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Samuel Holland: From Gunner and Sapper to Surveyor-General 1755-1764

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Abstract: The British Army engaged, in 1755, the young Dutch officer, Samuel Holland (whose patron was already the Third Duke of Richmond), to serve in North America as an artillery and engineering subaltern. Following many months’ service directly under the field commander, Holland became deeply involved in the siege of Louisbourg (1758) as the engineering assistant to James Wolfe. The latter warmly commended Holland to Richmond for his superior efficiency and his bravery under constantly heavy enemy fire. After the siege, Holland drew an accurate plan of the fortified port, illustrating the steps of the siege-attack and defence. He became busy in 1758 and 1759 in the preparation of the British attack on Quebec, during which he met the famous British navigator, James Cook, with whom he exchanged expertise. At the siege of Quebec he continued to serve Wolfe until the latter’s death in the battle of September 1759. From then until 1762 Holland served James Murray, first as part of a team of engineers participating in the defence of Quebec against a French siege, during which he was named acting chief engineer in place of a wounded officer and eventually confined in the city with the rest of the garrison until the siege was raised by the Royal Navy. Thereafter, under Murray’s command, Holland’s main achievement was his part in the surveying and mapping of the St. Lawrence valley, leading to the production of the “Murray Map”, an immense contribution to eighteenth-century cartography. Murray vehemently held, in the face of claims by officers of the Royal Engineers, that Samuel Holland deserved the most credit for the success and high quality of the product.

During the Seven Years War, Holland had been promoted Captain. Excluded from the Royal Engineers, he was therefor quite independent of the bureaucracy of that corps when in 1763 he sought-in new American colonies ceded by France-an appointment in surveying and cartography.
As a guest in the London house of the Duke of Richmond he had the opportunity of meeting influential politicians, where the recognition by Wolfe and Murray of the high quality of his professional competence finally led the British government to appoint him Surveyor General in North America.

The entry in *The Dictionary of Canadian Biography* on Samuel Johannes Holland,\(^1\) first surveyor-general in Canada under British rule, includes in its sources a considerable number of works published before 1983 on various aspects of Holland’s career. Published in 1924 was a monograph by the eminent surveyor Willis Chipman\(^2\) that is worth consulting for surveying and mapping.

Works published since 1983 have included two recent books of note. The first is a major work on surveying and mapping of the Atlantic coastal provinces from Nova Scotia to Rhode Island before 1776, a study that illustrates Holland’s collaboration with J.F.W. Des Barres\(^3\) and that led to the publication of the cartographic work *The Atlantic Neptune*.\(^4\) The second book is primarily a detailed study of Holland’s survey of Prince Edward Island in 1764-65.\(^5\) These works contain useful information on surveying and mapping in the eighteenth century.

The following essay has two goals: first, to recount the Dutch officer’s British military career from 1755 to 1764; it is a sequel to an

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\(^1\) F.J. Thorpe, “Holland, Samuel Johannes” in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* [DCB], Volume V, ed. Frances G. Halpenny, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 425-29. The place of birth in the DCB entry is to be corrected eventually in the online edition: Deventer (Province of Overijssel). The date of baptism was 22 September 1729 [note 6].

\(^2\) Willis Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland, surveyor-general, 1764-1801” *Ontario History*, 21 (1924): 11-90. The DCB criticism of the Chipman monograph concerned the author’s treatment of aspects of Holland’s life as a whole, not his depiction of Holland’s professional work. Although Chipman did not cite sources, remarks of his cited in the current paper reflect material in British documents.


article on the Dutch period of Holland’s military service. The second objective is to ascertain the circumstances throughout Holland’s years as a soldier that contributed to his eventual appointment to civic positions as surveyor-general of considerable parts of British North America. The two goals are pursued in unison: as military episodes are traced, the prescient factors are discussed.

Born and educated in the Netherlands, Holland became skilled in military engineering by way of service in the Dutch artillery as an officer-cadet during the War of the Austrian Succession, and thereafter as a junior subaltern. Even if he had aspired to become a military engineer, his level of education would not have gained him entry into the corps of engineers. On the other hand, the small society in Deventer, Province of Overijssel, in which he was brought up—Lutheran rather than Calvinist, of German origin and including artillery officers—combined with his flair for mathematics and a singular aptitude for learning, were more than enough to admit him as a candidate for an officer-cadetship in the artillery. In the defence of his homeland he had an opportunity to give, in military parlance, “a good account of himself.” Then, during the early 1750s, when senior Dutch military engineering commanders borrowed young officers from other arms for training in the preparation of permanent defences, Lieutenant Holland’s prior knowledge of measurement and of the elements of accurate map-making was the foundation for advanced training in designing fortifications and field defensive works, in preparing urban plans, and in the twinned disciplines of land-surveying and cartography. He declined to try a special entry examination to the engineer corps for officers of other arms, but instead brought examples of his work to the attention of the British when, in the winter of 1752-53, the Third Duke of Richmond, aged 18, was on a tour of the fortified towns of the Low Countries in the company of his mentor, Captain Guy Carleton, a future Governor


7 Thorpe, “Dutch Grooming”.
of Quebec. On that occasion, Holland gained an opportunity to demonstrate what the British observers considered to be superior engineering skills.

Samuel Holland’s encounter with the Duke of Richmond proved to be more than an introduction to the British army: the young peer’s friendship developed into firm patronage that lasted at least until Holland had attained a long-term civic career in North America and the Duke had become preoccupied with military affairs in Europe and politics in the United Kingdom.

Charles Lennox, third Duke of Richmond, was born in 1735 (about six years after Holland). His grandfather, the first duke, had been a natural son of King Charles II. He himself inherited the title in 1750 at the age of fifteen. Two years later he was commissioned ensign in a Guards regiment and in 1753, a few months after he met Holland, was promoted captain. By the age of twenty-one he was a lieutenant-colonel and by twenty-three a colonel. He served in the Seven Years War but in Europe, not in North America. In 1763 he was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Sussex, where he controlled two House of Commons seats. In addition to his estate in Sussex, he had a distinguished house in Whitehall, London.

Samuel Holland’s transfer to the British Army augured career opportunities that were lacking in the Netherlands service. An officer of the Dutch artillery seconded to another arm, he had been recalled to permanent garrison duty by the artillery commander at a time when Netherlands policy was drifting toward neutrality. Even within the corps of engineers the advancement of officers was distressingly slow. Holland did well to avoid becoming embroiled in such a future. In the British Army on the other hand, the prospect of demonstrating his talents in the face of an enemy could lead to career advancement, provided there was also patronage—a necessity in the 18th century. Needless to say, Holland was fortunate to have acquired as a patron an ambitious aristocrat.

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8 James Wolfe (then Colonel), who had recommended Carleton as Richmond’s mentor, knew that the young duke was already interested in “the higher and more solid branches of military knowledge.” See, R. Wright, Major-General Sir James Wolfe: a Biography (London, 1864), 249, 251.

9 Richmond might have become the brother-in-law of George III if the future king’s interest in Lady Sarah Lennox, the Duke’s sister, had been tolerated.

10 Rijksarchief, The Hague, OMM Algemeen Memorien #62 (1752-54)
Under the Act of Settlement (1701), commissions in the British army were forbidden to foreigners. It followed that those granted late in 1755 to Samuel Holland and other Protestants—from Switzerland and German states as well as the Netherlands—had to be provisional, pending a special Act of Parliament excepting them from the general rule. To make those exceptions more palatable to patriotic Britons,
the commissions, tenable in the 62nd (soon to become the 60th or Royal American) Regiment, were exclusively for service in North America. Officers like Holland were recruited particularly because good engineers were still rare in the British army. Traditionally the class educated in the classics had contempt for mathematics and related disciplines and the military élite preferred the “more glamorous” and (less scientific) cavalry and infantry. Scots, however, made up some 24 per cent of the strength of the Royal Engineers during the period 1741-1783.11 Foreigners were not welcome.

Hostilities had broken out unofficially the previous year in North America, where two infantry regiments had been sent from Ireland. The British government now sought to recruit not only residents of the British Isles, but also American colonists, to participate in the oncoming imperial conflict. In the American provincial militias, which included veterans of the 1745 siege of Louisbourg and the four-year occupation of Cape Breton that followed, there were varying degrees of aversion to service in the British army. In any event, apart from those veterans of the previous war (of whom relatively few survivors may have been available for active service anyway), only a small number of frontiersmen had particularly useful training and experience. The majority of the militiamen, solid members of their urban and rural communities with homes and families to defend, were nevertheless inadequately trained to face either professional soldiers or irregulars versed in Native-style bush warfare. Moreover, since it was colonial legislatures, jealous of their rights and privileges, who mobilized them (normally for terms of less than a year), paid them well and supplied them, they were difficult to control. There was virtually no prospect of recruiting most militiamen into British regiments; instead, it was chiefly “an idle and propertyless group, willing to sell themselves to the highest bidder,” who were potentially available for such service.12

Before William Pitt the Elder (later Earl of Chatham) gained power definitively in July 1757, British ministers held out considerable

12 Stanley M. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America (New Haven, etc., 1933; reprinted 1968), 130.
hope of inducing Americans to join British regiments, and initially the success of their recruiting parties in the colonies was not insignificant. The Royal American Regiment was the first experiment in this field, the brain-child of James (Jacques) Prévost, a Swiss soldier of fortune who proved to be of questionable character and reputation. Prévost, who had served in the Sardinian and perhaps the French army, and as a major in the Dutch service in 1749, began by proposing (in October 1755) to recruit deserters from some 500 regiments of various German states. Soon afterwards he amended the proposal to include Pennsylvanians of German and Swiss ancestry who lived near the disputed Ohio country—sturdy, freedom-loving men who needed only the discipline and leadership of an experienced officer corps to become good soldiers. Their officers would be German-speaking veterans recruited in Europe. The idea gained the acceptance of the Duke of Cumberland by whose sister, the Princess of Orange, Prévost had come highly recommended, not least because as a true Hanoverian, the Duke had German standards of discipline and despair of them in the British officer class.

Cumberland, whose strategic plan had led to the capture of Fort Beauséjour—although also to Braddock’s disastrous expedition against Fort Duquesne—deliberately planned to use the new regiment as a vehicle for recruiting engineers from continental Europe. He would commission them as officers of the line, second them from their regiment to engineering duties wherever and whenever they were


14 One of Samuel Holland’s brother officers in the 60th Royal Americans and a member of a prominent Anglo-Dutch family, Rudolph Bentinck, when he heard in April 1759 of the death of the Princess, a last link between the Houses of Hanover and Orange, wrote: “I am very sensible of the great loss which the [United] Provinces will sustain by the death of the Princesse Gouvernante. It will undoubtedly make a vast alteration in the Publick affairs and I hope that in these present conjonctures it may not prove of some unhappy consequences.” Bentinck to Bouquet, Apr. 8, 1759: BL, (Bouquet Papers) Add. ms. 21644, f.128.

required, and provide them with supplementary pay, while they were on such duties, out of contingencies.\textsuperscript{16} This amounted to introducing engineers by the back door, for they would never have been admitted into the engineering establishment, a kind of “closed shop” which fell under the Board of Ordnance. In any event, European officers having been assembled in England by December 1755, Cumberland in January 1756 officially asked John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, to become commander-in-chief in North America as well as colonel-in-chief of the new regiment of four battalions.\textsuperscript{17} In February 1756 legislation was introduced in Parliament “to enable His Majesty to grant commissions to a certain number of foreign Protestants who have served abroad as officers or engineers, to act and rank as officers or engineers in America only, under certain restrictions and qualifications.”\textsuperscript{18}

These measures of the government did not pass without criticism. Pitt, then in opposition, though begrudgingly allowing an initial cost of £81,178 16s. in order to raise the regiment, alleged that recruiting foreign officers was a threat to the British Army’s national integrity under the Act of Settlement. In any event he disputed the need for foreign, particularly Dutch, engineers.\textsuperscript{19} Americans, for their part, complained that placing their soldiers under the command of foreign-born officers might create dissension

\textsuperscript{16} Pargellis, \textit{Lord Loudoun}, 319.
\textsuperscript{17} Lord Loudoun, a representative peer of Scotland, was closely attached to the Duke of Argyll, head of the Campbell clan and a strong supporter of the ministry. Loudoun’s “previous military career, while empty of brilliant exploits, had been varied enough to bring most aspects of the military profession within his experience……his rank and personal qualities and tastes seemed to commend him as a fit person to deal with Americans.” See, Pargellis, \textit{Lord Loudoun}, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{18} Simmons and Thomas, eds., \textit{Proceedings and Debates} vol. 1, 139.
\textsuperscript{19} “Pitt thanked the Ministry for having departed from their first plan, which had been calculated to consist entirely of foreigners: yet he ascribed the honour of this mitigation to the opposition made, and said, that ever since they had heard the first objections, the Ministers had been trying to play with poison and dilute it, yet still it was poison. If others would take it for a remedy, let the Bill be brought in; though he had thought it wrong from the first concoction. He charged the plan as a violation of the Act of Settlement, on which supposition this and all the following debates rolled. He said, he heard that we wanted Dutch engineers for sieges --- what sieges had the Dutch made? English officers had behaved everywhere with lustre, the Dutch nowhere. Were Dutch officers of such value, that we should pro tanto repeal the Act of Settlement?” See, Debate in the House of Commons, 11 February 1756, in Simmons & Thomas, \textit{Proceedings and Debates}, vol.1, 138. For the initial cost, see 205.
by depriving a number of experienced American militia officers (such as Louisbourg veterans) of opportunities in the new regiment. To their minds, the army’s intention was simply to strengthen the metropolitan engineering capacity in North America, not to employ talented Europeans for the purpose of turning imperfectly trained Americans into professional soldiers.

Notwithstanding the representations of opponents of the legislation, including at least one colonial agent in London, the government’s majority assured its passage through both Houses, the regiment was formed and the commissions were granted. After several more months in England where he may have been employed

20 William Bollan of Massachusetts. See Pargellis, Lord Loudoun 63; House of Commons Proceedings, 18 February 1756 in Simmons & Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, vol.1 139-140.
21 Simmons & Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, vol.1 159-72. The commissions were made retroactive to Dec. 1755, thereby enabling the army to pay with effect from that date.
as Lord Loudoun’s draftsman, Lieutenant Samuel Holland sailed to North America with Lord Loudoun and the first battalion of the Royal Americans. The battalion, under John Stanwix as colonel commandant and Henry Bouquet as lieutenant-colonel, was convoyed by H.M.S. Sterling Castle, arrived at New York on 23 July 1756, and subsequently moved up the Hudson. Bouquet noted at Albany on 16 September 1756 that Holland could be employed as an engineer or gunner, or in mapmaking, and probably he did not accompany the battalion to Saratoga. A December return shows him detached from it as an engineer, and there is little doubt that he was seconded to Lord Loudoun as a draftsman and cartographer, in spite of that commander’s uncomplimentary generalization to Cumberland that the recently arrived foreign engineers “know no more than what

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22 Willis Chipman suggests that he may have been training recruits and absorbing the new atmosphere. But Holland himself asserts that, after Richmond introduced him to Loudoun, he was employed as the latter’s draftsman. See Chipman, “Life and Times of Samuel Holland,” 14, 78-79. It was possibly during this time that he made his copy (photograph in Library & Archives Canada [LAC], 240/Beauséjour-1755) of a plan of the 1755 attack on Fort Beauséjour, the original of which is in the library of Windsor Castle. Did Richmond also arrange for Holland to witness training in engineering at the military academy at Woolwich? As for the delayed departure, the reason lay in what Pargellis calls “administrative tangles” See Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, 61-66.  

23 In 1757 it was designated the 60th, and is usually referred to as such. 

24 Bouquet, a Swiss who had served in the Dutch army in 1748, had been brought into the British service by his compatriot Prévost. 

25 BL, add. mss. 21631-21660: LAC copies, MG 21, Bouquet Papers, vol.1, 8: «Officiers de Royal Américain qui peuvent être employés comme ingénieurs ou dans l’artillerie.» 

26 Loudoun, at Albany, reported to Cumberland in a letter of 3 October 1756, that Bouquet’s battalion was at Saratoga. See Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 239. 


28 There is no mention of Holland in Loudoun’s published correspondence. That he was seconded to the commander-in-chief is based on Holland’s own assertion in three memorials (1784, 1789 and 1795, quoted in Chipman, “Life and Times of Samuel Holland,” 70-71, 78, 79). According to that of 1784 it was Governor Pownall who introduced him to Lord Loudoun in North America, whereas in the other two he attributed the introduction to the Duke of Richmond, of course in England. Indeed, both introductions may have occurred.
Manorial Grants along the Hudson River ca. 1726. [HM 15441. Kashnor Collection of Early American Maps, 1670-1851, The Huntington Library, San Marino, California]
they have learned in a drawing school.”

Instructed by Loudoun to do a “general survey” and map of the Province of New York, obviously from existing cartographic sources, he spent the winter months of 1756-1757 on this task, and evidently completed it. His promotion (on 21 May 1757) to the rank of captain-lieutenant was granted on the basis of seniority.31 In any event, he accompanied Loudoun to Halifax to assist in planning what proved to be an abortive attack on Louisbourg. He copied plans of Halifax fortifications32 and must have been among the engineers whom Loudoun ordered “to mark out an angle of a fort, and trace out

29 See S. Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, Loudoun to Cumberland, 3 Oct. 1756, 235,241; Cumberland to Loudoun, 2 Dec. 1756, 254. The Duke asks whether Loudoun expects “Vaubans” or “Coehornes” among these captains and subalterns, referring to the rival commanders of engineers in the second half of the seventeenth century: Sébastien le Prestre, Seigneur de Vauban and his Dutch adversary Menno, Baron van Coehoorn; Loudoun to Cumberland, 22 Nov.-26 Dec. 1756, 277-78. Pargellis assumed that the engineers from the 60th regiment had been recruited in Germany; the most prominent among them were Wetterstrom [of Swedish origin?] and “Hollandt”. See, Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America, 319.

30 Assertion by Holland in 1789 and 1795, Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 78-79. There is no reason to question it, although to call it a “survey” seems an exaggeration. Holland did make rough copies of earlier detailed maps, such as the following held at the Huntington Library in San Marino, CA:

(1) Map of John Evans’ patent in Ulster and Orange counties. Original ca. 1721; and (2) Map of manorial grants along the Hudson River. Original ca. 1726. The originals for both of these appear to have been in the office of Cadwallader Colden, Lieutenant-Governor.


32 At least two such copies, dated 1757, are extant. One was taken from a plan of 1755 of the batteries erected in front of the town (photocopy of original in the Huntington Museum, San Marino, Cal.; photocopy of Holland’s copy at LAC, H3/240-Halifax-1755). The other was taken from a plan of around 1756 of the battery and redoubt on the east side of the harbour (Photocopy of Holland’s copy at LAC: H3/250-Halifax [1756]).
an attack on it, in order to show the troops their duty at a siege."  

After the expedition to Louisbourg was abandoned he returned in September to New York with Loudoun. From there he was sent to the New York frontier country, where he was ordered on scouting parties commanded by Brigadier George Augustus, Viscount Howe, second-in-command to Major-General James Abercromby; and when Ticonderoga was reconnoitered, Holland sketched the fort and its environs. Before the campaign of 1758 was under way

33 Loudoun to Cumberland, 6 Aug. 1757; Pargellis, ed., Military Affairs in North America, 392; Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 78-79. Whether he would have been one of two engineers selected to reconnoitre landing places near Louisbourg is less certain; see Pargellis, Military Affairs in North America, 390: Holburne (at Halifax) to Holdernesse, 4 Aug. 1757.
34 Abercromby, like Holland, had taken part in the defence of Hulst in 1747.
35 Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 78-79. No copy of the sketch has yet been found.
Lord Loudoun, recalled by Pitt in a letter of 30 December 1757,\textsuperscript{36} had returned to Britain. Holland’s selection by Lord Loudoun for special duties, despite that commander’s evident reluctance to pay compliments, was another step in the advancement of the Dutch officer’s career.

The campaign of 1758 proved to be yet another significant opportunity for Samuel Holland, for he became part of Lord Jeffery Amherst’s successful expedition against Louisbourg, not of Abercromby’s failed attack on Ticonderoga (Carillon).\textsuperscript{37} His experience in the abortive attack of 1757 may have been a factor. Unlike the previous year, British naval forces reached Louisbourg relatively early and their blockade of the harbour, though imperfect, was effective


\textsuperscript{37} See \textit{Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society}, vol. 5 (Halifax: Wm. Macnar, printer, 1887) 103, where Holland is designated (20 May 1758) as one of the officers to be employed as engineers on the expedition.
enough that with numerically superior forces\textsuperscript{38} the British were able to attack the defenders from several angles. The landing, like that of 1745, took place south of the town at Gabarus Bay, and seemingly the boldest and most vigorous division of the force was commanded by James Wolfe,\textsuperscript{39} the youngest of the brigadiers. Wolfe evidently requested the services of several engineers for the works he intended


\textsuperscript{39} Wolfe wrote that the operations following the landing “were exceedingly slow and injudicious, owing partly to the difficulty of landing our stores and artillery, and partly to the ignorance and inexperience of our engineers.” See Julian S. Corbett, \textit{England in the Seven Years’ War}, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1907), 326.
Samuel Holland to carry out and was granted one: Samuel Holland.\(^\text{40}\) As he later wrote to the Duke of Richmond, his engineer was in the thick of the action at all times:

Holland the Dutch Engineer has been with me the whole siege, and a brave active fellow he is, as ever I met with; he shou’d have been killed

\(^{40}\) LAC, MG 23 A.2, Chatham Papers, vol.3, 172 & seq., Lieut. H. Caldwell to Sir J. Caldwell, 25 July 1758. “As the works Gen. Wolfe intended carrying on required the assistance of more engineers and men, he applied for them, but by the jealousy of some people was absolutely refused both, so that under his direction, for he himself was chief engineer, he had only Captain [sic] Holland who acted by his direction.” Cf. Holland’s assertion 31 years later that “when ... Amherst took command of the army [he] approved of ... Wolfe’s proposal to have [Holland] with him as engineer to carry on the attack from the lighthouse to the west gate” See Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 78: Holland to Pitt the Younger, 14 May 1789.).
a hundred times, his escape is [a] miracle [sic]. I promised to mention him to your Grace, because he looks upon himself [as], in some measure, under your protection, and upon my word he deserves it. I hope Lord George [Sackville] will take him into the Corps of Engineers and when there is any business to be done, he will find him the most usefull man in it.41

This commendation served as a major step in the advancement of Samuel Holland’s career, particularly because it was made by the commander in North America whom Holland was to call his “protector” to the very influential aristocrat who was his patron at Court. That there was no likelihood of Holland’s admission to the engineer corps, despite Wolfe’s recommendation, would prove to be a blessing in disguise. Indeed, although the senior engineers Colonel J.H. Bastide (who had taken part in the siege of 1745) and Major Patrick Mackellar were both experienced, Wolfe was to blame the slow progress of the siege on poor strategy and methods unsuited to the Cape Breton terrain, which he attributed to Royal Engineers.42

On 8 June, after considerable difficulty resulting from the French defensive positions,43 where resistance was extremely fierce and “more than a hundred of the British ships’ boats sank or were smashed on the rocks by the heavy seas”,44 Wolfe was able to spearhead the landing by attacking the French entrenchments around l’Anse de la Coromandièere (Kennington Cove) with grenadiers, light infantry and irregulars supported by Highlanders. The landing succeeded, however, only because three boatloads of attackers, while under very heavy fire, had moved slightly to the east for cover and stumbled

42 R. Wright, Major-General Sir James Wolfe: a Biography 448; J. S. McLennan, Louisbourg from its Foundation to its Fall, 276-79.
43 On 2 June 1758, a French prisoner called Benoît who had been brought on board the Namur, described in such a way the renovations being undertaken by the garrison that Holland concluded they had been making redoutes en crémaillère in the covered way of the main work. See J.C. Webster, ed., Journal of William Amherst in America, 1758-1760 (London: Frome and London, 1927), 12. For an explanation of redoutes en crémaillère, see Capt. George Smith, An Universal Military Dictionary (London, Printed for J. Millan, 1779; reprinted, Museum Restoration Services, 1969), 70, “cremaillé”.
upon a sandy space “no wider than the length of a ship’s boat”\textsuperscript{45} among the rocks at the base of a high ridge. It was invisible to the entrenched defenders; a lookout or “maggie’s nest” above that site, with an excellent view of the whole shoreline, had been built in 1757 but was now left unmanned, evidently because the sixty-five-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel St-Julhien, failing to notice the secluded bit of beach, had thought a landing there impossible.\textsuperscript{46} Before the defenders had become aware of the landing and could mount an adequate counter-offensive, the first few troops were followed by a stream of others.

Once the main British force had established a beachhead on the south side of the cove and consolidated its position, Wolfe’s force made within the following week a wide sweep around the fortress toward the northwest. In an action that Wolfe called an “affair of the spade and pickaxe”\textsuperscript{47} Holland, using such manpower as was provided him, directed a difficult siege operation.\textsuperscript{48} On the night of 11-12 June after the Royal Battery had been destroyed and abandoned by its garrison, they proceeded to Lighthouse Point north of the harbour\textsuperscript{49} where they found another derelict battery and four spiked guns. Supplied by sea with artillery and the necessary stores through a small cove, and making use of a hurriedly abandoned French encampment in which there were even some provisions, they spent another week building a new battery. From there, with the advantage of height, the attackers could completely dominate the island battery at the harbour’s entrance. From the night of the 19th, determined not to repeat the Anglo-American neglect in 1745 of that key defensive work, the besiegers bombarded it mercilessly\textsuperscript{50} until, by the 25th, it was knocked out of action and the frigate \textit{Aréthuse}, whose guns had given “much annoyance”, was driven out of range.

The elimination of the island battery gained in significance as the siege progressed, for the 494 guns of the French warships bottled up

\bibitem{Hitsman and Bond, “The Assault Landing”, Canadian Historical Review 35, 4 (1954), 324.}
\bibitem{John Fortier, “Jean Masce de Saint-Julhien”, Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol.3, 440-41.}
\bibitem{R. Wright, 437.}
\bibitem{Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, vol.5, 131.}
\bibitem{Webster, ed., Journal of William Amherst in America, 1758-1760, 15.}
\bibitem{Ibid, 16-18.}
in the harbour became increasingly less effective than they had been against British batteries, largely as a result of their very limited maneuverability. Despite this, the Chevalier de Drucour, Governor of île Royale, overruled their commander’s wish to attempt an escape to France, ordered the sinking of four ships at the harbour’s mouth to block any British attempt to enter, and required the navy to share the fate of the town. As a result, by 26 July not only was the town largely destroyed, but also the vessels (except the Aréthuse, which did run the British blockade and escaped to France) were blown up, burned or captured.

The besiegers’ batteries exchanged fire with the fortress and the French ships and by 11 July their attack from the northeast part of the harbour to the west gate, using approach trenches and a parallel, had carried them to within 700 yards of their objective. There they set up a battery of four 32-pounders and six 24-pounders. During the night of 20-21 July they began a second parallel and were fired upon from the covered way. By the 25th, a day before the surrender,

51 The French ships had bombarded British positions “with considerable effect” and had forced Amherst to put off the extension of his trenches to the west of the town until his own batteries had been able to force some of the ships to shift their berths. See W.A.B. Douglas, “Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766” (PhD thesis, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ont., 1973), 321.
52 “A battery of two guns would sink the [whole] navy.... unless they can come within pistol shot and drive the men from their guns, by their small arms.” See Boscawen to Amherst, 15 July 1758, quoted in Douglas, “Nova Scotia and the Royal Navy, 1713-1766,” 321.
53 Two frigates and two store ships: Knox, An Historical Journal, vol.1 246 and n.1; Webster, ed., Journal of William Amherst in America, 19-20; Douglas, 321 says three ships were sunk, to the astonishment of the British admiral Boscawen, who had expected the naval force would attempt to run his blockade.
54 Webster, ed., Journal of William Amherst in America, 28
55 General orders for 6 July 1758 directed that the names of personnel assigned to the various advanced batteries were to be given to Captain [sic] Holland. See Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections, vol. 5, 131. “The enemy continued their fire as usual on all our works, General Wolfe’s batteries playing on their shipping.” See G.D. Scull, ed., The Montresor Journals (New York: Collections of the New York Historical Society, 1881), 167. Of 37 guns bombarding Louisbourg before its surrender, 24 were Wolfe’s; the other 13 did not fire into the town until 22 July. See, J.S. McLennan, Louisbourg from its Foundation to its Fall, 281.
57 Journal of William Amherst in America, 28.
Holland's plan of Louisbourg, 1758: fortifications, town, and environs. [Library and Archives Canada CARTO 10122]
Wolfe was reporting: “Holland has opened a new boyau,\(^58\) has carried on about 140 or 150 yards, and is now within 50 or 60 yards of the glacis.\(^59\) The enemy... apprehensive of a storm...fired smartly for about half an hour...\(^60\)

Holland’s accurate survey of the fortifications, town and environs of Louisbourg, carried out immediately after the surrender, is embodied in a large-scale coloured plan of 1758 which shows the progress of the seven-week siege and which, Holland recalled more than thirty-three years later, was intended to be a commemorative map that Wolfe might take to Pitt.\(^61\) The detail it contains reveals Holland’s intimate familiarity with all the stages of the siege and the battle, not only the sector in which he himself was involved, but also the others.\(^62\)

It was when Holland was conducting this survey that he first met the famous James Cook, then sailing master of the man-of-war H.M.S. *Pembroke*, under Captain John Simcoe. According to Holland,\(^63\) Cook asked to be instructed in the use of the plane table.\(^64\) Holland obliged, and thereafter he and Cook collaborated in the prosecution of the survey. Later, in Halifax under the supervision of Captain Simcoe and in preparation for the expedition of 1759, they charted together—much more accurately than had ever been done before—Chaleur Bay, Gaspé Bay and parts of the Gulf and River

\(^{58}\) “Boyau in fortification is a particular trench separated from the others, which, in winding about, incloses different spaces of ground, and runs parallel with the works of the place, that it may be enfiladed. When two attacks are made at once, one near to the other, the boyau makes a communication between the trenches, and serves as a line of contravallation, not only to hinder the sallies of the besieged, but likewise to secure the miners.” Captain George Smith, *An Universal Military Dictionary* 34.

\(^{59}\) Confirmed in *Journal of William Amherst in America*, 31.

\(^{60}\) R. Wright, 443: Wolfe to Amherst, 25 July 1758, “from the trenches at daybreak”.


\(^{62}\) An original of this plan: LAC H 11/249-Louisbourg (1758), which also has a rough, evidently earlier version [H3/249 Louisbourg (1758)].


\(^{64}\) This instrument was a normal part of the British military engineer’s equipment in North America: see the Board of Ordnance’s list, dated 12 Oct. 1754, in Appendix II of *Military Affairs in North America* 484. See also J.N. Wilford, The Mapmakers (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 143-144.
St. Lawrence.65 Again according to Holland, Cook “in London in 1776 after his several discoveries, confessed most candidly that the several improvements and instructions he had received on board the Pembroke had been the sole foundation of the services he had been enabled to perform.”66 Cook’s eminent biographer, J.C. Beaglehole, tends to confirm this opinion, without implying necessarily that Holland was the source of all the new knowledge, given the presence aboard the Pembroke of her captain, John Simcoe, and of J.F.W. Des Barres.67 Cook, Holland and Des Barres, under the careful supervision of Simcoe, each contributed his own particular kind of training and experience to a learning exercise that not only produced

65 “A plan of the traverse or passage from Cape Torment into the South Channel of Orleans”, a coloured manuscript map held by LAC (no call number) is said in the catalogue to have been “drawn from surveys made by Cook, probably assisted by Holland.” Its content is further said to have “assisted the British fleet in the passages up the St. Lawrence during the advance on Quebec in 1759.”
66 Quoted in Thomson, Men and Meridians, 95.
67 “Holland had introduced him to instruments of precision, and worked by his side in using them.” (Beaglehole, Life of Cook, London, 1974:701). For the education of Des Barres, see Evans, Uncommon Odurate, 33-6. For the collaboration later of Holland & Des Barres, see Hornsby, Surveyors of Empire, passim. For Des Barres and Cook, see Thomson, Men and Meridians, 95.
a good immediate result, but also served each of them well in the decades that followed.68

In accordance with the intentions of the British government, the Louisbourg besiegers were integrated with the seaborne expedition against Quebec which, in Amherst’s judgment, could not take place until 1759.69 Meanwhile, Louisbourg became the base, not only for the expedition itself, but also for preliminary operations designed to protect the future line of communication. Holland was sent with General Monckton between September and November 1758 to the mouth of the Saint John River, where he built, on the site of the former French fort, “a good fort”70 “with barracks for the accommodation of the troops”,71 that was called Fort Frederick. The winter of 1758-59, as we have seen, was spent in Halifax preparing maps and charts.

Holland was one of the engineers selected for service in the expedition against Quebec, having been strongly recommended by Wolfe.72 When Wolfe arrived in Halifax in the spring of 1759, Holland was waiting under orders to join the expedition.73 He and the others were vicariously familiar with the topography and fortifications of the capital of New France through the information imparted by the senior engineer, Patrick Mackellar (who had spent months in 1756-57 there as a prisoner of war), but they were visiting the St. Lawrence valley for the first time. Mackellar’s report in 1757 to the Board of Ordnance on the defences of Quebec and his adaptation of a plan by Bellin may have been the best information available to Wolfe at

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68 Assessment of the late L.M. Sebert.
69 The decision rested with the commander-in-chief, North America. Holland later asserted that he had agreed with Wolfe and Captain John Simcoe that Quebec should be attacked in 1758, but that they had been overruled by “the admirals.” See Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 18-19.
70 Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society, vol. 2 (St Johns: New Brunswick Historical Society, 1894).175.
71 Transcript in LAC MG 30, D1, 15, p.629: Holland to Hillsborough 19 Dec. 1770; Holland’s plans of Saint John harbour, the remains of the French fort, the situation of Fort Frederick (the new fort), two plans of Fort Frederick (one dated 24 Sept. 1758): photocopy at LAC Ph/249-Saint John (1758) of original in the Royal United Services Institute, London; Holland’s copy in the W.L. Clements Library of a plan deemed to have been drawn in 1756 and entitled “Plan of the Harbour of St. John’s [sic] in the Bay of Fundy”.
72 Holland’s inclusion is recorded officially in the Amherst Papers (NA [UK] WO34). LAC MG18, L4, vol.2: letters to and from Ligonier, packet 10, 52. Wolfe’s personal recommendation, dated 19 Dec. 1758, may be found in LAC MG23, A2, Chatham Papers I, 37.
73 LAC MG 18, L4, Amherst Papers II, packet 10, 52.
Halifax during the winter of 1758-59, but was out of date because it did not take into account substantial renovations made in and after 1745. It was the report’s basic premise, however, that was persuasive: “An Attack by Land is the Only Method that promises Success against the High Town and in all Probability it Could hold out but a very few Days against a Sufficient Force properly Appointed.”

Critical though he had been of Mackellar’s performance at Louisbourg as second engineer to Colonel Bastide, Wolfe based his Quebec strategy essentially on Mackellar’s recommendation, and once the British had arrived before the capital, the question was where to effect a landing. The story of his indecision and experimentation during the summer of 1759, his illness, and his desperate resolve to decide on a strategy early in September before the British battle fleet would be forced to abandon the St. Lawrence until the spring thaw of 1760, has been amply told. Our knowledge of Samuel Holland’s part in the siege, which is sketchy, is based largely upon his much later recollection, which omits specific dates for most of the events mentioned. Official records confirm that he was promoted captain on 24 August 1759. As he recalled years later, he accompanied Wolfe on a reconnaissance above the city, built batteries at Point Lévis, and, while attempting a feint at Sillery with 12-pounder guns, was run down by a schooner and had to escape from the enemy by swimming. After the landing at l’Anse au Foulon on the night of 12-13 September and the scaling of the heights, Holland “laid down a meridian line” on the battlefield “and set up stone monuments on it [the line].” Subsequently he was sent to erect a redoubt on the British left but was unable to do so because of the rapidity of the French

74 C.P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: the Siege and the Battle (Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1959; reprinted 1966). Stacey carefully reviewed the literature preceding his work, in the light of contemporary primary sources.
76 Nesbit Willoughby Wallace, A regimental chronicle and list of officers of the 60th, or the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, formerly the 62nd or the Royal American Regiment of Foot (London: Harrison & Sons, 1879), 81. See also L.A.C. MG30, D1, 15, 574.
advance.\(^{77}\) The nature of a wound he incurred on that day,\(^{78}\) and which he later failed to mention, is unknown. An official return shows only that he was wounded “during the campaign.”\(^{79}\)

Holland’s recollections of the campaigns of 1758 and 1759 twenty-five and thirty years later were based almost entirely on his memory, since he asserted in 1792 that his personal written records of that period had been stolen in London with his baggage some years before. Nevertheless, as Chipman wrote in 1924, “That Holland was a favourite of Wolfe there can be no doubt. He presented Holland with a brace of duelling pistols, suitably inscribed.”\(^{80}\) The pistols are now in the McCord Museum at McGill University in Montreal and a watercolour of the pistols is in the Samuel Holland Collection at Holland College in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.\(^{81}\) Also, Holland may have been one of the very few to know in advance of Wolfe’s final plan of attack at Quebec. He was chagrined to learn that Benjamin West had left him out of his famous painting of the death of Wolfe although he had been present, and that West had introduced into the scene persons who could not have been there.\(^{82}\)

Holland had “lost his protector”\(^{83}\) when Wolfe died, but gained another in James Murray, Wolfe’s successor and future Governor of Quebec. Holland spent the autumn and winter of 1759-60 in and around Quebec, preparing the outer fortifications for an expected

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\(^{77}\) Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 21, citing Sir Arthur G. Doughty, “A new account of the Death of Wolfe”, *Canadian Historical Review*, 4 (March 1923), 48 which, in turn, cites a letter from Holland to John Graves Simcoe dated 10 June 1792. Holland may have been the engineer who accompanied Wolfe back to Point Lévis after a brief visit by the General to Camp Montmorency. See G.D. Scull, ed., *The Montresor Journals*, 214.

\(^{78}\) Knox, *An Historical Journal*, vol.3, 125.

\(^{79}\) NA (UK): CO5/51, f.126: Brig-Gen. Robt. Monckton, 8 Oct. 1759: “Return of the killed, wounded and missing during the campaign”.\(^{46}\)


\(^{83}\) Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 20.
spring attack by the Chevalier de Lévis.\textsuperscript{84} In the ensuing Battle of Ste. Foy (20 April 1760) he, with Lieutenants J.F.W. Des Barres and L.F. Fuzer\textsuperscript{85}, supported Major Patrick Mackellar, the chief engineer; and when Mackellar was wounded, Holland was selected to act in his stead. After the defeat of the British and their retreat into Quebec, and until the Royal Navy forced Lévis to raise the siege, Holland and the two lieutenants were the engineers charged with defending a city with crumbling fortifications.\textsuperscript{86}

With the capitulation of Montreal in September 1760, fighting ceased in Canada but the war continued elsewhere and, at least in theory, Quebec was still vulnerable. Murray ordered the building of a number of fortification expedients that would furnish at least minimum protection against a surprise attack and a degree of resistance in the event of a short siege.\textsuperscript{87} And at such an early stage in the period of military rule, Murray was unsure of how the \textit{Canadiens} would react if there were a French raid. He may have discussed with Holland the kind of defensive works required to protect the garrison against an uprising, and the latter was probably familiar with a textbook, published in 1746 and prescribed for use in the Woolwich Academy, that stated:

In a country newly conquered, or one of a long standing, where the inhabitants are suspected of being disaffected to the government, citadels are built to keep them in awe, and prevent all attempts they may make to shake off their dependency; as likewise to secure the garrison [sic]

\textsuperscript{84} Recollection by Holland in 1784. See Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 70. Incidentally, Holland was granted in the Upper Town, probably by Murray, a “lot, piece or parcel of ground” on 12 March 1760 (LAC RG1, L3L, vol. 8, 2366). Presumably the grant became valid when the land was ceded by treaty to the Crown of Great Britain.

\textsuperscript{85} Officers, like Holland, of the 60th Regiment. Evans, \textit{Uncommon Obdurate}.


\textsuperscript{87} A. Charbonneau, Y. Desloges and M. Lafrance, \textit{Québec, ville fortifiée du XVIIe au XIXe siècle} (Québec: Éditions du Pélican, 1982), 151.
from their treachery, which they might be willing to undertake against them.  

Whether or not that influenced Murray’s decision to have Holland design a new citadel at Québec as part of the general’s attempt to render the town defensible, Holland’s plan, it has been stated, remains one of the best documented proposals for the defence of Québec made under British rule.

Holland’s design was to furnish the defenders with a relatively secure fortress while making use of existing works. His citadel had three sides, each 760 feet long, and throughout the structure were five bastions. One side was to face westward and comprise an existing half-bastion, a curtain wall and part of the left flank of another bastion. The other two, northward and eastward, were to face the town inside the old enceinte. A side along the cliff would incorporate an existing small front, to which a masonry wall was to be added to provide adequate flanking. Ravelins and counterguards were added to the design wherever the main works required additional support, and casemates were included for artillery, garrison accommodation and military stores. Internal communication was provided by posterns; external by two gates, one to the town on the east front and another on the cliff for contact with the outside world if the town were invested. With respect to his design, Holland has been commended for correctly applying the classical principles of bastioned fortification while taking full advantage of occupying the highest points on Cape Diamond.

Holland’s citadel was not built, nor was the fort he designed, also in 1761, for the Point Deschambeaux “about four leagues above the Jacques Cartier” which, in the opinion of General Murray, was the strongest and most important post in the Country. It naturally divides the whole into two parts, is the only road or avenue from lower to upper

89 Charbonneau et al, Québec, ville fortifiée du XVIIe au XIXe siècle, 154.  
90 Ibid, 154-55. The authors suggest it would have been preferable to place the external-communication gate on the west side, despite its being the most exposed, because of the difficulty of climbing and descending the cliff. Holland (and perhaps Marr in 1769, ibid, 157) may have thought the more likely source of assistance would be ships on the River.
Canada, on this side of the St. Laurence, and commands the rapids of Richlieu [sic]; by erecting batteries on the small island of that name, and some fortifications on the South shore the passes by Land and by Water may be rendered equally difficult, which is better explained by the survey and plan of the fortifications hereto annexed.\textsuperscript{91}

The Board of Ordnance was not prepared to recommend the expenditure of funds on constructing works they had not approved, according to designs by officers who were not royal engineers, when the threat of a French raid seemed to them remote. And so, though Holland had been highly praised by Wolfe, was considered by Murray to be “an industrious, brave officer, and an intelligent Engineer,”\textsuperscript{92} and though his acceptance in the Royal Engineers was recommended by both of them, the proposed citadel and fort were to be his last contributions to fortification design. Yet the excellence of that work served to enhance his reputation even more. And the continued barrier of membership in the engineer corps proved to be an opportunity to advance his career another step: to achieve leadership in surveying and mapmaking.

The end of hostilities in 1760 offered time and opportunity for surveying and mapping extensive parts of the newly acquired territory. Initially, this was done for strategic purposes, since a peace treaty was yet to be negotiated and “it was standard practice” for the occupying force to reconnoitre or survey land, the ultimate disposition of which was still in doubt. James Murray added to this goal a census of parishes, in order “to gather some idea of the number of habitants available to France in the event of fresh fighting.”\textsuperscript{93} Putting down in cartographic form, for the record, the sites and progress of the sieges and battles was a first stage in the process. The St. Lawrence valley would then be surveyed and mapped, not only for strategic reasons but also, if a future peace treaty so allowed, for settlement under British auspices. Holland participated in these


\textsuperscript{92} Shortt & Doughty, \textit{Documents relating to the Constitutional History of Canada}, 39.

endeavours with Captain-Lieutenant William Spry and Lieutenant John Montresor of the Royal Engineers, Lieutenants Joseph Peach of the 47th Regiment, Louis Fuzer and Peter F. Haldimand of the 60th Regiment, Ensign Pitman and Charles Blaskowitz; Holland emerged
as the surveyor and cartographer whose competence most impressed James Murray.94

The survey, which began in the autumn of 1760, “extended on the river proper from The Cedars below Montreal, down river to Isle aux Coudres, and was expanded to include important rivers as they were suggested.” 95 Holland’s assignment was the area from Montreal to île Ste. Thérèse on the north side of the St. Lawrence; on the south side from Longueuil to Bécancour, including parts of the Sorel, Yamaska, St. François and Nicolet Rivers; from St. Augustin to Québec; again, on the north side of the St. Lawrence, the Cap Rouge and St. Charles Rivers with the back settlements to the Montmorency River; and the town of Trois-Rivières with the St. Maurice River. Lieutenant Haldimand, nephew of Frederick Haldimand, then Acting Governor of Trois-Rivières, was given the area from the Chaudière River “to the uppermost settlements of Satigan -- from St. Joachim to Les Éboulements on the north side...”96 but he also assisted Holland, who was training him at his uncle’s request.

General supervision of the field work, most of which was done between February and November 1761, initially fell to John Montresor, who in February 1760 had led a frantic search for a military route from Quebec to New England via the Chaudière and Androscoggin Rivers.97 Holland outranked Spry and Montresor but, because they were of the engineering establishment and he was not, he was expected to take orders from them during the project. This was not difficult while Holland, responsible like the others for particular areas, was independently conducting field work— experience that would prove valuable to him in 1764 and thereafter. Problems did arise, however, after the return from the field to the “drawing rooms,” where Spry, who had taken over general supervision from Montresor, ruled with an iron fist, treating the others, they said, like schoolboys. Holland wished to draw his maps as quickly as possible in a quiet atmosphere;

95 Shipton, “General James Murray’s Map of the St. Lawrence,” 93.
96 D.W. Thomson, Men and Meridians, vol.1, 98.
97 Shipton, “General James Murray’s Map of the St. Lawrence,” 93.
and so when he found he could not do so in a “drawing room” he worked in his home. Spry was quite displeased with this but, not wishing to quarrel openly with Holland, he resorted instead to punishing Ensign Pitman for following Holland’s example. Murray, who placed timely results and a finished product of quality ahead of strict observance of the technical chain of command, sided with Pitman, removed Spry as supervisor and replaced him with Montresor for a time. Murray had to reverse this decision when Spry wrote General Thomas Gage that he could no longer assure him of a copy and accused Murray of trying to avoid sending one to the Board of Ordnance, from whom the engineers received professional direction. Events such as those delayed until the summer of 1762 the completion of the general map, which Murray had wished to see finished by May.

Copies of the “Murray Map”, a coloured manuscript measuring 45 by 36 ft., arranged in four divisions and scaled 2000 ft. to an inch, were ready to be sent to London by September 1762. The copy intended for Pitt was signed by both Montresor and Holland, but before it was sent Montresor, who had taken it home “to put it up properly in a box,” was found to have erased Holland’s name. Murray transferred Montresor in disgrace to General Amherst’s staff and ordered the names of all the surveyors, beginning with Holland’s, to appear on the map. He had already stated to Lord
Ligonier, the commander-in-chief who was also Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, that “the chief merit of this accurate work” was due to Holland, and he now informed Amherst that “had it not been for the assistance of Holland, and the other Battalion Officers, the Survey of Canada would never have been taken.” And yet, he wrote, the engineers wanted all the credit; he had refused to give it to them. Consequently, their complaints against Murray, leading to what he called “this inveterate animosity,” had reached Ligonier, who stood up for his engineers, so that Murray was forced to temper his criticism of them. 

Ironically, however, though Montresor developed a hatred for both Murray and Holland, in the long run he quite unintentionally gave the latter’s career yet another significant boost. In the opinion of one writer:

98 Who “had almost certainly used the plans of seigneuries to fill in detail on his mapping...” (The late L.M. Sebert in a paper for the author in 1988-89.
99 Shipton’s “General James Murray’s Map of the St. Lawrence”. Shipton used the Amherst Papers (NA [UK] WO34) and the Gage Papers in the William L. Clements Library.
The survey holds an important place in historical cartography. It was one of the biggest and most difficult ever undertaken by British mapmakers until then, and a milestone on their rise to primacy in eighteenth century cartography. Not only did it provide the home government with a comprehensive picture of the most settled part of Canada, but it undoubtedly contributed a major portion of the “full and particular account of the countries” demanded by the King. But [it] was no mere training ground. In both inception and execution, it clearly illustrated the “active and enterprising” nature of the new school.101

As the survey was important to the development of British cartography, at least some of the credit must go to the mapping conducted a decade earlier in the Netherlands, where Holland had received his informal training and early experience.

In 1762, the “foreign Protestant” officers of the Royal American Regiment became naturalized British subjects. In April, a bill to that effect was passed without opposition by the House of Commons and eventually approved by the House of Lords.102 And Samuel Holland could be sure that more doors were now open to him, except, of course, that of the Royal Engineers. He had considered seeking military service in Portugal103 but evidently came to the realization that now he was British he should seek his peacetime career on British soil and, “while glory could be won abroad, advancement seldom came except in London.”104 His decision to leave for England was taken no later than September 1762, when the “Murray Map” was finished.

He was now at least thirty-three years old105 and, because the British had required officers with his qualifications, he had served in their army for more than seven years. His service had been exemplary and varied. He had done surveying, mapping and field engineering work, including reconnoitring in the Hudson valley. He had helped to plan one expedition against Louisbourg and, demonstrating

101 Shipton, “General James Murray’s Map of the St. Lawrence”, 100-01.
102 Simmons & Thomas, eds., Proceedings and Debates, 391-97, where it is recorded that the Lords wished to broaden the bill to include all foreigners, officers and men, who had served in the British army in North America. In conference, the Commons persuaded the Lords to abandon an amendment to that effect.
103 Chipman, “The Life and Times of Major Samuel Holland,” 70. In mentioning this years later, Holland did not explain his reason, but at the time there may have been a shortage of good military engineers in Portugal.
104 E. Rapley in a working paper for the author.
105 He was baptized in September 1729 but his actual date of birth is unknown.
great courage and skill, had been in the forefront of the siege that succeeded a year later. He had designed and built a fort at the mouth of the Saint John River and collaborated with James Cook in charting the coasts and waters of the Gaspé region. He had been in the thick of the campaigns of 1759 and 1760 at Quebec, assisting in the repair of the town’s fortifications and acting as chief engineer during and after the Battle of Ste-Foy. He had designed a citadel and a fort in 1761 and done outstanding work on the Murray Map. And throughout the period he had established good relations with the Duke of Richmond, whose patronage was much encouraged by Wolfe; with three future governors of Canada: Murray, Carleton and Haldimand; with the father of the future lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, Simcoe; with Captain Cook; and with Rudolph Bentinck, a relative of William Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 3rd Duke of Portland, and of William, Count Bentinck van Rhoon and his son Captain John Albert Bentinck, r.n.\textsuperscript{106} These contacts, which were to prove very useful to him at various times in the future would, if he played his cards skilfully, lead to others. Though a foreigner of relatively modest social origins, he had developed a breadth of knowledge and a particular blend of skills which, as the Seven Years’ War drew to a close, provided a starting point for a new career. What he needed now was a modicum of luck and the sponsorship of the oligarchy in London who might require that blend of skills in order to put their policies into effect.

Captain Holland left Quebec in 1762 for Great Britain, where in May of that year the administration of the Earl of Bute replaced that of the Duke of Newcastle. Bute, the erstwhile tutor and “dear friend” of the young King George III,\textsuperscript{107} included among his entourage the eldest brother of James Murray, Lord Elibank, along with several other influential persons.\textsuperscript{108} Because they obtained Bute’s support for the appointment of James Murray as governor of the Province of

\textsuperscript{106} The Bentinck family came from a place between Deventer and Zutphen in Overijssel, Samuel’s home province. The first Earl of Portland, a Bentinck, had crossed to England with William III.

\textsuperscript{107} In published letters the King addressed Lord Bute in the third person as “my dear friend”; e.g. instead of “I prefer you to Mr. G.,” he wrote: “I prefer my dear friend to Mr. G.”

\textsuperscript{108} Patrick, 5th Baron Elibank, Sir Henry Erskine, Edward Eliot, the Earl of Eglinton, et al.
Quebec, Holland had an opportunity for their help, as well as that of other powerful supporters of Murray, in his quest for a senior position.

Bute, however, went out of office in April 1763; his administration was succeeded by several others during Holland’s eighteen-month stay in Britain. The real door to Holland’s meeting men of influence was the London residence of his distinguished patron the Duke of Richmond, where Holland was a guest evidently throughout his stay in the Kingdom. Richmond, though not yet a minister, was Lord Lieutenant of Sussex and had a strong interest in national, including North American, affairs. Although the Duke did not waste money on the frivolous entertainment of his aristocratic peers, his residence was nevertheless a meeting place of high-level social and political personalities. The Duke’s generous patronage enabled Holland to make his talents known to officials who were in a position to match those attributes to the needs of government; the most appropriate among them were the presidents and members of the Board of Trade and Plantations.

The Board proposed colonial policies and directed the implementation of decisions taken on such policies by Parliament and the Treasury. The signing of the peace treaty with France on 10 February 1763 confirmed the transfer to Great Britain of vast North American territories, thus creating new responsibilities for the Board. British landowners coveted large tracts of land in new colonies, particularly those already settled, developed and abandoned; but also, undeveloped land requiring the diligent attention of pioneers. The Board realized that the dimensions and other features of the new colonies most in demand were quite unknown and required expert study. Samuel Holland succeeded in demonstrating to Lord Shelburne, First Lord of Trade—as the President of the Board was known—that he possessed the required knowledge and experience for advising the Board on the appropriate action to take.

The settlement of new colonies was not to be the Board’s sole objective, for a principal secretary of state reminded Lord Shelburne that the British government had little accurate knowledge of the coastal topography of its empire from Newfoundland to Florida, including the established thirteen colonies from New Hampshire to Georgia. If for no other reason, the Admiralty required the most precise data

possible for defence purposes. Shelburne therefore ordered Holland first to examine existing maps and then to propose a general survey and mapping scheme that would include hydrographic information according to the latest scientific principles, and dovetail with naval surveys such as those around Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. His proposal having been approved, Samuel Holland was appointed

110 Hornsby, Surveyors of Empire, 41.
surveyor-general of Quebec and surveyor-general of the district of North America north of the Potomac River.\textsuperscript{111} The general survey of that northern district having priority over that of Quebec, the post of deputy surveyor-general of that province was created to act in Holland’s stead whenever it was necessary.

Holland was able to demonstrate his managerial as well as his technical talents by preparing the first budget for the general survey: it included personnel, equipment, transportation and other costs\textsuperscript{112}. Once again, the Dutch officer demonstrated initiative; he went well beyond text-book conservatism. This was typical of his military career.

CONCLUSION

History is about what happened, not about what might have happened. It is useless, for example, to speculate on whether Samuel Holland’s career would have been different had he sought entry into the Netherlands engineer corps, even if rapid promotion there had been feasible; or if foreigners had been accepted by the [British] Royal Engineers; or if he had not acquired powerful patrons.

Holland’s service in the British army in North America was, in the opinion of commanders such as Wolfe and Murray, exemplary. Even Loudoun had chosen him ahead of other “foreign Protestant” officers for special duties. He had gained a commission in the Dutch artillery but fortunately the commander of the engineer corps had borrowed young officers like him to learn field engineering, the design of fortification, surveying and cartography. Although Holland remained in the Dutch service, he had an opportunity to display his talents in the winter of 1752-53 to the influential young British officer, the Duke of Richmond. In 1754, as a result, he was one of several foreign officers invited into the British Army. In 1755 he joined a new British American regiment from which he could be detached by commanders whenever his artillery and engineering services were required.

\textsuperscript{111} The general survey included St. John’s Island, the Magdalen Islands and Cape Breton Island in the north, East and West Florida in the south. William Gerard De Brahm was named surveyor-general of the southern District. Ibid, 40.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, 41.
There is little doubt that Holland’s contact with the Duke of Richmond laid the cornerstone for the founding of a career in the British Army and ultimately in the colonial service as surveyor-general. Not only did commanders recognize him as an engineer, but he also spared no time in achieving Richmond’s friendship: career advancement in the eighteenth century depended on both ability and patronage.

Lord Loudoun failed to sing Holland’s praises, yet he preferred him for special tasks. For his part, Wolfe was not only greatly impressed by Holland’s skill and bravery but expressed those thoughts pointedly in a letter to the Duke of Richmond; he recommended Holland’s transfer to the Royal Engineers. In 1762 James Murray praised Holland’s work on the “Murray Map”, a performance he considered to be superior to that of the “Royals” who worked on the same project. The latter, jealous and offended, grew to resent Holland. Eligibility for entry into the engineer corps aside, Holland was certainly not welcome there; so that when he went to England in search of a civil appointment he was completely free to rely on his own talents, on Murray’s commendation and on the introduction to the First Lords of Trade through the patronage of the Duke of Richmond. The quick recognition by those officials of Holland’s talents was not only to his advantage but also to theirs: he became eligible for appointment to a professional post whereas they stood to gain politically.

Holland succeeded in serving directly under such able commanders as Wolfe and Murray who recognized his outstanding technical proficiency, bravery, innovation, initiative and self-sufficiency; as well as his resourcefulness in adapting to the exigencies of the moment. His autonomy from such military bureaucracies as the corps of engineers placed him in a good position to exhibit those attributes. In addition, he avoided political factions, demonstrated managerial aptitude by laying out organizational plans, courted patronage and enjoyed his share of good luck. Such qualities combined to lead to his appointment as surveyor-general.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Frederick J. Thorpe was born in April 1925, enlisted in the Reserve Army in 1942 and ‘went active’ in 1943, serving in Canada, the U.K. and
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