Internationalism, Regionalism, and National Culture: Music Control in Bavaria, 1945–1948

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FOR many Germans in the immediate postwar period, all that remained of their country was its art. Subjugation, destruction, the pain of unfathomable guilt: these had ripped away at the national psyche, severing nation from nationalism, person from people, the present from the past. "We are," wrote Wolfgang Borchert in 1946, "a generation without a homecoming, because we have nothing to which we can return." Nation: what would that word now mean? An occupied state no longer possessing statehood, a conquered people starved even of the moral strength that might come from resisting. Even if the institutions of national governance could be recreated, they could have no historical legitimacy; if Bonn were not to be Weimar, it would equally not be the kaisers' or the Führer's Berlin. For many, refuge from the shaming of the nation lay, as Theodor Heuss reflected, in a "decentralizing of the emotions," in a "flight" to those fields "where the violence of the great political world shake-up is not felt so directly." This drove literate Germans back to Goethe and music lovers to the endlessly-performed postwar symphonic cycles of Brahms and Beethoven. And yet, escaping into what Jost Hermand aptly termed "the protective wall of self-absorption" did not completely preclude connection to the national community of Germans. In fact, a

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powerful communion with the whole might still come through the personal enjoyment of a shared art or culture. In art might reside the essence of the national community, a stateless collectivity, without territories perhaps, but with borders and guardians nonetheless.

It struck social scientists as odd, when they came in the 1950s to quantifying these things, that West Germans expressed so little faith in the institutions of their nation state. In 1959, only 7 percent of West Germans admitted pride in their political system, though a far higher percentage were satisfied with the country’s recent economic performance. But there was, in truth, nothing anomalous about these results. Surveys made in the American sector at the time of the writing of the Basic Law found that the vast majority of Germans were not only uninformed about their constitution, they were uninterested in it as well. For the majority of West Germans, national pride remained unexpressed: an emotion too dangerous in its overtones and associations. In consequence, as David Clay Large has noted, in its early years the federal state “suffered from an acute lack of national identity.”

Regions fared much better, and for obvious reasons. In accordance with the Potsdam Protocol, municipal and Länder (state) governments under German control were the first to be reinstated after the war — with appointed leaders in the summer of 1945, and with elected governments following over the course of 1946 — for while government officials at these levels were certainly tainted by Nazism, the institutions of governance themselves seemed relatively free from criminal associations. There was, for example, no question of the American army running Munich, even though its former position as capital of the Nazi movement and a focus of party identification might conceivably have left it vulnerable to the same type of direct control as befell the zone of occupation. But the Allies felt that they needed to work with German authorities on some level, and cities and Länder simply did not appear important enough politically, or in terms of their ideational associations, to administer directly for long. In fact, because the Western Allies thought Nazi Germany to have been


4. In fact, in their initial planning for occupation governance, the Americans had conceived of directly running every level of government, including cities and towns. The opposition of the British, together with a recognition of the huge manpower resources that would be required for such an undertaking, led to the adoption of an indirect control model. For insight into the debate, see: AFHQ, Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 March 1943, in Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors, ed. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg (Washington, 1964), 170–71 and the subsequent correspondence between Charles Spofford and Lord Rennell and between Roosevelt and Churchill, Coles, ibid., 171–73.
a highly centralized state — in the Prussian tradition — strong municipal and federal institutions were seen as a part of Germany's political reeducation. Paradoxically then, though regional and local governments dealt with issues of paramount concern to ordinary citizens — schooling, cultural institutions, public works, rationing, taxation, and public transit — the Western Allies on these levels quickly assigned to themselves a mere supervisory role.5

In attempting to establish their own legitimacy, many of the newly constituted Länder and municipal governments rushed to embrace a memorialized past. Gothic cathedrals, baroque palaces, rococo theaters, these became mementoes of a localized, princely Germany without aspirations to Lebensraum. They could be recovered without shame and lovingly restored. As the prominent liberal economist, Wilhelm Röpke, declared in 1946: "Germany must regain her character as a 'nation of nations' and return to the good traditions from which, three generations ago, she departed to her undoing, this is the cure for . . . our German malady." The task here should not be minimized: the Americans estimated in 1947 that more than half of all the historic buildings in their zone had been damaged. In Bavaria, for example, much of the old city of Munich had been gutted, and its royal heart — the Residenz Palace and the Frauenkirche — were in ruins. Nuremberg, in the meantime, had its city center reduced to almost eleven million cubic meters of rubble. Still, the decision made in so many places — to restore rather than create anew — revealed a desire for connectedness and it was commonly to an autonomist, preunification past that localities turned. Monuments of the Nazi period, such as Munich's Führerbau, the party headquarters, or the Haus der Deutschen Kunst survived only because the Americans occupied them. Left to their own devices, the municipal authorities would have leveled these symbols of a nation they now wished to forget. The history that was to be made spatially manifest in ersatz form was the safe past, the dialect past: Reformation Freiburg, Wittelsbach Munich, medieval Nuremberg. It was as though old stones and new mortar could block out the crack of the bombs and seal away the memory of the regime that had brought them down.6


The Americans, like the other Western occupiers, regarded this surging localism with alternating feelings of favor and frustration. Strong regional governments made good sense in 1945–1946, when the discredited national institutions were replaced by an Allied Control Council and when the goal of policy was the eradication of the governmental behemoth. But as policy shifted fast, over the unstable ground of Bizonia and toward the solidity of the anti-Soviet Western zone, regional identifications came to appear more as obstacles than avenues. The Länder were resistant to zonal school reform, they obstructed the bizonal economic charter, they refused to accept a common policy on civil service reform. As the American military governor, Lucius Clay, lamented, although “a loose confederation of states cannot possibly cope with the conditions which will exist in Germany for several years to come . . . the power of the states has developed so rapidly that it will be difficult to adopt a constitution which gives the central administration sufficient power.” For the occupiers, however, options were limited. If particularism had to be fought, so too did what the Americans, at least, conceived to be Germany’s national culture. Nazism, they believed, was the hideous offspring of national traditions, and in particular German predilections for obedience, anti-Semitism, cultural superiority, romanticism, and militarism. It was the victor’s task to show the vanquished that they were not cultural giants; to humble them by revealing to them both the crimes committed in the name of their vaunted inheritance as well as the qualities other nations possessed. And so, in lieu of localism, the Allies offered supraregional institutions, and in place of German culture, they offered internationalism. These two ideological pillars of allied policy made sense in terms of what at least the British and Americans ultimately hoped would emerge in Germany: a powerful prowestern presence in the center of Europe; a stable democracy; and an integrated West European economy.

These may seem grand designs, traceable only at the highest levels—in Washington, London, Berlin, or Bonn—but their influence could be felt throughout the various branches of MG (Military Government). Although local officers may not have appreciated the strategic sweep of their mission, they understood their immediate objectives and, like good military men, struggled to attain them. The war, it must be remembered, had not ended for MG officials in May 1945. The Third Reich had been defeated militarily, but real victory, they believed, could only be won with the destruction of the culture in which

identity see Rudy Koshar, Germany's Transient Past: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill, 1998), chap. 5. Koshar, however, sees postwar urban restoration as involving a more direct dialogue with the immediate past and a less regionalized set of identifications than suggested here.

Nazism had developed. It was the particular job of the Army's cultural officers to isolate and destroy those elements of nationalism, cultural chauvinism, and militaristic order which they detected within the German tradition. The great struggle they waged for the soul of Germany was called reeducation by the Allies, and the main obstacle to its success was thought to be the public's pride in its own cultural inheritance. It was in the form of reeducation that the occupation's grand strategic plan surged through the apparatus of military government and came to be fought even by the runt of the MG litter: the Music Control Office in Bavaria.

The music section of the military government's Information Control Division (ICD) developed from the confluence of two separate streams. The first, and oldest, was the Office of War Information (OWI), an agency created in the summer of 1942 to filter the words and images that were flowing to the American public. As part of its European operations, OWI ran a radio station based in London, as well as a series of often mobile, local outposts in neutral, friendly, and, as the war progressed, liberated countries. From its outposts, OWI not only collected material for U.S. consumption, it also provided information and a wire service for local newspapers, lending libraries stocked with American books and magazines, documentary and other films to local theaters, and it organized musical and visual art activities showcasing American talent. After the war, the OWI outpost in Austria would provide the essential framework, materials, and personnel to the Army when it assumed authority over the American sector, while the New York office of the agency would come under War Department control and would become the coordinating and buying center for information control divisions in both Austria and Germany. The second stream, and the one that provided the infrastructure and personnel for Germany's Military Government, was the Army's Psychological Warfare Division (PWD). The Army had not really concerned itself with music until March 1945; even though prior to that time PWD had engaged in a variety of propaganda-related activities involving the arts, and it did have an entertainment division that was tailoring information concerning American culture for enemy consumption. Music joined theater, literature, and film as an interest of the entertainment unit around the time of the capture of the Radio Luxembourg facilities. The Army used the radio station to broadcast into Germany and, in addition to news and military directives, it carried music drawn from both British and U.S. sources and operated its own orchestra. The demand for recordings for broadcast, as well as the realization that musicians, alongside other artists, would need to be cleared prior to allowing them to perform in a vanquished Germany, led to the formation of a music branch of the entertainment division.8 Ultimately,

this element would attain section status when PWD reorganized itself as the Information Control Division in the summer of 1945.

The music section of the Theater and Music Branch, ICD, was never large. In Bavaria, it was made up initially of two full-time officers and two German secretaries. All told, there were around a dozen music officers serving in the American Zone in 1945, a number that was reduced steadily to a skeletal staff of six by 1948. The numbers, however, do not reflect the scope of the section's tasks, as the music officers would draw on the expertise of individuals in other areas of military government for specific jobs. In the early months, for example, the music officers were preoccupied with the licensing of musicians, but here they concerned themselves only with influencing the overall decision-making process. Information on licensees was provided to the music section through a German-staffed bureau that aided musicians in filling out their *Fragebogen* (questionnaires), or business information statements. The material thus presented was then cross-checked through the Intelligence Branch and, where necessary, interviews were conducted by either music or intelligence officers or both, and clearance came from the Liaison and Security Office at Special Branch; licenses were issued, initially through the Theater and Music Branch and later through a separate agency. The music officers had the responsibility, in cooperation with the Intelligence Branch, for supervising the activities of license-holders. The music officers, then, provided central coordination for the whole process and were charged with offering advice to the other branches and answering complaints from artists caught up in the process. Similarly, the section officers' other major tasks, promoting music that had been banned under the Nazis, securing travel permits for musicians, acting as liaison between the cultural ministries and the military, providing seats and tickets to American personnel, and making travel arrangements for visiting American artists, all involved innumerable MG and German officials. The extraordinary range of their activities and their heavy dependence on others, involving, as it invariably did, unpredictable delays and cumbersome procedures, was the music officers' universal complaint.

Impresario, ticket handler, licensing official, cultural attaché, agent of denazification: the music officer worked polyphonically. But it was in his central tasks of purifying the channels of German art culture, of denazification, and of promoting music banned or disfavored during the Third Reich, that the music officer ran up most powerfully against the forces of localism and had to come most directly to grips with the problem of German national culture. His

PWD: D. Taylor, memo, 12 January 1945 and D. Taylor to G.I. De Beer, 30 May 1945, NA, GG331, SHAEF, PWD, Box 24, Entry 87; Maritta Hein-Kremer's detailed discussion of the lending libraries provides an excellent introduction to the coordination of OWI/PWD activities, see *Die amerikanische Kulturoffensive, 1945–1955: Gründung und Entwicklung des amerikanischen Information Centers in Westdeutschland und West Berlin* (Cologne, 1996), esp. chap. 2.
work, in this regard, has not been previously studied, but some branches of ICD have, and the direction of the received wisdom is fairly straightforward. In general terms, denazification and reorientation have suffered from the same bad press that has dogged most of the divisions of OMGUS (Office of Military Government, United States). Though German scholars such as Ulrich Bausch and Norbert Frei have, in recent years, found much to praise in the work of the ICD officers, and almost everyone has kind words for the American Military Governor, Lucius Clay, the prevailing view has been that MG suffered from employing personnel poorly trained for their jobs that included complicated procedures and unclear, unworkable, and unreasonable goals. According to Edward Peterson, "MG simply did not have the people with skills to run the country . . . [and] quickly became irrelevant, except that it was in the way. It delayed solutions to problems until, strategically retreating, it permitted the Germans to solve them." In the case of the Army's cultural mission, it is furthermore generally suggested that the overarching goal was to Americanize Germany, though it is acknowledged that even in this the military were not nearly as effective as such informal instruments as Hollywood movies, corporate advertisers, and rock music would be in the 1950s and '60s. In effect, "the period of the Occupation," though "marked by economic colonization, cultural imperialism, and the re-education program, was [in reality] a prologue to a more developed Americanization. Chewing gum and Lucky Strike . . . were the harbingers of McDonalds." Bringing these two lines of analysis together, Marion Deshmukh attributes the deficiencies in cultural policy administration to the reluctance of the Americans to take art seriously. In fact, she suggests that because the Americans saw art merely as entertainment they adopted a "passive" cultural policy position.


Much can certainly be said in support of this perspective, but in some critical respects it misrepresents the work of the cultural officers. In the case of art music, the promotion of American culture became a dominant element in the military government's work only in the summer of 1947. At this point the gathering conflict with the Soviets led to a new emphasis on visiting American artists, German-U.S. cultural exchanges, and expositions through the network of Amerika Häuser (Information Centers). Until that time, local MG officials were allowed to choose their own path to the cultural goals established by the Information Control's executive. And ICD's terms of reference were very broad indeed: "to guide and control the reconstruction of German theater and music." Certain musical works were banned outright — such as military marches and songs associated with the Wehrmacht or Nazi Party — but in all other cases, censorship was "at the discretion of the local music officer." Similarly, initial directives specified only that no composer, performer, or producer "who has been a notorious Nazi or an ardent Nazi sympathizer" could appear in a presentation or "otherwise take part in any musical activity." In terms of positive policy, ICD was equally vague. The main endeavor was simply "to introduce or reintroduce the German public to the large musical world from which they had been barred under Nazi rule." At the very least, this meant the recovery of works by Jewish and Allied-nations' composers as well as the return to the concert halls of works by modern Germans whom the Nazis had labeled "degenerate." But ICD went further, suggesting — and this seems rather strange in retrospect — that even performances of "lesser-known works by famous German composers, which had not been accepted as part of the Nazi canon of German national culture, such as Haydn's symphonies, Mozart's piano concertos, [and] Schubert's chamber music, was [sic] likewise to be encouraged." While these directives certainly did not prohibit the promotion of American music culture, they nowhere stipulated it as a particular goal.

But the openness of ICD directives to local interpretation was not a sign of passivity; rather it had much to do with the Americans' respect for German music traditions as they understood them. For the Germans, the cultural officers asserted, casting a sideways glance at the United States, music, "far from being a luxury . . . has always been an essential element in . . . cultural and everyday life. Probably the greatest musicians in the world have grown from the rich background of German traditions." Moreover, "as Schiller said, the theater is a moralische Anstalt, or moral institution, where men can see presented the basic principles of life. The Germans recognize this." And, through their artistry, they had, in the past, made it manifest. In order to restore this rich cultural tradition,

ICD officials initially — and this placed them in harmony with MGs policy of German regional self-governance — argued in favor of decentralization. Germany's great musical tradition, it was argued, lay in "the development of small states . . . [with] wealthy and independent sovereigns [who] promoted an elaborate theatrical and musical culture . . . as a way of presenting the cultural achievements of their principalities to the outside world." Reconstruction and reeducation might therefore be merged into one: decentralizing the arts would both reawaken Germany's cultural greatness while at the same time undermining the chauvinism and militarism that were identified with the nation state. Consequently, American cultural officers saw a restoration of municipal and Land (state) authority over the arts as preferable to privatization, arguing that "it would be inconceivable to a German to go without his municipal theater." The Theater and Music Control Office's main job, then, as ICD defined it, lay in returning German art to its pre-Nazi state while at the same time "teaching" the German people "about the musical world outside" so as to reverse "the constant drilling received from Goebbels that musical culture could progress and survive only in Germany."12

The first months of the occupation, therefore, saw the music officers preoccupied with the purging of former Nazis from the major institutions and the supervision of the resumption of municipally and state-subsidized concert life. Unfortunately, in Bavaria at least, these two directives were to prove an uncomfortable fit. According to PWD orders, concertizing, which had been prohibited during the first few weeks of the occupation, was to be allowed to resume where it was judged, for morale or propagandistic purposes, "a military necessity"; at the same time, the musical organizations were to be sifted for Nazis, and only after being "cleaned" were they to be authorized to resume "normal" operations under military government license. This two-phase policy embodied twin goals. Over the long run, PWD insisted that exposure to music prohibited during the Third Reich would have a "re-educational and therapeutic value"; but in the short term, it would also "bring relief from the squalor and misery [of postwar life] and act as a 'safety-valve,' thus aiding the task of the occupation." In other words, while the overall ambition was to pull "a few solid non-Nazi bricks from the mass of rubble and with them [begin] to build up a new musical structure in Bavaria," the immediate concern was to get music back into people's lives. The trouble was that for music to be used as

a psychological tool it would have to be good; and this might prove difficult because most of the "great artists had been more or less affiliated with the Nazi regime."\(^{13}\)

Regrettably, Bavaria's first music officers ignored the fact that they had entered an undrained basin and advanced decisively into the muck. The Land's first chief of the Theatre and Music Branch, Harry Bogner, had been a Milwaukee architect until his recruitment by OWI in January 1945. He proved a jovial dilettante, preoccupied with meeting famous artists, ingratiating himself with them, and collecting autographs. He told Munich's Ministerialrat Metzger that the Americans had no desire to "meddle in theater and music life, but merely to exercise supervision over the organizational and political side ... and to ban overtly Nazi works and reinstate previously prohibited pieces." He was even rash enough to tell Munich's mayor Schattenhofer that he did not expect musicians connected to the NSDAP to be removed from their posts. Determined on hearing music sound among the ruins, Bogner, in early July 1945, authorized the Munich Philharmonic to begin offering weekly concerts in the bomb-damaged Prinzregenten Theater. And though he was acting in this regard in accordance with official PWD/ICD policy, there can be no doubt that in his desire to be the first to free himself of the traces, he had moved too soon.\(^{14}\)

The great problem, of course, lay in what to have performed and who would play it. Scores and parts for two previously banned works — Mendelssohn's *Midsummer Night's Dream* and Tchaikovsky's Fourth Symphony — were secured, thus fulfilling one part of the section's objective. But finding a conductor was less easy. Clemens Krauss, the Opera director, had long fled the city and the Philharmonic's maestro, Oswald Kabasta, had been relieved of his post as a "borderline case": not a Parteigenosse (party member) perhaps, but a Parteianwärter (applicant for membership). Edward Kilenyi, one of Bavaria's new music officers, while acknowledging Kabasta's musicianship, felt it was impossi-

13. Directive for Psychological Warfare and Control of German Information Services 18 April 1945, Special Staff — Psychological Warfare Division, Entry 87, Box 19 NA, GG 331 SHAFF; John Evans, Special Report: Music Control in Bavaria, June 1945—July 1946, 27 June 1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division Records, Theater and Music Section, Box 241; Reorientation Activities of ODIC in Germany, 15 April 1947, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Cultural Affairs Branch, General Records, Box 248.

ble to allow a leading artist to occupy "the same position under American control which he held under the Nazis"; at least until "extensive investigation" had cleared him. So the Branch turned to another Bavarian conductor, Eugen Jochum, the "energetic and successful" Generalmusikdirector of the Hamburg Philharmonic, who had returned to his family's Munich home in the last days of the war. For the second concert, the Americans secured Hans Knappertsbusch, the "idol of Bavaria" and a man who, the music officers believed on the basis of informal intelligence, had remained "comparatively clean under the Nazis." The orchestra that performed in these opening concerts was cobbled together from available musicians, but conformed roughly to its contours during the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{15}

The concerts, though of unflaggingly modest quality, were received with great enthusiasm by capacity audiences that interpreted them, logically enough, as evidence of the occupation's leniency. The impression did not last. On 7 July 1945, the day before the Philharmonic's opening concert, MG finally brought down its mandatory removal list that prohibited the employment of Nazi Party members or those who had profited from the regime in the public sector, including state-controlled orchestras and theaters.\textsuperscript{16} Fearful for his position, Jochum promptly returned to Hamburg and the leniency of British zonal administration. In the third week of July, the assistant conductor of the Munich Philharmonic was dismissed for having been an SS member and nineteen members of his orchestra as well as 40 percent of the Staatsoper Orchestra lost their jobs. With only two concerts behind them, the Philharmonic was forced to suspend performances when its license was temporarily revoked. Knappertsbusch, whose name did not appear on the blacklist, moved over to the Staatsoper and was named director. And then, unexpectedly, in late October 1945, his case too was reviewed and he was declared unfit to perform because of his collaborationist activities.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} H. Hagen, Report on Mission to Munich and Nurnberg, 29 September 1945, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Section, Box 241; on his Fragebogen (questionnaire), Kabasta indicated that he had applied for party membership in 1938, but had never received a membership card. The Americans initially accepted this, but by November 1945 they had found not only his 1938 membership number, but also evidence to suggest that he had joined the party in Austria six years before. Kabasta continued to deny his official membership in the party (whether dated 1932 or 1938) and, in despair, committed suicide in February 1946; for more see Meyer, "Oswald Kabasta und die Miinchner Philharmoniker," 161–65 (I am indebted to Joan Evans for this reference). A. Vogel, Daily Reports, 26 June 1945, 25 June 1945, 10 July 1945. A. Vogel, Daily Reports, 26 June 1945, 25 June 1945, 10 July 1945, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Administrative Records of the Director's Office, Box 20, Music Section.

\textsuperscript{16} Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer Besatzung (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), 149–56.

\textsuperscript{17} Music Section, Daily Report, 15 July 1945, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Affairs Division, Educational and Cultural Relations Branch, Administrative Records of the Director's Office, Box 20; J. Evarts, Special Report: Music Control in Bavaria, June 1945 to July 1946, 27 June
By then, Harry Bogner had returned to the United States amid charges of “gross inefficiency” and Arthur Vogel, the genial music section chief, had followed in late August 1945, leaving his successor, Edward Kilenyi, a brilliant but self-effacing Hungarian-American pianist, to restore some authority to the army’s music work in Bavaria. It was not an easy task. Despite protests that the “wholesale dismissals” were having a “paralyzing effect . . . on musical life” and that it made little sense to remove a second violinist on the grounds that he was “an incumbent of public office” and hence a political threat, there was, in fact, little that could be done. Kilenyi considered the situation “acutely embarrassing for this organization. After having encouraged them with their first concerts, we are now forced to castrate and behead the body.” The Knappertsbusch case, in particular, “had a very unfortunate effect on the Germans,” for he had not only been hired to conduct the Philharmonic, he had also performed, with Kilenyi as soloist, in a special concert for American military personnel. His blacklisting had therefore served particularly to “undermine their [the German public’s] confidence in the validity of our licenses and appointments.”

Doubtless, the music officers should have waited until the murky situation had been clarified before committing themselves to reviving musical activity, especially on so large and so public a scale. Though the source of the problem clearly lay elsewhere — in uncertain and contradictory initial policy directives — the music officers had themselves made the choice in the first two months of the occupation to emphasize the revitalization rather than the cleansing of music’s arteries. For men who had been music lovers, musicians and arts administrators in private life, the decision undoubtedly made sense: after all, they tended to accept (in all cases but those Vogel termed “outright stinkers”), the prevailing orthodoxy that music was unpolitical and that among artists “there was little incidence between personal politics and professional ability.” Theirs had not, then, been an unreasoned error, but it was one that would have a permanent and costly effect on the music branch’s activities and credibility.

In the wake of the debacle of denazification, the section was forced to reorient its activities. In mid-July 1945 it adopted, on its own initiative, the method already pioneered by the Russians in Berlin, and established German-run Kulturämter (cultural offices) in Nuremberg, Regensburg, and Munich. The

1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Section, Box 241; Aktennotiz attn. Staatliches Wohnungsamt, 2 August 1945 BHstA, MK 50187; Die Neue Zeitung, 25 October 1945.

18. H. Hagen, Personal Observations of Operations in 6870th DISCC, 29 September 1945, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Branch, Box 241; Music Section, Daily Reports, 15 July and 5 August 1945; Music Section, Weekly Report, 3 November 1945, OMGUS, Education and Cultural Relations Division, Administrative Records of the Director’s Office, Box 20.

music divisions of these agencies — the Arbeitsausschüsse für musikalische Berufsfragen (working committee on questions relating to professional musicians) — were charged with "interrogating" applicants for jobs and licenses, aiding musicians in the completion of their Fragebogen and acting as a liaison between the artistic community and MG. By transferring authority over the interview and information process, and by reserving to itself only the final recommendation regarding the issuance of licenses, the branch officers extracted themselves from much of the time-consuming contention that bogged down the business of issuing work permits. In the meantime, Kilenyi and his new assistant, John Evarts, a personable and energetic former music teacher at Black Mountain College, began to focus more clearly on MG designs regarding the place of music in German reeducation. They did this by “concentrat[ing] more on qualitative matters than on denazification [or] control.”

By taste and temperament, Kilenyi was a Central European. Though born in Philadelphia, he had been educated in the nineteenth-century European classics, trained at the Liszt Academy in Budapest, and he made his debut in Brussels. His father, an eminent music pedagogue and George Gershwin’s teacher, had conscientiously directed his son “away from American music, very much away from it.” As a result, Kilenyi not only had no American music in his own repertoire, but also believed that “there wasn’t so much of it to know.” Evarts, while significantly more knowledgeable, had the good taste to be a discriminating booster; his own preferences in contemporary music ran to Stravinsky, Hindemith and, especially, the French moderns. In a speech he gave “a hundred times” to different school groups and music societies, he spoke candidly about the strengths and weaknesses of American art music. There was, he explained, no great American opera, and the few decent works that had been performed would not really survive in the repertoire; similarly, there was no major American symphony, and no real American style. He apparently “caused extreme amazement” among audiences with his opinion that there were only three outstanding opera companies in the entire United States. And he spoke favorably about the German system of state-subsidized theater. Although part of the U.S. educational mission was to “counteract the deeply

rooted misconception that the United States is a purely materialistic power with no cultural life of its own,” a view a State Department survey in 1949 ruefully reported that is “shared by most Europeans, including some of our recent Allies,” the officers of the music branch helped to perpetuate the image they were charged with altering.\textsuperscript{21}

But if Evarts and Kilenyi were reluctant promoters of American music, they did show, if only by example, that military administrators could still be inspired artists and deeply musical people. This went a long way, as did the fact that both officers were generally well liked by the Germans with whom they dealt. Moreover, under Evarts’ direction — he succeeded Kilenyi as chief music officer when the latter returned to the U.S. in April 1946 — the branch was at last able to narrow the defining parameters of its work. To Evarts and Kilenyi, the primary goal was “to raise the musical standards of Bavaria from a level of narrow chauvinism and conservatism to one of greater inclusiveness and international scope.” Instead of concentrating narrowly on American music, the section promoted a salmagundi of twentieth-century European masterworks, securing scores and parts for pieces by Webern, Martin, Hindemith, Shostakovich, Bartok, and Ravel. In fact, the first orchestral work by an American to be performed in postwar Munich was not heard until late January 1947.\textsuperscript{22} There was, then, no effort made to force American art on the Germans; instead, the music officers seemed content to encourage artists to perform pieces by contemporary European composers and to do what they could to make those concerts possible. This involved, primarily, securing recordings that would allow works to be heard, ordering scores and arranging international contacts. More significantly, it involved reversing the direction of initial policy and instead of promoting the revival of local organizations and the rehabilitation of local artists, the music officers began pressuring the state’s cultural institutions into adopting a more international perspective.\textsuperscript{23}

In Evarts’s mind, encouraging exposure to exogenous culture was the best way of attacking the nationalism and chauvinism that he, like most of his peers,
saw at the root of National Socialism. Convinced that “for the last twelve years Germany lived in isolation from the rest of the world,” the music officers set themselves the task of “introduc[ing] an international point of view in the traditionally nationalistic conception of culture held by Germany.” Happily, this form of internationalization was also a type of Americanism, for as Evarts explained, an openness to the music of other nations was the primary characteristic of American high culture. The enormous energy coursing through American musical life, he asserted, was a product of stylistic cross-fertilization: “America has opened its doors to music from around the world, and extraordinarily vital work is resulting.” Interestingly enough, cultural integration and Germany's reassimilation into European art was already fixed as a goal of OMG Bavaria's music section by early 1946, a year before it would be specified as one of the central aims of U.S. occupation policy in the July 1947 revisions to MG's charter document, JCS 1067.24

The section's determination to promote contemporary, as opposed to narrowly American, art was nowhere more evident than in its dealings with Bavaria's leading musical personalities. The darling of the section was Karl Amadeus Hartmann, an enthusiastic promoter of the new, a composer of remorselessly grim music, and a man who seemed genuinely open to suggestions. Hartmann was the leading local example of the inner emigrant: during the Third Reich he had refused to allow performances of his works and had survived through the kindness of his wife's family, something that stood him in good stead among the occupation forces. With the help of the section, he was able to found a new music society in Munich, organize a contemporary music festival, head the Arbeitsausschuss (working committee), and act as coordinator for a number of MG-sponsored events and organizations. “Of all the musical people in Munich who deserve support from his fellow citizens,” wrote John Evarts gratefully, “Hartmann deserves it as much as any.” Unfortunately, his music was not much liked by the Bavarian public, and his efforts on behalf of new music were scrupulously ignored. For local audiences, there was only one great modern composer in Munich, and that was Carl Orff. “There is an Orff cult around Munich with 'oh's' and 'ah's' about its hero at the drop of a hat,” John Evarts snarled: “they connect him with Stravinsky and speak of him opening new paths.” Needless to say, “he composed throughout the Nazi regime.” The music section actually held Orff in decidedly low esteem; as Evarts observed, he “takes a perfectly pleasant musical phrase, orchestrates it neatly and then repeats it forty-five times, until some of the listeners are ready to throw

things." But it was not so much his activities under the Nazis, nor the manner of his music that made him so unpopular among the cultural officers; it was his self-proclaimed Bavarianness. The section was suspicious of his contacts with conservative Catholic politicians in the CSU and it regarded his vernacular Sprechoper, Die Bernauerin, which was premiered in July 1946, with deep disfavor. As Evarts sourly remarked of the work: "the occasional bright spots do not add up to anything really impressive nor make up for the essential poverty of musical or dramatic content." It was, he asserted, a "specious and static" work and he despaired over the talk of it becoming "Munich's own . . . traditional piece which will be given . . . each year, ritual fashion, like Parsifal in Bayreuth."25

Other local favorites received similar treatment. Professor Hans Ludwig Held, the city's Kulturbeauftragter (cultural administrator), was dismissed as "choleric and much too ardently Bavarian, though he pretends to a broad, international outlook." The conductor Eugen Jochum was also now caustically dismissed as too local in his musical associations; "he's very smooth, very smiling, very friendly, and known to be very Catholic," Evarts noted. Even Knappertsbusch, whose blacklisting had been the cause of such embarrassment, was now regarded as too Bavarian by half. As Arthur Vogel explained, he was difficult to work with because "the same independence of character and pride" that had kept him at arms length from the Nazis also made him "reluctant to give up even a small part of his Teutonic, heavily Wagnerian bias."26

What the Americans actually meant by Bavarian is not entirely clear. Certainly Evarts, who had spent much time in Germany before the war, had earlier rhapsodized about the Bavarians' "enjoyment [of life], their composed, healthy outlook, the gemütlich [sic] atmosphere." In fact, he thought Munich "the best place in Europe." Of course, that had been before the Nazis, the bombings, active service, and the occupation. The Bavaria of the rubble years was an emotionally turbulent place and what the cultural officers now confronted was bureaucratic resistance, administrative arrogance, public disdain for America, and a strongly parochial desire on the part of those in authority to support friends and political supporters. Bavarian came to imply an outward amiability cloaking inner opposition. It came to mean hostility to cultural integration into modern Europe, it came to suggest a desire to return to prewar conditions, it came to signify restoration rather than reeducation. For the largely Protestant music officers, Bavarian also now carried with it culturally-


inherited suspicions of conspiratorial Catholicism. In reality, then, Bavarian came to mean resistance against and independence from American control. And this was probably no surprise, for increasingly, in defending their noncompliance with occupation policies, the Germans with whom the Americans dealt were insisting on the importance of protecting damaged local traditions. Bavarian thus became a focal point of conflict, with the music officers instinctively opposing anything with local ties and the German authorities and public increasingly favoring those with strong parochial connections.  

If the music officers were to fulfill their mission, the challenge was to find performers and composers whose local connections did not block their receptiveness to contemporary, non-German music. And in this effort they had, paradoxically, Munich's Nazi past on their side. Thanks to the elevated position the city had attained in the cultural life of the fascist state, it was a prized catch for any musician — all the more so because the only German city whose star outshone its own, Berlin, had been so effectively reduced and so dangerously divided. As a result, Munich's major orchestras had their pick of conductors, even if precious few of the good ones were “white” enough to perform. Fortuitously, the end of the war found Hans Rosbaud in nearby Stuttgart and on a recommendation from Knappertsbusch, he was brought in to conduct the newly reconstituted Philharmonic late in October 1945. Rosbaud was a lucky find: he had neither been a party member, nor had he been prominent enough, like Furtwängler or Knappertsbusch, to have attracted much attention to himself; consequently, “with the blacklisting of practically every prominent German musician,” he remained “the one really good white conductor in the American zone and hence a musical plum.” Even more happily, he was known to be a friend of Stravinsky, Schoenberg, Webern, and Hindemith, and an ardent promoter of contemporary music. As one cultural officer recalled, “Rosbaud . . . was a really great musician and tremendously interested in contemporary music . . . I mean Rosbaud was right and with it.”


With the problem of the Philharmonic apparently satisfactorily resolved by Rosbaud's appointment as music director in mid-November 1945, the music officers turned their attention to the Opera. Here the issues were even more serious and a succession of weak conductors had to fill the breach until Ferdinand Leitner, a sharp young Kapellmeister, was secured from Hamburg in early 1946. Leitner, however, while viewed as a competent administrator, was never seriously considered for the post of music director. Still, at a time when logistics proved to be a considerable problem, Leitner was a major asset. The great difficulty for the Opera, at least in the beginning, was not the promotion of new music, but simply the production of anything. Operas require costumes, sets, decorations, and multiple vocal scores, and as late as December 1945, of the eighty-four works in the Staatsoper's prewar repertoire, only four were performable. To compensate, the Opera orchestra filled the gaps in the season with concerts, and many of these now featured works by contemporary composers like Schoenberg, Krenek, Stravinsky, and Poulenc. All of the interim conductors dutifully participated in these concerts. In the meantime, because Knappertsbusch's return to the podium was impossible, the Opera's state-appointed Intendant (chief artistic administrator), began negotiations with Jochum, who, it was agreed, would apply for denazification, something the cultural officers — who were interested in blocking Bavarian candidates — now greatly opposed and looked for ways to forestall.30

The breakthrough for the Americans came over Christmas 1945 thanks to a chance meeting in Switzerland between one of Munich's theater officers and Georg Solti, a young Hungarian pianist and conductor-in-training. Solti had known Kilenyi during his student years in Budapest, and though he had hardly ever conducted an opera, Kilenyi ordered the Intendant to "give him a trial" in one performance of Fidelio. His debut that summer was an electrifying sensation. Evarts observed that "the improvement in playing of the orchestra was little short of miraculous. Mr. Solti himself said that with only two rehearsals it was practically improvised, implying he could have made a much better job of it." Even the Intendant was momentarily exhilarated and enthused to Evarts that, after searching so long for a music director, "this is our man." Solti was immediately hired on a two-year contract as Musikleiter (music director), much to the chagrin of ministry and city officials who had confidently predicted Jochum's imminent denazification. For the Americans, however, the new conductor was an undoubted treasure — a Jew, a non-Bavarian, and an explosive talent. But he also had the disadvantage of youth and inexperience, and while not unwilling

to try the occasional modern work, he was building his own repertoire in Munich and gravitated to the pre-WWI classics.  

Still, in the summer of 1946 the Americans were feeling pretty satisfied with their achievements. Musical activity in Bavaria had “steadily progressed . . . more agents have been licensed, more halls made available, more orchestras formed and more musicians cleared.” Beyond Munich, symphony orchestras had been authorized in Nuremberg, Bamberg, Bayreuth, Hof, Würzburg, and Dachau and opera companies had been licensed in Regensburg, Coburg, Augsburg, and Nuremberg. The summer following the end of the war saw an average of ten concerts and recitals in Munich per week. Though the section officers had failed to prevent the dismissal from the orchestras of former party members, it had worked out a compromise whereby works of blacklisted composers could still be performed, so long as “no special honors [were] paid to them.” The two most pressing concerns, the conductor-vacancies in Munich, had now been resolved through the direct intervention of the section. Further, the Americans had developed a small coterie of loyal German contacts — people like Karl Amadeus Hartmann, Hans Rosbaud, Ferdinand Leitner, the great singer of the younger generation, Hans Hotter, and a great singer of the past, Paul Bender, as well as Wolfgang Jacobi at the Musik hochschule (Conservatory) — these were all individuals who were willing to advance the goals of the occupation and participate in American-sponsored organizations. Moreover, new European music and formerly banned classical works were now being heard in Bavaria, and this, Evarts pronounced, was “provid[ing] a healing antidote to the years of militarism, hate and suppression . . . As a universal language . . . [music is] a positive force and it has already contributed to the building of better morale among the Bavarians — a morale based upon something more lasting than Nazi ideology.”

Four months later it all began to unravel. American authority in the first year of the occupation was victory’s handiwork. While no members of the music branch ever resorted to force to ensure compliance with their wishes, the threat was always there. This threat was a reality for the Germans in 1945–1946, but it was unacknowledged by the section officers who were proud of the decency and respect they showed the defeated. As Evarts explained it, he believed his job was to act as a “liaison between Americans and Germans and vice versa.” This

31. Author’s interview with Edward Kilenyi, 8 June 1996; in his Memoirs (New York, 1997) and in an interview with the author, 16 March 1997, Solti maintained that he was only invited to perform in Munich after he had successfully conducted in Stuttgart on 26 April 1946. Bauckner, however, had already engaged him, “at the request of the military government,” to perform in Fidelio by late March: A. Bauckner to Staatsministerium, 25 March 1946, BHstA, MK 50204; J. Evarts, Weekly Report, 29 June 1946; K. Scharnagl to Staatsminister, 15 February 1947 and E. Jochum to A. Hundhammer, 23 July 1947, BHstA, MK 50187.

self-image grew out of the section officers’ sense of themselves as artists first, and their belief that music was above politics. Our aim, wrote Evarts with painful naivety, “has been towards having the best available people in the key positions, as far as possible removed from political considerations.” The narrow definition of politics on which this statement was based; the benevolence that officers like Evarts saw in their own actions; the sense that they were protecting the rich traditions of European music culture from the crudity of military rule, were views not shared by most Germans. For the occupied, the music officers were embodiments of national humiliation: unimportant college teachers, mid-western architects, narrow-minded bureaucrats, and second-rate performers who were presuming to order about the greatest artists and pass judgment on the finest music that Germany might produce. Moreover, they were Americans, a people most Germans considered utterly devoid of cultural or aesthetic sensibilities. Consequently, even though the section may have made artistically defensible and politically sensitive decisions — after all, Rosbaud and Solti were fine conductors and the encouragement of contemporary European works did contribute to Munich’s emergence as a center for modern and experimental art — their intrusions into the field of cultural promotion and management were viewed as particularly galling reminders of defeat. Resistance in this context was inevitable, understandable, perhaps laudable, and increasingly vicious.

It would, however, have smoldered in unvoiced containment had the military government not released it. For the music section, this happened early in October 1946 when the bayonets were withdrawn and the forceful advance of reorientation policies shattered. The cause lay in a major shift in the direction of the occupation following Secretary of State Byrnes’s seminal 6 September address to MG personnel in Stuttgart. In the speech, Byrnes had suggested that there must be a rapid return to German self-government and emphasized that reeducation would be achieved by tutelage and example rather than by control. For the music section, the new direction unfortunately first assumed form at the moment when it was trying to install one of its own in the powerful position of Staatsoper Intendant (chief artistic administrator of the State Opera). The Americans had appointed the first Intendant in the summer of 1945, but they soon found him unsatisfactory and were now pressing for his removal. In his place, they were pushing Ferdinand Leitner — one of their closer contacts — and a man who seemed at the time to be getting along exceptionally well with Solti. But at a crucial meeting with the Kultusminister (Minister of Education), the chief of the Information Control Division in Bavaria now sounded the retreat: “in matters of State positions in Theater and Music,” he announced, “ICD would simply clear the people politically and the entire choice otherwise

would be in the hands of the Kultusminister and his Referenten (advisors).” Evarts, who was at the meeting, was understandably furious: ICD’s “wishy washy behavior,” he stormed, had “removed our power of control virtually at the high point of conflict, making us look like ineffective school-boys.”34 It would prove a watershed.

Resistance to the occupation needed a grounding — a moral and political legitimacy — if it was to be anything but childish. The absence of a German nation made opposition on this basis difficult and rendered existing strains of Bavarian provincialism all the more potent. Overt nationalism might be unthinkable in prostrate, divided Germany, but regionalism was not. This was the safe, localized Germany the Americans had initially promoted as an alternative to the nation state, and it now turned on them with a vengeance. Kultusminister Fendt, for example, in explaining his opposition to Leitner’s appointment, declared that the musician would be a poor choice because “he did not come from Bavaria” and would not “in Bavarian political circles [be seen] as a good appointee.” In further discussion with Evarts and his section chief, Fendt stressed the “political aspects of the appointment” and, with an eye on Bavaria’s first postwar Land election just six weeks away, his “duties to the Völk.” Evarts noted that he now found “political and chauvinistic considerations are of prime importance” and he urged ICD to restore his authority so that “individuals chosen for important posts should be selected on the basis of professional capacity and personal merit and not on a political, religious or geographical basis.”35

MG, however, continued to clip the section’s wings. Late in July 1946, the Musikämter (offices of the working committees on questions relating to professional musicians) had been abolished, registration regulations altered and licensing placed under the jurisdiction of the section itself, thereby involving its personnel in a “comet’s tail of work” much of it involving the “complaints and wails and moans of the disappointed.” In March 1947, the blacklist was eliminated for everyone but theater producers and directors, enabling the clearance of all musicians and breaking yet another arrow in the section’s quiver. The more prominent musicians who had previously been blacklisted still needed to be cleared by a German denazification tribunal, or Spruchkammer, before they were allowed to perform, but outside Berlin, the process was entirely in local hands. Two months later, orchestral personnel were reclassified as ordinary labor, freeing them from all forms of screening.36

35. J. Evarts, Weekly Report, 12 October 1946, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Branch, Weekly Reports, Box 239.
36. C. Moseley to J. Clark, 10 May 1948, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations
Knappertsbusch's return to the podium followed quickly on the cancellation of the blacklist and it symbolized for Evarts the accumulating difficulties that confronted the music officers. Although he denounced the conductor for the "outrageous liberties" he took at his first concert, "Knappertsbusch admirers were wildly enthusiastic about the eye-and-ear-full [sic] which they received. An apparently well-organized clique raised their concerted voices at the end with cries of 'We want Knappertsbusch back at the opera.'" As Evarts realized, the protracted cheering was a direct criticism of occupation policies. His blacklisting had changed Knappertsbusch from a potential symbol of German-American cooperation into a monument to its injustice and a focus of its opposition. His return to Munich concert halls (and Jochum's in the fall of 1947) not only provided a medium for the expression of safe and vocal opposition to the Americans, it also made illegitimate the positions of the incumbents at the Philharmonic and the Opera. Leitner was the first to feel the pinch and, having failed to secure the Intendant's position and having no heart for the growing fight, he left Munich for Stuttgart early in 1948. Solti remained at the Opera's podium, but a half-century later he still well recalled "the hysterical screams of approval that greeted Knappertsbusch whenever he got near the podium. Coexisting with him was terribly difficult for me."³⁷

The music officers resisted the changes as best they could: they condemned governmental influence in the affairs of the theaters and urged MG to limit forcibly the Bavarian state's power "to such an extent that artistic considerations and not party politics should have a preference." Rebuffed on this demand, they then inflated their protests and called for a "decentralization" of the theaters sufficient to free the Intendanten from state supervision. But nothing was done and the situation became ever more frustrating for the section officers. Increasingly, the Americans were finding that the authority they wielded was personal rather than bureaucratic, meaning that where once they could compel they could now merely influence. As the OMGUS branch chief declared ruefully, "it has been brought out rather strongly that Information Control is losing its grip on the Germans and that they are inclined to regard Information Control officers as losing their power."³⁸

³⁷ J. Evarts, Weekly Report, 10 April 1947, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Branch, Weekly Reports, Box 239; Solti, Memoirs, 88. Munich concert-goers' wild affection for Knappertsbusch extended back to the early 1920s, when he had replaced Bruno Walter as Generalmusikdirektor of the Staatsoper; Kater, Twisted Muse, 40–41.

³⁸ Appendix 7 to Combined History of the Theatre Control Section and the Music Control Section, 28 April 1947, OMGB, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Cultural Relations Division, Administrative Records of the Director's Office, Box 20; J. Evarts, Yearly Report of Music Control in Bavaria, July 1946–July 1947, 15 July 1947, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theater and Music Branch, Weekly Reports, Box 239. In Berlin, Spruchkammer (denazification tribunal) decisions still needed to be approved by the Allied Kommandatura. P. Au Buchon to Theatre and Music Licensees, 19 June 1947, OMGUS, Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Theatre and Music Branch, Box 242.
By early 1947, at the Philharmonic, Rosbaud was acutely conscious of the weakness of his position as political and press criticism mounted. The December 1946 elections had placed a solidly conservative CSU government in office and cultural politics moved in decidedly more provincial, more confrontational, and more Catholic directions. He began to fight with the city's music advisor, Dr. Königsdorfer, and to come under fire from the music critic at the influential *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Once again, it was Knappertsbusch's hot breath he felt on his neck, while Jochum remained in the shadows.\(^{39}\)

In February 1948, the city government, under whose jurisdiction the Philharmonic came, used the excuse of impending currency reform to cancel Rosbaud's still-active contract, a move many interpreted as an attack on the contemporary music focus of his programming. Munich's mayor Scharnagl was more specific about why the conductor was leaving, charging that he had proven unwilling to submit to the city administration and seemed to regard his authority as deriving from elsewhere. Rosbaud, he claimed, had refused to accept the appointment of a second *Kapellmeister* and he had been resistant to the idea of inviting prominent guest conductors (such as Jochum and Knappertsbusch) to perform, as people "on all sides" were urging him to do. In sum, Rosbaud seemed to believe that the Philharmonic was "his orchestra" and that it should be "under his sole direction and answerable only to him." Cruelly turning American policy back on itself, the city now charged that, because of the nature of his initial appointment and the freedom that had been allowed him under his contract, Rosbaud was an exemplar of the "*Führerprinzip*" (leader principle). A new conductor, appointed by the city with the support of the Philharmonic, was necessary to restore "the democratic basis" of music life. Luckily for Rosbaud, he had the luxury of another job offer and, choosing flight over submission, he moved off to become the first director of the new *Südwestfunk* (Southwest radio) orchestra in the French Zone.\(^{40}\)

Of all the American appointees, Solti hung on the longest. With the election of the CSU, however, his position was also continually in question. His main rival was not Knappertsbusch, whom state policy makers regarded as too wayward for the position of Opera director, but Jochum. As a by now almost helpless Evarts editorialized in the summer of 1947, "the threat of Jochum is like the sword of Damocles over the head of Solti." But the young conductor was not without assets: he was, relative to other music directors, extraordinarily

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\(^{39}\) H. Rosbaud to K. Scharnagl, 16 February 1947, Washington State University Archive, Hans Rosbaud Papers, Box 6 file 89; and John Evarts to H. Rosbaud, 16 February 1947, Box 3 file 40.

inexpensive, he was extremely dynamic as a performer, he was already highly regarded outside of Munich and he had many local supporters, including Ministerpräsident (state president) Hans Ehard. Most importantly, he was a Jew, and as Carl Orff observed, the Kultusministerium could not force him out because everyone would denounce it as anti-Semitic. As a result, Solti survived his contract renewal in August 1948, but not unscathed: Jochum was installed as principal guest conductor at the same salary for his fifteen performances that Solti was earning for sixty-two. The 1949–1950 season, saw Jochum further maneuvered into the heart of the Opera when it was decided that he would be appointed to Leitner's old position of Opera manager, with Solti continuing as chief conductor and music director. Desperate now, Solti grabbed at the first passing offer, and in the fall of 1951 accepted the "demotion and punishment" of a move to Frankfurt.41

From an American perspective, it is easy to condemn these machinations. But for Bavaria's politicians and for many of its concert-goers, the removal of the occupation's appointees was a declaration of independence. Music was enormously important to people in those first postwar years; they had been deprived of live performances when the theaters had been closed in October 1944, and their reopening in the summer of 1945 was deeply meaningful. For people living amid the debris of war, coping with the grinding realities of death, destruction, hunger, and insecurity, music provided solace, excitement, and entertainment. As the photographs of the densely packed, rapt, heavy-coated concertgoers at the first postwar performances reveal, music, while not perhaps releasing people from the harshness of life, at least provided them with a momentary distraction. And more: for the first generation of postwar politicians it was conceived as the "crystallization point" of the entire reconstruction process, an encapsulation of both Wiederaufbau (reconstruction) and Forterhaltung (continuity). The truth was that the public was unwilling to accept the notion that its entire recent cultural development had been flawed by racism, chauvinism, and militarism, and it saw in the glories of music performance the justification for their beliefs. The centrality, transcendent humanity, and importance of the German musical canon was proof of the merits of their culture.42 Music halls needed reconstruction, some tainted performers had to be retired, some few compositions prohibited, but what music needed more than anything else, and what the public desired, was for the art, as they knew it, to be carried on.


42. Dr. Schwink to H. Meinzolt, 14 July 1945, L. Metzger, Aktennotiz, 20 July 1945 and F. Fendt to W. Hoegner, 6 May 1946, BHStA, MK 50007; F. Messmer makes this same point in "Münchner Tradition und Klassische Moderne — Der musikalische Neuauhang," in Trümmerzeit, ed. Prinz, 174.
The realization that the occupation forces were not going to leave even this element of German art untouched caused great dismay and anger. For a people sifting the rubble of their culture for evidence of goodness and greatness, the blacklisting of beloved musicians was an attack on their search for reconciliation with their own recent past, and the artists’ subsequent clearance, within just one year, made a mockery of the American measures as well. And yet, people clearly had difficulty expressing resistance to American actions and defending German culture in a country brimming with foreign soldiers. The result was the culture politics of regional assertiveness. Having approved and encouraged the rapid recuperation of the localities and Länder under its authority, MG suddenly confronted opposition from these very reconstituted polities. Time and again, when justifying their differences with the Americans, municipal and Land officials made reference to their Bavarian distinctiveness. The state’s dynamic fine arts advisor, Dieter Sattler, for example, in negotiations with Solti, emphasized that Jochum “wished for a return to his Bavarian roots.” This was important, he said, for while Jochum “as a Bavarian” would remain in the city through thick and thin, one could not ask the same of Solti, who, as a gifted young foreigner, would doubtless “not want to remain in Munich during the coming hard times” and for this reason, “it would not be right to hold him to a contract if his heart were not in it . . . The fact that Solti is a Jew,” Sattler concluded, and “he feels a special obligation to Jews, only adds to his [own] feelings.” In much the same way Mayor Scharnagl insisted that “since they must reckon on Solti either in the long or short run quitting Munich, it would be better to find someone now who through their [sic] personal relations with Munich and Bavaria had a special interest in the Staatsoper.”

Provincial identifications were very strong in Bavaria and provided the basis for the opposition to American cultural policies. Native Bavarians, it was maintained, were more dependable, loyal, and better understood the tastes of their compatriots than outsiders. As the State Department’s political advisor in Germany despaired: “Bavaria is the citadel of what complacency still remains in Germany [and] it has been less affected by change and has generally proved resilient to the occupation.” This was partly true, but it would still be misleading to understand the Bavarians’ recourse to localism in quite such simple terms. In the first place, not all local sons were treated with equal favor. Karl Amadeus Hartmann, for example, had considerable difficulty with the Bavarian


public and the premiere of his great contribution to local folklore, a chamber opera based on a seventeenth-century tale, *Simplicius Simplicissimus*, "almost amounted to a scandal." The work was scheduled to open at the Schausspielhaus in June 1947, a few weeks before Orff's *Bernauerin*, and the contrast between the two works could not have been more patent. For Hartmann, disaster followed disaster as singers could not be secured, rehearsals not arranged, and even Rosbaud, the scheduled conductor, sensed the mood and proved difficult. No one, Evarts complained, "officially stuck by it to make it go on" and the work was canceled; ultimately, it only received its first performance in a radio concert broadcast ten months later. Similarly, the composer Werner Egk never found Bavaria a congenial home and none of what he regarded as his major works — *Columbus*, *Peer Gynt*, *Circe* — was performed there before 1950. His great entrance into the postwar Munich cultural maelstrom was to be his Faust ballet, *Abraxas*, but one scene in the work was considered lewd and the ministry closed the work down after a single performance. Neither the Americans nor the Bavarian public protested this act of censorship with any particular vigor.45

Clearly, it was not simply a case of Bavarians favoring their own; nor was it merely a question of the artist's connections with the occupation — Hartmann was closely connected, Egk was not. Nor was the Bavarian public or state simply hostile to anything modern. Not wanting to appear too conservative, the state did spend a good deal of money on the promotion of contemporary music, something a Kultusministerium official noted was "in terms of cultural politics of the utmost importance... [it] represents the most effective propaganda regarding the progressiveness of Bavarian cultural politics." The Philharmonic, whose members chafed under Rosbaud's modernist yoke, complained that they wanted future conductors' contracts to limit the number of contemporary works that might be performed. Even so, they were willing to accept up to half of the regular season devoted to modern works. The public, in the meantime, found Orff's music no obstacle and was — after some initial hesitation — swept away with excitement by Hindemith's.46 Rather, it was in each case a shifting combination of factors that assured success or failure — American connections — if especially overt (as in the case of the conductors), could be damaging, but so too could music that offended the conservative tastes


46. D. Sattler, Aktennotiz, 17 April 1947, BHStA, MK50129; C. Moseley to Dear and Good Woman of Otis Boulevard, 20 February 1948 (copy in author's possession); Krauss, *Nachkriegskultur in München*, 64; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 March 1948.
of the Bavarian public through its atonality. Sexual content might similarly be tolerated in the abstract, as in Orff’s wildly popular *Carmina Burana*, or even if revealed in the independent theater or cabaret, but not in the home of the *Staatsoper*.

But localism had other limits as well, for within it rested an unspoken national consciousness that sometimes twisted it in peculiar ways. There was, for instance, nothing about Jochum’s or Knappertsbusch’s actual conducting, and little enough about their repertoire, that was distinctively Bavarian. While Jochum did perform Orff’s and Pfitzner’s works in Munich, Knappertsbusch seldom played anything more modern than Bruckner. Despite the emphasis on the artists’ local connections, people like Jochum or Knappertsbusch were figures of national importance and the music they played was closely identified with the mainstream of German cultural traditions. In this way, perhaps, they brought together both provincialism and national identifications, and the acceptability of the latter was in part made possible because it seemed subsumed under the former. A people humiliated as a national collective might channel their unexpressed connection to the whole in the guise of a pronounced provincialism. Which is not to say that the performers’ local connections were not a factor — this was their home audience — but in this regard it is notable that neither of Munich’s two favorite conductors ultimately secured positions in the city. When Solti left the Staatsoper, the top contestants for the position were all non-Bavarians: Karl Böhm, Joel Perlea, Rudolf Kempe, Erich Kleiber. Kempe, born in Saxony and most closely associated with the Opera in Chemnitz and the Symphony in Dresden, was the one who got the job. At the Philharmonic, Rosbaud’s successor was the 35-year old Fritz Rieger from Mannheim. He would, it was hoped, prove a new “Kabasta-Wunder,” a reference to another non-Bavarian and one who had done so much to convince Munich’s concertgoers that the Philharmonic was a front-rank orchestra.47

Strangely enough, the great sentimental favorites might have served as leverage against the Americans and a focus for local identification, but they were passed over for cheaper, younger musicians. And yet, somehow, these distinctions were not always perceived. When Rieger took over at the Philharmonic, one excited fan declared: “now we have our own conductor again; now we will really hear music!”48 The connection made to Kabasta was therefore not accidental; it was as though closure had come through a return to the past and with it a psychic expiation of the occupation of which Rosbaud was so evidently a symbol. What is so significant is that the return of power to Bavarians, which was linked

47. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 October 1948.
48. R. Hartmann to L. Meinzolt, 15 October and 29 October 1951. BHStA, MK50055; E. Hink to Münchner Philharmoniker, 6 April 1949, Stadtarchiv München, 1563; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 October 1948.
in the public and administrative mind to a rebirth of local musical traditions, was to be accomplished through outsiders.\textsuperscript{49}

Outsiders connected provincialism to nationalism in other ways as well, for fueling Bavaria's cultural politics was the miasma of anti-Americanism. Although some individual Americans, such as Edward Kilenyi and John Evarts, were held in high regard by the Germans who worked with them, personal admiration could not overcome contempt for a culture. The music officers' most difficult task, Evarts' successor, Carlos Moseley, recalled, was to convince the Germans "that America was not made up of barbarians, but was made up of a great number of highly cultivated people."\textsuperscript{50} There was nothing especially Bavarian about this anti-Americanism; it was common throughout Germany and its roots extended back into the nineteenth century. But in the first post-war years, this disdain for America — the conviction that it was a land of machines, crime, and money, without \textit{Geist} or \textit{Kultur} — served to empower the occupied people. In a sense, contempt for American culture was as crucial as the veneration of Goethe or Beethoven to the resuscitation of a German nation, as it gave the people confidence that the barbarians could never subdue what they could not understand. Germany might be occupied, the people could whisper to themselves, but America would never vanquish its spirit and art.\textsuperscript{51}

After June 1946, the American music officers could do little to combat this resurgent nationalism cum regionalism. The successive waves of OMGUS policy had washed over them, propelling them forward, pulling them back, and ultimately burying them in the sand. At the close of a year of work, the section had lost its coercive power and with it the authority to push the ministry and the public along the path of reeducation. Increasingly, the job of the music officer became that of the cultural observer and lobbyist, and so it might have remained had yet another policy shift one year later not produced a new

\textsuperscript{49} Sabine Henze-Dohring finds similar irony in U.S. policy regarding the Bayreuth Festspiel. Unable, in the face of heavy local resistance, to remake the Wagner Festival into an event featuring international classics and experimental works, the section watched the Wagner family restored to its traditional authority. But as Henze-Dohring notes, the festival became an international event nonetheless. See "Kulturelle Zentren in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: Der Fall Bayreuth," in \textit{Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland}, ed. Clemens, 39–54.

\textsuperscript{50} Author's interview with Carlos Moseley, 18 March 1996.

\textsuperscript{51} On the centrality of America to German national identity: Andrei S. Markovits, "Anti-Americanism and the Struggle for a West German Identity," in \textit{The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty}, ed. Peter Merkl (New York, 1989), 35–54; Dan Diner has observed that by making the Americans into oppressors and themselves into victims, many Germans were able to transfer the guilt over Nazism to a foreign power: \textit{America in the Eyes of the Germans} (Princeton, 1996), 111 and 119. Kaspar Maase valuable deepens these views by showing America to have been the battleground over which different groups within German society attempted to legitimize their lifestyles, politics, and their views of the nation and in so doing constitute themselves as social collectivities; "Amerikanisierung von unten: Demonstrative Vulgarität und kulturelle Hegemonie in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre," in \textit{Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts}, ed. Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marssolek and Adelheid von Saldern (Stuttgart, 1996), 291–314.
emphasis on the promotion of American art culture. The music office thus con-
tinued its work, adding American works to the general program of modern
music promotion. But things did not become any easier. For Carlos Moseley,
German audiences in 1948 remained “out of touch in general with the real
music world.” Like Evarts before him, he would do all he could “to get more
modern music played and heard” and, with the gradual weakening of restric-
tions on travel, would use section money to sponsor visits by a number of cele-
bribated international performers. Still, Moseley was no more confident than
Evarts had been of the effect all this was having, for as he remarked to a friend
in March 1948, “the American impression on Germans is still only skin-deep.”

In this sense, one can judge the MG’s efforts in Bavaria’s music field a failure,
but not by every measure. True, denazification had proved a fiasco to people at
the time: chaotically introduced, unsystematically applied, and too rapidly ter-
minated. If the point of it all had been to make Bavaria’s artists come to terms
with their own guilt and complicity in the crime that was the Third Reich, it
was a massive disappointment. Moreover, the music section had not been able
to shake the German public from their belief in the superiority of their art-
culture, nor had they been able to turn the mainstream of the concert audience
into ardent lovers of contemporary music. The internationalism in music that
the music officers tried to build similarly came apart on the shoals of the nation-
alism cum localism that MG had itself inadvertently encouraged. Bavarians were
not yet ready to choose Europe. To the credit of the Americans, however, their
failures were in large measure a result of having set their expectations so high.
Moreover, there were successes. Thanks in part to the music officers’ efforts,
concert life returned to Bavaria quickly after the war and the quality of per-
formance, if not exalted, was at least professional and the repertoire varied.
Music that had been silenced for more than a decade was once again available
and much that had never been heard was now heard. Through the efforts of the
cultural division and its German collaborators, new-music societies, such as
Musica Viva and the Studio für Neue Musik had been formed that would prove
of great importance to the emerging generation of artists. Further, the section
had resisted the temptation to impose American forms on the German base,
and, while fighting what it saw as an abuse of governmental power, had not
questioned the principle that the state had a positive role to play in cultural pro-
duction. These were all fine, lasting, and important achievements. But what
should really be recognized in the work of the music section is that it had gen-
erally been carried out by exceptionally competent people who acted, by and
large, in sensible ways. They may have failed in many of the goals they set them-
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52. C. Moseley to Helen 30 March 1948 (copy in author’s possession).
though they did act on the basis of a belief that Germany must be transformed into a crossroads for European cultural influences if the dangers of Nazism were to be permanently eradicated. The music officers were committed to the quintessentially American idea that familiarity might produce empathy and they saw music — the ultimate international language — as a mechanism for ensuring Germany’s peaceful development. In all this their assumptions might have been naive — in some ways even arrogant — and their failures may have seemed large, but their efforts were nonetheless commendable.

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