Double Relative Deprivation: Combining the Personal and Political

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Double Relative Deprivation:
Combining the Personal and Political

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Running Head: DOUBLE RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

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Abstract

Double relative deprivation, which has been virtually ignored in research on relative deprivation, was expected to predict women's collective action over and above egoistic and collective deprivation. The role of socio-political resources in perceiving deprivation and participation in action was also investigated. Female students (N=164) completed a questionnaire designed to assess their perceptions of egoistic, collective, double relative deprivation (defined as the interaction between egoistic and collective deprivation), resource availability and participation in collective action. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that double relative deprivation predicted collective action over and above egoistic and collective relative deprivation, and that resource availability also uniquely predicted action. Implications for expanding conceptual and operational definitions of these constructs are discussed.
On December 6, 1989, at the Université de Montreal, Canada, a man entered a classroom of engineering students waving a semi-automatic rifle. He forced the male students from the room, and to the women he yelled, "You are feminists. I hate feminists." He killed fourteen women, injured more, then turned the rifle on himself. His suicide note made apparent his intentions to send "the feminists, who have always ruined my life, to their Maker" (Lépine, as cited in Malette & Chalouh, 1991).

The tragedy of the "Montreal Massacre" inspired women across the country to participate in collective actions. Women who had rarely acted on behalf of women's rights began to participate in candlelight vigils and protests to "take back the night", and to lobby for governmental investigation into violence against women and new legislation on gun control (Malette & Chalouh, 1991). However, women's increased action became a point of controversy in a nationwide media debate which questioned the motivation behind their actions. On the one hand, women's increased collective action was attributed to their awareness of their vulnerability as targets of violence; if it could happen to the fourteen students simply for being women, it could happen to any woman, including oneself (Lacelle, as cited in Malette & Chalouh, 1991). In contrast, others argued that women's participation in action was instead due to a perception that useful socio-political resources were now available; women chose to act because they perceived widespread attention and sympathy that provided them with the opportunity to advance their position (St. Jean, as cited in Malette & Chalouh, 1991).

The controversy that was played out in the Canadian media is also seen in
alternative theoretical approaches to explaining collective action. In particular, relative deprivation theory suggests that individuals act to benefit the group when they became aware of their disadvantage. In contrast, resource mobilization theory suggests that individuals act when they believe that important socio-political resources are available to them. Research examining the relative validity of these two theories has not consistently reported that one is a more accurate account of collective action than the other, perhaps because researchers' conceptualizations have not adequately captured the key psychological and social constructs. Thus, the present study re-examined the social psychological conceptualizations of relative deprivation and resource availability and their respective roles in collective action-taking.

Relative Deprivation Theory

Among those who had participated in marches and calls for new governmental legislation were women who had been personally affected by violence against women, for example, survivors of the Massacre and women who had themselves experienced rape or abusive relationships. These women, according to initial conceptualizations of relative deprivation theory (e.g., Davis, 1959; Crosby, 1976), may have been motivated to act by their personal or egoistic relative deprivation (ERD), that is, by their own experiences as targets of violence. However, the suggestion that ERD provides significant motivation for collective action cannot explain why many direct victims of violence do not become active. To the contrary, many victims of discrimination, particularly victims of violence against women do not act to benefit the group (e.g.,
future victims) by reporting their experience to the appropriate authorities (Estrich, 1987). Moreover, an empirical relationship between ERD and action has not been substantiated (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Birt & Dion, 1987; Bowen, Bowen, Gawiser & Massotti, 1968; Geschwender & Geschwender, 1973; Muller, 1973; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Walker & Mann, 1987; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984).

More recently, relative deprivation theorists have suggested that perhaps it is not ERD that motivates individuals, but rather perceptions of group, or collective relative deprivation (CRD). CRD occurs when the individual feels that his/her group has been deprived, and appears to be a more theoretically consistent explanation for why women acted to benefit the group, yet were neither personally involved in the Massacre nor involved in other experiences of violence. While CRD is regarded as the more valid explanation of collective action, the relationship between CRD and action is moderate, at best (e.g., Abeles, 1976; Crawford & Naditch, 1970; Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Hafer & Olson, 1993; McInnis & Grant, 1990; Miller, Bolce & Halligan, 1977; Walker & Mann, 1987), explaining 8% percent of the variability on average. Indeed, while many women and other minority group members recognize their group’s discrimination, relatively few endorse or are involved in actions to change women’s status (Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O’Connell & Whalen, 1989; Matheson, Echenberg & Taylor, 1990; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam & Lalonde, 1990; Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, & Zellerer, 1987). Thus, the recent, almost singular focus on CRD does not appear to provide an adequate psychological explanation for collective action. An expanded
understanding of the role of perceived relative deprivation may be gained from alternative theories of group behavior, namely, theories of group consciousness-raising, which suggest that individuals act to benefit their group once they acknowledge that "the personal is political" (Bowles & Duelli Klein, 1983; Kimmel, 1989; Lerner, 1986; Stanley & Wise, 1983). This expression gained popularity during the 1970s through women's grass-roots consciousness-raising groups. These groups brought women together to discuss women's history and how the historical status of women influenced present-day women. Throughout such discussions, women began to realize that their experiences of discrimination are historically based, and therefore happen "not just to me" and "not just to them (other women)" (Wilkinson & Schneider, 1990). Women began to reinterpret their personal experiences such that personal discrimination became viewed not as a function of personal characteristics, but a function of being "women", thus the personal became political.

Research on relative deprivation however, has rarely explicitly examined the connection between the personal and collective experience that is inherent in viewing the personal as political. For example, ERD is most commonly understood and assessed as being distinct from the individual's group membership. The most common comparison group used when assessing ERD is the in-group; women may be asked the extent to which they feel deprived in relation to other women (e.g., Birt & Dion, 1987; Crosby, 1976; Geschwender & Geschwender, 1973; Hafer & Olson, 1993; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; Walker & Mann, 1987). While both the in-group and out-group are
theoretically appropriate comparisons, research suggests that individuals experience greater levels of personal deprivation when comparing themselves to the out-group rather than to the in-group (Hafer & Olson, 1993; Zanna, Crosby & Loewenstein, 1989) and, that ERD based on in-group comparisons is related only to individual behaviours rather than collective actions (Hafer & Olson, 1993). Therefore, it would seem that the most relevant comparison group for assessing the relationship between ERD and collective action is the out-group. This is consistent with other recent theoretical models of intergroup behavior, such as the five stage model of intergroup relations (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984) which incorporates the notion that personal status discrepancies can be assessed by comparing oneself to the out-group.

The assessment of ERD in relation to the out-group does not however, adequately reflect the connection between the personal and political that motivates action. For example, an individual woman who notices that her wages are less than her male colleagues in the office may consider herself personally deprived. By recognizing only ERD however, she has not recognized that women as a group also make sixty cents on the male dollar (Lips & Colwill, 1988). She may therefore attribute the reason for her deprivation to personal characteristics, for instance, not as much past experience, or time on the present job. Thus, when only ERD is experienced, participation in action to benefit the group may be an unlikely resolution for what appears to be a personal problem.

Similarly, the experience of CRD alone does not appear to reflect viewing the
personal as political. While past research has argued that a recognition of CRD is indeed relevant to one's personal experience (Crosby & Gonzalez-Intal, 1984), and that a lack of personal identification with the in-group presumably results only in "ideological deprivation" (Crosby & Gonzalez-Intal, 1983), or relative deprivation on behalf of others (e.g., Tougas & Veilleux, 1987), only small associations between women's collective identity and CRD have been found (Gurin & Townsend, 1986; Porter & Taylor, 1992). Moreover, there is consistent evidence that disadvantaged group members will deny the experience of personal discrimination despite a recognition of CRD (Crosby, 1984; Taylor, Wright & Moghaddam, 1990). Thus, for the minority group, the recognition of CRD may still exist independent of one's personal experience. In other words, a recognition of a either a personal or collective experience of deprivation does not necessarily entail a recognition of the other. As such, a woman who recognizes CRD alone may also be unlikely to participate in collective action. For example, if an individual woman acknowledges that women as a group receive lower wages than men, she may indeed consider the system unfair. However, in only recognizing CRD, she has not recognized the possibility that she too may be personally affected by wage discrimination at one point in her life and may reason that it is "their problem". Thus, participation in action to enhance group status may be an unlikely response to a problem that appears to be irrelevant to her personal experience.

Clearly, the recognition of either ERD or CRD does not necessitate a recognition of the other. In order to capture the connection between individual (personal) and group
(political) oppression it may be informative to consider the much ignored notion of double relative deprivation (DRD), which is defined as the perception of both personal and group deprivation (Runciman, 1966). It is suggested that a woman who feels both ERD and CRD (DRD) may report a qualitatively different experience that may be more strongly associated with action-taking than the experience of either ERD or CRD alone. For example, consider an individual woman who perceives that she is paid less than her male colleagues (ERD), and, she recognizes that women as a group often experience wage discrimination (CRD). She may be less likely to attribute the pay inequity to personal characteristics, because she is aware that other women share her experience. Moreover, the wage discrimination would not be viewed solely as "their problem" given that she too has experienced the discrepancy. Thus, with the integration of information provided in the recognition of both ERD and CRD, she may come to realize that she and her group are not independent, and personal discrimination is reinterpreted as being a function of the body politic. Consequently, because the group experience has become relevant to her own, there may be greater motivation to take collective action. Thus, DRD may be an appropriate psychological representation of the grass-roots consciousness-raising phenomenon (personal as political) which, unlike the simple recognition of ERD or CRD alone, may strongly motivate collective action.

It is possible that past research has considered DRD to be an uninteresting variable because it had been conceptually defined as an additive process whereby DRD simply
represents the accumulation of the experience of ERD and CRD (Runciman, 1966; Martin, Brickman & Murray, 1984; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). However, past research examining the relative importance of ERD and CRD consistently shows that ERD does not contribute additively to explanations of collective action over and above CRD alone (e.g., Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Hafer & Olson, 1993; Walker & Mann, 1987). Further, conceptualizing DRD as an additive concept is inconsistent with its theoretical definition, namely the perception of both ERD and CRD. For example, as an additive concept, a woman who recognizes high CRD yet no ERD would be defined as perceiving a moderate level of DRD, when clearly she does not. Given the presumption that ERD and CRD co-occur however, this inconsistency between the theoretical and operational definition of DRD has received little attention. In contrast, viewing DRD as a multiplicative interaction allows for the possibility that the recognition of one type of relative deprivation does not necessarily entail recognition of the other, and still maintains theoretical logic. For example, a woman may experience high CRD but no ERD, in which case she would not be labelled as moderately doubly deprived. Indeed, such a conceptualization may reconcile the apparent inconsistencies between theories of consciousness-raising that stress the importance of recognizing both ERD and CRD, while at the same time empirical research finds the recognition of ERD itself to be an unimportant predictor of collective action. The present study hypothesized therefore, that DRD, represented by the multiplicative combination of ERD and CRD would be associated with collective action-taking above and beyond the experience of
ERD or CRD alone.

**Resource Mobilization Theory**

In the debates over why women were motivated to take collective action following the Montreal Massacre, it was suggested that women had not become more aware of their vulnerability, but rather, action occurred simply because the time was right: the attention given women's issues experienced throughout the nation created a perception that socio-political resources were newly present (St. Jean, as cited in Malette & Chalouh, 1991). Resources may be defined as any psychological, social or tangible assets that provide an individual with the empowerment to change his/her situation: personal efficacy, social or organizational support, financial backing, or the potential that the situation may finally change (Kramnick, 1972; McCall, 1970; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Smelser, 1964; Tilly, 1978). Thus, the national distress enhanced the perception that women everywhere would now be provided with needed social and organizational support that may aid in enhancing their status.

The media's contention was consistent with resource mobilization theory which argues that action will occur when the necessary enabling resources are present, regardless of perceptions of deprivation (McCall, 1970; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Smelser, 1964; Tilly, 1978). In fact, individuals have been conceptualized as "free-riders" for whom collective action is motivated by a rational cost-benefit analysis of their own input rather than by perceptions of deprivation (Olson, 1965). Thus, women were considered to be active because there was new attention and support for their cause.
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The implication of such conceptualizations of resource mobilization theory is that collective action is self-serving, rather than goal-directed (Martin, 1986; Olson, 1965). Indeed, following the Massacre, women who acted to benefit their group were characterized, not as justified, but as taking advantage of the social resources created by the situation for their own personal agendas.

While resource mobilization theory argues that perceptions of resource availability are direct motivation for action (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977), theories of relative deprivation suggest that the motivating effects of resources are instead mediated by psychological deprivation. According to some relative deprivation theorists, resources may be necessary for the development of perceptions of deprivation. In particular, it has been suggested that people may be more likely to admit deprivation when they believe change is possible. Feasibility of change is considered a resource by resource mobilization theorists (e.g., Kramnick, 1972), and although not specifically labelled as resource, psychological theories have noted how feasibility of change affects perceptions of deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Nippenberg, 1993) and action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, some relative deprivation theorists may suggest that the feasibility of change is a resource necessary for the development of perceptions of deprivation (e.g., Crosby, 1976), which in turn, directly motivate action. However, other research has found feasibility of change to be negatively associated with relative deprivation (Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Rheame, 1983; Folger, Rosenfield, Rheame & Martin, 1983) or, even
unrelated to it (Bernstein & Crosby, 1980; Martin, Brickman & Murray, 1984). Thus, the mediating role of relative deprivation has not been substantiated.

This inconsistency may again be due to an inadequate conceptualization of the notion of resources. While feasibility may be one aspect of resources, it may not be a resource that minority group members commonly draw upon in their everyday lives. Any systemic change is difficult and rarely witnessed within one generation. For example, it was one hundred years after African American slaves were freed that they finally received legal civil rights; Canada did not legislate human rights until 1982, and even now certain groups are omitted despite active lobbying efforts for decades (e.g., homosexuals). Thus, even if minority group members recognize that change is feasible it may not be perceived as an available resource, given its intangibility.

Other studies have used single-item definitions of resources (e.g., group cohesion (McInnis & Grant, 1991)), or resources that within the context of the study may be relevant, but outside, where action often takes place, may be less relevant (e.g., ease of movement between groups formed on the basis of assigned letters from the alphabet (Ellemers, Wilke & Van Nippenberg, 1993)). Thus, expanding the operational definition of resource availability to include the various resources that women may perceive to be available to them in their everyday lives may provide greater insight into the relative roles of relative deprivation and resource availability in motivating collective action.

The present study was therefore designed to explore the relationships between DRD, resource availability and action. University women completed a questionnaire
assessing their perceptions of egoistic and collective deprivation of women, the resources available for women to deal with discrimination, and their participation in collective action to change women's status. It was expected that DRD (defined as the multiplicative interaction between ERD and CRD) would be associated with collective action over and above ERD or CRD. Second, the role of resources in relative deprivation and action was explored.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Female students (N=164) from Introductory Psychology (N=100; Mean age=20) and Women's Studies (N=64; Mean age=25) courses at Carleton University completed a 30-minute questionnaire. Women from both courses were recruited in order to maximize the potential variability in relative deprivation, resource availability and collective action. Once the questionnaires were completed, students were given an oral and written debriefing regarding the purpose of the study.

Materials

Egoistic Relative Deprivation. Using a scale derived from Inglis (1990) that ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly), participants responded to seven questions that assessed their cognitive perceptions of personal deprivation in relation to men. Relative deprivation was measured in terms of cognitive discrepancies between "have" and "have-not", rather than felt deprivation, or affective reactions. Example items included, "For the same employment, men will be paid more than I";
"Men have more employment opportunities than I have." Some items were recoded such that on all items, high scores reflected high perceived personal deprivation. The mean rating across all seven items was used as the overall scale score (Cronbach alpha = .86).

Collective Relative Deprivation. Using a scale derived from Inglis (1990) that ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly) participants responded to ten questions that assessed their cognitive perceptions of women's deprivation in relation to men. Example items included, "For the same employment, men will be paid more than women"; "Men have more employment opportunities than women." Some items were recoded such that on all items, high scores reflected high perceived collective deprivation. The mean rating across all ten items was used as the overall scale score (Cronbach alpha = .89).

Double Relative Deprivation. To define DRD, ERD and CRD scores were standardized, and a constant of 4 was added in order to eliminate negative scores. The transformed ERD and CRD scores were multiplied to create the interaction between ERD and CRD.

Perceived Resources. Using a scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (totally), participants responded to six questions assessing their perception of the availability of socio-political resources. The socio-political resources that were included, namely personal efficacy and organizational and social support were derived from theoretical discussions of resource mobilization (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977) and were phrased
to reflect resources that women may utilize in their everyday lives. The specific resources included, "feel[ing] you have someone to go with you to talks or organizational meetings regarding women's issues"; "feel[ing] you have someone close to you (spouse, parent, close friend) who supports your position on women's issues"; "feel[ing] you can speak your mind on women's issues, and be listened to rather than ignored"; "feel[ing] you can change unsatisfactory situations in your life"; "feel[ing] you can make choices about important aspects in your life" and having "available organizations on women's issues that you would consider joining." Higher scores reflected greater perceptions of resource availability. The mean rating across all six items was used as the overall scale score (Cronbach alpha = .72). For the purpose of the regression equations, these scores were transformed using standardized scores plus a constant of 4.

Collective Action Scale. Participants indicated with a check mark which of a list of 25 actions they had participated in during the last six months. The list of actions was derived from Lalonde and Cameron (1993), but wording on some items was changed in order to maintain contextual specificity for women (see Appendix). The total number of actions engaged in was used as the overall score which could range from 0 to 25.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics were used to examine the degree to which participants perceived relative deprivation, resource availability, and participated in collective
action. Zero-order correlations revealed a high correlation between ERD and CRD ($r = .80$). However, CRD was more strongly associated with action ($r = .57$) than was ERD ($r = .45$), $Z = 3.76$, $p < .001$, as well as with resource availability (CRD, $r = .31$, ERD, $r = .19$, $Z = 2.52$, $p < .01$). Moreover, consistent with the personal-group discrimination discrepancy (e.g., Crosby, et al., 1989; Taylor et al., 1990), women perceived significantly less ERD ($M = 4.6; SD = 1.4$) than CRD ($M = 5.0; SD = 1.1$), $t(161) = -5.37$, $p < .001$. Thus, although related, ERD and CRD appear to be distinct constructs.

Women perceived a moderate amount of resources to be available to them ($M = 4.5$, $SD = 1.0$). Consistent with the goal of developing a personally relevant scale, extreme scores ("a great deal", "totally") were indeed chosen (range = 5), and the distribution of scores was normal (skewness = -.28) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). Thus, the notion that these particular resources are ecologically valid for these women was supported.

Finally, consistent with past research (e.g., Taylor, Wong-Rieger, McKirnan & Bercusson, 1982; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990), women in the present study participated in few collective actions ($M = 6.1$, $SD = 4.4$). Not surprisingly, among the most frequently endorsed actions were actions that women could easily incorporate into everyday behavior, such as, "I don't let anyone treat me differently because I'm a woman" (72%); "I have discussed women's issues with family or friends, stressing the need to enhance women's position in society" (63%); "I make a conscious attempt to use non-sexist language" (57%); "I will correct other's use of sexist language" (57%). In contrast, actions rarely endorsed reflected much more effortful endeavours such as,
"I have organized support groups for women (e.g., those re-entering school..." (1%); "I have given lectures or talks on women's issues" (2%); "I have lobbied my member of parliament regarding women's issues" (4%); "I have written letters to newspapers in instances where I believe it was necessary to speak on behalf of women in general" (5%).

Relative Deprivation and Collective Action

In order to test the hypothesis that women's experience of DRD would be more strongly related to their participation in collective action than the experience of ERD or CRD alone, a hierarchical regression was conducted whereby the standardized scores for collective action were regressed onto transformed scores for ERD and CRD on the first step and DRD on the second \(^3\) (see Table 1). ERD and CRD together were related to women's participation in collective action, explaining 32.1% of the variability in action, \(F(2,156) = 47.28, p < .0001\). Consistent with previous research, the first step standardized weights indicated that while CRD was positively associated with taking more action (\(\beta = .53; SE = .45, p < .01\)), ERD was not significantly related to action when CRD was included in the equation (\(\beta = .05; SE = .44, ns\)). Significant zero-order correlations between ERD and action suggest that ERD became redundant with CRD. Thus, while perceptions of both personal and collective deprivation were associated with the tendency to take collective action, consistent with past research, they did not appear to have an additive effect, in that only CRD explained unique variability in action. When DRD was entered on the second step (see Table 1), it significantly
predicted action over and above ERD and CRD, explaining an additional 5.0% of the variance in action, $F(1, 156) = 12.50, p < .001$. Examination of the final step standardized weights indicated that the main effect for CRD was no longer significant, suggesting that CRD was redundant with DRD. Moreover, the Beta for ERD was significant, and to the extent that the Beta was stable, it indicated a pattern of negative suppression, whereby ERD was suppressing variability in DRD. However, the standard error for the main effect Betas also increased substantially when DRD was introduced, indicating high multicollinearity and making the statistical basis for the Beta for ERD unclear.

Given the significant contribution of DRD to the regression equation, the interaction was plotted (see Figure 1) to further understand the nature of its effect. To examine the simple main effects, median splits were performed on the raw scores of ERD and CRD and three orthogonal contrasts were performed. Women who perceived high DRD participated in more action ($M = 9.0$) than women in the other groups, $t(98) = 10.49, p < .001$. Women who reported high CRD but low ERD ($M = 4.2$) participated in more action than women in the two low CRD groups, $t(98) = -6.94, p < .001$. Women who reported low CRD and low ERD ($M = 3.9$) were not significantly more active than
women who reported high ERD and low CRD (M = 2.7).

Insert Figure 1

Resources, Relative Deprivation and Collective Action

To examine the relationship between relative deprivation and resource availability, a hierarchical regression was conducted whereby transformed scores for perceived resources was regressed onto the transformed scores for ERD and CRD on the first step, followed by DRD on the second (see Table 1). ERD and CRD shared 5.6% of the variability in perception of available resources, $F(2,156) = 5.06, p < .01$. DRD explained an additional 8.5% of the variability in resource availability over and above the effects of ERD and CRD, $F(1,156) = 15.57, p < .001$. Thus, consistent with relative deprivation theory (e.g., Crosby, 1976), perceptions of deprivation were positively, albeit moderately, related to resource availability.

To assess the relative roles of both relative deprivation and resource availability with respect to collective action, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted whereby all variables were entered simultaneously (see Table 1), hence controlling for the effects of one another. Both DRD and perceived resources predicted unique variability in action. While the combined relative deprivation variables uniquely explained 37.2% of the variability in action, $F(4,155) = 34.8, p < .001$, squared semi-partial correlations indicated that resource availability also uniquely explained 10% of the variability in
action. Thus, while both variables predicted unique variability in action, the relative deprivation variables explained significantly more variability than did resource availability ($Z = 2.13, p < .05$).

**Discussion**

As hypothesized, DRD was associated with collective action over and above perceptions of ERD and CRD; women who perceived a high degree of both ERD and CRD participated in the greatest number of collective actions. This suggests that DRD indeed reflects a qualitatively different experience from ERD or CRD alone, one that is more strongly related to women's collective action.

In contrast, although CRD was positively related to collective action, this relationship became redundant with, and hence subsumed by DRD. While past research has suggested that CRD is a good predictor variable of collective action independent of ERD, the present research indicates that greater action occurs when women also perceive high levels of ERD. Thus, CRD is certainly relevant to collective action-taking, but the extent to which it motivates such action is qualified by a recognition of ERD.

The role of ERD in relation to action however, is somewhat unclear. While ERD appears to be positively associated with taking action, it does not add to the prediction of action when CRD is considered. Instead, ERD appears to be redundant with CRD. This does not necessarily mean however that the role of ERD is irrelevant. It is possible that given the change in the weights when DRD is introduced, that ERD may
serve as a negative suppressor, enhancing the relation between DRD and action. This may be a function of shared measurement error. Several of the items assessing ERD were phrased in terms of future expectations (e.g. "For the same employment, men will be paid more than I"). Research suggests that perceptions of future possibilities may decrease deprivation (Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, 1983; Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume & Martin, 1983). Thus, if participants were feeling optimistic about their future, reports of deprivation may have been limited to the low end of the rating scale, hence creating systematic measurement error.

Alternatively however, what may appear to be a suppression effect may be a statistical artifact resulting from the multicollinearity between the relative deprivation predictors. Thus, while perceptions of personal and group deprivation may be moderately related, future research may need to examine operational definitions of DRD independent of a multiplicative interaction in order to better understand the relationship between the types of relative deprivation.

Although the unique effects of DRD explained only an additional 5.0% of the variability in action, the importance of reintroducing DRD into research on relative deprivation and collective action must not be underestimated as it contributed to a substantial relationship between relative deprivation and action. In fact, the small unique variability explained by DRD may be a conservative estimate of the association between DRD and action due to artifacts of the study. Although consistent with the general population, women in the present study participated in low levels of collective
action, thus, low variability in action may have attenuated the association between DRD and collective action. Research including more women who are activists may find stronger relationships.

Measurement factors may also have served to attenuate the relationship between DRD and action. While respondents' beliefs about deprivation were assessed, their feelings associated with this deprivation were not considered. In particular, deprivation was assessed in terms of a cognitive discrepancy between "what is" and "what ought" (e.g. "Men have more employment opportunities than women"). Yet there may be emotional reactions to perceived deprivation that may affect respondents' propensity for taking action. Collective action may be more likely for a woman who is upset by her perceived deprivation than for a woman who is not. The few studies that have examined the theoretical distinction between cognitive and affective relative deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966) have found affective ERD (Birt & Dion, 1987) and CRD (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983) to be more strongly related to militaristic and nationalistic attitudes. Based on such research it would seem logical that greater emotion with respect to perceived deprivation would be a catalyst to collective action-taking. This would suggest that the lack of consideration of affective responses to deprivation may have served to attenuate the relationship between DRD and action.

Alternatively, it is also possible that the emotional reaction to DRD may not be a motivating experience. Consistent with attribution theories of depression (e.g., Alloy, Peterson, Abramson & Seligman, 1984), DRD, which involves the recognition that
discrimination exists at all levels (personal and group), may result in a feeling of victimization. Consider a woman who recognizes that not only does she personally earn less money, but that due to the pervasiveness of the discrimination she cannot avoid it, despite working harder, changing jobs, or obtaining more training. She may become exasperated; everywhere she turns, discrimination exists. She may feel victimized and helpless to alter the situation, and consequently, as the learned helplessness literature suggests (e.g., Seligman, 1975), she may become depressed, rather than motivated to act. In contrast, recognition of discrimination at only one level, for instance, CRD, may allow the individual to attribute the discrimination to less victimizing sources ("discrimination happens to them"). Such a possibility further underlines the qualitative uniqueness of DRD and hence the need for further research that considers DRD within an intergroup context.

If, as the present study suggests, DRD has a positive association with minority group action, then there exists a need for research to understand how the connection between the personal and group experience is achieved. Making that connection may, in part, be a function of the group to which minority group members compare themselves. While past research has assessed ERD in terms of comparisons with in-group members, the present study defined ERD in terms of out-group comparisons because they appear to enhance intergroup differences (Hafer & Olson, 1993; Zanna, Crosby & Loewenstein, 1989). Consequently, intergroup discrimination may be more salient, and women may be more likely to make the connection between the personal
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and political, which in turn will motivate action. In contrast, had ERD been assessed in relation to the in-group, differences within the group may have been made more salient, thereby decreasing solidarity amongst women as a group, perhaps contributing to the understanding of the past lack of association between ERD and action (e.g., Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983).

Moreover, the connection between the personal and political does not appear to be the result of an additive process. That is, DRD does not appear to result from simply experiencing a moderate level of one factor, and adding a moderate level of another. To the contrary, Figure 1 reveals a non-significant, yet interesting trend: of the those who did not perceive women to be collectively disadvantaged, women who perceived personal disadvantage participated in less, rather than more actions. It may be that the experience of ERD without the benefit of recognizing CRD as well may incur self-blame rather than active opposition to an oppressive society. Thus, DRD might involve an initial pre-consciousness stage which may be characterized by the recognition of ERD alone, a recognition that simulates the effects of learned helplessness. This is consistent with the first stage in the development of a feminist identity, whereby women accept their traditional roles and the system (Downing & Rousch, 1985). These feelings of victimization may initiate a search for coping mechanisms, such as social support (e.g., Baum, Fleming & Singer, 1982). Social support may in turn provide a recognition of CRD, which when combined with ERD, will give rise to DRD.

The notion of social support playing a role in the development of DRD is consistent
with relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966), which suggests resources are necessary for the development of perceptions of deprivation. Indeed, in the present study women who perceived resources to be available also perceived greater double deprivation, although the mediating role of deprivation is difficult to substantiate given the correlational nature of the study. Instead, the present results indicate that both resources and relative deprivation may have a direct role to play in motivating collective action-taking. For example, the direct relationship between resources and action has been regarded as opportunism by the media and some researchers (e.g., Martin, 1986; St. Jean, as cited in Malette & Chalouh, 1991). Indeed, from a dominant group perspective, actions motivated by ability (perceptions of resource availability) rather than necessity (deprivation) may be defined as opportunism. That is, for those who live without pervasive discrimination and disadvantage, the motivating effects of resource availability on action may appear to exist in the absence of deprivation. Yet, from a minority group perspective, is deprivation ever absent such that resource availability is a singular and unwarranted motivation for action? Thus, to a minority group member, a direct relationship between resources and action may represent, not opportunism, but a perception of, at last, having "power over" necessary resources (Yoder & Kahn, 1992). In contrast, the recognition of the personal as political (DRD) may provide women with a sense of empowerment, or the "power to" (Yoder & Kahn, 1992) that provides the personal efficacy to act. Thus, as two different sources of power, DRD and resources may
provide distinct reasons for participating in action.

Reactions to the Montreal Massacre have brought academic, psychological debates regarding the motivation behind political mobilization into the real world. Rather than arguing over which variable provides greater predictability, as was done in the media across Canada, the relationships between DRD, resource availability and action suggest the need to integrate psychological theories of intergroup relations, sociological theories of collective action, and theories of group consciousness-raising. In doing so, expanded conceptualizations and operational definitions of grass-roots phenomena such as the personal as political, and perceptions of resource availability may be obtained. Ultimately, such integration may contribute to a more comprehensive, interdisciplinary framework for understanding group consciousness and the collective actions of minority groups.
References


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The psychology of protest. Psychiatry, 33, 208-223.


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Appendix

Items included in measure of collective action

I have gone out of my way to collect information on women's issues.

I don't let anyone treat me differently because I'm a woman.

If a man acts differently when I'm around because I'm a woman, I assure him that it is not necessary.

I make a conscious attempt to use non-sexist language.

I keep an eye on the views of my members of parliament regarding women's issues.

I have attended talks on women's issues.

I will correct other's use of sexist language.

I have discussed women's issues with family or friends, stressing the need to enhance women's position in society.

I have signed a petition advocating the Women's Movement's position on a social issue (e.g. pro-choice, pay equity, affirmative action).

I have distributed information on women's issues around campus or work.

I have lobbied my member of parliament regarding women's issues.

I have volunteered for groups aimed to help women such as Interval House.

I have donated money to women's organizations or events aimed at women's issues.

I have participated in discussion groups designed to discuss issues or solutions to problems that will benefit women in general.

I have written letters to newspapers in instances where I believe it was necessary to speak on behalf of women in general.

If, in a group of strangers (i.e., people who I haven't known for long or well), a sexist comment is made, I will make a point of arguing against it.
I am a member of an organization that deals with women's issues.

I have encouraged friends to collect information on women's issues.

I have encouraged friends to take classes oriented towards women's issues.

I have encouraged friends to join organizations that deal with women's issues.

I have participated in protests regarding women's issues.

I have organized events that deal with women's issues.

I have organized support groups for women (e.g. for those who are re-entering school, or the workforce, for single mothers etc.)

I have participated in fundraisers, consciousness-raising events etc. that attempt to increase the overall status of women.

I have given lectures or talks on women's issues.
Endnotes

1. Collective action, in this paper, refers to any action that serves to enhance the collective status of women. It may be done individually (e.g., signing a petition), or it may be done with a group (marching in a protest).

2. There was no relationship between age and the dependent variable, collective action. Thus age was not used as a covariate.

3. There were differences between the Women's studies and Introductory Psychology students on perceptions relative deprivation, resources and action, whereby Women's Studies students reported higher mean scores. However, when action was regressed onto these variables and a dummy variable coded for the two groups (Women's studies and Introductory Psychology students) there were no interactions between the independent variables and group. Thus, the relationships between relative deprivation, resource availability and action were the same for each group, and the following regressions were conducted using the combined sample.