"Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research During the Cold War (Book Review)" by Joy Rohde

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Recommended Citation
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol24/iss2/14
authors have made this subject to the reading audience. Scotland and Heys are outstanding medical historians and are to be commended for their work in this book.

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The body of historical literature that attempts to define and describe the residual effects of the Cold War on American military thought and national policy is enormous. Within that congested environment, though, Joy Rohde’s *Armed with Expertise* is a welcomed contribution as a rigorous study of one of the threads of that period that remains alive today; the application of social science to military problems. Rohde constructs her thesis and analysis around a concept first articulated by President Dwight Eisenhower in his farewell address. Eisenhower observed: “The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.” Rohde adopts a quasi-case study approach to examine the history of a narrow slice of that problem, a close study of the relationship between one academic entity, the Special Operations Research Office (Soro), and American University in the 1960s and 1970s.

Rohde frames her discussion with the observation that military use of social science is similar, but not identical, to the other applied sciences in that the output of the social scientists was always intended to support conceptual formation of military and diplomatic programs. The results were not intended to be used as a weapon, but instead to advance the exploration into how to influence and control other nations and cultures without undue force. Her argument begins with a broad discussion of the ongoing relationship between social science and government, the former having evolved as a means to create knowledge to solve problems attendant to industrialization in the early twentieth century.

Rohde succinctly delineates the tension at the boundary between the two: “(Social science) is scientific: amoral, factual, and technical. But it can be normative, for its origins lie in moral commitment to social welfare, reform, and progress” (p. 30). The book continues with a brief history of military-funded social science research, and the author notes that in the post-Korea and pre-Vietnam years, during the Eisenhower presidency, there was a visible rise in the popular use of scholarly research to inform military ends. Soro was one of those hybrid fusions of academic capability and government need, and Rohde highlights the rise of Soro by summarizing the contributions of three specific Soro scientists (referred to as Sorons): Earl DeLong, Jeanne S. Mintz, and Robert Boguslaw. It was the collective professional reputation of these three and their peers that gave the Soro/American University tandem a degree of legitimacy. During that phase of the Cold War, the social sciences studied the prospect of ideological expansion as a threat to the United States. That threat compelled the military customer to remove the research from the pure “white” of open academic discussion and review, into the gray area somewhere between pure academia and the military establishment.

Soro sought to test various approaches to social change, with an eye to countering the rise of communism globally. One of the pillars in this research regarded communicating with non-literate populations; those theories and conclusions echo even today in the wider attempt to understand how to capture hearts and minds of a culture, region, or state. At the time, Rohde observes, the researchers likely did not view themselves as military contractors, but instead as scholars who could offer scientific solutions to social questions. The gray area gave private scholars, those who might not otherwise work for the Department of Defense, a sort of de-militarized zone in which they could work for both government and academia.

During and immediately after Vietnam, however, the gray area came under attack. Critics assailed the de-facto construct as the exploitation of scholarly expertise to both evade democracy and empower a more militarized state. The ensuing schism led to American University removing Soro from their campus. Unfortunately, for those well-intentioned and outraged administrators and faculty, the action simply drove Soro even closer to the military sponsor. Soro, and others, simply reintroduced themselves to the world under new identities, this time without university allegiance or oversight.
The final chapters of the book discuss the consequences of that evolved relationship between the scholar and the state. Without the leavening influence of the parent universities, and as research became increasingly classified by the military customer, the new think-tanks suffered from the separation from former academic peers. Absent open discussion and peer-review, their scholarship often devolved into a sort of group-think, self-affirming and without external criticism. That loss of transparency caused by the absence of contact between contracted researchers and their former academic peers left the former in what Rohde terms the dark area. The translucence of the gray area reduced to opaque in the dark of the classified military world.

Well written and extensively documented, this readable study is limited just to the soro story in the 1960s and 1970s. Beyond a few, minor exceptions, Rohde does not stray from that end, and her discipline sustains a keen focus on the chosen subject. Her use of a broad array of sources lends gravity to the book’s analysis and conclusion and strengthens her argument throughout. Rohde’s linkage of soro and the military use of social science during the Cold War to the modern Human Terrain System and the collective counter-insurgency tactics for military, forces winning hearts and minds of affected societies (e.g. Afghanistan) and gives the book contemporary relevance in the context of the modern history of conflict.

Even with these strengths, the book is not perfect. From a purely social-science perspective, there is an absence of granularity in the author’s use of broad and ill-defined terms like militarization, which may create some unintended arguments with particular readers. Additionally, the close study of soro necessarily omits cross-comparison with other, similar institutions. It would have helped to place the soro narrative into an integrated context, but using Rohde’s work as a primary part of departure this is fertile ground for future study and analysis.

Armed with Expertise is a refreshing and original look at the introduction and growth of social science research in a military context. The book alludes to the ethical complexities sometimes attendant with government contracting of private expertise, but is primarily concerned with telling the story of one private/academic/government relationship in the Cold War, and explaining how that story remains relevant. The story is instructive about conditions that existed in the 1960s, while also assisting the reader in understanding
the nuances and implications of such relationships today. Rohde’s book is a terrific contribution to the literature in both arenas.

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Gwynne Dyer’s *Canada in the Great Power Game: 1914–2014* is an examination of Canada’s place in the world as it interacted and reacted to the changing international system that governed the world’s great powers. While Canada was certainly not among the Great Powers, Dyer describes how Canadians made their views and influence known (or were ignored in some cases). It is a Canadian perspective on its place in the world, but as a historical work it sometimes suffers from that narrow lens.

In its opening pages, Dyer declares his goal to “recount the wars” of the last century and “account for them” (p. 1). He is aware of the nationalizing narratives that often sway Canadian histories of its wartime roles throughout the twentieth century. As such, he consciously takes a position between two extremes of glorifying the sacrifices Canadians have made abroad, or denouncing them wholeheartedly. Instead, he argues that the people running Canada were “intelligent [and] reasonably well-informed,” who learned from past experience as the Canadian position in the world evolved. Ultimately, Canadian leaders challenged “the very basis of the great-power game” and emerged as leaders in the attempt to change that system (p. 5). From a perfunctory role in the Boer War and the First World War, Canada helped fashion an international system after the Second World War that prevented future global conflicts. Even though it is not a perfect system, Dyer writes, organizations like the United Nations and NATO helped end the cycle of Great Power wars of the early nineteenth and twentieth century—at least so far.

Herein lies the crux of Dyer’s work, which repeats in various ways as he progresses through the twentieth century. Canada shaped the international system that prevents wars. In his final pages Dyer praises the “job we embarked on almost a hundred years ago” to restructuring the international system (p. 398). Yet few historians would argue that Canada had any major role in shaping those