“Fairly Well Known and Need Not be Discussed”: Colonel A.F. Duguid and the Canadian Official History of the First World War

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In 1938, Colonel Archer Fortescue Duguid published the first and only volume of his Canadian official history of the First World War. It was eagerly anticipated as the Historical Section had been directed to compile such a history in 1921, and many veterans as well as the public were puzzled by the delay in publication. Despite this, however, reviewers were generally satisfied with the results. Writing in the *Legionary*, W.W. Murray declared it “a masterly work of great care and precision,” while W.B. Kerr believed that it would form the basis for all future works on the subject. It was hoped that the positive response would hasten completion of the remaining seven volumes; but nine years later and with seemingly little progress made, the project was cancelled.

Although the initial reaction was favourable, it would not prove to be lasting. Today, Duguid’s history is often overlooked for Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson’s *Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919* (1962), a one volume history of the entire war. Duguid is generally thought of—when thought of at all—as apathetic, unqualified, and through his failure, having deprived Canadians of an important episode in their history. Having “missed the boat” as one critic put it, Duguid and his work have subsequently been consigned to the background of Canadian military history, the positive reviews having been long since forgotten. Thus, there have been few attempts to fully explain why the official history was never completed. Historians, instead, preferring to lament its absence and generally point to Duguid’s alleged shortcomings as an explanation.

What little commentary there is has been brief, focusing primarily on two main points. First, that the Historical Section was given more duties than it could practically carry out. In addition to compiling the official history, the Section was charged with the collection and classification of military documents, the publication of historical material relating to the military history of Canada, rendering assistance to the British official historian, the Imperial War Graves Commission and private historians. Secondly, that production was hampered by the lack of professional historians, with the Section’s staff being composed of a mixture of civilian employees and serving army personnel, most of whom had no specialized historical training. Indeed, the presence of professional historians is widely viewed as instrumental in the later success of Canadian official histories. In the words on one former head of the Directorate of History, it has “made the difference between the quality and quantity of official history after the First and Second World Wars.”

Related to the latter point is the extent to which Duguid is personally to blame for the failure of the project. Historian A.M.J. Hyatt has sympathetically argued that Duguid and his staff
"struggled conscientiously with an enormous task for which they had little training and could rarely devote their full time," implying that Duguid was overwhelmed by a situation beyond his abilities or control. In contrast, Duguid's most strident critic was Colonel Charles P. Stacey, who assumed Duguid's position as Director of the Historical Section in 1945. Stacey initially gave Duguid's work a positive review and even referred to it as "one of the soundest pieces of historical work ever produced in Canada." Stacey's opinion of Duguid worsened as time passed, however, and the depiction in Stacey's memoir is hardly complimentary, with the early drafts even less so. Privately, Stacey was even harsher in his criticism, maintaining that Duguid was more interested in heraldry than history, was unqualified as an historian, official or otherwise, and that his failed efforts had proven to be an "expensive fiasco" and "a millstone around my neck for years." Conversely, a recent examination concludes that while poor staff choices were made, the real culprit was the 'malaise militaire' that gripped Canada immediately following the Great War.

Yet these conclusions, however persuasive, lack depth; moreover, by focusing on Duguid's shortcomings, historians have ignored or overlooked several other important factors contributing to the Section's failure. In fact, the Historical Section's problems can best be understood not as the result of incompetence, indifference and overwork, but instead as a management failure. Put simply, the failure was the result of several factors: government neglect and military indifference, when combined with Duguid's particular and painstaking methodology and his inability to effectively manage and prioritize the duties of the Historical Section, resulted in an unfocused effort and ultimately forced the end of the project.

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Archer Fortescue Duguid (Scotty or Forty to his friends) was born at Boutrie House, Arberdeenshire, Scotland on 31 August 1887 to Peter and Isobel Barclay Duguid. He attended Aberdeen Grammar School and in 1901 entered Fettes College in Edinburgh. In 1906 he traveled to Canada in order to attend McGill University and study engineering, graduating in 1912.

Intent on pursuing a military career he successfully passed the British Army entrance
examinations in 1910 and was given a temporary commission in the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery for the purpose of qualifying for a commission in the Imperial Army. However, his military ambitions were temporarily set aside in favour of employment with Grand Trunk Pacific and the Montreal Tunnel and Terminal Company. Only in June 1914 did he resume his military service by accepting a commission in the 39th Outremont Field Battery.  

Like so many other Canadians in 1914, he promptly enlisted when war was declared and went on to a varied and distinguished career in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF). He traveled to England with the First Canadian Contingent on the staff of the 2nd Brigade Canadian Field Artillery and landed in France with 1st Canadian Division in February 1915. After participating in the battles of Second Ypres, Festubert, and Givenchy, he was invalided sick to England. Following his recovery, Duguid was promoted Captain and posted to the 23rd Howitzer Battery and served with this unit through the 1916 battles of St. Eloi, Mount Sorrel, and the Somme. Shortly before the battle of Vimy Ridge he was again promoted and assigned to 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery as Brigade Major. In June 1917 he was wounded but remained on duty and was present for operations at Hill 70 and Passchendaele. Duguid was then posted to the headquarters of 3rd Canadian Division as GSO 2 in April 1918 and served as a staff officer until the armistice. During the war he was twice mentioned in dispatches and was awarded the Distinguished Service Order in June 1918. By all accounts, he was a successful and capable war service record.

In June 1919 Duguid was assigned to Canadian Corps Headquarters in England for medical reasons and began duty with the Canadian War Narrative Section (CWNS). The CWNS was an historical organization established in late 1918 by an agreement between Sir Arthur Currie and the Overseas Ministry. Under the command of Brigadier-General Raymond Brtinel, GOC Canadian Machine Gun Corps, the CWNS was to write a detailed narrative of the Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days of 1918. After helping to research and write Currie's 1918 Report of Operations, Duguid returned to Canada later that same year and under the terms of Privy Council Order 1736 was retained for the special purpose of completing an historical account of the CEF. With the merger of the CWNS and the Historical Section in 1921, he was promoted Colonel and made director, a position he held until the end of the Second World War. He retired from the army in 1947, received an OBE a year later and remained active, publishing a history of the Canadian Grenadier Guards in 1965. Colonel Duguid died on 4 January 1976 in Kingston, Ontario; he was 88.

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Perhaps the most common misconception about Duguid is that he was incompetent and/or indifferent to his appointed task, when, if anything, the opposite was the case. In fact, Duguid was an ardent Canadian nationalist who had very specific ideas about the purpose of an official history and history itself. In the preface to the official history, Duguid stated that he hoped it would provide "a memorial to participants, a source for historians, a manual for soldiers, and a guide for the future." It was not an accident that providing a memorial was foremost on his list of objectives as Duguid believed that the war had been a "national epic" and that accurately documenting the CEF's exploits was a "duty to the dead and to generations yet unborn." Key to any understanding of Duguid is this notion that history's primary purpose was commemoration. As an 'old original' of the CEF, Duguid also had a personal interest in commemorating the fallen and ensuring that their deeds would not be forgotten. As he explained to the Canadian Historical Association in 1935:

Not the least of the functions of history is the preservation of the tradition of self-sacrifice, and the transmission to posterity of that precious heritage so dearly bought in battle overseas during the most momentous years in Canadian history.

He therefore attempted to write history that he would be understood. "...100, 200, 1000 years hence." This would seem to be incompatible with telling the truth, but like his Australian counterpart, C.E.W. Bean, Duguid saw no contradiction between historical accuracy and nationalist commemoration and hoped that lessons would be learned from his account.
Duguid was also a proponent of a much older ideal, the militia myth. This enduring and ill-defined principle which, among other things, included a kind of Social Darwinism emphasizing that the typical Canadian soldier was of a breed apart from other combatants, a volunteer toughened by the pioneer life with which even the most urban Canadians were somehow familiar. Canadians were, in Duguid's eyes, "physically strong to endure, mentally alert and independent, spiritually fearless and confident in God's mercy as men are who daily come into contact with the forces of nature." In an early manuscript and in several articles, Duguid expounded on these themes, often mentioning the soldiers' civilian backgrounds, singling out Canadian innovations and generally explaining success in terms of national character. 20

The evidence indicates that Duguid viewed himself and the Historical Section as not only the chroniclers of the Great War but also the custodians of its memory. As self-appointed memory guardian, Duguid had difficulty concentrating solely on one task as he felt his supervision or intervention was necessary to ensure the accuracy of any and all information regarding the CEF. Therefore, it was perfectly reasonable - if not imperative - to spend time crafting detailed answers to enquiries, proofreading regimental histories, and closely monitoring what the British official historian was writing about Canadian forces in British histories. Many of these were significant undertakings; for instance, battle honours research began in 1923, at one point occupied nearly the entire staff, and was not fully completed until 1932. 21

It was this same feeling of duty or responsibility that prompted Duguid's involvement in the Memorial Chamber of the Peace Tower. Duguid was initially to write only a series of inscriptions for the project but later submitted a plan for the entire design that was approved and which replaced the original. With his specialized knowledge of heraldry, Duguid devised a complex arrangement of inscriptions, symbols, devices and figures from the CEF and earlier Canadian history, all intended to provoke a sense of continuity between past and present and to provide a memorial of national sacrifice. This was obviously a very personal project for Duguid and he spent a great deal of time designing and supervising the implementation of the over 800 separate carvings. Duguid is also credited with proposing the idea for the Book of Remembrance, which he claimed, was inspired by a passage in the Book of Malachi. He also assisted in its planning and production - a task that was not completed until 1942. 22

The results of these endeavors were not inconsequential; in addition to settling battle honours and designing the Memorial Chamber, the Section had, by 1929, sorted and indexed 135 tons of records, indexed over 7,000


Below: Design on ceiling of the Memorial Chamber.
photographs, answered approximately 8,000 enquiries, and composed inscriptions for numerous war memorials. In all, the Historical Section had compiled 6,432 pages of material, 150 maps, 4,288 charts and 12,000 cards, but no official history.¹³

The Historical Section’s problem remained a mandate that encouraged these extraneous activities, as it provided a range of duties without establishing clear priorities. The various tasks assigned the Section have been noted in a number of sources, but the exact terms of reference have never been published or examined in detail; yet, because they offer insight into the Section’s later difficulties it is worthwhile reproducing them to better explain their significance. Privy Council Order 1652 of 21 May 1921 empowered the Historical Section to carry out the following functions.

(a) The collection, classification, co-ordination, preservation and safe custody of all war diaries, reports, official and other correspondence, maps, plans and other documents or material containing information and data relating to the participation of Canada and the Canadian Military Forces in the Great War.

(b) The compilation and publication of a complete official history of the Recruiting, Organization, Mobilization, Equipment and Services of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in Canada from the 4th August, 1914, to the completion of demobilization and the further records as defined in the aforesaid Order in Council of 17th January 1917 (P.C. 19).²⁴

(c) The compilation and publication of a complete official historical account of the services of the Military Forces of Canada in the Great War out of Canada. This History will be supplemented by more detailed histories of the work of certain technical branches of the service.

(d) The preparation and publication of Historical monographs, as required, on special military subjects connected with the History of Canada.

(e) The compilation of such military historical information and data relating to Canada as may be required from time to time by the Historical Section (Military Branch) of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

(f) The preparation of location ledgers for Canadian military units serving in the Field during the late War and the supply of necessary data to the Imperial War Graves Commission and the Honours and Awards Branch of the Record Office.

(g) The supply of information from the records in its custody to properly accredited historical investigators and the facilitation of their research.²⁵

Little fault can be found with regard to the first task as the arrangement of records would be necessary for an official history, but several problems are immediately apparent in the others. First, the decision to divide the history into separate series for activities within and outside of Canada was an obvious error. It would mean, for example, that the story of the First Contingent’s experiences at Valcartier in Canada and Salisbury Plain in England – although interconnected – would be contained not only in separate volumes, but also in separate series with no guarantee of simultaneous publication. The mistake would eventually be corrected but its inclusion in the initial terms of reference is a telling indication of the inexperience displayed by the government and the Historical Section in planning the official history. Second, the remaining tasks – such as the preparation of monographs – were vaguely defined, and the scope and duration of the assistance to the British Historical Section and private historians was open to interpretation. Third and most important, there was no firm prioritization of the Section’s duties. Under the order-in-council, the preparation of location ledgers was potentially equal in importance to the official history. Indeed, Duguid would later claim that the Section had been given a dual purpose: supply “authentic information concerning the military history of Canada” and codify that into an official military history.²⁶ A final oversight was the failure to establish target dates for the publication of volumes or the history as a whole. Such a plan, however tentative, would have given the official history precedence and provided much needed guidance to the Historical Section.

Yet, even when focused on the official history, progress was hampered by the manner in which Duguid approached research. Considerable time was spent writing monographs and other specialized accounts to be used as quick reference guides when writing the official history. Duguid hoped these stand-alone narratives could be inserted into the narrative or included in an appendices volume. As a result, a great deal of material was prepared, some of it of high quality, but again, no official history.²⁷

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Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001
Perhaps because of his engineering background, Duguid also tended to approach history in scientific terms and felt that the:

Object is to find out exactly what happened: conclusions cannot be drawn until all information has been arranged in such a form that it can be grasped readily and the relative importance of events weighed. Otherwise conclusions will be faulty and probably entirely wrong.29

He felt that past historians had been hampered by a lack of reliable information and had engaged in excessive speculation. Such supposition could be avoided, Duguid thought, due to the sheer volume and accuracy of documentary evidence available for the Great War. Given the mass of documents, research was then primarily a refinement process and an attempt to create control points in order to construct a broad outline into which additional or new information could be easily inserted. From this framework, detailed chapter and paragraph sketches were arranged, drafts prepared, circulated to reviewers for comment and changes incorporated.29 Letting individuals and actions speak for themselves, Duguid hoped to tell the story of his old comrades in arms, not pass judgement.

Another important aspect of Duguid’s methodology was the incorporation of oral and written testimony from the actual participants into the history. Duguid believed that this was a vital component of his account and spent considerable time corresponding with and interviewing surviving CEF officers. Many also lent him their diaries and personal papers and permitted copies to be made of relevant information. In requesting information, Duguid was often quick to add that he recognized the sensitive nature of the material and would treat it with the utmost discretion. To others like Sir Richard Turner, former GOC of 2nd Canadian Division, Duguid gave assurances that the personal relations between officers would not be discussed. Some respondents, however, had no wish to participate in what they viewed as useless controversies and cautioned him against reopening old wounds.30

Duguid recognized that every event invariably produced numerous, often contradictory viewpoints, and he was deeply skeptical of many anecdotes, believing that assumptions and beliefs were often remembered as facts. He therefore tended to treat information gathered in this manner critically; one might even say too critically, as he did not consider personal testimony as accurate or as important as documentary evidence such as war diaries and original messages. This was because it “generally lacked the brilliance or historical value of an impartial field message smeared with the mud of a F.L.T.” He also rated the recollections of senior commanders and their staffs higher than those of front-line soldiers, as they alone knew the dispositions and interactions of units.31
This is a valid approach, but one is left with the strong impression that Duguid, a former staff officer, was in part responding to postwar claims of incompetence in the higher direction of the war.32

Duguid's approach to history had many advantages; first and foremost it yielded a wealth of information. One of the strengths of the Official History is its encyclopedic nature in which almost every aspect of Canada and the CEF between August 1914 and September 1915 is covered in some fashion. This painstaking fact-checking had another benefit as it allowed Duguid to uncover attempts, deliberate or otherwise, to omit or alter evidence. In the transcribed notes of an interview with Sir Richard Turner, for example, Duguid was able to add that at one point the CEF required 15,000 sets of razors (with cases) and 300,000 hand towels.34

However, the difficulty in compiling an official history lies not so much in research but in presentation, as 'truth' is a matter of perspective, opinion, available evidence, and all other manner of factors, including race, gender, social class and other intangibles. So while Duguid was often able to determine 'what actually happened,' what could be published was another matter. His stated desire to memorialize the achievements of Canadian soldiers, but to also tell the complete story, were further complications as they frequently worked at cross-purposes. For example, Desmond Morton astutely points out that with the exceptions of Hong Kong and Dieppe, more Canadians surrendered at Second Ypres than in any other battle in the 20th century.35 But the notion of Canadian soldiers surrendering did not accord with Duguid's ideas of Canadians as fearless, determined combatants. Consequently, the number of Canadians taken prisoner during the battle is not included in the Official History. The only reference to be found is one line in an excerpt from the German Official History in the appendices volume. Canadians are only depicted as being captured when wounded or overcome by weight of numbers, they willingly surrender.36

Nor was Duguid opposed to softening evidence or downplaying events in favour of individuals. In a lengthy dispute over Currie's actions at Second Ypres with the British Official Historian, Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Duguid deliberately withheld information pointing to the probable destruction of 1st Canadian Division's war diary as he distrusted Edmonds willingness to handle it with the proper restraint.37 Likewise, Duguid admitted that out of consideration for Turner the whole truth of his conduct at Second Ypres,
particularly his confused withdrawal to the GHQ line on 24 April 1915, had not been told. Instead, it was his policy to divert attention to either the “higher command, or to the brilliant fighting of the troops, or to a flank” when dealing with Turner’s mistakes. 38 Concealing the worst errors of individuals was not limited to Turner or even the official history. Duguid also altered a passage in Ralph Hodder Williams’ regimental history of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry in order to avoid criticism of an officer with an otherwise fine war record, and suggested changes to other regimental historians. At times, however, Duguid found that his official position made pointed criticism difficult and he once remarked that many of his criticisms would be too devastating to print. 39

It is wrong, though, to simply dismiss Duguid’s work as parochial and assume that he covered up every unpleasant aspect of the war. To his credit he refused to exclude the controversy relating to the Ross Rifle as Turner suggested. Some battlefield praise was added in response to criticism, but his discussion of the rifle’s history and deficiencies is quite frank and remains essential reading for anyone interested in the subject. 40 He also included figures indicating a high rate of venereal disease among Canadian troops and the problems encountered in supplying reinforcements to existing units. The early mismanagement of the war was mentioned and Duguid even suggested that the demands and consequences of modern war were not fully comprehended in 1915. 41 Unfortunately, Duguid’s inclusion of a mass of detail, his dry prose, and tendency to limit the text to a straightforward and uncritical narrative, has obscured many of his relevant points.

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If Duguid’s priorities and methodology slowed progress on the official history, some of the responsibility for this lack of production and focus must also lie with the army and successive governments. As the architects of the Section’s overall structure, both were slow to react to obvious problems. During the war the government had been content to rely upon the efforts of the flamboyant Sir Max Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook) and Dominion archivist, Arthur Doughty, to ensure the documentation of the Canadian war effort, waiting until just after the armistice to finally establish an Historical Section. 42 Although supportive in principal, a series of ministers who were uninterested in the defence portfolio meant that a coherent policy was, in Stacey’s words, “somewhat slow in crystallizing.” 43 This is, in fact, a rather generous assessment as the government’s actions suggest that there was never a clear policy of any kind. Having created a Historical Section the government then allowed three years to lapse before providing it with a mandate. Even then, there was little direction to clarify the Historical Section’s official role, with Duguid and his staff being saddled with a number of miscellaneous and wide-ranging duties unconnected to the official history. Viewing the Section as a temporary organization, the government also ignored or turned down numerous requests by Duguid to have his staff made permanent, prompting several to resign or request transfers. Not until 1940 were the civilian employees—some of whom had been ‘temporary’ for over 17 years—finally granted permanent status. 44

Added to this general indifference was the acrimonious atmosphere in the newly-created Department of National Defence. Intended to increase inter-service cooperation and reduce administration costs in a period of retrenchment, the department came into being on 1 January 1923. Problems immediately arose as the new Chief of Staff, Major-General J.H. MacBrien, sought to subordinate the interests of the air force and the navy to those of the army in order to maintain the army’s place as the senior service. The Director of the Naval Service, Commodore Walter Hose, strongly objected to this and the ensuing feud between the two effectively paralyzed the department until MacBrien’s resignation in June 1927. 45 This episode was particularly damaging to the Historical Section as it occurred at time when it needed direction to where its efforts should be focused. Indeed, successive ministers did not provide this guidance, and MacBrien, preoccupied with departmental in-fighting and plagued with financial difficulties, could offer infrequent assistance only.

MacBrien’s resignation returned a semblance of order to the Department and with it a renewed interest in the Historical Section and a chance to redress the neglect of the previous years. In early 1928 Duguid even responded to one query
by predicting the publication of the first volume in the next year, if the Section’s workload was reduced. The Defence Minister J.L. Ralston was not so optimistic and authorized a committee to investigate the Historical Section. Unfortunately, settling the committee’s composition proved problematic and it took some months before it was finally concluded. Eventually it came to include Henry Marshall Tory, President of the National Research Council, as chairman, and Major-General H.C. Thacker, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Adam Shortt, Chairman of the Historical Documents Publication Board, Norman Rodgers, later Minister of National Defence (1939-1940), and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfred Bovey, Director of Extra-Mural Relations for McGill University, formerly the commander of the Canadian Section at GHQ. And in what seems a conflict of interest, one of Duguid’s assistants, Captain Frank Cummins, acted as the Committee’s secretary.46

The Committee finally convened for three days in late December 1928 and issued its report early in the New Year. Among other things, it recommended that the history should be written and an advisory board appointed to oversee its production. What likely alarmed Duguid was the Committee’s view that the official history should not emphasize military history, instead focusing on the war’s social, political and economic impact. The strictly military aspects of war, the Committee felt, could be dealt with in several subsidiary volumes but should still emphasize the war as a national struggle. Exactly what form the history would take – one volume or a series of volumes - the Committee did not say. There was also no mention of a timetable for its completion, although Bovey later explained to the new CGS, Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, that they thought it would take seven or eight years. The Committee also wished to appoint a professional historian to the task, relegating Duguid to the role of research assistant.47

Fortunately for Duguid, none of the proposed changes went beyond the planning stages as McNaughton questioned some of the Committee’s findings and enthusiastically endorsed Duguid as the right man for the job.48 McNaughton’s praise may have been influenced by the fact that he and Duguid had served together and he (and no doubt others) must have been uneasy at the prospect of an ‘official’
monograph from someone other than a serving officer. As a result, no attempts were made to modify the Committee's findings and in the absence of any firm direction, very little changed and the Historical Section continued to operate much as it always had. Duguid even reversed his previous recommendation that the Section's work be reduced and for the next three years it continued with its many duties. That is, until McNaughton and Duguid interpreted a brief May 1932 statement by the Minister of National Defence Donald M. Sutherland, as an official appointment and finally got down to the business of writing.\textsuperscript{49}

The publication of volume one in 1938 seemed to herald a new beginning for the Historical Section and Duguid reported that work on the second volume was progressing steadily. Yet the outbreak of the Second World War sounded what would be the death knell for both Duguid and the Great War history. Even while urged to redouble his efforts, work on the history was almost immediately suspended as the demands of the current conflict inevitably limited the time that could be devoted to researching and writing it, despite the more than doubling of the Historical Section's staff by 1944.\textsuperscript{50} In many ways this was simply a continuation of the problems of the 1920s and 30s as official policy and Duguid's own priorities prevented any meaningful work on the history.

Things appeared to turn around in 1945 when Stacey was appointed Director of the Historical Section and Duguid was given a separate directorate with no responsibilities other than finishing his series. There was a sense of urgency to this move as Duguid had only about two more years to serve before retirement and was considered the only man capable of completing the job.\textsuperscript{51} The feasibility of finishing the remaining seven volumes in two years, when it had taken 17 years to publish the first, appears not to have been seriously considered. Duguid, on the other hand, did not think it could be concluded in two years, regarded the deadline as a target date, and therefore devoted his time to laying the groundwork for his successor.\textsuperscript{52}

Why the General Staff did not clarify their position or even seem to notice what Duguid was doing was partly due to the fact that Duguid's establishment was now but a subsection of a larger organization, one traditionally regarded with some ambivalence. As well, there were the greater and more immediate problems associated with reorganizing the Department of National Defence and demobilizing and repatriating the overseas army.

Surprisingly though, the final decision to cancel the official history was made by the army itself. Faced with certain cuts in defence spending in 1946, the CGS, Lieut.-General Charles Foulkes, directed his vice chief, Major-General C.C. Mann, to investigate the plans for both the First and Second World War Histories, the results of which were anything but encouraging. Mann recommended – and Foulkes concurred - that Duguid's section cease operations, be disbanded as of 1 January 1947 and its records deposited in the Public Archives of Canada. Both had balked at the total projected cost of the official history – over a half million dollars – at time when the armed forces were struggling to allocate scarce resources. Poor sales of Duguid's and Sir Andrew Macphail's medical history were also cited as evidence of little public interest in any such history and provided another compelling reason for its cancellation.\textsuperscript{53} Foulkes also argued that advances in warfare had rendered any study of the First World War unnecessary. The Great War was, in effect, old news, and any lessons, Foulkes reasoned, could be gleaned from existing works, even if none had a Canadian perspective. Perhaps as W.A.B. Douglas has suggested, with little experience in using history for its own institutional purposes, the Canadian military felt it could forego the effort – and the expense.\textsuperscript{54} Duguid's plea to reconsider the decision proved futile and in the ensuing budgets cuts the CEF history, along with the burgeoning historical programs of the Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force were eliminated with only Stacey's army history surviving.\textsuperscript{55}

Official historians, Sir Herbert Butterfield remarked, "get the reward that is certainly due to them". What Butterfield meant was that those historians with access to the "charmed circle", as he deemed it, of government officials, institutions and restricted documents, who fail to resist the "soft charms... and subtle comfortable chains" of their position, deserve the historical censure they so often receive.\textsuperscript{56}

Written over fifty years ago, Butterfield's
observations about the pitfalls of official history still resonate, but does Duguid deserve the disdain and ignominy that many seem to feel for him and his efforts?

It should be obvious that Duguid was a much better historian than Stacey and others have made him out to be. While Duguid's methodology was idiosyncratic, his notes and drafts show a sophistication of thought previously unacknowledged, and a keen awareness of the problems involved with interpreting evidence. Despite this reevaluation, few modern historians would agree with his views on the infallibility of documents. Moreover, Duguid was prone to generalize the experiences of soldiers to fit his own nationalist ideals, which led him to either alter evidence or place it in appendices to hide discreditable events. Similarly, pressure exerted on him by individuals, plus his own personal loyalty towards senior officers, resulted in the concealment of Currie's and Turner's worst errors. Still, to dismiss the entirety of his work on these grounds is to ignore his real qualities as a historian. A close examination of the official history reveals that much of what Duguid wrote is still relevant and the official history arguably remains the single best source for the early history of the CEF. In evaluating Duguid it is also useful to remember that he was not an academic historian or a veteran turned author like Will Bird, who was able to freely express his opinions, but an official historian with all the advantages and constraints of that position.

Although the analogy can be carried too far, the plight of the Historical Section in the 1920s and 30s paralleled that of the army itself as both were in need of guidance that was not forthcoming. The Historical Section's 1921 reorganization provided little direction due to its vague terms of reference and myriad of supplementary duties. This problem was compounded by the general staff's preoccupation with their own political battles and successive ministers who did not know what the Section was doing and had little inclination to find out. For his part, Duguid interpreted many of his responsibilities in the broadest manner possible and, at times, went out of his way to take on extra work. It would seem, therefore, that the Historical Section's problems were less the result of incompetence or indifference than they were of mismanagement at all levels.

This failure, however, was not preordained and it must be concluded that the primary reason for the lack of progress was Duguid's mismanagement. A vague mandate and official indifference may have made the job more difficult, but these were ultimately obstacles that could have been overcome by Duguid and his staff. Indeed, faced with many of the same hurdles, C.E.W. Bean produced what is regarded as perhaps the finest First World War official history series. In the end, it is somewhat ironic and unfortunate that Duguid's perfectionism and obsession with preserving the memory of the CEF actually prevented him from completing the one project that would have had the lasting impact he hoped for.

A recent analysis of the CEF in the latter stages of the war concludes "neither before nor since have Canadians played such an effective, crucial and decisive role in land warfare." Given this and the popular sentiment that the war proved to be Canada's 'coming of age,' Duguid's unfinished account must surely rank as one of the most regrettable episodes in the writing of Canadian military history. This is all the more telling when one considers that far from being the final authority that some imagined, official histories are often the first word and have tended to heavily influence the direction of subsequent debate. One could even argue that the lack of an official account - Nicholson notwithstanding - is why Canadian First World War historians, until very recently, have focused on a rather narrow selection of topics: the heroism of Second Ypres, the glory of Vimy, and the genius of Currie. For this state of affairs, Duguid bears a measure of responsibility and in a very real sense he did 'miss the boat,' although critics would still do well to remember Stacey's observation that "the task of an official historian is difficult at best, and in Canada perhaps especially so."  

Notes

The title of this article is taken from a book review by Cyril Falls in which the first line is, "The reasons why the Canadian Official History of the First World War stopped short with Colonel Duguid's excellent volume are fairly well known and need not be discussed." Of course, the reasons are not well known. Cyril Falls, book review of G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, in International Journal, Vol. XVIII, No.2 (Spring 1963), p.229.


4. This is also the argument advanced by Duguid, see Official History, pp. viii-xiv.


7. C.P. Stacey, "Canada's Last War – And the Next," University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. 8, No.3 (April 1939); Stacey, "The Nature of an Official History," The Canadian Historical Association Report, 1946, p.75.


12. Statement of Service in the Canadian Army – Col. Archer Fortescue Duguid. DSO, OBE, CD, Personnel Record Unit (FRU), RG 24, NAC; Duguid to Thomas J. Faught, 13 December 1945, Folder C, Vol. 3, DBF.


17. Duguid to Lieut.-Colonel Wilfred Bovey, n.d. but late February or early March 1947, Vol. 22, (Canadian Forces, Colonel Duguid, Historical Section), Alan B. Beddoes Papers, MG 30 D252, NAC.


22. Annual Reports, 1926, pp.46-47, 1929, p.38. The inscriptions that Duguid wrote for the Chamber are in The Canadian Forces In the Great War: The Record of Five Years of Active Service (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1947); See also Amelia Beers Garvin [Warnock], Canada's Peace Tower and Memorial Chamber: A Record and Interpretation by Katherine Hale (Toronto: Mundy-Goodfellow Print Co., 1935); The passage referred to is "A Book of Remembrance was written for them that feared the Lord, and that thought upon his Name. And they shall be mine, Saith the Lord of Hosts, in that day when I make up my jewels" (Malachi 3.16-17). For more on the Book of Remembrance, see Books of Remembrance (Ottawa: Government of Canada; Veterans Affairs, 1983).

23. The Historical Section (General Staff): Work carried out under P.C. 1652 of 27th May 1921 up to the 20th April 1929, 24 April 1929, File 11, DBF.

24. P.C. 19 authorized Brigadier-General Ernest A. Cruikshank to begin collecting war records and to "complete the history of the present war so far as...[it] relates to the work undertaken a carried out in Canada". Shortly thereafter, Cruikshank recommended the formation of a permanent Army Historical Section and in November 1918 he was named the first Director of the Historical Section of the General Staff. He was retired when what little work he had completed, met with universal disapproval; P.C. 19, 17 January; and P.C. 2814, 15 November 1918; (DHS 1-4, Vol. 8), RG
25. P.C. 1652, 27 May 1921, File 3, DBF.
27. A list of monographs prepared for use in the Official History can be found in, Official History Monographs, n.d., (File 7), RG 24, vol. 6998, NAC.
28. Handwritten Notes, n.d., [Introduction ... Contents, Duguid:]
31. A number of authors including Edmund Blunden, Robert Graves, Erich Maria Remarque and Siegfried Sasson published books in the late 1920s and early 1930s, that were critical of the war and its handling. The most obvious Canadian example would be Charles Yale Harrison, Generals Die in Bed (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1930). Duguid also strongly disapproved of the tone of W.B. Kerr’s Shrieks and Crashes: Being Memories of Canada’s Corps. 1917 (Toronto: Hunter, Rose, 1929).
33. Duguid, Official History, p.87; Duguid to Ralph Hodder Williams, 3 March 1924, (DHS 10-81), RG 24, vol. 1754; Appendix no. 55, (Chapter III, Vol. II, RG 24, vol. 6992; NAC.
34. Desmond Morton, Silenti Batalje: Canadian Prisoners of War in Germany 1914-1919 (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1992), pp.28. 31. Some 1410 Canadians were taken prisoner at Second Ypres.
37. Duguid to Major-General E.C. Ashton (CGS), 23 April 1936, (HQC 4950, Vol. 21), RG 24, vol. 2690, NAC; Duguid to McNaughton, (draft memo), 12 December 1934, p.6, File 73, DBF.
38. Duguid to Ralph Hodder Williams, 2 March 1924, (DHS 10-81, RG 24, vol. 1754; Duguid to P. Ashley-Cooper, 30 December 1936, (HQC 683-1-30-5, File 31, RG 24, vol. 1503; NAC.
40. Duguid, Official History, pp.141, 451-452, 499, 540-541; For the unprepared and disorganized nature of the early war effort see, Appendices, no. 8 (The Growth and Control of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada), pp.4-10; and Draft Chapters II and IV. (Chapters II, IV), RG 24, vol. 6992, NAC.
41. An excellent summary of their efforts is Robert McIntosh, “The Great War, Archives and Modern Memory,” Archivaria, No. 46 (Fall 1998), pp.5-14: P.C. 2814, 15 November 1918, RG 24, vol. 1732, NAC.
42. Historical Section, General Staff, Organizations and Functions, February 1947, 12 February 1947, p.1. (Official History, General 1945-1949), B91-0013/001, C.P. Stacey Papers, UTA.
44. Harris, Canadian Brass, pp.149, 153-155.
45. G.J. Desbarats (Deputy Minister) to Thacker, 30 January and 20 July 1928; Thacker to Desbarats, 9 February, 16 June, 28, 17 January 1929; Ralston to Desbarats, 24 February and 26 June 1928; (HQS 5393), RG 24, vol. 2732, NAC; Vance, Death So Noble, p.167.
46. Report of the Special Committee, 2 January 1929, File 9, DBF; Lieut.-Colonel Wilfred Boysie to McNaughton, 24 January 1929, (HQS 5393), RG 24, vol. 2732, NAC.
47. McNaughton to Minister (Ralston), 22 January 1929, File 9, DBF.
48. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 16 May 1932, p.2982; McNaughton to Duguid, 18 May 1932, (DHS 10-10 Vol. 3), RG 24, vol. 1755, NAC.
49. Annual Reports, 1939. p.67: The Historical Section’s initial establishment was set at 15, a figure that remained more or less stable throughout the inter-war period, and had risen to 36 by 1944, see P.C. 1652, 27 May 1921, File 3; Strength of the Historical Section (GS), File 15, DBF.
50. Stacey, A Date with History, p.172; Lieut.-General Charles Foulkes (CGS) to minister (D.C. Abbott), 5 October 1945, File 2, DBF.
51. Duguid to DCGS(A), 3 July 1946, File 2, DBF.
52. Mann to Foulkes, 16 September 1946; Foulkes to Minister (Brooke Claxton), 21 December 1946. Official History Sales, 23 January 1939 and 20 January 1946; Official History, War 1914-1919, Statement of Estimated Cost, 12 July 1946; File 2 DBF.
53. Foulkes to Minister (Brooke Claxton), 21 December 1946, File 2 DBF. Douglas was specifically commenting on the attitude of the post Second World War Canadian navy and its historical program, but the evidence suggests certain parallels with the other services, Douglas, “Naval History: The State of the Art,” in Military History and the Military Profession, ed. David A. Charters, Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson (Westport:

57. Duguid’s work also heavily influenced Nicholson, and the early portions of his volume, particularly the chapter on Second Ypres, is really a condensed, albeit much clearer version of Duguid’s history.
58. Will Bird. And We Go On (Toronto: Hunter, Rose, 1930); The Communication Trench (Amherst, N.S.: privately published. 1933).
59. Harris, Canadian Brass, p.162.
60. Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 143; Memorandum of Information Supplied by Mr. T.H.E. Heyes, Chief Librarian, Australian War Memorial, Regarding the Custody of Australian War Records, Trophies, Etc., and the Production of Australian Histories of the Great War, 27 January 1928. (HQC 54-21-1-212), RG 24, vol. 448, NAC.
63. Of course, Desmond Morton and others have consistently covered many aspects of the CEF, but for sometime, they were in the minority, as historians preferred to uncritically study Vimy. Currie and other seemingly more appealing topics. Fortunately, this trend has reversed, with literature on disparate aspects of the CEF now regularly appearing. A small sampling includes, Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Jeffrey A. Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship During Canada’s Great War, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1996); Thomas P. Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern: Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect,” Canadian Military History, Vol. 6, No.2 (Autumn 1997); Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999); and the aforementioned works by Jonathan F. Vance and Shane B. Schreiber.
64. Stacey, “Canada’s Last War – And the Next,” p.247.

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