"Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America (Book Review)" by Reg Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby

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Recommended Citation
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol24/iss2/19
which warrant further consideration. One thinks for example of the division of the Ottoman Empire, which was still then a sovereign state, however unstable its internal political control had become, as a violation of existing customs and conventions of international law. How then did actions like the Skyes-Picot agreement between France and Britain correspond to those states’ apparent regard for international law? The colonialist and Eurocentric assumptions that underlie much of the legal ideas of the people that Hull writes about certainly require a more substantive analysis. There is also much left to be written about the place of international law throughout the British Empire, and for Canadian historians in particular, the extent to which it influenced legal, political, and military thought in Canada and the other dominions.

This book should not get lost in the rather large volume of new studies published as we mark the centennial of the First World War. It marks a distinct contribution not only to the vast historiography of the war, but also to the developing body of literature on the intersection of law and international conflict. Historians of the First World War need to take law seriously—not just as a backdrop behind wartime events, but as a critical influence in the waging of war. Of course, it is not just a topic of historical interest, and it is difficult not to make connections between history and contemporary experience. The implications are clear. As Hull states in her conclusion, “momentary power superiority and great security anxiety might tempt a state to engage in unilateral legal destruction” (p. 323). States need to heed international law and military decisions need to be made in close conjunction with legal considerations. The temptation to view the necessities of war as a legitimate defense against wilful violations of international law ignores the long shadow of the First World War.

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The main theme of Secret Service—the new “complete” story of political policing in Canada—was to demonstrate in a larger context, the ongoing argument presented to us over the past twenty years,
by these three authors, as well as Wesley Wark, Gary Kinsman, and Franca Iacovetta: The Canadian intelligence services repeatedly abused their powers of observation and action to promote or uphold certain sets of upper middle class Canadian hegemony over matters of the division of labour, ethnicity, religion, culture, and gender. The major question posed by the authors, however, is considerably broader in its scope; because Canada’s history has been comparatively quiet, why would successive Canadian governments continuously renew their crusade against perceived enemies within, while significantly ignoring foreign agitators? (p. 7)

This objective does appear, however, to have been cloaked behind the other, or more accurately the real aim of the book, which was to enrage, rather than inform. This is accomplished by bombarding readers with sensationalist drama and bad puns. Both the frustration and cynicism of the authors is apparent in their writing, perhaps an indication of their age and life experiences. By their own admission, they further resent the RCMP for having grossly misjudged the meaning and objectives of Marxist historiography and watching one of the authors. Nowhere is this cynicism more apparent than in the brief discussion of the ‘fruit machines,’ where discourse about gender socialization—among its advocates and victims—is left to other scholars and is instead presented as a problem of civil liberty reinforced by satire as harsh criticism. As an example, a total of eleven insults (not perceptions of homosexuals at the time), genuine insults by the authors, aimed at the creators and advocates of the ‘fruit machine’ appear in one paragraph (p. 190). These range from calling the project “loony” to “grotesque” to “Bethamite dream” to putting science in quotation marks (p. 190). Here again, the aim seems blatantly obvious: to enrage rather than inform.

Hindsight is the single greatest contributor to the passing of moral judgement, but unfortunately perception based on socialization is one of the greatest drivers of policy making and history. Ergo, the ‘fruit machines’ need to be dealt with on its own terms by the historian. As Kinsman demonstrated, professor Wake’s research, attempting to empirically/biologically explain and identify homosexual behaviour, was publicly funded and discussed in medical journals. In short, it was considered exact science, publicly funded, and cannot be judged by our current medical/scientific knowledge, anymore than we can judge a doctor who prescribed bloodletting in the fifteenth century.
Perceived national emergencies drive much of the narrative, particularly in the discussion of the Trudeau government’s war on Québec separatism. Ultimately the War Measures Act, according to RCMP sources, was a psychological, rather than strategic move, to intimidate the FLQ and other separatists groups. Contrary to previous beliefs, the authors pit the failure of intelligence efforts on the listeners, meaning there is plenty of evidence to support the conclusion that the intelligence community had gathered sufficient information in Québec. Unfortunately for Laporte, that information had fallen on the deaf ears of the government for years (pp. 287; 291-292). This paints the Trudeau government in a particularly unfavourable light. It also reflects many of the staples of the arguments presented in parliament by the opponents of the War Measures Act.

Context can sometimes be a problem for readers wherever the authors make bold declarations about paranoia in the Canadian state. For example, Wesley Wark’s insecurity state thesis was a major influence on these authors in previous works, as well as this one, and yet nowhere is it referred to by name for non-scholars unfamiliar with historiographical developments. International historical context is also ignored in key places. Readers should be made aware, for example, that Gouzenko was not the first Soviet spy to defect to the west, which cripples the idea that the affair had put Canada into a Cold War mentality of domestic warfare against the KGB before the United States or Great Britain (p. 180). By 1945, the west had benefited from military intelligence leaks from captured or defected Soviet spies for years. What was significant about Gouzenko was that he was one of the first to be identified after the bomb, and reinforced the link between anti-communism and national security (p. 181) that was already at least thirty years in the making.

Carrying on the same theme—and lurking back of the readers’ mind throughout the entire story thanks to the brief overview of Arar, which served as the introduction of the book—is the case of Omar Khadr’s incarceration at Guantanamo and Canada’s slow response to violations of international (and national) laws designed to protect child soldiers (pp. 496-497). Once again the aim is to enrage rather than inform. Here the authors reiterate the common media thesis—presenting almost in the same words—the very criticisms that appeared in media outlets like the Globe and Mail, as well as arguments that came from opposition parties in Parliament, while clumsily ignoring American reports that came out. Most notably
is the report of forensic psychologist expert Michael Welner. The Welner report showed that Khadr was mature beyond his years and responsible for his actions. Ultimately, Omar was considered a valuable prisoner because of his intellect and the fact that he had been “too close” to Bin Laden on a personal basis. Nevertheless, the real embarrassment was Canada’s slow response to his incarceration, unlike Australia and Great Britain, where the arrest of its citizens involved with Al-Qaeda were quickly dealt with. What is required of CSIS, according to the authors, is reform in watchdog organizations and greater public accountability in the interest of human rights (p. 519).

In spite of its problems of exclusion in the research into more recent history, Secret Service provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of Canada’s capabilities and objectives in political policing. The information is presented in a refreshingly jargon-free manner, in contrast to a number of works which discuss the overall idea that the state assumed that white middle class values were under siege in the twentieth century. Readers vaguely familiar with the course of Canadian history in this period will find the book easy to follow, since it is presented chronologically rather than thematically and, for the most part, sticks to a rigid formula of history of events: including the Fenian raids, the Winnipeg General Strike, The October Crisis, the ongoing War on Terror.

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Donald Graves has again contributed to the historiography of the War of 1812 with And All Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final Battles in the North, 1814. Part of a trilogy that includes Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 1814 (1997), and Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm (1999), the author’s purpose in And All Their Glory Past is to describe the concluding campaigns of the war – those on the Niagara peninsula, the Plattsburg campaign, the British amphibious operations on the American seaboard, and McArthur’s Raid in what was then western Canada. Graves covers both land and naval aspects of the campaign