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The Problem of Religion in Canadian Forces Postings

Liebmann vs the Minister of National Defence et al.

J.L. Granatstein

This paper was written in March 1998 as a brief to support the plaintiff in a case against the Minister and Department of National Defence. I appeared as a witness and spoke to this brief, prepared using secondary sources and documents provided by the Department of Justice, the government's lawyers, to Lieutenant (Navy) Andrew Liebmann's counsel. Unfortunately, the judicial decision went against Liebmann.

In 1991 at the time of the Gulf War, Canadian Navy Lieutenant Andrew S. Liebmann sought and was offered a posting as Executive Assistant to Commodore Ken Summers, the Commander of Canadian Forces Middle East. The Government of Canada had placed the naval, air, and ground forces despatched to the Gulf on active service, and for the first time since the Korean War, Canada's armed forces were going to war.

Lieutenant (N) Liebmann, however, was not to go with them. Although the Gulf campaign was a war, not peacekeeping, the regular practice of the Canadian Forces of ascertaining the religion and ethnic origin of members being despatched on peacekeeping appears to have been followed in Liebmann's case, though perhaps mistakenly (as the Department of National Defence (DND) alleges). This practice of screening had been in effect for peacekeeping forces in the Middle East since 1956 and in Cyprus since 1964 and possibly since Canada first joined the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization [UNTSO] on the Arab-Israeli borders in February 1954. Being identified

as a Jew, Lieutenant Liebmann's posting, for which he had been instructed to ready himself, was cancelled for reasons that remain in dispute. The question at issue, however, is no longer what happened to Liebmann and why. Instead, the key question now is whether the policy of screening Canadian Forces personnel for peacekeeping operations on the basis of religion and ethnicity is a reasonable limit in accordance with section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that can be demonstrably justified in a democratic society.

I am a historian, not a lawyer, and the historian's first recourse is to the published literature. While there are some studies of First and Second World War policies, other than National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) Instruction Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) documents and Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAOs), regrettably there is quite literally nothing in print that touches on the Canadian Forces' policy of screening personnel despatched on peacekeeping operations – let alone into combat – to ensure that no one's religion, ethnicity, or gender might

cause upset in the host country or possibly hinder the effectiveness of the Canadian contingent. Nor do I have access to recent DND documents other than those disclosed for this case by the Department of Justice. For the purpose of this evidence, however, I have read the DCDS and CFAO documents and conducted interviews with some individuals who have relevant knowledge, and I have done research on past aspects of Canada's military policy and operations that bear on this case.

The Great War

The Canadian Forces in the 20th century have long practiced a discriminatory policy in enlistments. During the Great War, there were numerous examples of such policy, though it was never formalized, being motivated more by the prejudices of those in command or in the Cabinet at any one time. The government worried about the difficulties involved in recruiting recent immigrants into the army, fearing problems with language and, more seriously, worried over the enemy alien status of some. In

1916, for example, a proposal to raise a Polish battalion in Canada was rejected, in part because of a rumour that a Danish-Canadian in the Canadian Expeditionary Force had deserted to the Germans and revealed information. Proposals to raise a battalion of Japanese Canadians received similarly short shrift though, perhaps because Japan was an ally and warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy operated patrols on the West Coast until 1917, individuals were allowed to enlist and 196 fought overseas. Chinese Canadians also enlisted in small numbers. The British Columbia provincial government was markedly unenthusiastic about the enlistment of Japanese and Chinese Canadians, primarily because it feared that military service would entitle those who served to the right to vote. Indeed, in the 1917 federal election, soldiers overseas, whatever their ethnicity, did cast ballots. This cut no ice in provincial politics, however, and Japanese and Chinese Canadian veterans did not get the British Columbia franchise.

The Minister of Militia and Defence also expressed concern that native Canadians might not receive "the privileges of civilized warfare" in the front lines or if taken prisoner; his Chief of the General Staff feared, on the other hand, that Indians could not withstand the rigours of trench warfare and might fight among themselves. And when the government, increasingly desperate for men, tried to encourage black enlistments, General Gwatkin, the Chief of the General Staff objected in April 1916: "The civilized negroe [sic] is vain and imitative...the average white man will not associate with him on terms of equality." The latter part of that comment was likely true. In the end a construction unit of African-Canadians was raised and sent to France, while many individuals served in infantry battalions.

The Canadian government also connived at the recruitment of United States citizens before American entry to the war in April 1917, though some in Ottawa worried about such activities, and not only for fear of diplomatic repercussions. The Governor-General, the elderly Duke of Connaught, for example, was concerned in 1916 that "experience has so far shown that American citizens do not always make the best of soldiers." Whatever could have created that fear, other than sheer anti-Americanism, was unimaginable.

During the Great War, some thousands of nursing sisters aside, women were not recruited for service in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This has provoked the ire of a few present day Canadian feminist historians. In the widely used university text, *History of the Canadian Peoples* by Margaret Conrad et al., such "exclusionary" policies were denounced for increasing the reinforcement shortages at the front. "Despite the eagerness of some women to go overseas," the authors state without offering any evidence, "they were unwelcome on the front lines." That women were unwelcome as combatants is clearly so; what the textbook authors fail to consider are the societal mores of the Great War era and the simple fact that none of the combatants on either side used women soldiers. The ongoing difficulties the Canadian Forces have in integrating women into combat units today suggest that the gender problem, while insoluble in the 1914-1918 war, continues.

The Second World War

The Canadian government followed roughly similar recruiting policies in the Second World War. Once again, women were not combatants, though in this war, the army, navy and air force recruited women – in all, 50,000 served – for a variety of behind-the-

lines roles designed to release men for front-line service. There was no overt discrimination against African-Canadians – the idea of a black construction battalion was no longer acceptable to the Canadian public, and blacks volunteered or were conscripted as were other Canadians. Once again, native Canadians were encouraged to volunteer and large numbers did so. However, there was substantial resistance by Canadian Indians to the conscription for home defence provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act 1940. Band leaders argued that Indians constituted nations within the Canadian nation and thus were not subject to compulsory military service. The resulting story is complex, but, Michael Stevenson, the one student of the subject, has noted that compulsion was enforced with "policies of apathy and indifference" in the face of a Native "resistance campaign." The results of the call-up of aboriginal Canadians were insignificant at best.

Overt discrimination was the policy faced by Chinese and Japanese Canadians. Although Canada actively encouraged enlistment from virtually every other group, barriers were placed in the way of Asians. In British Columbia, there had been longstanding and substantial prejudices against Japanese Canadians especially and secondarily against Chinese Canadians. In 1940, B.C.'s Attorney-General urged the federal government not to call up Japanese Canadians for military service: "if these men are called upon to perform the duties of citizens and bear arms for Canada, it will be impossible to resist the argument that they are entitled to the franchise." Those who had served overseas during the Great War had won the right to vote, and this concerned the British Columbia government. The federal government concurred and, for good measure, it also exempted Japanese and Chinese Canadians

from military training under the National Resources Mobilization Act. Prime Minister Mackenzie King explained the decision on the grounds that "the danger of the whole Oriental problem" made it essential to act on the wishes and judgment of the provincial government. After protests from within the federal government, however, Ottawa created a Special Committee on Orientals to report, among other things, on the question of military training. The Committee report (2 December 1940) recommended "most reluctantly and not unanimously" that "Canadians of Japanese race should not be given military training." Chinese Canadians too, the Committee recommended, should not be called upon for military service. On 9 January 1941, the Prime Minister accepted the Committee recommendations: henceforth, Japanese and Chinese Canadians would not be accepted for military service. This decision was enthusiastically received by white British Columbians. In fact, a few Asians were enlisted. Some joined up before the ban was put in place, and a Nisei was accepted into the Army's Forestry Corps in July 1941, two more joined the army later in the year, and so did a Chinese Canadian.

Curiously, after 7 December 1941 and the Canadian declaration of war against Japan, an interdepartmental committee in Ottawa recommended the enlistment of Asian Canadians – to avoid the sense of racial discrimination among Japanese and Chinese Canadians and, more important, to prevent envy among white Canadians at their compatriots' relief from military obligations. This recommendation was turned down by a Cabinet committee. The army appeared to concur, the Chief of the General Staff noting that "While Canadian born persons of Japanese origin may appear to be good Canadian citizens, they do, however, bear the appearance and characteristics of another race, which

immediately sets them apart from the average Canadian." When it was urged that those Japanese Canadians already enlisted be released from the service, the Cabinet War Committee agreed but suggested that the Army discharge them on "other than racial grounds." There is no evidence of such dismissals, but further enlistment was forbidden. A few Chinese Canadians did manage to enlist before, in 1944, Ottawa declared Chinese Canadians subject to call-up under the National Resources Mobilization Act. By January 1945, after requests had been received from Britain and Australia for Japanese interpreters, translators and specialists, the Canadian government allowed the enlistment of a small number of Japanese Canadians. It apparently mattered not at all that the United States Army had successfully raised a regiment of Japanese Americans for combat service in the European theatre of operations, service that was performed with high distinction. In all, 134 Japanese Canadians served during the war, a tribute to their loyalty to Canada despite the discrimination to which they had been subjected. There are no accurate figures for Chinese Canadian enlistment.

There is another point that deserves to be made. In the Second World War, the Canadian Forces enlisted 16,720 Jews. Substantial anti-Semitism existed in Canada, and early in the war, at least, this was particularly so in the Royal Canadian Navy. Edwin Goodman records in his memoirs that when he tried to enlist in the Navy, he was told, "Forget this program...I doubt that anyone who is Jewish will be an officer in this man's navy." As Goodman noted, "The navy was the one branch of the service that had a reputation for bigotry, but that later disappeared with the growing need for recruits." Others have written similarly.

Almost all of those Jews who served overseas fought in Europe

against Germany. I raise this because of Nazi policies toward Jews. While it is doubtful that Canadian authorities knew many details of the Holocaust until very late in the war, no one doubted Nazi hatred of Jews, but this neither prevented nor inhibited the Canadian government from putting Canadian Jews into action against Germany. All that was done to protect Jewish servicemen against Nazi vengeance was to stamp identity discs with "OD" (Other Denomination) rather than Hebrew or Jewish. Jewish veterans, including former Minister of National Defence Barney Danson, a Queen's Own Rifles officer in Normandy, have told me that they discussed their fate if captured by the Wehrmacht or the SS – few seem to have expected much mercy. As it turned out, however, the Germans abided by the Geneva Convention and did not treat Jewish Prisoners of War (there were 84 Canadian Jewish POWs) more harshly than others; when Canada sent them into action, however, none in authority knew that this would be the case.

Still, the government and armed forces had no other option. It was neither politically nor morally possible to exclude Canadian Jews from combat on the grounds that the Nazis might treat them differently than other POWs. All the Jews in the armed forces were volunteers (except for those conscripted under the National Resources Mobilization Act), and they asked nothing from their government that other Canadian servicemen did not. During the war, in other words, Canadian Jews served, fought, and risked death exactly as all Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airmen did. This was as it should have been.

Peacekeeping

The first Canadian peacekeepers went abroad in 1950 to serve with the United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan. This sending

of a handful of officers was followed, as noted above, by the despatch of an additional small number of observers to UNTSO along the borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1954. In the same year, Canada sent a substantial number of officers and enlisted men to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to serve on the International Control Commissions, the nation's first non-United Nations peacekeeping effort. Canada's first major deployment in the service of United Nations peacekeeping came on the heels of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for his invention of what might be called interpositional peacekeeping as a way of separating the attacking British-French-Israeli forces from the Egyptians. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the result, and Canada despatched a contingent of more than a thousand men.

There is an allusion in the transcript of evidence, taken for this case in 1996, of Colonel J.M. Snell that the religion of servicemen being considered for UNEF service might have been a factor in postings as early as 1957. I believe this to be very likely and can contribute one additional piece of data to this story. In 1960-1961, I was in my fourth year at the Royal Military College of Canada, my intention at that time being to serve on graduation as a regular Army officer. As part of my course in honours history, I was writing an undergraduate thesis on Canadian peacekeeping, and I secured access to some otherwise closed records at NDHQ, Ottawa, including nominal rolls of those personnel sent to UNEF between 1957 and 1960. I had no way of ascertaining the religion of Canadian personnel so I simply checked the rolls, looking for obvious Jewish names (a method also mentioned in the Snell's evidence). I recognized that this was a highly imperfect device, but I was interested

to see if there was a practical religious test being applied, not least because I wondered how my being Jewish in origin could affect my own military career. I found no such names and reported this in my thesis.¹ How significant this was, frankly, was unclear primarily because I had no idea how many Jews were then in the Canadian Forces. My own military career ended in 1966 and, as I never had the opportunity to serve on a Middle East peacekeeping mission, my nominal religion in no way affected my service.

As for post-UNEF Middle East peacekeeping, whatever the administrative orders, anything other than anecdotal evidence is very limited. I asked Barney Danson and Lieutenant-General (retired) Charles Belzile, a former commander of the Army, if they were aware of Jewish or other servicemen being barred from peacekeeping in the Middle East. Danson recalled one case that occurred during his time as Minister (1976-1979) when a Jewish soldier was dropped from a peacekeeping mission. There was a fuss and Danson, who believed this was improper, had the case re-examined. In the end, he said, the soldier was given the choice of proceeding and, after weighing all circumstances, decided to go. This seems a good solution.

Even before a written policy was formulated at NDHQ, Belzile recalled that when there were cases of potential difficulty on peacekeeping operations arising out of religion or ethnicity, the usual practice in his time as Army commander was to unofficially discourage the serviceman. He recalled the case of a Turkish-Canadian officer whose suitability for a posting to Cyprus was questioned. What would the Greek Cypriots say? What if the officer had relatives in Turkey, a NATO ally but scarcely a democracy, and was subjected to pressure as a result? Belzile indicated that there were discussions, including some with

the officer in question, presumably in an effort to dissuade the officer from accepting the posting. In the end, the officer was sent to Cyprus but his employment in the field was restricted. For example, he was not permitted to lead patrols into Greek Cypriot territory. This seems a perfectly sensible compromise, one that minimized any possible harm to the effectiveness of the Canadian force and one that would not hurt the career of the officer in question as might have occurred if he had been forbidden an overseas posting. Given Canada's 30 years in Cyprus and the centrality of peacekeeping to the Canadian Forces for much of the period from 1964 to 1994 that Canada had troops there, it is reasonable to believe that an officer barred from service in Cyprus might have suffered in his career.²

A Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Instruction (DCDS 9/83) formalized the Canadian Forces policy in 1983. While piously stating that there would be no posting restrictions "for purely ethnic, racial or religious reasons," the policy went on to suggest that "considerations of safety and neutrality...might exist or arise that could impede the effective functioning" of a peacekeeping force or the safety of an individual or other members of the force. To obviate this, the policy directed that "the personnel records of all CF members nominated for peacekeeping duties will be screened" prior to posting. "If it appears that ethnic, racial or religious considerations could cause significant difficulties in the peacekeeping theatre concerned, individuals may be precluded from selection for such duties." The policy also allowed for the recall of personnel if their race, religion or ethnicity is found to cause problems in theatre. The Canadian Forces policy after this instruction came into force was, therefore, discriminatory despite the use of the weasel words "may be precluded." Nonetheless,

Robert Fowler, in March 1989 the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) at NDHQ, declared it "appropriate" that this policy "be tightened up somewhat," adding that the reason for this was "to protect the rights and safety of members, and not to ignore their rights." What Fowler could have meant by this tightening up of a discriminatory practice as a method of protecting the rights of Canadian Forces personnel is unclear to me. Nonetheless the process urged by Fowler obviously resulted in the issuance of Canadian Forces Administrative Order 20-53, a further codification of the Canadian Forces' discriminatory practices.

It seems clear that this policy has been applied almost exclusively in the Middle East. Belzile told me in an interview that he had visited a battalion of the Royal 22e Régiment in Haiti in 1997 in his capacity as Colonel Commandant. The Canadian force there included an intelligence section of Haitian-Canadians, all either born in Haiti or in Canada of Haitian parents. These men spoke the Haitian patois and understood the local society, a clear advantage to the Canadian force. On the other hand, given the political, economic, and class divisions in Haitian society, they might have been exposed to pressures from various factions. NDHQ apparently did not consider the possibility of pressure being exerted on service personnel of Haitian origin or ethnicity in such a case to be serious enough to block their inclusion in the Canadian contingent. That a different policy was and is applied in the Middle East to Jewish and Muslim service personnel is repugnant.

It is also worth noting that for the last decade and a half, female Canadian Forces personnel have been posted overseas in an ever-increasing variety of roles, including service in infantry units on peace support operations. There were also women sailors on board Canadian Navy

vessels during the Gulf War, a policy that might have been construed to be potentially as offensive to strict Muslim Arab allies as the presence of a Canadian Jewish officer.

American, British and UN Practices

Indeed, the United States forces, the major provider of troops for the Gulf War, based large numbers of women in Saudi Arabia. It is abundantly clear that the Saudi authorities raised no more objection to US women than they did to American Jewish service personnel serving on their soil and in their waters. Presumably, and properly, American women service personnel, just like Jewish personnel, were briefed on how to – and how not to – behave to minimize Saudi concerns. Significantly, the United States military followed its policies which are non-discriminatory.

Indeed, the American practice of posting service members overseas, detailed in Department of Defense Directive 1315.7 – Military Personnel Assignments, is very clear: "Assignment shall be made for all service members without regard to their color, race, religious preference (except chaplains), ethnic background, national origin, age, or gender (except where prohibited by statute and limitation of facilities) consistent with requirements for physical capabilities." Moreover, the Directive lays down a procedure to be followed if a foreign government refuses to accept US personnel. A "Summary of Selected Nations' Policy on Employment Restrictions Peacekeeping Forces," prepared in NDHQ in March 1989 did, however, note that "unofficially, in practice" the US forces selectively fill positions in UNTSO "to ensure that the individual by reason of race, age, religion, etc, would not jeopardize the mission or cause undue hardship or danger to the individual or others." How much weight should be put on

information – gossip? – gathered to give NDHQ the information it so clearly sought is doubtful.

For their part, the British have no written policy that would restrict serving officers and other ranks by virtue of ethnicity, gender, or religion. Women can be barred from certain posts to maintain a unit's combat effectiveness, however, and the War Office exercises some caution – on a case by case basis – in considering whether to post women abroad "where their presence may cause offence to the host government..." While "All personnel in the British Armed Forces are treated as equal," there might be cases that would require individual consideration, as in covert operations "where a person's ethnic origin may prevent them from being selected." The British therefore follow a practice that seems a pragmatic mix of principle and efficiency. There is no blanket prohibition, but on a case by case basis, judgments can be made on postings.

It is worth noting that American and British policies are not hypothetical. Both the United States and Britain have contributed and continue to contribute to peacekeeping operations. At 31 December 1997, the British had 401 soldiers in Cyprus, 11 on the Iraq-Kuwait border, 60 on the International Police Task Force, and 7 on the UN Mission in Georgia for a total of 479. The United States had 644 troops engaged in peacekeeping, with officers and other ranks serving on the Israel-Arab borders, on the Iraq-Kuwait border, in the Western Sahara, in Eastern Slavonia, on the International Police Task Force, in Macedonia, Georgia, and Haiti. At this same time, Canada deployed 254 peacekeepers on eight missions.

That the US and UK seem able to meet their extensive peacekeeping requirements without overtly discriminatory regulations is worth noting. That Britain is the historic link to the Canadian military tradition and

the United States today is our closest military partner is also noteworthy. I can discern no reason why Canadian military regulations need be more discriminatory than those of our closest friends and allies.

Why they need be more discriminatory than the policies of the United Nations itself again is unknown. When the Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN inquired in February 1989 of the "responsible UN official" what United Nations policy on the employment of personnel on peacekeeping was, the official simply passed the buck back to the contributing national military forces. The UN Force commander could determine the "assets and liabilities of each individual," a phrase that could (and most likely does) refer to military efficiency rather than religion or gender. The UN official did indicate that women might be a potential problem in some countries and said that their employment has been limited "in order to avoid complications in the field." The UN, however, also informed the Canadian delegation in New York that "With regard to religion, 'religion is invisible' but that females are not."

As documents provided by the Department of Justice indicate clearly, DND found this answer unsatisfactory. Robert Fowler observed in March 1989 that "it will not be possible to base our policy on the United Nations' approach." The Department then began a canvass of the policies followed by other nations in screening personnel for Middle East peacekeeping. All (Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, and Poland) had no policy on religion because of the tiny numbers of Jews or Muslims in their populations or armed forces. Australia classified peacekeeping as active service and automatically barred women. New Zealand apparently had not drawn its peacekeepers from military

specialties in which women personnel in its armed forces were employed.

Thus Canada was on its own in drafting its tightened policy, blazing a trail where none but Canada had gone before. The policy codified in Canadian Forces Administrative Order 20-53 represented DND's attempt to do so, and the only concession to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was that, as the drafting progressed, the initial phrasing – the "cultural, religious and racial sensitivities" of the host nation – was altered to the slightly less blatant "cultural, religious, and other sensitivities." Perhaps DND ought to have been just as concerned by the pandering to the cultural and religious sensitivities of host nations.

Conclusion

How does all this evidence apply to this case? In the first place, as has been noted above, Canadian policy has been discriminatory in this century. Blacks, Native Canadians, Japanese Canadians, and Chinese Canadians suffered overt discrimination in being prevented or discouraged from service during one or both of the First and Second World Wars. There is evidence that ethnicity has been a concern to the Canadian Forces, not least in Cyprus, as well as evidence that Jewish (and presumably Muslim) service personnel were prevented from serving with peacekeeping missions in the Middle East both before and after the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Canadian nation and the Canadian Forces that serve it are increasingly multicultural in their makeup, and overt discrimination against those who seek to serve their country, wherever they come from, whatever their religion and ethnicity, must not be practiced or tolerated. There is, to be sure, a balance to be found between the rights of individual Canadian Forces personnel and the operational

effectiveness of the peace support force in which they may serve, but it seems to me that individual rights and freedoms must almost always take precedence. Intelligently drafted regulations, sensibly and sensitively interpreted to protect the rights of individuals and assist the Canadian Forces to accomplish their mission, are needed, but blanket prohibitions are not the way to proceed.

Consider one hypothetical situation. Say Canada was called on to send a battalion of infantry to do peacekeeping in Northern Ireland. In a bitterly sectarian conflict where Protestants and Roman Catholics historically have been at each others' throats, which infantry unit could Canada send? The francophone Royal 22e Régiment, its members overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, might possibly be unacceptable to Ulster Unionists; the anglophone Royal Canadian Regiment, its personnel substantially Protestant with some presumably also of Irish heritage, might be equally unacceptable to Sinn Féin. Other than raising a Jewish or Muslim regiment, how could Canada participate in such a peacekeeping operation? I suggest that it goes without saying that Canada would send the R22eR or the RCR without a moment's hesitation, the very idea that there would be any problem of impartiality being dismissed at once by NDHQ. So it should be. But how then can the Canadian Forces suggest or imply that a Canadian Jew or Muslim might be an impediment to an operational mission in the Middle East?

The right to bear arms is a cherished tenet of citizenship, and it violates my sense of what Canada has become and is today to bar service personnel from honourable service solely because of their faith or ethnicity. After reading the relevant Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Instructions and Canadian Forces Administrative Orders, the trial record, the reasons for order, the

transcript of evidence of Colonel Snell, and the documents provided by the Department of Justice, I am forced to conclude that the Canadian Forces practices discrimination on the basis of religion and ethnicity. Canadian military personnel are Canadians, whatever their origins or faith, and they deserve to be treated as loyal servants of their nation. The present policy categorizes soldiers by race and religion and is profoundly repugnant.

Notes


1. In his *Pearson's Peacekeepers, Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), p.132, Michael

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J.L. Granatstein is co-author (with Dean F. Oliver) of *The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History* (2010).



Department of National Defence photo

Anti-submarine trawlers built at St. Lawrence yards under Admiralty contract, and assigned to the Royal Canadian Navy for operations on the East Coast in view of the German U-boat operations in North American waters that began in the spring of 1918. The photograph is probably from the late spring of 1918 when the newly completed trawlers fitted out at Quebec City or Montreal.

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
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