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The Road to Transformation
Ascending from the Decade of Darkness

Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley

Nobody likes mistakes. Fewer yet like to revisit errors – to analyze, discuss or study them. They are often an embarrassment and remind us of our fallibility and shortcomings. It is always much easier to celebrate our achievements and successes – that leaves everyone with a warm feeling. However, although it is always preferable to avoid making mistakes, once they occur they are important and must be recognized as such. They speak to our weaknesses as both individuals and institutions. They are signals, if not alarms, to warn us of deficiencies that must be addressed. In fact, it has often been said for good reason that one can learn more from one’s mistakes than from one’s successes.

The military has always been bad at accepting this premise. Mistakes are often construed as a sign of weakness or inability and many perceive them as potential career-ending events. Such a zero tolerance to mistakes breeds an environment of risk aversion, micro-management and stagnation. It kills initiative and experimentation. And, it avoids examining mistakes in detail – lest blame insidiously spread its evil tentacles and taint others in the chain of command. However, this state affairs leads to atrophy within an organization.

It takes strong will and determination to break such a cycle. Normally, crisis is the only catalyst that compels leadership within an organization to take action, and even then it is difficult. The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF), particularly the officer corps, found themselves in such a situation in the late 1980s and 1990s. By 1997, they were at the lowest ebb of their history. They had lost the confidence and trust of the government and Canadian people they served. They were stripped of their ability to investigate themselves. Furthermore, they were not trusted to implement the recommended changes forced upon them by the government and an external committee was established as a watchdog. Whether the leadership wanted to admit it or not, and they vehemently denied it at the time, there existed some substantial and deep rooted problems with DND, the CF and the officer corps. They were caught in a decade of darkness.

The road to this sad state was a long one. The assault on the CF and its senior leadership in the late 1980s and into the 1990s was cataclysmic. The well known Cold War paradigm, with its clear polarities of “us” and “them” disappeared almost overnight. The new security environment, marked by complexity, ambiguity, enemies and threats embedded in failed and failing states and an ever present media, overloaded a traditional, conservative and intellectually inflexible officer corps that saw the world in terms of absolutes. As if this was not enough, a government facing debilitating fiscal deficits looked to the military for a post Cold War “peace dividend” to solve part of its problem. Like all parts of government operations military spending came under sharp scrutiny even as available funds were slashed.

These pressures stressed the CF. Scandals and the bungled attempts at dealing with them led to the loss of government trust and a widespread loss of trust on the part of Canadian society. As the military’s failures, notably incidents of wrongdoing overseas, as well as reports of opulent or unethical spending and behaviour by senior leaders surfaced, Canadians quickly became incensed. Exacerbating this situation was a DND
leadership that was not accustomed to criticism or scrutiny by the public. The clear and present Soviet threat and spectre of nuclear Armageddon had always been enough to distract and silence critics. So they did what they always did, ignore the noise in the expectation that it would go away. They refused to explain themselves or provide information. They ignored or stonewalled queries believing that that the storm would blow over. If the winds were too strong they could always shelter behind the well tested barrier of “national security” and the condescending, if not arrogant, attitude that civilians should just leave military business to the professionals. That attitude only accelerated and deepened the government’s and Canadians’ loss of confidence.

In 1949, the West created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a hedge against perceived Soviet intentions of westward expansion. Soon after the Soviets created the Warsaw Pact, dragooning its occupied territories into an alliance to protect them from their fear of Western aggression, and Europe was divided by an “iron curtain.” This European centric contest soon became a global contest, with much of the world falling into one camp or the other. Faced with the prospect of nuclear Armageddon if the major antagonists faced off directly, the superpower competition soon played itself out in proxy wars in Korea, Africa, and the Middle East.

Throughout, one thing always seemed certain: the Cold War was just a breath away from becoming a hot war in which the superpowers could scarcely avoid using their nuclear arsenals. The only apparent safeguard against war was large Western standing forces to deter Soviet aggression.

This state of affairs had a great impact on Canada and its armed forces. For the first time in its history Canada maintained large standing forces. In fact, Canada deployed a substantial force overseas, including a heavy mechanized brigade group and a division of fighter aircraft.
As well, the navy’s expansion to more than fifty warships in the 1950s was primarily to support Allied forces in Europe. These large NATO commitments quickly became the raison d’être of the CF despite the fact that Canadian government policy always attempted to retain a robust second pillar for foreign and defence policy anchored in the UN. This created ongoing, albeit low grade, tension in civil-military relations.

The Cold War, despite its possible consequences, was in retrospect a simple era for the military. The threat seemed frighteningly real. Pictures of huge missiles pointed towards North America, impressive May Day parades in Moscow that revealed a large and very lethal military arsenal, the continued Soviet occupation of territory liberated from Germany in the Second World War and the brutal suppression of nationalist movements therein, reinforced the need for large Western forces. In the event this was not enough, every year (coincidentally around budget appropriation time) the US Department of Defense published its glossy The Soviet Menace, which showcased the Soviet Union’s bulging military arsenal. In sum, governments and their publics could easily recognize the threat. Accordingly, the military was provided the necessary budget and generally left to secure the Western way of life in the prosperous post war era.

The military had a clear mission, to counter the Soviet threat. Governments generally left that mission’s implementation to the military professionals. National security dictated secrecy and the Soviet’s active espionage campaigns, which often were made quite public once compromised, reinforced the need for a heavy cloak of secrecy on all things military. As a result, the military could easily hide behind this veil to avoid explaining those things it preferred not to discuss. A very closed mindset developed, one that avoided public disclosure and was indeed contemptuous of it. The military knew best, and those who did not serve could not possibly understand the intricacies of national security.

A second aspect of the simplicity of the Cold War was the operating environment. The world was largely divided into two spheres, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and each was careful not to interfere prominently in the other’s sphere. The containment of such events as the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the Czechoslovakian Revolution in 1968 (Prague Spring) provide clear examples of the unwritten understanding that existed. When a superpower became involved in a regional war, as in Vietnam, the Middle East, Angola, or Afghanistan, the other, even while supporting the enemy, did so in a manner calculated to avoid direct confrontation. Equally important, both camps generally ensured that the particular regimes or insurgencies they supported did not unduly challenge the global status quo.

Even peacekeeping during this period fell into the clearly understood model. Peacekeepers were only employed when both antagonists agreed to their presence. Their role was to monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement once the fighting had stopped. Their employment was always within a prescribed boundary, the buffer zone between the two former warring parties. The operating environment was very clear. Each side was clearly delineated by its front line and all participants were in clearly identifiable national uniforms. Moreover, there were rarely civilians or press to deal with, and when they did visit, it was under carefully controlled circumstances. Once again, the military was allowed to operate in almost complete isolation.

The relative simplicity of the operating environment bled into the very fabric of the institution. The Cold War bred a technology-centric culture. What became important was one’s capability of being a technically proficient warfighter. After all, the enemy was almost perfectly symmetrical, nearly a carbon copy of its antagonist. Weapons inventories and tactics were designed to fight a conventional (and possibly nuclear) war against forces of a similar type. Everything had a clear template. Soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers were taught Soviet order of battle and tactics. Exercises revolved around standard scenarios, such as the arrival of the combat reconnaissance patrol of a mechanized motor rifle division, which would indicate exactly what the enemy consisted of and where he was located. Based on the distances from friendly front lines, it could now be determined what tactics he would adopt. In essence, the key to training was learning the enemy’s order of battle. Training institutions provided lessons, handbooks and exams on the Soviet enemy. Students would memorize the
organizational composition (including numbers of personnel, specific weapons and their ranges, vehicles and tactics) from section level to division and higher depending upon rank level.

NATO policy and doctrine, dictated largely by the “Big Boys” of the organization, relieved Canada of much of the burden of strategic, as well as operational, decision making. Canada’s tactical role, whether on the Central Front in Germany or its Allied Command Europe (ACE) AMF(L) [ACE Mobile Force (land)] role in Northern Norway, reinforced the simplicity of the Cold War for the CF. It knew its role, its routes to the front, its actual fighting positions and the exact enemy it would face. Much of the training revolved around rehearsals for the possible showdown between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the actual ground and exact fighting positions where this would happen.

Within the CF, the Cold War nurtured the traditional military concept that leadership is a top-down hierarchical action that depends on unit command and experience in specific types of staff appointments to prepare individuals for higher command at the strategic level. Within this model, higher education had little importance. It stressed training (a predictable response to a predictable situation) to the virtual exclusion of education, a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation, that is, critical thinking in the face of the unknown.

In fact, a rabid anti-intellectualism thrived. Those seeking higher education (a masters degree, as a PhD was unfathomable) were deemed suspect; they were obviously trying to prepare themselves for a life outside the military. What was important within the military hierarchy were individuals who understood the system: the operating environment; the Soviet enemy; NATO doctrine and standard operating procedures; and Canadian equipment, tactics, and staff work. Significantly, this fervent anti-intellectualism denuded the officer corps of individuals capable of, or willing to undertake, analysis, critical thinking, reflection and visioning in the larger geo-political and societal context. The inherently conservative and traditional military mind frame, compounded by its hierarchical, authoritative and closed structure fed a system that not only ignored, but actively closed itself to, outside thought and criticism.

CF leadership doctrine embodied an industrial era model that focused on output. In essence, if the mission was successful, the commander had by definition showed leadership, whether the task was completed in spite of the commander or not. If the task failed, the commander was obviously let down by his subordinates. Clearly, within such a model, mission success at any cost became the key factor. Throughout the Cold War commanders cloned themselves and thereby they assumed they ensured the well-being of the institution. Through the years, the myopic view and isolation created an officer corps that was intolerant of criticism, self-scrutiny or wider intellectual stimulation. Experienced Cold War technicians, who did not rock the boat and supported the status quo, tended to do well.

In 1987, the Conservative government’s bold Defence White Paper, Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada, was welcomed with open arms by the military. It represented a reinforcement of the Cold War mentality, large conventional forces such as heavy mechanized forces in Germany and nuclear submarines. It also represented a halt to the continual downward spiral of defence spending that started in 1964, with the Liberal White Paper, and remained unabated ever since. However, the Conservative White Paper proved to be fleeting in its influence, and that did not bode well for the CF.

The destruction of the Berlin Wall in December 1989, which is now universally accepted as the end of the Cold War, left the CF and its leaders at a loss. What now? The Cold War was over. We had won. Moreover, the government and the public expected a peace dividend. With the Soviet threat eliminated, why maintain large military forces? Moreover, the Canadian government was facing a colossal deficit that was dragging down the national economy, devaluing the Canadian dollar and scaring off foreign investment. DND, with the largest discretionary budget of any government department, became a natural target.

The new world order quickly began to unravel. Former proxy states of the superpowers, now left to their own devices without the necessary economic subsidies to survive, or the security infrastructure to hold together fragmented ethnic and culturally diverse populations, quickly spiraled into chaos. Failed and failing states
mushroomed. In their wake civil war, ethnic cleansing and genocide erupted on the global scene.

Appalled by the scenes of horror and inhumanity beamed into living rooms by the nightly news, publics soon pressured governments to act. As a result, the West as individual countries, as well as a collective entity under UN auspices, soon dispatched military forces to bring order to the chaos. But, the attempts were awkward and ineffective. Manpower ceilings and equipment tables contrived to cut costs for the “peace dividend” and a politic desire not to present too warlike an image to the publics in the West fell short of providing the troops and the resources needed on the ground. Attempting humanitarian aid peacekeeping operations in an environment where there was still an active war in progress and where none of the belligerents welcomed the interference of UN troops created frustration, risk, and inefficiencies for the soldiers of the missions. The difficulties also showcased the UN’s ineffectiveness in the new world order. Member nations were unable to reach consensus, and unwilling to provide mandates with the necessary level of force; for these reasons the international organization was unable to provide the necessary command and control structure to react in a timely and effective manner, and missions floundered.

From the CF perspective, troops were sent into harm’s way without adequate resources, rules of engagement or coherent engagement policy. At the same time the CF was deploying a record number of troops on an unprecedented number of operations even as its budget was being slashed. From 1989 to 2001 the CF deployed on approximately 67 missions compared to 25 missions during the period 1948 to 1989. Yet, in 1994 to 1999 alone, the CF was reduced from approximately 90,000 to 60,000 personnel, civilian staff was cut almost in half and the annual military budget was slashed by almost 82.7 billion, representing a 23 percent reduction.

At this time of extreme institutional stress, Canadian contingents in the Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda had incidents of unprofessional and in some cases criminal behaviour. Questionable shootings and other disciplinary infractions, particularly drunkenness, as well as black marketeering and the misappropriation of funds and resources created scandals. There were also revelations in Canada of questionable practices, particularly the use of government resources for personal purposes by senior officers in DND. The bombardment of negative press eroded the CF’s credibility.

It was the torture killing of a teenage detainee by Canadian soldiers in Somalia on 16 March 1993 that proved to be the catalyst that sparked the implosion of the CF officer corps. The killing was horrific enough. It tarnished the international image of the “do-gooder” Canadian peacekeeper. Moreover, it assailed the Canadian public’s perception of its soldiers who seemingly no longer represented Canadian ideals or values. What

The role of peacekeeping was also a clearly understood model. Peacekeepers were only employed when both antagonists agreed to their presence. Their role was to monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement once the fighting had stopped. Their employment was always within a prescribed boundary, the buffer zone between the two former warring parties. Here, members of the peacekeeping mission to Cyprus meet with representatives from Greece and Turkey, August 1974,
made a bad situation worse, however, was DND’s response to the crisis. Faced with increasing criticism from the media and the public at large, the senior DND leadership, both civilian and military, decided to stonewall the detractors. Falling back on their Cold War experience and mindset, they attempted to ignore the criticism and, when this failed, they selectively released information often in a misleading manner. These tactics quickly led to charges of a cover-up at the highest levels in National Defence Headquarters, which later were proved to have substance.

In turn, the Commission, frustrated by an apparently obdurate officer corps, produced a scathing report, finding that “a failure of military values lies at the heart of the Somalia experience.” Of the 160 recommendations in the report, 112 were leadership and management related. The Minister of National Defence (MND) ultimately endorsed a total of some 250 recommendations for change, including the vast majority, 132 out of the 160, put forward by the commission, and many others from his own Report to the Prime Minister, the Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigative Services; the Report on the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence, and the Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves. The accepted recommendations covered virtually all aspects of the functioning of the DND and CF.

For the Canadian officer corps this was a low point in its history. As a corporate group it was unable or unwilling to realize that the world no longer fit the archaic Cold War paradigm in the face of substantial and significant geo-political and societal changes. Its failure to uphold a healthy military ethos, the values, beliefs and expectations that reflect core Canadian values and the imperatives of military professionalism, was catastrophic.

The general election of 1993 swept in a new Liberal government. Tiring of the public criticism and frustrated with the seeming lack of cooperation from DND, the new administration established the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia to examine the events and causes of the killing in Somalia. Not fully understood by many in the military, this action was decisive. It indicated that the government no longer trusted the military to investigate itself, and thereby stripped a key attribute of any profession, self-regulation, from DND and the CF. Although many tried to deny the implication, the CF officer corps had reached a new low.

However, confidence in the military’s leadership had sunk to such a low level that the government also established a Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (MMC) to “monitor progress with respect to the implementation of change...” General Maurice Baril, a former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) conceded, “Undeniably, the 1990s represented the first strong test of the contemporary Canadian officer corps and we found part of it was broken.” He added “experience in and of itself was not enough.”

This realization should not have been a revelation. Thirty years earlier, another former CDS had already alluded to the danger. “It matters little whether the Forces have their
present manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them,” warned General Jean V. Allard, “without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the best mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.”

The military, because of its anti-intellectual and conservative nature as a corporate body, simply ignored Allard’s warning and the warnings of many others. Certainly the requirements for officer education, training, and professional development has been a long-standing concern. As early as 1947, Brooke Claxton, the MND, asserted that officer training was “one of the most important matters to be dealt with in the organization of the Armed Forces.” Indeed, officer professional development (OPD) has been the focus of myriad studies. In 1947, the Inter-service Committee on Officer Training recommended that a university degree be the entry standard for any officer. In addition, it suggested that the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and Royal Roads Military College in Esquimalt be established as tri-service military colleges where aspiring officers would receive their university education. This was substantially implemented, and in 1952, a third service college, le Collège Militaire Royal (CMR) was opened at St Jean, Quebec to ensure francophones had an equal opportunity. Nevertheless, despite the existence of the three service colleges and the creation of a Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) that subsidized officer cadets who attended civilian universities, only a third of all serving officers actually possessed university degrees during the 1950s and 1960s. Although the Canadian officer corps was highly credible and well-respected by its allies in the post-war era, detractors were concerned that the system of officer development was unable to create a bilingual officer corps, and there seemed to be a large leakage of expensively-educated and well-trained officers who left the CF before normal retirement age.

In 1969, as a result of the upheavals resulting from unification of the forces, the department created an Officer Development Board (ODB) under Major-General Roger Rowley, the personal choice of the CDS, General Allard. Rowley determined that an OPD system had to satisfy three imperatives. First, all officers had to fully understand the philosophy and ethic of their profession, and be able to devote themselves spiritually and rationally to its services. Second, all officers had to master an effective level of expertise. Lastly, he believed all officers had to be given the opportunity fully to develop their intellectual potential. Concomitantly, he explained that the OPD framework had to be rooted in a clarity of mission and in a set of moral imperatives that ODB called the “Canons of the Military Ethic.” These canons were Duty to Country, Duty to the Service, Duty to Other Members of the Profession, Duty to Subordinates, and Personal Responsibility.

The ODB also recognized the university degree as the foundation of professional expertise and reiterated that it had to be the academic threshold for entry into the officer corps. The Board concluded that OPD had to be provided through an integrated and holistic system of education and training that would take an officer from the pre-commissioning stage through to senior rank levels. The critical component of the envisioned framework was the Canadian Defence Education Centre, where the intellectual and spiritual core of the officer corps would reside. It was from this institution that the concepts of military professionalism and officership, essential for the future effectiveness and well being of the armed forces, would be developed. The OPD system recommended by Rowley never came to fruition, although some measure of its
continuing validity is provided by the fact that much of it would be resurrected by Lieutenant-General Robert Morton's Officer Development Review Board some 25 years later.

Professional development for senior officers became the focus of analysis during the 1980s. The crux of the matter was the fact that the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, whose candidates were normally of major's rank, was the last formal training for the vast majority of senior officers. Although the National Defence College existed for top level national and international studies, its enrollment was limited to an annual military course load of twelve individuals. This was insufficient, particularly in light of the increasing complexity of national security issues and the demanding environment at NDHQ where since the early 1970s the top military and civil service appointments, together with high-level policy and administrative functions, had been fully integrated.

Major-General C.G. Kitchen, assigned in 1985 to address the issue, emphasized the social-political dynamic in which he believed the military profession, as part of society, had to be fully capable of participation. The CF, he concluded, had to furnish its officers with more and better opportunities for university studies, especially at the graduate level, and preferably at civilian universities. This idea, however, was quickly torpedoed by another study conducted by Colonel David Lightburn, who deemed the concept impractical. The Lightburn study, tabled in 1986, argued that the answer to senior officer OPD lay within a more structured yet flexible framework centered on national security studies rather than simply tinkering and adapting the existing system and creating new institutions and programs. In 1988, Lieutenant-General Richard Évrain tailed a paper that made three important recommendations. First, he noted that a special course applicable to each environment should be developed for senior commanders. Second, job related short courses and seminars should be created. Finally, he argued for the establishment of a centre for national security studies. More generally, Évrain emphasized necessity of CF personnel policies that directly supported officer education and training.

None of the initiatives gained much traction. In fact, with the end of the Cold War and the severe budgetary cutbacks of the 1990s, OPD took a major hit. The National Defence College, the CF Staff School and two of the three military colleges (Royal Roads and CMR) were closed. In 1994, General John de Chastelain, the CDS, commissioned the Officer Development Review Board (ODRB) under chairmanship of Lieutenant-General (retired) Robert Morton to “review the education and professional development required by Canadian Forces Officers during their careers and recommend a programme which meets the requirements of a professional Officer Corps of the future.” In all, Morton’s committee made 280 implicit and explicit recommendations. They insisted that the flawed officer professional development process in the CF was rooted in a defective and inadequate Officer General Specification (OGS). They also argued that there were major gaps in OPD philosophy, including “a need to develop a regime of professional development that has a military ethos woven into all aspects.” The major failing of the OGS was to define all elements of the military profession, particularly the importance of the military ethos. Furthermore, it did not define the specific training and education requirements for the four stages of officer development. In essence, the ODRB reiterated to a large degree the same conclusions and recommendations of the Rowley report 25 years earlier.

Throughout, the Morton report stressed education as a cornerstone of OPD. It set the minimum education standard for officers at post-secondary school qualification, with the ultimate objective for all officers, except those commissioned from the ranks, being a university level baccalaureate degree. The Queen’s Commission was to be recognized as the formal entry point into the profession of arms. Integral to the commission and throughout an officer’s service was the requirement for “an exemplary understanding of the ethos of the CF, a commitment to duty...a high standard of leadership...and the specific knowledge base and critical thinking abilities demanded of a military officer.”

Thus the ODRB insisted that military ethos and ethics were core elements of OPD. They formed the framework within which officers accomplished their tasks. They also set the officer corps apart from civilian professions. As a result, each developmental period (DP) of an
officer’s career should be designed to provide for these requirements. While DP 1 was the formative component of the system because of its critical role in shaping the professional character of newly joined officers, the remaining DPs should also be tailored to reinforce, mature and emphasize the leadership, ethos, and knowledge attributes of officership.

However, any OPD framework would be hollow if it did not have a sound, fully articulated military purpose. Morton recognized that the “primacy of warfighting” had to be incorporated into all aspects of the CF OPD system. Furthermore, the system also had to satisfy certain social and political imperatives. This included reflecting the bilingual nature of the nation Canada, as well as recognizing Canadian societal expectations such as the CF’s role in peacekeeping. To implement the new OPD system, Morton insisted that “a statement that outlines a flexible but well-defined philosophy and system within which OPD can function effectively and evolve in a timely manner” must be created. He argued such a document was necessary in order to construct the framework within which coordinated and related policies could be developed. Morton also believed this would provide the authority and rationalization for resources needed to support OPD.

The Morton Report was not well received by the CF. Some reforms were implemented, including a review of the OGS to address some of its deficiencies, as well as to attempt to ensure that the document reflected the needs of the CF officer corps in the post-Cold War environment. An Officers’ Professional Development Handbook was written embracing Morton’s OPD model of four developmental pillars within four officer developmental stages. However, the ODRB Report’s overall requirement for a total and comprehensive restructuring of the OPD system was ignored. The 282 “implicit and explicit recommendations” that the OPD working group identified in the report were determined to be “unmanageable.” Instead, the ODRB Report was dissected and subsumed into the larger and increasingly strained CF staffing process. Those recommendations that were accepted still had to compete for scarce funds for realization. In the resource strapped environment this was fatal. In the end, the ODRB recommendations had very little effect on the restructuring of the OPD system.

However, the crises in the 1990s, combined with the Canadian societal shift, which author Peter C. Newman described as a movement from deference to authority to one of defiance, forced the government and military to transform. No longer could either hide behind a veil of national security. The public demanded accountability, responsibility and transparency from its government and military. As a result, the message, which had been resisted for so long, finally sunk in. “The Army was forced to change,” conceded Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffrey, a former commander of the army, “I mean forced.” He added, “The challenge is not to forget those institutional failures took place. We had significant failures.” This message has not been lost. The tragedy in Somalia sparked a virtual reformation of the CF officer corps and the institution itself.

New appraisal systems and succession planning processes were undertaken, which importantly diluted the influence and power of unofficial “regimental councils.” Moreover, DND established a Canadian Military Journal to provide a forum for professional discourse, discussion and debate and it undertook a public affairs policy that was based on transparency and accuracy. The department put increasing emphasis on its obligations under the access to information legislation. It also undertook a multitude of initiatives that addressed issues from employment equity, soldier and family quality of life, to more fiscally responsible management practices. With regard to professional
development, a series of steps were taken, some concurrently, some sequentially.

One significant early initiative was the establishment, in 1998, of the Royal Military College Board of Governor’s Study Group, chaired by General (retired) Ramsey Withers, a former CDS. The study group, established outside the normal chain of command of the CF Recruiting and Education System (CFRETS) and the Associate Deputy Minister for Human Resources-Military (ADM(HR-Mil)), had direct access to the Minister of National Defence. The eight month study made two major recommendations, out of a total of 65. The first called for a new model for new entry officer training, called the Enhanced Leadership Model (ELM). The second insisted that consideration should be given to the establishment of a CF University within the context of CFRETS. The first recommendation launched a seven year process culminating in a modified ELM focused on the early military socialization of new officer entrants. The second required even greater pressure and took longer to overcome bureaucratic inertia and other barriers to its final realization.

In February 1999, the CDS appointed the first ever Special Advisor to the Office of the CDS for Professional Development (SA-PD). The first incumbent was Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire. The office was created in part to demonstrate to the Minister’s Monitoring Committee that a concerted effort was being made to address leadership issues of direct concern to that committee’s mandate. Even more so than the case of the Wither’s Study Group, it was very important that the SA-PD operated outside the chain of command and reported directly to the CDS on a weekly basis.

Given the rank and reputation of the SA-PD this created considerable tension and even animosity between his office, CFRETS, ADM(HR-Mil) and to some extent the VCDS. The lack of effective communication with the latter officer was indeed unfortunate since the VCDS oversaw the concurrent work being done to produce the important overarching CF strategy document, Defence Strategy 2020. This strategy did provide a suitable framework for the SA’s work and over time the VCDS began to see the merits of Officership 2020.

Over the course of a year the SA’s office developed the Statement of Requirement (SOR) for Officer Professional Development entitled Officership in the 21st Century. The SA’s office maintained a good relationship with the MMC and the committee was supportive of its work while at the same time tabling reports critical of the rest of the department’s response to the minister’s report to the Prime Minister. In the MMC’s opinion, at this stage the CF was still proposing tactical solutions to strategic problems. The MMC considered the focus of the SA’s office more appropriate.

Officership in the 21st Century was a compelling document that broke the log jam in the PD system and led to fundamental change. In essence, the SOR recommended the disbandment of CFRETS and, in more detail than in the Wither’s Report, described the requirement for a CF University. The SOR also strongly recommended the establishment of a CF Leadership Institute responsible for research and the creation and promulgation of doctrine and concept development in regards to leadership and the profession of arms. This institute was created in 2001, very shortly after the publication of Officership in the 21st Century.

Armed Forces Council considered the SOR at the end of 1999. Although there was general support for several of its themes, there was great consternation that the document did not have sufficient “buy-in” throughout the department. Over the previous year numerous attempts at collaboration by the SA’s staff had been either ignored or rebuffed. Caught in something of a dilemma, with his own SA’s advice being challenged by his senior staff, the CDS directed that the SOR go through another round of analysis with widespread participation throughout the CF. This was duly undertaken using the so-called “Empowerment Model.” A series of large working group meetings, in three tiers – junior, intermediate and senior ranks – took place over the next six months. Ultimately, the revised SOR, now entitled Officership 2020, received formal endorsement by both the CDS and the Minister of National Defence.

This was a critical moment in the transformation agenda discussed in this article. With the support not only of the minister, but
also now by both the CDS and the VCDS, real progress could be made. *Officership 2020* set eight strategic objectives for the long-term professional development of the officer corps. Importantly, it also specified concrete initiatives to make such progress possible. Of particular note was yet another endorsement of the CF University concept to ensure that the education pillar of professional development would receive the much needed attention that it deserved.

Secondly, *Officership 2020* proposed the creation of three CF wide capstone manuals: the profession of arms in Canada manual to define, describe and explain the concept of Canadian military professionalism; a leadership manual to update leadership doctrine last reviewed in the 1970s; and a CF strategic doctrine manual to provide the context for PD for the next 20 years. While beginning the research to write these manuals, the SA's office also turned its attention to the non-commissioned member (NCM) corps. If possible, Canadian NCMs were more mired in the Cold War mind-set than the officer corps. In addition, if the officer corps was to be fundamentally reformed what needed to be done with NCMs? Four senior, experienced chief warrant officers were added to the SA's staff and an extensive analysis of the NCMs was conducted. The result was *NCM Corps 2020*, a strategic document that initiated a virtual paradigm shift in the concept of the NCM Corps and how it was to be developed. To be sure, there was, and still is, considerable resistance to the new construct that envisages a much higher educational component in NCM PD and new, more demanding, roles and responsibilities for NCMs. This in turn necessitates a different approach to the officer/NCM team. Nonetheless, considerable progress is being made.

In terms of structure, the major result of *NCM Corps 2020* was the establishment of the NCM PD Centre in St. Jean, Quebec. The centre is now the focus for innovative thinking about NCM PD and the delivery of modern, challenging leadership courses from the rank of master-corporal to chief petty officer 1st class/chief warrant officer.

While the SA's Office was working on *NCM Corps 2020* the VCDS engaged the services of a private consulting firm to examine and make recommendations concerning the overall structure of common PD throughout the CF. Based on the work done in the Wither's study, the Dallaire SOR and *Officership 2020*, they focused on the concept of a CF University. The original idea in the Wither’s study that such an organization could be created within the CFRETS framework had failed. CFRETS simply could not understand the vision. Consequently, the consulting firm's strong recommendation was to establish what was now referred to as the Canadian Defence Academy, with the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and the CF Leadership Institute (CFLI) acting as its academic engines.

The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was officially opened in 2002, while CFRETS was disbanded. The new Academy Headquarters consisted of CFLI, the Directorate of Professional Development (DPD) and the Directorate of Learning Management (DLM). CFLI was to be the conceptual and philosophical engine of the formation, DPD was to direct the delivery of PD products and DLM was to develop new techniques and processes to deliver education and enhance life-long learning throughout the CF. At that time CDA encompassed RMC, the CF College in Toronto and Campus Fort St. Jean, including the Management School and the NCMPD Centre. When CDA stood up the SA's office was disbanded and some of the staff moved to CFLI. Work had already started on two of the capstone manuals...
directed in Officership 2020, the profession of arms manual and the leadership doctrine. This work would now be completed by CFLI.

By 2003, the first publication was ready. *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* was a seminal work that addressed many of the underlying problems of the previous decade in terms of professionalism. It defined professionalism as comprising four attributes: responsibility, expertise, identity and professional ideology. The latter attribute represents a claim to a specialized, theory-based body of knowledge and contains the Canadian military ethos. As mentioned earlier, the Somalia Commission’s report had stated explicitly that a failure of military ethos lay at the heart of the crisis, and *Duty With Honour* was designed to deal directly with this conclusion. To be sure the department, in response to the commission’s report, had set up the Defence Ethics Program, which produced *The Statement of Defence Ethics*. However, this document fell far short of the requirements of a truly military ethos.

*Duty With Honour* developed the comprehensive “Statement of Canadian Military Ethos” which comprised chapter two of the manual. The ethos comprises three components: “Beliefs and Expectations of Military Service” (unlimited liability, fighting spirit, teamwork and discipline); “Fundamental Canadian Values”; and the four “Core Military Values of Duty, Loyalty, Integrity and Courage.” This ethos, together with the common concept of military professionalism espoused in the manual now serves as a unifying force promoting a CF identity within which nests the strong single service identities of the Navy, Army and Air Force. It now serves as the doctrinal base throughout the CF’s PD System.

The next capstone manual addressed was, in fact, a suite of three manuals published in 2005-6: *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, and two applied manuals, *Leading the Institution* and *Leading People*. *Conceptual Foundations* established a values-based leadership construct based on the military ethos contained in *Duty With Honour*. The construct identified a primary leadership outcome and three enabling outcomes. These were mission success, member well-being and commitment, internal integration (e.g. morale, cohesion) and external adaptability (i.e. accept, anticipate and lead change).

Based on this model *Leading the Institution* addressed system level issues such as stewarding the profession, visioning and change and being a military strategist in practical terms. It targeted senior officers and NCMs and was written with the experiences of the 1990s clearly in mind. *Leading People* is concerned with direct leadership at all levels. It emphasizes the military ethos and ethical decision-making and provides practical guidance with regard to achieving mission success while keeping the three enabling outcomes in appropriate balance.

The road to transformation did not end with the distribution of the first editions of the CF capstone manuals. If anything the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, the publication of the Defence White Paper in 2005, Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan and the appointment in February 2005 of General Rick Hillier as the CDS, had demonstrated yet again the ubiquitous nature of change. Perhaps now, more than ever, there is a requirement for a highly educated and trained, experienced officer and NCM corps.

The new phase of CF transformation initiated by General Hillier in 2005 affects the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and conflict. It will require a highly motivated, well educated and skilled Force for its full realization. Starting down the road to transformation in the period 1997-2006 is just that – a good start. Only if the anti-intellectual, mechanistic and linear mindset characteristic of the Cold War has been truly rooted out will the CF be able to prevail in the complex and deadly battlespace of the early 21st century. The Canadian Defence Academy has a pivotal role to play in the rest of the journey.

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