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The Canadian Corps’ Long March Logistics, Discipline, and the Occupation of the Rhineland

Chris Hyland

This march was probably the sternest test of sheer endurance, as apart from bravery, that the division ever encountered. Food and smokes were short all the way, the men were filthy and covered with lice, and utterly worn out. The marches were very severe – anything up to twenty miles a day, the roads bad and the weather usually appalling.

Reverend Kenelm Swallow, British 29th Division

Abstract: This article explores the Canadian Corps’ march to, and occupation of, the Cologne bridgehead after the First World War. It examines the reasons for Canadian participation in the occupation, assesses the impact of logistics on decision making and service conditions, and explores the experiences of Canadian soldiers while marching across Belgium and performing garrison duties in the Rhineland. The article contends that the logistical situation which existed in the immediate aftermath of the First World War prevented the Canadian Corps’ timely demobilization so Canadian leadership sought temporary duties for the corp which would gain prestige for the Dominion.

Just hours before the armistice of 11 November 1918 came into effect, there was a ferocious fight for the Belgian city of Mons. During the night of 10 November and into the following morning, vicious street battles raged as a combined assault by 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions sought to liberate the town. After putting up some stubborn resistance, the German Army retreated at 0420 hours and the town – where the British had started their fighting four years earlier – was finally secured. The Allied armies had achieved victory, and celebrations rang out in towns and cities around the world. The fighting was over. Germany had asked for terms and the soldiers would soon return home. But, for the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) and many other Allied soldiers their work did not end on 11 November 1918. In fact, the Canadian Corps was about to embark on one of the more intriguing periods in its history. Instead of demobilizing and returning home, the corps began preparations for a march into Germany as part of the Army of Occupation. Half of the Canadian Corps trekked for 28 days across Belgium and Germany to take up garrison duties around Cologne and Bonn. This occupation of hostile territory was a first for the Dominion, as never before had Canada’s civilian soldiers been asked to garrison the home terrain of a European enemy.

The operation was also conducted in a period of great tension, with social, political and economic chaos swirling in Germany, and under the cloud of looming negotiations in Paris. This brief period of Canadian participation in the occupation forces was very much a military operation conducted in an atmosphere of apprehended war. In short, for the Canadian Corps, there remained much to do after 11 November 1918.

Under the terms of the Armistice agreement, the Rhineland was to be divided into four occupation zones: British, French, American and Belgian. The British Army, which included the Canadian Corps, was assigned to the zone starting just south of Düsseldorf stretching south to Cologne and Bonn. Once in Cologne and Bonn, the Canadians and British were to establish heavily defended bridgeheads in preparation to advance into the German heartland in case resistance should make that necessary. The German armies had not been entirely destroyed, had retreated in good order and still possessed a significant capacity to continue the war. The occupation of the Rhineland was viewed as a critical deterrent.

The armistice provided the Allies with a mandate to occupy the Rhineland, but otherwise no specific orders were provided. Thus, from 11 to 18 November, plans for the operation were quickly sketched out and revealed to the Canadians during a conference at British Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Cambrai. General Sir Herbert Plumer informed Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie that the Canadian Corps had been selected for the
Army of Occupation and that its
four divisions would form part of
Second Army, leading the advance
to the Cologne bridgehead starting
on 17 November and continuing for
30 days.\(^7\)

Why was the Canadian Corps
tasked with this assignment? Several
answers seem likely. First, General
Plumer knew he was going into
hostile territory and was uncertain
how the population would respond.
He required reliable troops that
would perform under pressure
and Canada’s four divisions were
recognized as among the best
available.\(^8\) Second, the Canadian
Corps was close by, the 2nd and
3rd Canadian Divisions having just
led the successful assault on Mons.\(^9\)
Third, although the Canadian Corps
had tactical and administrative
autonomy, it was still subject to the
British High Command and would
have to advance if so ordered.\(^10\)
Finally, General Plumer knew that
Currie was keen to have the corps
included. Currie was later quoted
saying: “It was a great gratification
and honour to us.”\(^11\)

Yet, upon further investigation,
the Canadian Corps was likely
chosen for two other reasons related
to logistics and Canadian politics.
In the immediate aftermath of the
First World War, demobilization was
the main concern for most nations
involved in the conflict. With the
signing of the armistice, a huge
rush ensued to get the Imperial and
American citizen soldiers home as
quickly as possible. The only certainty
was there would be delays, despite the
best intentions of military planners.
The large size of the Canadian forces,
a global shortage of shipping, the
decision to return Canadian units
via England where movements were
delayed by dockworkers’ strikes,
limited Canadian port facilities, and
overcrowded Canadian railways
would complicate and prolong the
withdrawal of units from Europe.\(^12\)
In fact, the first Canadian division
to leave France for England did not
embark at le Havre until 9 February
1919.\(^13\)

With the end of the fighting,
military and political planners
worried about soldier morale and
discipline. Both Prime Minister Sir
Robert Borden and General Currie
knew that bored soldiers would find
ways to create trouble. Thus, Borden
was willing to commit the Canadian
Corps to the Army of Occupation,
at least temporarily, because it
would engage the troops in a useful
activity until they could be brought
home.\(^14\) Canada’s involvement in the
occupation of Germany was never
meant to be a long-term commitment.
As soon as it could be arranged, the
four Canadian divisions would leave
Europe.\(^15\)

Borden viewed the occupation
as an appropriate role for Canada
within the British Empire, one that
would raise the country’s profile.\(^16\) In
the aftermath of the First World War,
he favoured the active participation
of Canada in international affairs
to sustain and develop the status
the Dominion had won during
the war as a leading member of
the British Empire.\(^15\) In 1918 and
1919, Borden was seeking ways for
Canada to distinguish itself and gain
international prestige. Involvement
in the occupation of Germany was a
chance for the Dominion to shine on
the world stage and garner the world
attention he desired.

During the planning phase for
the occupation, 11-17 November
1918, Canadian military leadership
knew the march to Germany was
going to be difficult. Huge logistical
obstacles needed to be overcome to
feed and supply the 107,000 Canadian
soldiers and 25,000 horses about to
walk across most of Belgium. Yet,
corps logisticians had reason to be
confident. General Currie and his staff
fully recognized the importance of
logistical support and corps logistics
had dramatically improved during
the last year of fighting. From April
1918 onwards, a number of positive
changes had been implemented. The
supply column and ammunition park
were amalgamated into divisional
Mechanical Transport Companies.
Extra transportation capacity was
added at the divisional level resulting
in one hundred more trucks per unit
and greater mobility than their British
counterparts. The pool of labour
dedicated to supply and engineering
was vastly increased. This large
supply of labour meant that the
engineers no longer had to beg,
borrow or steal men from combat
units to complete their various
tasks. Finally, an affiliation between
Canadian officers and closely knit
teamwork had developed during
the course of the conflict as General
Currie resisted pressure to break
up his corps. This familiarity led to
greater trust between officers and
more efficiency in the system.

Streamlined administration, more
trucks and more men produced better
results. Damaged infrastructure such
as train tracks, roads and bridges
could be repaired or replaced quickly
and efficiently. The infantry and
artillery were adequately supplied
during the set-piece attacks of 1918
and it was now possible to pursue
the enemy in more mobile warfare.
For example, the Battle of Amiens on
8 August 1918 was a small logistics
success. It was not easy, but the
combined logistical system provided
supplies and ammunition for the first
hours of action and rapid advance.
Canal du Nord on 27 September
was perhaps the best example of the
manner in which logistical capacity
for swift moving, complex operations
had developed. The engineers quickly
placed footbridges across the canal
for infantry, and built pontoon
bridges and roads for the artillery.
In fact, the success of the whole
operation depended on how rapidly
large forces and vast quantities of
supplies could be pushed across a
limited number of canal crossings
and sustain the fast-moving, multi-
pronged offensive.

Yet, for all the improvements
made to the logistics system during
1918, deficiencies still existed and
came to light when the system
was under duress. For example, a
huge problem with road congestion
occurred during the move to the
Amiens sector in July and August
1918. Stockpiling sufficient supplies
before the Amiens offensive proved
difficult due to the erratic arrival
times of the ammunition trains at
the corps’ railheads and the long
distances to the refilling points.
As the operation progressed and
troops advanced further from their
supply bases strains appeared in the
system. It was a struggle to establish new ammunition and refuelling points and there were not enough men to clear the ammunition from the railheads. Pack trains arrived late, often delayed by 48 hours, so the infantry went hungry. At the Canal du Nord, serious problems occurred at the level of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The ammunition trains and divisional pack trains strained to keep up with the heavy demand and often arrived late. These problems in turn affected the Canadian Corps. On 1 October several lorries of ammunition failed to arrive for 1st Canadian Division and the resumption of the scheduled attack had to be cancelled.

The point is that logistical problems were nothing new to the Canadian Corps when it joined the Army of Occupation. It had already faced road congestion, erratic arrival of supply trains, shortages of food and ammunition, severely damaged infrastructure, lack of labour, and the difficulties associated with lengthening supply lines. During the final 100 Days, these issues were overcome, but the persistence of similar challenges during the march into Germany demanded undiminished effort.

Canadian logisticians implemented significant changes in preparation for the advance to the Rhine. From 13 to 17 November, the system was streamlined, thereby easing the provisioning of the troops. To add flexibility and capacity, Mechanical Transport Companies were placed under divisional command and allotted extra trucks. Additional contingents of soldiers were detailed to unload at the supply refuelling points. Railheads were moved as far forward as possible. Engineer brigades and machine gun battalions were sent to march as one unit. Specialized units, such as salvage companies, trench mortar brigades and burial parties, were disbanded and the soldiers ordered to return to their original units. To complement the organizational adjustments, some sacrifices had to be made. Stores of ammunition and divisional canteen supplies were cut. The plan to carry the infantry’s packs on trucks was scrapped. Unfit horses and remounts were left behind. All extra leave was cancelled and the divisions would be unable to supply showers or underclothes for the men.

With a logistics plan in place, attention turned to another matter of great importance – the maintenance of discipline. Because specific information regarding the German military and political situation was unavailable, the march was to be held under wartime conditions. Allied military planners were uncertain if the armistice would hold and could only speculate on what reception the occupation forces would receive once inside Germany. The Allied armies also had a reputation to maintain. Discipline was essential not only to maintain fighting efficiency, but also to avoid international embarrassments. Specific references to troop discipline featured in almost every set of orders issued from 11 to 17 November. In British GHQ’s “Orders for the Advance” of 11 November, the very first item was the following: “The maintenance of discipline is of the highest concern during the period following cessation of hostilities. Breaches of discipline were to be repressed firmly and immediately.”

General Currie was concerned with the reputation of his corps. At a meeting on 12 November at Canadian Corps HQ, Currie drew attention to the necessity of upholding the “smart and soldierly-like appearance” of all the troops and avoiding laxity in saluting.

In General Currie’s “Special Order of the Day,” 25 November 1918, he encouraged his forces to maintain a good appearance:

> Above all, it is of capital importance to establish in Germany the sense of your overwhelming moral and physical standing, so as to complete by your presence of your potential strength, the victories you have won on the Field of Battle. All external signs of discipline must be insisted upon.

Thus, during the armistice period, the Canadian Corps wanted to project an image of impeccable military correctness and professionalism. The Dominion’s involvement with such a high profile mission was a chance for the young country to share the international spotlight.

On the cold, wet morning of 18 November, the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions commenced their march, relieving the examining posts of the 3rd Canadian Division and assuming responsibility for the front. Despite the poor weather, the march initially proceeded according to plan. After two days of rest 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions again continued the advance on 21 November and reached the general line Gosselies–Nivelles–Lillois. However, problems were already starting to appear. The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions’ marches for 21 November were cancelled. The supplies for 2nd Canadian Division were very late, making it necessary for the division’s quartermaster to draw dry rations. Later, the scheduled marches for 22 and 23 November were cancelled for all Canadian divisions. Many were left wondering what was going on.

The British Army, which was supplying the Canadian Corps, faced huge logistical problems that were complex and difficult to solve in the short-term. For the march to Germany, the British quartermasters relied upon trains to supply the approximately eight hundred thousand soldiers of Second and Fourth Armies. Under normal circumstances, supplies from a base would be brought forward by train to the closest railheads. Trucks would then move the goods to supply refuelling points where they were
picked up by the divisions, using another set of trucks. The problem at the outset of the march was the delay of the trains in getting to the railheads. Fighting along the Western Front had destroyed most of the railways in an area varying in depth from 30 to 50 kilometres and extending the length of the British area in France. Military rail lines were promptly laid across the gap, but these could not handle the same volume of traffic as civilian lines. Furthermore, the quick repair of existing civilian lines proved almost impossible, the damage being so severe, and this placed an extra burden on functioning civilian and military rail lines. To further complicate matters, French and Belgian civilian traffic and armies in the midst of demobilization were hindering the movement of trains in the rear areas. All of these factors, coupled with a shortage of adequate rolling stock and locomotives, proved insurmountable and the British Army was forced to alter their plans for the occupation.

British supply problems affected the Canadian Corps in two ways. First, the original march timetable was scrapped and a new one issued. Second, the composition of the Army of Occupation was altered and only half of the selected divisions would proceed. On 23 November, General Currie received instructions stating that Canadian Corps HQ, 1st Canadian Division, 2nd Canadian Division and Canadian Corps Troops would move to the Rhine. The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions would remain in Belgium and were transferred to IV Corps of Fourth Army on 24 November.

With a more sustainable number of divisions moving forward, the slimmed down Canadian Corps continued its trek across Belgium. From 24 to 28 November, it advanced four out of the five days. It was a punishing pace as the men marched for seven to eight hours each day, covering distances ranging from 20 to 30 kilometres. At times, the men arrived so late they had to find their billets by flare light. On the road the troops had to carry a heavy load: full packs, a rifle, a blanket, ammunition and their steel helmets. Blistered feet and worn-out boots were common and many soldiers were evacuated with crippled feet. The mud and continual drizzle were depressing and the marching on second and third class roads difficult. To add to the discomfort, clean clothing, canteen supplies and proper showering facilities were unavailable most days. The extra chores such as
mending, laundry, cooking and washing made a long march seem even longer. These discomforts were exacerbated by acts of random destruction by the retreating German army. In violation of the armistice agreement, German forces damaged the road and rail networks and detonated ammunition dumps. In some cases, entire switching yards, sections of rail and bridges were rendered useless. The German retreat through Belgium was not marked by a sustained campaign of destruction, but particular acts of demolition caused headaches and delays for the advancing Canadians.

Canadian soldiers had little choice but to accept the punishing pace. A peace treaty had not yet been signed, so Marshal Ferdinand Foch, supreme commander of the Allied armies, wanted to control as much German territory as possible in case hostilities resumed. Further, the armistice was set to expire on 17 December, 36 days after it was signed. Marshal Foch wanted the Armies of Occupation in place, firmly entrenched in their bridgeheads before the agreement ended. As a result, General Plumer’s orders of 26 November required the Canadian Corps to cross the German frontier on 1 December and the Rhine on 13 December. With a reputation to maintain the Canadian Corps could not afford to be late.

Relief from the boredom and exhaustion of marching in Belgium came whenever the Canadian Corps entered a town. At Nivelles, the vanguard of the 1st Canadian Division was greeted in the square by a dense crowd all cheering wildly. Colonel A.L Barry remembered that at Houdeng-Goegnies they were showered with flowers everywhere they went: “It was like Caesar returning triumphantly from Gaul.”

On 27 November, the Canadian Corps left the heavily populated lowlands of Belgium and began marching towards the Ardennes, in still more difficult conditions in the rugged and hilly region of eastern Belgium. Bad weather and muddy roads on 27 November were a hardship, and the celebrations were over; the journey became a depressing route march through a sparsely-settled district. On 28 November, after an exhausting march, Canadian soldiers arrived at their billets to find that the logistical structures had failed them yet again. As the march continued across Belgium, supply lines were stretched. The railhead supplying the Canadian Corps was still west of Valenciennes. To reach the leading troops, trucks needed to haul supplies for over 160 kilometres. The strain on the Mechanical Transport Companies was tremendous and delays were inevitable. Many trucks wore out due to wear and tear and a lack of spare parts, especially tires. Maintenance crews could not keep up with the volume of repairs. Furthermore, the muddy, narrow, twisting and unfamiliar roads caused the transport companies frequent misdirection and delays. As a result, from 28-30 November rations failed to arrive for some units of the 1st Canadian Division and the soldiers went hungry. Corps leadership had little choice but to cancel marches for 29-30 November. The 2nd Canadian Division fared better and continued its advance with sufficient supplies of food.

Most units coped with the strain of hard marches and insufficient rations in the Belgian Ardennes. As Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Cooper wrote:

The wagons are caked with mud, the steel is a bit rusty and we are all a little bedraggled. But the men are bearing up well. They are cheerful and smile, even though the road is tough.

When morale sagged and rations did not appear, the Canadian YMCA helped. Throughout the march, volunteers of the YMCA set up free drink stations and canteens at each rest stop that had been set up ahead of the line of march. Nevertheless, in some units thoughts turned to mutiny. As the Canadian Corps exited the Ardennes and approached the German frontier, platoons of the 29th Canadian Infantry Battalion refused to parade until they received a proper meal. The commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel H.S. Tobin, handled the situation well and cancelled the parade because of rain (only one rain drop was felt that morning). He ordered the

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**Canadian soldiers line up to receive hot drinks and other treats from a YMCA Canteen.**
men to polish kit in their barracks. Meanwhile, Lieutenant S. Fletcher of “A” Company managed to procure some supplies. By evening, after a good hot meal of Mulligan stew, mutinous thoughts in the battalion had evaporated.54 Elsewhere, three platoons of the 16th Canadian Battalion also refused to parade when rations were short. In this instance, the battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel C.W. Peck, who had recently been awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions in September, talked to the men and the insubordinate platoons fell in and reached the battalion parade ground on time.55 It is unlikely that any soldiers of either the 29th or 16th Canadian Battalions seriously considered mutiny, but when food fails to appear there is bound to be some grumbling.

The Canadian Corps approached the German border on 3 December: 1st Canadian Division at Petit Their; and 2nd Canadian Division at Beho. The crossing into German territory on 4 December was planned as a highly symbolic spectacle. General Currie issued a “Special Order of the Day” calling on all units to maintain strict discipline and not show any weakness whether on the march or at rest.56 The soldiers were reminded not to fraternize and to respect private property and the billets they would occupy.57 All kit had to be mended and polished. It was clear that Currie’s intent was to project an image of soldierly perfection. On the morning of 4 December, with Union Jacks and regimental colours flying, the Canadians crossed into Germany to the sound of pipe bands playing “O Canada” and “Maple Leaf Forever.”58 Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Cooper captured the mood when he wrote, “The wildest Canadian dream has been to march to the Rhine and here today we are well on our way to Prussian soil.”59 By nightfall, both divisions had crossed the border.

Unexpectedly, the inhabitants of the Rhineland seemed almost
relieved to see the British and Canadian forces. Unbeknownst to the Canadians, for many Germans, the Armies of Occupation represented stability and order in a country full of confusion. From November 1918 to January 1919, Germany teetered on the brink of political and economic anarchy. Bolshevists and Spartacists threatened to tear the country apart. Although an armistice had been signed, the naval blockade of Germany remained in force and this meant dangerously low food supplies and a lack of raw materials to fuel the German economy which in turn led to massive layoffs. Added to this volatile mix was the return of thousands of soldiers who increased further the high levels of unemployment.

During their first day and night in Germany, Canadian soldiers observed two characteristics of the German people they encountered. The first was the cold and aloof reception from the local population, in marked contrast to the festive atmosphere of the Belgian towns. The second notable thing was the compliant attitude of local civil officials. Local officials had in fact been ordered by the central government to cooperate with the Army of Occupation. Newspapers published the government's edicts, spelling out to the people exactly what was expected of them: make room for the enemy, no fraternization, be friendly but distant. Local Catholic priests preached the same points from the pulpit.

After the corps crossed the German frontier, it completed the march to the Rhine over the next eight days, from 5 to 12 December. Aside from continuing supply problems, this final leg was completed without incident. The 1st Canadian Division remained grounded on 5 December because its supplies had failed for a third time, on this occasion due to a train derailment between Valenciennes and Mons. The daily marches averaged 16 kilometres, shorter than the 20 to 30 kilometres in Belgium.
An urgent telephone call interrupted the routine of the march as the mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, pleaded for a quick occupation of his city. Adenauer feared civil unrest during the period between the withdrawal of the German Army and the arrival of the British. His fears were realized when the German Army withdrew on 3 December and food riots erupted in the city and continued through the next day. A mob of approximately 300 people looted stores and shops. The Cologne civic guard managed to restore order, but only by firing their machine guns above the crowd. Realizing the situation was rapidly deteriorating, General Plumer ordered a small contingent of British cavalry and armoured cars to enter Cologne and seize strategic points on 6 December. General Plumer also ordered the 28th Brigade Group – including the Royal Newfoundland Regiment – to move to the suburbs of Cologne by rail. Thus, the first elements of the British Army reached the Rhine on 6 December 1918, unheralded and without much fanfare.

Three days later the first Canadian troops reached the Rhine. The full strength of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions arrived by 12 December. It was almost miraculous that the artillery arrived on time, having had to march over 40 kilometres in one day to make up for delays. The 1st Canadian Division was allotted billets in the towns and suburbs south and west of Cologne and the 2nd Canadian Division in villages west of Bonn. The soldiers must have been pleased: the long march was over; proper barracks, showering facilities, and good food were now available.

Friday, 13 December was set as the date for all the Armies of Occupation to cross the Rhine. This was an occasion of great significance, more so than the crossing of the German frontier. As S.D. MacGowan wrote in New Brunswick’s Fighting 26th:

For the Canadians, it was one of the high points during the ravaging war and they were determined to parade at their best. It was a symbolic triumphant ending of the conflict, a proud and well-disciplined victor versus the humbled enemy. This spectacular march was a peaceful way for the Canadians to indicate their supremacy.

The morning of the 13th dawned dark and a steady rain poured down the whole day. The leading troops of the Canadian Corps were soaked as they crossed into the German heartland. With their bayonets fixed, colours flying, and bands playing, the infantry marched over the river. General Plumer took the salutes as the 1st Canadian Division crossed the Rhine by the South Bridge in Cologne. Meanwhile at Bonn Bridge, General Currie stood for five hours taking the salutes from the soldiers of the 2nd Canadian Division. To the infantry’s relief, their heavy packs were being carried in trucks.

It took three more days of short marches for all units to reach their final areas of responsibility. Most units were in place by 16 December, just hours before the armistice was set to expire. At long last, the Canadian Corps’ long march was over.

The focus now turned to planning for the defence of the Cologne bridgehead. Lieutenant-
General Currie and his staff received directives from both Marshal Foch and General Plumer, but the details of the deployment were left to Currie. Foch and Plumer instructed the corps commanders to keep the damage of local property to a minimum, to not advance past the 30 kilometre perimeter, and to deploy forces to facilitate reinforcement from west to east. Furthermore, owing to the dense population in the bridgehead, General Plumer decided that it was necessary to locate the majority of the Canadian Corps forces east of the Rhine. The exception to this principle was a force necessary to hold the left bank. General Currie also incorporated a variety of geographical features into the Canadian Corps’ defence scheme.

Each divisional area had the following defensive features: an outpost line – to control all exits and approaches to and from the perimeter; a main line of resistance – composed of defended localities (if available) sited on the main tactical features of the area; and a support line, also based on defended localities. The defences featured infantry, artillery and machine gun positions. Each brigade posted one battalion on the outpost line; two battalions in the main and support lines; and, one battalion was held in divisional reserve. In support of the infantry, two brigades of heavy artillery took up positions on the high ground near Rosrath and Hangelar respectively. The remaining three brigades of heavy artillery were assigned to counterbattery work and were positioned at Altenrath, Walsdorf, and an area near Rolandseck. Finally, two battalions of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps (CMGC) were located in an intermediate area, between the outpost line and the main line of resistance. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades (CMMGB) remained in corps reserve.

Not only did the occupation troops have to defend the bridgehead, but they also faced the daunting prospect of governing the people in their areas. Because no one could foresee with certainty whether hostilities might be renewed, martial law was declared and the military forces took direct responsibility for preserving law and order. The army commanders drastically reduced the civil liberties of the German population, but still followed all the provisions of the Hague Convention.

General Plumer adopted a policy of minimal interference in his guidelines for the administration of population. Civilian institutions were to continue; civilian authorities – the German police and courts – would enforce local laws and those passed by the military government. Yet, the British Army’s presence was clearly established by a new layer of courts imposed upon the German people. Summary courts and courts martial were established and staffed by the military authorities for transgressions against orders issued by the military government, or for offences against the military authority’s personnel or property. The penalties could be stiff: fines of up to 5,000 marks, prison, or death.

The rules imposed on the German people were necessarily strict, to
control people’s movements, prevent espionage, and encourage respectful behaviour towards the British Army. All civilian rail, road and pedestrian traffic from the occupied territory to Germany (or any other country) was denied. Postal and telegraph communications were permitted, but heavily censored. But of all the new rules and regulations German citizens probably most hated two – a dusk to dawn curfew (1900 to 0600 hours) and the requirement of men to tip their cap to Allied officers. Over time, however, the rules were relaxed. Limits on movement within Allied territory were eased and the curfew was pushed back to midnight. To most Germans’ relief, the requirement to remove hats in the presence of occupation troops ended on 1 January 1919.

The system of administration imposed upon the German public was effective and did not burden the average Canadian soldier. Most military work associated with garrison duty was minimal, routine and boring. Patrol and guard duty were the most common tasks assigned to the Canadian Corps. The chief annoyance was restricting civilian movements between occupied territories and those still under German control. The lack of interpreters and a population unfamiliar with the rules caused many headaches for the soldiers on the outpost line. Smuggling was also a concern as a thriving black market for luxury goods and foodstuffs tempted some Germans to sneak contraband through Canadian lines. The busiest Canadian soldiers, however, proved to be the engineers, who repaired and constructed roads, bridges, sanitary facilities, and gun emplacements.

Boredom and idleness became a serious issue. Officers recognized this and numerous education and entertainment programs were offered. At some levels of command, support for the educational scheme was strong. Canadian Corps HQ encouraged brigadiers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to give their “personal attention” to establishing a system of education and to arrange suitable hours for lectures and classes. The battalions were greatly assisted in their educational efforts by the Khaki University of Canada. Initially, the educational scheme met with some resistance below the corps level of command. Battalion officers were sceptical and when teachers were found, the officers were loath to take on extra responsibilities. Most coveted by the troops were day passes to Cologne or Bonn. In the cities, Canadian soldiers could enjoy the baths, the cinema and the shops. At the battalion level, sightseeing trips were organized to Cologne, Bonn, the Drachenfels and Koblenz. Tickets to a performance of the “See Toos” concert party were popular; free tickets to the opera were not. The YMCA established canteen services, clubs, reading rooms and several theatres all of which were greatly enjoyed.

Canadian Corps HQ had promised to look after the comforts of their soldiers and on paper they did so. In reality the troops were
largely confined to the small towns in which they were billeted, and these offered little scope for diversion. The YMCA resources were limited and often could not reach the majority of soldiers scattered throughout the bridgehead. The brigades tried to organize concert parties, but largely without success. Some battalions arranged sightseeing trips and other excursions to urban centres, but the majority did not. For entertainment, Canada’s soldiers were largely left to their own devices.

After the regular fatigue had finished, sports became the prime pastime. Nearby fields were converted into soccer pitches and baseball diamonds. Inter-company and inter-battalion soccer matches were scheduled. The largest organized sporting event by far was held on 18 January – an interdivisional Sports Day between 2nd Canadian Division and 42nd American Division. As with the education scheme and other entertainments, sports events were designed to keep soldiers busy and out of trouble.

The system of military administration coupled with the official and unofficial distractions for the soldiers proved generally effective. No major clashes between the Canadian military and the German public occurred and daily life went on much as always. There was little friendliness between the soldiers and inhabitants, but the discipline of the Canadian forces and the fairness of their behaviour were gratefully acknowledged by the townspeople. The desire of Prime Minister Borden and General Currie for an incident-free occupation would not be met. Canadian soldiers still managed to find trouble. The most infamous event occurred in Cologne on the evening of 26 December and resulted in the Canadian Corps being temporarily barred from the city. The exact nature of the incident is unknown, but the following morning Canadian Corps HQ received a telegram from General Sir Charles Ferguson, the British area military governor:

Owing to continued misbehaviour of Canadian troops they will be confined to the Canadian Corps Area from 27th inst inclusive except when on duty. The Canadian Corps will piquet all exits from their area and in particular the entrance into the town of Cologne which is placed out of bounds to Canadians.

Essentially, General Ferguson had turned the entire Canadian Corps Area into a prison camp. General Currie was furious because the Canadians’ reputation had been called into question. He responded with a letter to General Plumer, the ultimate authority in the British sector. After assuring General Ferguson of his compliance with the order, Currie wrote:

To receive the order that Cologne was out of bounds to Canadians would not have hurt, and I would have appreciated the Military Governor giving me privately his reasons for so doing, but to state that owing to continued misbehaviour the Canadian Troops were to be confined to the Canadian Corps Area can be considered nothing short of insulting. The only people who are confined in an area with pickets guarding all exits are criminals awaiting trial or serving their sentence, and I submit the Canadian Corps does not deserve this treatment. … The wording of this order is most bitterly resented, and I consider it should be withdrawn.

In a meeting on 27 December, Currie put the matter before Plumer, demanding nothing less than a full apology from Ferguson. Plumer tried to laugh off the incident, but the matter was so serious to Currie that he threatened to take the matter directly to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. Ferguson’s apology arrived the next day and the reputation of the Canadian Corps, while battered, remained intact.

Despite the best efforts of the corps’ leadership to maintain strict discipline, some serious breaches of conduct happened and a small number of Canadians faced court martial. A survey of the infantry battalion and brigade courts martial records for the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions from 11 November 1918 to 31 January 1919 reveals that 20 soldiers were formally charged. The three most frequent charges were disobeying a superior officer, being...
absent without leave (AWOL) and drunkenness. Twenty cases is not a large number considering the number of soldiers involved – approximately 50,000. It is likely that two factors were to account for the low number of courts martial. First, the soldiers of the Canadian Corps were engaged in active service in unfamiliar territory during a state of apprehended war. Second, the educational scheme, entertainments, sports and other distractions were somewhat effective. Furthermore the 20 court martial cases were related to the maintenance of discipline, and had little to do with the German population. For example, on 9 December Private George Auger of the 27th Canadian Battalion was convicted of disobeying a superior officer. His crime was taking seven biscuits instead of four from an offered plate and refusing to give them back. On 20 December 1918, Private Eugene Bisonnett of the 29th Battalion was convicted of disobeying the lawful command of a superior officer. He had refused to wash the company cook wagon when ordered. These two cases and many others demonstrate the benign nature of most of the crimes prosecuted.

Anything exotic in the experience of occupying German territory soon lost its appeal and demobilization plans quickly became the soldiers’ focus. The Canadian government, for sake of administrative expediency and lower costs, wanted to break up units and repatriate individuals based on length of service and marital status. That policy, Currie warned, would quickly break down discipline and morale in the corps, and greatly hamper support services. Currie prevailed. The Canadian Corps would return by units from England, where many of the men wanted leave to visit friends and family before returning to Canada. The question remained, however, which of Canada’s four divisions would be sent home first.

On 16 December, the Canadian Corps received some good news. Just as 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions had established themselves in the bridgehead, General Currie received the following telegram asking his views:

War Office order GHQ [to] dispatch 400 men daily this month, 17,500 in January and 20,000 each succeeding month, and that two Canadian divisions be released for this purpose. GHQ desire 3rd Division to go in January – this owing to railway situation – and 1st Division in February. Currie would have preferred to send the divisions home based on the order in which they had arrived in Europe, yet, it was impossible to have the 1st Canadian Division concentrated near the French coast in time for it to leave in January. Thus, Currie reluctantly arranged for 3rd Canadian Division to be demobilized first. These demobilization plans were possible because by late December the logistics network in Western Europe was in much better repair and under less pressure. Thus the 1st Canadian Division

Above right: Soldiers of the 13th Canadian Infantry Battalion cheer as they board a train to start the long journey home.

Right: A pipe band leads the 15th Canadian Infantry Battalion to the train station as they depart Germany.
Division began withdrawing from the Rhineland on 7 January and 2nd Canadian Division on 19 January. Officially, Canada’s commitment to the occupation ended on 26 January 1919 as command of the Cologne bridgehead was handed over to X Corps at 1600 hours.

There is little doubt that Canada’s soldiers were anxious to get home as quickly as possible. John A. Cooper wrote:

We were not glad to come, we were not anxious to stay, we were not sorry to go. Of course it is an honour to the Canadian Corps to have crossed the Rhine. It will be memorable in the history of some units. Nevertheless, as individuals we would just as soon have passed up the honour.113

Currie as well noted the troops’ desire to leave: “They are very anxious to get home... We all want to get away from [the occupation] and are very glad that early in January we are to be moved.”114 Some soldiers had enjoyed their time in Germany. It had the effect of rounding off their experience, establishing awareness that the German Army had actually been defeated and that they themselves had taken part in that accomplishment. There may have been a tinge of regret when the Canadian Corps returned to Belgium. Their Belgian hosts had grown weary of soldiers, even their liberators, as their country had been continuously occupied since 1914. The soldiers of the Canadian Corps did not want to stop in Belgium, but would have preferred to carry on straight through to England and Canada. Their sojourn in Germany had ended and their duties were complete. All that was left was to return to Canada. For that trip home, however, the Canadian soldiers would have to wait a few more months.

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The Canadian presence in the Rhineland lasted for only a brief period – a span of eight weeks from 4 December 1918 to 6 February 1919. Actual garrison duties lasted only three to five weeks. Despite its brevity, the march to and occupation of the Rhineland was a historic occasion for the Canadian Corps. Never before had they marched so far, approximately four hundred kilometres. This was the first time any British colony been asked to occupy the home territory of a European enemy. Yet, Canadian involvement in Germany was something of a fluke, a product of the unique circumstances existing in the aftermath of the First World War.

The divisions of the Canadian Corps were available for duties in Germany largely because shipping and, in Canada, rail capacity was unavailable for a quick repatriation in November 1918, which delayed the Canadian Corps’ demobilization plans. The British Army selected the corps for garrison duty precisely because it was available and Canadian.115 What the British Army needed in the aftermath of the First World War was time – time to demobilize its conscripted soldiers, reorganize, and occupy Germany with an all-volunteer force.116 The Canadian Corps, as well as other colonial forces, thus, in a small way, relieved some of the burdens on the British Army.

The most important factor affecting the Canadian advance to the Rhineland was logistics. The difficulties of supply forced 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions to remain in Belgium and when the pack trains failed to arrive, soldiers went hungry. They marched on muddy roads, in worn-out boots, without the chance to shower. Still, discipline could not slip. Professional comportment and appearance was essential to maintain the reputation of the corps and the country in a high-profile assignment that signalled Canada’s increasing role in international affairs. Overall the court martial records indicate good behaviour on the part of the troops, albeit with some notable exceptions.

Upon the conclusion of the First World War, Canadian soldiers desired nothing more than a quick return home. Yet, there was a sense of satisfaction when they learned they were to occupy Germany, a role that visibly recognized the part of Canada’s citizen soldiers in defeating the Germans. Despite the
hard marches, short rations and an indifferent German public, Canadian soldiers considered it an honour to be part of the Army of Occupation. The Canadian Corps’ brief commitment in the Rhineland was a mark of distinction, one to be remembered for many years to come.

Notes


2. War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, 1 November 1918, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG 9, III D3, vol.4847; War Diary, 3rd Canadian Division General Staff, 11 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4855.

3. The Americans are included in all references to the Allies, even though they were not technically part of the Entente Cordiale of 1907, but rather, as President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed, an “associated power.”

4. The four occupying powers were Belgium, Britain (including several of the self-governing dominions), the United States and France.

5. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were formally transferred to Second British Army on 12 November 1918. Colonel W.W. Murray, The History of the 29th Canadian Battalion in the Great War 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Mortimer Ltd., 1947), p.323.

6. There are a number of other reasons for the occupation of the Rhineland: to compel German diplomats to negotiate in good faith at the upcoming peace conference, to secure France’s border, and to demonstrate to the German public that their country lost the war.


9. War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, 9-11 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4818.11.49.


24. Major S.S. Lawson, “MT during the Last 100 days,” p.2.

25. Lawson, “MT during the Last 100 days,” pp.2-3.


28. “Administrative Instructions Issued in Connection with the March of the 2nd Canadian Division to the Rhine,” War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA&QMG, 15 November 1918, RG 9, III D3, vol.4850, AQS4-33.


32. War Diary, 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 18 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4891.


34. War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA&QMG, 21 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4850.

35. War Diary, Canadian Corps AA&QMG, 9 December 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4822, 615QA.


40. War Diary, 1st Canadian Battalion, 27 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4913.

41. War Diary, 1st Canadian Battalion, 18 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4913. Occasionally, extra trucks were available to carry the soldiers’ packs. However, for most of the march the men had to carry their packs.

42. All first class and most second class roads had been allotted to the artillery and transport brigades.

43. War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division AA&QMG, 26 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4850.

44. John A. Cooper, “From Mons to the Rhine with Canada’s Army,” Toronto Daily Star, 25 January 1918. (The report was filed 8 December 1918).

45. Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland, Appendix 1, pp.327-34. The Armistice was renewed on 18 December 1918, 16 January 1919 and 17 February 1919, each time extending the military occupation of Germany.

46. Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland, p.86.


49. War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division Mechanical Transport Company, 14 April 1918 – 30 April 1919, LAC, RG9, III D3, vol.5022.

50. War Diary, 1st Canadian Division AA&QMG, 30 November 1918, LAC, RG9, III D3, vol.4840.

51. War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, 30 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4837.

52. War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, 1 December 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol.4847.

53. John A. Cooper, Toronto Daily Star, 28 January 1919, p.3. (The report was filed 11 December 1918).


57. War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division A&QMG, 15 November 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4850, AQ56-34.


59. John A. Cooper, *Toronto Daily Star*, 25 January 1919. (The report was filed 8 December 1918.)


62. A Burgomeister is roughly the equivalent of a town or city mayor, one who is appointed by the central government. He is the chief civil official.


64. “To the Rhine: British Troops in Germany,” *London Times*, 4 December 1918. (The report was filed 1 December 1918.)


67. War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, 5 December 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837.


72. “Order has been Restored in Cologne,” *Halifax Morning Chronicle*, 7 December 1918.


75. War Diary, Canadian Corps General Staff, 11 December 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4818.

76. War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, 9 December 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837; War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, 9 December 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847.


79. War Diary, 1st Canadian Division General Staff, 12 December 1918, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4837, G.3-105/8, Operation Order No. 316.


83. Sir Arthur Currie Papers, LAC, MG 30, E100, vol. 58, Canadian Corps Defence Scheme: Cologne Bridgehead – Germany Appendix B: Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery Defence Scheme of the Occupied Area East of the Rhine, 2 January 1919.


92. John A. Cooper, “Canadians Restless in Hun Territory,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 4 February 1919, 10. (The report was filed 31 December 1918.)


94. War Diary, 2nd Canadian Division General Staff, 18 January 1919, LAC, RG 9, III D3, vol. 4847.


110. MacMillan 42.


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