4-17-2015

Training for Operation Jubilee Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid, 1939-1942

Caroline D'Amours

Recommended Citation
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Training for Operation Jubilee
Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal
and the Dieppe Raid, 1939-1942

Caroline D’Amours

Abstract: The disastrous Dieppe Raid of August 1942 has received a great deal of attention from historians since the end of the Second World War. This article examines the training given to officers of infantry units of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division using the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR) as a case study. The article contends that the infantry officers were not ready, as their tactical training was impeded by the absence of a common doctrine, the lack of realism, and time constraints. FMR’s junior leadership therefore lacked speed, initiative, and instinct, all vital elements for an operation as risky as Operation Jubilee.

At dawn on 19 August 1942, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division launched an attack on the French town of Dieppe. Of the 4,953 Canadians landed on the beaches at Dieppe, only 2,210 men returned to British soil at the end of this fateful day. The raid has captured the interest of historians and broad audiences ever since because it was the Canadian Army’s first major European engagement of war and because the tactical failure of the raid was marked by high casualties. Debates over the planning and execution of the operation have fuelled scholarly and popular interest in the assault.¹

Yet, despite the exploration of new questions and sources in recent years,² few authors have focussed on the training of the infantry that participated in the operation. Existing studies mainly look at the failure of Yukon I and II, two large-scale combined exercises in June 1942 whose objective was to rehearse the operation. C.P. Stacey, the official historian of the Canadian Army, states that “Yukon [I] did not go well. Units were landed miles from the proper beaches, and the tank landing craft arrived over an hour late.”³ Several historians have echoed Stacey’s critical assessment of the exercises.⁴ Paul Douglas Dickson, who mainly bases his analysis on the 1942 Combined Operations Headquarters report, notes the wide variation in the level and extent of the training within the Canadian battalions, a result of the significant latitude left to the officers in the implementation of training programs. According to Benneweis, there was also a lack of realism and of standardized methods to assess the training.⁵ However, his findings do not dwell on the training with regard to the particular characteristics of Operation Jubilee. Bill Rawling discusses the training given to Canadian battalions in Dieppe 1942: La catastrophe, but he was more reluctant to question its overall value. He maintains that the commando training received by the soldiers on the Isle of Wight was essential and particularly beneficial to men during the operation.⁶ In his book Tragedy at Dieppe: Operation Jubilee, August 19, 1942, Mark Zuehlke calls attention to unit training, which took place almost exclusively at the company level or lower. According to him, choices had to be made because of the lack of time, which resulted in “virtually no battalion-scale exercises and nothing at all at the brigade or divisional level” in the period before the Yukon I and II exercises.⁷

In the end, these studies do not provide a measure of the training state of the junior leaders involved in the raid, the ultimate architects of unit effectiveness, especially in this type of operation. This article will not question the relevance and weight of the various reasons developed in the literature to explain the failure of the Dieppe raid. Its intention is to expand the scope of the discussion by focusing on the training provided to the units’ officers, employing as a case study the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR). For the men of this unit, an amphibious operation constituted a
type of operation with which they were unfamiliar and which included several activities outside their normal duties. It is thus important to understand how the unit’s officers were prepared for the task that was assigned to them on the beach at Dieppe. In order to do that, one needs to go back to the beginning of the war and even a bit further to be able to assess all of the factors influencing the FMR’s training before Operation Jubilee and to appreciate the difficult enterprise the men had in front of them. Before examining the regiment’s preparation, it is useful to begin with the operation and what happened in the small coastal town of Dieppe.

**Operation Jubilee**

The attack on Dieppe involved nearly 5,000 men from 2nd Canadian Infantry Division accompanied by a Canadian tank regiment and British Commando and Royal Marine troops. The plan called for limited fire support from Royal Navy (RN) destroyers and squadrons of the Royal Air Force (RAF). The first phase of the landing would begin at 0450 hours. To the east, No.3 Commando would launch the assault at Berneval (Yellow Beach) while the Royal Regiment of Canada with three platoons of the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada would push towards Puys (Blue Beach). To the west, No.4 Commando would rush to Varengeville (Orange Beach) and the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada would land at Pourville (Green Beach).

The Commandos’ task was to eliminate the German coastal batteries on each side of Dieppe. The Canadians’ objective was to first occupy Puys and Pourville to neutralize the machine gun posts and artillery batteries which protected the beaches in front of Dieppe, as well as destroy local targets. At 0520 hours, the Essex Scottish Regiment and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI), along with tanks of the Calgary Regiment, would launch a frontal attack on Dieppe (Red and White Beaches). The FMR and A Commando Royal Marine would serve as the floating reserve and exploit any favourable situation in addition to occupying the perimeter in order to provide a protective screen for withdrawing units who had completed their tasks.

The frontal attack began as planned. Unfortunately, the RHLI and the Essex Scottish were to open the assault without the essential artillery support of the tanks, since the latter landed ten to fifteen minutes late. In addition, the heavy
fire sustained by men on Red and White Beaches made matters worse. The flank assaults failed to wrest the coastal batteries from German control and the guns remained pointed at the Dieppe beaches. These factors combined to halt the Canadians at Dieppe and only a few small groups of men were able to infiltrate the city. It was impossible to neutralize the enemy and achieve the objectives. According to the initial plan, the FMR was supposed to concentrate on the Parc Jehan Ango in order to cover the withdrawal of other Canadian units. Major-General J.H. Roberts, commanding officer of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, observed the raid from aboard HMS Calpe. Because he had received ambiguous reports that indicated the possibility of Essex having entered the city, Roberts ordered the FMR to land on Red Beach. The new target became the tobacco factory, which was supposed to be in Essex’s hands.10

Around 0710 hours, the FMR landing craft crossed the smokescreen. The situation in front of them was not, however, the one expected: boats were scattered all along the seafront because of the smoke, the heavy fire and the currents. Because of this, a considerable part of the unit landed on White Beach. A and C Companies landed on the narrow strip of beach under the cliffs west of the Casino while D and HQ Companies landed ashore in front of the casino. B Company was the only one to have disembarked in front of the tobacco factory on Red Beach. Despite heavy losses, the officers were trying, with difficulty to regroup and organize their sub-units. Although some FMR detachments managed to enter the city during the operation, most of the men remained on the beach sheltering from the heavy enemy fire. Therefore, they became perfect targets for the German troops. At 0930 hours, nearly four hours and a half after the start of the operation, it became clear that none of the objectives would be achieved. After some hesitation, Roberts set the withdrawal for 1100 hours and this extremely difficult task ended three hours later. For the FMR, the operation was horrific – of 32 officers and 552 other ranks that embarked for Jubilee, only 5 officers and 120 men returned to England; 8 officers and 111 men were killed, 2 officers and 48 other ranks were wounded and 19 officers and 225 other ranks were taken prisoners.11

Despite the flaws of the plan and the fierce resistance encountered during the landing it is appropriate to question whether the men were ready to deal with the inherent complexities of Operation Jubilee. Of course, members of the infantry unit had to master the various technical elements of amphibious operations: the landing and re-embarkation from a craft, swimming, handling of light and heavy weapons as well as explosives and long-range radios, transporting of the wounded, in addition to “hardening” training. Furthermore, the men of the FMR were also required to know the tactical concepts related to this type of operation such as technical landing and embarkation through a smokescreen, village fighting, and night fighting. More specifically, the infantrymen needed to become familiar with cooperation with tanks, the RN, and the RAF. Indeed, support weapons belonging to the battalion were not enough to cross the beach. It was therefore necessary to master the elements of the all-arms cooperation to maintain heavy fire support to suppress the enemy.12

On the other hand, the faulty communication system between the beaches, the RAF, ships, and tanks during the operation had resulted in a lack of fire support for the FMR from the various services, causing a significant number of losses even before they arrived on the beach. This same failure forced the unit and sub-unit commanders to improvise and work without direction from their superiors. Above all, the operational role assigned to the FMR in Operation Jubilee necessarily implied that the senior and junior leaders possessed great flexibility and initiative since the unit may have been required to strengthen any vital sector of the Red and White Beaches. Thus, the question is whether these officers were ready to lead their sub-units on the beach and to improvise leaving the beach as quickly as possible. Speed, initiative and instinct was therefore imperative to allow companies to spread out as...
much as possible and then regroup inland near their objectives. Thus, the historian seeking to explain the level of preparation of the FMR’s officers needs to examine the pre-war state of the Canadian Army.¹³

On the eve of the Second World War

On 1 September 1939, General Order 135 established the active army. This directive affected, amongst others, the FMR, one of the first units of the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) to be mobilized for the Canadian Active Service Force. However, before the Second World War, the fighting value of the FMR men was almost negligible. Political and institutional elements affected the establishment of effective training within the unit. The Canadian Militia had two components: the Permanent Active Militia (PAM) – the regular force composed of professional soldiers, and the NPAM – the part-time force. From the earliest days of the war, these two components suffered from a severe lack of preparation. Members of the PAM had a total of about 4,000 men and 400 officers, but completely lacked modern military equipment. Since the end of the previous war, Canada’s military had a minuscule budget. The memories of the massacres on European soil a quarter of a century earlier maintained pacifist sentiments as well as the idea, or hope, of Canada being a “fire-proof house.”¹⁴ The economic crisis of the 1930s reinforced the pattern of little attention being placed on defence matters. The memories of the divisions within the Canadian population over conscription in 1917 also led Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King to essentially reject Canadian rearmament until 1937. Budget constraints and lack of attention to the army thus partly explained the general lack of preparation of the Canadian Army.¹⁵

For the FMR, the consequences were significant. This lack of interest in military affairs from both the government and the population made recruiting difficult. In the case of the Montreal unit, between 1930 and 1939, regimental strength wavered from 269 to 428 NCOs and men with an average of 345, approximately 50 percent of the normal establishment. Compared to other units of the NPAM, the FMR’s size was fairly representative. However, the regiment was much larger than other Francophone units, an impressive accomplishment considering the small recruitment pool in Montreal’s French Canadian population who held generally negative views of the military.¹⁶

These elements also played a role in the recruitment of the Royal 22e Régiment (R22eR), the Permanent Force regiment that provided a training cadre for teaching part-time militia units of Military Districts 4 and 5. Historians Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier emphasized that the R22eR faced significant recruitment difficulties. Its average complement of 14 officers and 390 NCOs and other ranks in the inter-war period did not allow for the development of a cadre to lead in establishing rigorous and effective training. The situation did not improve on the eve of war because, in 1939, the unit’s strength only totalled 19 officers, 165 NCOs and other ranks.¹⁷ As a result the manpower shortage severely limited training opportunities for Quebec’s part-time militia and Permanent Force units. The small French-Canadian training staff from the R22eR compromised the quality of training provided to other militia units in Quebec.

Even if the number of recruits was adequate or the budgets allowed the supply of modern weapons, the tactical knowledge transmitted proved to be flawed. Since the R22eR provided the training cadre for Quebec part-time units like the FMR, the tactical training given in this unit formed the foundation on which others built. According to historian Yves Tremblay, these activities were limited to “spit-and-polish,” physical training and close-order drill. Individual handling of weapons, target shooting and route marches made up the rest of the training. Clearly the training of the regular soldier was quite limited. By extension, one can believe that training militia units followed a similar but slower pace.¹⁸ According to the regimental history of another infantry regiment of the NPAM, the Régiment de la Chaudière, it seems that social activities during the inter-war years formed the bulk of the training while exercises were limited mainly to the handling of rifles. For the FMR, the findings from the regimental history reading are even more appalling: parades and uniforms were the main interests of their military activities.¹⁹

With regard to the officers, their training also suffered from limited recruitment and budgetary constraints during the inter-war period. Indeed, the lack of enlisted recruits drastically reduced the opportunities for officers to practice the art of command or handling of their men as well as implementation of tactics. In one year, militia personnel trained one or two nights a week in addition to spending 15 days at the annual summer camp if the state of the commanding officer’s personal finances and those of the unit allowed for it.²⁰ The FMR sent troops four times to the annual exercises during the decade preceding the war, for an average of 175 officers and men per year. From this figure, one must question whether the number of men sent in 1937 (one officer and nine other ranks) enabled the advancement of training, as most officers knew nothing of the art of command.²¹

Historian David French has shown that the preparation of British regimental officers suffered from a
number of deficiencies including the lack of opportunities to train properly. In the 1930s, tactical training for infantry officers was decentralized. The situation was worse for the infantry since, unlike other service branches, it had no centralized school. Since the Canadian Militia started out in the British organization, Yves Tremblay points out that the same defects existed in the Canadian training system. The infantry officers, after being commissioned, went directly to the regiment to learn how to lead their men and were entirely dependent upon their sergeant for learning basic skills. This approach also brought a large variation in training value provided to the men as well as in the interpretation of tactical doctrine. Secondly, tactical training given to reserve officers generally remained low due to the predominance of administrative and disciplinary tasks developed in the militia course. Indeed, Tremblay pointed out in an article that “reserve officers of a higher rank than lieutenant were virtually left to fend for themselves, that is to say that they had to read and interpret the tactical brochures on which they could lay the hand on or, for some, to satisfy themselves with summaries appearing in the Canadian Defence Quarterly.”

In short, the level of training given to the FMR men until the Second World War proved to be poor. It shows that the status of the NPAM at the outbreak of the war was relatively limited. Indeed, in 1939, several candidates of the FMR were rejected for medical reasons. In addition, many men would serve as a cadre to form the second-line battalion. This explains why, at the announcement of mobilization in 1939, the number of FMR was even lower than its actual peacetime strength. Moreover, the French-Canadian regiment only had 227 soldiers, including 26 officers, when the mobilization order came in. The FMR would have had to recruit and train about three quarters of their establishment before they had been ready to take the field. It is important to note that the tactical training provided to officers who would themselves be training Canadian force units was particularly low in both theory and practice until the eve of the conflict. Of course, the Canadian government based its policies on the British wait-and-see strategy, but the fact remains that it took at least 18-24 months of training to really be able to cope with the German Army.

Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Grenier commanded the FMR at the start of the war. Though he had fought on the Western Front with the Royal 22nd Regiment, he was not up to the task of commanding the FMR in the Second World War.

Lieutenant-Colonel Grenier’s era

The combat capability of the FMR depended upon the quality of the officers and their ability to train the men to perform the tasks they had to undertake. However, the state of readiness of the FMR’s officers at the beginning of the conflict was lamentable. At the outbreak of war, lack of accommodations, shortages of uniforms, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and training sites explained, in part, the inadequate start-state of training in the FMR as well as many of the other units and formations of the Canadian Active Service Force. The comments from one of FMR’s sergeant-instructors are particularly interesting in this regard:

[I] was theoretically in charge of the anti-tank platoon, responsible for defence of the battalion with six anti-tank guns called “two pounders.” My men soon knew theory of parts, nomenclature, assembly and stops, and the commands because we
managed to get an instruction book for this gun. But we had neither guns nor their gun tractors. There were also three trucks for the whole battalion! We had no ammunition. What was so funny, it was to make a semblance of manoeuvre, in front of a picture of the gun, because we had no gun! Try therefore under these conditions to maintain the interest of soldiers?27

After Montreal and the unit’s brief period of training at Camp Valcartier (only one month in June 1940), the FMR soldiers went directly to garrison duty in defence of Iceland. Their main task was to support the building of the Kaldadarnes airport and a network of trenches, as well as various island-defence schemes which drastically limited training opportunities. Physical training, parade drill, rifle training and route marches constituted the bulk of the routine. Activities necessary for the defence of Iceland interrupted the rhythm of individual training between July and October 1940. In fact, this meant that basic individual training would only resume in September of 1940. In short, when the FMR troops set foot in the United Kingdom in November 1940, none of them could boast that they had completely mastered the basic skills normally taught in a maximum time period of 12 weeks. Then again, the problems arising from a harried mobilization and tasks in defence of Iceland do not entirely explain FMR training deficiencies.28

The inexperience of the battalion’s leadership was another stumbling block. The FMR officers generally had no military knowledge because of the poor state of militia training during the interwar period. With the war beginning, one would have thought that the training of junior officers would progress quickly. It did not help that Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Grenier, the commanding officer of the regiment, was not up to the task of correcting training deficiencies.

Grenier was born in Montreal in 1893, joined the army as a lieutenant in 1915 and served in France and Belgium with the R22eR where he was badly wounded at Passchendaele. By the end of the war, he was a captain. Between the wars, Grenier stayed in the NPAM where he was promoted to major in 1928. He was the FMR’s second in command from 1934 until he took command of the unit in early 1938 at age 45 when he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel.29

According to his personal military files, he never passed the Militia Staff Course and he only attended the Senior Officer’s Course in January and February 1941. He did not really excel at Senior Officer School even if the school’s commandant, Brigadier W. Robb, was enthusiastic about Grenier’s personality. In a report, Robb stated that he was unsure about his tactical knowledge but put the blame on the question of language.30 However, when British Lieutenant-General Bernard L. Montgomery, commander of the South-Eastern Command in England, reviewed the Canadian units and their commanders in the spring of 1942, he concluded that Grenier was a poor leader. Indeed, in Montgomery’s mind, the “weak link in this [Brigade] is the [FMR].” He placed much of the fault on Grenier’s shoulders as he said that he did not “believe that Grenier has the military knowledge and professional ability to produce a good and well-trained [battalion]. He has commanded the [battalion] for over 5 years and is nearly 50 years old. He should really be replaced by a better and younger man.”31 Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar (GOC I Canadian Corps) also expressed such an opinion in a letter to Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart (Chief of the General Staff), which contended:

his tactical abilities are open to doubt and may well prove inadequate during the approaching tests of unit and formation exercises in which case we shall need to dispose of his services that account. Further while he was in command [of his unit for some six years both past and current Brigade [commanders] and [Division commander] here have indicated their inability to recommend him for further promotion in field.32

The training given to officers and other ranks thus suffered from Grenier’s deficiencies as a commander. First, the training lacked realism. All the instructions were given in form of lectures with no effective follow-up tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) or field training exercises to apply what had been learned. Furthermore, it is quite obvious when one looks at the war diary that the battalion’s officers received very limited specific training to improve their individual skills. During the 31 months that Grenier was in command of the FMR, four TEWTs were the only training dedicated to his officers. Of those exercises, only one was given by Grenier on the subject of a company in the attack; another was led by the commanding officer of Calgary Regiment (Tank), Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Andrews, on tank-infantry cooperation; and the last two others were given by unit junior officers on the defence of a village and on the appreciation of the ground.33

However, the FMR’s officers had to absorb a significant amount of knowledge in order to practice minor tactics and fieldcraft. As historian Timothy Harrison Place noted, “such highly practical skills cannot readily be mastered by book-learning alone.”34 Unfortunately, most of the training received by officers and NCOs in these areas was theoretical. This was clearly insufficient for junior leaders charged with leading others into battle. These exercises did not allow for the reproduction of the sounds and
confusion of the battlefield. This meant that the FMR officers were lacking both the depth of military expertise and tactical knowledge about modern warfare. Therefore, opportunities for improving the tactical knowledge of the unit’s officers fell almost exclusively on the training obtained outside the battalion. Thus, it was essential that officers have the opportunity to take courses offered by the Canadian and British armies in England.35

Yet, according to the unit war diary, from the beginning of mobilization to November 1940, only one officer had passed the Militia Staff Course and one junior officer went to the Infantry Company Commanders’ Course. Until the Dieppe raid, the FMR’s war diarist noted that only two other officers went to the Infantry Company Commanders’ Course, while one attended the Junior War Staff Course and another went to the Canadian Corps Junior Leader School. If one focuses on the military records of officers killed in action while one attended the Junior War Staff Course and another went to the Canadian Corps Junior Leader School. If one focuses on the military records of officers killed in action, one can see that the situation did not improve with time. Of the six files available for consultation, one had attended the Infantry Company Commanders’ Course and only one other had passed through the Canadian Junior Leader School.36

The small number of subaltern officers who attended the army courses seemed to slowly improve unit’s collective training. However, training varied widely from company to company under Grenier’s direction. While some companies lingered on elementary individual training, others conducted diverse tactical training, which started in May and June 1941. Company exercises in attack, defence, and withdrawal began to emerge in the better-led sub-units. The small number of officers who attended courses between November 1940 and November 1941 meant that most of the unit’s junior officers were dependent on the knowledge and skills of their commanding officer to improve their own individual capacity, which partly explained the wide variations in their tactical and leadership skills as well as those of the sub-units they led.37

New training initiatives

If they wanted to improve their tactical knowledge, the regiment’s senior and junior officers could turn to official doctrine stated in the training pamphlets produced by the British Army. Unfortunately, the theoretical knowledge provided by the pamphlets had some shortcomings. At the end of the First World War the British Army had recognized that firepower dominated the battlefield. To be able to advance on the battlefield it was necessary to combine firepower with movement. To achieve this, the British favoured a creeping barrage as a means for the infantry to advance at a short distance from the enemy. Canadian tactical doctrine, on the eve of the Second World War still embraced the need to consolidate gains on the battlefield before exploiting success. The aim was to minimize losses arising from any offensive movement. Therefore, Allied attacks would always be very slow and bound to the constraints of artillery fire plan.38

The state of British and Canadian doctrine in the summer of 1939 is best explained by a 1937 army pamphlet entitled Infantry Training: Training and War, which was the last pre-war infantry doctrinal literature available for subaltern commanders until early 1941. Here, one can see that the ideal to which soldiers were to aspire was based on a doctrinal dichotomy: initiative was encouraged while discipline and obedience were also emphasized.

In all wars soldiers have been required who are disciplined, physically fit and skilled with their weapons. In modern war, with its more powerful weapons and greater decentralization, the responsibility of the individual has been increased and he therefore requires a far higher degree of individual initiative than was formerly necessary. Commanders must do all that they can to encourage initiative and individuality, remembering always that these must be disciplined.39

Yet, the rapid and unexpected German victory over France in the spring of 1940 highlighted the British Army’s slow tempo in action, due to outdated tactics and lack of initiative at all levels, as well as the German Army’s superior training. The introduction of machine guns and tanks on the battlefield meant that soldiers had to disperse to survive. This also meant that from that point on, decision-making capacity was needed by all soldiers. This required initiative, intelligence and military knowledge.40 The British Army’s outdated doctrine was particularly evident in the system of autocratic command and control that stifled initiative at all levels. Indeed, this convinced some British and Canadian military officers of much needed changes in the battle doctrine, organization and training for the armed forces.41

As head of the British I Corps after Dunkirk, Lieutenant-General Harold Alexander spread the use of tactical training drill in his formation. The publication of a pamphlet, I Corps Tactical Notes, in the fall of 1940 favoured the dissemination of this tactical guide for soldiers. The War Office, after some resistance, published the pamphlet in February 1941 under the title Tactical Notes for Platoon Commanders. Although Alexander’s foreword was omitted and there was no reference to the term “battle drills,” the aim of the pamphlet published by the War
Office was to serve, as a tactical guide for platoon commanders and, in this way, was a step towards improvement. In this document, the author of the pamphlet mentioned the lessons of the events of 1939-1940 presented above, and added that

To-day, against an exceedingly quick and bold opponent who relies for success on surprise in the form of rapid infiltration, we shall find ourselves at a grave disadvantage if we cannot be as quick, bold, and enterprising as he is...Let us, therefore, keep before our eyes this guiding principle – SPEED. Speed in making up our minds, speed in delivering our orders, speed in reconnaissance, and, finally, speed in execution.

Battle drill was a method of teaching minor infantry tactics and fieldcraft that emphasized fire and movement and was directly aimed at section, platoon and company leaders. It was a flexible type of training where soldiers rehearsed situations encountered on the battlefield. The acquisition of a tactical instinct was the fundamental objective of battle drill so that junior officers and NCOs were able to adapt to circumstances faced in real combat. As such, battle drill broke down manoeuvres into a series of basic movements – a very important aspect that made it different from other training methods. In practice, the objectives of battle drill were to enhance the physical capabilities of individual soldiers; to show them how to use the ground, to maximize the use of small arms and to teach them teamwork from the section upward. Battle drill also implied improved realism in the exercises and the introduction of battle inoculation to prepare troops for the sights and sounds of war. Both theoretical and practical exercises of increasing complexity were introduced on topics as varied as village fighting, street fighting, river-crossings, attacks of all sorts and night movement.

Still, John English, in his study *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, is more critical of this form of training. According to him, the battle inoculation aspect was pushed to the extreme by trying to bring the soldiers to “kill joyfully.” English questions the value of the use of live fire since nothing can replace the experience of being shot at with the intent to kill. In addition, he argues that battle drill was a training method that was too rigid and impeded the junior officers’ tactical understanding. English might be correct on the battle inoculation flaws, but is not on the tactical rigidity of this training method. The primary purpose of battle drill was to instill initiative and independence to junior leaders as a way of surviving on the battlefield.

Battle drill was introduced in the Canadian Army when the 2nd Canadian Division worked with the 47th (London) Division during the summer of 1941. The
Calgary Highlanders sent some officers to attend demonstrations of this new tactical method in October. Upon their return, they prepared a similar training course which was taught to all platoons and companies of the regiment. From November 1941 onward, the regiment received members from other Canadian regiments. In fact, one can see that 2nd Division’s Training Instruction No.6 dated 28 November 1941 focussed on the need for individual training and specifically mentioned that special attention should be placed on the Tactical Notes for Platoon Commanders pamphlet as well as on battle drill training.47

Six FMR officers attended battle drill courses from November 1941 to May 1942 and the unit began battle drill training from January 1942 onward. This new type of training worked well and was received positively by men as additional officers returned from battle drill courses to share what they had learned.48 The unit war diarist noted at the beginning of March 1942 that “More and more, a greater number of officers are sent on these courses (Battle Drill) from where they come back with new and better ideas from which the Unit will greatly improve. It is hoped that this Battalion will shortly arrive to a very high standard of training.”49 The introduction of battle drill allowed the dissemination of a common understanding of the doctrine at lower command levels. For the men and officers of the FMR, it was a welcome change to the dull training regimen that had been in effect since 1939. Moreover, the new tactical exercises against an “opponent” – a specialized group of instructors playing the role of the enemy – enabled a better understanding of desired responses. In fact, from the company level down, decisions were measured in seconds, not after lengthy consideration and so that type of training was much needed.50

Despite all these improvements in the unit’s training, there would be a more drastic change in April 1942. When Lieutenant-General Montgomery reviewed the Canadian units and their commanders that Spring, he concluded that Grenier was a poor commander. To remedy this situation, Crerar appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard to replace Grenier. Ménard was born in Montreal in 1913 and studied business at Université Laval before enrolling in the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston. He graduated from the RMC in 1932 and received his lieutenant’s commission in 1936 in the R22eR. He served in India from 1938 to 1940 where he took part in the Waziristan campaign with the South Waziristan Scouts. After being promoted to captain in 1939, he was assigned to the 2nd Division HQ as liaison officer in mid-1940 and went overseas with this formation. In June 1941, he was promoted to major and transferred to the R22eR before returning to Canada to take the Junior War Staff Course at RMC. He spent a short period at 8th Brigade headquarters before given command of the FMR in April 1942. At the age of 29, he was the youngest lieutenant-colonel in the Commonwealth.51

From the start, Ménard turned the battalion’s routine upside-down. First, he evaluated his officers and replaced those who were under-trained or unfit. He took charge of officer and NCO training, something that Grenier had never done. Officers’ days were held every week, during which he showed them, amongst other things, how to train their men. The battalion war diary entry of 27 April is particularly interesting in this regard and says much about the lack of officer training prior to Ménard’s arrival. “An ‘Officer’s Day’ has been held today and this new kind of training was enjoyed by all Officers. Much enthusiasm has been shown in the preparation of the discussion and T.E.W.T.’s.”52 Subjects covered by Ménard in the next months were varied, in direct line with the battle drill guidelines, and focussed on minor tactics, namely verbal orders,
the use of the ground, and the making of a plan. In short, he improved and standardized training through the whole battalion, an essential change before beginning a much more elaborate training programme.

Simmer Force: Combined operations training

In anticipation of Operation Rutter, the original plan to attack Dieppe, the men of the FMR arrived on the Isle of Wight on 19 May 1942 where they would become “a first class ‘Assault’ Unit of the highest quality” according to the unit’s war diary.53 Amphibious operations constitute one of the most complex types of operations. The majority of the forces which took part in Operation Jubilee were completely unfamiliar with tasks they had to perform and had to be given special training to ensure cooperation between the various services besides familiarizing all individuals with operations of this nature.54

The training program for the 2nd Infantry Division provided a progression in three phases: technical instructions, tactics related to amphibious operations, and a last stage to progressively integrate large-scale exercises with all the components participating in the final operation. For men of the FMR, the technical training had to be alternated with the tactical training probably due to time constraints and administrative work resulting from sending the reconnaissance detachment too shortly before the arrival of the remainder of the division. Therefore, the unavailability of training areas, the lack of ammunition and equipment as well as the paperwork that had to be completed during the first week on the island caused several cancellations and changes in the training program.55 As such, 2nd Division’s first training report is most telling about the training problems: “If training cannot go forward more steadily than it has in the past, training in some units will not be complete by the time exercises are ready to commence.”56

Thus, the period between 20 May and 12 June stood out for its use of more theoretical training where men became familiar with the concepts related to amphibious operations while including progressively practical exercises. In the case of the FMR, emphasis during this period was placed on landing and embarkation exercises, demolition and heavy explosives, and village fighting in addition with battle drill. Like other units of Simmer Force – 2nd Division’s name for this operation – special attention was paid to physical fitness, the aim being the ability to walk nearly 18 kilometres in full assault kit in 120 minutes. However, on 28 May, the training

Though tanks played an important role in Operation Jubilee, little combined arms training took place before the raid.

Above right: Churchill tanks line up for an inspection during an assault training exercise in July 1942.

Below right: A Churchill from the Calgary Tank Regiment exits a tank landing craft during Exercise Yukon I, 11-12 June 1942.
report indicated that “In the assault courses, troops were able to complete the course but were, in many cases, unable to fight or fire effectively when finished.” This would explain why the training report of 6 June still lingered on the physical condition of the men. This same report indicated that “The condition of the men has improved and better results have been secured from speed marches but it has become evident that in the short time available, training to the standard required is not possible without sacrificing other valuable training.”

Therefore, little room was made for “valuable training” such as all-arms cooperation, a major shortcoming in regard to the limited focus on this particular aspect since the beginning of the war and the role of fire support during the assault on Dieppe. Besides landing exercises, which necessarily involved members of the navy, no exercise was done in collaboration with the 14th Army Tank Regiment (Calgary Regiment) or the RAF for this period. In addition, on 21 May some expected tactical situations such as street fight exercises were carried out under the command of NCOs, while the officers acted as umpires. It was difficult then for officers, especially for young officers, to learn how to manage their sub-unit in these tactical situations not to mention having to increase their own initiative on the battlefield.

On 2 June, a larger exercise, Mox, gradually increased the realism of the training even though it did not involve enemy fire. Mox’s principal objective was to “practise the landing of a raiding force who had to go 1 or 2 miles inland to effectuate tasks previously detailed and then withdraw to its boats.” The men of FMR were conducting their first assault under the command of Major J.R. Painchaud, second in command of the unit. On the same day, a second landing at Colwell Bay was also planned at noon where the unit had to complete the assault of a cliff. According to the unit’s war diary, “The first landing went very well same as withdrawal, the only points which were feeble was [sic] few sub-units bunching on the beach and so other losing temporarily direction in the dark.” This observation is particularly interesting, especially when one knows that no enemy defended the beach and, therefore, the men of the FMR were not under fire.

The first training test was done during the night of 11-12 June with Exercise Yukon. It was created with the operational plan in mind and was therefore designed to practice the technique and details of Operation Rutter. Thus, all units involved were practicing their roles on a stretch of coastline at West Bay near Bridport in Dorset County which looked similar to the Dieppe area. Three tasks were given to the FMR. The unit was to land on a beach and then establish a protected area for units that had to withdraw after completing their tasks. Then, the FMR would constitute a reserve that could be sent against any dangerous point on Red, White or Green beaches on division commander’s orders. Finally, the unit had to cover demolition teams in operation in the West Bay Harbour.

Even though Yukon began as scheduled at 0500 hours, the rest of the operation was not going according to
plan. Several units landed miles away from the beaches and landing craft transporting the tanks arrived more than an hour late, which resulted in major chaos on the beaches. The delay in the landing and the slow pace of the infantry advance inland caused problems in the achievement of the objectives. The FMR landed on Red Beach at 0715 hours, its four companies reaching their objectives after searching buildings and destroying all remaining enemy defences. The men remained on the beach for nine hours holding a protective perimeter to cover the withdrawal of other regiments. The battalion then progressively reduced its perimeter before battalion headquarters and platoon rearguards final re-embarkation under the protection of a smokescreen. However, problems met in Yukon forced the military authorities to put in place another rehearsal to allow for additional training before undertaking Operation Rutter. On 23 June, Yukon II was carried out at the same place. Though it was slightly better than the first exercise, the lack of precision as to the time and place of landing as well as the use of smoke still complicated its execution for some units.62

The purpose of these exercises was to achieve maximum realism while at the same time coming as close as possible to simulating conditions which would occur during the actual operation. To do this, the landing took place under an important simulated aerial bombing. Indeed, explosives were attached to an underwater wire, which if hit by a boat triggered a blast. Machine guns and snipers fired as close as possible to the assault troops in addition to using mortars to familiarize young
soldiers with the sounds of modern warfare and to teach them to keep their heads down.\(^{63}\)

If the Yukon exercises were trying to recreate the most realistic conditions possible, the goal was not always achieved. First, the information obtained on the defence of Dieppe showed that the city was protected by “low-category troops amounting to one battalion, with 500 divisional or regimental troops in support, making no more than fourteen hundred men.”\(^{64}\) These were second-class troops who were expected to be 40-45 years old. Therefore, for Yukon I and Yukon II, an important and systematic defence was not part of the plan, as the role was assigned to a single battalion of local Home Guard troops. Furthermore, when the dummy aerial attack was carried out by Hurricanes, these local troops carefully took cover, which facilitated the advance of the assault units in the frontal attack.\(^{65}\) It is probably for this reason that an NCO from the FMR observed that when they landed on Red Beach during Operation Jubilee: “Everybody expected that we could land, take a position, and begin to shoot. That was not what happened.”\(^{66}\)

Another important factor for the FMR was that the only operational role they practiced during Yukon I and II was the protection of other units’ withdrawal. No reference was found in the war diary that referred to a situation where the FMR was sent into a specific area as a reserve to support the advance of
another unit. Indeed, the FMR were ordered during Operation Jubilee to disembark and support the attack of the Essex Scottish Regiment at Red Beach near the tobacco factory. This role involved flexibility, initiative, and instinct by junior leaders to avoid the beach becoming a killing zone under enemy fire. However, this was never practiced during the Yukon exercises.67

Thirdly, British Army amphibious operational doctrine put great emphasis on the support of tanks during a landing against a defended beach. However, the FMR did not train with the Calgary Regiment before Jubilee. Given their more static role on the cover of the withdrawal phase, the FMR did not advance inland in conjunction with the tanks. Indeed, the latter were ordered to land on the beach and form a bridgehead in support of the infantry. Yet, the FMR’s operational role during the attack of Dieppe necessarily required collaboration with tanks since the unit could not overwhelm the enemy with its own weapons and needed armoured fire support. Despite the various shortcomings of Exercises Yukon I and II, Operation Rutter was set to take place during the first period of favourable weather between 2 and 8 July. Since the weather never improved, the raid was cancelled. The operation was revived under the code-name Jubilee and had the disastrous consequences we all know about today.68

* * * * *

From 1939 to 1942, the men of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal began a drastic transformation of their training methods. The publication of the pamphlet *Tactical Notes for Platoon Commanders* in early 1941 and the introduction of battle drill in the training routine of officers and men of the FMR late in 1941 were critical improvements. Officer training improved significantly with the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Ménard who introduced more systematic training to increase their leadership and tactical understanding. This progress was also a result of the changes Crerar introduced in I Canadian Corps’s training policy in 1942. Before the assault on Dieppe, corps training instructions had already stressed the importance
of infantry-tank cooperation, individual weapons competence and the importance of training junior leadership.

Yet, it has to be understood that those “new” concepts of training were introduced in the FMR’s training program nearly two years after the onset of the war and only eight months before the raid. The uneven training standards and methods presented within the unit can be explained, in large part, because in the period of time before 1942, the FMR’s senior officers were allowed to decide for themselves how to apply the doctrine and train their troops. In fact, it was only in August 1942 that the development of a common doctrine on training methods was established as a training standard and then reiterated in the training instructions of October 1942 and April 1943.

That Crerar had yet to stress the importance of having a common doctrine after three years of conflict seems distressing. The Canadian military’s effectiveness was compromised by the inability of infantry officers to convey the lessons learned in the first years of the war as we have seen here. Thus, when the combined training was introduced in the Spring of 1942, 2nd Division’s infantry officers had to learn the techniques and tactics of such a complex type of operation in addition to performing their regular duties. Whether they really mastered all of the elements is another question. This probably explains why, after the raid, the combined operations training and exercises, individual and junior leadership initiatives as well as the use of fire support were given primary importance. Specific consideration was given to beach landings, the establishment of beach bridgeheads and operations at brigade and battalion levels against enemy-defended localities, especially in towns and villages. Perhaps those questions were the true lessons learned on this very tragic day. Thus, the next time the Canadians attacked the Atlantic Wall they would be better prepared for the fight.69

Notes


2. On public relations, see Timothy J. Balzer, “Selling Disaster: How the Canadian Public was Informed of Dieppe,” M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 2004 and Balzer, “The Information Front: The Canadian Army, Public Relations and War News during the Second World War,” PhD thesis, University of Victoria, 2009, published by University of British Columbia Press in 2010. On the Quebec collective memory of the event, see Béatrice Richard, La mémoire de Dieppe: Radioscopie d’un mythe (Montréal: VLB, 2002) and Richard, “Dieppe: la fabrication d’un mythe,” Canadian Military History 21, no.4 (2012). In Richard’s article in Canadian Military History, she explores other topics, such as the RAF’s support for the raid, Stacey’s struggle to record this military disaster, as well as the German view of the operation through their war artists and media.


13. The author wishes to thank Yves Tremblay for helping her push these thoughts contained in these last two paragraphs.


18. Yves Tremblay, Instruire, p.45.

22. French, Raising Churchill’s Army, chap. 2; Tremblay, Instruire, pp.38-50.
25. French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p.53.
26. War Diary (WD), Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR), September 1939-March 1940.
27. Dumais, Un Canadien français à Dieppe, pp.18-19. Author’s translation.
28. WD, FMR, September 1939-October 1940.
30. Grenier, Personnel Files, Brigadier W. Robb (Commandant, Senior Officers’ School), Report from CMHQ Course no. 715 serial nine dated February 27th, 1941.
32. Grenier, Personnel Files, Confidential letters from Crear to Stuart dated 12 March 1942.
33. WD, FMR, September 1939-March 1942.
35. Tremblay, Instruire, p.356; French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p.200; WD, FMR, December 1940-November 1941.
36. WD, FMR, September 1939-March 1942.
37. WD, FMR, September 1939-March 1942; FMR’s Dieppe Raid Officer KIA service files.
40. Place, Military Training in the British Army, pp.43-45.
41. French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p.189; Tremblay, Instruire, pp.118, 184.
42. Place, Military Training in the British Army, pp.49-55; Tremblay, Instruire, pp.189-97.
44. “Battle inoculation” was a psychological approach to the battle designed to desensitize soldiers so that they were not disturbed by the sounds and horrific sights of battle.
45. For a more in-depth analysis of the battle drill movement and methods, see Place, Military Training in the British Army and Tremblay, Instruire, chaps. 5 and 6. Both agree that battle drill was an important part of the actual training progression of the British and Canadian armies.
46. John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), chap. 5. I follow the more positive analysis here. I want to thank my University of Ottawa colleague R. Daniel Pellerin for his important comments on this particular aspect.
47. Place, Military Training in the British Army, pp.50-52; Tremblay, Instruire, pp.212–213; WD, General Staff (GS), 2 Canadian Infantry Division (2 Cdn Inf Div), November 1941: Training Instructions No. 6, 24 November 1941.
48. WD, FMR, December 1941–March 1942 and FMR’s Dieppe Raid Officer KIA service files.
49. WD, FMR, March 1942, 10 March 1942.
52. WD, FMR, April 1942, 27 March 1942.
59. WD, FMR, May-June 1942.
60. WD, FMR, June 1942.
61. CMHQ Report no.100, p.36 and WD, FMR, June 1942, 12 June.
64. Quoted in Whitaker and Whitaker, Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph, p.203.

Caroline D’Amours is a PhD candidate at the University of Ottawa under the tutelage of Dr. Serge Marc Duflurier. Her dissertation examines the Canadian infantry reinforcement training system during the Second World War. The present paper is based on her MA research at the Université Laval, “Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal au débarquement de Dieppe: doctrine et entraînement au Canada et en Angleterre, 1939-1942.”