The Spatial Impress of Capital with the Colonial State in Swaziland, with Particular Reference to the Period 1903-1914

Jonathan S. Crush
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THE SPATIAL IMPRESS OF CAPITAL AND THE COLONIAL STATE IN SWAZILAND, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD 1903–1914.

By

Jonathan S. Crush
B.A.Hons., University of Cambridge, 1975

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Geography

Wilfrid Laurier University

1978
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Swaziland is in many ways a unique country on the African scene. The last African state to receive political independence from colonial Britain (in September, 1968), it has since been politically and socially dominated by the considerable personage of the world's longest reigning Monarch, His Majesty King Sobhuza II. The King, with absolute sway in the traditional sphere, is also proving a considerable binding force for a Nation being atomised by the forces of westernization. The Nation, a single tribe, is a relatively small one of approximately 520,000 population in a country of just over 6400 square miles.

Process is, of course, no respector of scale and as has been pointed out on a number of occasions, Swaziland duplicates many of the phenomena and dynamics of Independent Africa at large. For the student its size becomes a distinct advantage since it represents a compact laboratory which encapsulates much of the African past and present.

Swaziland has been my periodic home for the last twelve years. I was fortunate to be there during the 'heady' days of independence in 1968 and to experience at first hand the dissolution of many of the pernicious racial barriers which had been allowed to penetrate from neighbouring South Africa during the colonial period. In the years since one has been made aware of the signs of increasing prosperity and material welfare and a 'booming economy'.

In recent years, as knowledge of the country has increased and a more perceptive eye hopefully gained, it has become increasingly obvious that the greater prosperity is the preserve of a privileged few, that the economy is controlled by the forces of multi-national capital way beyond Swazi reach and that deep internal social contradictions are developing in the country. In addition, regional inequalities in health and wealth have if anything intensified and what was once called the colonial legacy – its distinctive human landscape – is still very much present.

In African studies as a whole there has been a growing awareness over the last decade that much of Africa is de facto still colonial; at least still tending to serve the purposes of the former European colonial power.

A desire to uncover the nature and implications of these purposes in Swaziland has led to a growing interest in the Swazi past. This interest has been fuelled by the geographer's appraisal that the human landscape bears the visible imprint of these purposes as they were worked out during the colonial period. It is within this interest area that the objectives of this thesis were framed.

Research for this thesis was undertaken during leave of absence from Wilfrid Laurier University from August 1977 to January 1978. The time was evenly divided between Britain, where research was primarily archival, and Swaziland, where archival research was coloured by first hand experience and by conversation with both black and white within the country.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my thanks to the following, for assistance and encouragement at various stages in the preparation of this thesis. In the field, to Mr. E.S. Crush of the University of Botswana and Swaziland, for unlocking some metaphorical research doors; to Mr. Julius Dlamini of the Swaziland National Archives, for unlocking some actual research doors; and to Mr. Sidney Williams of Manzini, Swaziland, for providing a living key to Swaziland's past. The final draft of the thesis owes much to the sage counsel of my supervisor, Dr. Bruce Young of Wilfrid Laurier University, and Dr. Ron Bullock of the University of Waterloo. I also thank my family for their unstinting support at all times and a large number of friends, near and far, without whose humour the task would not have been complete.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

"Swaziland is an unusual country, in some ways quite unique."
Sir Alfred Pease, 1914.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this research paper must be viewed in the context of the new research field of African historical geography, particularly as it relates to the contribution of defunct colonialism to the geography of newly-independent states. This objective is, in essence, to provide a deeper historical and geographical understanding of the arrangement, patterning and organisation of space in contemporary Swaziland. In particular, it seeks explanations for a distinctive pattern of land ownership and control, and the relationship of this pattern to the space-economy of development.

The use of an orthodox developmental perspective on Third World spatial organisation, even were a coherent one to exist, appears doomed to flounder on the rocks of classic ideological bias and abstracted empiricism as previous studies of spatial organisation in Swaziland have done. The search for alternative modes of explanation was triggered in the first place by the realization of persistent and intensified regional and social inequalities in the post-colonial period and by the fact that the first decade of independence (1968-78) has witnessed no substantial reorganisation of colonial space and hence, presumably, also of its underlying structure.
The penetration of Marxian-structuralist interpretations of colonialism, imperialism and development/underdevelopment into geography in the recent past (post 1970) have, however, provided a new range of theoretical constructs which appear to have much greater explanatory depth in the analysis of spatial organisation in the Third World. Commitment to such a mode of explanation, with its fundamental emphasis on historicity, would also breathe new life into the stagnant state of African historical geography.

In this initial chapter of the study the basic geographical patterns in Swaziland are constructed as a contemporary backdrop to the historical emphases of this dissertation (1.3). This follows an outline of the basic aims and intentions in attempting to construct the underlying structures of spatial organisation in the historical context (1.2). Data used and methodology deployed are discussed (1.4) and a summary of the structure of the thesis presented (1.5).

1.2 SUMMARY OF INTENT

In pursuit of the primary objective of this dissertation postulated in 1.1 above the following focii need to be enunciated. In the historical context of the thesis, it is intended to try and establish the association and connections between regional and international economic and social forces and the organisation of space at the local level, within Swaziland. This has already been attempted for a number of other countries in Africa (see Chapter Two). It will entail the construction and analysis of the process of European capitalist penetration of Swaziland for
the colonial period; looking at the agents of capital and their links within the metropolis and with the colonial state, and at the aims of capital in relation to methods of surplus appropriation, prospective and realised.

At the local level the study will explore the particular way in which space was organised in Swaziland in response to the implicit and articulated social and economic aspirations of a metropolitan settler class in relation to control over land, labour and raw materials. Examination of the details of land alienation and partition, as proposed and implemented, will reveal the ways in which an apparently unordered spatial array is, in reality, the product of an ordered social and economic structure of capitalist integration.

To mitigate a total Eurocentric bias it is further intended to pinpoint the areas of value conflict between imposed and indigenous systems and to show how the will of the former inexorably dominated at points of conflict. It is proposed that the empirical focii of the thesis be sited in neo-Marxian structuralist conceptualisations of social and economic reality as an integrating explanatory framework.

1.3 CONTEMPORARY SPATIAL ORGANISATION

Swaziland has existed as a definite political entity since the 1870's. Its location in relation to other southern African states and its small size are illustrated in Map One. It was ruled as a British colony from 1902 - 1968; receiving formal political independence from Britain on 9th September, 1968.
MAP ONE: SWAZILAND LOCATION & SIZE
General elections in the same year under a Westminster-style constitution returned the Imbokodvo National Movement, with its leader the traditional monarch Sobhuza II, to power. After the 1972 elections, the King suspended the constitution and disbanded parliament as a prelude to investing supreme legislative powers in himself. This autocracy has continued to the present 4. Economically, the country is committed to its colonial inheritance of dependence on South Africa for imports and its neo-colonial status as a supplier of raw materials for the western capitalist world 5.

As regards internal spatial patterning, Webster, Murdoch & Lawrance (1968), I'ons (1967) and Murdoch (1970) all give some indication of the environmental diversity prevailing in Swaziland. But it has become common practice in the heterogeneous mass of secondary accounts to divide the country up into four north-south running natural belts, clearly distinguished by several environmental indicators (Table One and Map Two).

Superimposed over this pattern of spatial environmental diversity, and not totally unrelated to it, is a complex and dynamic patchwork of land holding and ownership. Two general categories of land holding can be identified, based on diametrically opposed principles of holding and ownership; 1. Individual Tenure Land (I.T.L.), which is held under freehold or leasehold by international capitalist corporations (10% of the total area) and individual white owners, resident and absentee (32%) 6. In 1974, there were 589 farms and estates. Of these a mere 35 covered 60% of I.T.L., or almost one-quarter
SWAZILAND: NATURAL BELTS

- MBABANE
- MAMZHINI

HIGHVELD
MIDDLEVELD
LOWVELD
LEBOMBO

MAP TWO
### TABLE ONE

THE NATURAL BELTS OF SWAZILAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>ELEVATION(m)</th>
<th>MEAN ANNUAL TEMP.(°F.)</th>
<th>MEAN ANNUAL RAIN.(mm)</th>
<th>DROUGHT HAZARD %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(sq.km.)</td>
<td>MEAN RANGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHVELD</td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>1200 790-1820</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1000-2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLEVELD</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>600 330-1050</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>750-1150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWVELD</td>
<td>6200</td>
<td>270 80-750</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>500-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUBOMBO</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>550 40-900</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>600-1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* % of years with less than 635mm rainfall.

Source: Murdoch(1970), Hughes(1972)

### FIGURE 1

TOPOGRAPHIC SECTION ACROSS SWAZILAND

1 to 8 miles north of the Usutu River, approximately west-east

VERTICAL SCALE 1 75,000  HORIZONTAL SCALE 1 750,000  VE 10

of the total area of Swaziland.\textsuperscript{7}

2. Swazi Nation Land (S.N.L.), which is held "in trust" for the Swazi nation by the monarch. Individual ownership of land is consequently not practised. Land allocation and tenurial practice is still largely traditional within the bounds of a complex social framework elaborated by Hughes (1964,1972) and Kuper (1966).\textsuperscript{8} It comprises land allocated to the Swazi in 1907 by the British colonial state and subsequent extensions during the colonial period. Also included are extensions since 1968 (11\% of total area).

The breakdown of control between these types of land holding is portrayed in Table Two and Map Three.

A number of other spatial configurations tie in closely with this basic subdivision of space. These include population distribution, landscape form and functional organisation.

As regards distribution and density of population, Murdoch (1970) writes that "the overriding factor determining gaps in the network of homesteads has been the 1907 partition" (p.62). Table Three illustrates the clear difference between S.N.L. and I.T.L. in population holding. A demographic analysis is still more enlightening. This reveals that the male : female ratio on S.N.L. is 75 : 100, on I.T.L. it is 126 : 100, and in urban areas 192 : 100. These are startling differences which indicate the existence of a marked differential migration pattern in the colonial period (Map Four).\textsuperscript{9}

Second, with reference to landscape appearance, inspection of the 1972 Swaziland Ministry of Agriculture air photo coverage
TABLE TWO

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND HOLDING, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SWAZI NATION LAND</th>
<th>ACRES</th>
<th>%TOTAL AREA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of which;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibiyo Fund, Govnt.</td>
<td>461,250</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stations etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land held or grazed by Swazi farmers</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL TENURE LAND</td>
<td>1,879,750</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban land</td>
<td>23,250</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title Farms</td>
<td>559,200</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation Title</td>
<td>458,500</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Swaziland Ministry of Agriculture, Land Planning Section.
TABLE THREE

SWAZI POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POP. ('000s)</th>
<th>SQUARE MILES</th>
<th>DENSITY (per sq. mile)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNL</td>
<td>ITL</td>
<td>SNL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHVELD</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLEVELD</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWVELD</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUBOMBO</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>3650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones (1968).
MAP FOUR: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

SOURCE: FAIR ET AL. (1969)
shows up the visible differences between Swazi rural landscape with its dispersed settlement pattern and the larger-scale commercial farms and plantations.

Most striking, however, is the functional variation. Table Four illustrates the major differences between tenurial type in terms of agricultural practice. As regards total agricultural G.D.P., almost 60% comes from I.T.L. while about 39% originates from S.N.L. Of the total area of land under I.T.L. control (43% of Swaziland) only 6.8% is crop cultivated (3.1% is sugar plantations). Of the area under cultivation, nearly 60% is owned by only 20 farms or estates. Thus agricultural production is the dominant preserve of 20-35 estates (a number of which are completely owned by foreign capital), while considerable areas of unused or under-utilised land are locked-up outside the control of the Swazi nation. S.N.L., on which 76% of the total population reside, are characterised on the other hand by over-population, over-grazing and concomitant environmental degradation. In 1976, 65% of rural Swazi families were unable to satisfy minimum required levels of nutrition and imports of maize reached an all-time high of $1.6 million.

It is possible to be somewhat more definitive about the structure of the contemporary space-economy under capitalist development. This was first analysed by Fair, Murdoch and Jones (1969) who identified four "core development regions", but which are better referred to as zones of intensive capitalist articulation. These zones are delimited on Map Five. The severe regional imbalances which they represent are
### TABLE FOUR

**LAND USE AND MAJOR CROPS (1975)**

#### A. SWAZI NATION LAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use (%)</th>
<th>Major Crops (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivation</td>
<td>Maize 76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallow</td>
<td>Groundnuts 8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homesteads</td>
<td>Sorghum 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazing</td>
<td>Beans 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others 8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. INDIVIDUAL TENURE LAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use (%)</th>
<th>Major Crops (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivation</td>
<td>Sugar Cane 42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallow</td>
<td>Cotton 17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazing</td>
<td>Maize 14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forests</td>
<td>Rice 6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Land</td>
<td>Citrus 5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others 4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Central Statistical Office.*
highlighted by the following statistics;

(i) These zones comprise 15% of the total area of the country and contained, in 1966, 24% of the Swazi and 75% of the white populations.

(ii) Land in these zones is 95% non-Swazi controlled.

(iii) These zones were together responsible for 91% of G.D.P. in 1975 and accounted for 92% of the total value of exports in the same year.

(iv) The flow of foreign private capital investment and foreign aid since 1968 has continued to be almost exclusively towards these zones. These are therefore the zones of most intense surplus extraction. The International Labour Organisation estimates that external payments of foreign-owned corporations were at least $22 million in 1974 (as high as 20% of G.D.P.).

Foreign domination of the economy and the consequent external conditions of dependency are examined by Fransman (1973) and Crush (1977).

(v) Almost 93% of the total wage-earning labour force of 61,000 is located in these zones (84% of which is unskilled or semi-skilled).

(v) Per capita incomes show sharp regional inequalities. The 15% of the population in urban areas/corporation towns received 43% of the total personal income; the 20% on I.T.L. received 16% of the total; whereas the remaining 62% accounted for only 18%. There are also wide income discrepancies between the white/black urban-based middle class and the wage labourers within the four zones.

(vi) The sex-age structure of the population is significantly different between these zones and the rural periphery.
SWAZILAND: LAND DISTRIBUTION AND THE SPACE ECONOMY

Swasi Nation Land
Individual Tenure Holdings
Cores of Economic Activity (From Fair, Murdoch & Jones 1969)
Major Urban Centres (Population 3000)
S A R Railheads
1964 Railway
Proposed Route of 1978 Railway

Source: Crush (1977)

MAP FIVE
The poorly-developed transport infrastructure of the country (except in the Mbabane-Manzini region) is a reflection of the external orientation of the capitalist zones. The lack of internal integration is shown up by Maasdorp (1971) in a traffic flow study. The railway serves purely as an agency for export of the products of foreign exploitation.

This background information on the contemporary spatial structure of Swaziland highlights the existence of considerable regional inequalities within the country and also suggests that the arrangement of contemporary space is controlled by the social and economic processes of integration into the international capitalist system. The argument to be sustained in this thesis is that this link between capital and spatial structure is not merely a contemporary phenomenon or indeed only a function of the advent of the multi-national corporation since 1940. It is rather a link which goes back to the earliest penetration of foreign capital into the country.

1.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The materials and data analysed in this study comprise empirical and empirically-based information from a variety of sources. The direction of the research proposal (presented in March 1977 in Wilfrid Laurier Graduate Seminar Series) indicated that qualitative source materials of primary and secondary nature were the chief concern. Quantitative data tends to be
fragmentary in the historical record. Where available, however, it was recorded and is used to amplify and support the major arguments of the thesis.

Research was conducted in two locations during the period August to December, 1977. These were Britain, the colonial hearthland, and Swaziland, where the effects of colonialism were most strongly felt. Certain relevant documentation has found its way into proximate South African archives, and these sources were consulted where necessary. Data sought was in accord with the stated aims of the research, outlined and discussed in this chapter and Chapter Two.

In Britain, The National Registry of Archives (London), with its comprehensive bibliographic catalogue, in combination with N. Mathews and M. D. Wainwright (1971) A Guide To Manuscripts And Documents In The British Isles Relating To Africa, are the natural jumping-off points for the primary source material search. Attention was directed from there to The Public Records Office and to two Oxford University libraries (The Bodleian Library and The Rhodes House Library). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library and the Royal Commonwealth Society Library contain little pertinent information on Swaziland that cannot be found elsewhere.

An unhappy coincidence was the closure of the Public Records Office (moving its location from Chancery Lane to Kew), during the period of the research season in England (1 August – 10 October, 1977). It is believed that this omission may not be as damaging as at first thought since most of the documentation catalogued in Mathews and Wainwright
proved available for consultation elsewhere.

Important collections of private papers were consulted at Oxford (Appendix 1a). These included those of Lord Milner (Governor of the Transvaal, 1897-1905) and the Earl of Selborne (Governor of South Africa, 1905-1910) in the Bodleian Library and Sir Robert Coryndon (Resident Commissioner, Swaziland, 1907-1916) in the Rhodes House Library. L.B. Frewer (1971) Manuscript Collections Of Africana In Rhodes House Library, Oxford is a good guide to the holdings of the latter library.

The British Museum Reading Room proved to be a useful source for some of the more obscure secondary texts concerned with Swaziland. These include such works as Davis (1898), Griffith (1890), Coryndon (1914) and O'Neill (1921).

In Africa, The Swaziland National Archives was the major source of primary and secondary materials. In January, 1978 the archives were moved from Mbabane to a new centre at Lebombo. For primary source materials, V.F. Ellenberger (1962) Catalogue Of The Swaziland Records, 1881-1949 proved a satisfactory guide to the invaluable collection of original colonial, settler and Swazi documentation for the period up to 1940. The files consulted were in a state of disarray but the required catalogued information was, with one notable exception, fortunately generally available (Appendix 1a). A patchy index available at the Archives covers the period from 1950 but these files were not available for study due to the change of location.

The extensive Swaziland National Archives Library, built up by R.V. Hiller in the early 1970's, contains a great deal of
official and unofficial published material. For the period prior to 1900, the Colonial Blue Books were consulted for information about the nature and processes of colonial officialdom. In the Blue Books, Convention agreements, individual and commission reports, and private correspondence are a mine of qualitative data. S.B. Williams, M.B.E., a member of the first British colonial administration in Swaziland in 1903 and still resident in Swaziland generously consented to the loan of his personal set of Blue Books for further study.

For the early colonial period, The Times Of Swaziland proved worthy of close scrutiny. Despite its unashamed role as an advocate of white interest it carries much valuable comment on the pre Boer War era (pre 1899). It also provides objective accounts of the proceedings of the Swaziland Concessions Commission and the work of the partition commissioner. Several publications of the Commission itself were drawn on for supplementary information and material (Appendix 1b). The High Commissioner's Gazettes and Notices contain all legislation passed by the colonial state during the colonial period. These are currently being indexed at the National Archives (but see also, M.G. Balima A Guide To Official Publications In Botswana Lesotho and Swaziland, 1868-1968).

A sojourn in Durban, South Africa, enabled research on the private papers of A.M. Miller at the Killie Campbell Africana Library (University of Natal). This proved to be an important exercise considering Miller's role in early colonial Swaziland (Appendix 1a/1c). The private papers of G. Grey, Partition Commissioner for Swaziland 1907-8, proved impossible to trace,
but a comprehensive picture of his role can be pieced together from the aforementioned sources (Appendix 1c).

C.S. Wallace (1967) *Swaziland: A Bibliography*, J.P. Webster and P. Mohume (1968) *A Bibliography of Swaziland*, and particularly J.J. Grotpeter (1975) *An Historical Dictionary of Swaziland* are good guides to the published secondary material on Swaziland, most of which was available in the National Archives Library. The National Archives has a small map collection but the most important discovery for the purposes of this thesis were the maps of the 1906 Concession Boundary Survey, found by chance in an office of the Ministry of Works, Power & Communications, Mbabane.

An obstacle encountered in research was the paucity of primary Swazi documentation for the period under study. Since it was necessary to obtain information (particularly for Chapter Six) the same documentary stock as above was utilised. Its interpretation must therefore be a matter of some care.

Retrospective comment on earlier eras and personal interpretations of the contemporary scene were obtained in an informal manner from a number of Swazis, white residents and S.B. Williams.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The review of the literature in Chapter Two traces the development of neo-Marxian perspectives and theory in development and historical geography, through a summarised critique of orthodox approaches to the appropriation of a model deemed suitable for the study of Swaziland's spatial evolution. Chapter Three provides a historical background and base to the period
under specific study. Chapters Four, Five and Six constitute the core of the thesis, analysing the interplay between capital, the colonial state and the Swazi population in generating a distinctive colonial spatial patterning and organisation. Chapter Seven briefly traces the changes in spatial organisation in the remainder of the colonial period (1914-1968) and afterwards, while the final chapter is a statement of conclusions to be drawn from the study.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

"The theory of development is simply a theory, and a bad one."

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to and synthesis of neo-Marxian approaches in development and historical geography. This is prefaced by a summary of the critique of orthodox development geography from within the discipline (2.2). Approaches to a general theory of imperialism and colonialism, and the related question of Third World spatial form and organisation are then elucidated (2.3 and 2.4). The argument that attention should be focussed on the structures of imperialism is carried through in the elaboration of a model within which the study as a whole can be framed (2.5). A summary of theoretical elements at the heart of the study is then presented (2.6).

2.2 ORTHODOXY

Brookfield (1973) marks the nadir of orthodox geographical approaches to development as Hodder's "Economic Development In The Tropics", published in 1969. It seems, however, that ingrained perspectives die hard as exemplified by the work of Johnson (1970), Weinand (1972), Logan (1972) and Ginsburg (1973). Under a breaking wave of criticism of inherent Eurocentricity and capitalist ideological bias from Hurst (1973), Blaut (1973),
Santos (1974), McGee (1974), Brookfield (1975), Slater (1975a, 1976), Cannon (1976) and Hudson and Carney (1976), such recent contributions as Knight and Newman (1976) and De Blij and Best (1977) stand out as lonely and largely inarticulate voices. The neo-Marxian critique is directed at orthodoxy in general but also applies to specific studies of internal spatial organisation.

Slater (1975a) lays most of the blame for the redundancy of orthodox approaches at the door of geography's "quantitative revolution" and its unquestioning application in the Third World:

"Instead of a concentration on theoretical issues embedded in any substantive attempt at explanation of social reality, relative sophistication in the measurement and description of a set of abstracted relationships has become the major gauge of scientific worth." (p 161)

Slater designates this as an inverted methodology. Other characteristics of this "abstracted empiricism" are an overriding concern with surface descriptions of spatial patterning at the expense of exploration of underlying social process, a failure to grasp the inter-connections between spatial structure and political economy, and uncritical derivation of theory from the social sciences.

Slater (1973) identifies three orthodox models of analysis of Third World space common in geography in the 1960's and early 1970's. These are (i) spatial differentiation (economic dualism, centre-periphery models), (ii) spatial diffusion (modernization studies), and (iii) spatial integration (models of national integration, growth pole models). The particular emphasis of these approaches is the construction of elaborate
descriptive models of contemporary space-economies based on the operation of supposed spatial processes and on offering inadequate prescriptions for resolution of growing Third World regional and social inequalities. Johnson (1970) undoubtedly represents the worst excess of this methodology in an intensely ahistorical study which expresses a concern to identify "the dominant organising principles of organised space" in the Third World. Johnson falls far short of his stated mark.

Both Brookfield (1975) and Slater (1975a) are highly critical of the "modernization" school in geography represented by the work of Gould (1964, 1970), Soja (1968), Witthuhn (1968), Riddell (1970), Soja and Tobin (1972) and, in the Swaziland case, Lea (1972) \(^1\). It is significant that this school has been silent in the last four years. The early concerns of the school were to identify spatial patterns of "modernization" in the Third World. Modernization, as defined, was alarmingly Eurocentric and deeply ideological. In fact, the choice of variables to describe modernization were invariably representative of colonial and capitalist artifacts; but the theory was seen to break down in its equation of development and modernization. That the spread of modernization would lead to greater social and economic egalitarianism and the destruction of regional inequalities was perfunctorily assumed and never questioned in the light of experience. Modernization exposed to the light was seen to imply the introduction of capitalism to pre-capitalist social formations and to function to the benefit of development
at the metropole to the detriment of the peripheral country.

The school had some of the trappings of an historical approach but Riddell's (1970) study of the diffusion of modernization is only superficially historical. It assumes that all things Western are beneficial to development and therefore gives no history to the indigenous society or economy; particularly the manner of its weakening and destruction under the impress of capitalism.

Duality, and its attendant centre-periphery model of the space economy, are core concepts in Fair, Murdoch and Jones (1969) and Maasdorp's (1976) description of Swaziland's space. For the former:

"The geographic pattern of economic development in Swaziland comprises a number of social and economic enclaves, representative of the modern economy, and widespread economically backward areas of subsistence activity on the other." (p 39).

The simplistic dualism which they propose and which Maasdorp (1976) extends is obfuscating for a number of reasons;

(i) They propose the existence of two discrete, mutually exclusive entities for what is, in reality, a single social and economic whole. Relations between "backward" regions/social groups and "modern" regions/social groups represent, according to Slater (1973):

"The functioning of a unified society of which these are two poles which originate in the course of a single historical process " (p 23).

Holistic emphasis would grant a history to the so-called backward sector which might lead to the conclusion that its backwardness should not be counterpoised with the modernity
of the capitalist centre but that it is, in a more profound sense a creation of it. This approach fails to take account of the actual mechanisms which gave rise to the dichotomy in the first place.

(ii) While both authors admit to the weakening and destruction of the pre-capitalist economy in the early colonial period neither analyse the mechanisms underlying this process, and both unquestioningly assume that closer integration of all social groups and regions into the international capitalist system is the path to future development.

(iii) Iliffe (1971), with reference to Tanzania, has argued that the whole country is directly or indirectly integrated into the capitalist system. This could also be argued for Swaziland, if we regard individual tenure land as a rural extension of capitalism and the Swazi nation land as essentially a peripheral labour-supply zone.

(iv) A serious weakness of the centre-periphery model is its failure to identify the social and economic contradictions within the centre, which is by no means homogeneously egalitarian.

The point is not to belabour the superficiality of the dualistic approach in relation to Swaziland but to point out that it gives little credence to the penetration and destructive impact of capitalism in the country.

National integration of the assymetrical space economy is deemed a planning necessity by Fair, Murdoch and Jones (1969) to ensure "balanced regional development". This should incorporate a strategy to "spread modern development to the rural areas"(p 9).
This process is conceived within a framework which insists upon the inevitability of a development path following along patterns established in the western world. Most of the strategies suggested are designed to benefit foreign capital and not the local population.

Brookfield's (1975) pertinent criticism is that orthodoxy tends to locate the Third World country in a "historical vacuum" with no real history of its own. Slater (1977) extends Brookfield's criticism in a paper which takes orthodox approaches to task for their avoidance of the realities of the world capitalist economy:

"One is struck by the total absence of any serious consideration, or in some cases even mention of, capitalism....no analysis or even description is provided to enable a move towards a comprehension of the development and expansion of western capitalism and its profoundly significant effects on peripheral social formations. The specific historical position that these social formations occupy in the polarised structure of the world capitalist economy is evaded and yet without an understanding of their position, no analysis, whether it be concerned with spatial structure or not, can hope to advance beyond a superficial and mechanistic analysis of forms and appearances" (p 18).

Such a criticism, while harsh, is exemplified in the descriptive historical approaches to colonialism adopted by Hellen (1968, 1969), Witthuhn (1976) and Crowder (1970).

The school they are in argues that colonial administrative policies per se are fundamental to the evolution of landscapes in the colony which are likely to be obliterated in the post-colonial period. This does not lead that far. There is no real suggestion of the factors influencing and reasons for such policies and particularly lacking is any analysis of the
historical relationship between capital and the colonial state. Christopher's (1971) empirical study of the evolution of land policy in Natal, under two different systems of white land settlement is of a similar genre.

Mention should also be made of the 1960's debate between Floyd (1962), Roder (1964) and Hamilton (1965) about land alienation in Rhodesia. The point at issue is the agro-potential of black and white held land. The argument that Roder and Hamilton convincingly rebuff through consideration of historical evidence is that land alienation per se had no inimical effect on the indigenous society and economy since the whole country is of uniform agro-potential and that land perceived as desirable by capital was uninhabited by blacks. It is left to Arrighi (1970) to show how land alienation was a major measure responsible for the creation of a black labour force. Porter and de Souza's (1974) excellent summary of Arrighi highlights the fact that with a penetrating historical analysis contemporary land control patterns assume a quite different significance when tied in with the expansion of international capitalism.

The sparse and often ineffectual writing of geographers on African history prompts one to cast the eye over methodological stances of social and economic history writing. Such work is profoundly aspatial in intent and execution but invariably focusses on the social and economic processes and structures which the geographer cannot afford to ignore if understanding is to penetrate beyond the naive. Arrighi (1970) on the proletarianisation of the African peasantry, Polanyi (1971) on the structure of pre-capitalist economies, Rodney (1972) and
Amin (1972) on the process of underdevelopment, and Wallerstein (1974) and Cohen and Daniel (1975) on dependency theory are mere samples from a burgeoning literature which aims at a critical re-interpretation of colonialism and imperialism and reiterates the importance of firmly locating any particular country of study within the broader context of the world political economy.

At the empirical level, Pachai's (1973) otherwise vapid study of colonial legislation in Malawi suggests, by implication rather than explicitly, that a reorientation towards constructing the links between capital and the colonial state would be a fruitful exercise in explaining colonial policy. Henderson (1974), for colonial Zambia, stresses the close relationship between the colonial state and the large mining corporations and also argues for a redefinition of the roles of white settlers and black populism in determining colonial policy. Both Austen (1975) and Neil-Tomlinson (1977) propose that isolation of the mechanics of capitalist expansion in the late 19th Century would provide a clearer insight into the colonial legacies of the colonial states. It is left to Slater, H. (1971,1975), in penetrating case studies of the changing methods of capital to appropriate surplus in colonial Natal, in response to changes in the regional political econmy, to suggest how such a rationale might be implemented in practice.

Studies by Thompson and Aldoff (1975), Gann (1975) and Hammond (1975) focus attention on the official economic policies of the colonial state with reference to Africa for France, Germany and Portugal respectively. A particularly penetrative analysis by Peemans (1975) of capital accumulation in colonial
Belgian Congo reveals the particularly active role adopted by the colonial state in facilitating the inflow of Belgian capital and the expropriation of peasant surplus. In sum, these recent studies indicate that new interpretations are not confined to British colonialism and imperialism in Africa.

Nevertheless, the social and economic history fields have their own orthodoxies as evidenced by a number of works on Swaziland. Swaziland in general and the period under consideration in this thesis have been badly neglected research areas to date. Boyce (1947) was the first of a rather weak series of descriptive accounts of the period 1870-1915. Following in this tradition are Whittington and Daniel (1969), Mashasha (1973), Drooglever (1976) and Nyeko (1976). Nothing presented goes much beyond reproduction of official published sources from the period and the detailing of various colonial legislation. With an overemphasis on political rather than economic history little attempt is made to develop an appropriate theoretical framework for studying the actions of the colonial state. Thus locating the country in the broader historical context of the expansion of capitalism, a fundamental location to explain many of the internal social, political and spatial dynamics, is ignored. Youé (1977) is the first to take halting steps in this direction. His focus is on a comparison of British colonial policy towards black attempts to regain expropriated land in Rhodesia and Swaziland. Even this study is inadequate, however, because it fails to give due credence to the role of metropolitan capital in Swaziland in the period concerned.
Both theoretically and empirically this study therefore attempts to break new ground in the study of Swaziland's past and present.

What is called for is an alternative methodology with an historical perspective for examining the spatial structure of colonialism and development under capitalism. Two interlinked directions are taken in the search. First to the attempts by geographers to derive and expand an holistic theory of imperialism and, second, to a consideration of structuralist approaches to spatial organisation in the Third World.

2.3 GEOGRAPHERS AND THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM

With regard to the theory of imperialism Slater (1977) writes:

"When studying the geographical literature published prior to 1970 one finds very little evidence indeed of an awareness of the theoretical importance of imperialism" (p 3).

Blaut (1970,1975), Folke (1973), U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977) have all published cases for the inclusion of a general theory of imperialism in geography. Their argument is first a negation of the purely politico-historical definitions of imperialism favoured by political historians and, in geography, the Hellen school:

"In this view imperialism is seen purely as a political phenomenon closely related to the nineteenth century concept of Empire. Consequently attention is diverted away from its economic and social elements" (Slater, 1977, p1).

Secondly, they call for the development of a rigorous neo-Marxian definition and concept of imperialism consistent with the refocus of scholarly attention on the international
capitalist system as an objective of research. A new theory of imperialism promises to be:

"An alternative theoretical system which can enable us scientifically to explain the socio-economic phenomena which development geographers are concerned with but unable to account for" (Slater, 1977, p. 1).

Thirdly, they argue that in the development of such theory, admittedly still in its infancy, it is insufficient merely to describe the process of penetration of the periphery by capital as Porter and de Souza (1974) propose. A theory of imperialism would hope to explain the essentially expansionist nature of capital and the manner of its world penetration in the past and present.

Several social scientists have produced summaries and extensions of the theories of imperialism to be found in Marx, Lenin, Hobson and Luxemburg. The nuances of this debate on the content of a theory of imperialism are not the concern here although all of the work by geographers on the theory give due consideration to these studies. The positive contributions to theory by geographers to date are limited to Blaut (1975), U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977).

Blaut (1975), ever-conscious of the paucity of class-analysis in neo-Marxian geography, conceives imperialism as the export of the class struggle from the developed to the Third World in a manner castigated by U.S.G. (1976) and Slater (1977). The spatial homogeneity of class explicit in Blaut's model is a basic failing and Slater (1977) even challenges Blaut's understanding of class as being inverted and non-marxist.

Both U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977) consider the inherent
expansionary nature of capital. The former draw their conceptualisation from the work of Emmanuel (1972) and Amin (1974) on the process of "capitalist accumulation" in specific historical contexts. Harvey (1977) on the other hand attempts to rediscover a classic Marxist theory of imperialism. Of these, Harvey is the more useful and penetrating. His analysis of Marx leads to the conclusion that the phenomenon of capitalist accumulation is inherently expansionary. Thus he writes:

"The Marxian theory of accumulation under the capitalist mode of production says that capitalism is bound to expand through both an intensification of the relationships in the capitalist centres of production and a geographical extension of those relationships in space" (p 281).

Harvey (1977) claims that the theory as elaborated is an abstract one which awaits application in specific historical contexts.

Slater's (1977) approach to a theory of imperialism is more eclectic. He derives his basic definition from Kemp (1967):

"The Marxist theory of imperialism is centred around the aim of explaining the immanent characteristics of the capitalist mode of production in its latest and most advanced stage, and in fact the theory uses the term not to signify the relationship between an advanced imperial country and the colonial areas falling within its formal empire, but to analyse a special stage of capitalist development" (p 5), and, more succinctly, direct from Lenin (1963):

"Imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism" (p 5).

Slater tries to empirically address several of Lenin's assertions about the characteristics of the monopoly stage. These include the concentration of capital, the merging of bank and industrial capital, the export of capital, the formation
of international monopolist combines and the territorial division of the world. Slater finds Lenin's contribution on the historical export of capital from the metropole to be deficient as others have done before him. The relationship between imperialism and colonialism is then addressed.

Summarising a lengthy argument, imperialism is seen to be a stage in the development of capitalism and colonialism, as territorial division and control, as an adjunct to but not prerequisite for imperialism. They should therefore not be seen as synonymous. European colonialism in Africa in the nineteenth century is seen as closely related to imperialism in that it provided the specific historical context for monopoly control of territory, for protection of capitalist interests and for anticipatory capitalist penetration. Acceptance of the last point would certainly challenge Robinson and Gallagher's (1961) widely held thesis that British colonialism in Africa was purely strategic, albeit to protect British capital investment in the east.

While concurring with Slater's (1977) thesis that the focus of study of Third World social and spatial formations under western impact should be couched within a general theory of imperialism, the question of the linkages between imperialism and colonialism still lie largely unresolved both theoretically and empirically. The issue is addressed again in 2.6 where the role of the colonial state in capitalist expansion in nineteenth century Africa is considered.

Slater (1977) finally quotes extensively from Luxemburg (1968) to argue that a holistic theory of imperialism must incorporate study of the impact of capitalism on pre-capitalist social
formations, modes of production and the spatial organisation of the Third World. To pursue this point further this review now turns to geographical studies which incorporate an explicit consideration of Third World spatial organisation within structuralist formulations.

2.4 SPACE AND STRUCTURE

The cue for the structuralist paradigm is taken from:

Coutsinas and Pax (1977):

"We need to take into account past or present forms of the integration of the country into the dominant capitalist system. This integration is at the root of the explanation of internal spatial dynamics.... we should look for the determining factors of spatial organisation in Third World countries in the functioning of the dominant capitalist system" (p97),

from Corragio (1977):

"There is a need to conceptually separate what constitutes material spatial manifestation from the social structures proper which regulate the production of such phenomena"(p15)

and from Slater (1975b):

"An approach to the explanation of spatial organisation and inequality might well be couched in terms of the historical development of a particular spatial structure ....we must situate the phenomenon in an overall context of international capitalist expansion and focus on time, space and structure"

Structuralism and structuralist approaches to spatial organisation in geography tend to draw their inspiration from approaches in the social sciences. To date, however, only a very few geographers have attempted to come to terms with the need for an articulated structuralist paradigm. Most obvious are the contributions of Gregory (1976) and the earlier expositions of McTaggart (1974) and Olsson (1974).

Taking the premise, as Gregory (1976) does, that the reality
of process and function cannot be unambiguously determined from form since underlying relationships, dialectical change and conflict are not mappable, prompts the conclusion that the focus of attention in explanation should not be unrelated spatial aggregates but related structured systems.

Gregory (1976) thus distinguishes between two common understandings of 'structure' in geography. The more orthodox view sees social structure as being made up of observed patterns of interaction, so that the term 'structure' refers to some visible ordered arrangement of parts or components. The structuralist view proper is that the elements of manifest reality must be mediated by a concealed structure. De George (1972) argues that:

"If there is one common idea which ties together the many different forms of structuralism, from Marx to Freud to Piaget to Levi-Strauss, it is the conviction that surface events and phenomena, the explicit and the obvious, can be explained by structures and relationships which are below the surface, implicit, not obvious, out of conscious awareness. This attempts to move beyond (but by no means ignore) the empirical patternings derived from actual observation" (p 123).

The importance for De George is that structuralism does attribute special significance to concepts such as mode of production and class contradiction. De George (1972) is also a salutary reminder to Gregory (1976) who appears to be all for rejecting any actual observation of empirical patternings.

Elements of structuralist approaches to spatial organisation in the Third World can now be considered. Buch-Hanson and Neilsen (1977) conceptualise spatial organisation as "territorial structure". This is seen as both a condition for and the result of the social and economic development of a society. They claim that each mode of production (feudal,
pre-capitalist, capitalist, and so forth) forms its own spatial structure through dialectical interaction with various "elementary conditions" which further or hamper the development of such a structure. These conditions include the natural resource base distribution (the objects of labour as defined by the mode of production), the distribution and growth of population, the social superstructure (including the state) and the territorial structure of the pre-existent mode of production. The last condition is taken up by Santos (1977):

"A mode of production is expressed in space through a struggle and interaction between the new, which progressively dominates, and the old" (p 5).

The conceptualisation of exactly how the capitalist mode of production creates its spatial structure is only suggestive though the idea that spatial organisation is likely to be the most optimal for surplus appropriation and capital accumulation is a basic one. Harvey (1977), however, goes a step further and argues that the continued development of the capitalist mode of production is not a contradiction-free process in space:

"In order to overcome spatial barriers and to annihilate space with time, spatial structures are created which themselves act as barriers to further accumulation. Capital comes to represent itself in the form of a physical landscape created in its own image to enhance the progressive accumulation of capital on an expanding (and intensifying) scale. The geographical landscape is both a crowning glory of past capita development and a prison which inhibits the further progress of accumulation" (p 273).

Slater (1975a) elucidates a framework for explaining the nature of spatial structure under colonialism in areas where there is more than one mode of production with the capitalist mode becoming dominant and where, through the institute of the
colonial state, capital develops a unified control over the processes of production. In a rather abstract elucidation, Slater identifies the following components of the capitalist mode of production which in combination and applied to a specific country would help explain the spatial configuration:

(i) The uneven development of the productive forces (objects of labour, instruments of labour and the division of labour),
(ii) The manner and pattern of surplus appropriation (including the type of surplus appropriated - either surplus value, merchant profit or surplus labour),
(iii) Class structure (comprising the expatriate or local capitalist class, the merchant class, the proletariat and the peasantry),
(iv) The mode of utilising the surplus (including expropriation to the metropole and the distribution of the remaining surplus).

The role of the colonial state is an implicit theoretical element in Slater's schema.

Slater (1975b) attempts to build on this earlier model by identifying the specific mechanisms employed by capital to appropriate surplus (plantations, settler states and mining concerns). He also argues that as the capitalist mode of production penetrates, a distinctive spatial structure evolves and crystallises and spreads to new territory via the construction of a physical infrastructure. Using Luxemburg (1968), capital is seen to pursue the following ends:

(i) Possession of the objects of labour (land, raw materials),
(ii) Liberation of labour-power from indigenous modes and co-ercion of labour into its service,
(iii) The introduction of a commodity economy.

The colonial state is perceived as an apparatus erected in the metropole to ensure the stable political conditions required by capital to achieve these ends. Slater applies his historical schema of the plantation mode of production to Tanzania in an extremely enlightening exercise. Consideration of the settler-state such as Kenya, Algeria, Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and Swaziland is deferred to another date. Porter and de Souza's (1974) description of spatial evolution in Kenya is not much clearer on this point. Their excessive concern with identifying the general motive for European expansionism ("the drive for tropical raw materials") leads to an ignorance of the role of the settlers themselves in affecting spatial evolution.

Santos (1975) introduces a further dimension to the argument in his conception that an essential facet of the capitalist mode of production is "spatial domination of one space by another":

"Spaces are being regarded as differentiated by the amount of capital they represent, by their produce and the amount of profit they bring in, and in the last resort, by their power to attract investments" (p 347).

Santos argues that there is a need for an understanding of spatial domination and the "blatant inequalities" it produces. The idea that the capitalist spatial structure embodies within it "the process of the domination of man through the domination of space" is a useful one.

Barrios (1977) whose primary concern is the political organisation of space, also suggests that the relations of capitalist domination are founded on the appropriation of physical
space. The implication of this is clear: land alienation in the colony was a means to control one of the objects of labour for the exploitation of capital (land) and one means to promote the creation of a labour force.

Harvey (1977) is a fitting postscript:

"The landscape which capitalism creates is seen as the locus of contradiction and tension, rather than as the expression of harmonious equilibrium" (p 274).

A number of the concepts discussed above must be included in the construction of a model for the evolution of Swaziland's space. A suitable historical model for the structuring of these concepts and several other dimensions is to be found in the work of Brett (1973), Banaji (1973), Good (1976) and Friedland (1977). This is the notion of settler colonialism.

2.5 THE COLON MODEL

Banaji (1973) identifies two specific historical forms of the restructuring of an indigenous mode of production by capitalism;

(a) Rapid integration into the world subjugation to the dominance of merchant and usurer capital, as in much of West Africa, and

(b) The rapid destruction of productivity of the traditional mode of production by economic and legal mechanisms as part of an internal process of primitive capital accumulation. Most settler-states are seen to accord with this second form though it should be stated that even within the evolving settler-state, particularly in the early colonial period, there often existed conflicts between policies to control or undermine peasant production.
Good (1976) has attempted to construct a model of the second form, the **settler-state** or **colon** model, from an empirical and dialetical base. It derives from a consideration of the "important similarities" between settler societies such as South Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya and Algeria. The model is divided into four sections;

(a) The geographical and social origins of the **settler class** or **petit-colon**,  
(b) The aims of the petit-colon in regard to the objects and means of production,  
(c) The linkages between the petit-colon, metropolitan capital and the colonial state both within the colon and within the metropole,  
(d) The consequences for the indigenous mode of production of capitalism in the colon. 

First, the origins of the petit-colon are considered. Good (1976) argues that historically the settler-state generally emerged where militarism and domination of indigenous society by force were particularly heavy. Force, for Good (1976), is not to be viewed as sadistic racist fury but:

"An integral aspect of Europe's advancing industrial superiority with its purpose of gaining greater control over African land and labour" (p603).

Bradby (1975) provides an interesting discourse on the associations between violence and the spread of capitalism in the Third World. Her contention is that force was not a sine qua non for the domination of capital and had little direct function in forcing the indigenous population to accept wage-labour or participate in the money-economy. It was rather primarily
a function of local resistance to metropolitan attempts to control and produce raw materials for home industry.

Settlement was encouraged by the metropolitan state and capital for several reasons. Robinson and Gallagher's (1961) thesis is that the settler-state was a strategic "must", a more forceful claim to a particular region for the metropole desiring to protect interests elsewhere (Africa for India). Good (1976) agrees that strategic motives certainly were one element underlying the encouragement of settler societies but re-iterates that in the context of international political economy the African settler-state was also viewed by state and capital as:

"the natural as well as the most rewarding mode of imperialist capitalist expansion" (p601).

For the state, the economic strength of the metropole was consolidated by improved access to raw materials and by the provision of export markets for home industry. For metropolitan capital:

"the settler as fully developed capitalist man was a loyal and energetic partner" (p601).

Good (1976) thus makes the assumption that the settler was drawn from a capitalist class in the metropole, with consequent links with metropolitan capital and an ideological commitment to the capitalist mode of production in the colon. These assertions need to be tested in empirical contexts. They also lead to the second section of the colon model.

According to Good (1976) the twin motivating aim of the petit-colon was to acquire control over land and raw materials, and over labour, as a means to primitive capitalist surplus
appropriation. Various mechanisms were employed by the petit-colon to accumulate surplus. These included land speculation, extraction of rent from black tenants and the use of the black population as a cheap wage labour force. A major problem for the petit-colon was thus to free labour from the indigenous mode of production and to coerce it into the service of capital. Good (1976) argues that land expropriation while an end in itself, also enabled the petit-colon to acquire control over labour. This had two dimensions. First, blacks left resident on expropriated land could either be ejected or if necessary immediately be forced into a new set of social relations by the imposition of rent or the extraction of labour service. Friedland (1977) elaborates on the second dimension. Through constriction of the area under black control the traditional system, perceived of as inefficient and backward, would become unviable. With concomitant economic scarcity the African was forced to enter into relationships with the petit-colon. That this was a motive for land expropriation is not, however, well-documented although historically this was seen to be the case.

Friedland (1977) notes that the process was hastened by the imposition of political legislation such as a taxation system on blacks (head and hut taxes) forcing them either to sell productive surplus or to sell their labour. The apparent motive for taxation was to generate income for administrative costs; the inevitable result was the promotion of control over black labour by the petit-colon where blacks were forced to sell labour to pay taxes.

Banaji (1973), in an otherwise doctrinaire statement, portrays
the penetration of capitalism under a settler-state as a form of primitive capital accumulation and as a transitory phase;

"In the settler colonies in Africa the colonial mode of production emerged as a purely transitional and subordinate phenomenon, fuelling an internal expansion of the capitalist mode of production" (p 399).

This observation was historically verified in the South African and Rhodesian cases but elsewhere it was not. The difference requires explanation.

Third, the links between the petit-colon, metropolitan capital and the colonial state are of some importance to Good's (1976) model.

On the theoretical level, a number of geographers have advocated study of the relationship between colonialism and imperialism (2.3). The major concern here is a subset of that debate; that is, to identify the ways in which the colonial state was used to further the ends of capital in what U.S.G. (1976) have called the "age of classic imperialism" (1870-1914). Harvey (1976) provides an excellent synthesis of classic Marxist views of the state as applied to contemporary imperialism. U.S.G. (1976), drawing on similar sources, show how classically the colonial state is viewed simply as a coercive tool of capital with very little autonomy. Neo-Marxian writers give the colonial state much greater autonomy since it functions as a mediator and pacifier between conflicting capital interests and between different social classes in the colony (similar to the role of the state in the metropole).

In the "age of classic imperialism" the colonial state is seen as an essential element in the process of expansion
of metropolitan capital and the tieing in of the colonies to the metropolitan economy. The role of the colonial state in this context is viewed by U.S.G. (1976) as:

(i) The destruction of pre-capitalist economies through legal-juridical measures such as taxation, forced migration, land alienation and labour importation, to supply labour for the capitalist mode of production.

(ii) The development of a transportation and communications system designed to enable areas to be best exploited by capital.

(iii) The administration of colonies. Taxation of blacks was used to pay for the maintenance of subordinate administrative systems which forced blacks into the money-economy.

(iv) The provision of loans and services, differential to white enterprise.

General colonial state expenditure within the colony is viewed as of two types with the underlying purpose of facilitating capitalist enterprise under a facade of benefiting the black population. These are social investment, including infrastructure and education with the aim of increasing labour productivity and profits; and social expenditure, including investment in projects and services for blacks, to maintain harmony in the system, and on military and policing for the same purpose.

Writers thus relationship between capital and the colonial state as essentially one of necessary collusion during this period. But what of the specifics of the colon model?

In the early development of the settler-state or colon the colonial state provided active support and was particularly interventionist. The basis of this interventionism was to facilitate
petit-colon control over land and labour. As a consequence:

"Wide scale state intervention contributed to the evolution of a capitalist economy" (Good, 1976, p605), and

"The British state was committed to capitalism in Africa as it was at home" (Brett, 1973, p 79).

The links between colonial state and petit-colon must, according to Brett (1973) be seen in the context of a managed economy to which both accepted a commitment. This pre-supposed the colonial state would take responsibility for general economic guidance and arose from the needs of capital for infrastructural investment which it would not or could not afford to supply itself. Thus, the colonial state provided infrastructure services, agricultural extension and research, and control of the legal framework of production and marketing; and the petit-colon had the reserved right to develop production, processing and marketing, through external capital or peasant production.

Petit-colon demands, to which there was invariable acquiescence, were elaborated thus:

"The aim was to ensure that the metropole made no liberalising concessions to the black majorities (since the common and overriding interest was in the exploitation of the black majority) and their basic method was constant reactive clamour and blocking manoeuvres" (Good, 1976, p611).

Brett (1973) elaborates the political structure of the colonial state and convincingly demonstrates the privileged access which the petit-colon was allowed at all levels of the hierarchy. Locally, with colonial state officials, and in the metropole, with the Colonial and Foreign Offices, through its links with metropolitan capital. So much so that:

"The most pervasive and effective influence on economic policy was certainly exerted by the representatives of British capital directly or indirectly involved in Africa" (Brett, 1973, p 63 ).
Brett (1973) identifies two further influences on colonial state policy. First, he argues that it is important to establish the personal linkages between colonial administrators and metropolitan capital. It is often summarily assumed that there were no such linkages. Such an assumption needs careful testing. Second, he attempts to identify the ideological impulse of the colonial ruling class. Their values were embodied in the assumption that:

"The colonized peoples were not capable of governing themselves "under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and that the relationship between the interests of colonised and coloniser was an essentially reciprocal and creative rather than an exploitative and contradictory one" (Brett, 1973, p 41).

This was a powerful ideological justification for the promotion of capitalist interests in the colony.

Fourth, the model posits the consequences for the indigenous mode of production. Good (1976) perceives a much faster disintegration of the pre-capitalist mode and advanced articulation into international capitalism under the colon than under other circumstances. An obvious feature is seen as the growth of a new class structure based on capitalist social relations with the concomittant proletarianisation of the peasant.

Banaji (1973) perceives the consequences as more complex, however:

"The capitalist subordination of the traditional mode of production required a certain restructuring of the latter, which by its very nature led to the disintegration of certain of their characteristic forms and intensification of others" (p 696).

A dual process of dissolution and conservation is unelaborated but appears to represent the fact that some conservation was
inevitable since the petit-colon was unable to absorb the total black population into a labour force.

Ignored by Good (1976) are the series of programmes instigated throughout the colonial period in Africa to force rural dwellers into cash-cropping as a further raw material source for capital.

2.6 SUMMARY

This multifarious survey of current geographical approaches to colonial spatial organisation has suggested a number of elements essential for consideration in the course of this study. These can be summarised as:

(a) The sources and aims of capital with regard to land, raw materials and control of labour.

(b) The nature of the linkages between metropolitan capital, the petit-colon and the colonial state.

(c) The explicit and implicit roles of land alienation in pursuing the aims of the petit-colon, as well as the mechanisms of such alienation, and

(d) The response of the indigenous society to the dominance of the petit-colon and the colonial state.

In the next chapter, the focus is once again empirical as the historical origins of the period of early British colonial rule in Swaziland are traced.
CHAPTER THREE

EARLY INTERACTION : STATE, CAPITAL AND SWAZI

"the country awaits the capitalist"
Rev. Joel Jackson, 1890

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter covers the period up to 1902 in Swaziland. It identifies the roots of processes which were to come to fruition in space in the post-Boer War period. The origins of the Swazi state are reviewed and the major characteristics of the pre-capitalist mode of production outlined (3.2). The role of Swaziland as a political football in the development of the broader regional southern African political economy is then described (3.3). The penetration of metropolitan capital into Swaziland prior to 1899 is examined. Particular stress is placed upon the development of an incipient settler-state or colon, and upon the links forged by the early white immigrants with metropolitan capital (3.4). Finally, the historical base is summarised (3.5).

3.2 CONQUEST AND CONTROL : DEVELOPMENT OF THE SWAZI STATE

An important distinction can be drawn between the two methods of early conquest and control which prevailed in this area and to whose interaction may be attributed the origins of Swaziland's present extent and location.

Under the indigenous system conquest was invariably by open
force, and once subjection was achieved integration and fusion of the conquered and conquerers followed. The following brief account of the emergence of the Swazi as a socio-politically organised state is drawn from research into the strong oral traditions of the Swazi by Matsebula (1972), Kuper (1952, 1961, 1966), Marwick (1940) and Scutt (1966).

The Swazi trace their origins from the great southward Bantu migrations from the eleventh to eighteenth centuries along the line Nguni - Tekela Nguni - Bembo Nguni. It was not, however, until 1750 that the bakaNgwane clan settled in what is now Swaziland at Eshiselweni ("the Birthplace of the Nation"). Under Ngwane III (Appendix 2a), their conquest procedure, which was to characterise their subsequent expansion of control, was to eliminate pre-existent Sotho clans in the area who refused to submit to their authority and to absorb those who did. Around 1820 they were driven to the north by a temporarily more powerful clan where the principal homesteads were established. Map Six shows how the period 1820-1870 was spent in consolidating their position under Sobhuza I and then Mswati. By 1845, Sobhuza had laid the foundations of the nation-building process and had extended his control by the vehicle of armed conquest over an area of some 18,000 square miles. The picture is of a diffusion of control from a central nucleus out over an area three times that of present-day Swaziland.

It is not necessary to report in full the investigations into the Swazi pre-capitalist mode of production of Kuper (1961), Marwick (1940) and Hughes (1972) except to highlight the roles
EXPANSION OF SWAZI
POLITICAL CONTROL
PRE 1875

Swazi Capitals
Lebombo—Present Capital
Paths of Swazi Migrations to 1820
Frontiers of Early Swazi Kingdoms
Present National Boundaries

Source: Murdoch (1970)

MAP SIX
of land and labour under that mode.

The homestead and extended family was the basic unit of production and consumption:

"While the subsistence economy obtained the unit was almost entirely independent....each individual household was self-supporting and the need for trade was non-existent" (Kuper, 1961, p 45).

Division of labour within the unit was based on age/sex differences rather than technological specialization. Labour mobility existed on a local and hierarchical level. The aristocracy could demand communal labour from their subjects as tribute with no reward, while individual units could request labour from fellow units with an obligation to reciprocate and usually a festive reward.

Wealth, conceptualised in terms of a complex mythological interplay between land, cattle and wives was unevenly distributed but no class structure along western capitalist lines could be identified. As Kuper (1961) writes:

"There is no capitalist class with the monopoly of the means of production, no proletariat from whom the means are debarred and no leisured class that maintains itself on the labour of others" (p137).

Land was held by the King in trust for the Nation and rights to usufruct were allocated out down a socio-political hierarchy of chiefs and sub-chiefs. Individual ownership of land was non-existent and grazing land was held communally. Land was, however, representative of the power the rulers held over the people.

Cattle were the real basis of wealth and status-prestige was accorded to quantity holdings. Certain circulation mechanisms ensured that this wealth was concentrated in the aristocracy;
particularly noteworthy being the lobola system involving cattle-wife exchanges. Wealth was largely a privilege of the aristocracy and, according to Kuper (1961), approved by the masses. Wealth was, however, a side-benefit of prestige and power not a condition for it as under the capitalist mode:

"The basis of power and prestige is birth not the accumulation of property" (Marwick, 1940, p.

3.3 CONQUEST AND CONTROL : CONFLICTING IMPERIAL DESIGNS

The Swazi were one of a minority of southern African tribes with whom early contact with whites was not marked by armed conflict. Economic conquest and subordination was no less effective here than elsewhere however. The last quarter of the nineteenth century marks the period of white penetration and the loss of political sovereignty by the Swazi.

At this time in southern Africa, both Boer and Briton were demarcating their boundaries and defining their spheres of interest. The expansionist and republican policy of the Transvaal Government under Paul Kruger after 1877 is well-attested by Robinson and Gallagher (1961), de Kiewet (1966), Moodie (1975), Leyds (1919), and others. The primary aspiration was to establish an independent outlet on the eastern seaboard free from British interference. Control of Swaziland was seen as an essential preliminary step to the building of a railway (Best, 1965). Britain, with its own designs in southern Africa, had no apparent desire to annex an isolated country of dubious economic potential but was equally opposed to complete Boer control and the implied coastal
The early result of such conflicts of territorial interest were two conventions to which both states were party (Pretoria Convention of 1881, London Convention of 1884) which prohibited each from unilaterally annexing Swaziland and, in effect, guaranteed the independence of the Swazis within the boundaries arbitrarily defined by a commission in 1880. Despite an enforced contraction of the area under direct Swazi control, the role of the newly-defined Swaziland as a pawn in a Boer-Briton power struggle ensured the survival of the political autonomy of the Swazi state, for a time at least.

As Hughes (1964) writes:

"It could be said that Swaziland owes its present existence as a separate political unit to the historical accident that it lies in an area where the interests of Boer and Briton clashed during the nineteenth century. Neither was prepared to allow the other to gain any undue influence over the country; its independence was protected until nearly the end of the century by the mutual jealousies of powerful neighbours" (p 60).

Throughout the 1880's the South African Republic continued to press Britain for the annexation of Swaziland and followed a number of strategies in pursuit of their ends. There were unofficial attempts by Boer groups to obtain documents of cession from the Swazi monarch. At another level, the Republic spent almost £90,000 on acquiring crucial concessions from the Swazi to control revenue collection and transportation in Swaziland. This was ostensibly to improve its bargaining power with the British state and private capital. Two agents, Harrington and Cohen, were employed by the Republic to obtain these concessions. Most crucially, however, Kruger repeatedly
petitioned Britain and in May 1889 offered to withdraw all South African Republic claims north of the Limpopo in exchange for control over Swaziland. The offer touched a responsive chord in British state and capital circles:

"We should be much abused in this country if we let the Boers annex Matabeleland and Mashonaland....as they are rich territories, and concessions by Lo Bengula are held by some influential people; but we shall have to face considerable danger of conflict with the Boers if we bar them from extension to the North. I should be inclined to compromise with them by letting it be known that if they come terms with the Swazi king we shall not prevent them from protecting and annexing Swaziland. This will bring them to the sea which is their chief desire" (8).

A potential deal fell through when the Republic rejected an additional British demand that they join a Customs Union with Natal and the Cape Colony.

Meanwhile, agitation within Swaziland and a conflict of interests between representatives of all three national groups (Swazi, Boer and Briton) led to a Swazi appeal to both states in 1889. Mbandzeni's inability to exert traditional authority over the white immigrants had earlier precipitated the introduction of administrative machinery to implement a form of dual control whereby Theophilus Shepstone, independently installed as Resident Adviser and Agent by the King, and a British-dominated "white committee" of fifteen property-owners were given a charter of self-government to administer the whites while still subject to the sovereignty of the King (Drooglever, 1976; Matsebula 1972). The committee failed to exercise control. Inefficiency, Boer antagonism and factional interests mitigated against its authority and it was disbanded in 1890.

Ostensibly in response to the protection appeal both states
agreed to a joint commission of enquiry. This was the De Winton Commission, which from the British point of view, was also charged with investigating the prospects for British capital in Swaziland. De Winton's brief from the Colonial Office was that:

"It is an essential feature of our policy that there should be no undue restrictions upon the advancement of British trade and enterprise in any part of South Africa" (11).

The De Winton report was published in 1890 and is an extensive document detailing the proceedings of five meetings with representatives from different national groups, perceptions of exploitable resources and economic potential in Swaziland and suggestions for the protection of British capital interests. Temporary Boer residents were predictably in favour of incorporation into the South African Republic but British residents opposed it. The Boers had a numerically superior voice but "do not represent much capital". Swazi fears were allayed by reassurance of political independence. De Winton concluded that:

"Matabeleland and Mashonaland are ten times larger than Swaziland. The land is rich in minerals and would be a good opening for British commerce, manufacturers and enterprise. To acquire control over these large and important territories for the British Empire rather than cling to doubtful possession of a territory difficult to protect, is a necessity. British commercial interests and the interests of investors of capital in mining or other enterprises in Swaziland could in addition be protected by treaty arrangements" (12).

This view was actively supported in the upper echelons of British state and capital. It led to the promulgation of the 1890 Convention which provided a three-cornered provisional government in Swaziland pending further investigation.13 Kruger's Republic continued to press for annexation in the early
1890's and consolidated her internal control by purchasing concessions up to a value of £200,000 (Table Five and Map Seven). Kruger could then argue that:

"We hold all valuable concessions and we have the right to all the practical expenses of administration. The right to build railways, the roads, the posts, the telegraphs - all state rights are in our hands. Swaziland surrounded as it is on three sides by the Transvaal, represents merely an extension of our own system.... historically, geographically and administratively Swaziland is ours" (14).

In 1894 Britain, under the powerful influence of Rhodes' designs, finally waived her objections, and abandoned the assurances to the Swazi nation in the interests of consolidating the strength of British capital north of the Limpopo. Without the necessity for Swazi consent and despite concerted protest from metropolitan capital in Britain, the 1894 Convention provided for Swaziland's becoming a protectorate of the South African Republic.

The Swazi guarantees of independence were consequently sacrificed on the altar of British capitalist interests to the north. At the same time the Convention provided for the protection of British capital within Swaziland.

As a postscript to this section it might be added that the Republic's railway designs were finally thwarted by British annexation of Tongaland in May 1895; a move which incidently was to have severe repercussions on the development of a colon in Swaziland after 1910.

The South African Republic administered Swaziland until the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. At this time all whites were ordered out of Swaziland by their respective governments.
### TABLE FIVE

**CONCESSIONS ACQUIRED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

A. MONOPOLIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Cost (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveying</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal Services</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canals &amp; Navigation</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraphs &amp; Electricity</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Bars</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost</strong></td>
<td><strong>£ 39,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. REVENUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Cost (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Revenue</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Revenue Concession</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost</strong></td>
<td><strong>£ 65,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. LAND CONCESSIONS

- P 2 (£4000), P1 and P6 (£45,000), P23 (£3,700).
- L5 (£11,800), L6 (£2,800), L8 (£600), L60/61 (£4000), L64 (£860), L75/76/77 (£3700).

**Total Number**: 16  **Total Cost**: £88,710

D. MINERAL CONCESSIONS

- M9.

Source: c 7212 (Appendix 1b)
LAND CONCESSIONS ACQUIRED BY SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 1898

MAP SEVEN
3.4 THE COLON: DEVELOPMENT AND METROPOLITAN LINKAGES

In this section the processes of early white penetration of Swaziland are traced, including the methods employed to gain control over the objects of labour (land and mineral resources). Two sets of linkages are then outlined; those with metropolitan capital and those with the two rival colonial states.

Swaziland was isolated from the mainstream of white migration in southern Africa and contact with whites was limited before 1850. Thereafter, rapid penetration of the area was a function of the desires of Boer pastoralists from the Transvaal and British mining prospectors, traders and agriculturalists. For the Boer, winter grazing for sheep was perceived as superior to that of the Transvaal, and transhumance became common practice:

"For a good many years Swaziland has been the favourite grazing ground of the Boers. In the winter time a number of them with their flocks move to the warmer veldt of the lower country and have been allowed to squat there by the King for the winter months. Some of them have obtained grazing licenses from the King, the consideration given being a horse or heifer. Granting of licenses has gone on for eight years but only in the last four have the Boers come in any number"(17).

The annual influx of Boers reached 1000 by 1890.

Gold was discovered in 1874 in the north-west of Swaziland and this prompted a rapid influx of Britons in the 1880's:

"The news that gold was found fired men's imagination with the idea that Swaziland was a veritable Eldorado. The finding of a few small reefs and some alluvial tin sufficed to send adventurers into the country in swarms, and there was a constant stream of potential concessionaires going and returning from the royal kraal" (18).

In the wake of the miners followed a large number of traders, farmers and speculators, fiercely competitive and acquisitive in
the drive for profit. The permanent white population, including dependents, rose to 500 by 1890.19

Paying lip service at least to the sovereignty of the Swazi over their own resources and to avoid overt physical conflict the incipient petit-colon sought some sanction for its projected exploitation. The years 1877-1890 marked a period of intense concession-granting by the Swazi King Mbandzeni, as he was pressured by whites trying to obtain his mark on the often complex, legally-prepared concession documents they were brandishing. The use of concessions as an obtuse mechanism to obtain black sanction of the appropriation of desired rights was common throughout Africa at this time (Pedler, 1975; Slinn, 1971). The method undoubtedly reached its worst excess in Swaziland.

Concessions obtained by whites, which ceased to be granted after the death of Mbandzeni in 1890 on the order of the rival colonial states, were as follows:
(i) Grants of grazing rights over specific areas for periods of up to 50 years (there were 76 of these),
(ii) Land grants in freehold or leases of land in perpetuity (31),
(iii) Agricultural rights over specific areas for periods up to 99 years (138),
(iv) Mineral rights over specified areas (54),
(v) Trading rights over defined areas (7)
(vi) Speculative industrial monopolies (60)
(vii) Miscellaneous rights including the right to collect the King's revenue, rights to customs duty exemption and the Unallotted and Lapsed Land and Mineral concessions.
The remuneration accruing to the Swazi elite from the granting of concessions was estimated as £150,000 between 1885 - 1888 and from 1890 - 1899 the munificent annuity was £12,000. By 1900 the rulers had received £270,000 from concessionaire interests.20

The temporal distribution of the concessions is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. The marked peaks in the late 1880's in Figure 2 are a reflection of increasing white immigration and levels of aquisitiveness.21 Figure 3 is a partial surrogate for white mobility. The predominance of grants in the winter months, May to August, is consistent with the Boer pattern of temporary residence for winter-grazing. The more even non-Boer distribution is a function of more permanent residence in the country. All concessions, except the monopolies, contain explicit spatial clauses and the guaranteed protection of 'native rights'.22

The excesses which this speculative drive to control the objects of labour precipitated are highlighted by Forbes (1938) (Appendix 2b), and by a retrospective glance at this era in 1909:

"Practically the whole country was covered two, three or even four deep by concessions of all sizes, for different purposes and for greatly differing periods. In but few cases were even the boundaries defined; many of the areas have been subdivided several times, and seldom were the boundaries of the superimposed areas coterminous. In addition to this, concessions were granted for all lands and minerals previously unallotted. Finally over these three or four strata of conflicting interests there had to be preserved the rights of the natives to live, move, cultivate, graze and hunt" (23).

Nevertheless it has proved possible to construct a map of
FIGURE 2: THE CONCESSIONS ERA
FIGURE 3: MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND GRAZING CONcessions
prior-granted concessions which reveals the spatial configuration of different types of land grant (Map Eight). Of particular note is the consolidated block of grazing concessions in the southwest of the country.

A number of scholars have speculated on the excesses of the concession granting process (Boyce, 1947; Drooglever, 1976). The irregularities and dubious nature of the whole procedure are often referred to from various first-hand accounts. Drooglever (1976) goes further and argues that the appointment of white advisers (Shepstone and Miller) by the King had the opposite effect to that intended and that both took advantage of their post for personal benefit and became channels of coercion for white interests as a whole. 24

From the Swazi viewpoint (Matsébula, 1972) there are claims that the King would have had little conception of the rights demanded by whites (minerals, industrial processes and exclusive land ownership), that his intention was to grant usufructuary rights in accordance with the traditional framework and that the King took advantage of short-term material benefit in recognition of the inexorable domination of whites in the region. As he himself expressed it:

"You are getting rich from my country and I should be able to do the same....we must eat before we die" (25).

The whole process was obviously facilitated by the autocratic decision-making role of the King and the investiture of ultimate control of land and labour-power in him under the traditional mode of production. A primitive form of co-option thus enhanced the appropriation by the incipient petit-colon of the objects of labour. 25a
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF LAND RIGHTS
GRANTED BY MBANDZENI

MAP EIGHT
The need to legitimise the appropriation in the eyes of any prospective colonial state inevitably arose and here there is a need to briefly examine the linkages with metropolitan capital and the colonial states during this era. For the transient Boer population:

"They are anxious to convert their grazing rights into rights of ownership" (26).

While the Boer national group, as Moodie (1975) and Lincoln (1977) argue, were increasingly to adopt the capitalist mode of production as their productive norm, at the stage of penetration of Swaziland this was probably more nascent than realised. Yet the objectives of the Boer faction were in essential concurrence with those of British based capital at this time. For the Boer, confining his activities to extensive pastoralism, unfettered land control was a necessity. Land alienation also later appears to have represented a means of gaining control over Swazi labour to channel to the farms of the Eastern Transvaal.

For the Briton:

"Companies are now being floated and refloated in England on the frail tenure of Mbandzeni's grants and money amounting to millions will shortly be invested by the English public on properties of doubtful security" (27).

In 1890 De Winton was conscious of the factionalism and overt social conflict within the incipient colon and suggested, in response, the organisation of a legal tribunal to arbitrate in cases of conflicting rights. The white residents pressed for wider legal powers for the court in meetings with De Winton, demanding the permanent establishment of all rights and title and that concessions granted should be recognised by any future
government. The acquiescence of the two colonial states in consort is embodied in Article 2 of the 1890 Convention. The court was duly established, sat in what is now Manzini from October 1890 to January 1891, and confirmed legal title to all concessions supposedly approved by the Queen Regent.

The incipient petit-colon thus successfully concluded the first stage of its appropriation with the sanction of the colonial states;

"These concessions have been validated by the Court established for their examination under the 1890 Convention and Great Britain was a party to the Convention and is bound to respect them" (30).

Two unsuccessful attempts were made around this time by capital interests to control the country as a chartered state. Prior to 1889, Cohen, later an agent of the South African Republic, was employed by a firm of financiers (Porges & Eckstein) to obtain controlling concessions in Swaziland with a view to obtaining a charter for the firm. The failure of this scheme is attributable to the similar rival interest of the Republic. The second attempt revolved around the acquisition of the Unallotted and Lapsed Land and Mineral concessions on which the Umbandini Concession Syndicate (later the Swaziland Corporation Ltd.) was floated. The activities of this Company are examined in depth in Chapter 4.

On the basis of achieved legitimacy of their concessions the British faction forged links with metropolitan capital to obtain the necessary capital backing to exploit their acquisitions. Twenty companies were floated in England on the basis of mining, agricultural and industrial monopolies. By 1894 these comprised an
aggregate capital of £3 million and represented over 5000 British shareholders (Table Six). Original concessionaires resident in Swaziland invariably became local managers but were ultimately responsible to Britain-based boards on whom sat numbers of well-connected capitalists. It is clear that all of the share capital was not immediately invested in Swaziland but as early as 1890 £25,000 p.a. was flowing into the country.

The major obstacles to mining development did not therefore lie in the area of capital scarcity. Instead the main hindrances were seen to be the lack of a transportation system and "the drawback of a scarcity of African labour". As Miller wrote in 1900:

"During 1897 labour was unprocurable and several mining companies were forced to close down" (33).

Despite the strong metropolitan links and the intense lobbying which these links facilitated the British faction lost their attempt to influence the British colonial state against the annexation of Swaziland by the South African Republic, and had to be content with the 1894 Convention guarantees of the protection of British capital. The concerns expressed in the metropole in protesting the proposed South African Republic takeover covered a number of issues.

There was the obvious desire to protect invested capital and to ensure that future capital flows in and out of the country would not be adversely affected. Then, as far as the mining fraternity were concerned, there was a great fear of the imposition of the Republic's gold mining taxation system in Swaziland. A
TABLE SIX

BRITISH BASED COMPANIES OPERATING IN SWAZILAND IN 1892

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>SHARE CAPITAL (£)</th>
<th>SHAREHOLDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acton's Concession Ltd.</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bird's Swaziland Concession Ltd.</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi Goldfields Ltd.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havelock Gold Mining &amp; Exploration Co.</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indimba Land Exploration Co.</td>
<td>16,750</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson-Forbes Gold Mining Co.</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland Gold, Exploration &amp; Land Co.Ltd.</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbes Reef Gold Mining Co.</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Forbes Reef Co.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piggs Peak Estate &amp; Gold Mining Co.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>1700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyldsdale Gold Exploration &amp; Devnt. Co.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbandine Concessions Syndicate.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pullen's Concession Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horo Syndicate</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruby Creek Syndicate</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaforth Mining Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity Gold Mining Co. Ltd. (London),</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komati Goldfields Syndicate.</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland Mercantile Association.</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryland (Swazi) Gold Mining Co.Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: c 6200, c7212 (Appendix 1b).
further threat was perceived by the holders of industrial and revenue monopolies from any administration which would seek to acquire them. A more widely discussed issue was that the trade of the South African Republic would eventually be diverted away from the British colonies in South Africa.

Nevertheless, despite local and metropolitan lobbying, the annexation was concluded. To the British colonial state it was a function of the inefficiencies of dual control, the geographical location of Swaziland and the Republic's control of revenue concessions. But as Miller ruefully admitted in 1900:

"In the 1890's Africa's most powerful voice, Rhodes, urged the handing over of Swaziland to Boer mis-rule to secure capitalist development for the territory north of the Limpopo" (35).

3.5 CONCLUSION

The historical process of capitalist penetration of Swaziland attempted prior to British colonial rule provides a clear illustration of the domination of the local population at international and sub-national levels, in the pursuit to consolidate control over land, labour and minerals and to begin to extract surplus. The links of the early white settlers of Swaziland with metropolitan capital interests are demonstrated in 3.4. Major obstacles to the inflow of capital are seen to be the broader political uncertainties due to Swaziland's place within the broader regional political economy in a state of flux, the essentially spatial conflict of interests between whites in the country caused by the excesses of the concession granting period, and the inability of capital, in and of itself, to force labour
out of the indigenous economy and into a new set of social relations under capital. All three issues begged resolution before capital could begin to extract the surplus desired.
CHAPTER FOUR

COLONIAL STATE AND CAPITAL IN INTERACTION AND COLLUSION

"Some four millions of capital and the livelihood of those who are resident and interested in Swaziland depended on His Honour's announcement", Times of Swaziland, 1908.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter a chronological framework is first outlined and the primary colonial state policy-makers in relation to Swaziland are identified (4.2). The aims and objectives of capital in Swaziland in the period 1902-1909 are then presented (4.3), and the structuring of the colon in pursuit of these aims is described (4.4). The ideological acquiescence of the colonial state policy-makers is examined (4.5) and the influence and impact of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd. in this period is analysed (4.6).

4.2 CHRONOLOGICAL SYNOPSIS: 1903 - 1909

The administration of Swaziland was inherited by Britain from the defunct South African Republic after the Boer War and validated by Order-in-Council of 1903 (Appendix 3a).

Despite being labelled from the first as a 'protectorate', the precise colonial status of Swaziland vis-à-vis the Crown was never actually defined (Youé, 1976).1 To all intents and purposes, however, its status was that of a dominion colony under the Colonial Office. The 1903 Order-in-Council vested control of Swaziland's affairs in the Governor of the Transvaal and after, 1906, in the Governor-General of South Africa who was also High Commissioner for the Protectorates despite being resident in South Africa.2 Perusal
of the 1903 Order-in-Council reveals the high degree of decision-making autonomy invested by the Colonial Office in the High Commissioners, Milner and Selborne, in administering Swaziland (Hailey, 1953, 1956) (Appendix 3b). The historical record bears this out. Both Milner and Selborne exercised considerable power in the colonial resolution of Swaziland's perceived problems. The role of these two is therefore a crucial one in examining colonial state policy. Both were ultimately responsible to the Colonial Secretary but, in practice, the contact was limited to keeping the Secretary informed of decisions and to those instances where the full weight of the colonial state was required to reinforce decisions (see Chapter 6.3).

Within Swaziland, at a lower level of the administrative hierarchy, a Resident Commissioner and four District Commissioners were appointed by the High Commissioner. In practice, the Resident Commissioner was a mediator between the High Commissioner and Swaziland residents, informing them of colonial state policy and monitoring response for the High Commissioner. Familiarity with the local scene also made him a considerable information input into the decision-making of the High Commissioner. Thus, for instance, Coryndon's influence is clearly seen in Selborne's policy. The Swaziland Concessions Commission also performed the role of an information source for policy-making.

Colonial state policy-making in Swaziland was therefore highly decentralised, localised and individualistic.

The immediate purpose of the British colonial state in Swaziland, since armed subjugation was not an issue, was to bring
some arbitrationary order to the visible legacy of capitalist penetration of the previous two decades. Milner visited Swaziland in 1903 to familiarise himself with the local conditions and commissioned J.F. Rubie to prepare a set of recommendations for colonial state policy in Swaziland. Rubie's suggestions formed the basis of the first major administrative proclamation in 1904.  

Under this Proclamation a 5 man commission was appointed (Swaziland Concessions Commission) to (a) define the boundaries of all land and mineral concessions, (b) expropriate from the holders at pre War value all industrial and trading monopolies, (c) arbitrate on the nature and priority of claims between whites, and (d) provide the Swazi with the use of that land "to which they are entitled."

The country was subjected to a detailed field survey in 1905 and the detailed decisions of the Commission re the expropriation of monopolies and conflicting white interests are recorded in their 1906 and 1908 reports (Appendix 1b). Under the 1904 Proclamation all land concessions for 99 years duration or for 50 years with right of renewal became freehold farms, as did all perpetual land grants. All concessions of less than 50 years duration were confirmed as leaseholds conferring exclusive and comprehensive land rights on the holder. In cases of spatial overlap the procedure was to determine the basal concession which gave fullest rights to the surface (usually the prior-dated ones) and to define any leases registrable as servitudes against it.

Two superimposed networks of basal concessions were
consequently defined— one of mineral concessions, the other of land holdings. These are shown in Maps Nine and Ten.

Selborne visited Swaziland in September 1906 to consult the Swazi rulers and the whites and as a result the controversial Partition Proclamation of 1907 was issued. This Act allowed for the setting aside of one-third of the area of the country for Swazi reserves; leaving the remaining two-thirds under the control of white landowners and the Crown. It also provided for the appointment of a Special Commissioner to carry out the land partition. George Grey was enlisted from C.Africa by Selborne for the purpose. The partition was effected between January and December 1908.

4.3 THE PROSPECTS FOR CAPITAL

From contemporary published accounts it is possible to construct a picture of the optimistic perceptions of the petit-colon as regards the prospects for the capitalist mode of production under the British colonial state.

The keynote to the era is provided by the rationale of the Swaziland Corporation:

"The weight of the Corporation's influence will go towards the opening of its lands and minerals with the sure confidence that the exploitation of these holdings will... earn the speediest profits for shareholders" (10).

The mineral wealth of Swaziland was still something of an unknown quantity in the period 1903-9. Certainly there was little sign of the "orgie of enthusiasm" (Miller, 1937) of the 1880's but the apparent failure of the mining companies to pay the expected dividends in the 1890's was rationalised away. Miller (1900) attributed the failure to (a) poor mine management, (b) political
SWAZILAND: BASAL LAND CONCESSION NETWORK, 1906

Source: S.C.C. Survey Maps (1906)
uncertainty, (c) high transport costs for mining machinery and (d) the absence of a railway. The first two were considered to be transient problems and a railway was thought to be imminent (Best, 1965).

The Swaziland Corporation annual report of 1906 posits the lack of capital for underground mining as a further causative factor of failure in the 1890's. This too was not viewed as an insurmountable obstacle.

A more serious potential handicap was, as before the War, the production of a regular black labour-supply:

"The most serious handicap to mining is the scarcity of native labour" (13).

The Swaziland black mining labour force was to reach 1087 in 1906 and 2017 in 1910. At a later stage, the mining fraternity was to see their small labour supply severely affected by the powerful capitalist competitors for labour on the Witwatersrand. Thus, in 1911, Miller wrote:

"A battalion of labour recruiters from South Africa has invaded and disorganised the local labour supply" (15).

Apart from mining, there was an increasing awareness of the environmental potential of Swaziland for large-scale agricultural production. This was frequently articulated as was the perceived role of the Swazi in these potential developments:

"The low country will one day produce cotton and tobacco on so large a scale that great areas will be put under the plough. The middleveld is suitable for all classes of sub-tropical produce, including citrus, and the highveld will become the home of the stockraiser. If European energy and capital are devoted to the agricultural development of these productive areas the prosperity of the native will follow. He will soon learn to imitate what the higher race initiates and a close industrial inter-mixture of the two peoples would assist towards the regeneration of the native race" (16).
Or again, with a note of qualification:

"The soil and climate of Swaziland are suitable to the growth of products which would not rely solely upon a local market for their disposal. Possibly 50% of Swaziland is adapted for the cultivation of plantation produce such as tea, coffee, tobacco, fibrous plants and for cattle rearing.... but a railway is necessary to the development of agriculture on a large scale" (17).

One of the reasons for such faith in the plantation potential of the country was the perception of distinct locational advantages:

"We are within 60 miles of the finest port on the East African coast and 40 miles of a railway communicating with the populous districts which will grow in consuming power more rapidly than it will in supply" (18).

It was also founded on the results of experimental agricultural work on a variety of cash-crops, ranching and timber by both the Swaziland Corporation and the Henderson Consolidated Corporation. Cotton, in particular, showed promise of £5 per acre profits. 19 Success would, it was anticipated, attract capital from further afield:

"On this plantation we will be able to build up an industry and be in a position to attract American planters by showing that Swaziland offers wide scope for the cotton grower"(20).

Any impediments to the realization of profit were considered resolvable. Best (1965) describes the Milner-Davies railway proposals of 1902-5. This railway was to join Johannesburg with Lourenco Marques via central Swaziland and the whites in Swaziland were acutely aware of the implications of this scheme in providing market accessibility. 21 The creation of a labour force, as with mining, was considered a necessary pre-requisite for plantation development but here too there were grounds for optimism.
With reference to prospective cotton plantations:

"We do not anticipate difficulty in getting raw hands to pick cotton. If we can make the work popular there will be an inexhaustable labour supply" (22).

Competition for labour was anticipated from outside Swaziland as well, however, though this concern was best articulated by Selborne:

"The whole interest of the Boers of the Eastern Transvaal lies in the direction of Swaziland since all of them want to open up trade with Swaziland and increase their supply of Swazi labour" (23).

The promotion of private settlement schemes was viewed as a means to realise the prospective agricultural development by the introduction of a large settler management class, as well as to increase the speculative value of holdings. 24

The primary pre-condition to agricultural exploitation and the deployment of a managed black labour force was, however, the confirmation of control and titular security over land by the colonial state. Thus:

"The concessionaires had not deemed it advisable to commence the development of their concessions until they knew what servitudes the concessions carried and what their boundaries were" (25).

The objectives of the petit-colon at the outset of this era can be summarised from this section as the consolidation of control over raw material sources, the creation of a local labour force and the application of further foreign capital to extract surplus via mining and plantation agriculture. The colonial state had an integral role to play in the fulfillment of these objectives as well as in providing a suitable transport and service infrastructure.
4.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE PETIT-COLON

The permanent white population of Swaziland was 890 in 1904 and 1083 in 1911. This implies a rapid in-migration after the emigration of the Boer War period. The temporarily resident population of sheep farmers from the E. Transvaal reached upwards of 500 during this era, with their annual influx of 200,000 to 300,000 sheep. The petit-colon was consequently sharply differentiated along lines of nationality and mobility.

Another disseminating influence within the petit-colon was the individualistic nature of white interest in Swaziland. Centralization of control had developed only in the mining industry where 75% of concessions were corporately controlled. Only 14 land concessions were owned by companies and there were 56 British and 152 Boer owners. The Boers had achieved some small measure of unification with 68 concessions being syndicate-controlled.

The argument to be sustained here is that internal differences and antagonisms within the petit-colon, so evident in the pre War period, were now subsumed in the interests of a common quest to consolidate control over land and labour. A consolidated front was a necessity for collective bargaining with, and lobbying of, the colonial state.

The unifying voice for white interests was the local representatives of foreign capital. Table Seven lists the companies registered as operating in or as interest holders in Swaziland in 1905. The aggregate share capital for these companies was over £4 million. The companies with the most active capital involvement in Swaziland were also the most vocal,
## TABLE SEVEN

**COMPANIES IN SWAZILAND, 1904**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>SHARE CAPITAL (£)</th>
<th>SWAZI EMPLOYEES</th>
<th>CONCESSIONS I. L. M.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henderson Consolidated Corp.</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 2 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland Corporation Ltd.</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>11 7 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi Goldfields Ltd.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toweli Gold Mining Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi Coal Mines Ltd.</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Swaziland Gold Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piggs Peak Gold Mining Co.</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland Tin Ltd.</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Swazi Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercantile Association</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Concessions Ltd.</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pullen’s Concession Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usutu Tin Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCready Tins Ltd.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acton’s Concessions Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland Gold &amp; Land Co.</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A &amp; I Estate &amp; Exploration Co.</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A. Tin Co. Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Estates &amp; Mining Co.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rylands Gold Mining Co.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indimba Land &amp; Exploration Co. Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Goldfields Syndicate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson Forbes Gold Mining Co.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnston Syndicate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland Monopolies Syndicate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chester Diamond Drilling Co. Ltd.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Rubie’s Report of 1903 (Appendix 1b), Swaziland Concessions Commission Report (1906)

K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.11 MS 418.
in particular the Swaziland Corporation and the Henderson Consolidated Corporation.

Local officials of the companies were given easy access to Milner, Selborne and, particularly, Coryndon; often by-passing the appointed Commission in the statement of their demands. To consolidate an effective lobby, the various capitalist interests, as well as individual farmers, formed the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1903. The Chamber saw itself involved in:

"The persistent fight to rescue Swaziland from native absorption and to maintain through years of inoperation, cost and loss, those properties which by purchase and judicial confirmation were European property" (28).

A Swaziland without whites and without capitalist development was an anathema to the Chamber. The Chamber's elected representatives, of which A. Miller, Chairman of the Swaziland Corporation, was a prominent personality, met regularly and published an annual progress report. On 21 October 1905, the Chamber was assured of the support of the E. Transvaal faction and on 28 October 1905, that of the farming community of Swaziland which had earlier banded itself together into a number of Farmer's Associations. 29

In addition to the Chamber we have to reckon with the considerable, consolidated and vociferous advocation of their "rights" by the white residents. Personal representation, written petitions and the Times of Swaziland were the major channels of protest. The Swaziland Corporation published the Times as a continuous monitor of events and as a voice for white sentiment and interests. The paper undoubtedly played a significant role as a channel of information communication and concrete expression.
of the interests of capitalist development in the country. Apart from comprehensive reports of events and issues of interest to concession-holders, the editorial policy of the paper shows a distinct white bias in which the aspirations of the Swazi were frequently criticised and the effects of white settlement and foreign capital invariably feted. The need for solidarity of aspiration and attitude within the petit-colon led to the conclusion in 1908 that:

"The paper has exercised a powerful influence upon the public life and commercial development of Swaziland" (30).

4.5 CAPITAL AND STATE LINKAGES

A basic postulate of this study is that the colonial state played a fundamental role in the early capital penetration of Swaziland. This emerges both explicitly and implicitly at various points in Chapters Four through Seven. Bearing in mind the highly de-centralised decision making of the colonial state in relation to Swaziland (4.2), it is of value to draw out the linkages between capital and colonial state officials as background to the more specific discussion which ensues. To this end, personal linkages with capital interests are first discussed and then some privately and publicly articulated general attitudes towards capitalist development and the role of the Swazi in such development are elucidated.

Marlowe (1976) contains a lucid exposition of Milner's links with metropolitan capital during his South African commission, the ways in which his obsessive concern with British capital interests in southern Africa affected his policy-making and the fact that
after leaving the colonial service he spent several years in the direct employ of capital. Marlowe contains no specific reference to Milner's Swaziland dealings but his negotiations with the Swaziland Corporation (4.6) indicate a fundamental empathy with the aims of capital in Swaziland.

Selborne's entire career was in politics and the colonial service and there is consequently no overt personal linkage with capital, as with Milner. The revelation of possible non-apparent linkages awaits the publication of a definitive biography. The only discernable connection in the Swaziland case was with a British-financed settlement scheme for whites (5.3) which appears to have had a significant effect on his partition policy.

Both Coryndon and Grey had very strong links with British capital prior to their Swaziland commissions. Stokes and Brown (1966) document Coryndon's period of employment by the British South Africa Company in Rhodesia and Palmer (1977) and Youé (1978) consider the relationship between Coryndon's linkages with capital and his attitudes towards capitalist development. Brelsford (1965) and Coryndon (1914) show that Grey's work in Swaziland was his only colonial commission. The remainder of his career was spent in the service of capital in Central Africa (Appendix 3b).

Selborne made few, if any, public declarations of policy towards development in Swaziland. In private, however, statements of support for capital interests were frequent. A characteristic of Selborne, in particular, in relation to the Swazi was his extreme cultural and racial arrogance and dislike of the nation.
Thus he said to a delegation of farmers in 1907:

"The Swazis are inferior...mentally, morally and intellectually. Continued contact of the European with them is necessary to raise them out of barbarism... it is our duty to elevate the native from his lowly state and make him useful for State and society. The first step is to teach him diligence, orderliness and obedience" (34).

To Grey he later wrote:

"They are indeed a most uninteresting people; stupid and sulky" (35).

To the Colonial Secretary, Elgin, he said:

"The Swazis are the most barbarous, least advanced, the least intelligent and the least reasonable of all natives living under the tribal system. Civilisation has made no progress with them, and at the head of the tribe is the Chief Regent who differs from the tribe in being clever but whose moral standard is lower than its average member" (36).

Selborne's strong dislike for the Swazi Queen Regent can be traced to her opposition to the policies of the colonial state (Chapter Six).

Coryndon, on the other hand, displays no such overt arrogance though his paternalism is clear in dealings with the Swazi. But as Youé writes:

"Coryndon is often dismissed as a reactionary follower of Rhodes who was pro-settler and therefore anti-African. In fact, his attitudes were not that simple though his racial arrogance cannot be denied. He was 'pro-economic development' rather than pro-white or anti-black. In Swaziland he thought the whites were better suited to develop the land" (37).

Coryndon's private and public expressions of support for capital were frequent. For instance, in his arrival speech in 1907 he saw his role in Swaziland as "expending all energy in the development of Swaziland" and he perceived the Swaziland situation
"A triumph of chaos. The complications which have hampered its development are fast disappearing and we can now work to transform the country into the home of a well-ordered, prosperous and contented British community" (38).

Coryndon's attitude towards retaining the investment of the Swaziland Corporation in Swaziland can be seen as symptomatic of his general ethos (4.6). The role of the Swazi in 'development' was also apparent to Coryndon. In discussing various land partition schemes he argued for one which would hasten the breakdown of tribalism and which would ensure an evenly distributed labour supply which could be kept in closer contact with white demands.

Grey's 'development' attitudes are clearly seen in the proceedings of his partition work (Chapter Five).

Thus while there were no overt colonial state-capital linkages specifically in Swaziland (with the possible significant exception of Selborne) the general rationale of colonial state officials was clearly to further the aims of capital in Swaziland. This becomes apparent in considering the case of the Swaziland Corporation (4.6) and the land partition question (Chapter Five).39

4.6 MONOPOLY EXPROPRIATION: THE CASE OF THE SWAZILAND CORPORATION

In 1903 Rubie had recommended to Milner that all trading and industrial monopolies should be expropriated from the owners with compensation and that all land and mineral concessions should be confirmed.40 The grounds for this differential treatment of concessions are elucidated by Rubie. Historically,
the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the monopolies were considered sufficient enough grounds for their expropriation. Socially, the confirmation of monopolies was regarded not to be in the public interest, however vaguely that was defined. The primary grounds were, however, economic ones. Thus, the need to maximise revenue for administration would be inhibited by the confirmation of importation monopolies and the trading/industrial monopolies were considered contrary to principles of laissez-faire competition and therefore "a hindrance to legitimate development".41 The reasons for the expropriation decision were largely uncontested by capital though lobbying for liberal compensation was a feature of the Swaziland Concession Commission enquiry.42

The real objectives of capital lay elsewhere. These objectives were seriously transgressed by Rubie's recommendation that two concessions known as the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands Concession and the Lapsed and Unallotted Minerals Concession should also be expropriated with compensation. These two concessions are reproduced in full in Appendix 3c. The response to Rubie's recommendation from the holders of the two concessions, the Swaziland Corporation, was immediate and persistent.43 The two concessions were of far-reaching implication and, if validated by the colonial state, would have confirmed the Corporation in the immediate control over three extra mineral and seven extra land concessions. It also implied that with the passage of time, the Corporation would eventually control all mineral rights and well over one million acres of land as concessions expired and lapsed. The speculative possibilities for the Corporation
under this monopolistic form of control were clearly immense. The colonial state, however, perceived a threat to its power in this form of monopolism and the Corporation was given access directly to the Governors, Milner and Selborne, so that the issue could be resolved.  

The Corporation considered that it bargained from a position of some strength:

"This Corporation holds the chief commercial and financial position in Swaziland. It has been and is the pioneer company in that country"(45),

and,

"Swaziland and the Swaziland Corporation are synonymous terms.....under the British flag the Corporation will earn the reward that its capital, consistently directed in the exploitation of this country entitles it to"(46).

The claimed holdings of the Corporation are given in Table Eight. Map Eleven was constructed to show the potential expansion of the Corporation's control over land if the Lapsed and Unallotted Land Concession had been confirmed.

A.M.Miller, local manager of the Corporation, met with Milner in Pretoria on 28.12.1904 after the promulgation of the 1904 Proclamation to present a case for the Corporation. Milner was compliant and compiled a joint memorandum with Miller outlining a deal with the Corporation. The interpretation of this memorandum was later to be a matter of some dispute. The Corporation undoubtedly saw it as an agreement though the Colonial Secretary, Elgin, later dismissed it as merely a tentative directive to the Swaziland Concessions Commission.  

Miller was consequently anxious to push through with the agreement but was thwarted by the wider forces that led to Milner's resignation in 1905 and the
TABLE EIGHT

SWAZILAND CORPORATION HOLDINGS,

A. MONOPOLIES

Printing and publishing, Gas and electricity, Construction of animal
Pounds, Banking, Lithography, Treatment of Tailings, Liquor Import,
Liquor Manufacture (25%), Iron Manufacture (33%), Tobacco Import (25%),
Diamond drills (25%).

B. MINERAL CONCESSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concession</th>
<th>Area (Acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M.75 Forbes Reef</td>
<td>55,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.33 Horo</td>
<td>263,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.36 McNab's</td>
<td>66,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*M.1 Albu &amp; Davis</td>
<td>9,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*M.27 Kannemeyer's</td>
<td>190,080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* Claimed as lapsed under the Lapsed and Unallotted Minerals Concession.)

C. LAND CONCESSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concession</th>
<th>Area (Acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L.153 Peebles</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.177 Du Pont/Cummings</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.10 Steyn's</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Campbell's</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Umvurulisa's</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Bell's</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Beatrice's</td>
<td>69,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Mather's</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>414,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(** Claimed as lapsed under the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands Concession.)

SUMMARY OF LAND HOLDINGS CLAIMED (Claimed: 1,245,160 acres)

1. Land to be surveyed 414,200
2. Land lapsing in 12 yrs 92,600
   in 25 yrs 79,600
   in 35 yrs 65,560
   in 40 yrs 14,000
3. Areas affected by personal rights 111,500
4. Grazing areas over 464,300 which Co. claims rights

Source: Swaziland Corporation (1903), Annual Reports K.C.L.MS MIL 1 08 3.
inception of Selborne as Governor.\textsuperscript{48}

The memorandum itself (reproduced in Appendix 3d) contained an undertaking by the Corporation to forfeit all their monopolies and the two Lapsed and Unallotted concessions in exchange for the confirmation of ownership to five mineral concessions and title to a maximum of one million acres of land and an agreement to encourage white settlement of Corporation land holdings.

The Swaziland Concessions Commission reported to Selborne on 7.7.1905 in a report critical of the Corporation for making no attempt to prove the value of their monopoly concessions as other corporate interests were doing at the time. The Commission nevertheless recommended to Selborne that the idea of a land grant to the Corporation in settlement of their claim was a reasonable one, on the condition that the Corporation's claims about the extent of their actual and potential holdings were substantiated by the General Survey, then in progress. Selborne did not appear to be in favour of the ad hoc proposals of the memorandum and agreed with the Commission that the survey should be completed first.\textsuperscript{49} The Corporation agreed to suspend their claims until 1907 though Miller accused Selborne of back-tracking on Milner's memorandum.\textsuperscript{50}

When the British directors of the Corporation petitioned the Colonial Office in early 1907 they were informed that Selborne would not negotiate further and that they should proceed with their claims through the Concessions Commission.\textsuperscript{51} The decision of the colonial state was acidly criticised by Miller in February, 1908.\textsuperscript{52} Despite the temporary closure of channels to the policy-
makers of the colonial state:

"Mr Miller attended all sessions of the Commission.... and most actively pressed the claims of his company to lands unallotted or lapsing at a future date" (53).

Selborne appears, at least in 1907, to have been acting under advice from the Colonial Office. The Colonial Secretary, at one stage, advised him of the inadvisability of a generous arrangement with the Corporation and of a non-pecuniary settlement. Selborne instructed the Concessions Commission to begin evaluating the Corporation's holdings including the two controversial concessions.

The evaluations of the Commission were based on the guiding principle for the general expropriation of monopolies; that is, to minimise compensation costs for the administration. Thus only the pounds (£204) and the banking concessions (£5,109) were compensated and the value placed on the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands Concession was £30,450. This total evaluation contrasts sharply with the Corporation's own evaluation of this concession at £116,000.

In September 1908 the Corporation was offered £35,763 as a cash settlement for their claims or in lieu of cash an area of land of 350,000 acres, location undefined. The Corporation's British shareholders were incensed but were inclined to accept the cash compensation. The colonial state, ex officio, did make one last unsuccessful attempt at appeasement; Coryndon offered to approach Selborne about increasing the land offer by 200,000 acres since:

"It seems a pity that the long and intimate connection of the Swaziland Corporation with the country should be severed without an effort being made to retain these interests of yours" (60)
The Corporation were unmoved and were left with their mineral holdings, 50,000 acres of land (Map Eleven) and a cash payment to pay off their litigation debts. As a direct result the share capital of the Corporation was reduced to £2 million and the Corporation considered devoting all its future attention to mining.61

The failure of the Corporation to achieve finally the degree of land control solicited was ultimately attributed by the Corporation to the replacement of Milner by Selborne as High Commissioner.62 No unequivocal evidence was uncovered that Selborne was acting under direct orders from the Colonial Secretary although the Secretary did remark, somewhat enigmatically, in late 1907 that:

"His Majesty's Government would find great difficulty in defending an arrangement which seems to be too generous to the Corporation."(63)

Rather, Selborne seems to have taken a more thorough and pragmatic approach to the whole problem, desiring that a precise definition of Corporation holdings should be obtained. To this end he appears to have preferred to work through the appointed Swaziland Concessions Commission in search of a solution. It was the Commission's recommendations that eventually dictated Selborne's policy and the Commission were far from generous in their treatment of the Corporation's case for the following reasons:

First, the Commission challenged the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the Lapsed and Unallotted Concessions. These were seen to be highly dubious, as was Miller's role in their acquisition though Miller himself strenuously denied the accusations.
Second, although the Corporation repeatedly claimed liberal treatment on the grounds of its opening up of Swaziland to British capital, the Commission argued that the capital was predominantly prospective and not realised. It was concluded that the Corporation therefore held its interests for speculative purposes. Third, while the colonial state preferred that a private company should take responsibility for the opening up of a white settlement programme, it was argued that:

"It is inadvisable to have large areas of single ownership of land as the experience of Transvaal and Rhodesia show that settlement and development is impeded by this form of ownership" (65).

Monopolism of the form advocated by the Corporation as conducive to capitalist development was consequently abhorred by the colonial state as, in fact, not in the best interests of capitalism in Swaziland.

4:7 CONCLUSION

The examination in this chapter has been of the aims of capital in relation to control over land, labour and mineral resources for prospective mining, plantation agriculture and white settlement schemes in Swaziland. The consolidation of a formerly-disparate petit-colon in pursuit of the common goal of achieving dominance over the forces of production was, it is argued, a noteworthy feature of the early years of British colonial rule. Articulation of demands in collusive interaction with the colonial state was facilitated by the local and metropolitan representatives of foreign capital. The Swaziland Corporation, in particular, is seen to have a fundamental role in
this laying of the groundwork for the articulation of the Swazi into a new set of social relations under the capitalist mode of production. The case of the Swaziland Corporation per se in its attempts to obtain monopoly control is presented to highlight a particular facet of interaction between capital and the colonial state, where despite basic ideological empathy conflict arose on the best means of implementing capitalist development in Swaziland.

The actions of the colonial state as a mediator between the petit-colon, the implementation of its inflexible demands and the Swazi, in the translation of the capitalist ideology into space is presented in Chapters Five and Six.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE

"There is nothing haphazard in the partition"
Times of Swaziland, 1908

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the access of capital interests to the colonial state is first considered in relation to petit-colon lobbying with regard to the question of alternative spatial schema for land control (5.2). Then, the spatial implementation of the provisions of the 1907 Partition Proclamation by the colonial state is considered. The selection of a suitable proportional division of land between black and white is examined and the attitudes of the colonial state towards crown land are shown to have worked to the advantage of the petit-colon (5.3). The explicit and implicit principles underlying the spatial division of land are then analysed in some detail (5.4). Some summarised comments on the social and economic structure of space are then proferred (5.5).

5.2 ALTERNATIVE SCHEMA

A reading of the sources shows that five different schema were proposed to effect an alienation of land in Swaziland and create reserves for the Swazi. In this section, each of these is examined in turn; identifying its protagonists, critics and the reasons for its acceptance or rejection by the colonial state.
Such an exercise highlights the interplay between capital and the petit-colon and the colonial state, represented by the Concessions Commission, the administrators Milner, Selborne and Coryndon, and the Colonial Office in London. Initially, however, there is a need to consider two foundational issues upon which the schema were built. These issues, which confronted the colonial state, were, firstly, whether to effect a general expropriation (cancellation with compensation) of land and grazing concessions from the holders, and, secondly, when this course of action was decided against whether to partition the land surface between black and white or to allow both to occupy the land concurrently.

Rubie's report (Appendix 1b), on whose recommendations Milner's policy was based, considered a general expropriation of land and grazing concessions by the colonial state, along the lines of the industrial monopoly expropriation, to be both undesirable and unnecessary. It would involve the administration in additional expense and, in addition:

"The requirements of the public interest can hardly warrant a general expropriation" (1).

"Public interest" was conceived in the narrowest sense as that of capital and the petit-colon. Thus, for Milner, expropriation was a dead issue and he became a clear advocate of a land partition which would give white and black mutually exclusive ownership to different portions of the land surface:

"Milner's idea was to divide the country up so that each concessionaire had a piece of ground over which the natives had no right and in return from this immunity from native interference to give up a portion of his concession" (2).

A general expropriation of all concessions was consequently
rejected by the colonial state in the 1904 Proclamation. Although Selborne later mentioned it again in a letter to Elgin in 1906 he indicated that he too could not seriously countenance expropriation as a viable strategy to further white interests. He also indicated that it would place an intolerable burden on local revenues.

Selborne's major dilemma in pursuit of a solution to "the problem which has vexed me more than any other" was whether to follow the course of partition favoured by Milner and pressed for by the petit-colon or to favour a concurrent black-white landholding until the expiry of the concessions when the land would return to exclusive Swazi ownership. Prior to September, 1906, and his official visit to Swaziland, Selborne still countenanced concurrency but deemed it inadvisable on several counts. In particular, he saw a natural increase of the Swazis and the likely increase in white immigration as eventually posing insurmountable difficulties for white enterprise under concurrency:

"Indeed as long as the present system of joint occupation exists it will be impossible to develop the country agriculturally" (6).

On his return from Swaziland, with his views reinforced by those of the petit-colon, he considered a spatial division of land between black and white imperative since without it:

"Whites would eventually leave and men who were valuable in civilising the country would be lost" (7).

Selborne appears to have given particular weight to the arguments of the Swaziland Chamber of Mining, Commerce and Industry against concurrency. The Chamber argued that a bureaucratic legal structure would be a pre-requisite to ensure whites
"the unrestricted right to exercise all rights in the original concessions" and to prevent the wholesale immigration of blacks from the Transvaal into Swaziland. In addition, they argued that the possibilities for exploiting resources would be minimal:

"The concessionaire feels he cannot make beneficial use of his rights without risk of native disturbance. They are convinced no progress and no development of natural agricultural resources can take place unless rights are separated" (9).

One white resident was more vitriolic:

"They are the laziest, dirtiest and most degrading of all Bantu tribes...the undoubted resources of the country can only be developed by European brains and industry. Solve the concession problem and light would dawn. The Swazie will never fulfil God's command to subdue the earth; 'From him that hath not must be taken away even that he hath' must take its course, and this fair land so long made hideous and vile must be entrusted to the European whose watchword is 'Forward Swaziland' " (10).

Other criticisms of concurrency were that the whites would not have security of title to land on which to make capital investments, that the mobile Swazi would "spread out" and leave no land suitable for white agriculture and that grass burning by the Swazi would destroy white grazing and crops. A type comment on the perceived negative impact on white enterprise was:

"The property of the concessionaire is worthless. What is the good of the concessionaire turning out cattle if the natives could do the same, eat the grass and introduce disease" (12)

A crucially reiterated criticism of concurrency was that the farmer would have no control over his labour supply under such an arrangement. A partition was considered a necessity by the petit-colon and the colonial state was assured of white support if they retained at least 60% of the land surface and the
power to retain Swazis on their land if required as a labour supply.  

For Selborne, the only real advantage of concurrency was that Swazi rights would only gradually be eroded and:

"Their imagination would be confronted with no sudden loss of rights over great tracts of Swaziland" (15).

This was related to his only uneasiness with partition which revolved around the possibility of effecting it without violent Swazi reaction.  

He argued that built into any partition scheme should be certain provisos which would minimise the chances of unrest. These included that there should be no forced removal of Swazis to reserves and that Swazis wishing to move should have a minimal distance to travel.

An implicit colonial assumption of both Milner and Selborne was that the petit-colon rights to the land surface superceded those of the Swazi and that partition was a concrete spatial exercise which would afford greater control over both land and labour. The Rand Daily Mail of 5.1.1905 commented:

"On the question of delimitation there has been a certain tendency to lay stress upon what the Europeans are prepared to give the natives and to say little about the rights of the Swazi themselves".

It is now possible to move on to a consideration of various alternative mooted partition schema. Clause 20 of the 1904 Proclamation stated that:

"Nothing in this proclamation shall in any way affect the continued use and occupation by natives of the land now in their possession and of all grazing or agricultural rights to which they are entitled....but it shall be lawful for the Commission to set apart a portion of any concession for the sole and exclusive occupation of natives and thereupon all rights of the holder shall cease in respect of the portion of land so set apart but the remaining portion of land shall not be subject to any such use and occupation."
The initial interpretation of Milner's directive by the Swaziland Concessions Commission is embodied in the first partition scheme of 1905, popularly called the "Spotted Dog Partition" at the time.

PROPOSAL ONE: THE CONCESSIONS COMMISSION PARTITION SCHEME, 1905

In all deliberations of the Commission the assumption was that the majority of the land surface (excluding crown land) was the property of the petit-colon and hence that the Swazi should retain "all grazing or agricultural rights to which they are entitled" was explicitly construed as being merely as much land as was required for the immediate purposes of each Swazi family.

To determine this requirement the Commission sat in Pretoria in 1905 to consider evidence from South Africa. Two South African Native Affairs officials were questioned by the Commission as to "native requirements". Their findings are presented in Table Nine. Taberer's strictures must be interpreted in the light of his belief that:

"It is against the interests of the country and the natives themselves to provide for more than the present generation" (17).

He argued that surplus population could then be directed to labour centres. Krogh appears to have been more lenient in his attitude to future expansion. At this stage, however, the Commission tended to agree with Taberer. A white delegation was informed that:

"The Swaziland Concessions Commission has ordered what are the Swazi's present requirements......we make no provision for the future at all" (18).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture Land Required (acres/family)</th>
<th>Grazing Required (acres/head)</th>
<th>Total Required (acres/family)</th>
<th>Swazi Reqd. (acres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.C. Krogh</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.M. Taberer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Both officials set family size at 7.
In the deliberations of the Commission two issues specific to Swaziland were ignored. First, the continental rinderpest epidemic touched Swaziland in the late 1890's producing stock losses estimated at 65,000 between 1901-4:

"Within a short period the country was practically denuded of stock" (19).

It was impossible to trace any reference to suggest the Commission took this into account.

Second, given the prevailing level of Swazi technology and farming practice, family variables such as size and stockholding, the hierarchical structure of traditional society, and particularly the factor of environmental diversity, the advisability of producing a single land requirement which would be indiscriminately applied could well be questioned. Table Ten shows the land actually found under Swazi use in the two locations for which they collected data when in Swaziland. The differences with Table Nine are salutary.

With the Native Affairs figures in mind the Commission envisaged setting apart land on each defined concession for the Swazis resident on that concession. The Commission went to Swaziland from July to December, 1905, to effect this piecemeal partition in the field on two concessions which had been defined by the general survey. 20

The scheme was aborted in December, 1905, as a result of consolidated protest from the petit-colon:

"It is seldom that an outburst of public opinion so unanimous and widespread greets a public act in this country" (21).

Protest against what was perceived as the random scattering of
### TABLE TEN

**LAND UNDER BLACK USE IN SWAZILAND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Acres Used</th>
<th>Acres/Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MBABANE AREA BLOCK 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOWVELD BLOCK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279</td>
<td>24534</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
small Swazi allotments over concessions can be crystallised into four issues. First, it was claimed that the scheme was a blatantly uneconomical and time-consuming mode of solution. Second, equality of treatment was demanded. Under the Commission scheme it was unlikely that an equal proportion would be deducted from each concession. Third, it was claimed that the creation of a "great native rabbit warren" would promote conflict between white and black. Fourth, it was forcefully argued that white agricultural development would be inhibited.

Thus, Forbes, of the Henderson-Forbes Gold Mining Co., claimed the whites would be deprived of all quality land. Penfold, of the Henderson Consolidated Corporation, desired that whites should have free access to water resources and consolidated blocks of land. Miller, of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd., was more vocal:

"The impracticality is that if the farms are cut up by small areas for natives in a country where the native is an absolute savage (with associated practices) the farming development of the country is at an end" (23).

Selborne agreed with such sentiments and abandoned the scheme initiated under Milner in early 1906.

Having obtained an assurance from the colonial state that a partition was to be effected, the petit-colon were not loath to proffer suggestions of their own for its implementation (Proposals Two and Three).

PROPOSAL TWO : THE PETIT-COLON LOCATION PARTITION SCHEME

A proposed alternative solution by the petit-colon was to set apart large 'locations' or reserves for the Swazi into which they could be forcibly moved if necessary. Generally, either a single block or four blocks of land were proposed as most
suitable. The scheme was officially proposed for the first time in Commission sittings in early 1905 and is elucidated in a newspaper editorial of a later date:

"Four large blocks should be expropriated. One in the south to accommodate natives living south of the River Usutu, one in the east, one in the west for the hill residents and one in the north for those north of the River Komati" (24).

The forced removal of large numbers of Swazis to these reserves was a fundamental tenet of this scheme, leaving the remainder of the land surface in petit-colon possession and free for capitalist agricultural development. The petit-colon were also concerned, however, about how to retain black labour for their usage. The production and control of a labour force was a basic consideration in their proposal that the total area of the reserves be 50% of that which the Commission considered necessary for the whole population. Swazis could then be forced to move to the reserves or be kept on white land as tenants.

This scheme does not, however, appear to have been seriously countenanced by the colonial state (either the Commission or Selborne) since it patently violated Selborne's fundamental principles of partition that there should be no forced movement of Swazis and that potential voluntary movements to reserves should be of minimal distance.

PROPOSAL THREE: THE PETIT-COLON HIERARCHICAL PARTITION

This scheme, to which all petit-colon interests gave assent, embodied an implicit recognition on the part of the whites that the traditional hierarchy should be recognised in any partition. The concommitant advantage to the whites from this
perceived appeasement of the indigenous power structure was seen as greater control over the rank and file Swazi. Two similar hierarchical plans were mooted at different times. These are presented in Table Eleven.

In Plan One it was proposed that the 30 acres per family be held in consolidated blocks on the borders of each white farm which was over 6000 acres in area. These blocks would initially be for the Swazis resident on that farm but Swazis resident on farms of less than 6000 acres could move to these blocks over a proposed period of five years. Thus, there would be a labour pool on the periphery of each large land-holding.

In Plan Two all white farms were to have blocks for Swazis, irrespective of their size. Each farm was to have one block and it would be formed by a constant proportion of land being deducted from each farm. The blocks would be on the borders of the farms, as with Proposal One, and the Swazis outside the blocks would be given three years to move to them. The advantage of this scheme over Plan One was that each farm would have its own labour pool, irrespective of its size.

In both Plans the power controllers of the Swazi were to be allotted land held by the Crown.

The similarities of these Plans to Proposal Two will be appreciated but they had the distinct advantage of creating reserves for surplus labour while retaining a proportion of the Swazi populace on, or close to, white farms as an immediately exploitable labour force. If it was deemed desirable that some Swazis would remain on the farms as tenants, this possibility was also provided for.
TABLE ELEVEN

HIERARCHICAL LAND PARTITION PROPOSALS

A. PLAN ONE

13 dignitaries : 5000 to 6000 acres each
Swazis : 30 acres per family
Total Swazi land : 574,000 acres

B. PLAN TWO

Queen Regent : 12,000 acres
District Chiefs : 18 blocks of 3000 to 6000 acres each
Swazis : 60 acres per family
Total Swazi land : 1,097,400

Sources : Plan One - Times of Swaziland, 21.10.1905
Plan Two - Memorandum from Chamber of Mining, Commerce and Industry to Selborne, 29.9.1906, SNA J205/06.
The grounds of the colonial state for the rejection of this scheme was again the desire to avoid unrest by minimising necessary African movement. The confirmation to as many Swazi as possible of land actually in their possession was viewed by Selborne as an essential starting point for security. The Swazi should also be given the choice to move at least for a period of time. But as Selborne patronisingly wrote in 1907:

"The chief object of reserves is not to compel all natives to go into these areas but to move of their own free will. As a rule natives make little use of these reserves. The native chooses his Master and looks up to him for help, advice and protection.... it is our duty to elevate the native from his lowly state to become useful for State and Society" (28).

The response of the petit-colon to the rejection of the proposals highlights the rationale behind them:

"These proposals, if adopted, would have opened the country to the full tide of European capital and energy" (29).

But for Selborne, it was not an outright rejection. He acknowledged his debt to the Plans in the formulation of his final solution:

"I considered and accepted their basic plan and built on it" (30).

In particular he noted their willingness to part with one-third of the area of their concessions.

PROPOSAL FOUR: THE SWAZI PROPOSAL

The response of the Swazi to the deliberations in which their say was minimal is considered in greater depth in Chapter Six. However, the Queen Regent reportedly proposed a scheme which came in for vitriolic attack from the Times of Swaziland. The proposal was that one-third of Swaziland be transferred to the
Transvaal in return for an annuity of £4,000 and the reservation of the remaining two-thirds for the Swazi.

The idea does not appear to have been seriously countenanced by the colonial state since it ran counter to petit-colon and state interests but it does indicate the oft-expressed Swazi desire to retain total control over a consolidated land surface.

PROPOSAL FIVE: THE SOLUTION OF THE COLONIAL STATE: GREY'S PARTITION.

The actual scheme chosen for the spatial implementation of land alienation under capitalism was attendant upon the final delimitation of concession boundaries by the general survey and is embodied in the Partition Proclamation of 1907 (Appendix 4a).

Among the salient points of the Proclamation were the disbanding of the Concessions Commission and the appointment of a single Commissioner to effect a partition (Article 3), provision for the deduction of one-third of the area of each concession for the creation of Swazi reserves (Article 4), the confirmation to whites of either freehold title or leasehold title to the remainder of each concession (Article 7) and a five-year period of grace for the Swazi to move to the reserves (Article 6). To force the Swazi resident on white land either to move to the reserves or to accept a tenancy relationship with the white landowner, a tax or labour tribute was exactable by the landowner after the expiry of the five-year period, payable on pain of eviction (Article 6).

This scheme is considered in some depth in 5.3 through 5.5.
5.3 QUANTITY DIVISION

An outcome of the abandonment of the Concessions Commission partition scheme (5.2) was petit-colon realization that any scheme incorporating similar principles of quantity-division would leave them in control of much less than 50% of the land surface. A one third : two thirds division between black and white, while construed as unnecessarily generous to the Swazi, was determined upon as an alternative principle for bargaining with the colonial state. To ensure internal cohesion and harmony within the petit-colon, it was proposed that a similar proportion be deducted from each holding. 33

Selborne complied with the proposal, having anticipated greater difficulty in obtaining such an agreement, and ratified it to them in a memorandum on 12.10.1907, and in a statement of policy on 6.1.1908:

"At the request of the concessionaires, not that of the Swazis, I am dividing the country. In my opinion they are quite right to clamour for partition, because the concessions over the land are worthless as long as the natives have unrestricted right to prior use.... it was the concessionaires themselves who offered to me to surrender one-third and I accepted the offer on the understanding they should retain the balance of the concessions for their own use" (34)

A significant condition articulated by the petit-colon in their offer was concerned with utilization of the Swazi as a labour supply:

"A division of rights is necessary. The Europeans will agree to this if not more than 30% of the land is taken for the natives, if they do not cause trouble and if the Swazies are allowed to remain on white land as a labour supply" (35).

Selborne's unprotesting compliance implied that a mere 25.2%
of the land surface would be retained for Swazi reserves but was
to be interpreted in the light of the large pre-partition crown
holdings of 1,056,619 acres available for disposal by the colonial
state (Map Twelve).

If all crown land had been transferred to Swazi possession,
over 50% of the land surface would have been under their control.
The Swazi were fallaciously led to believe that this was colonial
state policy for a period of time. Colonial Secretary, Elgin,
addressing a Swazi delegation in November 1907 said:

"It is provided that there shall be a deduction of one-
third of its area from every land concession. That is
an enormous deduction to make .... and I believe that
taken in conjunction with lands belonging to the crown
it will make so ample a provision for native occupation
that half the land will be in their occupation"(36).

At the local level, Coryndon made the same assumption:

"In addition to the one thirds there are large areas of
crown land which will be available for native settlement.
Therefore the Swazi will see that the first thing the
British Government did was to give half the country
back to the Swazis"(37).

Other forces were at work to prevent the wholesale transfer
of crown land coming to pass. First, Selborne had instructed the
Partition Commissioner, Grey, to provide enough land for the
accommodation of the whole Swazi tribe and the "reasonable expansion
of the tribe by birth not immigration". Grey later estimated
that one-third of the total area of the country was sufficient
to fulfil this condition (5.4). Little store was set by the
wholesale transfer of crown land; only as much as was required
to bring the Swazi holding up from 25.2% to one-third. In the
final analysis this was 35% of crown land.

Second, a number of colonial state officials held highly
critical views of tribalism, traditional culture and the efficiency and utility of the traditional mode of agricultural production; in particular, of shifting cultivation and extensive pastoralism. Land alienation and restriction of cultivable and grazing area was viewed as a concrete means to effect basic changes in the traditional mode:

"By limiting the area available for native agriculture and pasturage, land will be improved by the necessity for closer grazing and less primitive methods of cultivation and will therefore be able to bear a larger native population than now on it. The present practice of shifting agriculture and impoverishing the soil will then cease" (39).

This constituted a powerful justification for limiting the designated area to one-third. It also implied that the colonial state was perfectly justified in expropriating two-thirds of the land surface for "modern", "efficient" capitalist agriculture under the petit-colon and that the traditional society would inevitably benefit from being tied more closely to cash-cropping in the money-economy.

Third, the colonial state began to perceive crown land as a realisable asset - a mechanism to generate income for the administrative costs of the country and, incidentally as a means for consolidating the petit-colon via a joint capital-state settlement scheme. Sale of crown lands to individual whites and corporate interests generated an income of £58,000 between 1910-15 and a further £79,000 between 1916-25. In 1909, the Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme was founded as a joint exercise between state and capital to "acquire land suitable for the settlement of Britishers in Swaziland". The purchase of 67,000
acres from the crown at a nominal price by "anonymous public
spirited men assisted by Lord Lovat and the Earl of Selborne"
instigated a scheme which deprived the Swazi of any realistic
chance of obtaining crown land from the colonial state.41

A simple calculation reveals that the Swazi were allocated
36.9% of the land surface instead of a rounded one-third. This
differential could be set down to operational error but was it
transpires a curious attempt at window-dressing by Grey and
Selborne, which strikingly portrays the mentality which the
colonial state brought to bear on the land question as a whole.
Grey suggested to Selborne that he could add some unproductive
land to the demarcated one-third to make the partition appear
more generous to the Swazi than it in fact was. It appears that
this suggestion was designed to pacify the belief that Elgin
had made a promise to the Swazi about the amount of land they were
to receive. Selborne replied:

"I think it well, where you could easily do it, to add
to the native reserves a lump or two of land. I under­
stand that the land thus added would not be of good
quality or capable of supporting a large population and
that in addition it would be a shop-window addition; but
I think it a legitimate and not unwise thing to do under
the circumstances. It is legitimate to add some poor
land to forestall the ignorant criticism that we are
taking away two-thirds of the land surface from them"(42).

Grey's agreement to this explains the discrepancy, although he
was later to note that he had not been able to add as much as
he had hoped without incurring compensation costs.43

At partition, therefore, the petit-colon was given control
of 49.2% of the land surface, consolidated further to 58% by the
later purchase of crown land.
5.4 PROCEDURAL CRITERIA

The translation of the principle of land expropriation into physical space was effected by George Grey, appointed by Selborne as Partition Commissioner, between January and December 1908 in continuous consultation with both Selborne and Coryndon. 44

Thirty two reserves were eventually demarcated after an extensive field survey. These are shown in Map Thirteen. The apparently haphazard patchwork has little obvious order and it is therefore expedient at this stage to identify the set of procedural criteria with which Grey worked and to determine to what extent it is a function of a structure of capitalist articulation. This set, culled from a number of different sources, is presented here in numerical form for the sake of clarity.

(1) The question of explicit boundary demarcation was one which pre-occupied Grey and Coryndon. At Coryndon's request Grey attempted to use rivers and streams as clear demarcation lines:

"Wherever possible I have adopted well defined watersheds, watercourses or rivers as boundaries of native areas, such boundaries will be easily understood and recognised by the natives" (45).

Thus of a total boundary length of 1690 miles, 613 was perennial river. The greater proportion of the remaining boundaries was made up of concession boundaries.

Grey also foresaw the possibility of the necessity for more definitive boundaries with white agricultural development:

"Whereas rivers may be suitable now, in a few years when white land is better occupied and stocked many difficulties will arise particularly if the white farmer wishes to fence he would have to fence out water. I recommend that if a white farmer wished to fence and still use water he may submit a line of fence which crosses the river two or more times but which ensures a fair proportion of river is on each side of the fence" (46).
SWAZI RESERVES DEMARCATED
BY GREY, 1909

Source: Map compiled in Surveyor General's Office,
Pretoria, July 1914, Scale 1 inch: 2.34 miles

MAP THIRTEEN
(2) Selborne assumed that by confirming land already being utilised to the Swazi (see 6), a partition would produce a situation in which greater than one third of "fertile land" would be in their possession. Grey later claimed that "fifty per cent of the most fertile portions of Swaziland are in native area". Crush (1975) has argued, however, that Grey's claim is difficult to substantiate (Table Twelve).

In the field Grey tried to obtain information from Swazi Chiefs about the land they were cultivating and which they considered most desirable for agriculture, for inclusion in the reserves. The response to his request was uniform:

"Generally I was given little or no information by the Chiefs I visited. Usually they explained quite civilly that without the Chief Regent's orders they were unable to point out the land they most required" (49).

Consequently Grey could only make his own evaluation of land the Swazi considered desirable though he was confident of his own perceptions:

"I am confident that my partition will be found to have provided for all the requirements of the native and that the interests of the Swazi have been made known to me as well as if they had co-operated" (50)

Nevertheless the reserve network thus contains no overt expression of Swazi land desirability.

(3) The partition pattern is, however, related to Grey's perception of the four environmental provinces identified in Chapter One:

"The middleveld is the most thickly inhabited district and has a greater capacity for carrying a large native population than any other portion of Swaziland. The severe winters of the highveld and the prevalent malaria in the lowveld seem less desirable to the nation than the middleveld......while the natives appreciate the valleys of the highveld and the fertile middleveld, the concessionaires value more than any
TABLE TWELVE
GREY'S PARTITION : LAND QUALITY AND EQUITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL ACREAGE (Murdoch)</th>
<th>GREY'S NATIVE AREAS ACREAGE</th>
<th>% OF EACH LAND CAPABILITY CATEGORY IN NATIVE AREAS</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL NATIVE AREA IN EACH LAND CAPABILITY CATEGORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AS Good soil - suitable slopes</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>148,396</td>
<td>38.05</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS Fair soil - suitable slopes</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>63,342</td>
<td>24.36</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS Poor soil - suitable slopes</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>222,042</td>
<td>30.83</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS V.Poor soil - suitable slopes</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td>412,919</td>
<td>46.92</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES Until.soil - slopes &lt; 14°</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>87,676</td>
<td>33.72</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT Good soil - too steep slopes</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>29,256</td>
<td>41.79</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT Fair soil - too steep slopes</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>37,536</td>
<td>26.81</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT Poor soil - too steep slopes</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>70,564</td>
<td>28.22</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT V.Poor soil - too steep slopes</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>52,210</td>
<td>26.11</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET Until.soil - slopes 14°</td>
<td>1,140,000</td>
<td>340,259</td>
<td>29.84</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GT Soil ratings A-D,too steep slopes</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>529,285</td>
<td>29.43</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM Until.soils,all slopes(ES,ET)</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>427,935</td>
<td>30.57</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN Good soils,all slopes(AS,AT)</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>177,652</td>
<td>38.50</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

other area, the highveld grass for winter grazing. At the present time most concessionaires value land more for its pastoral than agricultural possibilities and they therefore have a large proportion of lowveld" (51).

Thus as Table Thirteen shows, the Middleveld was Grey's favoured zone for reserve demarcation; based, it might be added, on Grey's perception of the desires of capital which do not entirely accord with the stated aims of capital, outlined elsewhere (4.3). The Middleveld was not to be the exclusive preserve of the Swazi, however, since white interests were generally paramount:

"In the middleveld I have succeeded in keeping out of native area two large stretches in which a considerable white farming population might find settlement" (52).

A contemporary observer of Grey's work made an additional comment upon the relationship of the network to the environmental provinces:

"The Commissioner in his work has obviously proceeded on a method, and that method has been to define the alternate European and native areas on latitudinal lines - that is as near as possible strips of land running from the western to the eastern border" (53).

No such articulation could be located in the writing of Grey, however.

(4) Grey determined that any land already under white occupation and cultivation in 1908 was automatically precluded from the reserves. Thus in Grey's preliminary fieldnotes, which were sent to Selborne, there are references such as:

"The best agricultural land and much good grazing land is left to the white owner... the white owner should be well satisfied with the portions; the most accessible are left to him... the portion left to the concessionaire contains some of the finest grazing country in Swaziland, is well watered and contains good agricultural land" (54)

(5) The basic network of defined concessions within which
## Table Thirteen

**Land Partition by Environmental Province**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% of Swazi Land in Each Zone</th>
<th>% of Each Zone Demarcated as Swazi Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highveld</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middleveland</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowveld</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebombo</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Grey was to effect a partition undoubtedly exercised a set of spatial constraints on the possibility for producing consolidated or symmetrical reserves. That Grey exercised his perogative not to deduct a rigid on third from every concession represents, in part, an attempt to circumvent these constraints. A further complication would have arisen if concession sub-divisions had been considered. Information on subdivision was only supplied by the petit-colon on one concession and all others were assumed to be discrete wholes by Grey.

The one third portions, together with the crown land being used, were arranged to form compact blocks wherever the network constraints permitted, under instruction from Selborne:

"I have attempted to make the native areas as large as possible and at the same time to cut off exactly a third of all land interests" (55).

Grey consolidated 32 blocks from the portions of 181 defined concessions, though with a considerable size range (2,900 to 259,000 acres) and a mean size of 45,700 acres (Appendix 5b).

Selborne's directive to Grey in consolidation was that:

"The native areas must not be in one place nor in a very few blocks. Neither should they be numerous small portions dotted and mixed up with white farms which would lead to friction and the diminished value of the white farms. Avoid the evils of undue concentration and undue dissemination" (56)

The stated rationale for a degree of consolidation was thus (a) to minimize prospective black-white friction, and (b) to preserve aggregated blocks of land for unfettered white enterprise. Coryndon, while acknowledging the so-called evils of dissemination held a degree of fragmentation to be desirable for a number of reasons; (i) "the natives are easier to supervise and control",


(ii) tribalism could be more easily broken up, (iii) the "material development" of the Swazi would be more rapid and thorough if they were kept in closer touch with the surrounding white population, and (iv) the supply of black labour would be more evenly distributed and could be more rapidly developed by closer contact with demand.  

From the comments of Selborne, Coryndon and Grey it is arguable that the spatial pattern is a function of policy which pre-supposed the expediency of cultural, social and economic domination of the Swazi by the petit-colon. It also reflects the desire of the colonial state to promote the articulation of the Swazi into the capitalist mode under a new set of social relations.

The desire of the colonial state to minimise the possibilities of social and political instability, and fulfil its role as a politically stabilising force, has already been seen as introducing the principles of (i) no forced movement of Swazi to the reserves, and (ii) minimization of potential distance to be travelled for those who did chose to move (5.2). Accessibility of reserves to all Swazi is a further element in the consolidation of blocks by Grey. Thus no point on white land is greater than ten miles from the nearest reserve.

Notwithstanding it was always a clear assumption of the colonial state that the great majority of alienated Swazi would chose to remain on expropriated land and enter into tribute or labour contracts with the petit-colon.

A further factor encouraging consolidation was that while there was a consensus that traditional agricultural practices should be curtailed, unless blocks were consolidated "natives would be deprived of freely moving their kraals which they so much
value" (59). Psychologically, according to Selborne, the mass of Swazi were to feel no immediate deprivation or constriction of rights.

(6) The security motive was also worked out in other directions. Grey was directed by Selborne to reduce to the smallest proportion possible the potential disturbance of existing homesteads. The rationale was to maximise the number of Swazi who would experience no residential change or overt and immediate change of social and economic status in relation to the petit-colon. Thus the most densely populated zones were a pre-requisite for demarcation. In general, Grey attempted to incorporate as many Swazi as possible within the reserves. For this purpose, maps were drawn to show population distribution on which an estimated 80-90% of the homesteads were marked. Grey's comment on these maps highlights the difficulty faced in effecting this principle:

"It will be seen how evenly distributed the population is, and how unavoidable it will be that a large proportion of it must be left on those parts not laid out in native areas" (61).

In consequence, of 6787 plotted homesteads, a total of 3914 (58%) were within the reserves. That Grey was able to concentrate 58% of the Swazi population on 36% of the land is explicable in terms of expropriation flexibility:

"While choosing as native areas those parts of Swaziland most thickly inhabited by natives I have at the same time, wherever possible, formed the areas out of exact thirds of concessions. Owing to local population density I have at times been forced to recommend the expropriation of whole portions of concessions in excess of one third" (62).

Where population was less dense Grey tended to take less than a third.
Thus Grey still left 42% of the Population in residence on alienated land, subject to the five years voluntary movement rule, and in a subordinate social and economic situation vis-à-vis the petit-colon and capital.

(7) The colonial state was invariably conscious of the strongly hierarchical social structure of the Swazi and the concentration of power in the upper echelons of the hierarchy. Appeasement of the Swazi rulers was thus a basic tenet of colonial policy. The motive was basically in conformation with the security-desire of the state and capital, and is built into the spatial apportionment of Grey. As discussed above (5.2) the suggestion of the petit-colon for appeasement was a differential land division which favoured the royal household. Selborne conceived an alternative method which was more subtle but probably just as effective.

Grey was instructed to ensure that every royal homestead, chief's homestead, royal cattle post and royal burial ground was within the reserves. How fundamental this factor was is confirmed by perusal of Grey's notes in which the identification and location of these elements looms large (Appendix 4c). Selborne's assumption was that if neither royals nor regional chiefs were required to move their locations Swazi protest as a whole would be considerably muted. The success with which this criterion was fulfilled is illustrated in the construction of Map Fourteen, which shows how closely the distribution of elements of the traditional social structure are correlated with the demarcation of reserves.

Of 124 chiefs only one was left outside the reserves and all royal households, royal cattle posts and burial grounds were included.
DISTRIBUTION OF SWAZI CHIEFS IN RELATION TO DEMARCATED SWAZI AREAS, 1909

Source: Map compiled in Surveyor General's Office, Pretoria; July 1914.

MAP FOURTEEN
In one instance a royal grave was too remote to be included in a reserve without also cutting out "thousands of morgen of valuable grazing ground" so a small enclave was declared around the grave.

The arrangement of the implementation of the partition around elements of the traditional spatial and sacredotal structure by the colonial state to implicitly further the interests of capital was not an immediately obvious procedural criterion. More obvious, and to be anticipated, was the arrangement around the incipient colonial infrastructure.

(8) At this early stage of colonial rule, both a transportation system and an urban system were in a state of infancy but even the prospective development of an integrated infrastructure exercised an influence on the spatial array. This is particularly obvious in two areas (Map Fifteen). Potential urban centres - Mbabane, Manzini, Forbes Reef, Piggs Peak, Mankiana, Dwaleni and Stegi - were all clearly surrounded by land under petit-colon control although the reserves were all proximate enough to ensure the ready availability of an urban labour supply for commerce and industry. No positive relationship was proposed or could be detected between the road network of the time and land division, but there is a correlation with a prospective railway line. The railway, still in prospect in 1908, was seen by Grey as of minimal relevance to the reserves and he thus attempted to maximise petit-colon accessibility to the proposed line of rail. Map Fifteen shows this clearly where 80% of the route is over white controlled land.

Grey's final exercise after demarcation according to the above criteria, was to produce carrying capacity figures for the
SWAZI AREAS
AND COLONIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

MAP FIFTEEN
reserves. This was to determine how the reserves in toto could bear an increase in total Swazi population. Grey estimated that the reserves could bear an increase of 159,278 or 52½% of the population. The theoretical assumptions which he used to determine carrying capacity are given in Appendix 5d and the projected carrying capacities for each of the reserves is listed in Appendix 5b. The capacity of each reserve is related to his perceptions of the areas in the light of his theoretical agricultural/ grazing land requirement estimates:

"I considered each area selected separately and apportioned it a definite amount of land per family, varying with the quality of agriculture and grazing land and the amount of rocky barren hillside or wasteland. The unit apportioned to each family varies from 15-60 morgen per family" (67).

No attempt was made by Grey to relate carrying capacity in each reserve to the actual population resident there at the time of partition. He did however argue that though the carrying capacity figures would inevitably be reached at some stage in the future it would take a considerable time since:

"Most farmers will try to keep the natives which they have on their land" (68).

5.5 CONCLUSION

An examination of the historical backdrop to land partition in Swaziland reveals how the spatial array is structured by a set of procedural criteria implemented by the colonial state which closely accord with the interests of promoting white agricultural development and of articulating the Swazi into such a mode of production. As Enraght-Moony, Resident Commissioner, 1903-7,
wrote:

"The European desires to expropriate the best ground for himself, to stop indiscriminate cultivation and to displace any natives not required for his own purposes" (69)

The colonial state facilitated these desires at almost all points. The patent inequality of alienation of two thirds of the land surface to the crown and less than 600 whites, while constricting over 100,000 blacks to the remaining one third is explicable both in terms of the desire to expropriate land for direct white utilisation and as being a concrete means to break down the self-sufficient traditional mode of production and to acquire control over its labour-power. Constriction was perceived as a means to enforce and hasten change of the basically self-sufficient traditional agricultural base towards the money-economy and to promote dependency on the petit-colon for taxation costs and the essentials of life, by the sale of labour. Thus it was necessary to leave a potential labour force on white land, to create reserves for surplus labour and to institute measures to force the Swazis resident on white land to sell their labour to the petit-colon.

At the detailed level this chapter has identified how the physical arrangement of space embodies several inter-linked sets of criteria designed to facilitate exploitation of land and labour. Thus the spatial pattern is related to Grey's perception of the needs of capital. The desire for consolidation of reserves is seen to be a function of a desire to create an optimal pattern for minimising reactive political response from the Swazi and hence to hasten the penetration of white settlement and capital.
The manipulation of the traditional spatial and sacredotal structure by the colonial state to promote political stability and the linking of the land pattern with the incipient colonial infrastructure were further inducements to capitalism in the colon.

It should be noted that the policy-making of the colonial state was both a function of and a medium for the ongoing process of foreign domination of the country. Many of the decisions were based on prospective developments under capitalism many of which, however, eventually failed to materialise. But at this optimistic time in which spatial patterns were erracibly imprinted on the country the mood of the colonial state was aptly summed up by Grey himself,

"I have been the instrument that has locked up much beautiful and fertile country from which the European is forever to be excluded" (70).
CHAPTER SIX

THE PERIPHERAL RESPONSE : VOICES OF THE SWAZI

"Our land is being taken from us without reason. We think it is being done because we are a separate race. The land is ours."

Swazi Queen Regent, 1908.

"I am convinced the settlement is both just and sound."

R.C. Coryndon, 1908.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Perceptions of the process of political, social and economic domination by the colonial state, the petit-colon and capital are undocumented for the mass of Swazi. The concentration of power in the upper strata of the traditional hierarchical social system meant that it was at this level that protest was articulated and interaction with the colonial state occurred. This interaction is well documented and talk of "swazi" attitudes, perceptions and so on must be interpreted as those of the ruling group for the nation as a whole.

First the channels of protest and the views of the Swazi on colonial state policy on a number of land-alienation connected issues and the stance adopted by the colonial state to counter protest are considered (6.2). The intrigue and maneuvering which underlies this stance are then examined in relation to the 1907 Swazi Delegation to Britain (6.3). The almost total failure of the Swazi to shift the monolithic colonial state in any policy matter is in marked contrast with its accommodating position vis a vis
the petit-colon and capital interests. The failure is seen to lead to attempts to re-appropriate land through the open market. The reactive response of the petit-colon to this strategy reveals again the fundamental empathy between colonial state and capital (6.4).

6.2 CHANNELS AND ISSUES OF PROTEST

The Swazi rulers were allowed formal access to officials of the colonial state under enforced conditions of subservience on a limited number of occasions. There was a delegation to Milner in December 1904, two petition-bearing delegations to Selborne in Pretoria in July 1905 and May 1909, a delegation to Gladstone (Selborne's successor) in 1913, the Malunge delegation to England in December 1907, and public meetings within Swaziland with Selborne in September, 1906, and on a number of occasions with Enragt-Moony and Coryndon.

The issues of protest were relatively constant and were reiterated as colonial legislation continued to be passed. They can be crystallised into a number of areas;

(1) The fundamental protest of the Swazi constituted challenges to the political rights of Britain to exercise colonial rule in Swaziland. The independence clauses of pre War conventions were frequently cited to criticise the 1903 Order in Council by which Britain assumed control of Swaziland and to criticise all subsequent legislation in Swaziland by the British colonial state:

"The limitation of boundaries (for reserves) is an abhorrence to the Swazi Nation, and to alienate their land, as is proposed will be to treat them as a conquered people, which they are not" (2)

The colonial state gave little credence to this challenge of its right
to rule. The will of the state was inviolate in such matters.

(2) The Swazi were also critical of the means used by the colonial state to generate income for administration and the costs of partition. In effect, the Swazi were being forced to pay the costs of actions by the colonial state to which they had fundamental objections. The taxation structure imposed by the state in 1903 was overtly criticised, as was the sale of crown lands (5.3) and the expropriation of concession rental revenue by the colonial state. Prior to the Boer War, the South African Republic held the Private Revenue Concession in which all concession rentals were collected by them in exchange for an annual payment of £12,000 to the Swazi. No payments were made after 1899 and in 1904 the Swazi consequently claimed £60,000 and the continuation of payments.³ The colonial state blandly denied the debt, cancelled the concession and expropriated all concession revenues on the grounds that the mass of Swazi would benefit rather than just the ruling elite - a dubious claim since virtually all early revenue went towards partition costs.⁴

(3) More closely related to the land question were calls for the cancellation of all concessions on the grounds of non-payment of rental during the Boer War. In effect, this was a call for a blanket cancellation which was summarily rejected by the colonial state under contrary pressures from the petit-colon and capital. The stance commonly adopted was to claim the authority of the 1890 Concessions Court.⁵

(4) The 1907 Proclamation and the alienation of land which it provided for provoked bitter and impassioned response from the Swazi. Thus images such as "being killed", "living in darkness",
"cutting up the land", "being pushed into the mud", and "being stripped naked" are common in Swazi articulation of events. R.T. Coryndon, the Resident Commissioner, was called Msindazwe or "he who weighs down, sits heavy upon, encumbers or clogs the land".6

Frequent appeal was made to the history of concession granting and to the white manipulation of Mbandzeni and his intentions in granting concessions:

"The dividing up of our land is a thing we feel very much especially since land was only leased and was never parted with irrevocably. The land was lent and should return at the expiry of the time for which it was lent"(7) and,

"If the Government were serious they would produce documents to show that Mbandzeni sold the land. He lent land to whites. The High Commissioner said the land was sold. I asked him if "buy" and "lend" are the same word"(8).

The reiterated claim was that under the Swazi system land was a national property and consequently inalienable. Land was therefore by intention and definition only leased to whites under the terms of the traditional system.9

It was at this point of diametrically opposed social interpretations of the role of land in the productive process that the will of the colonial state triumphed. Land had to be alienated for capital and the petit-colon and the necessary actions were taken despite vociferous Swazi objection and a total refusal to co-operate at the local level with Grey's partition.10

The stance which the colonial state adopted towards the Swazi was that of an arbitrator between conflicting but equally -valid rights to land. Thus Selborne said to a Swazi delegation in July 1905:
"Both Swazis and whites claim rights to land. I must separate these rights. We want to help you keep as much land as you can use, and more, quite undisturbed by the white man" (11).

Comments of this genre continued to be made by Selborne and Coryndon in dealings with the Swazi throughout this period. The idea that the colonial state was acting in the best interests of the Swazi was patently a misrepresentation of its true role and cut little ice with the Swazi. The Queen Regent, at least, could detect the 'hidden hand' of capital in colonial policy:

"Our land has been taken from us without reason. It is Mr. Miller and Mr. Forbes who have done this",

and,

"Were the people also sold? My people are being taken away from me too" (12).

At the local level there are no data available on Swazi migratory response to land expropriation, although Annual Colonial Reports of the period note no mass exodus from white land between 1909 - 1914. At the expiry of the five year period of grace, eviction notices were served on only 964 families by white farmers, leaving, it is estimated over 35% of the Swazi population on white land. These were immediately forced to enter a new set of social and productive relations with the petit-colon by the imposition of a standardised tax of £1 and labour tribute.13

6.3 COLONIAL OBSTRUCTIONISM AND THE 1907 DELEGATION

Continual reference by colonial state officials to the authority vested in them by the home government prompted a Swazi desire to appeal to this higher authority. For instance, Coryndon, in informing the Swazi of Selborne's partition decision had said:
"We have laid all the facts before His Majesty King Edward VII and he has decided what is to be done. His Excellency (Selborne) now desires me to tell you that the King has decided to make a final partition of rights between you and the concessionaires" (14).

The attitudes and actions of colonial state officials, Selborne and Coryndon, in attempting first to obstruct a delegation and then to minimise its impact display the view of the colonial state towards the aspirations of the Swazi:

"Their history has never taught them the futility of resistance to the unyielding decrees of a consistent administration" (15)

Both Selborne and Coryndon saw the Swazi Queen Regent as a potentially powerful threat to the effecting of a smooth land expropriation for the petit-colon:

"The failure of the delegation will be a severe blow to the influence of the Regent, whose influence is at present the cause of most of our administrative difficulties" (16)

Initial attempts to negate her influence included a proposal by Coryndon to depose her and install the under-age Sobhuza as Monarch (rejected by Selborne) and the close monitoring of all correspondence with the legal advisers to the Swazi. 17

Swazi pressure throughout 1906-7 for a delegation to Britain was repeatedly opposed by Selborne. He confidentially requested an order from London which he could use to support his views on partition:

"I am sure that the only results of a deputation to London will be harmful and cause increased trouble and fresh misunderstandings. I hope you will be able to send me a really stiff reply which can be communicated to the Regent to the effect that the decision was the King's and that he is surprised and displeased that the Chief Regent should question that fact or try to reopen the matter, that the decision is inevitable and that there is not the least use in her thinking that a deputation to London would have any effect in repealing it or modifying it" (18)
An apparent change of heart was purely a function of realization by the colonial state that a carefully manipulated delegation might work to their advantage and serve to pacify the Swazi. Thus a delegation was allowed to visit Britain from December 1907 to February 1908.

The timing of the announcement of the 1907 Proclamation was deliberately delayed until the Swazi ploughing season in October with the thought that the mass of Swazi would be too pre-occupied to take much notice of it. Colonial agreement to a delegation was purposefully announced just prior to the publication of the 1907 Proclamation since:

"The knowledge that the deputation is going to London will act as a safety valve when the decision about land partition is received" (20).

The Queen Regent, as most vociferous critic of the administration, was barred from the delegation. The delegation was repeatedly informed that the purpose of its visit to London was to pay homage to Edward. It was predetermined that no concessions would be made to the Swazi. The delegation was refused financial assistance by the administration and had to raise their own funds. Once in Britain, Selborne prohibited the flow of further funds to the delegation so as to curtail the length of their stay:

"The delegation should not stay long in England in case their case comes to the attention of and is exploited by negrophilist interests" (24).

The delegation was given an audience with the Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin, to present their case and were met with blunt expressions of support for Selborne's policy and the immutability of colonial laws. Marwick, a District Commissioner in
Swaziland, who was sent with the delegation reported success in keeping the delegation away from 'negrophilists'.

The delegation returned:

"We are still not satisfied. We were told in England that our petitions would not be granted, but we will continue to cry to the Government.....we did not know we were killing ourselves by going under the British Government" (27).

The manoeuvring of the colonial state to effect maximum benefit from the delegation at minimal cost is well-documented. They failed to mute Swazi protest entirely and the Regent was far from discredited, but protest was never to erupt into acts of violence against the state or petit-colon and in 1909 the Regent declared that the issue would be shelved until Sobhuza came of age.

With the implementation of land partition by Grey the Swazi turned to other channels to attempt to regain control over land. At this point there was a direct conflict with the interests of the petit-colon again and the colonial state is seen to intervene in response to white protest to undermine a perceived threat to capital.

6.4 LAND REPATRIATION AND THE RESPONSE OF THE PETIT-COLON.

The failure of the Swazi to make any appreciable impact on colonial policy prompted a decision to instigate a land re-purchase programme in 1909:

"I felt I must lose no time. I told the Council that all our weapons had failed and now with our own strength we must set out with determination to buy back as much land as we can of our Swaziland" (28)

Raising funds was a national effort and all Swazi males were urged, in 1909, to seek employment and pay £5 to a land purchase fund. The Swazi collected almost £40,000 from this source. Attempts were
made to supplement this figure with loans from South African banks until the colonial state intervened, ostensibly to protect the Swazi from debt. Yet:

"To our great surprise the administration interfered in every way to discourage capital, despite offering us no financial assistance themselves" (31)

Eventually 77,000 acres were purchased but not before the colonial state had passed legislation to give it control of any further land transfers. Legislation against Swazi land purchase was a direct function of petit-colon protest against the repatriation of land considered suitable for white settlement:

"There is an intense feeling among the Europeans against the indiscriminate purchase by natives of land suitable for European settlement. The Europeans will organise meetings in all parts of Swaziland and will call upon the Government to regulate purchases" (33)

The resultant legislation gave the colonial state control over any Swazi funds collected for land purchase and the right to veto all prospective purchases. The constriction proved such a complete disincentive to the Swazi that land repurchase ceased after 1916 until the 1940's.

6.5 CONCLUSION

It is clear that the Swazi were doomed to failure in their struggle against the forces of capital and the colonial state in consort. That they confined themselves to orthodox, non-violent channels of protest probably ensured their survival as a protected dependency of Britain, but failed to carry sufficient weight to thwart the inexorable march of capitalism in the region.
Land alienation in particular was an imperialistic act clearly and deeply resented by the Swazi. Yet, once effected, and in association with other acts of the colonial state such as the imposition of a harsh taxation system, the actual and potential articulation of the Swazi into a new set of productive relations under capital became virtually inevitable.

It could hardly have been anticipated by the petit-colon that the Swazi would enter the land market to regain land and inadvertently promote the desire of capital, at least in the broader regional context, to exploit labour. For the petit-colon, however, assured of an adequate labour supply without this additional incentive, entrenching land control was a more important concern. The petit-colon in its own interests consequently forced the Swazi out of the land-market and thus considerably curtailed the flow of labour to South Africa.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1914-68) AND AFTER

"The claws of the white man sank deep into the soil of Swaziland"
David Forbes, 1938.

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In this penultimate chapter there is a much less detailed treatment of the evolution of spatial organisation in Swaziland from 1914 to the present. In so doing it is intended to examine the major characteristics of the evolving relationship between capital, the petit-colon, the colonial state and the Swazi as the structure upon which the organisation of space is built.

The failure of the petit-colon to capitalise on the land partition is seen to be a function of minimal infrastructural support from the colonial state and the peripherality of Swaziland in the South African space-economy (7.2). The advent of multi-national corporation capital after 1940 is seen to produce a re-orientation in colonial state attitude towards its role in the "managed economy". The role of multi-national capital in entrenching the existing pattern of land control and the superimposition upon it of a new pattern of capitalist development is then considered (7.3). Actual shifts of land from petit-colon to Swazi in the colonial period through two colonially approved schemes are then examined. Both are seen to flounder on the conflict of social and economic values between the colonial state and the Swazi Nation (7.4). Some comment is then proferred on the independence period. The question of the relationship
between land control patterns and the commitment of the new ruling elite to the capitalist mode of production in Swaziland is addressed (7.4).

7.2 THE FATE OF THE PETIT-COLON

We have attempted to demonstrate that early colonial spatial organisation in Swaziland was a fundamental product of the penetration of foreign capital in the age of "classic imperialism". This is not immediately obvious without an accurate historical analysis since a distinctive feature of the pre 1940 period was the failure of capital to appropriate the surplus promised in the heady 1885-1915 period. The petit-colon's metropolitan linkages were gradually eroded and the petit-colon itself ossified into a small, isolated petit-bourgeoisie, unproductively controlling large areas of Swaziland and utilising black labour on a small scale.¹

Figure Four is a clear indicator of this process. Tin mining and cotton growing were the only fields in which metropolitan linkages were sustained in the 1920's. Exports of tin to the Straits Settlements continued into the 1930's, reaching a peak in 1924-6. Gold mining was never to reap the promised dividends. Commercial agriculture in tobacco, cotton and beef cattle was confined to a small number of enterprises, and exports, fluctuating annually, remained at a low level. Sporadic wattle-growing in the 1920's was the only other export source. Various petit-colon instigated white settlement schemes floundered and large areas of purportedly settlable land lay idle.² The petit-colon per se did, however, continue to exercise an inordinate influence on local colonial policy through an elected body, the European Advisory Council.³
The failure of the petit-colon to realise the prospective developments of the early colonial period (4.3) can be partially related to the failure of the colonial state to provide the necessary infrastructure for capitalist development. Best (1965) traces the failure of railway schemes in 1918, 1921, 1924 and 1946. In 1928 the state offered incentives to white farmers in the form of a loan fund but the petit-colon's inability to generate income for the administration meant that local costs continued to be met by crown land sales, grants in aid from the Imperial Treasury and heavier black taxation. Hailey (1956) notes that in the 1930's the Swazi were the heaviest taxed blacks in the sub-continent. The reluctance of the colonial state to undertake capital expenditure on infrastructure in Swaziland may be related to lack of funds but was certainly a function of the belief that transfer of Swaziland to South African control was inevitable.

The peripherality of Swaziland in the incipient southern African space economy also helps explain the fate of the petit-colon. South African producers viewed Swaziland as a market for goods and a labour source but as a potential agricultural competitor. Thus poor market accessibility for petit-colon producers was exacerbated by the monopolistic control of road transport within South Africa by the South African Railways system. Best (1965) notes the tariff structure worked to the disadvantage of Swaziland producers forced to use this as the sole means of transport to South African markets. In addition, the Union state acted forcibly on several occasions to protect its own producers from outside competition. From 1910-16 there was a total embargo on beef from Swaziland and from 1924-32 there were stringent veterinary controls and a weight embargo.
Tobacco producers in Swaziland were forced by South African interests to join a marketing co-operative which forced many to drop the crop and production slumped. Cotton, grown under the aegis of the Empire Cotton Growing Association (Wood, 1927) by companies such as the Swaziland Corporation, faded after 1926 due to falling world prices and poor market accessibility (Doveton, 1937). Free South African access to the Swaziland consumer market and the small size of that market effectively prevented the development of any manufacturing industry.

The petit-colon's failure precipitated no appreciable spatial re-organisation of land control, however, despite continued Swazi pressure to the contrary. The whites continued to enjoy a protected relationship with the colonial state and principles of individual ownership and private property had been deeply ingrained. These were entrenched with the advent of multi-national corporation capital after 1940.

7.3 RENEWED METROPOLITAN LINKAGES

Metropolitan capital, on an altogether different scale, and quite extraneous to the petit-colon penetrated Swaziland in the post 1940 period (Best, 1967, Harrington, 1957, Hendy, 1953). Penetration of capital and associated control over an enlarging Swazi proletariat was under the benevolent umbrella of the colonial state. The British parastatal body, the Colonial (later Commonwealth) Development Corporation initiated a number of capital and labour intensive projects in association with British (Tate and Lyle, Lonrho, Courtauld's, Turner and Newall, and Libby's) and South African (particularly Anglo-American) private capital in mining and plantation
agriculture. As a direct result Swazi economy and society in the colonial and post colonial periods have become ever more firmly tied to international capitalism.

Penetration of capital had a strong spatial component since integral to the success of these prospective developments in generating profit was the acquisition of land for plantations. Between 1945 and 1960 400,000 acres were purchased on the open market for a total cost of £1.6 million. Purchase was within the pre existent spatial framework (that is, no land was obtained from the Swazi) and, in effect, tied up over 10% of the land surface under the direct control of foreign capital (Map Three). Purchased land in four distinct localities became the spatial foci for capital and colonial state infrastructural expenditure, creating zones of intensive capitalist surplus extraction towards which black labour was drawn from the rural areas.

The petit-colon was largely by-passed by the advent of multi-national capital, except in so far as they were able to capitalise on land speculation in the 1940's and 1950's, and became a static, peripheral community holding large areas of land in an increasingly vulnerable political situation as the colonial state began to relinquish its political control over the country in the 1960's. Nevertheless in the historical context it had exercised an inordinate influence over the organisation of space in Swaziland.

7.4 SHIFTS IN LAND CONTROL

Figure Five shows the shift in land control during the colonial period in favour of the Swazi but still leaving 40% of the land
SHIFT OF LAND CONTROL DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Source: Murdoch (1970)

FIG. 5
surface outside Swazi control in 1968. Consideration of this shift of control reveals further significant facets of state policy during the colonial period and highlights the interplay between the colonial state and the Swazi regarding land repatriation.

Official Swazi protests to the colonial state under King Sobhuza II were made at regular intervals in 1921, 1926, 1941 and 1958. The major points at issue were basically reiterations of protest made in the 1902-15 period (Chapter Six). Challenges continued to be made to Britain's claim to the historical right to rule and legislate in Swaziland, particularly in 1926 when the right of rule was challenged in the Privy Council. Such claims were summarily dismissed until the post war era of decolonisation. At the core of all Swazi argument was the expression of grave injustice over land expropriation and the desire to regain total control over the land surface for the exclusive use of the Swazi nation. With no political power to challenge the structure of landholding and to effect autonomous radical change, such as nationalisation of land and abolition of the land market system, the Swazi attempted to use the open land market as the only available mechanism for regaining land. Chapter Six showed how the colonial state, under pressure from the petit-colon, stymied early Swazi attempts to enter the land market but by the 1940's other factors had come into play.

Daniel (1962) writes:

"Whereas before the Swazi could move over the whole of Swaziland in 1907 they were confined to one third of its area. Not only did they have to produce as much food on less land but they had to adapt themselves to a money-economy. The fact is that the Swazi had to forsake the customary system of shifting agriculture and develop
something new in its place. That they had neither knowledge skills or resources to do this was overlooked at the time of partition".

The final point is a contentious one but it should be reiterated that the destruction of shifting agriculture and pastoralism was a fundamental tenet of state policy. The effectiveness of this policy is identified by Fair, Murdoch and Jones (1969):

"Along with the introduction of the Swazi to wage earning the traditional economy showed signs of weakening and modification in other directions. Absenteeism of able-bodied men and serious imbalances in family and tribal organisation and productive capacity were inevitable as the total impact of these events was compounded" (p 30)

and Marwick (1940):

"The natives are heavily taxed. This means that the natives have had to change from a subsistence to a money economy, If they are not able to sell their own produce (they often do not even have enough for their own requirements) or their cattle (which they have a deep prejudice against doing) their only other asset is their labour. This means they must seek employment to meet their obligations to the Government".

By 1934, the Swazi were only producing 20% of their food requirements. It was considered axiomatic that disintegration of the indigenous mode of agricultural production would produce a concomitant trend towards cash-cropping for export. The assumed spontaneity of this process remained unfulfilled in 1940. This, taken in conjunction with perceived environmental degradation under increasing land pressure and falsely seen as a function of the perpetuation of "inefficient", "inherently destructive" traditional methods of production, instigated colonial attempts to hasten the articulation of peasant production into the capitalist system:

"The Swazi must learn the new methods of civilised agriculture and abandon shifting agriculture" (16)
In addition, the colonial state was faced with the problem of the existence of a non-employed population of 25,000 Swazis on white land in 1936. With the proposed advent of multi-national capital the necessity for forced evictions was foreseen.

The method for the solution of these supposedly intractable problems as an elaborately conceived, large scale experimental land resettlement scheme. Success of this scheme, it was assumed, could lead to the wholesale reorganisation of land and agriculture in Swazi reserves as well. Acquisition of land by the colonial state was a prerequisite for the scheme. Land was purchased in several localities by grants under the Colonial Development & Welfare Act, supplemented by crown land which was still unsold to whites. Rigorous control of settlement, spatial organisation and functional land allocation, basic infrastructure, crop and technical inputs and marketing was proposed. Strict control of grazing, stock numbers, rotations, soil conservation and rights of occupancy were also suggested. Award of individual land tenure was considered a basic adjunct to the success of this scheme.

Although 364,875 acres were set aside (including 130,000 of crown land) for the whole programme only 120,000 was eventually used and a mere 1766 families or 8830 people settled. Total state expenditure on the scheme was £230,000 (Map Fifteen).

The reasons for the abandonment of the scheme by the colonial state are unresearched though Hughes (1972) has suggested some possibilities. He blames financial stringency, spoon-feeding of settlers, the influx of unauthorised settlers, the inability of the state to enforce its rigorous settlement and production regulations
and the experimental bias of the programme as contributory causes. Hughes assumes that while the implementation may have been faulty the underlying assumptions were legitimate and desirable. Thus, for instance, that providing security of tenure automatically raises productivity or that the aim of Swazi producers should be cash crops for export is assumed rather than questioned by Hughes. Research into Swazi perceptions of the scheme would undoubtedly shed greater light on the failure of the scheme to force Swazis into cash-cropping.

To the Swazi nation the scheme could be counted something of an inadvertent success since a further proportion of the land surface was unlocked to Swazi use and eventual control at no extra cost.

Consistent with stated Swazi policy, in 1941 Sobhuza II proposed the re-entry of the Swazi into the open land market. The colonial state agreed to this proposal. The reasons for agreement are to be found in the state's interpretations of the Swazi proposals. These were to raise funds by culling cattle from all Swazi stockholders and selling the proceeds. Alarmist views on the 'explosion' of Swazi stockholding were prevalent and the scheme appeared to provide a method to control stock with Swazi agreement and to instil new attitudes about the economic potential of cattle.

With certain restraints, such as the necessity for cash purchase, the state assisted in the culling and sales of stock for this LIFA fund, as it was called. Almost 219,000 acres of land was eventually purchased on the open market experiencing dramatic speculative price rises as a result of the advent of the multi-nationals (Map Sixteen).

The overall response of the mass of Swazi to the scheme is
difficult to gauge. Reluctance to contribute cattle has been attributed by Hughes (1972) to the burden on the small stockholder and to the fact that acquired land did not tangibly add to the controlled areas of all chiefs who had subscribed to the scheme.  

The petit-colon saw the scheme as a Swazi reiteration of the values of traditionalism and called on the colonial state to abolish the Lifa Fund on the grounds of its detrimental influence on capitalist development in the country. Comments included:

"The policy is not economic development in the interests of the Swazis but has a political aspect which should be discouraged(a). This is not an attempt to improve the lot of the Swazi but a political effort to buy out the European from the country(b). Allowing this to continue will discourage foreign capital(c)." (25)

These views coincided with colonial realization that the scheme was not succeeding in fulfilling the aims of the state in supporting it. The motive of destocking was patently not being realised and the issue came to a head with disputes over the quality of beasts to be culled.  

From this point on it was only a short time before the state withdrew its support for the scheme as the underlying socio-political motive of the Swazi was re-appraised.

The land question formed an integral part of Swazi negotiations for political independence in the late 1950's and the 1960's. As a result of a petition from Sobhuza to the High Commissioner and the appointment of a subsequent commission of enquiry both the remainder of crown lands and the land obtained for the settlement scheme in the 1940's were transferred to the Swazi.

In 1968 the first Swazi Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini, went to London to discuss the question of a land shortage in Swaziland and requested a blanket grant for Swazi purchase of land. This
was refused in favour of a monitored grant scheme (7.5).

It is instructive to consider the actions of the new Swazi power elite once political autonomy was obtained in 1968. In particular there is a need to elucidate Swazi response to the inherited structures which produced and maintained the pattern of land control and to examine any measures taken to regain land.

7.5 THE NEO-COLONIAL MILIEU

The Swazi state has made a small number of apparently significant moves to promote the repatriation of land in the post colonial period. The significance of these moves must be evaluated in the context of the commitment of the government to the international capitalist system.28

In 1972 the Land Speculation Control Act was instituted. Prior to this the colonial free market system in land prevailed. Thereafter all land transactions have been monitored through a Board. Citizens may buy and sell freehold title land virtually without restriction but non citizens are generally prohibited from purchasing, though exceptions are made for corporate foreign interests. Ostensibly the Act was to control rife speculation in land (particularly urban land) by absentee owners in South Africa.29 It carries with it the idea of a gradual transfer of marketable land to Swazi citizens:

"This establishes an institutional frame work which allows the repurchase of the freehold title land but at a pace slow enough not to adversely affect the commercial agricultural sector" (30)

Direct or indirect attempts to force landowners to place land on the market have thus far been minimal and no forced expropriation,
with or without compensation, has been instituted or is likely to be under the present regime.

The legislation, or lack of it, can be seen as epitomising the conflicts produced within Swazi society by the historical penetration of capital and the more recent commitment of the ruling elite to the western capitalist system:

"For my part I have always recognised that external skills play a very important part in the development of the country's substantial natural resources; and I am confident that the entrepreneur will find in Swaziland promising opportunities and a highly satisfactory climate for investment" (King Sobhuza II) (31).

The traditional element in power still regards land repatriation per se as a National priority but the associated desire to retain existing and solicit further foreign capital necessitates that no actual or potentially destructive moves are made. Possible restructuring of the land market system has been rejected in favour of market manipulation through the Land Speculation Board. This accords with a general policy of gradualism in land transfer.

Granted the confirmation of the inherited land market system, two methods have been deployed to raise funds for land purchase as it comes on the market. The first reveals the strong neo-colonial links with Britain by whom land purchase is regarded as an integral part of a general foreign aid programme. In 1968 the Swazi demanded a blanket grant to buy land; a demand rejected outright by Britain in favour of an offer of a strictly controlled land repurchase programme to buttress the colonially-instituted rural development programmes in the country. Britain made £3 million available for land purchase which could be added to existing rural development areas or which the Swazi could prove would be "beneficially occupied".
By 1976, £0.5 million had been disbursed on 68,500 acres of land. Thus the ex-colonial state refused to buy land for any reason that would not support its foreign aid aims. But the echoes from the abortive settlement scheme of the 1940's must be strong as considerable difficulties continue to be experienced in effecting rural development programmes.

During the last two years the Swazi once again instituted their own collection fund. It is intended to use the royalties from foreign mining operations in the country to re-purchase land (Tibiyo Fund). Details are sketchy but it appears that land has already been bought from this fund. I.L.O. (1977) notes that land purchased is being withheld from the mass of people in favour of:

"Commercial farms on which the aim is to introduce effective management to make the farms profitable enterprises"

Usage of land so dramatically opposed to traditional precepts would undoubtedly be consistent with the commitment of the new elite to capitalism in Swaziland. It would also tie in with what appears to be an increasing trend, individual Swazi entry into the land market to hold land under individual ownership with funds obtained from foreign bank loans. The attitude of the power controllers to this movement appears to be an ambivalent one.

The uniquely privileged position which the petit-colon appears to enjoy after the first decade of independence must in one sense be interpreted in the light of the Swazi desire not to alienate foreign capital. It is also a function of the privileged access which the petit-colon built up with the traditionalist political party during the vulnerable period of the 1960's. Potholm (1971) has documented the role of the petit-colon in supporting the
traditional faction against anti-white Pan Africanists in the political struggles of the 1960's.\textsuperscript{33} This strategy was designed to ensure survival after independence and the strategy appears to have met with a modicum of success since a number of whites retained prominent positions in the first and second Independence governments.\textsuperscript{34} Despite the new autocracy since 1973, there is no reason to suppose these links have weakened.

### 7.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted a brief overview of the remainder of the colonial period, after the years under particular review, and offered a few observations on the decade after British colonial rule had ended. These periods are being examined in detail by other workers.\textsuperscript{35} An attempt has been made to trace the evolution of spatial organisation from the time of the definitive partition onwards. The virtual redundancy of the spatial pattern created for capital in the period 1903-1910 is highlighted by consideration of the fate of the petit-colon in the later period prior to 1940. The realisation of the resource and labour potential of the country for capital awaited the advent of the multi-national corporations in the post-war period, however, and it is to this advent that much of the spatial restructuring of the past thirty years can be attributed.

The resilience of traditional Swazi protest to land alienation is evidenced throughout the colonial period and continues into the present. Protest in the colonial period was kept in check by the institution of the colonial state in collusion with capital and the petit-colon. At the present time it is still confined by the contradictions of the neo-colonial situation the country finds itself in.
"While the future's there for anyone to change, sometimes it is easier to change the past" J. Browne, 1974.

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is presented as a brief recapitulation of the rationale of the thesis (8.2), and the major findings and arguments within a model of settler-colonialism (8.3). A possible future scenario for spatial organisation in Swaziland is then speculated upon (8.4) and the thesis concludes with a note on future directions for study and practice in Swaziland (8.5).

8.2 THE OBJECTIVES RE-ITERATED

The research for this dissertation was prefaced by a set of basic geographical questions relating to the historical and contemporary organisation of space in Swaziland. These included enquiry into the factors accounting for the original pattern of black-white landholding in Swaziland, the manner and reasons for change during the colonial period and the contemporary pressures towards change in the pattern of holding. As the research focus crystallised, attention was primarily directed to the first of these three sets of questions and this is reflected in the space allocation of this study. The problem underlying the research is, nevertheless, encapsulated within these sets of spatially-oriented questions
That is, to describe and explain the genesis of a visible pattern of land holding and control.

The problem was by no means a novel one, notwithstanding the scanty research literature on Swaziland. Boyce (1947), Whittington and Daniel (1969) and Mashasha (1973) ostensibly set themselves similar tasks. Their focus of explanation appeared to be deficient in two major areas. First, in the tradition of Hellen (1969), Crowder (1970) and Witthuhn (1976) their analyses are largely or purely political. Little explicit or even implicit credence is given either to the powerful economic forces of expansionary capitalism which were drawing much of the world into the capitalist orbit in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or to the ways in which these forces might be expected to organise and re-organise space within the colonised world. So dramatic has been the post-1945 impact of multi-national corporation capital that the role of capital in earlier eras has been obscured and left in a vacuum.

Second, with regard to colonial state policy, the literature exhibits a tendency, in its more enlightened guises, to regard policy as "unfair", "culturally arrogant" and even "racist" (Leibbrandt, 1976, and Matsebula, 1972, in particular) but no attempt is made to relate it to what it was in essence ultimately designed for; that is, the benefit of British capital interests and its associated metropolitan settler-class. The ideological assumptions underlying policy are left uncovered and the pragmatic effects of metropolitan economic interests on policy are ignored.

The reasons for these deficiencies can in one sense be related to an incomplete reading of colonial source materials. Study of the published and official data base can lead to an acceptance of policy
at its face value. Unofficial and private colonial correspondence and the untapped white settler data source cast quite different interpretative lights on policy. In another more fundamental sense, they relate to the failure to structure research in a broader framework which examines the phenomenon of nineteenth and twentieth century European imperialism and colonialism, and their linkages. The recent studies of Brett (1973) and Leys (1975) are salutary reminders of the necessity for this method of approach to African studies.

In Chapter Two of this thesis, a number of new trends within the field of development geography were identified. With a total rejection of the 'developmentalism' of the 1960's and a critique of orthodox development models has come a call for a thorough-going historicism in development studies. This suggests a point for a suitable marriage between development and historical geography in Africa. The potential contribution of the historical geographer in Africa to the development field is an apposite one.

Tentative explorations in a theory of imperialism in geography take two directions: (a) examining the expansionary nature of capital in theoretical and specific historical contexts, and (b) examining the impact of capital on economy, society and, for the geographer, spatial organisation, in the pre-capitalist world. This thesis takes its cue from the second direction. Attention was directed, therefore, to a set of assertions about the impact of capitalism in the settler-state and its relations to the phenomenon of colonialism. These assertions have been tested for applicability in the Swaziland case.
8.3 THE COLON RE-VISITED

In Chapter Two, a historical model of settler-colonialism was abstracted from the literature as a frame within which to structure this set of assertions. It is within this framework that some general and specific concluding statements can be made about the early socio-economic and spatial impact of capital and the colonial state in Swaziland.

The particular advantage of the empirically-based model for areas in which metropolitan capital deployed a settler-class is that it gives general statements about capitalist expansion a specific and particular historical context which identifies the concrete social mechanisms operative in articulating these areas and their pre-capitalist modes of production into capitalism. Yet, as Banaji (1973) has re-iterated, the settler-state or colon was only one of a set of means adopted by European capital in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to restructure indigenous society and economy to meet its own ends.

Conclusions from the study are presented within the four stages of the model outlined by Good (1976).

First, the origins of the petit-colon were examined in Chapter Three. Origins in this sense refers only secondarily to geographical locale. That the Swazi, politically, did not go the way of all other black flesh in South Africa in the pre Boer War period is attributable to broader conflicts within the evolving regional political economy. Socially and economically, however, the differences between the two competing states as they affected Swaziland were minimal as both sanctioned and legitimised penetration by their subjects. The national duality of this penetration only superficially introduces
a complicating element into the model. One can locate the British-based faction within a broader social class with its roots in the metropole, with strong links with metropolitan capital and which subscribed to the particulars of capitalist ideology (3.4,4.3,4.4). While of different geographical and socio-cultural origins, the objectives of the transient Boer population in Swaziland were in essential concurrence with those of the British faction at this time. Social conflict within the white community between 1885-1899 essentially had its origins in individual and group competitiveness for monopoly control over the objects of labour and labour power itself, and only secondarily was it along the explicit racial-national division of Boer-Briton.

The aims and objectives of the petit-colon closely accord with the propositions in Good's (1976) model (Chapter Four). Utilization of peasant surplus does not appear to have been a countenanced strategy by capital in Swaziland. This is attributable, at least in part, to the essential subsistence-orientation and self-sufficiency of the indigenous mode so there was little visible productive surplus to appropriate. The alternative was a three-pronged monopolistic drive by British settlers to control mineral resources, land for plantation agricultural development and to create and control a black labour supply. A fundamental motive was therefore to extract surplus by supplying raw materials to metropolitan industry. Land expropriation, exclusive private ownership and concommitant labour control were concrete principles embedded in the objective of the British settler class (4.3). Both of Friedland's (1972) propositions about the potential role of land expropraition from the Swazi in producing a new set of social relations under capital are verified
in Swaziland (2.4).

The interpolation of industrial and trading monopoly acquisition by the British settler in Swaziland, while purely an unsuccessful speculative venture, is a dimension ignored by Good (1976) which identifies a further monopolistic facet of the drive for profit.

For the Boer, confining his activities within Swaziland to extensive pastoralism, unfettered land control was also a necessity. Land expropriation also appears to have represented a means of gaining control over labour to channel to the farms of the Eastern Transvaal. The aims of Briton and Boer in Swaziland were consequently essentially similar in this era.

The third stage of Good's (1976) model examines the ways in which the colonial state facilitated the capitalist drive to control land, labour and resources. The role of the colonial state, at least in Swaziland, is to be found in neo-Marxian rather than classic Marxist positions. This allows explanation of the state's failure to sanction the Swaziland Corporation (4.5) and the industrial monopolies. Nevertheless, underlying a guise of claimed protectionism of the Swazi lay a fundamental commitment to restructuring the indigenous mode of production, to confirming the petit-colon in the exclusive control over land and mineral resources and to assisting in the provision of labour power for the new industrial enterprise via taxation and the sanctioning of tenancy relations.

A feature of the model which requires refinement in the Swaziland context is the question of colonial state revenue and expenditure. The neo-Marxian critique contains a clear view of the role of colonial state expenditure in the colony (2.4). Less obvious
is the question of revenue generation to effect this role. It appears in the Swaziland case that a significant impact on policy was had by the colonial state requirement that local administrations be self-financing. Thus, expropriation of the Private Revenue concession and duty-free importation monopolies, the sale of crown lands, taxation of blacks, the appointment of a single partition Commissioner and the decision not to effect an expropriation of all concessions from the petit-colon can all in part be attributed to the need to minimise costs and to generate revenue. Colonial state expenditure in Swaziland is, however, consistent with the postulates of the model. The particular irony of the Swaziland situation is that the Swazi were forced to contribute the majority of the revenue to effect a scheme to which they were diametrically opposed.

Banaji (1973) claims that the natural development of the settler-state is an internal expansion of the capitalist mode of production. In the Swaziland case, not only did the country fail to develop as a raw material base for metropolitan industry under the petit-colon but that this projected expansion, as in South Africa and basically because of South Africa, failed to materialise. This may also be attributed to the eventual failure of the colonial state to accept its share in the "managed economy" posited by Brett (1973) and Good (1976) (Chapter Seven).

Detailed analysis of the articulation of the Swazi into the money-economy and capitalism under the petit-colon and colonial state lies outside the scope of this study. In Chapter Six this study concentrated instead on the reactive response of the Swazi to external domination and land alienation. Historically the outward
signs (destruction of self-sufficiency, migration for wage-labour, participation in the money-economy) are that fundamental changes were being wrought at an early stage. Any advanced class formation within the Swazi population was, however, delayed until the post-war era of multi-national capital.

It is at this stage with the underlying social and economic processes recalled that one is free to move outside Good's (1976) aspatial model to a consideration of the tangible working out of these processes in physical space (Chapter Five). Hence, the procedure of the colonial state in arriving at a suitable model for land expropriation, acceptable to all white interests can be described (5.2) and the details of partition can be examined (5.3-5.6).

Here the voice of a consolidated petit-colon and the local representatives of British capital (Swaziland Corporation, Henderson Corporation) with landed interests in Swaziland are seen to have had a significant role in determining policy formulation of the colonial state in Swaziland. The considerable de-centralization of colonial state control in relation to Swaziland should not, however, give support to what Brett (1973) has called "the myth of the practical official responding to fact rather than theory." The historical particulars of the Swaziland situation were in one sense unique; the ideological impulse brought to bear on them by the colonial state certainly was not (4.5). The superficial geometry of the partition is historically structured by a set of procedural criteria deeply sympathetic to the principles of capitalist articulation and to capital control over land, resources and labour. This emerged in considering both the decision to effect a partition and in its detailed implementation by Grey.
The criteria used by Grey are all symptomatic of the colonial state desire to further the interests of capital in Swaziland. Of particular note in view of the pacificatory role of the state postulated in Good's model was the security motive implicit in the partition. Actions of the colonial state in support of capital had caused violent response elsewhere. In Swaziland a desire to minimise the possibilities of violent protest is clearly seen in the partition procedure. The subsequent decision of the Swazi to protest within 'legitimate' channels was easily manipulated and controlled by the state.

8.4 SPECULATION ON THE FUTURE

The growth of discrete social classes within the Swazi population is a feature of development on the periphery of international capitalism (Fransman, 1973). The growth of a cohesive Swazi proletariat in the post-war period of multi-national plantation agriculture and mining development was indicated by the social unrest of 1963, quashed by the colonial state, and unanimous worker support for Pan Africanist political groupings in the 1968 and 1972 elections (Potholm, 1971). Concommitantly there has been the growth, particularly since Independence, of a middle-class urban-based elite which has increasingly adopted many colonial economic and social structures as its own. The colonial structure of production, distribution and consumption is entrenched and the position of the foreign multi-national corporation is reinforced.

Since this structure of production is unlikely to be substantially modified under the present regime in Swaziland, despite growing internal contradictions between the different social groups,
ancient and modern, it is possible to predict that there will be little dramatic spatial re-organisation in Swaziland either of physical space or the space-economy. What can be postulated instead is the manipulation of this structure by the new elite to work to its own material advantage and there are signs that this is occurring already (Jones, 1977).

The privilege of access which the white settler class enjoys with the traditionalist element in government is likely to wane with time and may do so dramatically if a new regime comes to power. While their future as a class may be increasingly endangered, the structures which maintain them, including the private property market, are not. The manipulation of the property market for returning land to traditional occupation and usage will undoubtedly continue to be a priority with Sobhuza II in power but it may increasingly be rejected, under the encouragement of British foreign aid and banking loans, in favour of manipulation for the benefit of the new middle class and of continuing to force the mass of Swazi into cash-cropping for the ultimate benefit of capital.

8.5 FOOTNOTE

Palmer and Parsons (1977) write that Swaziland is "particularly interesting to the economic historian as (a) compact laboratory of processes evident elsewhere" in its exemplification of white settler interpenetration and enclave development. Demonstrating this contention has not been a major task of this study but their point is well-taken and it is hoped that this study is a contribution not only to re-interpreting the Swazi past but the African past as a whole.

For the present, R.T. Coryndon wrote in 1914 that "desperate
diseases require heroic remedies". It is a moot point whether contemporary Swaziland is in the grip of a "disease". The judgement that one makes will in any case be largely a function of ideological stance. The apparent prosperity and wealth of the country, glowingly described by such as Nxumalo (1972), undoubtedly diverts attention away from increasing internal social and economic contradictions, a growing spatial and social maldistribution of wealth, and the inherently destructive nature of the western-styled and foreign-dominated development path as regards traditional culture, values and lifestyle. If these are the symptoms of disease then identification of root causes is a sine qua non which may not necessarily be achieved within the confines of orthodox development theory. If, as a counter-argument runs, the remedy lies in basic structural transformations, it is obviously the historic right of the Swazi themselves to apply a "heroic remedy".
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER ONE


4 C.P. Potholm, Political Development In Swaziland, 1967, and C.P. Potholm, The Dynamics Of Political Modernization, 1971, contain detailed studies of the political evolution of Swaziland in the last twenty years.


6 In 1975, 40% of I.T.L. was under the control of absentee owners (Central Statistical Office (C.S.O.) : Census Of Individual Tenure Farms, 1973-4).


8 There were 49,000 homesteads in 1972 and 152 regional chiefs (C.S.O. : Census Of Swazi Nation Land, 1973).

9 The national average is 91:100. Figures are calculated from the 1966 Census returns (H.M. Jones, Report On The 1966 Swaziland Population Census, 1968). Age structure statistics suggest a much higher proportion of individuals in the 20 to 45 age bracket on I.T.L. than the national average.

10 Thanks are due to Mr Mick Abel of the Ministry Of Agriculture, Mbabane, for permission to examine Swaziland's aerial photo coverage. It was unfortunately not possible to reproduce the photographs in this thesis to amplify the point.

12 An estimated 30% of I.T.L. is considered to be "underutilised" in International Labour Office (I.L.O.), Reducing Dependence, 1977.

13 I.L.O. op.cit. puts the minimum figure at 2200 calories/person/day. Also lamented is the lack of income to provide a minimal standard of household consumption and the inaccessibility of essential services to the bulk of the rural populace.

14 After the 'metropolis-satellite' theorising of A.G.Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment In Latin America, 1967.

15 C.S.O. : Annual Statistical Report, 1975

16 I.L.O. op.cit.

17 I.L.O. op.cit.

18 Per capita personal incomes in 1974 were $139 p.a. on I.T.L. and $53 p.a. on S.N.L. for Swazis. In the urban areas and including Swazis in multi-national corporation employ, the figure was $506 p.a. The per capita personal income for non-Swazis living in Swaziland was $1782 p.a. (I.L.O. op.cit. Table 8.4).


20 Thanks are due to Mr. Doug Levy, Surveyor-General of Swaziland, for directing my attention to the existence of these maps when the fact of their very survival was in doubt.

CHAPTER TWO

1 Both Soja and Riddell have retracted much of their earlier work. See E.W. Soja, Topian Marxism and Spatial Praxis, A.A.G. Meetings, New Orleans, 1978.


3 Union of Socialist Geographers, Study Papers on Imperialism, contains a critique of the views of Blaut and Porter & De Souza on imperialism.


CHAPTER THREE

1 Attributed, at least from the Swazi side, to a dream of Sobhuza I in which dire consequences were predicted for the shedding of white blood (Matsebula, 1972).


3 In 1881, Article 24: "The independence of the Swazies within the boundaries of Swaziland, as indicated in the first Article of this Convention, will be fully recognised." This was made more explicit in 1884, Article 1: "The independence of the Swazies, as recognised by the Convention of 1881, is confirmed, and no inroad on that independence shall be allowed without the consent of both her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African Republic." (See c. 2998, 3914, Appendix 1b).


5 In 1887, Mbandzeni refused to sign a document of cession presented by a Boer commando, despite its presentation under false pretences as a mining concession (C 5089 Appendix 1b).

6 Drooglever, *op. cit.*, shows that the Swazi Resident Adviser, T. Shepstone, was on the payroll of the South African Republic when the concessions were granted.
Details are carried in c 5089 (Appendix lb).


c.5089.

c.6200, pp 65-75.


De Winton's Report, c.6200.

The administrative problems encountered during the period of dual control (Aug. 1890 to Nov. 1893) are discussed in C.7212 (pp 1 - 166).


The 1893 Convention proved an embarrassment to both states. It gave the Republic leave to annex Swaziland on the condition of Swazi consent. Not only was Swazi consent unobtainable but the Swazi sent a delegation to London to protest the transfer. The 1894 Convention unilaterally waived this condition. See B. Nyeko, Pre-nationalist Resistance To Colonial Rule : Swaziland On The Eve Of The Imposition Of British Administration, 1890-1902, Trans-African Journal of History, 5:2, 1976.

The 1894 Convention contained the following articles:

Article 11 Without the incorporation of Swaziland into the South African Republic, the government of the Republic shall have and be secured in all rights and powers of protection, legislation, jurisdiction and administration over Swaziland.

Article Vll All British subjects residing in Swaziland, or having in Swaziland any property, grant, privilege or concession, or any right to, title to, or interest in, any property, grant, privilege or concession shall be secured in the future enjoyment of all their rights and privileges of whatsoever nature and kind.

Article Xlll The Government of the South African Republic withdraws all claim to extend the territory of the Republic, or to enter into any treaties with any native or native tribes to the north or north-west of the existing boundary of the Republic, and undertakes to aid and support by its favouring influence the establishment of order and government in those territories ruled by the British South Africa Co., within the limits of power and territory set forth in the charter granted by Her Majesty to the Company.
17 **Natal Witness**, Special Report on Swaziland, 11.5.1887, (c.5089).

18 See C.C. Watts, *Dawn In Swaziland*, 1922.

19 Population statistics are from the De Winton report (c.6200).

20 *Times of Swaziland*, 21.11.1908. The £12,000 p.a. was payment to the Swazi by the South African Republic for possession of the Private Revenue Concession. This concession permitted the holder to collect all concession rentals and dues for a payment of £12,000 p.a. to the Swazi.

21 Both states agreed to invalidate concessions granted after the death of Mbandzeni on 13.9.1890 (article 5, 1890 Convention).

22 83 concessions contain this guarantee in explicit form (see Rubie's report, Appendix 1b).

23 **Swaziland Annual Colonial Report**, 1909.

24 The majority of concessions were granted during the terms of office of T. Shepstone and A. Miller. Both acquired extensive personal interests and Shepstone was a witnessing signatory to over 150 concessions. An agreement with the Swazi gave him 50% of the income of the country for a period (£19,000) and it was thus in his interest for there to be a liberal granting of concessions. Drooglever, *op.cit.*, notes that this enabled him to pay off extensive personal debts acquired outside Swaziland.

25 Mbandzeni to a meeting of concessionaires, 1887 (c.5089).

25a For contemporary co-option strategies of capital see Friedman (1972).


27 De Winton Report conclusions (c.6200).

28 See c.6217.

29 On the death of Mbandzeni the Swazi were ruled by the Queen Regent, Labotsibenzi, until Bhunu came to power in 1894. In the 1890 Convention (Article 2h), the Swazi nation were asked to prepare a list of concessions it approved of for the court. Shepstone prepared the list and obtained proclamations from the Swazi authorising the court and giving it the power to verify concessions not on the approved list. 352 out of 364 concessions were legally confirmed. The Queen Regent ineffectually protested in 1894 that she was not a party to the proclamations nor the approved list and that she was unaware of the sitting of the court (see c.7611).

30 Colonial Secretary to Sir H.B. Loch (High Commissioner), 1.12.1892, c.7212.
31 See *Times of Swaziland*, 4.10.1907, for mention of this scheme in an obituary to N.H. Cohen.

32 Government Committee Report, 1894, c.7611.

33 See A.M. Miller, *Swaziland*, 1900.

34 The following corporate interests all petitioned the Colonial Office around this time: Umbandine Concessions Syndicate, Acton's Swaziland Concession, Bird's Swaziland Concession, Havelock Gold Mining & Exploration Co. and the Chambers of Commerce in London, Glasgow, Leeds, and Birmingham. The letters, petitions, etc. are published in c.7611.

Ripon's enigmatic response to these petitions was, "I do not attach much importance to their opinion... knowing how they are manufactured", Ripon to Roseberry, 4.9.1894, reported in Robinson and Gallagher, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

35 A.M. Miller, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER FOUR

1 This confusion is highlighted by an extract from the Privy Council Appeal hearing of 1926 in the case "Sobhuza II v. A.M. Miller":

Viscount Haldane: Is your proposition that we annexed Swaziland?  
Attorney-General: Not so as to make it part of our dominions but for all practical purposes, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, yes.

Viscount Haldane: I do not know what you mean by that; either it became part of our dominions or it did not.

Attorney-General: It did not; it became part of our protectorates.

Viscount Haldane: What do you mean, that we intruded into an alien country and went there and established ourselves like the Barbarians used to do and dominated the place?

Attorney-General: I do not like the analogy of the Barbarians; but we in effect assumed a jurisdiction which has been acted upon and submitted to by the native population and I submit that in all but name we are sovereign there; we have many of the attributes of sovereignty.

2 In practice, Selborne as Governor of the Transvaal in 1906 became Governor-General and High Commissioner. Thus control was vested respectively in Milner (1903-5), Selborne (1905-10) and Gladstone (1910-14).

3 Colonial Secretaries during this period were Lyttleton (1903-5), Elgin (1905-8) and Crewe (1908-10).

4 Enraght-Moony (1903-7) and Coryndon (1907-16) were Resident Commissioners in Swaziland.
High Commissioner's Proclamation No 3 of 1904.

High Commissioner's Proclamation No 28 of 1907

Crown land in the Swaziland case was land once owned by the South African Republic which became Crown property on the transfer of Swaziland to the Britain. It also comprised land which was not granted by Mbandzeni to concessionaires.

Selborne to Grey (Confidential), 1907, Bodleian Library (B.L.) MS.Selborne 71.

High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908 and No 53 of 1909.

Swaziland Corporation, *Swaziland and The Swaziland Corporation*, 1903.

In all £350,000 (110,000 oz.) of gold was recovered, primarily on the Forbes Reef Concession. But only one dividend was reportedly paid by the companies i.e. £10,000 by the Forbes Reef Gold Mining Co. ( Killie Campbell Library (K.C.L. MS.MIL. 1.08.11).

K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a.

K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a.

Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports, 1906 to 1910. The total wage bill in 1906 was £18,000 or a mere £1.10s per worker per month.

K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a. See also Swaziland Annual Colonial Report, 1911.

Times Of Swaziland, 18.5.1907.

Miller, 1900, *op.cit*.

Swaziland Corporation, 1903, *op.cit*.

Swaziland Mining, Commerce & Industrial Chamber, *Swaziland, California Of South Africa*, 1907.

Swaziland Corporation Annual Report, 1907, K.C.L.MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a.

A.C.G.Best, *The Swaziland Railway, A Study In Politico-Economic Geography*, 1965, advances some possible reasons for the failure of this scheme. These include a new government in Britain, Portugese interference and political pressure by the Natal Government. True to the general tenor of the work the reasons advanced are primarily political ones.

K.C.L. MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a. There is no suggestion of how it was intended to popularise the work. Certainly the proposed wage of 20/- per month would hardly appear to be sufficient incentive. The optimism must be directly attributed to the imposition by the British colonial state of a tax of 40/- per male head in 1903. This was ostensibly to generate income for the administration (in 1906, 80% of Government revenue) but served the purpose of forcing Swazi to accept wage-employment.
Chamber of Mining, Commerce & Industry, 1907, *op.cit.* The Chamber planned to instigate a scheme to sell 2000 acre Highveld blocks at 10/- per acre, 300-500 acre Middleveld blocks at 20/- per acre, and 1000 acre Lowveld blocks at 20/- per acre. The speculation implicit in these proposed selling prices is worthy of note. In 1907 the Swaziland Concessions commission evaluated Highveld land and Middleveld land at 4/- per acre and Lowveld land at 2/- per acre.

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report, 1907.

Jones, 1968, *op.cit.*

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report, 1906.

Swaziland Chamber of Mining, Commerce & Industry, 1907, *op.cit.*


High Commissioner's Notice No 10 of 1908.

Milner was also considered an ally of capital interests in Kenya around this time (Personal communication from Dr R. Bullock, University of Waterloo).


Booth, 1969, *op.cit.* points out that Selborne had a greater liking for the Basotho but even here paternalism was his hallmark.

Selborne to a delegation of farmers, March 1907, Swaziland National Archives (S.N.A.) 45/07/140.

Selborne to Grey (Confidential), 10.10.1908, S.N.A. D09/2.

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 30.3.1908, quoted by Booth, 1969, *op.cit.*, p 137.

Personal communication from C. Youe, March 1978.


It is possible that a further motive in encouraging capital was to increase revenue for the state, though this is undocumented.
40 Rubie's Report (Appendix 1b), Sections 26-46. In ascertaining pre War value speculative value and the capital of joint stock company owners was ignored, the procedure was to ascertain the annual value of the rights to the holder, to capitalise such value for the remainder of the term of the concession at 6% p.a..

41 Rubie's Report, 1903 (Appendix 1b).

42 Swaziland Concessions Commission: Report On The Expropriation Of Monopolies, 1906 (Appendix 1b). See also Times Of Swaziland, 11.2.1905 to 13.5.1905.

43 The history of the Corporation is apertinent one. Concessions obtained in the 1880's by J. Thorburn and A.M. Miller were floated into a Company in London on 29.5.1891, under the name of the Umbandine Concessions Syndicate, with a share capital of £50,000. This syndicate acquired sundry other concessions and in 1898 parted with its interest to a new company, the Swaziland Corporation Ltd., with a capital of £3,000,000. In 1908 there were 850 British shareholders. A.M. Miller was the Swaziland Manager, responsible to a London Board of Directors. Source: Swaziland Corporation, 1903, op cit.

44 Almost simultaneously Milner had declined to receive any representation from the Swazi except through the Resident Commissioner, Milner to Moony (Confidential), 30.1.1905, SNA J190/05.

45 Directors of the Swaziland Corporation to Selborne (Confidential), 21.2.1907, SNA J 120/06.

46 Swaziland Corporation, 1903, op cit.

47 Elgin to Directors of Swaziland Corporation (Confidential), 25.5.1907 (SNA J120/06). See Times of Swaziland, 21.11.1908, for the Corporation view.

48 J. Marlowe, Milner: Apostle of Empire, 1976 traces Milner's growing disenchantment with British policy towards the place of South Africa in the Empire which eventually led to his resignation with a Liberal government coming to power in 1905.

49 Swaziland Concessions Commission to Selborne, (Confidential), 7.7.1905 (SNA J 190/05) and Honey to Miller (Confidential), 18.7.1905 (SNA J190/05).

50 Miller to Honey (Confidential), 20.10.1905 (SNA J190/05).

51 Directors of Swaziland Corporation to Selborne, 21.2.1907 Colonial Secretary to Swaziland Corporation (London), 23.3.1907 Selborne to Swaziland Concessions Commission, 17.1.1908 (SNA 45/07/2129).

52 Miller to Honey (Confidential), 3.2.1908. Miller to Coryndon (Confidential), 5.2.1908 SNA 45/07/2129.
53 Swaziland Concessions Commission: Report Of Details, 1908.

54 Colonial Secretary to Selborne (Confidential), 7.12.1907
Selborne to Coryndon (Confidential), 12.12.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129).

55 Selborne to Commission, 11.12.1907, SNA 45/07/2129.

56 High Commissioner's Notice No 10 of 1908.

57 Times Of Swaziland, 21.11.1908. The difference between the two evaluations is explicable in that the Commission took the lapsed concessions clause to mean concessions lapsing within one year of the grant of the concession; patently not what the holders had in mind.

58 Rodwell to Miller, 19.9.1908, KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 229.

59 Times Of Swaziland, 21.11.1908, reports the final acceptance of the Corporation's shareholders.

60 Coryndon to Miller (Confidential), 12.10.1908, KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 281a. In 1909 Coryndon made an arrangement with the Corporation to exchange Corporation land in the Lubombo Mts. for crown land near Mbabane:
"It is proposed that an arrangement be made for the mutual benefit of the Corporation and Government" (Coryndon, SNA D09/65a).

61 Swaziland Corporation Annual Report, 1909, KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a.

62 Times of Swaziland, 21.11.1908.

63 Elgin to Selborne (Confidential), 7.12.1907, SNA 45/07/2129.

64 Swaziland Concessions Commission: Report Of Detailed Decisions, 1908 (Appendix 1b). See below 64 (Cont.).

65 Swaziland Concessions Commission, 1908, op. cit.. R.Palmer, Land And Racial Domination in Rhodesia, 1977, shows how large land grants during the period of British South Africa Company rule proved a considerable hindrance to agricultural development in the early years of this century.

64 (Cont.) The Report notes that Miller's duties as Agent & Adviser were to protect the King's interest "a duty which was apparently ill-discharged". At the time of the grant there was no evidence to prove Miller was interested in it. But 6 weeks later he acquired a 1/3 interest in it and for his interest he received 1000 shares on the flotation of the Umbandine Concession Syndicate, of which he later became Manager.
CHAPTER FIVE

1 Rubie's report, *op.cit.*, Section 71.

2 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 14.5.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

3 High Commissioner's Proclamation No 3 of 1904.

4 As it was the total cost of the settlement of the concessions question was £171,000 (Annual Colonial Report, 1910)

5 See Selborne's correspondence with Elgin in BL MS Selborne Box 163. On 17.7.1906 Selborne was empowered by the Colonial Office to make and implement all decisions to resolve the land question.

6 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 17.11.1906. Elgin approved Selborne's idea of a partition on 28.2.1907 in a telegram and 30.3.1907 by letter, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

7 Selborne to Elgin, (Confidential), 17.11.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

8 Chamber of Mining, Commerce and Industry to Selborne (Confidential), 29.9.1906, on the outcome of discussions between Selborne, Coryndon and Chamber representatives including A.M. Miller (SNA J 205/06). The *Times of Swaziland*, 15.9.1906, contains details of the meeting. White evidence included testimonies to "native interference" which had "ruined farming operations".

9 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 17.11.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

10 Quoted in the *Morning Star*, 2.2.1905.

11 On his visit to Swaziland Selborne was treated to two stories of how veld fires "started by natives" had ruined two farmers, Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 17.11.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

12 Ermelo farmers to Selborne, 19.12.1906, SNA J205/06.

13 D. Forbes to Selborne, 20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

14 D. Forbes to Selborne, 20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

15 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 17.11.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

16 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 17.11.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163. In a reference to the Zulu 'uprising' of 1906 Selborne saw it as related to the question of land in Natal and feared that a native war in Swaziland might eventuate if the plans were pushed through to partition. For an excellent study of the Zulu protest see S. Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances In Natal*, 1970.

17 *Times Of Swaziland*, 7.10.1905.

No maps of the concessions they partitioned could be located. It is believed that one was to the north-east of Mbabane and the other in the Lebombo Mts. On the former they demarcated four parcels for the Swazi and on the latter, three.

Times Of Swaziland, 7.10.1905. Also, "Swaziland Crisis" (Times Of Swaziland, 21.10.1905) reports a meeting of Transvaal interest holders and an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber. "Unanimous Meeting in South Swaziland" (Times of Swaziland, 28.10.1905) reports a meeting of southern interest-holders pledging support for the Chamber. Also, a statement by W. Penfold (Local Manager, Henderson Consolidated Corporation) in Times of Swaziland, 1.7.1905, and an editorial comment entitled "The Settlement" in Times of Swaziland, 7.10.1905. At "Meeting in Pretoria Between Commission and Concessionaires", Times of Swaziland, 23.12.1905 and 16.12.1905, a memorandum from the Chamber was presented and many unanimous protests voiced. On 20.1.1906 a deputation visited Selborne.

A.M. Miller at a meeting with the Commission (Times of Swaziland, 23.12.1905).

Chamber of Mining, Commerce & Industry to Selborne, 20.9.1906, SNA J 205/06).


Meeting between Selborne and the Chamber (SNA J 205/06).

In a meeting with Coryndon in June 1907, however, the Regent denied that she had made any such offer (SNA 45/07/640). Yet in meeting with Elgin in London in December 1907 a member of the delegation, Josiah Vilikazi, maintained the Swazi would be content if they were given two thirds of the land surface.

Selborne to Smuts (Confidential), 6.1.1908, SNA D09/2. An original copy of this memorandum is in the private papers of Mr Sidney Williams, Manzini, Swaziland. It was also published in the Times of Swaziland, 12.10.1907.
35 Forbes to Selborne, 20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

36 Elgin to Swaziland deputation, December 1907, BL MS Selborne Box 163 f 157. Yet as Elgin wrote to Selborne afterwards no concessions were intended to the Swazi and none were made.

"I think you will admit that I gave them no ghost of a chance for hoping the decision would be reversed...we shall do all we can to ship them off. I hope the result will strengthen your hands", quoted in R. Hyam, Elgin and Churchill At The Colonial Office, 1905-8, 1968, p 385. Matsebula's interpretation that this was a definite promise is therefore open to question. See J.S.M. Matsebula, A History Of Swaziland, 1972, p 138 (1976 edition).

37 Coryndon to Swazi Chiefs at a meeting, 7.3.1908 (SNA 45/07/640).

38 Selborne's Partition instructions to Grey, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

39 BL MS Selborne Box 163.

40 Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports, 1910-1926.

41 A further 37,000 acres were purchased from private interests for this scheme. As early as 1909 Selborne appears to have been involved in the financing of this settlement scheme in Swaziland. Thus even while Coryndon was attempting to pacify the Swazi with promises of a larger proportion of the land surface (37), Selborne wrote to him privately with:

"I do not consider myself prohibited from putting a white man on any crown land which may become available" (23.11.1907, SNA 45/07/640). The extent of Selborne's involvement is unfortunately not admitted or articulated. Indeed it was not until the 1930's that his role was even openly admitted. A. Miller also appears to have had a major role in the scheme though even he was careful to dissociate himself from it publicly.

In 1912, the Swaziland Development and Ranching Co., another company in which A. Miller had extensive personal interests, bought 84,000 acres of crown land and 87,000 acres of private land. A further 100,000 acres was purchased in 1917 (KCL MS MIL 1.08.47 MS 725a).

42 Selborne to Grey (Confidential), 10.10.1908, SNA D09/2.

43 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 15.10.1908, SNA D09/2.

44 Grey was a close contact of Selborne and prior to his Swaziland commission was General Manager of Katanga Mines from 1901-6. This commission appears to have been an attempt by Selborne to introduce Grey into the colonial service (Selborne to Grey, BL MS Selborne Box 71). In a letter to the Colonial Secretary Sept., 1908, (BL MS Selborne Box 71) Selborne writes of his appointment of Grey and also suggests the possibility of Grey entering the colonial service in Swaziland.
44 (Cont.) R.T. Coryndon, Some Account Of George Grey and His Work in Africa, 1914, describes Grey's fieldwork:

"Armed with district maps, cut up into sheets suitable for use on horseback, he covered without haste the whole area of the country in a close examination of the character of soil and density of native population. He told me there were few large valleys upon which his eyes had not rested, and few dominant mountains from the top of which he had not searched out the native kraals, the cultivated lands and the concession boundaries. The examination caused him to mark on his maps almost every kraal in the whole territory, and his acquaintance with every corner was so close that it no doubt enabled him to arrange an acceptable solution".

That only one Commissioner was appointed by Selborne was to hasten the partition process and to minimise colonial expenditure Times of Swaziland, 12.10.1907.


47 Selborne's Partition instructions to Grey, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

48 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 31.12.1908 (SNA D09/2).

49 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 3.5.1908 (SNA D09/2).

50 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 31.12.1908 (SNA D09/2). See Chapter 6 for a discussion of Swazi uncooperativeness. Grey reports a correspondence in which Coryndon tried, without success to persuade the Regent to order the chiefs to assist Grey.

51 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 31.12.1908, Section 34 (SNA D09/2).

52 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 31.12.1908, Section 36 (SNA D09/2).

53 Times of Swaziland, 21.11.1908

54 Typed copies of these notes, covering about 60% of the country, are to be found in SNA D09/2. These notes were sent to Selborne direct.

55 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 18.2.1908 (SNA D09/2). In the final partition exactly 1/3 was deducted from 62 concessions, more than 1/3 from 51 concessions and less than 1/3 from 68 concessions. Thirty two compensation schemes were devised by Grey (High Commissioner's Proclamation No 15 of 1909).

56 Selborne to Grey (Confidential), 16.11.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129).

57 SNA 45/07/1464.
58 For instance:

"The chief object of the reserves is not to compel all natives to go into these areas but to move of their own free will. As a rule natives make little use of these reserves. The native chooses his Master and looks up to him for help, advice and protection" (Selborne, SNA 45/07/1464)

and,

"It is likely that most farmers will try to keep the natives they have on their land" (Grey, SNA D09/2)

59 Selborne to Grey (Confidential), 16.11.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129)

60 At the time of writing it had proved impossible to trace the whereabouts of either the originals or copies of these maps. High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908 mentions them as on a scale of 1 inch : 1 mile. There is reason to suppose that all or a number of these maps are to be found in File J 53/06 in the Swaziland National Archives. This particular file was missing from the shelves.

61 Grey to Selborne, 13.2.1908 (SNA D09/2).


63 Selborne's Partition Instructions to Grey, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

64 SNA D09/2.

65 The map from which this data was extracted from a map made in the Surveyor General's Office, Pretoria, 1914. The Swaziland National Museum recently acquired an original map from S.B. Williams and the Swaziland National Archives has a photostat copy of the map.

66 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 31.12.1908, Section 35 (SNA D09/2).

67 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 31.12.1908, Section 26 (SNA D09/2).

68 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 31.12.1908, Section 31 (SNA D09/2).

69 Enraght-Moony to Selborne, 8.9.1906 BL MS Selborne Box 163.


CHAPTER SIX

1 B. Nyeko, Pre Nationalist Resistance to Colonial Rule, Trans-African Journal of History, 5:2, traces the rise and consolidation in power of the Queen Regent, Labotsibeni.

2 Swazi Petition to Milner, 30.12.1904, to protest the 1904 Proc. (SNA J 138/05). White and black legal advisers, Parsonson, Bremer and Seme, were employed to draft petitions for the Swazi.
Swazi Petition to Milner, 30.12.1904, SNA J 138/05.

Sir Francis Hopwood to 1907 Delegation to Britain, December 1907, SNA 45/07/640.

The attitude of the colonial state to the 1890 Concessions Court was largely a matter of convenience. In cancelling the industrial monopolies the function of the Court was minimised, but in dealings with the Swazi it was always used as an immutable legal tribunal with far-reaching powers of concession confirmation.

RHL MSS Afr S 633 Box 10 fl.

Malunge to Elgin, 21.11.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

Queen Regent to Coryndon, 7.3.1908, SNA 45/07/640.

J.S.M. Matsebula, A History Of Swaziland, 1972, reveals that this view is still held by contemporary Swazi. In conversation with Matsebula, the author claimed that the payments made to the King were interpreted as traditional forms of tribute to the monarch.

Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 31.12.1908, SNA D09/2. Swazis were later given leave to appeal against any of the partition details. A mere 34 appeals were made through District Commissioner's, a function of Swazi dissatisfaction with the partition as a whole. 90% of these were rejected anyway by Grey (SNA 45/07/140).

Selborne to Swazi Delegation, 1905, BL MS Selborne Box 163 f 157.

These perceptive comments are hopefully also a rebuke to Mashasha, op.cit., 1973, for his acceptance of colonial policy at its face value. (SNA 45/07/640).

SNA RCS 379/14. Also, High Commissioner's Proclamation No 24 of 1913.

Times of Swaziland, 12.10.1907. This ploy to give added weight to locally-made decisions was often used in dealings with the Swazi.

Coryndon to Selborne (Confidential), 6.5.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

Selborne to Elgin, 17.8.1907, SNA 45/07/640. The failure of the delegation to obtain any concessions from the colonial state was pre-supposed. Selborne's private view of the Regent was less charitable. The Swazi were not supposed to protest actions of the colonial state undertaken in their supposed best interests: "These are the whims and intrigues of an autocrat who is intemperantly selfish and ambitious and has frequently exhibited a dangerous credulity for the advice of irresponsible and unsrrupulous adventurers"(Selborne to Coryndon, 6.6.1907, SNA 45/07/640). Swazi tradition attributes quite a different character to the Regent, Matsebula, op.cit.
Coryndon's proposal is in RHL MS Afr S 633 Box 10. The Swaziland National Archives contains a file of intercepted correspondence between the Regent and Parsonson, a Pietermaritzburg attorney.

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 13.5.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 13.5.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 13.5.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 28.8.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

Coryndon to Queen Regent, 16.9.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

Selborne to Elgin (confidential), 13.5.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential), 28.8.1907, SNA 45/07/640.

The delegation was also granted an audience with King Edward. A prepared statement of allegiance was read. The delegation attempted to express their grievances direct to the King but Marwick, the translator, refused to translate under orders from Elgin, SNA 45/07/640, Marwick memorandum on the 1907 Delegation.

Marwick memorandum, SNA 45/07/640.

Queen Regent to Coryndon, 7.3.1908, SNA 45/07/640.

Queen Regent to Coryndon in retrospect, 16.6.1914, SNA RCS 375/14.

Within a short period the numbers of Swazi employed in the South African mining industry rose dramatically, but tapered off after 1914 (Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports, 1909-1930).

Loans were sought from the National Bank of Africa ($30,000) and the Standard Bank ($100,000). The Banks were discouraged by the colonial state from making the loans.

Seme to Coryndon, 16.6.1914, SNA RCS 375/14.

High Commissioner's Proclamation No 2 of 1915. Land was bought from two whites, Torrens and Du Pont, who had themselves apparently bought it from the crown. Some speculation is therefore postulated though there is no apparent evidence. C.P. Youe, Imperial Land Policy in Swaziland and The African Response, 1977, writes that the colonial state allowed this transaction as an appeasement exercise.

Miller to Coryndon, 30.4.1914, KCL MS MIL 1.08.47 MS 725b.
CHAPTER SEVEN

1 The number of whites involved in agriculture was 533 in 1921 and only 570 in 1936 (Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports, 1921, 1936). P.M. Mutibwa, White Settlers in Uganda: The Era of Hope and Disillusionment, 1905-23, Trans African Journal of History, 5:2, 1976, examines a similar process in Uganda though attributing it to different reasons.

2 For instance, the Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme, which never managed to attract the numbers of settlers solicited. The Swaziland Corporation was also unable to attract settlers for its holdings. In 1960 there was no cultivation at all on 42% of landholdings and 40% of all holdings were owned by absentee landlords. The large proportion of externally-held land can be in one sense attributed to speculation by South Africans in the post-war period of rising land prices.

3 The Swaziland National Archives carry a full set of European Advisory Council minutes from its inception in 1924 until 1964. Examination of these records would undoubtedly show the impact of the petit-colon on local colonial policy throughout the colonial period. For instance, on several occasions a tax on unutilised land was proposed by the colonial state, opposed by the petit-colon and subsequently dropped. M.P.K. Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, 1968, is a good study of the petit-colon impact on Kenyan policy.

4 The loan fund was instituted by High Commissioner's Proclamation No 36 of 1929 as the Agricultural Development and Loan Fund Act. Between 1929-37, £30,000 was loaned to whites at easy interest rates for fencing, boring and land purchase mortgages. Grants in Aid amounted to £300,000 between 1928-38 but even as late as 1932, tax on blacks was still generating 40% of colonial administrative income (Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports, 1927-39).


6 See the work of T.J.D. Fair on the South African space economy; For instance, T.J.D. Fair, Polarisation, Dispersion and Decentralisation In The South African Space Economy, 1975.

7 Hertzog to Secretary of State, 25.4.1934, in H.M.S.O., Basutoland The Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, 1952, p 46.

8 No stock of weight less than 800lbs was allowed entry to the South African market. The major colon ranching enterprise,
the Swaziland Ranching and Development Corporation (Capital: £170,000) in which the ubiquitous A.M. Miller was a major shareholder, controlled 200,000 acres of land and built up large herds in the early 1920's by importing stock. The Company went into liquidation in 1928 as a direct result of the Union embargo (KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 268).

National Development Plans were first instituted in 1946 and appeared at regular intervals for the remainder of the colonial period. The commitment of the colonial state to encouraging British multi-national capital in Swaziland is clear from these plans and is re-iterated in the reports of various economic survey missions. See V. Liversage, Swaziland Development, H.M.S.O., 1948, A. Symon, Economic and Financial Report on The High Commission Territories, H.M.S.O., 1954 and sections on Swaziland in colonial economic reports of 1951, 1960, and 1965.

The role of the Colonial Development Corporation is appraised by A. R. Kendrick, The Role Of The C.D.C. In Project Formulation And Implementation In Swaziland, in J. Barrat (ed), Strategy For Development, 1976, and by several propaganda publications of the C.D.C. (particularly, Notes In Explaining The Corporation's Work In Helping The Countries Of The Developing World To Raise Their Standards Of Living, 1976). Multi-national Corporation activities in Africa are considered in Langdon (1975), Widstrand (1975).

There is no indication who the land was purchased from but a large proportion is believed to have belonged to South African absentee landowners, and possibly speculators.

For foreign capital, the construction of company towns with sharp black-white urban morphology (Mhlambanyati, Bunya, Mhlume and Big Bend) and the 1965 Railway to export iron ore, pulp and sugar.

In 1945, 40.3% of colonial state expenditure was on agriculture and only 5.6% on urban infrastructure. By 1963, the position was reversed (11.1% and 76.5% respectively). Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports, 1945, 1963.

In 1936 700 Swazi were employed in mining and 2900 in white agriculture. In 1970 foreign capital controlled a Swazi labour force of over 25,000.

C. P. Potholm, Political Development In Swaziland, 1960-5, 1967

For the texts of these petitions see SNA 45/07/640. Matsebula, op. cit., 1972, p 177-8 (1976 ed.) documents the 1958 petition and the colonial response.

The Swazi National Archives Library carries a detailed account of the proceedings of the Privy Council Appeal (No 158 of 1924) in the case of A. M. Miller and the Swaziland Corporation v. Sobhuza II. Detailed comment on the appeal is carried in, The British Protectorates and The Privy Council, Calcutta Weekly Notes, 30:41, 1926.

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report, 1934.

V. Liversage, op. cit., 1948. See also Appendix 4c for a comparison between 1946 population and stock figures on reserves with
Grey's carrying capacity estimates made in 1909.

17 Swaziland Annual Colonial Report, 1936.

18 High Commissioner's Proclamation No 2 of 1946.

19 The implementation of the Native Land Settlement Scheme is covered in the Reports Of The Native Land Settlement Dept. (1946-54).

20 G. Whittington and J. Daniel, Problems Of Land Tenure and Ownership in Swaziland, in M. F. Thomas and G. Whittington (eds), Environment and Land Use In Africa, 1969, comment that former Land Settlement Areas show no obvious differences in appearance or organisation from longstanding Swazi areas.

21 Sir Evelyn Baring, Resident Commissioner, meetings with Sobhuza II (July 1945) in SNA File 1018.


23 Speculation was rife around this time by landowners, resident and absentee.

24 It was not possible to confirm or deny the supposed mismanagement of LIFA funds suggested by some informants.

25 From, Secret Meetings Of A Special Session Of The 3rd European Advisory Council of Swaziland, 1953. The quotation is a compilation of comments from C. Todd(a), J. Murphy(b) & R. Stephens(c), all of whom were later senators in the first independent Swaziland Government.

26 The colonial agricultural officials desired the culling of the poorest stock in herds whereas the Swazi, for whom quality is traditionally a side issue, wanted to sell the stock that fetched higher market prices, SNA File 1018.

27 Times of Swaziland, February 1968.


29 The market value of land quickly fell to 10% of that for similar quality land in the Transvaal.

30 Personal communication, Ministry of Agriculture official, King Sobhuza.


32 See 1st and 2nd National Development Programmes (1968-78). Jones (1977) suggests that a land grant claim by the Swazi was supported by the petit-colon who preferred the prospect of being
bought out than having their land confiscated. That there has not been a general expropriation of land is attributed to the influence of the settler and the desire to retain foreign capital.

33 The land question was invariably central to the Pan Africanist rhetoric during this period. Nationalisation of all land holding and the restoration of traditional Swazi rights was an oft-reiterated policy of the opposition N.N.L.C. party until its banning in 1973. The policy of accepting British funds for land repurchase was particularly attacked. See Ngwane Forum, 12:11, 1972, and Kusile Ngwane, 1:3, 1968.

34 R.P. Stephens, currently Minister of Finance, was once general manager of Peak Timbers and is a powerful advocate of petit-colon and foreign capital interests. Two other senators, the late C. Todd and J. S. Murphy, held extensive landed interests in Swaziland.

35 M. Franssman, University of Sussex, is researching for a doctorate on this period of Swaziland's history. Other workers in the field of Swaziland's history are B. Nyeko of Makerere University and F. Mashasha of the University of Oxford.
APPENDIX ONE

A. PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS

B. PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS: ARCHIVES LIBRARY

C. RESEARCH LETTERS: Killie Campbell Library
   Government Archives, Pretoria
APPENDIX ONE A: PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS

SWAZILAND NATIONAL ARCHIVES (S.N.A.) at Mbabane and Lebomba, Swaziland

1. Demarcation Of Native Area
   EX D09/2, J155/02, J205/06, J53/06, RCS 321/09, File 1291, File 769.

2. Deeds Office Records
   RCS 891/30, File 80, J212/02, RCS 153/15.

3. Colonial State and the Settler Companies
   J53/03, D09/05A, RCS 520A/09, 45/07/1464, 85/07/2129, S513, RCS 763/32, RCS 738/37, RCS 244/25.

4. Swazis On Individual Tenure Land
   D08/80, RCS 579/13, RCS 247/14, RCS 249/14, RCS 336/14, RCS 450/11, RCS 379/14, RCS 619/14, RCS 462/14.

5. Trekeep Farmers
   File 546, RCS 78/03, File 2203.

6. Purchase Of Land By Swazi Nation
   File 1018, RCS 375/14, RCS 273/15, RCS 281/15, RCS 84/18, RCS 270/14 - 145/16, D09/88

7. Native Tax
   J1/03-175/03, J62/04, J18/05, J138/05.

8. White Settlement Schemes
   RCS 625/26, File 1289, RCS 599/27, RCS 579/22.

9. Colonial Settlement Schemes

10. Unconsulted Files for period after 1949
    File 3014, 0, 011, J/1, B
    File 3306

KILLIE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY (K.C.L.) at Durban, South Africa

Allister M. Miller Papers (MS.MIL.)

1. MS.MIL.1.08.3
   KCM 2355, 2362, 2364-68, MS 229, 191a, 268 Correspondence concerning the Swaziland Corporation (1908-22) including Annual Reports
   MS 281a Correspondence with R.T. Coryndon (1908).

2. MS.MIL.1.08.10
   MS 406 Correspondence with Lord Milner on Protectorate administration.

3. MS.MIL.1.08.11
   MS 418 Information about mining companies in Swaziland.

4. MS.MIL.1.08.23
   MS 558 Memorandum on various concessions and syndicates in Swaziland.
   MS 547 a,b Mineral prospects and concessions in Swaziland.
   MS KCM 2459-67 Papers presented to the Swaziland Concessions Syndicate (including original copies of concessions 144 to 82).

MS.MIL.1.08.37
5. MS.MIL.1.08.37
KCM 2295-2363, MS 645, MS 936 Correspondence about the Swaziland Development
and Ranching Co., and Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme.

6. MS.MIL.1.08.38
MS 661, 651 Attitudes to incorporation.

7. MS.MIL.1.08.47
MS 725 Memo relating to land purchase by natives.

RHODES HOUSE LIBRARY (R.H.L.) at Oxford, England

R.T. Coryndon Papers (MSS.Afr.S633)

Box 9: f 1-20, f 5 ff 1-32
Box 10: f 11 ff 16-32
Box 12: f 1 ff 2-4
Box 12: f 4 ff 1-3

BODLEIAN LIBRARY (B.L.) at Oxford University, Oxford, England

Selborne Papers (MSS.Selborne)

MS.Selborne Z1, f 125-5
Z2, f 173-80
163, f 157
170k, f 204

Milner Papers (MSS.Eng.Hist)

55(53), 9(7), c. 658
APPENDIX ONE B

PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS (Swaziland National Archives Library)

COLONIAL BLUE BOOKS

1748 of 1877
2316 of 1879
2505 of 1880
2695 of 1880
2998 of 1881 Convention of Transvaal
3152 of 1882
3419 of 1882
3914 of 1884 Convention of 1884
4037 of 1884
4648 of 1886
5089 of 1887
6200 of 1890 Report of De Winton Commission
6217 of 1890 Convention of 1890
7212 of 1893 Concessions Listings
7511 of 1895 handing over of Swaziland to the South African Republic
7978 of 1895
9602 of 1899

SWAZILAND CONCESSIONS COMMISSION REPORTS

1903 J. HUBIE: Swaziland Concessions Report (including a digest of Concessions)
1905 Report to the Governor (relating to a suggestion by A.H. Miller on behalf of the Swaziland Corporation)
1906 Report On The Expropriation of Monopolies
1908 Report Of Detailed Decisions (relative to boundaries, registration of servitudes, periods of enjoyment, etc., in respect of land, grazing and mineral concessions)
1915 J. S. HUTS: Report On Registration of Land in Swaziland (unlocated),

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S GAZETTES

Swaziland Order-in-Council of 1903
Proc.No.3 of 1904 Concessions Proclamation
Proc.No.4 of 1907 Partition Proclamation
Swaziland Order-in-Council of 1908
Proc.No.28 of 1907 Demarcation Of Native Areas
Notice No.119 of 1908 Grey's Report
Proc.No.70 of 1908
Swaziland Crown Lands Order-in-Council 1907
Swaziland Crown Minerals Order-in-Council 1908
Notice No.53 of 1909 Grey's Compensation Report
Proc.No.15 of 1909
Proc.No.39 of 1910 Preserving Native rights on Native Area
Proc.No.13 of 1911 Disposal Of Crown Lands
Notice No.19 of 1912 Cancelled Concessions
Proc.No.24 of 1913 Natives still on Individual Tenure land
MISCELLANEOUS

Times of Swaziland, 1897-1912 (published weekly)

Annual Colonial Reports for Swaziland, 1905-1966
Dear Mr. Crush,

A.M. Miller's Papers

Thank you for your letter of 5 November 1977.

The Allister Mitchell Miller Papers housed in this Library form a large collection, extending in all over a hundred files and covering a wide range of topics, viz. administration, communications, agriculture, mining, Swazi history and customs, certain companies operating in Swaziland, as well as personal and business correspondence of A.M. Miller. Incidentally, the Library has also a virtually complete set of the Times of Swaziland from its inception in 1897.

Should you wish to consult the Papers, the Library is open on weekdays from 08h30 to 13h00 and 14h00 to 16h45, and on Saturdays from 09h00 to 12h00. However, with the coming Christmas vacation the Library will close at midday on 23 December 1977 and re-open on 3 January 1978.

Yours sincerely,

(Miss) J.F. Dugger
Africana Librarian

JFD/pjb
Dear Mr. Crush

I am writing in reply to your inquiry dated 8-11-1977 concerning the concession boundaries in Swaziland.

The Report of the Commission appointed under the Swaziland Administration Proclamation, 1904, as to the Expropriation of the Rights referred to in Section 12 of the Proclamation with appendices (PM 1/2/170-48/30) is in the custody of the Transvaal Archives Depot. The report covers 210 pages; six maps are also included in the report.

Xerox-copies can be supplied at 6 cents per copy plus 4 cents postage for every ten copies ordered, payable in advance. An order form is included.

I regret to inform you that I could not trace any information regarding Mr. George Grey or his private papers.

Yours faithfully

[Signature]

for CHIEF : TRANSVAAL ARCHIVES DEPOT
APPENDIX TWO

A. ROYAL SWAZI DYNASTY

B. EXTRACTS FROM SETTLER'S ACCOUNTS: Forbes Miller
APPENDIX 2a

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE ROYAL SWAZI DYNASTY

DLAMINI 1
  MSWATI 1
  NGWANE 11
  DLAMINI 11
    NKOSI 11
    MAVUSO 1
      MAGUDULELA — LUDVONGA 1
      HLUBI — DLAMINI 111
    NGWANE 111
      NDVUNGUNYE (Zikodze)
      SOBHUZA 1 (Somhlolo, Ngwane IV)
        MSWATI 11
        DLAMINI 1V (Mbandzeni)
        NGWANE 1V (Bhunu)
          SOBHUZA 11

Pre 1750

| 1815-1836 |
| 1840-1868 |
| 1875-1889 |
| 1897-1899 |
| 1921- |

d.1780

d.1815

Note: Traditionally a chosen King does not attain full sovereignty until reaching his majority at age 21. In the interim period the Queen Regent, generally the mother of the new King, rules in his stead. LabotsibenI held this office from 1809-1897 and again from 1899-1921 when Sobhuza 11 was installed as King.

Source: Matsebula (1972).
APPENDIX 2b


Then came the concessions era in Swaziland. We had returned to find it at its height. We realised that all was lost as regards the mineral rights all over Swaziland held by my uncle and father. So my brother and I decided to share in the spoils, and get concessions for ourselves. It was an exciting and also an amusing game. There were dozens of men walking around the King’s kraal with concessions papers written over in their pockets ready to put before the King to be signed. Each man kept his own particular piece of ground as secret as possible in case another man forestalled him. He had a Swazi Chief as his agent to secure an audience with the King for him.

We all walked or sat around the kraal to all outward appearance for no other reason than for the sake of our health. Only with our friends did we discuss the concession.

On getting an audience with the King you would tell him you just wanted a piece of land as big as your hand on which you wanted the rights. You would give the King some money now, but thousands of pounds later, when you discovered gold and worked it. He got £3000 when Forbes Reef was floated into a company. If your luck was in and the King was in a good mood he would say “Let me see the money” and never in your life did you part with your money quicker and more willingly. The King would say “Where is the pen?” He would make a cross where indicated, as his signature. Then there would be a scramble with the chiefs present to sign as witnesses and the custom was to give each chief who signed £1. A place was always reserved for Sandhlana and Tecuba to sign.

The King was now very ill and, I am sorry to say it, we whites saw the end coming to our harvest of securing concessions, and most of us had just one more we would like to secure; I in common with the others. So I approached the King one day, as others were doing. He looked at me and said “You, Mahleka, son of my friend, are you also joining the vultures that want to pick my bones before I die? I did not expect it from you.” Never have I felt such a crushing rebuke in my life.
The year 1887 saw the birth of a concessions-hunting boom. It may have been picturesque but was definitely sordid. Roads were made and footpaths worn to bedrock by the horses of the would-be concessionaires. The King's sweeper, his brewer, his snuff-bearer, his nail-parer, were sanctified entities in the eyes of the suppliants. Into ever-open hands a constant stream of silver fell in the expectation that it might disclose some veiled path to the giver of good things. The ndunas were still more substantially rewarded. Gold was their guerdon and uncounted wealth was distributed in enlisting their assistance.
APPENDIX THREE

A. SWAZILAND ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1903

B. COLONIAL BIOGRAPHIES

C. LAPPED AND UNALLOTTED CONCESSIONS: Land

D. SWAZILAND CORPORATION MEMORANDUM

Minerals
APPENDIX 3a.

SWAZILAND ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1903.
(As amended by the Swaziland Orders in Council, 1906, 1909 and 1934.)

At the Court at Buckingham Palace,
The 25th Day of June, 1903.

Present:

The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas the Government of the late South African Republic exercised rights and powers of protection, legislation, jurisdiction, and administration in and over the Territory known as Swaziland;

And whereas the late South African Republic was conquered by His Majesty's Forces and was annexed to and now forms part of His Majesty's Dominions, and provision has been made for the government thereof as one of His Majesty's Colonies under the name of the Transvaal;

And whereas all the rights and powers of the late South African Republic with respect to Swaziland have, by virtue of the conquest and annexation of the said South African Republic, passed to His Majesty, and His Majesty has by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, power and jurisdiction in Swaziland;

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue of the powers by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or otherwise in His Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. This Order may be cited as the Swaziland Order in Council, 1903.

†2. In this Order unless the contrary appears "Swaziland" means the territory known by that name bounded on the North, the West, and the South by the Transvaal, and on the East by the Colony of Natal and the Portuguese territories. "His Majesty" includes His Majesty's heirs and successors. "Secretary of State" means one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State. ["High Commissioner" means His Majesty's High Commissioner for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.]
"Gazette" means the Official Gazette of the High Commissioner for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

*3. The [High Commissioner] may, on His Majesty's behalf, exercise all powers and jurisdiction which His Majesty, at any time before or after the date of this Order, had, or may have, within Swaziland, and to that end may take or cause to be taken all such measures, and may do or cause to be done all such matters and things therein as are lawful and as in the interest of His Majesty's service he may think expedient, subject to such instructions as he may from time to time receive from His Majesty, or through a Secretary of State.

*4. The [High Commissioner] may appoint a Resident Commissioner and so many fit persons as, in the interest of His Majesty's service, he may think necessary, to be Assistant Commissioners, Judges, Magistrates, or other officers, and may define from time to time the districts within which such officers shall respectively discharge their functions.

Every such officer may exercise such powers and authorities as the [High Commissioner] may assign to him, subject nevertheless to such directions and instructions as the [High Commissioner] may from time to time think fit to give him. The appointment of such officers shall not abridge, alter, or affect the right of the [High Commissioner] to execute and discharge all the powers and authorities hereby conferred upon him.

The [High Commissioner] may remove any officer so appointed.

*5. In the exercise of the powers and authorities hereby conferred upon him, the [High Commissioner] may, amongst other things, from time to time by Proclamation, provide for the administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, order, and good government of Swaziland, and of all persons therein, including the prohibition and punishment of acts tending to disturb the public peace.

The [High Commissioner] in issuing such Proclamations, shall respect any native laws by which the civil relations of any native chiefs, tribes or populations under His Majesty's protection are now regulated, except so far as the same may be incompatible with the due exercise of His Majesty's power and jurisdiction, or clearly injurious to the welfare of the said natives.

*6. Every Proclamation of the High Commissioner shall be published in the Gazette, and shall from and after the date of such publication or from and after such other date as may be mentioned in such Proclamation, and thereafter until disallowed by His Majesty or repealed or modified by any subsequent Proclamation,
have effect as if contained in this Order, and the High Commissioner shall take such measures as he thinks proper for giving due publicity thereto within Swaziland.]

7. His Majesty may disallow any such Proclamation wholly or in part, and may signify such disallowance by Order in Council or through a Secretary of State, and upon such disallowance being notified in the Gazette, the provisions so disallowed shall from and after a date to be mentioned in such notification, cease to have effect, but without prejudice to anything theretofore lawfully done thereunder. Due notification shall be publicly made by the [High Commissioner] within Swaziland of the disallowance of any such Proclamation.

8. (Revoked by the Swaziland Order in Council, 1906.)

9. The [High Commissioner] may as he shall see occasion, when any crime has been committed within Swaziland, or for which the offender may be tried therein, grant a pardon, in His Majesty's name, to any accomplice, not being the actual perpetrator of such crime, who shall give such information and evidence as shall lead to the apprehension and conviction of the principal offender; and further, may grant to any offender convicted of any crime in any Court, or before any Judge, Justice, Magistrate, or other Officer within Swaziland a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions, or any respite of the execution of the sentence of any such offender, for such period as to the [High Commissioner] may seem fit, and may remit any fines, penalties, or forfeitures which may become due and payable.

10. (Revoked by the Swaziland Order in Council, 1906.)

11. This Order shall be published in the Gazette, and shall thereupon come into operation, and the High Commissioner shall give directions for the publication of this Order at such places, and in such manner and for such time or times as he thinks proper for giving due publicity thereto within Swaziland.

12. His Majesty may from time to time revoke, alter, add to, or amend this Order.

And the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

A. W. FITZROY.
Appendix 3b

MAJOR COLONIAL OFFICIALS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SWAZILAND, 1902-14.

**SIR ALFRED MILNER**

Career Details: Private Sec. to Chancellor of Exchequer (1886-8), Private Sec. to Viceroy of India (1888-9), Director-General of Accounts, Cairo (1889-92), Chairman of Board of Inland Revenue (1892-7), Governor of South Africa and High Commissioner for Protectorates (1897-1905), Sec. of State for War (1916-8), Colonial Secretary (1918-20)


**SECOND EARL OF SELBORNE**

Career Details: Under Sec. of State for Colonies (pre 1900), First Lord of Admiralty (1900-5), Governor-General of South Africa and High Commissioner for Protectorates (1905-14), Minister of Agriculture (1915-16).

Biography: none, but see


Publications:


**SIR ROBERT CORYNDON**

Career Details: Private Sec. to Rhodes (1896), Administrator of N-W Rhodesia (1897-1907), Resident Commissioner for Swaziland (1907-16), Rhodesian Native Affairs Commission (1914-15), Governor of Uganda (1917-22) and Kenya (1922-25).
3b (Cont.)

Capital Linkages: Administrator for British South Africa Co. (1897-1907).

C. P. Youe, Dalhousie University, is currently doing PhD research on Coryndon's career.

Publications:

GEORGE GREY

Career Details: Special Commissioner for Swaziland (1907-9)

Capital Linkages: Manager, Northumberland Syndicate (1891), employee of Zambesi Exploration Co. (1895-99), General Manager of Tanganyika Concessions Co. Ltd. in Katanga (1901-6).

APPENDIX 3c

LAPSED AND UNALLOTTED LANDS CONCESSION

Enclosure 1 in No. 33.

Duly registered in the books of the King.

(Signed) ALLISTER M. MILLER,

Embekelweni, Resident Secretary and Agent, Swazie King.

29th July 1889.

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN—

Be it hereby made known that I, Umbandeni, King and Paramount Chief of the Swazie Nation, acting with the advice and consent of my Indunas in Council assembled, hereby grant, cede, and assign unto and on behalf of John Thorburn and Frank Watkins, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, the sole, full, free, and exclusive farming right over all such pieces and portions of my country of Swazieland bounded on the north by the Komatie River, on the west by the Transvaal border, on the south by the Transvaal border, on the east by the Portuguese and Tongaland borders, and lying within these boundaries, as have not at the date of signing of these presents been granted for farming and agricultural purposes.

The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall further enjoy the full right and privilege to divert streams, make and utilise watercourses, make roads, build dwelling-houses, store-houses, and cattle kraals and stables, and do all such acts and things as may be requisite and necessary for the better carrying out of the business of a farmer on any and all such pieces, plots, and portions of ground as are contained in the boundaries aforesaid, and become their property by the signing of these presents.

The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall also have the right to use such water for irrigating and other purposes as they may deem necessary, the right to cut and use wood on the farms above referred to, the right to import any and every description of machinery and farming implements which they may deem requisite and expedient for furthering the interests and requirements ceded to them by this grant, as also the right to import all grains, cereals, and manures for farming purposes.

The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall have the right to sublet, sell, or transfer to any person or persons, or company, syndicate, or companies of persons, any portion or portions of the whole of the ground made over to them by virtue of this grant, and such person or persons or companies aforesaid shall acquire all and singular the rights, privileges, and benefits, granted under these presents.

The period during which the said concessionaires and their foresaids shall enjoy the rights made over to them shall be for a period of fifty (50) years, to be reckoned from the date of the signing of these presents, provided, should they so desire it, they shall obtain a renewal of the rights hereby made over and granted for a further term of fifty (50) years, subject to the same terms and conditions as herein are provided.

As and in full consideration for the rights and privileges hereby granted and made over, the said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall pay to me or my successors by way of yearly rental the sum of fifty pounds (50L) sterling.

The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins, on behalf of themselves and successors, agree and bind themselves to respect all prior rights, should such exist, affecting this grant, and further in no way to interfere with the rights of my native subjects; and I, Umbandine, on behalf of myself and successors, agree to afford them all protection in the enjoyment of the rights hereby granted and recognised by me.
And it is the true intent hereof—

1. That he said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall enjoy the full and exclusive grazing rights over all portions of my country lying to the south of the Komatie River, and bounded as above described, and which have not at the date of these presents been granted to anyone else; as also the grazing rights over all portions of my kingdom already granted, but which may during the continuance of this grant lapse and become null and void through any cause whatsoever; further, the right to carry on dairy operations in connection with the grazing rights; and also, as aforesaid, the right to make use of and import all machinery and dairy appliances which may be considered necessary.

2. The full, sole, free, and exclusive right in that portion of my country lying to the south of the Komatie River, and bounded as already described, to cultivate and carry on any and every species of agriculture and arboriculture and planting, on all portions or pieces of land where such rights have not been granted at the date of these presents to anyone else; as also the full and exclusive right to carry on any species of agriculture, planting, or arboriculture on all portions of my country over which such rights have already been granted, but which may during the continuance of this grant through any cause whatsoever lapse and fall back to me; and, further, for the purpose of carrying on agricultural operations, to make use of all such agricultural machinery and appliances as may by the concessionaires be deemed needful and necessary.

The concessionaires and their foresaids shall enjoy and have the full, free, and undisturbed use and enjoyment of the rights hereby granted them, for which grant I have this day received good and sufficient consideration, and I engage, on my protection being asked, to prevent anyone whomsoever from destroying and trespassing upon or injuring the agricultural operations or works of the said concessionaires.

Given under my hand and seal at my Head Kraal, Embekelweni (Gufane), Swaziland, on this, the twenty-sixth (26th) day of July, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine (1889), in the presence of the subscribing witnesses.

(Signed) UMBANDENI, King, his X and (L.S.)
Their
T'KUBA ×
HELEMI ×
M'TSHASA ×
JOSEBOMOU ×
BOBOSA ×
MAKAHLALAGA ×
INCABANA ×
LANGABALALA ×
A'MABELE ×
LUNTSHENGA ×
mark

As Witnesses:
(Signed) ALLISTER M. MILLER.
CLAUDE H. VERHALL.
A. O. GOULD.

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I, this twenty-sixth day of July in the year 1889, duly and truly interpreted the contents of the above document to King Umbandeni and to his Indunas whose names are subscribed above.

(Signed) E. COOPER.
LAPSED AND UNALLOTTED MINERALS CONCESSION

Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

Duly registered, 24th December 1888.

(Signed) Theophilus Shepstone,
Resident Adviser and Agent, Swazie King.

Be it hereby made known that I, Umbandeni, King and Paramount Chief of the Swazie nation, acting with the full consent of my Council, do hereby give, grant, assign, and make over unto John Thorburn, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, the sole, full, free, and exclusive right to prospect, mine, dig, search, or otherwise explore for gold or other minerals or precious stones on all such pieces, parcels, plots, or portions of ground or country in this my kingdom of Swazieland, as have not up to the date hereof been granted, assigned, or apportioned as mineral concessions or rights; and further, the sole, full, free, and exclusive right of refusal of all such concessions, mineral or otherwise, as may from time to time from the date hereof be abandoned or forfeited by the present holders; the said John Thorburn and his foresaids in each and every instance abiding by the conditions laid down for the working and rental of such concession or concessions, unless I, the said Umbandeni, or my successors, agree to the modification of the same; and the said John Thorburn and his foresaids on discovering gold or precious stones or minerals of any description on or in any parcels or plots of ground or country which are by these presents made over to him or them, or which may from time to time, either by forfeiture or abandonment or noncompliance with document or agreement, become the property of the said John Thorburn or his foresaids, shall have the sole, full, free, and exclusive right to treat the same by machinery or otherwise, according to the usages of mining in all its branches, and for the sole and exclusive benefit of the said John Thorburn and his foresaids, to whom shall belong the full and undivided profits thereof.

The period during which the said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall enjoy the rights made over to him and them by these presents shall be a term of fifty (50) years, to be reckoned from the date hereof; provided that, should he or they so desire it, the said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall obtain a renewal of the rights hereby granted for another term of fifty (50) years, subject to the same terms and conditions as herein are provided.

As and in consideration in full for the rights hereby granted him and them, the said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall yearly pay to me or to my successors in office the sum of 100l. (one hundred pounds sterling), for each and every Concession, whether mineral or otherwise, becoming the property of the said John Thorburn or his foresaids, through forfeiture or abandonment of the original holder or holders, or his or their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, the said John Thorburn shall pay to me, or my successors in office, a yearly rental as set forth in the original Grant or Concession Deed of the Concession so acquired by the said John Thorburn or his foresaids. And, furthermore, the said John Thorburn and his foresaids hereby agree to pay to me or to my successors in office a bonus of 3,000l. (three thousand pounds), on the completion of the erection of the first stamping machinery or battery on any of the mineral concessions granted to him and his foresaids by virtue of this document.

The said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall have the sole, full, free, and undivided right to divert watercourses, dig and construct water-races, build houses and workshops, and cut timber on each and every piece or parcel of ground on which he or his foresaids may by virtue of these presents mine, or dig for precious stones, such rights,
however, only to be exercised for the better development of the mineral rights and privileges hereby made over to him and them.

And, further, the said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall have the sole and exclusive right and privilege to build stores and trade goods and liquors on such mineral concessions and mining lands as are by these presents granted him and them.

And the rights hereby granted and made over to the said John Thorburn and his foresaids is a sole and exclusive grant and concession for the whole of Swazieland, whereby the said John Thorburn and his foresaids become possessed of mineral rights over each and every portion of this my country which has not at the date and signing of these presents been granted for mining purposes; and further, of the sole, full, and free right to take over on the original terms, unless modified terms are mutually agreed upon between I, the said Umbandeni, and the said John Thorburn or his foresaids all Concessions, whether mineral or otherwise, abandoned or forfeited by the original holders, their heirs, executors, or assigns, such rights and privileges being further extended to the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the said John Thorburn.

And, furthermore, I, the said Umbandeni, on behalf of myself and successors, agree and bind myself not to grant any further mineral concession or concessions for the mining of and for precious stones in this my country after the date and signing of these presents; nor to grant a similar right for the first refusal of each and every concession abandoned or forfeited by the original holders, their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, to any other person or persons, company or companies, syndicate or syndicates; but, on the other hand, to forbid, disallow, and prevent any other person or persons, company or companies, syndicate or syndicates from infringing on any one or each of the rights and privileges for the finding and treatment of gold, and the securing of abandoned and forfeited concessions hereby granted to the said John Thorburn and his foresaids.

The said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall have the right of disposing of and transferring the rights granted under this Concession, or portion of such rights, to any person or persons, company or companies, syndicate or syndicates, who shall thereby acquire all and singular the rights or portions thereof which are enjoyed by the said John Thorburn and his foresaids in respect of same.

It is the true intent hereof that the said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall enjoy and have the full, free, and undisturbed use, occupation, and enjoyment of the rights hereby granted him; but it is required of him that he and his foresaids shall duly respect all prior rights granted by me.

In making this Grant or Concession I do not alienate any part of my dominion, but reserve to myself and successors the sovereignty of the country.

Thus done and passed at Embekelweni Kraal, Swazieland, this twenty-second day of December, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight, in the presence of the subscribed witnesses.

(Signed) UMBANDINE, King, his X and (L.s.)

Their

T. Kuba X
UNYUBEKA X
HELLEMI X
JOHBS X

marks.

Witnesses:—
(Signed) T. B. RATHBONE.
ALLISTER M. MILLER.

I, the undersigned, do hereby declare that the foregoing deed of Concession or Grant was duly and truly translated and interpreted by me to the Swazie King, Umbandeni, in the presence of his Council and of the witnesses before mentioned.

(Signed) T. B. RATHBONE, Interpreter.
MEMORANDUM compiled by Lord Milner after discussions with A.M. Miller of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd., (28.12.1904)

The following is a proposal, which, if accepted by the Governor, Mr. A. Miller is prepared to recommend the Swaziland Corporation to accept for the settlement of all its claims under its various conditions in Swaziland, in accordance with the terms of Section 12 of Proclamation of 1st October, 1904.

This proposal is not intended to exclude the Concession Commission. Indeed it is only the Commission which could give effect to it in detail. All that is desired to arrive at by the agreement are the lines on which the Commission would proceed in dealing with the particular case of the Swaziland Corporation.

The proposal is as follows:

The Corporation is to surrender, without compensation, all its concessions, on being confirmed in perpetuity in the sole and exclusive mineral right over certain areas, and receiving freehold titles to certain other areas, subject in neither case to the burdens imposed on mineral or land owners by the Proclamation and further subject, in the case of the land given to it in freehold to the servitudes hereinafter referred to.

The areses over which the Corporation is to have mineral rights or aforesaid are those comprised in the following concessions:

1. Forbes Reef Mineral Concession
2. Horo Mineral Concession
3. McNab Mineral concession
4. Albu & Davis Mineral Concession
5. 7/9 of Kannemeyer Mineral Concession.

The Corporation is only to be confirmed in mineral rights over these areas, to the extent to which there is no present conflicting claim to any of them which the Commission may deem to have priority over that of the Corporation, and the decision of the Commission as to boundaries is, in all cases, to be final and unquestionable.

The land to which the Corporation is to receive freehold title is not to exceed 1,000,000 acres in all minus any amount which the Commission may set aside for the sole and exclusive use and occupation of the natives. In order to establish its right to under the agreement, the following course is to be pursued:

The Corporation is to receive freehold title to all lands already in its possession, and in which no other land concessionaire has any rights, whether its claim is based on purchase or on the operation of the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands Concession (L.U.L.C.). Subject to proof of such claim and to the delimitation of boundaries, all these lands, minus the portion set aside for the sole and exclusive use and occupation of natives, are to be vested in the Corporation.
It is to be clearly understood that the above provision gives the Corporation no right to any land at present in its possession which the Commission may find to have been acquired by mistake or usurpation.

Mr. Miller estimates the extent of the land lawfully in the possession of the Corporation and free from servitude, though of course, subject to Native rights at upwards of 500,000 acres, but it is not proposed that this estimate should form any part of the agreement of that any argument should be based on it.

Whatever may be the amount ultimately given to the Corporation in freehold under the above provisions, that amount is to be made up to 1,000,000 acres, if possible (including any land which may be set apart for natives) by giving the Corporation freehold title.

1. To any land, which it at present claims, either on the strength of the separate documents or under the L.U.L.C., but over which other concessionaires have other rights, such as grazing (in the case or any such land, subject the proof of the Corporations's reversionary rights and to the delimitation of the boundaries, the freehold title is to be given to the Corporation; concessionaires being endorsed as servitudes on the title).

2. To any land which will fall to the Corporation under the L.U.L.C. between this date and the end of 1939 (in any such case also, subject to the proof of the Corporations's reversionary rights and to the delimitation of boundaries, the freehold title is to be given to the Corporation immediately, the rights of the present lease-holder or life interest holders being endorsed on the title as servitudes)

It is to be understood that all the claims of the Corporation, to any lands under (1) and (2) above is to lapse, as soon as the Corporation has bee given freehold in an extent of land of 1,000,000 acres in all, including the areas to be set apart for natives.

It is also to be understood that if the land, at present in the possession of the Corporation, to which it succeeds in proving its claim, together with the lands under (1) and (2) above, to which it succeeds in proving its claims, do not collectively amount to 1,000,000 acres is only an upward limit. Moreover, whether the amount much land as is required for the use of natives is to be taken out of such amount.

With regard to the land to be set apart for the sole and exclusive use and occupation of the natives, and which will be a deduction from any land, in which the Corporation would otherwise have the freehold title, the Commission is to determine, in every case, what amount it is reasonable to reserve, having regard to the requirements of the natives actually residing on, or habitually using any particular land.

As however a perfectly unlimited discretion in this respect might make the present arrangement absolutely useless to the Corporation, it is proposed that the quantity of land to be reserved for natives should not exceed, on the average, 20 acres per native family, or in the aggregate 15% of the land allotted to the Corporation i.e. if the land reaches 1,000,000 acres not more than 150,000 acres.
It is further proposed that the Corporation should agree to offer not less than 50,000 acres of its freehold land to agricultural settlers, for purchase in installments.
APPENDIX FOUR

A. PARTITION PROCLAMATION, 1907

B. GREY'S CARRYING CAPACITY ESTIMATES

C. EXTRACT FROM GREY'S NOTES

D. CARRYING CAPACITY CALCULATIONS
OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER


No. 28 of 1907.

PROCLAMATION

By His Excellency the High Commissioner.

Whereas by the Swaziland Administration Proclamation 1901 provision was made amongst other things for the constitution of a Commission to deal in manner provided by such Proclamation with concessions or grants made by or on behalf of the King or Paramount Chief of Swaziland and confirmed by the Chief Court established in the said territory by the Organic Proclamation 1840;

And whereas it is expedient to amend in certain respects the provisions of the said Swaziland Administration Proclamation 1901 relative to the concessions to be dealt with by the said Commission and in particular to provide for the setting apart of land for the sole and exclusive occupation of natives of the territory and the grant of freehold or other rights to persons holding concessions in respect of land not so set apart;

Now therefore under and by virtue of the powers and authorities and jurisdiction conferred upon and committed to me by His Majesty under the Swaziland Order in Council 1900 as amended by the Swaziland Order in Council 1901 I do hereby declare proclam and make known as follows:

1. In this Proclamation unless inconsistent with the context:

"Commission" shall mean the Concessions Commission appointed under section eleven of the principal law.

"Concessionaire" shall mean in relation to a concession the holder for the time being of such concession.

"Gazette" shall mean the Official Gazette of the High Commissioner.

"Land concession" shall mean any concession confirmed by the Chief Court (other than a mineral concession) which confers any title or right (not being a right included in section twelve of the principal law) to mine or work or otherwise explore for precious or base metals or coal or for precious stones or in the case of any such concession which confers any such right in addition to other rights such concession in as far as it relates to such right.

"Principal law" shall mean the Swaziland Administration Proclamation 1901.

"Prior land concession" shall mean a land concession prior to a later land concession but conferring rights similar to and over the same area or a portion of the same area as that covered by the rights conferred by such later land concession.

"Special Commissioner" shall mean the person appointed under section three of this Proclamation.

"Territory" shall mean the territory of Swaziland.

PART I.

SETTING ASIDE OF LAND FOR EXCLUSIVE OCCUPATION OF NATIVES OF THE TERRITORY.

2. Section twenty of the principal law shall be and is hereby repealed.

3. The High Commissioner may from time to time appoint the Resident Commissioner or some other fit and proper person to be a Special Commissioner to carry out the provisions of this part of this Proclamation. The Special Commissioner shall in carrying out such provisions act in accordance with the lawful directions and instructions of the High Commissioner and with any regulations that may be from time to time framed under section eleven.

4. (4.) The Special Commissioner shall set apart portions of land affected by any land concession or land concessions for the sole and exclusive use and occupation of natives of the territory and shall for such purpose cause land so set apart to be surveyed and diagrams thereof framed at the cost of the concessionaire or concessionaires and if necessary apportion such costs pro rata amongst such concessionaires. The provisions of section sixteen of the principal law shall mutatis mutandis apply to the repayment of such costs with interest thereon by instalments.
Concessionaire may grant or refuse such application provided that if such application be granted the purchase price of the portion so expropriated shall in default of agreement be determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Transvaal or such person as may be necessarily incidental to such determination not including any costs incurred by the concessionaire being paid out of the general revenues of the territory.

6. All rights of interest conferred upon a concessionaire by his land concession shall in respect of any portion of land demarcated selected or transferred under section four cease and determine and such concessionaire shall sell such a special land or of the area of land the subject of such transfers as the resident commissioner may in his discretion determine in respect of the High Commissioner as in section nine is provided.

7. Any rights with regard to precious or base metals precious stones minerals or water products conceded or granted by a mineral concession or otherwise in respect of any portion of land demarcated selected or transferred under this section shall not be determined by such arbitration under the section but such rights shall be subject to the provisions of section ten of this proclamation.

5. A concessionaire may after the exercise of the powers of the last proceeding section in respect of his land concession make application that such portion of land the subject of his land concession which has not been demarcated selected or transferred may be expropriated and the High Commissioner is satisfied that he has compensated the holder of the later land concession for the value of rights which would by the grant of such freehold title to
extinguished. The amount of such compensation shall in the absence of agreement be fixed by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of the Transvaal.

8. Every grant of freehold title made under the last preceding section shall be subject to the following conditions: that is to say,—

(a) The grantee shall continue payment of any rents royalties or other monies due under the concession on which his claim to freehold title is based; provided however in substitution for any such rents royalties or other monies which are payable to the Swaziland Administration the grantee may be required to pay quitrent of such amount and at such times as may be fixed by regulation;

(b) The grantee shall not by virtue of the grant become entitled to receive any rents royalties or other monies payable under any concession affecting the land included in such part or any portion of such land which he was not entitled to receive by virtue of the concession on which his claim to freehold title is based;

(c) The grantee shall in the event of his failing beneficially to occupy the land hereby granted or one or more of the substitutes of full age to the satisfaction of the High Commissioner be liable to pay to the Swaziland Administration fines of such amount and at such periods as may be fixed by regulation;

(d) All rights to precious or base metals precious stones minerals and mineral products shall be excluded from the grant; with the exception of any such rights which are specifically granted by the concession on which the grantee's claim to freehold title is based;

(e) such other conditions not being inconsistent with the conditions above-mentioned as are by the laws of the Transvaal implied in grants of Crown land. The term "the grantee" as used in this section shall be deemed to include any person who is the grantee's successor in title to any land included in a grant or any portion of such land.

9. An appeal shall lie to the High Commissioner against any exercise by the Special Commissioner of the powers of this part of this Proclamation but there shall be no other appeal against any exercise by the Special Commissioner of powers and the decision of the High Commissioner shall be final.

10. (1) The High Commissioner may from time to time by notice in the Gazette define areas which are occupied by or are in the occupation of native chiefs or other persons of special importance or are the sites of the graves of native chiefs as protected areas and notwithstanding anything contained in any mineral concession it shall not be lawful to carry on any prospecting or mining operations in such protected areas.

(2) The exercise of rights under mineral concessions shall be subject in all respects to such restrictions on the disturbance or interference with water buildings works kraals cultivated lands and other improvements and to such provisions as to compensation for any such disturbance or interference as the High Commissioner may determine from time to time by Proclamation.

11. The High Commissioner may from time to time make alter and rescind regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this part of this Proclamation as to the amounts and times of payment of quitrents and fines mentioned in section eight and generally for the better carrying out of the objects and purposes of this part of this Proclamation.
## APPENDIX : 4b  GREY'S CARRYING CAPACITY ESTIMATES

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* 1946 Figures > Grey's Carrying Capacity

Source : S.N.A. D/09/2
APPENDIX 4c : EXTRACT FROM GREY'S NOTES

SECTION 111a NATIVE AREA NO. 2

This area is chosen so as to include the country in which the graves of the Kings Ludonga, Mbandini & Bhunu are situated, and to include the kraals of the chief Zulongangeni, the custodian of the graves, and his son Dinabantu who will succeed him.

I am satisfied that I have included all the country revered by the Swazi Nation in respect of the graves of these three Kings though the information I obtained as to their exact situation was rather vague owing to Zulongangeni's reluctance to give any but very general information. But this is a point on which I hope to get more exact information later.

All of this area chosen in connection with the graves is very rugged rocky mountain and completely uninhabited, but the neighbourhood of Zulongangeni and Dinabantu's kraals while hilly are in places fairly fertile and capable of considerable agriculture while the valley of the Mbuluzi contains much cultivated land.

My inspection of this Section has shewn me that it will be necessary to alter the proposed partition north of the Mbuluzi in Section II so as to include both sides of the Mbuluzi valley in an area giving more contiguous land to Zulongangeni and his people.
APPENDIX 4 d : GREY*. CARRYING CAPACITY CALCULATIONS

Grey arrived at his estimates as follows :

1. Estimate of Total Swazi Population
   a. Total number of males over 18 from tax records = 23,204
   b. Assumes these are 50% of the male population = 46,408
   c. Assumes the number of males is less than females
   d. Formula for total population = \( \frac{4}{5} \times \text{over 18 males} \)
   e. TOTAL POPULATION = 104,418

2. Increase of Swazi Population
   a. Selborne and Grey agreed a 50% margin of increase.
   b. TOTAL POTENTIAL POPULATION = 156,627

3. Land Required for Agriculture
   a. Estimates average family size as 7
   "whether 7 is a correct average or not is of no importance
   What matters is that the amount of land estimated as
   capable of supporting a native family in each area should
   be able to provide food and grazing for the stock of a
   group of 7 natives"
   b. Total number of families is 156,627/7 = 22,372
   c. Estimates Land Productivity
      i. Assumes each family of 7 consumes 2lbs each per day of grain food
         grown on own land (14 lbs).
      ii. Total annual requirement per family is 14 X 365 = 5110 lbs/year
      iii. Best land in Swaziland "cultivated by native methods" yields
           1000 lb grain food/acre/annum.
      iv. Concludes a minimum of 5 acres cultivation each season is
           necessary to supply a family with food for a year.
   d. Cropping Frequency
      Assumes Swazi crop fields for 3 years and fallow for 2-3 years.
      Thus minimum agricultural land requirement should be doubled
   e. TOTAL AGRICULTURAL LAND REQUIRED : minimum 10 acres/family of 7.
4d (Cont.)

4. Land Required for Grazing

a. Estimates number of cattle held as 5/7 population. This takes into account the decimation of rinderpest and east coast fever:

"The Swazi being a stock loving people will undoubtedly try, once east coast fever is stamped out, to take every opportunity to acquire new herds. It is necessary to provide sufficient land for the grazing of a normal quantity of stock not found in Swaziland under the present abnormal conditions"

b. Could not verify empirically the carrying capacity of land. Estimated an average 13 acres per head was necessary.

c. Concludes areas chosen can carry 5/7 population

5. Examined chosen areas with theoretical figures in mind. Concluded that a TOTAL POPULATION of 159,278 could be supported (a 52% increase).

Total stock carrying capacity : 113,770.
APPENDIX FIVE

1907 SWAZI DELEGATION PETITION
APPENDIX 5

The humble petition of Malunge Nkosi, Nogcogco Nkosi, Mamkiniki Kambule, Josiah Vilikazi and Heheriah Vilikazi on behalf of themselves, the Chief Regent, the Councillors and people of the Swazi Nation.

SHEWETH : -

The Independence of the Swazi Nation was recognised by the Governments of Great Britain and of the South African Republic by the Conventions of London of 1881 and 1884.

In October 1889 King Umbandini died, and on the 18th of December 1889 the Queen Regent, the Headmen and Councillors of the Swazi Nation (the new king Bhunu being a boy of tender years) issued a Proclamation creating a Provisional Government Committee with powers defined by the said Proclamation but which powers in effect related exclusively to jurisdiction over persons of European birth or extraction and over matters and things in which any such persons were concerned.

In July 1890 a convention was entered into between Great Britain and the South African Republic by which the independence of the Swazies as recognised by the 1881 and 1884 conventions was affirmed. The Provisional Government Committee was with the consent of the Swazi Government continued in its powers subject to certain conditions one of which was that a Judicial inquiry should be held into the validity of the Concessions granted by King Umbandine and with the like consent of the Swazi Government a special Court was established to exercise jurisdiction over Europeans - Articles 5, 6 and 10 of the said Convention were in the following words:--

Article 5. Saving all existing rights the sovereignty and ownership of the Swazi Nation in respect of all land within the boundaries of Swazieland shall be recognised and respected, but no disposition of any such land, or any right in respect of any such land, and no grant or concession whereby any privileged or exclusive right is granted or conceded, or any right directly or indirectly interfering with the powers and jurisdiction of the Government Committee, shall after the date of such organic Proclamation be recognised as of any validity unless it shall be made with the approval of Her Majesty's High Commissioner and of the State President of the South African Republic.

Article 6. The control and management by the Swazi Government of all affairs in which natives only are concerned shall remain unaffected by such organic Proclamation as aforesaid, and shall be regulated according to native laws and customs, save in so far as by such laws and customs any danger may arise affecting good and orderly government under the provisions of the organic Proclamation aforesaid.

Article 10. The Government of the South African Republic withdraws all claim to extend the territory of the Republic or to enter into treaties with any natives or native tribes to the north or north-west of the existing boundary of the Republic, and undertakes to aid and support by its favouring influence establishment of order
and government in those territories by the British South Africa Company within the limits of power and territory set forth in the Charter granted by Her Majesty to the said Company. Save as provided by the last mentioned Convention the late South African Republic neither possessed nor exercised any rights of legislation, jurisdiction or administration over Swazieland either in law or in fact by the said South African Republic by agreement or otherwise, or became binding upon the Swazie Nation.

Your petitioners admit that the late South African Republic was conquered by Your Majesty's Forces and was annexed to and now forms part of your Majesty's Colonial Possessions but Your Petitioners deny and are ready to prove that no rights or powers over the territory of Swazieland ever passed to Great Britain by the conquest and annexation of the South African Republic and that the independence of Swazieland recognised by the Conventions of London of 1881 and 1884 has not been otherwise destroyed or impaired.

In June 1903 shortly after the South African War Your Majesty on the advice of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Swazieland Order in Council 1903 was pleased to invest His Excellency the Governor of the Transvaal with all powers and jurisdiction which your Majesty by the conquest and annexation of the South African Republic may have possessed within Swazieland. This Order in Council proceeded upon the assumption that the late South African Republic had exercised rights and powers of legislation and jurisdiction over Swazieland and that these rights by reason of the said annexation passed to and became invested in your Majesty. The Swazie Government has always protested against the issue and execution of this Order in Council.

Your petitioners are now threatened in the execution of this Order in Council with a confiscation to your Majesty of all Swazie territory, the annihilation of all their rights and interests as well as the confiscation of the revenue of the King and government and the destruction of the national life and political independence of the race. Your Majesty's Resident Commissioner has proclaimed to the Swazie Nation that the policy of the future will partition the country into allotments and inter alia make grants of land in freehold and other tenure to concessionaires and others and will retain other portions of the land as Crown Lands and set apart certain areas as tribal lands for the use of the native race and will altogether exclude the native race from the ownership of all minerals underlying the said lands or any part thereof and will also after a period of five years exclude the native race from the use and occupation of any lands they now enjoy which may become the subject of any such Crown grants;

Your petitioners humbly pray:

That Your Most Excellent Majesty will be graciously pleased to take this petition into Your Most Gracious Consideration and refer the same to a Commission or Board of Your Majesty's Privy Council
or to some such other competent Tribunal to inquire and report as to the truth of the recitals contained in Swazieland Order In Council 1903 and otherwise to determine the validity of the said Order and if it shall appear that the said Order ought not to have been made or that it is contrary to International Law that Your Majesty will be pleased to revise, alter or vary the said Order or that Your Petitioners may have such further and other relief in the promises Your Majesty in Your great wisdom may seem meet.

And your petitioners will ever pray, etc.
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