Currie and 1st Canadian Division at Second Ypres, April 1915: Controversy, Criticism and Official History

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On 22 April 1915, 1st Canadian Division was stationed in the Ypres salient, when the first gas attack of the war took place. To the left of the Canadians was the French 45th Algerian Division, which hastily retired in the face of the unexpected chlorine gas. It was left, therefore, to 1st Canadian Division to fill the gap and restore the situation, which was basically achieved by 23 April. However, severe German attacks over the next two days, 24 and 25 April, tested 1st Canadian Division to the limit. The critical problems of these two days caused Brigadier-General Arthur Currie (General Officer Commanding (GOC), 2nd Brigade, in 1st Canadian Division) to order two of his battalions to retire during the morning of 24 April, but the retirement did not take place. Further difficulties at midday on 24 April caused Currie to again issue retirement orders, and to leave his headquarters and seek reinforcements to fill a gap on his left. This entailed a visit by Currie to the headquarters of the neighbouring British 27th Division, commanded by Major-General T.D'O. Snow. Currie did not rejoin his 2nd Brigade staff until some time that evening. The next day, 25 April, strong German attacks and some false information again caused Currie to order two of his battalions to withdraw. This action took place, to a depth of some 1,000 yards, but subsequently the two battalions returned to their original positions. That night, 2nd Canadian Brigade was replaced in the line by a brigade of the British 28th Division.1

After the war, in 1927, the Official British Historian of the First World War, Brigadier General Sir James Edmonds, told his friend, military historian Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, of this episode:

Currie three times ordered the Canadians to retire, but his troops did not obey. Currie reported his orders to Alderson (Lieutenant-General E.A.H. Alderson, GOC 1st Canadian Division) and on telling Snow, the latter said, “If Currie was an English Officer I would have had him put under arrest and he would probably have been shot.”...When recorded in the (British) Official History, vol. 3, Currie begged for its deletion and this was granted. (It had hung over his head for 13 years).2

In fact, Currie did not beg for deletion of this passage, although he did think that Edmonds was “poisoned” against both himself and the staff of 2nd Canadian Brigade. Perhaps for this reason, Currie drafted the reply that Colonel A.F. Duguid, the Canadian Official Historian, sent to Edmonds, defending Currie’s actions.3 Currie was not blameless in issuing his three orders to parts of his brigade to withdraw. For example, Colonel Kirkaldie (Staff officer, 8th Battalion, later Brigadier-General, commanding 12th Brigade of 4th Canadian Division) told General Sir David Watson [commander 4th Canadian Division] that he had saved 2nd Canadian Brigade at Second Ypres, when "He had received orders from Currie at midday [24 April] to retire, and with Lipsett [Lieutenant-Colonel Lipsett, commanding 8th Battalion of 2nd Canadian Brigade] was writing out orders, and he stated that if Regiment had to retire up face of hill, they would be cleaned out. They phoned to [Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert

Plumer's VI Corps in line, and found that they could hold out, and then asked that order should be cancelled, which was granted. They could not get Currie, having been told he was away trying to get reinforcements. Later, order to retire was again sent them, 8th Bn." Later, at 1400 hours on 25 April, Currie personally handed over a retirement order to Lieutenant-Colonel Tuxford, commanding 5th Battalion in 2nd Brigade, but although the battalion withdrew it then returned and did not leave until after dark that day. Tuxford also noted that his battalion had disobeyed orders to retire the previous day.

It does seem that Currie was under considerable pressure on 24 and 25 April, and that he was probably hasty in issuing orders to retire on those two days, but it must be emphasized that, apart from tremendous German pressure, the real culprit was actually Brigadier General R.E.W. Turner, V.C., commanding 3rd Brigade in 1st Canadian Division. In the late morning of 24 April, at 1135 hours, Turner ordered his battalions, plus two British battalions, to fall back to the GHQ line, which left a 3,000 yard gap to the left of 2nd Brigade. He was ordered to close the gap, but did not respond to 1st Canadian Division's orders, and the situation was not restored until the next day, partly by British troops and partly by Currie's 2nd Brigade. Turner's actions, which would have been disastrous if the Germans had discovered this gap, were covered up firstly by Lieutenant-General Alderson, and then in the Canadian Official History by Colonel Duguid.

Thus far it appears that Edmonds had exaggerated Currie's actions, although there was a core of truth to his accusations. However, Edmonds' reference to Snow's comment about Currie probably being shot if he had been an English officer, was less reliable, as witnesses of Currie's visit to Snow's 27th Division headquarters on 24 April later showed. Currie himself remarked that:

As soon as I [Currie] mentioned [to Snow] that apparently there was a gap between the left of my 8th Bn. and the 3rd Brigade troops, he shouted at me and asked how dare I allow such a gap to occur. To hear him you would think that I personally and solely was responsible for that gap... He roundly abused me and told me to get out, shouting at me to "give them hell, give them hell." I asked if I might send a message to the 1st Division, but had no sooner sat down at a table to write the message when I was told that I was taking much too long over it. That was an insult and so at variance to the treatment which one officer should receive from another of superior rank that I was almost dumbfounded.

Currie's version was supported by another witness, a Major Lynn, of the Canadian Engineers. Lynn remembered that when Currie asked Snow for reinforcements, saying that "Your men are fresh and their assistance would be of great value," Snow replied angrily: "Have you come here to teach me my profession and dictate to me how I shall handle my division?" Currie repeated his request, and Snow responded unhelpfully: "Do you expect me to wet nurse your Brigade? You have got yourself and your men into a mess and you will have to get them out as best you can." Finally, Snow cut short the interview: "Enough of this, I have heard enough of your harangue. Get out of here. Take care of your own line, etc."

According to Edmonds, Currie had apparently shown Snow a conditional withdrawal order to the GHQ line for his 2nd Brigade, and Snow certainly suspected that Currie wanted to take his brigade out of the line, but at the least, Edmonds' version of the interview seems skewed against Currie.

At the same time that Edmonds was relating the Currie story to Liddell Hart, he was also arguing generally with the Canadian Official Historian, Colonel A.F. Duguid, over the role of 1st Canadian Division at Second Ypres. Summing up his disagreements with the Canadian version of Second Ypres, Edmonds wrote a report to his superiors, the branch of the Committee of Imperial Defence that controlled the British official histories of the First World War. Edmonds' varied criticism of Currie forms a key part of this report, but he also raised another general problem, namely, the reliability of the Canadian Official History due to the absence of certain war diaries, and what he saw as the devious conduct of Colonel Duguid. Because Edmonds' official report to his superiors has never been published in full before, it is worth reproducing in order to show how suspicious Edmonds was of Currie and Duguid, and of the way in which the Canadian Official History was being prepared.
Text of J.E. Edmonds, “Canadian Comments on ‘1915 (France)’” Vol. 1; Committee of Imperial Defence, Sub-Committee for the Control of the Official Histories. Report of the Work of the Historical Section by the Secretary.

The first TS. draft of this volume was circulated in the usual way to all the principal surviving officers who were concerned, down to the battalion commanders. In the case of the Canadian Division (which participated in the battle of “Second Ypres”) a copy was sent to Colonel A.F. Duguid, the head of the Canadian Historical Section for him to circulate (which he did not do, merely sending the remarks of his Section). After the receipt of all comments, the chapters were revised, and re-typed and copies then sent to the War Office and Foreign Office, some of the principal officers concerned and again, at his request, to Colonel Duguid.

In May 1926 - 15 months after 1914 Volume II was published - the volume was ready to go to press, except that the Canadian comments had not been received. It had been approved by the War Office and by all the British officers concerned, including General Sir G. Milne (whom Lord Plumer had deputed to act for him in the matter) and Lieut.-General Sir E. Alderson, who in the period concerned was commanding the Canadian Division. He wrote that he considered the narrative “excellent and fair.” Of the three other divisional commanders in “2nd Ypres,” Lieut.-General Sir E. Bulfin (25th Division) wrote, “I am full of admiration of your clear and consecutive narrative of events.”

Lieut.-General Sir T. Snow (27th Division) came personally to offer his congratulations, and Lieut.-General Sir H. Keary (Meerut Division) wrote:

“I have carefully read through the draft of chapters and have compared it carefully with the private diary which I kept at the time. I do not find anything recorded which I wish altered, nor have I any reasonable comment to make.”

The comments of subordinate officers were equally satisfactory.

The drafts of the four chapters in which Canada was concerned were sent to Colonel Duguid on the 5th January, 22nd January, 11th February and 17th February, 1926, respectively. No comments were sent off by him from Ottawa until 16th July (received here 30th July), but in the meantime private letters from a little group of Canadians who are supporters of General Sir A. Currie were received by various persons in England, complaining that the narrative was not impartial, etc. Among others who received a letter from General Currie’s particular friend, was Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. He was good enough to reply:

“I have, as you suggested, read the three chapters in the second draft. I cannot see anything on the face of them that could be considered lacking in fairness or appreciation or differing in tone towards the Canadians from its tone towards other units.”

Another who received a letter was Major-General Sir P. Radcliffe, at one time the B.G.G.S. Canadian Corps. I sent him the TS., and he wrote:

“I have read it very carefully, and I honestly do not see anything to which exception can be taken as regards Canadians at ‘Second Ypres.’”

Mr. C.T. Atkinson (Exeter College, Oxford), who knows the records thoroughly, wrote:

“I don’t think the Canadians have the least cause for accusing this account of lacking in appreciation or generosity.”

I had, indeed, covered up a number of unpleasant incidents, and particularly the unsoldierly behaviour of General Currie and some of the higher officers, appointed apparently by the late Sir Sam Hughes for political services. Their conduct, inter alia had the result that their commands left the front without waiting to be relieved by other troops.

When the Canadian comments arrived, they were found to be unimportant: small corrections of detail and spelling, whilst obvious typing errors were treated as errors of fact: they included also, however, corrections of the account of the action of British Imperial troops, of which the Canadian Historical section had no first-hand information, the changes being made in order to give more credit to Canadian units. Instead of sending, as requested, the remarks of the principal surviving

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* One ran away to Poperingh and reported he was rallying his battalion there!
Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Official British Historian of the First World War

officers, all of course under the rank of divisional commander in 1915, Colonel Duguid only sent those of twelve officers, who only concerned themselves with a few points:

General Sir A. Currie (Brigade Commander)
Principally abuse of General Snow, who did his best to prevent him withdrawing his brigade prematurely.

Lieut.-Gen. Turner (Brigade Commander)
Who denied sending a message from General Snow’s headquarters, and said he went there through “simple curiosity, to see their wonderful dug-outs.”

Br.-Gen. Armstrong (C.R.E.)
Who complained that nothing had been said about his supplying engineer stores to Imperial troops as well as Canadians.

Lieut.-Col. Lamb (G.S.)
Noting his own services as liaison officer (13 lines only).

Lieut.-Col. Gordon Hall (G.S.)
Ten lines comment on the misuse of the divisional reserve.

Br.-Gen. Hayter (Brigade Major)
Four lines to the effect that “it is difficult to work into an official narrative all the small incidents.”

Br.-Gen. King (Battery Commander)
Explaining the curious retirement of his battery across the Canal on the 22nd April.

Br.-Gen. Sir F. Loomis (Comdt. of St. Julien)
This officer had been removed from command of his battalion and was put in charge of 2 1/2 companies of reserve. His comments are general and abusive: “unfair, unfriendly and ungenerous treatment.”

Colonel McCuaig (Company Commander)
Attempt to minimize the services of a company of the Buffs, which stiffened the Canadians.

Captain Ross (M.G. Officer)
Seven small useful detail comments. 20 lines in all.

Colonel Anderson (not present)
General comments on the “unfairness” of the draft.
Colonel Meighen (Battalion Commander)

General comment on the minimizing of the share of Canadians.

None of these comments, except Captain Ross’s, was of the least use, and no explanation of why the TS, was not circulated to the numerous other surviving officers, not supporters of Sir A. Currie, was offered.

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the cablegram notifying the despatch of the comments from Ottawa, which arrived on the 30th July, I was informed by the High Commissioner’s Office and the War Office that Colonel Duguid had left Canada on a holiday visit to relatives in Scotland.

I got into communication with Duguid on his arrival, and invited him to come to London offering to pay expenses. He came at once arriving on 2nd August. I entertained him, and we spent the next four days together. Far from being uneasy, he said, “it was like Ajax defying the lightning - and not half liking the job.”

We went one by one through all the comments, Duguid getting more and more ashamed of them. In the course of time I got the following out of him. I had asked him five times in the previous year to send me redrafts of any portion of the narrative that he did not agree with: he says he had direct orders of the C.G.S. NOT to do this, but to find every possible fault with the draft. He had checked the rank and initials of every officer mentioned, the spelling of every name and place name and the hour of every event; when accounts, time, or even spelling of Belgian place names varied, he had suggested the opposite to that one which I had accepted. (This is evident in the comments.) The object of all this smoke and dust was to obscure the real issue which Colonel Duguid said was to get expunged from the record that on the 24th April Sir A. Currie and his staff had made grave mistakes, and on the morning of the 25th April, regardless of the troops alongside, had ordered the retirement of his brigade, reported his action in writing (the message is preserved) to the Canadian Division and verbally to General Snow (who used rather strong language to him). The publication of the whole story of General Duguid’s conduct would ruin his position in Canada - where he is passing as a staunch supporter of the Imperial connection. To my natural comment, why didn’t you write this to me and save all this bother, he said that he had not been allowed to do so in writing. Further, though admitting that at the time too much credit had been given to the Canadians and too little to the British (I have this in writing), he begged for more praise for the Canadians, and that the share in the battle of General Snow might not be made so prominent, (Generals Snow and Hull were singled out for special praise by Sir J. French in his dispatch and thoroughly deserved it).

On the advice of Mr. Amery and Mr. Churchill - to whom I mentioned the difficulties - I added a little more praise, although the British troops at 2nd Ypres - particularly the 28th Division, which lost three times as many men as the Canadian Division - were disgusted at the praise lavished by the press on the Canadians, and omitted the incident of General Currie’s orders and his other dubious conduct at Ypres, though it had an effect on the position of troops which it is a little difficult to hide; and in general I accepted Colonel Duguid’s proposed corrections where they did not affect Imperial troops, in particular that the Canadian retirements had been made in good order, and that the slow German advance was due to the Canadian defence, not, as the Germans say, to their troops being of a poor class and unwilling, after months of trench warfare, to push on. He expressed himself fully satisfied, and wrote me the following letter in leaving:

“S.S. Montcalm, 13th August 1926

Dear General Edmonds,

From the above you will see that I leave for Canada according to plan, so this is just a line to thank you for your kindness and consideration in what would otherwise have been a nasty mess.

With kind regards, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

A. Fortescue Duguid"

When I asked him to let me have a note of his expenses, he said that his trip to England was paid for officially, and he admitted that the story of his being on a holiday was a pretense. I also
asked Colonel Duguid why in the eight years since peace, with a large historical section, Canada had not produced a history of the troops in the war, as Australia and New Zealand had done. He replied that the Canadians dare not write until the British account had appeared, for fear of their version not being believed: their plan was to force their narrative on us. Sir Max Aitken's (Lord Beaverbrook) "Canada in Flanders" he said was worthless — as a matter of fact it contains statements which upset some of the present Canadian claims that they never gave ground.

To complete the unpleasant story, it should be added that it was somewhat difficult in the first place to compile the account of 2nd Ypres, as the Canadian war diaries of the period for the Division and the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades (commanded by Generals Currie and Turner) have disappeared, and typewritten narratives have been substituted for them. These narratives unfortunately do not fit in with the war diaries that are available. When I asked Lieut.-General Sir E. Alderson what value could be placed on the divisional narrative, he wrote:

"I am not surprised that you found the account and maps inaccurate. It was written soon after by one of my Canadian staff. I did not want to hurt his feelings. I sent it in much as he wrote it. They were very sensitive, and I often had to do that."

I consulted Field-Marshal Lord Haig on the matter, and he said, "the Canadians never were where they said they were," and that at Festubert he had to send an aeroplane to look for them.

It should also be placed on record that Duguid tried to impose on me as historical material a typewritten dossier entitled "Extracts from messages, reports, etc. Second Battle of Ypres." This purported to be a file of the messages and reports arranged in order of narrative time. On checking them I found that hours, even days in some cases, did not correspond with such originals as I had, and that extracts of some sort of narrative had been interpolated as contemporaneous reports. Colonel Duguid could not say how it was that this had happened.

I have further to report the following incident: In 1924, when Colonel Duguid was in England to collect material for the Canadian Official History, we agreed verbally that before the British Historical Section published any volumes in which Canadian forces were engaged, the draft should be sent to Canada for comment, and he volunteered the promise that the Canadian Official History should be submitted to me. This he subsequently repeated in writing. But he has got round the promise by publishing in the Encyclopedia Britannica Supplement Volume III, just issued, an entirely misleading account of "Second Ypres." It is signed with initials "A.F.D." explained in list of contributors as "A. Fortescue Duguid". In this he devotes nearly the whole space to the Canadian Division, only mentions six battalions of the five (and part of a sixth) British divisions engaged, and entirely omits the Canadian retirement on the 24th and 25th April 1915 by which a large piece of the Salient was lost. Naturally he does not mention the counter-attack of the British Yorkshire Territorials, which drove the Germans out of St. Julien after the Canadians had lost it.

(signed) J.E. Edmonds 1.XII.26

* It seems certain that he did not expect that his name would be divulged.
It is of interest here to get Duguid’s side of the story of his visit to Britain. Duguid told the Canadian Chief of Staff that he arrived in Scotland for his holiday, and then received the anticipated invitation from Edmonds for an interview in London. Duguid argued that as a result of his discussions with Edmonds, liaison between the two sections was properly established, that errors had been replaced by facts, that the anti-Canadian atmosphere at Edmonds’ office had been dispelled, and that Edmonds had promised a third draft for Canadian perusal. Nevertheless, it does appear that Duguid was on the defensive, that he did conceal some evidence from Edmonds, and that there probably had once been a 1st Canadian Division war diary which was replaced by a later narrative of events. For example, Colonel J. Sutherland Brown, DAQMG of 1st Canadian Division, told J.H. MacBrien, the Canadian Chief of Staff, in 1925, that “The report of the battle [Second Ypres] was available but I was informed by Col. Lamb [Staff Officer, 1st Canadian Division] that the correspondence [between Alderson, GOC 1st Canadian division, and Turner] had been destroyed... and it is probable that the War Diaries compiled at Divisional HQs, together with some correspondence connected with the retirement of the Third Brigade, were burnt at the same time...” Colonel Cecil Romer, a British staff officer with 1st Canadian Division, stated that someone in “G” branch of 1st Canadian Division kept the usual war diary, but “Why and when the latter vanished I have no idea.” Finally, Brigadier-General E. de B. Panet, also 1st Canadian Division Staff, simply noted that there was a war diary, but he did not keep copies, and thought it rather extraordinary that they were missing. Duguid forwarded “Extracts” of this debate to Edmonds in January 1926, but omitted the Sutherland Brown, Romer and Panet information.

Edmonds’ other chief target in his report, the allegations against Currie, have been addressed above, but one item in Edmonds’ report is still an open question. Why did Duguid and his Canadian official history staff only produce one volume of narrative for the years 1914 to 1915 (plus a documents volume and a medical volume) of the Canadian Official History of the First World War? Why did this volume take until 1938 to appear? And what happened to the other volumes for 1916, 1917, and 1918? Edmonds’ answer is contained in his report, namely, that the Canadian strategy was to wait for the British volumes to be drafted, and then press their own version onto the British volumes, before presumably getting on with their own volumes. One letter from Duguid seems to support this position, where Duguid argues that efforts to make the British History accurate had seriously interfered with the Canadian Official History, and this seems to be the case, for already in 1924 Duguid had laid out a projected eight volumes. But under public pressure in the late 1930s, Duguid explained that the Historical Section was reorganized in 1921, and then for 11 years simply collated a large quantity of documents and answered queries, especially from the British Historical section. Then in May 1932, Duguid started writing the Canadian History. This still seems a very slow rate of progress, but it was not because of staff shortages, because Duguid also argued that adding to the staff would not help, although the present staff should be placed on a permanent basis. However, in the end Duguid basically argued that the other Canadian volumes were not written because the Historical Staff had so many other duties to perform, presumably answering queries, no doubt largely from Edmonds and his staff.

This story really reveals that the history of the Canadians in the First World War is composed of two aspects—the events themselves—and then how the events were agreed upon and published by the official historians of both Britain and Canada. There is also the evident and rather surprising bias of Edmonds against the Canadian forces (and subsequently other Dominions) as he reported to his superiors and wrote his version of the First World War. And finally, these controversies and criticisms relate to 1st Canadian Division in its first major battle of the war, before, according to Robert Graves, it became one of the “recognized top-notch divisions” of the entire British Expeditionary Force.

Notes

1. For an earlier account of this episode, see Tim Travers, “Allies in Conflict: The British and Canadian Official Historians and the Real Story of Second Ypres (1915),” Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 24, (1989), pp. 301-325; and Daniel Dancocks, Welcome to...
3. Currie to Major-General MacBrien (Canadian Chief of Staff), draft, c. 7 May 1926, and Colonel Duguid to Currie 7 May 1926, Correspondence, Volume 8, file 22, Currie Papers, MG 30, E 100, National Archives of Canada (NAC).

4. "Incidents of Interest to Turner," at end of Diary, General Sir David Watson (GOC 4th Canadian Division), Watson Papers, MG 30 E 69; also 2nd Canadian Brigade narrative of events and war diaries, for 22-27 April 1915, in file #4, vol. 1, Urquhart Papers, MG 30 E 75; Lieutenant-Colonel Tuxford to Colonel Duguid, 19 July 1926, vol. 2, RG 24, vol. 2680; NAC.


6. Currie to Colonel Duguid, 24 April 1926, RG 24, vol. 1755, part 1, no page numbers, NAC.

7. Major Lynn's comments in Colonel Duguid to Edmonds (draft letter), 22 October 1936, vol. 2, Correspondence with Officers, RG 24, vol. 1756, pp. 4-5; Snow apparently tore up Currie's conditional withdrawal orders in front of him, ibid., and did think that Currie wanted to take his Brigade out of the line, since Snow then phoned 1st Canadian Division HQ to ask if retirement was Currie's intention, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Hall [Staff Officer, 1st Canadian Division] to Colonel Duguid, 27 April 1926, vol. 2, RG 24, vol. 2680; for Currie showing Snow a conditional withdrawal order, Edmonds to Colonel Duguid, 5 June 1925, DHS 3-17, vol. 1, RG 24, vol. 1738; NAC.


9. Colonel Duguid to Chief of Staff, 16 September 1926, vol. 1, RG 24, vol. 1755, NAC.

10. J. Sutherland Brown, DAQMG 1st Canadian Division, to MacBrien, Chief of Staff, 25 November 1925; Colonel Romer, 1st Canadian Division Staff, to MacBrien, 4 December 1925; Colonel Panet, 1st Canadian Division Staff, to MacBrien, 4 December 1925; vol. 1, RG 24, vol. 2680, NAC. It is fair to add that the individuals of 1st Canadian Division blamed for destroying the war diary and other documents, Colonel Lamb, Colonel Mitchell and General Alderson, all denied the allegations, ibid. See also Travers, "Allies in Conflict," pp. 312-313, and footnote 35, pp. 321-322.


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