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“For God’s Sake send help” HMCS Galiano, Pacific Navigation and life in the West Coast Reserve fleet, 1913-1918

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On 30 October 1918, Arthur Ashdown Green, a wireless operator on Triangle Island, British Columbia, received a bone-chilling signal from a foundering ship. “Hold’s full of water,” Michael John Neary, the ship’s wireless operator desperately transmitted, “For God’s Sake send help.” Nothing further was heard, suggesting that the ship had already slipped below the cold and storm-tossed surface. One can only speculate what horrible images haunted Green at that moment, the more so since he and his fellow operators had a heart-wrenching decision to make. W.C. Neary, one of their colleagues at the station, was asleep in the next room. After a short discussion they came to the conclusion that they would wait until morning to tell Neary that his brother was asleep in the next room. After a short discussion they came to the conclusion that they would wait until morning to tell Neary that his brother – along with 30 other shipmates from the Canadian warship HMCS Galiano (as well as one civilian) - had likely fallen victim to a particularly vicious Pacific storm.1

Galiano was an unlucky ship. Aside from the unfortunate distinction of being the only Canadian warship lost during the First World War, she also struck a rock off the appropriately named Disappointment Inlet and grounded twice – all within the span of three years. A portion of this article, therefore, will argue that there was a correlation between these incidents and Galiano’s sinking. It will also show how these incidents were reflective of the navigation challenges that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) faced on the West Coast in an era before radar, modern navigation aids and forecasting equipment. Yet there are other aspects of Galiano’s history that deserve closer scrutiny. Little has been written on Canadian Pacific coastal operations between 1914 and 1918 (most likely since that presence was so small), and as a result a study of Galiano is critical because her evolution from a Fisheries Protection Ship into a proto sea-going reserve fleet on the West Coast well before the establishment of the modern naval reserves in 1923.2

Abstract: HMCS Galiano is remembered mainly for being the Royal Canadian Navy’s only loss during the First World War. However, a close examination of this ship’s history not only reveals important insights into the origins and identity of the West Coast’s seagoing naval reserve, but also the hazards and navigational challenges that confronted the men who served in these waters. The aim of this article, therefore, is to determine how particular navigation challenges affected Galiano’s commanding officer to the point where they contributed to the ship’s sinking. It also proposes that the waters of British Columbia were witness to a remarkable evolution that effectively gave birth to a proto sea-going reserve fleet on the West Coast well before the establishment of the modern naval reserves in 1923.

For the first 43 years of its existence Canada did not have a navy of its own. Instead it relied on the Department of Marine and Fisheries for all activities related to Canada’s oceans and inland waters including the maintenance of navigation aids, enforcement of regulations and the upkeep of hydrographical requirements. Protecting Canadian sovereignty and fisheries was also one of the department’s key roles, and thanks to American poaching in the second half of the 19th century it was a task that represented a constant problem for the young Dominion. As the department’s maritime vanguard, the Fisheries Protection Service, which had undergone a significant expansion from one to nine ships in 1886, was the key organization responsible for containing these encroachments. By 1904 the Fisheries Protection Service had grown even further to a total eight armed “cruisers,” and the rest of the government fleet included six icebreakers, and 18 other vessels. Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier saw a need for Canada to have its own national navy and logically it should be developed from those civilian vessels.3

Increasing tensions in Europe, particularly from an upstart Germany and its growing naval ambitions, had forced the Royal Navy (RN) to turn its attention to home waters and abandon many of its imperial commitments. Fleet units and personnel were subsequently reassigned from the RN bases in Halifax and Esquimalt, and that fact – along with Laurier’s desire to promote nationalism through the
creation of truly Canadian institutions – was forcing the young country to develop the means to protect its own interests. As a result, Laurier, along with the minister of marine and fisheries, Raymond Préfontaine, revitalized an earlier plan that called for the Fisheries Protection Service slowly to be converted into a fighting force. This would not only provide the core organization for a naval service, but it would also create a base from which a future naval militia could be trained. To achieve these aims Préfontaine would champion the Naval Militia Bill of 1904, while the Fisheries Protection Service acquired two new cruisers that were to be “run like crisply disciplined navy ships.”

The failure of Préfontaine’s bill, which, had it become law would have laid the foundation for a Canadian naval reserve, was a serious setback for the nation’s maritime ambitions. More bad news followed as the department was rocked by scandalous charges suggesting that its senior managers were incompetent and its sailors demoralized. Whether the latter allegations were accurate was hard to determine, but stories about low wages and unfair patronage appointments where politicians had the final say on the hiring of personnel were hard to dismiss. In fact, some argued that this not only resulted in crews of questionable quality, but also led to an exodus of men who would take their Canadian training and use it to make a better future for themselves in the United States Navy. More severe criticisms, however, were heaped upon the department itself, which British officials decried as “one of the worst-run ministries in a country they described as one not noted for efficient, principled public administration.”

The findings of the 1908 royal commission on public administration spurred Laurier and Préfontaine’s successor, L.P. Brodeur, to clean shop at the Department of Marine and Fisheries. Commander O.G.V. Spain, an ex-RN officer who had commanded the Fisheries Protection Service as the Director of Marine Services since 1893, was one of the first to go. His replacement, a Canadian-born retired RN officer, Rear Admiral Charles Kingsmill, was a well-connected and capable man who, along with the new deputy minister, G.J. Desbarats, would get the department running smoothly. So much so, in fact, that when the Canadian navy came into existence on 4 May 1910 there was no doubt that Kingsmill would become the Director of the Naval Service (DNS) in addition to his continuing command of the Fisheries Protection Service. As a result, the fate and organization of the navy and Fisheries Protection Service were closely linked and Kingsmill certainly had his work cut out for him. Ambitious plans to acquire a sizable naval fleet were sadly reduced to the purchase of the two aged RN cruisers, HMCS Rainbow and Niobe, while the militarization of the Fisheries Protection Service not only occurred at a slow pace but its future acquisition program was also limited to a handful of new ships.

As small as that expansion may have been, Robert Mayes Pope was nonetheless excited when he discovered in early 1913 that the Fisheries Protection Service was acquiring two new ships to augment its small West Coast fleet. And since the RCN was responsible for the administration of this organization and the direction of its vessels he contacted Kingsmill, asking that he be considered for command. Nor did he stop there. Having learned that Kingsmill was coming to the West Coast in May, Pope made a point of calling upon the DNS in effort to plead his case in person. Kingsmill liked what he heard. In fact, Pope was so eager that he told the DNS:

... he [Pope] is prepared to pay his passage to England, if he is favourably considered, and to bring out one of these [new] ships, waiving all claim on the Agents for return passage to England. I think that this matter might easily be arranged with the Builders, and it would be of great advantage to us to have the Captain in the Ship from the start.
Kingsmill was equally impressed with Pope’s sea-going career which dated back to 1884. Although Pope had been ashore for almost nine years, Kingsmill was quick to point out to the deputy minister that this candidate had extensive time with various steamship companies, the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) and the Canadian marine and fisheries department, which included time (mostly as a second mate) on ships sailing from Great Britain to India as well as Esquimalt to Africa. He also served as a lieutenant on four warships. While Pope’s experience ended after he had risen to the rank of first mate on the “Dominion Government Ship” Quadra between April 1902 and May 1904, Kingsmill emphasized to the deputy minister that all these appointments had resulted in a slew of “excellent certificates” and positive performance reviews, adding that Pope “is a man of some education, and in my opinion would be a suitable Officer to command one of [our new] ships.”

Such accolades certainly helped Pope’s application, but it may have been age that served him best. Kingsmill wanted relatively younger men to command these vessels, and since one of the frontrunners was close to retirement age, the forty-two year old Pope suddenly found himself in the second slot behind the top candidate, Mr. Holmes Newcomb, who was already an experienced officer with the Fisheries Protection Service. Indeed, Kingsmill coached Pope on how to play the patronage game associated with the politicized appointments to the Fisheries Protection Service. Getting Pope a command appointment nevertheless proved exceedingly difficult, particularly since Kingsmill had warned the deputy minister that “from personal conversations on the [West] Coast we are likely to get a great many recommendations on behalf of old gentlemen whose principle time for some years has been spent in Victoria or Vancouver.”

But Kingsmill was in no position to make any promises and he said as much to Shepherd:

The patronage of the cruiser destined for the southern waters falls to the member of Nanaimo [Shepherd], and that for the cruiser destined for the northern waters of BC to the member for Comox-Atlin. The Estevan, and Quadra of Victoria falls to the member for Victoria. This is by mutual arrangement. Captain Pope being a member in my Constituency I have pleasure in backing up his application. I trust when the other appointments are being made that you will kindly consider the above mutual arrangement.

In the end, Kingsmill secured Shepherd’s support, and that was all that mattered. Pope was slated for command of the government

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Rear Admiral Charles E. Kingsmill, a Canadian-born former Royal Navy officer, commanded the Fisheries Protection Service and was appointed the Director of the Naval Service upon the creation of the Canadian Navy on 4 May 1910.
ship Galiano while Newcomb had already been given her sister ship, Malaspina.14

Much like today’s Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) and ORCAs, the Auxiliary Patrol Ships (APS) Galiano and Malaspina were constructed to civilian standards so as to be “as simple as practicable,” and had their naval armament added separately from the original construction.15 Built by Dublin Dockyard Company and noted for the innovation of being “electrically lighted throughout,” the 160-foot long, 26½-foot wide, and 700-ton Galiano and Malaspina were billed as very modern ships.16 That Pope was taking over such a new ship after a lengthy absence from the sea did cause the DNS some concern. Kingsmill told the deputy minister that this new officer would need thorough refresher training before taking charge.17 The deputy minister agreed and Pope was informed that in the three months prior to Galiano’s arrival on 27 February 1914 he would receive mentoring from Newcomb as well as a refresher on life at sea through service on the Roman as well as the recently accepted Malaspina.18 It was a good introduction particularly since the men and ships of the protection service often worked closely together while patrolling up and down British Columbia’s coastal waters looking for illegal fishing activities. Wartime conditions, however, would offer Pope and his crew – along with the other west coast Fisheries Protection vessels – new challenges.

Eighteen days after Canada went to war with Germany in August 1914, Commander Charles Trousdale, RN, conducted a survey of the forces, facilities, and personnel available to the RCN for the protection of the Pacific Coast. Barely four years had passed since the birth of the RCN and it was clear from Trousdale’s report that the service was still very much in its infancy. With a total strength of less than 350 officers and ratings and Rainbow its only true West Coast warship, the regular force RCN was desperately short of personnel and ships. The situation was indeed grim, as aside from Rainbow the defence of the West Coast rested in the hands of the remnants of the old British Pacific Squadron (the sloops HMS Algerine and Shearwater), as well as a ragtag fleet consisting of ships from the Canadian Fisheries Protection, Queen Charlotte Island Fisheries, former Grand Trunk Pacific company, and civilian chartered vessels (collectively these ships were the Galiano, Malaspina, Newington, Restless, Estevan, Protesilaus, Prince George (hospital ship), Aid and Gannett). There was also the submarines CC 1 and CC 2, which, originally having been built by a Seattle company for the Chilean navy, were independently procured by the province of British Columbia at the time of the declaration of war.19

Without the sailors to man most of these ships, the RCN’s West Coast fleet was certainly fortunate to have the Fisheries Protection Service as well as a cadre of men, who, as members of the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve (RNCVR), were more than willing to take up the slack.20 That these individuals were available for service was not the product of deliberate planning. Since the previous attempts to establish a naval militia had failed...
the Naval Service Act of 1910 did have provisions for the creation of a naval reserve and volunteer reserve, but a lack of government funding was making it difficult for the young RCN to ensure its own survival let alone the creation of a part-time force. Once again, much like the acquisition of the submarines, CC1 and CC2, British Columbians did what they could to help. In particular, some keen Victoria business and yachtsmen, most notably Dr. J. Harper, R. Ponder, G. Edwardes, and S. Greary, sent an application to Prime Minister Robert Borden in May 1913 asking permission to establish a local volunteer reserve unit. It took another year before a Privy Council order granted this request by authorizing the formation of the RNCVR, but that did not stop these enthusiasts – most of who did not even have uniforms – from conducting training and rudimentary drill nights on their own and without pay.21

Although one scholar would aptly characterize Rear-Admiral Walter Hose’s establishment of a truly national naval reserve force in 1923 as a “restart” of these earlier pioneering efforts, the standard historical narrative often portrays the RNCVR as little more than an imperial defence force designed to augment the Royal Naval (RN) and RCN in times of war.22 There is some truth to this interpretation as the RNCVR did in fact serve as a nationwide manning pool that took civilians who would fight for the duration of hostilities-only and directly fed them into the immediate war-time naval requirements of the Empire. And it could be argued that it is for this reason that the RNCVR, which would come to represent 8,000 of the RCN’s 9,000 wartime personnel, did not survive as a national institution once the emergency created by the First World War was over. Upon closer examination, however, there is compelling evidence which strongly suggests that the RNCVR – along with segments of a militarized Fisheries Protection Service – came together to become more of a sea-going Canadian reserve force on the Pacific coast (as well as a pivotal component to the province’s maritime defence) than previously believed.

The citizens of British Columbia had good reason to worry about their maritime security. The province’s remote location from either Imperial or Canadian naval re-enforcements ensured that sufficient forces would not be readily available to counter potential encroachments by hostile raiders. It was the fear of such danger, in addition to the province’s sense of isolation, which triggered a desire to augment the federal government’s relatively miniscule presence on the West Coast through the purchase of CC1 and CC2 as well as the formation of the RNCVR. Indeed, providing for British Columbia’s maritime security requirements was not easy for either an aging Empire or an inspiring young Dominion. Laurier’s and Kingsmill’s vision of turning the Fisheries Protection Service into a paramilitary force certainly helped to provide some measure of security to the West Coast, but it was not nearly enough. Unlike Kingsmill, who had looked to the Fisheries Protection Service to act as a local reserve defence force, Hose was more in tune with what the patriotic citizens of British Columbia were trying to achieve with the creation of the RNCVR. While holding the rank of commander and having captained Rainbow since June 1911, Hose did what he could to support their
fledgling efforts, going so far as to give the Pacific RNCVR opportunities to train at the Esquimalt naval base. He also made his ship available to them and allowed his officers and petty officers to act as instructors. His efforts and belief in the RNCVR paid off. Within weeks of the onset of hostilities, 95 of the RNCVR’s 140 members in British Columbia found themselves in seagoing billets where they filled desperate crew shortages on Rainbow as well as the former civilian vessels Aid and Prince George. Nor did their direct contribution to Canada’s west coast sea going fleet stop there as in time they would also provide entire ships’ companies for the submarines CC1 and CC2 along with various Fisheries Protection ships such as Galiano.

The RNCVR wasted no time making their Pacific presence felt. With the Shearwater and Algerine off the coast of Mexico and in the same general proximity as the German cruisers Leipzig and Nuremberg, naval authorities in Ottawa borrowed from the traditions of the RN by telling the under-manned and hopelessly outclassed Rainbow to go to their rescue with the stirring words: “remember Nelson and the British Navy. All Canada is watching.” Hose, who made a potentially suicidal dash towards the area, fully recognized that over one third of Rainbow’s crew (which was already sailing at half her normal complement) consisted of local RNCVRs:

I am sure that we shall put Leipzig out of business in a fairly short time after we get within 6,000 yds. of her, and I can assure you that I shall get into that position at the very earliest opportunity after I hear that war is declared. …The Naval Volunteers have been invaluable, fortunately I had already embarked 46 for the Bering Sea Cruise before the war news came.

Hose suggested that the search for Algerine and Shearwater would
not have been possible without the volunteers’ assistance:

I am dreadfully anxious about Algerine + Shearwater, if they have steamed straight along for Esquimalt and the Germans have been chasing them we cannot meet in time. It is like a nightmare this running to save those two ships with the hopeless feeling I have about it if the Germans are on their tracks. But I assure you that of those two ships are lost to us either interned, captures or sunk that the Nuremberg and Leipzig will be brought to book by Rainbow as early as is humanly possible, to reach those two ships is the one and only objective in my mind, and by Heavens nobody shall laugh at “the Rainbow” again. I wish you could see the ships company, not one sick all as happy as larks and working like Trojans, the Volunteers are splendid, it is wonderful how they stand the work of trimming down coal, etc considering it is all so much harder than anything they ever have to do in their lives. ...My word it was a fortunate day for Canada when she decided to approve the Naval Volunteers for we could not have been here now without them.27

Hose certainly appreciated the value of Canadian citizen-sailors and his desire to develop a truly national reserve force in the 1920s clearly can be traced to these early experiences with the West Coast RNCVR. Yet even before Hose’s vision took root, the West Coast was well on its way to developing a seagoing reserve force of its own.

Although no German warship would come within 2,500 miles of British Columbia, the fear of commerce raiding or even the direct bombardment of Vancouver and Victoria was only eased once the powerful RN Bristol class cruiser, HMS Newcastle, arrived in provincial waters later in the month. 28 Japan’s entry into the war as a British ally brought some comfort to a nervous West Coast population, but that did not mean there was no longer a Canadian naval requirement in these waters. Regular patrols of the area were still needed and this was a duty that would fall largely to the Galiano, Malaspina, Newington and Restless. While beginning the war as Fisheries Protection ships, it would not take long before RNCVRs would integrate with this small force of patrol vessels to such an extent between 1914 and 1917 that they would collectively become a proto West Coast sea-going reserve fleet.

The concept that a proto-naval reserve fleet was serving the waters off British Columbia is new, particularly since accounts within the literature, which are the product of research originally done in the 1940s, generally portray these vessels’ conversion to naval ships as a sudden affair that only came about when they were commissioned into the navy in late 1917. Moreover, this older
interpretation further argues that Galiano and Malaspina, as well as the Restless and Newington, were actually civilian-manned Canadian government ships that only occasionally conducted military operations throughout the course of the war. Yet the evidence that these Fisheries Protection Vessels had been effectively converted into proto-naval reserve ships well before the time of their commissioning into the RCN is strong.

Galiano was particularly quick off the mark in this regard. When Kingsmill was recommending Pope for the command of the Galiano he advised the deputy minister that he wanted a man who could be a disciplinarian and had had naval training; most notably because the DNS knew that as much as one-third of the crew would immediately consist of naval personnel who would be lent to the Fisheries Protection Service. Pope proved the perfect candidate. Soon after the start of the war Pope used his RNR experience to institute a naval routine on board Galiano, and as a result his rules tended to be stricter than the other captains in the Fisheries Protection Service. Nor did he hesitate to purge his ship of troublemakers and non-conformists, as over a one-year period Pope dismissed at least seven men on various charges of drunkenness, incompetence, desertion, refusing duty and insubordination. Although Pope undoubtedly had good reason to release these men, his routine went too far for some civilian members of the crew; so much so, in fact, that the ship experienced an abnormally high number of resignations during the spring of 1915.31 Others decided to join their naval compatriots who were on loan to the Fisheries Protection Service by enrolling in the RNCVR. As a result, Galiano’s crew was taking on such a reserve flavour that there were only a small handful of men who had to be transferred from the Fisheries Protection Service to the RNCVR when the vessel was officially commissioned into the navy (and in doing so changing her “APS” designation to “HMCS.”)

Although Galiano did perform civilian fisheries patrol duties for the bulk of her sea-time throughout the war – the highlight of which came on 17 August 1915 when she seized the US registered, Solano, fishing within Canadian waters – she actually found herself conducting functions that were more military in nature as the war progressed. Acting as an examination vessel, which involved intercepting ships to inspect their papers and cargoes, was another of her primary roles; although it was ironic that the “regulations of traffic in time of war” (as well as fears of upsetting a neutral United States) led to a somewhat unusual policy where Galiano’s six-pound quick firing gun would be removed while she was performing these duties. Minesweeping was an additional key task that Galiano as well as Malaspina practiced at least once or twice per year, while the Newington, on the other hand, had been fitted out as a minelayer so that she could “lay a defensive minefield in the Johnstone Strait, should the need arise.” Other typical responsibilities that Galiano performed included re-supplying the province’s wireless stations, ferrying military VIPs to various ports, responding to search and rescue calls, delivering confidential mail, and acting as a target tow for Rainbow.

Galiano was also called upon to conduct some rather unorthodox missions. The fact 75 percent of the province’s army deserters had sought refuge in coastal ports that were hard to reach from land resulted in cruises where parties of Military Police joined both Galiano and Malaspina in an effort to track these men down. While such sweeps did lead to numerous arrests, another unique search – this time involving reports of marooned German infiltrators – proved fruitless. Requests that Pope be given the powers of a justice of the peace so as to maintain order and deal with “[a] certain amount of unrest among [the] inhabitants of the Queen Charlotte Islands since the outbreak of hostilities” show that Galiano also played a critical constabulary function. An important point emerges; namely, that with a few exceptions, Galiano, Malaspina, Restless, and Newington were performing many of the same tasks that today’s MCDVs and ORCAs are playing on the West Coast.
Coast. Acting as a harbinger of things to come, Kingsmill even went so far as to create a plan in March 1918 which was designed to take advantage of the navigationally challenging waters off British Columbia to train RNCVR watch-keeping officers on Malaspina and Galiano. Using language that actually describes aspects of modern officer training on the west coast, Kingsmill noted that the ships were “to cruise among the Islands in order that they may have practical instruction in navigation as far as is practical. A class of six [RNCVR officers] should be sent at a time. The vessel[s] to return to Esquimalt each evening.”37 It is these types of similarities with today’s west coast reserve fleet that further suggests that Galiano, Malaspina, Newington and Restless had not only evolved into a proto west coast naval reserve fleet, but also makes them direct descendants of today’s MCDVs and ORCA classes.

The destruction of Von Spee’s squadron off the Falkland Islands early in the war, and later America’s entry into the conflict, meant that this proto-reserve fleet had little to fear from any German threat, but there were other dangers associated with sailing in these waters. The October 1918 storm that sank Galiano was certainly a good example of the extreme weather that often plagued the area. Packing winds of over 100 knots and with seas reaching 45 feet, the colossal storm of 1918, which one observer described as “just one mass of white foam,” was responsible for many deaths - including the 350 passengers and crew of the CPR ship Sophia.38 Galiano’s involvement with this storm began with an urgent signal from the Triangle Island wireless station advising that it was on the verge of running out of much needed supplies and gasoline. This put naval officials in Esquimalt in a difficult position. Weather reports suggested that there was a small window of opportunity to get a ship out to the island before the storm arrived.39 A decision was therefore made to send Malaspina, but thanks to a collision with a jetty that crushed her bow, Galiano was sent instead.

Although Galiano was in need of her own maintenance – boiler work and repairs to the main bearing of her tail shaft – it was deemed that she was seaworthy and up to the task. This did little to alleviate the crew’s concerns. Some were even scared. The area between Cape Scott and Cape St. James, which they simply called “the Triangle,” had a reputation as being “the worst piece of water on the Pacific Coast,” and reports that the approaching storm...
had already devoured a large victim like the steamer Sophia only made matters worse. Many crewmembers wrote home and confided their fears to loved ones. “[We are] leaving on ‘a dangerous trip’ to carry food and supplies to the civilians [on Triangle Island]” 16-year-old Roderick McLeod wrote to his family, a concern that was echoed by shipmate James Reeves who told his wife that “This is going to be an awful trip.”

But it was James Aird who best captured the crew's apprehension about what lay ahead: “We are running into very stormy weather since leaving Vancouver. I don’t think we will be home until the end of November…I dread the Triangle.” Unfortunately, for too many British Columbian families this was the last they would hear from their loved ones.

The fact that 25 of her 39 sailors had listed their next of kin as residents of British Columbia (compared to three from Alberta, six from the United Kingdom, two from Quebec, two from the United States and one from New Brunswick), strongly suggests that RNCVR manning on the Pacific coast was a local affair, the more so since various newspaper reports were quick to emphasize the local connections between the province and its missing reservists. Headlines such as “Victorians shocked” and “Vancouver Men on board” were followed by vivid personal stories about the crew and their grieving communities. The town of Nanaimo was particularly hard hit after it was discovered...
that four of its citizens had been serving on the ship. A well-known member of the RNCVR orchestra, 21-year-old George Douglas Stanley Bate was remembered for his days learning the candy-making trade in Nanaimo as well as his ability as an amateur actor and director of the New Westminster Dramatic Society. New Westminster, on the other hand, was mourning its own loss. Affectionately known throughout the town as “Tabe,” Arthur Hume, who had been a fireman on the Great Northern railway before joining the RNCVR, was a popular figure whose mother received tremendous local support after her son’s body was one of the few that were recovered. Similar stories of grief and loss were played out all over the province and in other parts of Canada, the US and the UK, but some accounts were more heart-wrenching than others. None, however, was more painful than the Nanaimo mother who successfully petitioned the navy to have her son transferred from the east to west coast which, while bringing him closer to home as she had hoped, effectively led to his death on the ill-fated Galiano.42

Fate was also wonderfully merciful on that day. The Spanish Flu, which would claim approximately 18 million victims world-wide, actually proved a lifesaver for at least eight members of the Galiano’s crew who found themselves laid up in the base’s hospital rather than at sea with the ship.43 Of course, their replacements were not nearly so lucky. Indeed, the people of South Vancouver were saddened to discover that Joseph, the father of four, was on board.44

Of course, their replacements were not nearly so lucky. Indeed, the people of South Vancouver were saddened to discover that Joseph Gilbert, a “well known” citizen and father of four, was on Galiano rather serving in his usual capacity as a reservecist on Rainbow.44 Other accounts described some of those lost as “leading citizens” or “popular young Victorians” who had joined the RNCVR “to serve Canada” further illustrate that Galiano’s reserve crew were truly representative of the province and country that had sent them to war. Yet it was a relative of Able Seaman William Stafford who best captured the appreciation that was felt for Galiano’s lost reservists. After recording that the telegram informing him of his brother’s death was a “grief to my heart,” he continued with the patriotic observation that “like others we must bravely pay the price of freedom.”45

As with those on the Galiano, the RNCVRs serving on the other ships of the West Coast’s proto-reserve fleet were also facing the possibility that they too might have to pay the ultimate price. Their fates, fortunately, were not nearly so tragic. Newington, for instance, reverted to government work until she was sold to commercial interests in 1937, while Restless’s log entry for 31 December 1918 captured her inglorious last day in the RCN, simply observing that “the Restless was paid off PM today. This log kept by VGL Larsen Maker who has been demobilized.”46 Malaspina would continue her service in the navy until 31 March 1920 at which point she reverted back to being a Canadian Government Ship. Malaspina still carried out some naval work providing sea-training for cadets from the Royal Naval College of Canada in addition to her fisheries patrol work. She would not be paid off until 24 January 1945 after serving once again as an HMC ship performing patrol, examination, and training duties during the Second World War.47 The storm of October 1918 robbed Galiano of the chance to share this future.

According to the findings of the navy’s board of inquiry, Galiano was lost around 0320 hours on 30 October approximately 20 miles off Cape St. James. Without survivors no definite cause could be attributed to the sinking, but the available evidence led to the conclusion that:

...she foundered in terrific weather. It may safely be assumed that the loss was in no way attributed to any failure on the part of the machinery or weakness of the hull and structure of the vessel; immediately before encountering their heavy gale, she was to all intents and purposes a sound and efficient vessel.48

No one disagreed with the notion that the storm was the primary cause of the loss, but theories quickly emerged on possible contributing factors. Much of this was the product of Galiano’s reputation as a particularly seaworthy ship. Stories about Galiano encountering “fierce storms” while rounding Cape Horn on her maiden voyage from Ireland stood as a testament to her ability to survive rough weather. Indeed, Galiano’s first officer, who was one of those who had missed the sinking due to the flu, had trouble believing that she had foundered, telling the Board that “I say and have always said that I would go around the world in her at any time.” Holmes Newcomb agreed. Having commanded Galiano’s sister ship, Malaspina, for the past five years, Newcomb told a Victoria reporter that he believed “it was hardly possible for Galiano to founder without striking the rocks” while another sailor made a similar statement claiming that “she must have struck something as this is the only way she could have sunk.”49

Another theory held that a rogue wave must have overwhelmed the ship by breaking over Galiano’s stern and flooding her holds. The evidence to support this theory was best summarized by the captain of the trawler, GE Foster, who, after finding the body of one of Galiano’s crew members as well as some wreckage, argued that:

there seems to be no doubt to me but that the vessel has foundered in the heavy seas...It is possible that one of these unlucky seas was shipped by the Galiano and with the weight of water rolling around inside her,
her bulkheads would soon give way, causing her to roll more and ship other seas. The man we picked up had on a lifebelt, which had evidently been fastened in a hurry, as it was not done correctly, and his clothes bore the appearance of having been hurriedly put on, as if he had tumbled out of his bunk before rushing on deck. There is every probability that as the ship filled, the air in her cabins blew the skylight, which we picked up.

The captain of the Foster, at least, was convinced that Galiano had swamped.

That enough water could get into the ship to completely flood the holds proved a difficult pill for some to swallow, particularly since the recovered skylight was fastened tight, evidence that the ship was battened down for rough weather. As a result, a third theory emerged suggesting Galiano had been somehow disabled, leaving her “helpless in the face of the storm and pounded by the terrific seas she may have foundered.”

Malaspina’s stability that were first expressed by the superintendent of construction and Canada’s chief naval architect, Mr R. Newman. Having had a chance to discuss these matters with Newman, the Dublin Dockyard Company reported back to Ottawa that:

...his [Newman’s] points were mostly with reference to stability of the vessel, due to the higher centre of gravity of the Single Screw engines, the slightly larger boiler, very heavy boats, teak bridge deck, etc., the stability of the vessel does not compare very well... even though we have increased the beam as suggested by 2. We are now providing for the fitting of 20 to 30 tons of permanent ballast into the vessel, and it is principally for this reason that we wish to reduce the deadweight asked for. ...Our calculations however allow for no margin and it is in view of this that we submitted these alternatives to Mr. Newman, and we also propose to increase the beam by a further 4” or 5”.

This, however, was not enough for Newman, who, after further examining the builders’ specifications, observed that “the boat as designed is stable under all conditions other than at light draft, when the G.M. becomes minus 0.6 of foot. ...for safety I would strongly recommend that if possible the beam be made 27 feet.” An official notation on this memo shows that Canadian authorities agreed with Newman’s assessment, and as a result the builders were asked to extend the beam by another half a foot.

In fairness to the builders, the Canadians had asked for a number of changes and additions to the original design and consequently the Dublin Dockyard Company’s response simply claimed that the stability issue “has already been fully dealt with, and it’s quite impossible to [further] alter the beam at this stage.” The builder had a point.

Dublin Dockyard Company had already placed orders for steel based on agreed requirements and satisfying the Canadian requests for alterations was proving exceedingly difficult. They were, however, willing to entertain some of these suggestions for change from Canada. Newman was not impressed and he expressed his concerns at every opportunity to the point where the builders complained to Canada that:

We see no reason for Mr. Newman to become uneasy as everything is going on satisfactory, unless with
respect to the suggestion to change the beam... We would like you to give Mr. Newman assurance that we are making satisfactory progress, and that there is really no need for his presence here at present. We regret to notice that Mr. Newman is somewhat impatient but do not think there is the slightest reason for it.55

That the Dublin shipbuilders were growing frustrated with Newman’s comments was obvious when they began chastising the Canadian government for a situation where it was asking for changes to the design on the one hand, while on the other one of its representatives was complaining that these same modifications were putting these ships’ stability at risk. This explains why Dublin Dockyard Company sent a message to Ottawa warning that:

There are many cases before our minds where contractors unwittingly allowed owners to go on piling up weights with most disastrous results in the end, and discredit to all concerned. It has always been our practice in the past to watch this most carefully, and we would be much obliged for your kind assistance. If the speed has been designed for a speed of 11 or 12 knots, liberties could have been taken with them that are not possible with the subjects before us.56

Worse yet, the company would go so far as to tell the Canadian government they were “a little surprised that so many alterations from the proposals” was approved by the department which was “causing a great deal of uncertainty and much delay,” and that many of the company’s suggestions to meet the stability issue were not only being ignored, but also that their “hopes” of rectifying these problems had largely “vanished.”57

The fact that these stability issues were never fully addressed (and that Galiano’s beam was not extended to the full degree recommended) was significant. Moreover, it is intriguing that Galiano, which had just unloaded at Triangle, would have been at light draft, meaning that Newman’s original fears about that the vessel’s negative stability in an unloaded state may have been well-founded. Of course, the navy was not aware of these earlier disputes nor was it interested in exploring any theory which could not be supported by sufficient evidence.

There was, however, one mystery that did catch the board’s attention. On the day before the sinking Pope sent a message to Esquimalt from Triangle Island noting that the approach of threatening weather was forcing an early departure, and as a result he had little choice but to leave some of the supplies he had just delivered below the high water mark. What the board could not understand, therefore, was why Pope was even sailing for Ikeda, particularly since the confidential mail that he was delivering to the station was not so important as to justify his heading into such a fierce storm. In their search for a solution, the board members turned to the men who knew Pope best. Newcomb was the first man on their list, but unfortunately his answer only added to the mystery of why a normally cautious commander had taken such a risk. When asked what course he would steer to make Cape St. James light, Newcomb was direct in responding:

Unless I could possibly help it I wouldn’t make the run from Triangle at night at this time of year.... I consider this one of the worse pieces of water that it is possible to imagine.... On account of the strong tides and currents and heavy confused sea between Cape St. James and Triangle, and I wouldn’t like to cross there except in daylight and in fine weather.58

With each witness the mystery continued to deepen. For instance, when Pope’s former first officer, E.G. Alcock was asked if it was “the practice of Captain Pope to do this trip from Triangle to Ikeda regardless of weather” Alcock answered with an emphatic “No.” Four years of sailing together had left Alcock with the single impression that Pope was a “very cautious” commander, and as a result the attempt to reach Ikeda was not only out of character, but also simply did not make sense.59 Other former crew members made similar statements and an explanation of why this cautious commander made a seemingly mad dash across a treacherous stretch of water with an approaching storm remained elusive. Yet a careful examination of Pope’s command of Galiano does offer some clues as to why he took such a risk.

One event in particular, which occurred in a gale on the morning of 10 January 1915, appears to have.
a direct bearing on the events of 29-30 October 1918. After receiving orders to investigate a vessel reportedly dragging her cable off Royal Roads, Pope set sail only to end up grounding his own ship. The damage to Galiano was considerable and the subsequent Board of Inquiry into this incident was merciless, concluding that the stranding “was due to want of almost every proper precaution on the part of the Commanding Officer.” Worse, they went even further by observing that Pope’s “gross neglect of duty” should result in his being permanently relieved of command. Kingsmill, however, came to Pope’s rescue and while he agreed with the general findings of the court he was not convinced that the punishment fit the offense.60 The DNS’s defence of Pope was understandable. Not only had he handpicked Pope for command, but Kingsmill had himself once grounded a ship, off Souris Point, Chaleur Bay, in 1906. That earlier incident, which was the product of an unfortunate string of events where the navigating officer misidentified a number of key landmarks, nonetheless had a negative impact on Kingsmill’s career prospects in the RN as he was eventually relieved of his command of HMS Dominion for an older battleship of the Royal Sovereign class.61 Kingsmill’s personal command history, therefore, likely play a role in his sympathetic attitude towards Pope, the more so since he had determined Galiano’s grounding took place “under extraordinary conditions and not in the ordinary course of navigation.” Moreover, as Kingsmill would further explain to the deputy minister, Pope was “a good officer and his services have been very useful.”62

Kingsmill’s defence of his officer, which resulted in a lesser punishment of the loss of two years seniority and a warning to be cautious in the future, was appreciated, but Pope could not forgive himself. He therefore sent a heart-filled apology to Kingsmill, explaining that:

I feel that it is necessary to write to you to express my regret for the accident that befell this ship. I am sorry that I have jeopardized the confidence that I felt you had in me, that I feel more than anything else and can only hope that my work in the future will restore it.”63

Pope’s confidence was clearly shaken but two other incidents, both in June 1918, only made matters worse. The first occurred on 22 June when Galiano ran aground off Disappointment Inlet, and then the vessel struck a rock on the following day. Once again, Pope was found responsible as this Board of Inquiry concluded that he had made an “error in judgement” in not giving the extending shoal a wide enough berth, while a failure to correct his charts – which showed a spar rather than a new can buoy – resulted in the rock strike. Pope
actually had a legitimate defence in the second incident where he argued that, regardless of the actual type, the buoy marking the rock was not in its charted position – a claim that was later verified by federal officials. However, this did not change the fact that Galiano was kept alongside for 30 days to repair the $25,000 damage for which the navy had told Pope he was to blame.

The impact of repeatedly being reprimanded and told to be more cautious appears to have had a significant effect on Pope, who, according to one of his subordinates, was already an overcautious commander: “in very bad weather – thick weather he was a bit nervous. I have found it more so after running on the rock on the west coast...Any little thing that happened he was irritable.” As a result, a mixture of bad encounters with Pacific weather and difficult navigation conditions had conspired to turn a good and solid commander into a somewhat erratic one. Upon closer examination, Pope should not have been so tough on himself. Other commanders had certainly had their fair share of incidents. Moreover, the fact that Galiano and Malaspina’s builders were specifically told in 1912 that the Canadian government wanted a robust design because “much of the water in which these boats will operate has not yet been charted” is even more significant since it represents a clear indication that the Fisheries Protection Service understood the danger these ships would confront in British Columbia.

When viewed through the prism of the navigational challenges that commanding officers faced on the West Coast, Pope’s actions on the night of the sinking are easier to explain. Rather than running the risk of a fourth incident – Triangle Island was a notoriously bad anchorage where dragging cable and grounding in a storm were real possibilities – the available evidence suggest that Pope was trying to reach the relatively safe waters of Ikeda where his ship would be in a much better position to weather the storm. For the Victoria media, however, Pope had taken a considerable risk on that day, telling their readers that “The men of the Galiano... have ventured into rough places [before]... This time they took a chance and lost.” Such a conclusion is one-sided and perhaps even a little harsh – anchoring at Triangle could have also led to disaster – but the true significance of Pope’s experience is that it shows exactly how Pacific navigation and weather conditions haunted one particular RCNVR officer and impacted his decisions.

Galiano’s story is also important because of what it reveals about the seagoing history of the West Coast’s early naval reserve. An analysis of Galiano’s activities throughout the war shows that this ship, along with Malaspina, Restless and Newington, experienced an evolutionary process that effectively saw the Pacific RCNVR merge with the men of the Fisheries Protection Service to create a proto sea-going reserve fleet on the West Coast. Carrying out many of the same functions as the modern West Coast seagoing reserves, this small First World War patrol force represents a direct descendent of today’s Pacific MCDVs and ORCAs. Moreover, as was illustrated by the response to Galiano’s loss, the contribution that the ships of this early reserve fleet made to the local maritime defence of the province was not forgotten by the population of British Columbia as their presence set the way for the modern RCNVR.

Notes

1. “Unsung Heroes of the Airwaves,” The Daily Colonist, 6 October 1963. I would like to thank Mr. Rick James for bringing this article to my attention. This article, which includes an interview with Syd Elliott who was on duty at the Triangle Station on the night of the sinking, makes clear that the popular account that WC Neary had received the message from his brother is untrue. The story that WC Neary had copied Galiano’s signal was likely the product of over-enthusiastic journalists who may have jumped to conclusions when they learned that WC Neary was serving at the radio telegraph station at the time of the sinking.


5. Hadley and Sarty, p.17.


10. For more information on the political patronage process of the Department of Marine and Fisheries see Hadley and Sarty, p.18.


15. P.C. Howe memo, 6 May 1912: Specification of a Steel Screw Steamer for Canadian Fishery Board, 1 June 1912, LAC, RG 23, Vol.454, file 707-51-2 (3); G. Desbarats memo, 10 April 1912, LAC, RG 23, Vol.454, file 707-51-2 (1). I would like to thank Mr. Gord Miller for drawing my attention to Galiano's and Malaspina's construction files.

16. HMCS Malaspina, Directorate of History and Heritage [DHHF], 81/520/8000, Box 62, File 1.


20. German, p.33.


23. German, pp.27, 30.

24. Commander C.W. Trousdale to CinC HMC Dockyard, 22 August 1914, CGS Galiano, DHH, 81/520/8000, Box 39, File 1; Fraser McKee, Volunteer for Sea Service, pp.6-10.

25. German, pp.36-7; J. Mackay Hitsman, Canadian Naval Policy, MA thesis, Queen's University, April 1940, p.125; Milner, Canada's Navy, p.35.

26. Walter Hose to Kingsmill, 3 August 1914, Un-archivoed item, Naval Museum of Alberta. I am grateful to Rich Gimblett who provided me with photocopies of this correspondence.


29. HMCS Malaspina, DHH, 81/520/8000, Box 62, file 1.


34. Chief inspector to captain superintendent, 2 September 1918; Captain superintendent to asst. provost marshall, 13 June 1918; Kingsmill memo, 6 June 1918 and Major to captain superintendent, 11 June 1918, LAC, RG 24, Vol.11902, file AE-7-7-13.


42. AE Plaula to Minister of Marine and Fishers with notation by Kingsmill, nd, LAC, RG 24, Accession 1992-93/169, Box 234.

43. “A Dangerous Trip,” The Daily Colonist, Victoria, 10 November 1918.

44. “Ship’s Complement,” The Daily Colonist, Victoria, 31 October 1918.

45. IA Stafford to Ballantyne, 2 November 1918, LAC, RG 24, Accession 1992-93/169, Box 200.


47. A Brief history of HMCS Malaspina, HMCS Malaspina, DHH, 81/520/8000, Box 62, file 1.


55. Ibid.


60. Captain superintendent to sec Dept of Naval Service, 30 July 1918, LAC, RG 24, Vol.5671, file NSS 80-5-23. This letter clearly seems to exonerates Pope’s argument as the “Department of Marine, Victoria” reported that Browning passage buoy was 30 feet to the South West of its proper position.

61. Yarrows to E.H. Martin, 9 August 1918; Director naval service to Captain Superintendent, 17 July 1918, LAC, RG 24, Vol.11903, file AE-10-4-14.


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