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## CFB Goose Bay and Operation “Desert Shield”

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# CFB Goose Bay and Operation “Desert Shield”

**James R. McKay**

Canada committed forces to the American-led Coalition in the 1990-1991 campaign to liberate Kuwait (Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM). The Navy played an important role in the naval portion in this campaign known as Operation DESERT STORM. Canadian CF-18s provided defensive combat air patrols over the Persian Gulf region (less Kuwait and Iraq). Canadian soldiers helped guard prisoners of war, defend airfields and provide security for the 1st Canadian Field Hospital that provided additional health service support. While all of these were important contributions, Canada also provided assistance for Operation DESERT SHIELD. A number of states deployed forces to Saudi Arabia to aid in that Kingdom's defence should Iraqi forces have attacked. Some Canadian contributions to this operation remain unacknowledged. The massive victory in DESERT STORM was a direct result of the efforts expended in DESERT SHIELD. The two operations comprise the 1991 Gulf Campaign. Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Goose Bay played a little known but remarkable role in Operation DESERT SHIELD in August 1990. It was, in fact, the first unit of the Canadian Forces to support the 1990-1991 Gulf Campaign by acting as a transit station for the US Air Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC) as well as other US Air Force formations during Operation DESERT SHIELD.

## **Problem**

Neither Canadian nor American official histories mention anything about the role of Goose Bay in the airlift that formed the backbone

of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Both bases have been used by the US military as transit stations for deployments outside of continental North America. The histories of the war produced in Canada tend to focus on the units that participated in Operation DESERT STORM yet provide a good account of the lead-up to Canadian participation in DESERT SHIELD.<sup>1</sup> This is, in part, is due to the fact that Canadian work tends to focus on overseas operations where forces are placed in harm's way. The United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Official History of the 1991 Gulf Campaign, memorably titled *So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast*, provides a detailed account of both the airlift and sealift operations supported by a significant amount of statistical evidence. It identifies some of the American bases in Europe as well as European military bases used to support the airlift in its discussion of routes, but there is no mention of any Canadian bases.<sup>2</sup> The US Department of Defense's report to Congress on the *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (CPGW)* never mentions Goose Bay or even the use of Canadian airspace. It does, however mention the following:

- Canadian participation in the maritime intercept operations,
- the Canadian contribution of intelligence personnel to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters,
- Canadian participation in the RED FLAG series of fighter exercises held at Nellis AFB, NV,
- the Canadian contribution of a CF-18 Squadron,
- the loan of 250 chemical sniffers, and
- Canadian contractors associated with some U.S. military equipment.<sup>3</sup>

CPGW acknowledges and heaps praise on MAC as well as the bases that supported MAC aircraft in transit to the Persian Gulf. Airlift allowed the United States to react quickly, which was crucial for the successful defence of Saudi Arabia.<sup>4</sup> It has since come to light that Saddam Hussein had little intention of invading Saudi Arabia, but in August 1990, this was not known. For example, General Chuck Horner, USAF (Retired), then the Joint Forces Air Component Commander, recalled that: "...we struggled desperately to build up our forces knowing that at any time the Iraqi Army could easily push across Saudi Arabia and capture not only the majority of the world's oil supply but also the air bases and parts necessary for deploying our forces."<sup>5</sup> The lop-sided victory in Operation DESERT STORM overshadowed the desperation felt by the coalition in DESERT SHIELD.

So why is it the case that the role of Canadian bases and Goose Bay in particular have been overlooked? There are two reasons:

- The mechanisms of defence co-operation between Canada and the United States made this a routine manner in a time of crisis, and
- The actual volume of MAC and other USAF traffic that passed through Goose Bay in August 1990 became insignificant in the months following August 1990 for TRANSCOM's historians to mention it.

Yet it must be stated that the volume of MAC and other USAF traffic forced CFB Goose Bay to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week for August 1990. In the eyes of those airmen providing support to the airlift (as well as the day-to-day operations in Goose Bay), this was a major event.


### Situation

Goose Bay had been a transit station since the Second World War for American transatlantic military air traffic between the Continental United States (CONUS) and Europe. The movement of aircraft from CONUS to Europe meant that a 'polar circle' route would be used. The first leg of the 'polar circle' route meant that aircraft starting from CONUS would travel through Canadian airspace and possibly use Canadian bases (such as Goose Bay) as transit stations. In the early 1950s, the American and

Canadian governments chose to maintain the route and apply the NATO Status-of-Forces Agreement to American forces stationed in Canada.<sup>6</sup> Goose Bay's importance to the US military transportation network was not changed significantly by the increase in the average range of aircraft. While it would seem logical that as ranges increased, the requirement for transit stations would decrease, but the development of the annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercises meant that the volume of aircraft bound for Germany would surge every fall. An annual increase in volume meant that there would be additional air traffic moving across the North Atlantic air routes and Canadian airspace. The US Air Force, therefore, needed bases in Northeastern North America to provide refuelling and maintenance services as transit stations. Goose Bay was a prime location, and in the fall of 1976, Canada and the United States renewed their agreement for the use of Goose Bay by the US Military Airlift Command. Under the agreement, Canada was to provide, 'free of rent,' access to the airfield, existing infrastructure and support services (less fuel and aircraft servicing). American forces would be subject to Canadian policies with regard to the use of equipment, but the agreement noted that the: "USAF shall be responsible for obtaining aviation fuels and lubricants and aircraft ground support services required for US Armed Forces operations..."<sup>7</sup> As a result, the USAF maintained a small detachment of aircraft maintenance personnel (approximately 16 strong) at Goose Bay, and MAC, since that time, "...moved a fair number of aircraft through the airport, particularly during the annual REFORGER..."<sup>8</sup> The 1976 agreement also included the clause that it was: "...understood that any substantial change in the level of US activity at Goose Bay will be subject to prior consultation between the parties..."<sup>9</sup> Ten years later, the Canadian government signed a Military Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU) with the United States, United Kingdom and Germany for a ten-year lease of facilities at Goose Bay for low-level flying training.<sup>10</sup> Goose Bay became the home of the NATO Flying Training Centre (NFTC).

The presence of the NFTC in Labrador led to Goose Bay becoming a well-known name in the late 1980s. Since its inception, the NFTC has been controversial due to the low-level flying. The Innu have been opposed to its operations due to

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the potential effects on the caribou herds. The number of training sorties in 1990 suggests that the pace of activity over the skies of Labrador was hectic:

- 3,205 German Air Force sorties,
- 944 Royal Air Force Sorties,
- 1,420 Royal Netherlands Air Force Sorties.<sup>11</sup>

The Innu argued that their safety, culture and way of life were in jeopardy as a result of the low-level flying.<sup>12</sup> During the late 1980s, Innu protests (including occupations of range areas, ramps and other facilities) attracted both media and political attention.<sup>13</sup> The situation came to be so politically sensitive that the Canadian government had to take additional security measures. The Base Historical Report noted that:

...on 10 Apr 90, six defendants attended Provincial Court and were found guilty of mischief resulting from charges laid at a demonstration held by the Innu on the base...a company of militia deployed to Goose Bay on 16 Apr 90 to act as perimeter guard to prevent incursions onto the aerodrome by demonstrators. Op UNIQUE involved 120 militia personnel from Quebec. The BDF was also augmented during this period by 35 personnel from other CF units. The exercise remained in place until 14 Nov 90, the end of the allied flying season.<sup>14</sup>

The Innu protests turned Goose Bay into a political sore spot for the Canadian Government

and this one offered the potential for international consequences.

In early 1990, the American government saw an opportunity with the drawing-down of the Cold War (and the reduction of the Soviet threat) to start changing its force postures. In July, MAC announced that it would withdraw from Goose Bay. Without a Soviet threat, the REFORGER exercises would not be required, and therefore the USAF would not have to maintain its detachment in Goose Bay. REFORGER ceased to be incredibly salient. The small USAF presence in Goose Bay was to be withdrawn.<sup>15</sup> It was to leave a single civilian behind in Goose Bay to act as the Military Airlift Committee Liaison Officer (MACLO). The Base Historical Report for the year noted that: “The MACLO position has already made a significant impact on Operations, coordinating the transition to the Canadian Forces of the Non-MMOU transient servicing which was performed by the withdrawing USAF.”<sup>16</sup> The American withdrawal from Goose Bay had not yet been completed, but the Canadian Forces were to provide the maintenance services for American aircraft using the base as a transit station.

### **Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait**

It is common knowledge that Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and that this act



C141 Starlifter of the United States Military Airlift Command on final approach to CFB Goose Bay on its return flight from the Persian Gulf.

touched off an international crisis. It is equally well known that the US sought to aid its primary ally in the Persian Gulf by rapidly deploying forces to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the event that Iraqi forces might invade. On 6 August 1990, at a meeting with high level political and military representatives from the United States, King Fahd granted permission for American and other forces to assist in the defence of Saudi Arabia. The Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, US Army, requested that forces begin moving immediately to Southwest Asia (SWA).<sup>17</sup> Such speed meant that they would have to be airlifted. CONUS-based forces would be moved through Europe to SWA, and this meant 'polar circle' routes would be used.

The Canadian government was somewhat surprised by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and it took a few days to consult with allies and develop a response. Prime Minister Mulroney spoke with President Bush on two occasions shortly after the invasion, namely on 4 and 6 August 1990.<sup>18</sup> Three days later, the National Defence Operations Centre activated a Crisis Action Team

to coordinate the Canadian military response, which would be centred on a Naval Task Group.<sup>19</sup>

Goose Bay, however, was far from the centre of international attention, and it seemed unlikely that an air force base in one of the more remote locations in Canada would play a role in the Gulf Crisis. Military Airlift Command, however, was more prophetic. One of the Aircraft Control staff, Private Jeffrey Noel, noted in his journal that MAC reported that it might need to send some traffic through Goose Bay as a result of the invasion.<sup>20</sup> On 3 August 1990, there was a noticeable increase in the number of MAC flights being pushed through Goose Bay. Private Noel noted that it was: "...averaging about two an hour versus two or three a day."<sup>21</sup> This, of course, was occurring as Hurricane Bertha was ravaging the eastern seaboard of the United States. Since that time, Hurricane Bertha has entered the popular memory as the 'Perfect Storm.'<sup>22</sup> Additional

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**Opposite:** During the initial stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD an almost constant flow of US military aircraft transited CFB Goose Bay. Regular visitors were UASF C5 Galaxy transports.

American personnel were assigned to the base to help address the increased volume. The meteorological section, for example, expanded to include two USAF forecasters.<sup>23</sup> Two weeks later, a detachment of USAF Air Police arrived to provide security for MAC aircraft.<sup>24</sup> The volume of traffic increased further on the 5 and 6 August, and although the Bush Administration had convinced the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to permit foreign forces on Saudi territory, the volume of traffic tapered off until 10 August. The rapid deployment of troops requested by CINC CENTCOM required the creation of an "aluminum bridge" of aircraft that spanned from CONUS to Saudi Arabia.<sup>25</sup> This "aluminum bridge" meant that a large volume of traffic would be pushed through Goose Bay. This traffic first appeared over the skies of Labrador on 3 August 1990.<sup>26</sup> As Goose Bay was also a training base, there were significant limitations on the airport's availability. Goose Bay only handled MAC and other aircraft at night and dealt with fighter operations during the day.

The creation of an "aluminum bridge" that spanned from CONUS to Saudi Arabia was no small feat. The TRANSCOM official history listed the major transit bases in Europe for DESERT SHIELD as:

- Torrejon AFB, Spain 31%
- Rhein-Main AFB, Germany 27%
- Zaragoza, Spain 18%
- Ramstein AFB, Germany 14%
- RAF Mildenhall AFB, UK 6%
- Rota AFB, Spain 4%.<sup>27</sup>

There was no mention of transit bases in North America for DESERT SHIELD. The European bases were mentioned primarily due to their provisions of services to MAC aircraft. These services in Europe were vital, as the airfields in the Middle East often did not have sufficient ramp space, fuelling, billeting, cargo handling or maintenance services.<sup>28</sup> Private Noel's recollection of the events of the night of 14-15 August 1990 illustrates the importance of the latter:

Several airborne emergencies mixed in with the traffic: FLEGL 26 (C130 Herc), 21 SOB's, #1 Engine out; a/c did a fuel dump before landing safely at 0539z. Second airborne emergency on another Herc (FLEGL 12); 36 SOB's, #3 Engine out, low oil pressure - landed safely at 0735z. Third emergency was on a C5 inbound with one engine out, one engine showing fire indication, 72 SOB's and class A/B/C explosives...<sup>29</sup>

The schedules for flights within the "aluminum bridge" were tight. A crew spent five-and-a-half hours in the air flying from Saudi Arabia to Spain and had a two-hour layover there. It then flew seven-and-a-half hours to Goose Bay and had a two-hour layover there. It then flew for seven hours to reach Travis AFB for a twelve-hour layover before completing the process in reverse.<sup>30</sup> This hectic pace could not be maintained without the support provided by the transit stations.

Yet the provision of support did not mean that there were no challenges experienced by the USAF or the CF during August 1990. The events of 20 August provide a single yet powerful example. Private Noel recalled that on that day when he was:



...driving by the MAC ramp on our way home to the PMQ and noticed that it was ringed with portable klieg lamps. Just as we passed, the MAC ramp [was] lit up like a Christmas tree! [I] gave Tower a call when we got home and was told that the C5 that arrived this afternoon had a US Air Police unit aboard, complete with Hummer's and a couple of dogs. The lights are supposed to block anyone from seeing what's going on on the USAF ramp. The Tower actually had to request that the lights pointing north towards the tower be shutdown because they blocked out the duty crews view of the approach to the north/south runway. MAC Ops took several hours to comply because they had to get permission from the USAF in Washington to do so...<sup>31</sup>

While the American actions may seem comically paranoid in trying to secure a remote location from hostile acts, there were other sources of potential interference. Private Noel recalled that on 30 August 1990: "Of all the things to happen today, the Innu decided that it was their time to protest low-level flying by cutting through the south perimeter fence adjacent to the USAF ramp. Don't these people realize that there is a war on!"<sup>32</sup> The American reaction was, understandably, fraught with alarm. The Base Historical Report noted that: "MP [Military Police] and Op UNIQUE [Airfield Defence and Security] forces responded to the first and only Innu demonstration of 1990 on 30 August and successfully prevented an attempted incursion onto the runways."<sup>33</sup> Given the politically-charged nature of the debate over low flying, this could have become a significant controversy. Swift intervention prevented a political problem from influencing the Coalition's operations.

### Airlift in the Operation

So how many MAC aircraft actually passed through Goose Bay on their way to and from the Persian Gulf in August 1990? The Base Historical Report stated that:

August saw the beginning of the USAF Military Airlift Command's support for Operation Desert Shield. Over one thousand heavy transport aircraft staged through Goose Bay in a 60-day period. The Met Section provided 1478 briefing [sic] to USAF crews during Aug and Sep. ATC Section increased personnel on shift to meet the demand for services created by the late night movements of C5s and C141s.<sup>34</sup>

The exact number is reliant on official sources, and due to the reporting methodology, subject to interpretation. The Report noted that there were 2,183 USAF 'itinerant' flights that passed through Goose Bay in 1990.<sup>35</sup> This includes the entire year and all USAF traffic, and as a result, it does not focus on purpose or destination. Approximately 67 per cent of the 'itinerant' flights from 1990 occurred in August and September. The BHR also compared annual transits by type of strategic airlifter or refueller, and this shows a significant increase from 1989 to 1990 in these types of aircraft.

**Figure 1: Annual Transits by Aircraft Type**

Type	1988	1989	1990	1991*
C5 Galaxy	40	51	116	14
C141	552	410	1391	137
KC135	18	23	23	1

\*Jan-Mar 1991

A similar comparison to previous year can be found for the month of August 1990 in the total number of flights as shown in Figure 2:

**Figure 2: Annual Transits by Purpose<sup>36</sup>**

Purpose	1989	1990
Civilian	2969	2122
Military	2878	4353
Total	5847	6475

While the data above shows an increase in the number of American strategic airlift aircraft that passed through Goose Bay, it does not draw a direct link between the airlift in support of DESERT SHIELD and Goose Bay, although we would assume the increased volume is exactly that.

There is, however, other evidence. One of the Annexes to the Report did state that in August 1990, USAF aircraft flew from Goose Bay to the following destinations:

- 94 Flights to the UK
- 157 Flights to Germany
- 246 Flights to Spain
- 7 Flights to Saudi Arabia.<sup>37</sup>

These flights matched some of the routes described in the US TRANSCOM official history.

It is likely that the flights to the UK were bound for RAF Mildenhall or other USAF installations in the UK. The flights to Germany were bound for Rhein-Main AFB or Ramstein AFB and the flights to Spain were headed to Torrejon, Rota or Zaragoza. The Base Report also noted that these flights represented 20 per cent of the annual USAF itinerants in only a single month, meaning 20 per cent of the annual amount occurred in 8.3 per cent of the time.<sup>38</sup> Private Noel expressed it in more human terms: "Since the airlift began, we've averaged 51 MAC birds a day, with 102 alone yesterday!"<sup>39</sup> He went further and provided a more detailed analysis by noting that the:

...traffic count for the month is 7,236 - an increase of 1,389 over last August. That increase is exclusively MAC birds, but we've had more than that because the RAF stopped flying mid-month so tack on another 400-500 movements to make up for them. That should put MAC movements around 1900 since 3 August (65 per day); since most MAC movements occur during the nightshift that makes 5 per hour per 12 hour night period or 1 every 12 minutes . . .<sup>40</sup>


On 17 August 1990, the RAF suspended its flight operations in North America pending a redeployment of RAF assets to the Persian Gulf.<sup>41</sup> By Private Noel's analysis, the increase in flights (by almost 1900) was directly attributable to

the MAC flights in support of DESERT SHIELD. This is a significant difference from the 504 flights identified in the Base Historical Report, but this same Report noted that almost 1500 meteorological briefings were given to USAF crews in August and September 1990. If all flight activity matched that of the aforementioned USAF crew from Travis AFB, where aircraft that flew to the Persian Gulf via Goose Bay also returned through Goose Bay, then the number of MAC flights associated with DESERT SHIELD was approximately 1,000. The BHR noted that in August 1990, the United States was the destination for 487 flights.<sup>42</sup> One could draw the conclusion that Goose Bay was used as a transit station for aircraft returning from the Gulf as well as a transit station for aircraft headed to the Gulf. The TRANSCOM official history stated that there were 1,668 flights in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD in August 1990.<sup>43</sup> This suggests that Goose Bay was a transit station for roughly two-thirds of the MAC flights between CONUS and the Persian Gulf in August 1990. Goose Bay was not just one of many bases that supported the 'aluminum bridge'. It was a significant contribution to a larger effort. MAC made 16,203 flights from the start of DESERT SHIELD to the redeployment in April 1991. Yet the vast majority of Goose Bay's MAC traffic

Several KC135 aerial tankers occupy spots on the USAF ramp at CFB Goose Bay. These particular aircraft were deployed to CFB Goose Bay during the initial buildup of Operation DESERT SHIELD and carried out air-to-air refuelling operations off the Labrador coast for fighter aircraft enroute to the Persian Gulf.







**Top left:** Part of the US Army's Aviation Force to transit CFB Goose Bay was an OV 1C Mohawk light observation and reconnaissance aircraft.



**Above left & right:** An RAF Victor aerial refuelling aircraft, nicknamed "Saucy Sal."

**Above left:** A US Army RC-12 Guardrail electronic surveillance aircraft was one of the many 'smaller' American military aircraft to pass through Goose Bay. The RC-12 was a heavily-modified Beech King Air and was used as an electronic signals intelligence platform that operated at the forward edge of the battlefield to record enemy transmissions.

**Above:** RAF GR1A Jaguar 'Mary Rose' in desert camouflage, 28 July 1991. The markings on the side of the aircraft indicate that it flew 36 bombing, and 1 strafing mission during the first Gulf War.

**Below left:** A Pan Am Boeing 747 redeploying troops to the continental United States via Goose Bay.

**Below right:** Mission score painted on the side of another aerial tanker recently returned from the Gulf indicate the aircraft flew 66 combat support, 32 cargo and 16 other missions in support of the Royal Saudi Air Force.



occurred in August 1990, and over time, its significance to the 'aluminum bridge' waned with the volume of traffic in the Fall of 1990.

Goose Bay's role in DESERT SHIELD/STORM has been all but forgotten. While aligning practices in peace with those in war is one of the best things a military force can do (within legal limits of course), there are unintended consequences. Ironically, during the Cold War, the REFORGER series was a dress rehearsal for an unforeseen war in the Middle East. Due to the similarity of the airlifts associated with

a REFORGER and that of DESERT SHIELD, the drama associated with the task has been reduced. In this case, the lack of drama contributed to Goose Bay's role being overlooked by the historians in Ottawa, Washington, and at TRANSCOM Headquarters in Scott AFB, IL. Yet Goose Bay was a Canadian link in a broader chain of bases used to support the 'aluminum bridge' to the Persian Gulf. More importantly, it played a role in the liberation of Kuwait even before the Canadian government committed the Navy or for that matter, the country to that task. It should be remembered.

### Notes

DISCLAIMER: This article does not represent the views of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces.

The author would like to thank Master Corporal Jeffrey Noel for his candor about his experiences and his notes from 1990 and Major John Grodzinski for his keen eye as an editor and a historian.

1. Examples include: Major Jean H. Morin and Lieutenant-Commander Richard H. Gimblett, *The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf: Operation FRICTION 1990-1991* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997). For an inclusive and detailed list, see Sean Maloney, *War with Iraq: Canada's Strategy in the Persian Gulf 1990-2002* (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 2002), pp.7-11.
2. James Matthews and Cora Holt, *So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002).
3. Department of Defense, *Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1992). (Henceforth CPGW)
4. CPGW, pp.36, 358 and 376.
5. General Chuck Horner, USAF (Retired), "What We Should Have Learned in Desert Storm, But Didn't," *Air Force*, Vol. 79, No. 12 (December 1996), p.52. For an argument on the importance of retaining secure ports and airfields, see Scott W. Conrad, *Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond*, McNair Paper 32 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994).
6. "Exchange of Notes (April 28 and 30, 1952) between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement relating to the Application of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 19 June 1951 to the United States Armed Forces in Canada including those at the leased bases in Newfoundland and at Goose Bay, Labrador, in Force September 27, 1953," *Canada Treaty Series 1952*.
7. "Annex - 'Statement of Conditions Governing the Use by the United States Armed Forces of Facilities at the Goose Bay Airport'" to "Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States, Washington, DC, November 10 and 24, 1976, In Force November 24, 1976, With Effect from October 1, 1976," *Canada Treaty Series 1976*, No. 42.
8. Harold Pickering, *Foreign Policy as an Extra-Territorial Extension of Public Policy: The Development of the Military Training Industry at Goose Bay, Labrador*, Ph.D. Thesis (Kingston: Queen's University, 1991), p.68.
9. "Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States, Washington, DC, November 10 and 24, 1976, In Force November 24, 1976, With Effect from October 1, 1976," *Canada Treaty Series 1976*, No. 42.
10. Pickering, p.83.
11. Annex B to BHR.
12. Pickering, pp.155-169.
13. *Ibid.*, pp.192-197.
14. BHR, p.2.
15. Pickering, p.253. The US government also withdrew from the MMOU on low-level flying training at the same time.
16. 1630-1 (B Ops O) *CFB Goose Bay Base Operations 1990 Historical Report*, 6 March 1991, p.2. (Henceforth BHR).
17. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pp.354-355.
18. Morin & Gimblett, p.24.
19. Morin & Gimblett, p.36.
20. Excerpts from the Journal of Private Jeffrey R. Noel, CFB Goose Bay, Labrador, 2 August 1990-30 August 1990, p.1. (Henceforth *Excerpts*).
21. *Excerpts*, p.1.
22. Hurricane Bertha has been immortalized in Sebastian Junger, *The Perfect Storm* (New York: Norton, 1997) and the 2000 film adaptation of that book.
23. BHR, p.10.
24. *Excerpts*, p.4.
25. Matthews & Holt, p.38. This became the popular term for the airlift from CONUS to the Persian Gulf region during DESERT SHIELD.
26. *Excerpts*, pp.1-2.
27. Matthews & Holt, p.78.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Excerpts*, p.3.
30. *Excerpts*, p.2.
31. *Excerpts*, p.4.
32. *Excerpts*, p.5.
33. BHR, p.5.
34. BHR, p.5.
35. Annex B to BHR, p.B1.
36. Annex A to BHR.
37. Annex C to BHR.
38. Annex C to BHR.
39. *Excerpts*, p.3.
40. *Excerpts*, p.6.
41. *Excerpts*, p.3. BHR, p.3 places the RAF suspension of operations at 14 September 1990. It is suspected that the 17 August 1990 announcement was the warning for deployment, and that the last aircraft left Canada on 14 September 1990.
42. Annex C to BHR.
43. Matthews & Holt, p.39.

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Announcing the

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Maritime Command, along with the Directorate of History and Heritage, is holding a two-day conference on Canadian naval history at the new Canadian War Museum located at 1 Vimy Place (near the corner of the Ottawa River Parkway and Booth St.) in Ottawa on Thursday 22 September and Friday 23 September 2005. Panels will convene in the Barney Danson Theatre at 0845 and finish at approximately 1630 on each day. While topics on all aspects of naval history will be presented, the conference will emphasize the technological side of the navy's weapons, platforms, and tactics during the Cold War Period. There are no conference fees but for planning purposes those wishing to attend are asked to pre-register by writing to [mayne.ro@forces.gc.ca](mailto:mayne.ro@forces.gc.ca). Information packages will be emailed upon registration.

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The Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University, and the Canada Research Chair in Conflict and Culture, Department of History, The University of Western Ontario, invite proposals for papers to be presented at the 17th Military History Colloquium, to be held at the University of Western Ontario on 5-6 May 2006.

The primary focus will be on all periods of Canadian military history - pre-1914, First and Second World Wars, the Korean War and post-1945 developments including peacekeeping. Proposals for papers advancing new and innovative perspectives will receive first consideration. Papers addressing all facets of military history, including tactics and operations, social and cultural issues, economic impacts, and the home front, from the colonial era to the present day will be considered. Proposals are welcome from all scholars, but graduate students and recent Ph.Ds are especially encouraged to submit.

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