined that they had become 'self-regulatory' rather than being regulated by the government. As a consequence, during the Pearson government, this criticism led to the founding of the Science Secretariat under the P.C.O. and the Science Council. While there was no doubt difficulty created in the relationship between the Science Secretariat and the Science Council due to, in some cases, joint membership, both organizations did contribute to attempts to define a national science policy as well as to oversee the Medical Research and the National Research Councils.

Contrasting with the Diefenbaker period, during which White Papers were used to publicize government policy, White Papers under Pearson became an instrument

of testing opinion of 'intended' government policy. The White Paper on Defence (21) was utilized for this purpose particularly because the government, having a minority in Parliament, needed some Opposition support for such controversial policy (22); needless to say, such tendering for public opinion, in this case, met with unqualified, though not necessarily welcome, success.

It can be seen therefore, that the Pearson government, though not as entirely 'rationalistic' as that of its successor Mr. Trudeau, did encourage new sources of policy input which were not bound to the turgid incrementalism of the past. The redefinition of roles for advisory organizations, the restructuring and differentiation of policy-making roles at the executive level, and the broader perspective of departmental accounting by way of the Treasury Board and S.I.M.P.A.C., though they did not reach operational maturity under Pearson, were unquestionably significant in the evolution of the policy process.

(21) Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence, (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1964). This publication outlines Hellyer's programme for unification as well as re-examining Canadian defence priorities.

(2) The Reorientation of Defence Policy

The efforts of the Pearson government to implement the new management procedures recommended by the Glassco Commission, the development of new sources of policy initiative, and the fledgling attempts to disassociate programme outputs from the incrementalism of the past was also represented in matters of defence policy. Such efforts acquired two forms; the redefinition of defence priorities and capabilities with respect to collective agreements, and the reorganization of the defence forces. Certainly these two tasks were not unrelated, since management, and civilian control and direction of the forces were co-terminous with the redefinition of priorities and their eventual subjection to P.P.B.S.

The first step taken by the Liberals was to set up the Special Committee on Defence, the Sauvé Committee,(23) to examine not only defence costs but also policy. The Sauvé Committee called in non-government personnel to testify and to make recommendations at its hearings; in addition, supplementary studies were in due course commissioned to deal with defence policy, security agreements, arms control and disarmament. As well,

(23) Sauvé was the first chairman of the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence.
a review of all defence commitments was begun. In the interim, the government suspended further equipment purchases. This was done, according to Paul Hellyer, because previously: "policy has been set to agree with the equipment already decided on."(24) Pursuant to this policy review, the government, with Mr. Hellyer as Minister of National Defence, published the White Paper on Defence of 1964.

This White Paper indicated significant changes in government policy pertaining to defence commitments; namely, that Canada should determine roles and equipment requirements of her own forces rather than such roles and requirements being appended to the prescriptions of alliance commitments. These changes took the form of a restructuring of defence priorities in which U.N. operations took precedence over alliances. As McLin has noted:

"In the past, the precedence of the former (alliances) had meant that peacekeeping operations had to be undertaken by forces the shape of which was determined primarily by alliance commitments. Now, however, those commitments were to be made only after the development of a coherent policy in which such

(24) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, 1964. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, May 19, 1964, p. 11 Hereafter referred to as the Hahn Committee
factors as the requirements for peacekeeping forces would be taken into account."(25)

Correspondingly, it was felt also, that this redefinition of priorities would adumbrate the excessive costs of trying to equip the forces with highly sophisticated equipment designed specifically for alliance commitments; namely the CF104's strike-reconnaissance role in N.A.T.O. Instead, the government desired that Canadian forces be organized and equipped for a multiplicity of operational roles as relatively autonomous, self-contained units. By way of example, the brigades in Europe were to be equipped with their own air support and air transport. As a corollary benefit, this policy meant that Canadian forces could be equipped through domestic defence industries such as Canadair. Canadian forces then, were to be self-contained, flexible and highly mobile contingents more amenable to U.N. requirements than to strategic requirements of the alliance.(26)

It should be indicated however, that despite the emphasis given to peacekeeping, the equipment that Canada already possessed, Bomarcs, Honest John rockets

and Voodoos, were in fact, supplemented with a variety of heavy equipment designed for diverse service roles. The White Paper also confirmed the present roles of the brigade and air division units in Europe; hence, alliance commitments were obviously not being abandoned.(27) Nonetheless, the Pearson government approached the issue of alliance commitments, particularly nuclear commitments, cautiously.

Although both the Honest Johns and the Bomarcs were armed, the Liberals were reluctant to engage in subsequent debates over continued deployment of nuclear weapons systems. This became particularly evident in view of Canada's 'virtual abstention' from debates concerning the U.S. proposed 'multi-lateral-force (M.L.F.) for N.A.T.O.'(28) As McLin explains:

"One of the reasons for this relative silence on questions of central importance for the future character of Canada's alliance stands out above all others: the desire, indeed the political necessity, to avoid reviving the recently ended trauma about the acquisition of nuclear weapons."(29)

The Pearson government, having rejected additional nuclear roles, then set about designing defence policy around the utilization of conventional forces for multinational and domestic requirements.

(29) Ibid. p. 211.
Force Reorganization and Unification

The effect of the Glassco Commission as described earlier, was to highlight the enormous difficulties which confronted the Canadian armed services: the disparity between manpower and equipment costs; duplication of services; the unwieldy committee structure; the absence of executive authority in the Chiefs of Staff Committee; and the realization that due to inadequate staffing in the Deputy Minister's office and the multiplicity of channels directed to the Minister, civilian control was in jeopardy. The Pearson government's remedy for these issues was unification of the services.

Although the Glassco Commission had rejected unification, instead recommending that the Chairman of the C.S.C. be granted some executive authority, the White Paper insisted that such a plan was inadequate:

"In the opinion of the Government, this solution does not adequately resolve the basic issues. If a single command structure is not established, co-ordination by the committee systems will remain with all of its inevitable delays and frustrations. The fundamental considerations are operation control and effectiveness, the streamlining of procedures, and, in particular, the decision-making process, and the redirection of overhead. To the extent that operational command is exercised by Canada, it is the view of the government that it can be most
effectively exercised by a single command."(30)

This meant of course, that the armed forces would be integrated at the headquarters level, having a single Chief of Defence Staff. This then, would be the first step towards ultimate unification.

Having accomplished this however, the central question remains, why was unification necessary if integration would accomplish many of the objectives of military organization.

The answer to this is inexorably tied in to defence policy being envisaged as a programme output rather than being an incremental extension of previous policy. The Diefenbaker government would not extricate itself from the demands of alliance commitments and equipment purchases. Concomitantly, the government had denied itself the infusion of policy initiatives, preferring alternatively to rely upon the personal persuasions of General Foulkes, the Chairman of Chiefs of Staff, who assisted the 'stampeding' of the government into N.O.R.A.D., and General Pearkes, the Minister of National Defence, who, as a serving officer and later as member of the government, demonstrated little hesitation in infringing upon civilian control or

granting ascendancy to the military viewpoint. These factors, coupled with a relating benign and understaffed Deputy Minister's office, and the self-ordained jurisdictions of the separate services, meant that defence planning as a part of national and central policy objectives was virtually non-existent. This is precisely what Hellyer hoped to achieve through unification, which could not be accomplished merely through the integration of the Chiefs of Staff Committee; there had to be expanded provision for civilian direction, that is, a 'restructuring of influence' in the determination of defence policy. This was to be effected through functional command, that is, programme-tasking of the service elements.

Mr. Hellyer was adamant in his delineation of governmental and military responsibilities:

"Ministers of National Defence are by law, responsible for the armed forces. I believe I have to listen to all of the advice that is available...But, having listened to it and evaluated it and analysed it, it is then the responsibility of the Minister to make a decision and recommend that decision to the government."(31)

Mr. Hellyer, as Byers has stated:

"was convinced...that over the years the military had increased its role to the point where civilian control was being endangered by the inability of civilians

(31) Byers, R.B. op. cit. p. 2.
and politicians to adequately assess the proposals presented to them."(32)

In May of 1964, Hellyer asserted that the reorganization of the forces would:

"permit an effective exercise of civilian control and equally important, civilian direction in the carrying out of defence policy as laid down by the government."(33)

Hellyer then proceeded to undertake a number of measures to ensure the civilian control and direction of the forces. He created the office of Chief of Defence Staff to replace the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee so as to expedite decision-making and to reduce separate service demands upon the Minister.

As Mr. Hellyer testified before the Hahn Committee:(34)

"The main difference will be in practice... that submissions from the military force, from the chief of defence staff to the Minister and associate Ministers, will be considered and analysed by the Deputy Minister's staff before they are considered in the defence council and before decisions are taken in respect of them... so that the Minister will have the advantage of a civilian point of view... there have been many cases throughout the years when proposals, particularly those having operational aspects, have not been given any analysis other than the analysis

(32) Ibid. p. 4.
(33) Ibid. p. 5.
(34) Hahn succeeded Sauvé as Chairman of the Special Committee on Defence. This Committee was a forum for the debates on Bill 90, the integration stage of unification.
they received in the forces before being proposed to the Minister." (35)

Having eliminated the three service chiefs, Mr. Hellyer stated that:

"problems of civilian control would be very much simplified. It will no longer be necessary to deal with three Defence staffs, which necessarily resulted in a good deal of the resources and energies of the civil staff being applied to problems of co-ordination." (36)

The White Paper on Defence alluded to the:

"introduction into the Department of National Defence a management system planning and controlling major Defence programmes at the Department level." (37)

The reference was to control costs on a programme basis, but, Paul Hellyer also took further steps to insure civilian control by utilizing the Defence Council as a 'cabinet' to the Department of National Defence. Mr. Hellyer outlined before the Hahn Commission the development of the relationship between the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Defence Council, claiming that 'through custom, a division has occurred', (38) between these two organizations because of the intensity of involvement

(36) Byers, R.B. op. cit. p. 6.
(38) Hahn Committee, May 19, 1964, op. cit. p. 18, Testimony of Paul Hellyer.
the Chiefs of Staff Committee were engaged in post-war negotiations. As a consequence:

"the Chiefs of Staff Committee advises the Minister of National Defence and the Cabinet External Affairs and Defence Committee on matters of defence policy and prepares strategic appreciations and military plans as required. In addition, the Committee has been responsible for co-ordinating the efforts of the armed services in fulfillment of a single defence policy and over-all policy direction of joint service organizations."(39)

The Defence Council, conversely, had been largely relegated to logistics and personnel duties.(40)

Through the elimination of responsibilities for tri-service co-ordination, and the infusion of additional civilian personnel from both within and outside of the department, Mr. Hellyer sought to have the Defence Council become "the principal departmental policy group."(41)

The Deputy Minister's office, which had been singled out for criticism by the Glassco Commission for being unable to cope with the demands being made upon it, was to be expanded in order that, as Mr. Hellyer stated, there would be; "a strong civil staff in the defence department outside of the military chain of

(39) Ibid. p. 19.
(40) Ibid. p. 19.
(41) Ibid. p. 19.
command"(42), to analyse military requirements and available resources; the 'defence programming' to which Mr. Hellyer had eluded. This then would also reduce the department's dependence on the Chiefs of Staff Committee for the determination of its finances. As Byers has observed, Hellyer's statement regarding the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the role played by the Deputy Minister and the Defence Council are clearly indicative that Mr. Hellyer was not at all content with the degree of civilian control as it existed prior to unification.

Critical to the reorganization process was the evolution of functional command; essentially this meant the elimination of the eleven command structures which existed under the separate services and the redistribution of six commands organized on a functional basis. The new command structure was as follows: Air Transport Command replaced a very similar organization of the same name which had previously been under the authority of the R.C.A.F.; Maritime Command (M.A.R.C.O.M.) replaced both east and west coast maritime commands but with the Pacific command being directed from Halifax and including greater integration of sea and air

(42) Byers, R.B. op. cit. p. 6.
components; Air Defence Command (AIRDEFCOM) which had been located in St. Hubert, Quebec, was relocated in North Bay, Ontario, with the AIRDEFCOM commander also being appointed senior Canadian member of N.O.R.A.D., Northern Region; Mobile Command (MOBCOM) was to be the largest command having within it most of the tactical air and operational land elements (3 brigades); Training Command (TRAINCOM) replaced Air Training Command and was to integrate trades common to all services as well as to innovate new planning techniques for their utilization; Material Command (MATCOM) was implemented to integrate the logistics of the three services into one system. In addition to the six new commands, the European brigade and air division were to report directly to headquarters, rather than to one of the commands.\(^{(43)}\)

The new command structure therefore, not only established a 'task orientation' for Canadian forces but was also conducive to the breaking up of the fiefdoms which the separate services had acquired for themselves. Not surprisingly, inter-services rivalry intensified as the services engaged in jerrymandering to influence the distribution of the functional commands.

\(^{(43)}\) Kronenberg, V.J., \textit{op. cit.} pp. 75-76.
The debates on unification, which ensued from 1964 to 1967, became more furious as unification loomed closer; in fact, several senior naval officers were stunned when they came to realize that Mr. Hellyer actually intended to pursue such a scheme. (44)

Although the debates on unification focused upon a variety of issues from operational roles and command structure to pay scales and retirement benefits, this section is concerned with the principal opponents of unification and the issues they raised.

While much of the criticism from the services, particularly the Navy, was scarcely more than a lament for the loss of service traditions, nonetheless, Mr. Hellyer came under fire for the government's apparent inability or unwillingness to divulge its sources of military advice to support unification. Mr. Hellyer himself did very little to dispel such criticism. (45)

(44) Admiral Landymore, who has weathered several attempts at integration and unification was apparently the first to realize that Mr. Hellyer was serious. Hellyer interview, August 1975.

(45) Hahn Committee, May 19, 1964 op. cit. pp. 30-31 Mr. Hellyer was questioned by Lambert as to the organizational basis of unification, that is, who had Hellyer consulted in devising this programme. Mr. Hellyer refused to address himself to the question. Lambert retorted that: "He is asking us and Parliament to approve of it on his word and that of the government."
Mr. Terrence Nugent accused the Minister of National Defence of ramrodding unification for no other purpose than to "ensure his own greatness". (46) He further argued that Mr. Hellyer's refusal to provide further information about unification amounted to nothing more than; "a barrage of propaganda and the bland assurance of the Minister that all is well." (47)

Significantly, the roles which the Canadian forces would be capable of carrying out came under close scrutiny. W.B. Nesbitt stated that the Canadian hybrid would be unable to co-ordinate its operations with N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D.; further, that the forces were designed for a peacekeeping role exclusively which would result in Canada surrendering other defence responsibilities to the United States. (48) The Associate Minister of National Defence, Leo Cadieux, argued to the contrary that precisely because of unification, Canada would be better able to accomplish its designated defence roles. He insisted that the $1.5 billion in new equipment which included heavy artillery, anti-tank missiles, mortars and anti-submarine systems were obviously not for the purpose of peacekeeping missions alone. (49)

(47) Ibid. p. 12478.
(48) Ibid. pp. 12470-12474.
(49) Ibid. pp. 12535-12539.
The unification issue came to a head in August 1966 when Paul Hellyer dismissed Admiral Landymore for "eighteen months consistent disloyalty". Hellyer was vehement in his condemnation of Landymore's effort to organize support against unification:

"A small group of officers is trying to run the Armed Forces...the civilian control of the military is the main issue...I have no intention of letting anyone - even if he's an Admiral - tell the government how to run the Armed Forces." (50)

Mr. Hellyer later offered as a justification for firing Admiral Landymore:

"to openly attempt to dictate a policy contrary to that approved by Parliament is simply not acceptable in a mature democracy. The principle of civilian control must be maintained." (51)

Following his dismissal, Admiral Landymore claimed that it was "political science not military science," (52) behind unification. He asserted that the proponents of unification could only justify their case through the explication of the merits of integration, not through unification. (53) He criticized the command structure of

(51) Ibid. p. 9.
(53) Ibid. p. 1050.
Mobile Command, as dangerous to democracy because of the power invested in its commander.\(^{(54)}\)

Although several other Canadian officers had already expressed their disapproval of unification, including among them General Foulkes, Rear Admiral Brock, Major General Macklin and Air Marshal Curtis, organized opposition surfaced in 1967 when the Tri-Service Identities Organization (TRIO)\(^{(55)}\) and the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces\(^{(56)}\) presented their briefs to the Groos Committee. These organizations were strongly opposed to unification arguing that; (a) since unification did not have the support of many serving officers its credibility was in doubt, (b) that the Defence Council did not have sufficient service representation, (c) that the officers who were retired prematurely were instructed to as a result of their opposition to unification, (d) that the degree of civilian control was excessive.

Opposition to unification then, still centred upon the relative advantages of integration \textit{vis à vis} unification. In response to his critics Mr. Hellyer had consistently argued that:

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\(^{(54)}\) Ibid. p. 1086.
\(^{(56)}\) Ibid. February 13, 1967, pp. 889-919.
"no over-all strategic plan applied to the three services...there was no over-all co-ordination of the equipment programmes in the sense that priorities were established on a hard basis to fulfill national objectives..."(57)

The tendency of the Chiefs of Staff to support each other's requests for equipment on a quid pro quo basis meant that such equipment purchases were not based upon national needs, but rather upon those of the individual services and their commanders.(58)

Although the Navy had persistently sought to stress the distinctiveness of its service roles and traditions, Mr. Hellyer argued that such a xenophobic point of view tended to: "preserve the traditions of a particular service rather than contributing to the total defence picture".(59) To illustrate his point, Mr. Hellyer cited the inter-service rivalry over the Caribou aircraft between the Army and the R.C.A.F., and the dispute over the N.A.T.O. 7.62 rifle which the Army had wanted but the R.C.A.F. and R.C.N. had not. It took five years to finally procure the rifle.(60)

In response to criticism that integration alone would resolve Canadian defense problems without the negative aspects of unification, Mr. Hellyer replied

(59) Ibid. p. 1562.
(60) Ibid. p. 1562.
that:

"It would be impossible to maintain integrated forces over a long period of time. Integration is not a stable position." (61)

(6) **Summary**

The transition from separate to a unified service was at times a painful endeavour. The change to functional command proceeded relatively smoothly because in many instances, the new structure did not necessitate sweeping reform; many roles under both systems were similar. At headquarters it had been an altogether different situation since unification sought to impose what was essentially a civilian mode of organization upon a military structure; this was even more complex during the initial stages because the two systems of organization were both operative at the same time. This, coupled with the government's failure to produce a detailed plan for reorganization, meant that there were many changes in roles and responsibilities as the government attempted to 'muddle through'.

Defence policy, then, under the Pearson government, had accomplished a number of significant tasks: the redefinition of defence policy priorities,

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while not entirely in conformity with a 'national mission', had decreased dependence upon alliance systems in the determination of policy and equipment procurement; it had reorganized the armed forces into a unified body and eliminated many of the redundancies and archaic traditions endemic to separate services; the new command structure had been designed along functional lines rather than corresponding to traditional service tasks. Of singular importance is that through unification, the 'restructuring of influence' had unquestionably asserted the principle of civilian control and direction of the military.

As described in chapter four, although Mr. Pearson's government had stimulated new sources of policy input and had provided the machinery for long-range defence planning, the transition in the policy-making process was not complete. It remained for Prime Minister Trudeau to be the innovator of the 'optimal policy-making system'. In terms of defence, this meant, (a) the reappraisal of the objectives of defence policy in congruence with national objectives, and (b) the determination of the management changes necessary to accomplish them.

Significantly, this chapter also suggests, through an examination of the effects of optimal policy-making
upon the political executive and the defence establishment, that the transition in the policy-making system is continuing. Unlike Doern and Aucoin, who have assumed, incorrectly, that the policy-making process occurs in a linear progression, this chapter suggests that the over-centralization of authority, and the failure to recognize the necessity of 'special skills', namely, those of the military, shall have serious implications for parliamentary government and for the military's ability to accomplish its assigned roles.
Chapter IV: The Trudeau Period:

Systems Management

Although the previous Liberal government was instrumental in developing new sources of policy initiative, they evolved largely because of the 'benevolent acquiescence' (1) of Pearson rather than being a clearly determined attempt to reform the policy-making structure. The Pearson government, despite such sources of policy initiative, remained attuned to the incrementalism of the past and made little effort to co-ordinate programmes on a cross-departmental basis; this is not however, so much a criticism of Pearson as it is the recognition that programme management was then not a mature phenomenon.

With the advent of Pierre E. Trudeau as Prime Minister, systems management had acquired an apostle, for Trudeau was a protagonist of the ingestion of 'rationality' into government:

"Nationalism will eventually have to be rejected as a principle of sound government. In the world of tomorrow, the expression 'banana republic' will not refer to independent fruit growing nations but to countries where formal independence has been given priority over the cybernetic revolution. In

short, if not a pure product of reason, the political tools of the future will be designed and appraised by more rational standards than anything we are currently using in Canada today."(2)

Trudeau descended on Ottawa imbued with the spirit of innovation, and disdain for the languid, incrementalistic approach of his predecessors in the definition of policy priorities:

"And some of these programmes - it's really incredible when you begin to look at these in detail - some of the programmes were started back in the 1920's - to meet a real need then. But they no longer have the same justification."(3)

He condemned policies and institutions whose effects were debilitating on the government's ability to exercise 'rational' decisions. He referred to Parliament as 'a Coney Island shooting gallery', perennially dedicated to patching up crises but not resolving them. Low priority programmes inherited from the past were to be scrapped in order to funnel resources into high priority policies. The political party, the Prime Minister explained:

"which is attuned to the needs of our society is not one which confines itself to particular employment or

(3) Ibid. p. 130.
income groups, or which speaks for particular regions or language groups, but one which reaches out to absorb the ideas and to reflect the aspirations of all Canadians... It may be that, in future, political parties will be distinguished from one another, not so much by issues, as by the perspective in which they view such issues and the method which they employ in devising new policies to resolve them."(4)

Trudeau then, clearly rejected the premises of incrementalism and its costly hand-outs to disparate groups and regions, he offered instead policy determined by national objectives through the co-ordination of programme outputs. He argued that a bill of rights, that is, a declaration of goals, be firmly ensconced in a constitution prior to the differentiation of federal and provincial powers. He distrusted the conservatism and influence of the civil service in the making of government policy and alternatively surrounded himself with computer and communications specialists.(5) Policy, then, would no longer be aimed at what Noel has described as "the


accommodation of elites", (6) in the absence of national symbols and goals, but rather upon the optimization of policy objectives as they relate to other policies and available resources. (7)

Critical to such a policy orientation (and to any other) are the sources of Prime Ministerial advice; the distinctiveness of the Trudeau regime however, has been the rapid expansion of these sources. As Stewart points out, in 1967, under Pearson, the P.M.O. had 12 members, the P.C.O. 156; under Trudeau the P.M.O. had increased to 92 and the P.C.O. to 292 by 1972. (8)

Quite apart from quantitative changes, there have also been a number of substantive changes in the organization of the P.M.O. and P.C.O.

(6) Noel, S.J.R. "The Prime Ministers Role in a Consociational Democracy", in T.A. Hockin. op. cit. p. 104. Noel argues that in a nation such as Canada, having no national symbols but numerous subcultures, a Prime Minister may continue to govern only through accommodation of elites at the provincial level.

(7) Szabowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making System: Implications for the Canadian Political Process", in T.A. Hockin. op. cit. p. 137. Szabowski states that: "optimizing is concerned with the relations among objectives. Thus, a decision-maker considers the adoption of a specific policy aiming at a specific goal must take into account all other policy goals relevant to the issue area and the resource requirements needed for their implementation." Such policy would have precedence over the regional accommodation of elites. p. 137.

(1) **Expansion of Government Institutions**

There have been three major developments in the P.C.O., the first of these being the appointment of three deputy secretaries whose functions are planning, operations and federal-provincial relations. Their significance is that they are more concerned with policy development, rather than acting as secretaries to the Cabinet. Secondly, Michael Pitfield, a personal friend of the Prime Minister and an advocate of 'rational' policy-making, was chosen to head the P.C.O. planning group. (9) The third development pertains to the Cabinet Committees whereby the Prime Minister is the Chairman of the Federal-Provincial Relations Committee and the Planning and Priorities Committee. (10) There are nine such standing committees, including the External Affairs and Defence Committee. As well, there are several functional committees of a temporary or ad hoc nature which have resulted in the appointment of additional assistant secretaries in the P.C.O. As Doern points out:

"The net result of the committee system is that most issues that go before the

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(10) Schindler, F. "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet History and Development", in T.A. Hockin. op. cit. p. 44.
full Cabinet will have been assessed in at least one of the Cabinet sub-committees. Also many matters are actually decided by the Committee in that formal Cabinet approval is assured unless there is a division in the Committee or unless a Minister has strong views and wishes to take it to the full Cabinet."(11)

The sheer volume of committee work however, could be deleterious to a Minister's other responsibilities, and so the P.M.O. s function is to; "Differentiate and improve the quality of...the political input into policy deliberations."(12) As a consequence, the role played by Tom Kent under Mr. Pearson has been expanded and formalized under Trudeau. In addition, the P.M.O. seeks to; 'ensure that P.M.O. inputs are present at the very earliest stages of policy formulation' and therefore; "representatives of the P.M.O. sit on various inter-departmental committees...and on committees of the Privy Council Office."(13) There are, in addition, several other steps, including P.M.O.-P.C.O. co-ordinating meetings, during which the Prime Minister attempts to ensure a political 'presence' in policy development.(14) Trudeau has also

(13) Schindler, F. "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet History and Development", in T.A. Hockin. p. 45.
(14) Ibid. p. 46.
utilized the creation of Ministers without Portfolio, to augment political inputs, as well as 'regional desks', to keep in touch with party officials and 'backbenchers'.

This liaison between the P.M.O. and the P.C.O. also had important implications for P.P.B.S. Whereas P.P.B.S., as contemplated by the Pearson government, was centred upon fiscal control and programme outputs on a departmental basis, under Trudeau, P.P.B.S. is intimately involved with the central organs of the policy process itself. P.P.B.S. then becomes an; "information system designed to produce and recombine information in such a way that it will serve planning programming and budgeting objectives in an integrative way."(15) To this end, resources are allocated on the basis of broad functional categories, including among them, health and welfare, government services, defence, and others; as a result, the department is no longer the basic unit of policy determination. The Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning, chaired by the Prime Minister; "expresses its priorities for any given year according to these broad functional categories."(16)

(16) Ibid. p. 91.
In addition, the Treasury Board, through P.P.B.S., is engaged in long-range planning for resource allocations.

There have also been significant changes in other sources of policy input; Mr. Trudeau, unlike his predecessors, has tended to prefer 'task forces' over Royal Commissions. As Wilson points out, however:

"The entire process of using outside consultants and task forces, and the creation of an inventory of professional personnel outside of government whose talents could be tapped on a temporary basis, do indicate a concerted effort to place the Prime Minister's Office in a strong controlling position over policy formation." (17)

Task forces have come under fire for a variety of reasons. By way of example, Mr. Hellyer's housing task force, drew criticism for its methodological weaknesses and insufficient expertise. (18) Furthermore, the task forces are not required to publish their results, and consequently, their research findings are available only to the Cabinet and perhaps to some senior civil servants, to the exclusion of Parliament. (19)

The changing role of White Papers is clearly aligned with the Prime Minister's predilections for

(18) Ibid. p. 125.
(19) Ibid. p. 124.
cybernetics, that is, the White Paper becomes a communication 'interaction mechanism'\(^{(20)}\) between the government and the public. As Wilson points out:

"(the) rationalistic approach to policy-making emphasizes long-range planning and review. Thus, the White Paper is conceived of as a part of a larger exercise of review."\(^{(21)}\)

Although there have been a number of White Papers on diverse policy issues, Doerr asserts that their objective, to stimulate public debate, has not been entirely successful principally because there has not been a public forum for debate.\(^{(22)}\) This problem has to some degree been resolved as witnessed by the more recent 'green' papers and public discussions on immigration policy.

The examples provided by the relationship between the Science Council, the National Research Council, and the Medical Research Council are instructive as to the dilemmas which the government encountered when it attempted to append a functional advisory council having its own area of responsibility into a P.P.B.S. system.


\(^{(21)}\) Ibid. p. 185.

\(^{(22)}\) Ibid. p. 198.
The Science Council, which was to be the policy overseer of the other councils, proved to be; "excessively preoccupied with developing its long-range rationalistic posture" (23) and not on policy development. The National Research Council and the Medical Research Council prefer to ignore the Science Council and cultivate instead whatever scientific activity they are presently engaged in. As Aucoin points out, their approach to policy has been entirely incremental and seemingly dedicated to; "frustrating the attempts of the Federal Government to establish science policies to accomplish national goals." (24) As Doern has suggested, the relationship between such organizations must be subject to revision:

"not on the naive assumption that somehow the total policy-making process must have some central deposits of information, but rather the assumption that it is important that the relationship between such organizations be conceptualized in some way." (25)

The Economic Council of Canada has also changed significantly in regard to its contribution to policy

development. Under Pearson, the Economic Council was preoccupied with what it has called 'performance goals' including among its research areas regional development, tariffs, manpower and transportation policy. In 1969 however, following the poverty report, the Economic Council expressed their interest in 'achievement goals', that is, fundamental national objectives. This was in part a reaction to the limited role which P.P.B.S. had played under Mr. Pearson. Under Mr. Trudeau, however, there was congruence between the Prime Minister's desire for 'counterweights' of policy input and the Economic Council's willingness to provide them.

The Trudeau period has witnessed many significant changes in the policy-making process: the expansion, differentiation and formalization of policy roles in the P.M.O. and P.C.O.; the expanded responsibilities of the Treasury Board in the implementation of P.P.B.S.; the emergence of functional committees in the Cabinet Secretariat; the pervasive influence of the Prime Minister in P.C.O.-P.M.O. liaison and the Priorities and

(27) Ibid. p. 237.
Planning Committee; the activist role of the Economic Council of Canada in pursuant of 'achievement goals'; the public debate encouraged by the use of White Papers as interaction mechanisms. The emphasis placed upon planning and the defining of priorities is of course underscored by the Prime Minister's personal philosophy of policy development; policy as functional categories of cross-departmental programme outputs. It is to be anticipated that such tendencies would reveal themselves as well in defence policy.

(2) Defence Policy and the Role of Unified Forces

Unification had accomplished many of its objectives: (a) the Chiefs of Staff were integrated under a single Chief of Defence Staff; (b) the traditional lines of command were dispersed with the imposition of functional command; (c) separate services were eliminated, and (d) civilian direction and control had been firmly established. What remained to be determined however, was the objectives of defence policy, that is, what role was the military to play.

Congruent with the Prime Minister's policy objectives and methods, he announced a foreign policy statement in April, 1969, outlining the impending redefinition of Canadian defence policy. Mr. Trudeau
argued that:

"N.A.T.O. had in reality determined all of our defence policy. We had no defence policy, so to speak, except that of N.A.T.O. And our defence policy had determined all of our foreign policy... It is a false perspective to have a military alliance determine your foreign policy. It should be your foreign policy which determines your military policy."(29)

Subsequently the new priorities for defence were to emphasize the protection of Canadian sovereignty rather than alliance commitments.

The review of defence policy had been going on since 1969 and culminated in the publication of a White Paper in 1971, Defence in the 70's under the authority of the new Minister of National Defence, Donald MacDonald. The influence of the foreign policy review was clearly evident:

"Defence policy cannot be developed in isolation. It must reflect and serve national interests, and must be closely related to foreign policy which the government reviewed concurrently with defence. In the course of these reviews the principle that defence policy must be in phase with the broader external projection of national interests was underlined."(30)

Citing the "increase in stability in nuclear deterrence" and the "return to a form of multi-polarity in the international system" (31), the White Paper on Defence argues that:

"A catastrophic war between the super powers constitutes the only major military threat to Canada...Canada's overriding defence objective must therefore be the prevention of nuclear war by promoting political reconciliation to ease the underlying causes of tension, by working for arms control and disarmament agreements and by contributing to the system of stable mutual deterrence." (32)

While declaring allegiance to alliance commitments however, the White Paper directs attention to the maintenance of sovereignty through surveillance, norther development and aid to the civil power. The priorities for Canadian defence therefore become:

"(a) the surveillance of our own territory and coast lines: i.e. the protection of our sovereignty; (b) the defence of North America in co-operation with U.S. forces; (c) the fulfillment of such N.A.T.O. commitments as may be agreed upon; (d) the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume." (33)

The elucidation of such priorities stands in contrast to the collective security and peacekeeping roles that the Pearson government was so enamoured with. Protection of sovereignty would include surveillance of violations of Canadian airspace, which would be, in part, operative through N.O.R.A.D. installations, although a number of these were shut down. Also, surveillance would be undertaken to ensure control

(31) Ibid. p. 4.
(32) Ibid. p. 6.
(33) Ibid. p. 16.
of northern regions and coastal waterways; the latter would embrace such items of assistance to the civil authorities as patrolling foreign fishing fleets, ice reconnaissance and mineral explorations. (34) The Canadian land forces would also come to the aid of the civil power should the need arise as in the case of the October crisis and the rioting at Kingston Penitentiary.

The Canadian contribution to North American defence would also acquire new characteristics. While reaffirming that co-operation with the U.S.; "will remain essential so long as our joint security depends on stability in the strategic nuclear balance"; the government decided to curtail the Bomarc anti-bomber defence and to reduce the significance of the anti-submarine warfare role in preference to other maritime duties. Furthermore, the Honest John system was abandoned and the CF104s would drop the nuclear strike role in Europe; therefore, only the CF101 Voodoos would require a nuclear capacity. (35)

In April, 1969, the Prime Minister announced that as part of the defence policy review, N.A.T.O. contributions would be reduced. (36) As Szablowski points out, this too was another example of optimized planning.

(35) Ibid. p. 30.
The government reason was that:

"continued deployment of resources to N.A.T.O. at the same level would have resulted in the progressive minimization of the aggregate output in the entire defence policy area because of the size of the N.A.T.O. resource allocation relative to the remaining defence policy goals."(37)

Resources diverted from N.A.T.O. could be then applied to higher priority tasks, namely surveillance.

The White Paper on Defence made evident Canada's disenchanted with, though continued willingness to participate in, peacekeeping operations.

"The experience has all too often been frustrating and disillusioning. Some operations have been severely hampered by inadequate terms of reference and by a lack of co-ordination on the part of those involved. Other detrimental factors have been the absense of political support of some of the great powers, and insufficient international logistic and financial resources. Certain operations have tended to become 'open ended' in the absense of political settlement between the parties to a dispute."(38)

Such circumstances were re-confirmed during Canada's participation in the I.C.C.S. mission in Vietnam;(39)

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Canada subsequently withdrew from the mission; having become somewhat more particular about the criteria upon which to engage in peacekeeping.\(^{(40)}\)

Following the publication of *Defence in the 70's*, the Department of National Defence began publishing a yearly review of the activities of the department, cautioning however, that these publications were for the purpose of review only, not policy papers.\(^{(41)}\) These reviews did not deviate substantially from the *White Paper on Defence*, in terms of the objectives of national defence; there was however, a number of managerial changes which carried serious implications.

The first of these to be considered, given Mr. Trudeau's 'optimal policy' stance and his insistence on cross-departmental functional outputs, were the defence priorities established in the White Paper which required the participation of several departments to accomplish these objectives. Since the military, prior to unification, was more accustomed to tending its own

\(^{(40)}\) Proceedings from the *Atlantic Council of Canada*. Toronto. May, 1975. The discussion focused on the pre-conditions for Canada's participations in peacekeeping operations.

\(^{(41)}\) Canada, Department of National Defence. *Defence 1972* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1973). In the preface to *Defence 1972*, Minister of National Defence Richardson was emphatic that these annual reviews did not indicate impending policy changes.
backyard, the co-ordination of departments became a difficult task. As J.F. Anderson, Director of Programme Analysis, and Dr. J.C. Arnell, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) of the Department of National Defence, report, since:

"the principal, if not the only, direct military threat to Canada's national security is that incidental to nuclear war...which Canada is unable to escape... or prevent such an attack...Canada is incapable of establishing its security requirements in terms of a direct defence of its national territory...The consequence is that there is really no way for the Canadian defence analyst to define objectively either an upper or lower limit of the amount of resources which Canada should expend on its own defence." (42)

This was of course, further compounded by the 'non-military' nature of some of the new defence priorities. Dr. Arnell (43) and Mr. Anderson argued that these priorities required greater ministerial direction and cross-departmental co-ordination to determine the degree


(43) Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Hahn Committee. Nov. 21, 1968. Dr. Arnell detailed the difficulties encountered in attempting to apply P.P.B.S. to services accustomed only to a "single operational environment". pp. 550-554.
of support which the military would provide, particularly with reference to surveillance. Such direction and co-ordination ultimately involved the Departments of Fisheries, Transport, Indian Affairs, Energy, National Revenue, and the R.C.M.P.

It is scarcely surprising that such complex relationships gave rise to the need for a Management Review Group, created in 1971 to: "improve the co-ordination between the military, civilian and research staffs of the Department." (44) The Management Review Group sought to dispose of what was essentially two staffs, one civilian, another military, working under the Minister of National Defence. This had created needless duplication of effort and serious problems of co-ordination.

Under the new system, both the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff are jointly responsible for military management, supplemented by the appointment of several assistant Deputy Ministers, functionally organized. Both the Chief of Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister however, do retain some explicit power of their office, in the former case the control and administration of the forces, and in the Deputy Minister's

case, the powers to act on behalf of the Minister. (45) The military chain of command outside of headquarters, is retained. Nevertheless, the implications of such changes are that there has been an injection of civilian staff and management techniques into headquarters.

(3) **The Effect of Optimal Policy-Making**

Policy-making in Canada has passed through three distinct stages; the 'fused, personalized and passive' policy organizations under Mr. Diefenbaker; the beginning of new sources of policy initiative and the differentiation of policy roles, co-terminus with incrementalism, under Mr. Pearson; the expanded, formalized, differentiated, and active sources of policy inputs under Mr. Trudeau. Defence policy, similarly, has evolved in congruence with the policy-making structure: under Mr. Diefenbaker, the excessive influence of the military in the determination of policy and, the indecisiveness which led to adherence to previous policy and equipment commitments; under Mr. Pearson, the review and reorientation of such commitments, and the attempts, through unification, to exercise civilian control and ultimately civilian direction over the military; the Trudeau period, which has dramatically redefined defence priorities,

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consolidated civilian control and imposed civilian direction even within the chain of command at headquarters.

One could conclude from this that the 'optimization of policy' and the 'civilianization' of the military, is the 'best of all possible worlds', wherein the current military malaise is but an aberration from the logical progression of systems. Such a conclusion becomes suspect however, given the fact that under the current Minister of National Defence, James Richardson, the de-unification process has begun. Furthermore, recent years have witnessed a deterioration in the enthusiasm for P.P.B.S. as the foundation of policy development, as well as resentment over the Prime Minister's methods in introducing policy proposals. Such events have raised crucial questions not only concerning defence policy, but about the nature of policy-making, indeed, parliamentary government itself.

(a) **Prime Ministerial Government and P.P.B.S.**

With reference to the source of Prime Ministerial authority, Szablowski points out that:

"The traditional relationship between the Canadian Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues has to be transactional. It permits Ministers to retain regional
loyalties and to represent regional interests within the Cabinet." (46)

Provincial leaders expect bargaining concessions from the Prime Minister. (47) Through the optimal policy-making system, the Prime Minister dispenses functional responsibilities to his Cabinet members who, as a result; "tend to discard regional loyalties...and bargaining on behalf of regional interest". (48) If, as Noel suggests, the ability to govern is based on the accommodation of elites at the regional level, "then any policy-making system and its decisional technology which may either weaken or modify these consociational leadership roles strikes at the fundamental determinants of stability". (49)

Policy-making based on P.P.B.S. has been subject to criticism and has been fraught with difficulties; one example of which was mentioned earlier concerning the implementation of new defence priorities. The Treasury Board found that it was rather problematical to align functional classifications of priorities such

(47) Ibid. p. 142.
(48) Ibid. p. 144.
(49) Ibid. p. 142.
as 'national unity' and 'pollution' with existing functional categories. As Doern states; "The Treasury Board was then required to...ask departments which of their programmes could be identified as assisting the function of national unity."(50) Programme forecasts by departments, rather than being expressed functionally, are still very much incremental and department oriented.(51) Disagreement has arisen between Ottawa and the Provinces as to the implementation of P.P.B.S. As Doern points out, the government has recognized that: "incrementalism has come to be characterized less as an unfortunate aberration from P.P.B.S. principles, and more as an inevitable and even necessary element of a policy and budgetary philosophy."(52)

Although Doern concludes that the pervasive influence of P.P.B.S. over the determination of planning, and priorities has engendered 'confidence' (53) among senior government and civil service officials, this is scarcely a unanimous perspective. Walter Stewart alleges that policy is developed not by the elected representatives in Cabinet, but rather by a 'supergroup'

(51) Ibid. p. 97.
(52) Ibid. p. 98.
(53) Ibid. p. 103.
of hand-picked Trudeau cohorts in the P.C.O. and P.M.O. Eric Kierans resigned from the Cabinet largely because of the inability of Cabinet members to influence policy which had already been decided upon by the P.M.O. and P.C.O. (54) His resignation illustrates Doern's point that policy is often determined by Cabinet Committees rather than by the Cabinet itself. (55)

The influence of the Prime Minister and his staff has been described as analogous to that of the American President and his advisors. Denis Smith argues that through the parliamentary reforms of 1968 by which the Trudeau government; "diverted detailed debate on all estimates and virtually all legislation from the floor of the House to specialized committees," (56) and through Rule 75C, which permitted the government to; "in the absence of agreement by the other parties, ... timetable discussions on the stage of individual bills." (57) Smith contends that through Prime Ministerial power over the bureaucracy, the Prime Minister has; "created around him a presidential...

(57) Ibid. p. 237.
office". (58) Although Smith ascribes to Trudeau "unerring presidential instincts", (59) the value of his research is not so much his conclusions but rather the evidence he compiles to indicate the tremendous control and power exercised by Mr. Trudeau over policy-making. The implications for the Canadian political process are that while the characterization of the Trudeau government as 'parliamentary' may well be naive, intimations of a 'closet president' are brash and eclectic. No doubt, however, Canada does have "prime ministerial" government.

(b) Military Professionalism and De-unification

Certainly one of the most disturbing aspects of the redefinition of defence priorities has been the deterioration of military morale with particular regard to what many members of the military consider a decline in professionalism. The critical issues appear to be the perceived ascendancy of military managers over commanders and the 'non-military' roles prescribed by Defence in the 70's.

(58) Ibid. p. 239.
(59) Ibid. p. 238.
As Colonel A.P. Wills points out:

"In our lemming-like rush to espouse the totems of management theory...we seem to have lost sight of those fundamental attitudes and practices which have eternally assured that a military force is greater than the sum of its parts... Although of like size to a large corporation, the Canadian forces serve a different purpose and must be fundamentally different in nature and outlook." (60)

Implicit in Colonel Wills' remark is the rejection of civilian management of the military in the absence of retaining those characteristics which are distinctively military. This sentiment persists; it is the view that military professionalism is derived from the traditional values of leadership, command and military training, exercised in response to a foreseen or unforeable threat to national security. As Major T.B. Winfield points out:

"No management theory, civilianizing process, technical revolution or edict from on high, will elicit the deserved response from units or servicemen in action. Those who have not learned about leadership in peace will not commence to practice it in war. If we condone in peacetime promotion on the basis of administrative or technical competence alone, we may well be seen to lack what it takes to respond to our country's expectations in an emergency." (61)


The corollary problem of course is the emphasis upon 'national development' and aid to the civil authority in the absence of more 'respectable' military occupations. Such dilemmas led to a seminar in Kingston in 1971, on the question of professionalism in the services. Richard Preston contributed a paper which argued that although the military may resent such 'civilian' roles, strategic realities dictated that a traditional military posture would, for Canada, be unrealistic. He stressed that contributing to 'national development' was not unique nor without precedent in the history of Canadian forces; further, given the events of October, 1970 and the military participation in that crisis, 'aid to the civil authorities' was a legitimate and respectable military role. (62) He recommended however, that critical to the maintenance of a high standard of professionalism was multi-purpose training to provide for 'conventional strategic deterrence' (63) both domestically and abroad. Despite Preston's optimism, reluctance to perform 'civilian'


(63) Ibid. p. 19.
roles does not appear to have diminished.

The civilianizing of management of the forces continues to be a source of irritation, if not outrage, for the military. The positive benefits of civilian control and direction have become mired in the excesses of civilian hegemony through the obsession with optimal planning. With the restructuring of headquarters, the responsibilities of the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff were merged. As a result, the chain of command is interspersed with civilians who know little about military operations(64) and whose:

"sympathies and aspirations seem likely to lie with the Treasury Board and the civil service hierarchy. As a result of this merger, the field commanders report to the C.D.S. and the staff report to the Deputy Minister. This makes the Minister the Commander-in-Chief...The C.D.S. could perhaps be considered the Commander-in-Chief except that his every move and direction has to have the support and concurrence of the Deputy Minister, who controls in exacting detail, all policy development and the provision and administration of personnel and materiel."(65)

The restructuring at headquarters also provided for the appointment of Assistant Deputy Ministers having

(65) Ibid. p. 37.
functional responsibilities (policy and strategic planning, personnel, finance and materiel). As Colonel J.E. Neelin and Colonel L.M. Pederson point out:

"It is the A.D.M.s who develop and define military policy...It is therefore the D.M. and the A.D.M.s who perform the important military functions, vis à vis the C.D.S. and the commanders. Their enormous authority reaches down through separate channels to the lowest field units and there seemed to be no way they can be held to account for anything short of calamitous failure." (66)

The concern then, and it is quite justifiable, is that in the event of an emergency situation, the Canadian response will be exercised by staff officers and civilians through an extraordinary centralized, complex and lengthy chain of command.

The preface to de-unification occurred in the fall of 1974 when Minister of National Defence, Richardson, threatened defence budget cuts, which would reduce personnel and prohibit the purchase of desperately needed new equipment while at the same time requiring continued multi-tasking. Richardson argued that it was better to have a well equipped force of 50,000 than 80,000 who were not. As John Gellner has asserted, Richardson's point was: "...irrelevant. If the mission of an armed force is such that it cannot be accomplished

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(66) Ibid. P. 38.
by 50,000 men then it obviously does not greatly matter how well paid they are or how well fed and equipped."(67) Criticism poured in from the military, the Royal Canadian Legion and the Canadian Defence Association. In November, the government announced an 11.2% increase in military spending. (68)

In mid-January of this year, Mr. Richardson announced the creation of an Air Command and a $275 million increase in the defence budget: (69)

"Once again, the Canadian Armed Forces will have three distinct commands - the Sea, the Land, and the Air. The C.D.S. General Dextraze and I have come to the conclusion that it is of the greatest importance for the Sailor, the Soldier and the Airman, while still being part of a unified force, to remain within, and to progress within, specific service channels...we have decided to form an Air Command similar in function to the Maritime and Mobile Command." (70)

A few weeks later, in February, Mr. Richardson suggested that the N.O.R.A.D. agreement be extended indefinitely. In May, he announced that Canada would henceforth control

her own air defence with two new N.O.R.A.D. regions in North Bay and Edmonton. The Air Command would be placed in Winnipeg, Mr. Richardson's constituency.

It would be premature to judge how the new Air Command will affect civil-military management at headquarters, indeed, it may even be premature to suggest that the forces are in fact, being de-unified. Both Mr. Richardson and General Dextraze insist that the forces shall remain 'unified'.(71) Such statements however, are misleading. During a press conference in Ottawa, Mr. Richardson distinctly left the impression that 'unified' forces did not mean unification, but rather 'integration'. The implications of his remarks are that the separation of land, sea and air contingents are a return to the integration phase of the 1964 White Paper on Defence.

(4) **Summary**

Despite Prime Minister Trudeau's enthusiasm for 'rationally contrived' policy objectives, their implementation through P.P.B.S. has been less than entirely satisfactory. The adjustment to cross-departmental programming has produced confusion while at the same time,

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(71) "Defence Shakeup to give Canada an Air Command", in Toronto Daily Star. op. cit.
recognition, that policy outputs may necessarily have to incorporate incremental aspects as well. Furthermore, the dramatically increased numbers of appointed policy advisors has led some observers, and Cabinet members, to believe that the Cabinet's role in policy matters has been surreptitiously handed over to the 'supergroup' in the P.M.O.

In defence matters, the co-ordination of other departments with National Defence has proved complicated and the redefinition of defence priorities has left the military somewhat bewildered as to their appropriate role. This dilemma has been further compounded by the permeation of headquarters with civilian staff and by the recent announcements that command would be de-unified. Such factors, coupled with the scarcity of resources for equipment purchases are undoubtedly responsible for the state of melancholy which has beset Canada's armed forces.
Chapter V: Conclusions and Observations

This research paper was based on the premise that previous analyses of unification, emphasizing service tradition and identity, command structures and management, or even nationalism, were not sufficient to justify the agenda for unification as proposed by Mr. Paul Hellyer. (The inadequacy of such analyses was a result of the failure to comprehend unification as a part of the political environment. Unification was inexorably related to the policy-process through which the civilian authority would attain its capability to determine the priorities of defence. This capability could not be accomplished through integration, because integration alone would not permit the 'structuring of influence' necessary in the policy-making process to ensure the civilian control and direction of the military.)

The ability of a government to determine its defence policy, is directly related to the policy-making process. This is not to infer that the substantive character of defence policy will necessarily change, but rather, that the government's ability to effect policy, relative to the degree of competition with the defence establishment, will change. Unification then, became the method through which the 'structuring of influence' in the policy-making process was transformed.
The military's legacy, both during and after World War II, of transgressing their responsibilities, coupled with Mr. Diefenbaker's incrementalist approach to policy and his reliance upon General Pearkes, meant that the civilian perspective in the formulation of defence policy was severely limited. It remained for Mr. Pearson, and ultimately Mr. Hellyer, to re-assert civilian supremacy. This led of course, to the defence policy review and unification.

Significantly, the transition in the 'structuring of influence' which occurred between the government and the defence establishment, paralleled the transition in the policy-making process. The expansion and differentiation of policy-making organs, the new sources of policy input and the introduction of SIMPAC and P.P.B.S. signalled a re-orientation as to how policy would be determined. The incrementalist approach to policy, though still prevalent, would no longer be the sole basis of policy planning.

With the election of Prime Minister Trudeau, policy-making became even more synonymous with the P.P.B.S. approach. Since unification had already confirmed civilian hegemony in defence matters, it remained for Mr. Trudeau to incorporate defence policy into the prescriptions of national policy objectives. This then,
was the defence policy review announced in April, 1969, which culminated in the publication *Defence in the 70's*.

Despite the initial confidence in a more 'rational' approach to policy-making, it soon became evident that incrementalism would not be entirely abandoned, nor could the Prime Minister's staff presume to acquire such a preponderance of influence in the policy-making process without creating dissention at the Cabinet level. In terms of defence, the infusion of civilians into National Defence Headquarters after 1971, coupled with what were regarded as 'non-military' roles for the Canadian Armed Forces, led to significant consternation among serving officers as to their 'identity'.

The implications of these events are not, as Messrs. Doern and Aucoin would have one believe, that the policy-making process is evolving towards a 'greater good', expressed through a more highly differentiated, expanded and centralized policy apparatus. Conversely, this research paper suggests that the degree of centralization endemic to an optimalized policy-making process necessarily leads to entropy among the components of the system. This has resulted from the Government's failure to recognize the need for, as in the case of the military, special skills, or the failure, or unwillingness
of the Government to comprehend that the pervasive influence of such a centralized hierarchy can lead to the deterioration, as Szablowski has argued, of the practices and institutions upon which it is founded.

Unification then, through asserting civilian direction and control, has also prepared the stage for Prime Minister Trudeau and his staff to inundate the military command structure with civilians. This is not intended to suggest that the Prime Minister's staff have become 'commissars' to the field forces, but rather that they have intruded into the management of the forces at headquarters. Whereas Paul Hellyer sought to assert civilian control through the elimination of separate commands and the expansion of civilian participation, under Pierre Trudeau the excesses of civilian participation have contributed to the return of elemental command, that is, de-unification. This is undoubtedly a retrogressive step because separate command structures, whether they are called Air Command, MARCOM and MOBCOM, or Army, Navy and Air Force, will inevitably lead to difficulties identical with those which existed prior to the 1964 White Paper on Defence.

With the spectre of de-unification close at hand, what emerges from this research is that if Canada is to have a credible defence policy, one which is
compatible both with the roles to be performed and with the military, then Canada must refrain from indulging in further structural change, and concentrate upon accomplishing the priorities defined in *Defence in the 70's.*
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