UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS IN THE WORKPLACE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN JUSTICE AND NEGOTIATION

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by

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ABSTRACT

The central role of emotions in organizations, once underrecognized and underappreciated by organizational scholars, has attracted a great amount of research interest in recent years. Despite this important development, I argue that a number of critical questions have remained unaddressed, which limits our ability to predict the outcomes of emotions for individuals and organizations as well as describe employees’ subjective experiences at work. In this dissertation, I contribute to the understanding of the role of emotions in the workplace by identifying critical gaps in the emotions literature, integrating theories from different literatures to address these gaps, empirically comparing the interpersonal effects of different types of emotions, and offering suggestions for future research directions. Specifically, in Manuscript 1, a conceptual analysis, I argue that further integrating the emotions literature with the organizational justice literature can create important insights that can enhance our understanding of both disciplines and outline a number of research avenues that are likely to arise as a result of such integration. In Manuscript 2, I present four empirical studies \((N = 1,041)\) that together contribute to our understanding of the interpersonal effects of emotions in the workplace by examining the effects of emotions with different targets (i.e., integral versus incidental) in a negotiation context. I conclude by situating this dissertation in the extant literature and discussing its theoretical and practical implications.
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STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

The research contained in this dissertation was conducted between September 2012 and April 2018. This is to certify that the content of this dissertation is my own work except where due reference is made. It is being submitted to Wilfrid Laurier University as part of my PhD degree requirements. It has not been and shall not be submitted for the award of any degree or diploma at any other institution of higher learning.

Annika Hillebrandt
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION:

UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS IN THE WORKPLACE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN JUSTICE AND NEGOTIATION
UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS IN THE WORKPLACE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN JUSTICE AND NEGOTIATION

“A new research paradigm is emerging within organizational behavior […], based on the increasing recognition of the importance of affect to organizational life.”

- Barsade, Brief, and Spataro (2003, p. 3)

Emotions play an influential role in organizations across a wide range of organizational contexts and domains. Indeed, many events that have important implications for employees and organizations are difficult to describe without acknowledging the central role of emotions. Organizational justice, for instance, is a critical concern for employees and violations of justice tend to provoke strong emotional reactions – it is difficult to describe employees’ experiences of unfairness without acknowledging the role of emotions such as anger and guilt (for reviews, see Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008; Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2011). Likewise, emotions such as happiness, pride, and anger play a central role in negotiation – they frequently follow from negotiators’ evaluations of the negotiation, guide negotiators’ offers, and may influence the cognitions and behavior of their negotiation partners (for reviews, see Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999; Van Kleef, 2016).

In spite of the central role of emotions in organizations, emotions have frequently been underemphasized in the organizational literature, which has traditionally been dominated by a highly cognitive perspective (Ashkanasy, 2003; Elfenbein, 2007; Thompson et al., 1999). Research on negotiation, for instance, has traditionally been concerned with understanding negotiators’ cognitive (e.g., decision-making) processes and viewed affect as a hindrance or by-
In the justice literature, there has been a similar emphasis on cognitive processes, with much research having focused on identifying the criteria that individuals use when judging the fairness of an event (e.g., the extent to which procedures are biased; the extent to which outcomes reflect effort; Colquitt, 2001), leading some justice scholars to conclude that “[although] we must know that fairness and feelings are closely related … affect has not been given the attention that common sense, if not academic theory, says it deserves” (Cropanzano et al., 2011, p. xiii). In recent decades, there has been a growing recognition that examining emotions is critical to understanding employees’ workplace experiences and predicting their attitudes and behavior (for a review, see Ashkanasy & Humphrey, 2011). As highlighted in the epigraph, this recognition has contributed to a rapidly growing body of research examining the various roles of emotions in organizational contexts (Barsade et al., 2003). However, our understanding of emotions in organizations remains incomplete and critical questions remain unanswered.

This theoretical shortcoming is also reflected in practice. Within the context of negotiation, for example, there has been considerable debate about the effects of emotions, both among professional negotiators and scholars (Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001). Some have argued, for instance, that negotiators should suppress all emotion – an approach that is reflected in an emphasis on emotional control found in many negotiation training programs; others have argued that only positive emotions are beneficial, whereas others believe that

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1 Consistent with the dominant approach in the literature (e.g., Frijda, 1994), I use “affect” as a general term that encompasses a wide range of subjective feelings states, including moods (e.g., positive or negative mood) and discrete emotions (e.g., anger, guilt) as well as stable individual differences (e.g., trait negative affect). Emotions, which are thus a subtype of affect, are differentiated from other types as they follow from a specific set of evaluations (i.e., appraisals) of a particular object or event, are relatively short-lived and intense, and associated with specific action tendencies (e.g., anger with a motivation to attack; guilt with a motivation to make amends; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Across the two manuscripts presented in this dissertation, my main focus is on understanding discrete emotions. However, I also discuss other types of affect in Manuscript 1.
negative emotions are most conducive to securing a favorable deal (for a review, see Van Kleef, 2016). A better theoretical understanding of the role of emotions is vital to resolving such debate surrounding the functionality of emotions and can contribute to the development of practical recommendations regarding the strategic use of emotions. Similarly, within the context of organizational justice, understanding employees’ experiences of (un)fairness – including their emotional experiences – is critical to the development of practical interventions aimed at ensuring that employees feel fairly treated at work and preventing a host of negative consequences that have been associated with the experience of unfairness, including depression, underperformance, and retaliation (for meta-analytic reviews, see Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng 2001; Colquitt et al. 2013; Rupp, Shao, Jones, & Liao, 2014). Furthermore, given that one’s emotions are not only privately experienced but may also be observed by others (e.g., coworkers), interventions aimed at mitigating the negative emotions of focal employees also have the potential to improve the fairness perceptions of other individuals in the workplace (Hillebrandt & Barclay, 2017).

In this dissertation, I present two manuscripts aimed at identifying critical gaps in our current knowledge and contributing to a better understanding of the role of emotions in the workplace. Across these manuscripts, I focus on the role of emotions in two organizational domains that are characterized by their highly interdependent nature and central role of emotions – organizational justice (Manuscript 1) and negotiation (Manuscript 2).

**OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS**

Manuscript 1 (“Integrating organizational justice and affect: New insights, challenges, and opportunities”) is a critical analysis in which I argue that further integrating the emotions literature with the organizational justice literature can create important insights that can enhance
our understanding of both disciplines. Building on a recent historical review of the literature on justice and emotions (Cropanzano et al., 2011), I identify critical remaining gaps and outline a number of potentially fruitful research avenues that arise when theoretical insights from the emotions and justice literatures are integrated further. Among other contributions, I criticize the current focus of the justice literature on negative emotions and propose that examining negative and positive emotions can contribute to a more complete understanding of employees’ experiences of (un)fairness. I also argue that it is important to further examine the potentially differential effects of different discrete emotions (e.g., anger versus guilt), given that each discrete emotion is associated with a specific set of appraisals and action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Further, I note that even though fairness issues arise in social interactions (e.g., Bies, 1987; Greenberg, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Smith, 1998), research has tended to examine individuals’ fairness perceptions in isolation (cf. Degoey, 2000). To address this theoretical gap, I integrate perspectives from the justice literature with theoretical insights from the emotions literature (e.g., Van Kleef, 2009) and call for further research examining the impact of social influences on employees’ experiences of (un)fairness, including how emotions expressed by third parties (e.g., coworkers) may influence employees’ fairness perceptions.

Manuscript 2 (“Comparing integral and incidental emotions: Testing insights from emotions as social information theory and attribution theory”) contributes to our understanding of the interpersonal effects of discrete emotions (i.e., how individuals who observe others’ emotions may be influenced by these emotions). I examine these interpersonal processes in the context of negotiation. Drawing on Emotions as Social Information theory (Van Kleef, 2009) and attribution theory (e.g., Weiner, 1985, 2014), I propose that the interpersonal effects of emotions are not only influenced by the type of discrete emotion that is expressed (e.g., anger
versus happiness) but also by the target of the emotion (i.e., how the emotion relates to the situation). Specifically, across four empirical studies ($N = 1,041$), I examine the interpersonal effects of incidental emotions – emotions that lack a clear target in the immediate situation – and compare these to the effects of integral emotions, which do have a clear target (cf. Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). I demonstrate that negotiators tend to perceive that an opponent’s incidental anger must have been caused by their offers but are inclined to attribute incidental happiness to something that happened outside the negotiation. These different attributions, in turn, may lead negotiators to infer different information from their opponent’s emotion (e.g., different degrees of threat or cooperativeness), which ultimately affects their own behavior (i.e., makes them more or less likely to concede). Further, I demonstrate that these results are influenced by individual differences related to the motivation to engage in information processing (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) – negotiators with a stronger motivation to process information tend to consider a wider range of potential explanations for an opponent’s incidental emotion, which ultimately predicts their behavior.

Taken together, this dissertation makes a number of contributions. First, it answers repeated calls in the literature for more research on emotions within organizational contexts (e.g., Barsade et al., 2003; Cropanzano et al., 2011) and demonstrates important theoretical insights that can be gained when the emotions literature is further integrated with the literatures on fairness and negotiation. In particular, the manuscripts in this dissertation highlight the influence of discrete emotions in the workplace – including the role of emotions as antecedents – by outlining how employees’ cognitions and behavior may be influenced by the emotions expressed by others (e.g., coworkers or negotiation partners). Thus, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the social and contextual factors that may influence employees’ judgments (cf.
Degoey, 2000), which can help predict employee perceptions, attitudes, and behavior.

Within the domain of justice, specifically, a better understanding of the role of emotions is important, given that the experience of unfairness is closely associated with the experience of emotion (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, Pugh, 2005; Bies & Tripp, 2002; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). More precisely, examining emotions can help us better understand how employees form fairness judgments (e.g., by considering the emotions that coworkers express in response to fairness events) and also provide further insight into employees’ phenomenological experiences of (un)fairness (cf. Barclay & Kiefer, in press; Barclay & Whiteside, 2011). With respect to the negotiation literature, Manuscript 2 contributes theoretical insights by answering critical questions regarding when individuals infer strategic information from others’ emotions and how others’ emotions can shape employees’ reactions. In addition, this research answers repeated calls for studies that explicitly compare the interpersonal effects of integral versus incidental emotions (cf. Van Kleef, 2016; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010).

Second, from a practical perspective, understanding how emotions may influence employees’ fairness perceptions, characterize their experiences of unfairness, and predict their attitudes and behavior in the workplace is important given that perceived unfairness has been associated with a host of negative outcomes for employees and organizations (for a review, see Colquitt et al., 2001). Thus, a better understanding of the role of emotions in these processes has the potential to contribute to the development of interventions aimed at reducing the negative experiences associated with unfairness and preventing potentially detrimental consequences. With regard to negotiation, the research presented in this dissertation also contributes to a better understanding of when expressing emotion leads to detrimental versus beneficial outcomes for negotiators. Further, this research has implications for the strategic use of others’ emotions
within negotiation, as it demonstrates how negotiators’ motivation to engage in information processing may bias the inferences that they draw from an opponent’s emotions and suggests strategies for overcoming such biases.

In summary, my dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of the role of emotions in the workplace by identifying critical theoretical gaps, integrating theories from the emotions literature with perspectives from the justice and negotiation literatures to address these gaps, and examining the interpersonal effects of emotions in a series of empirical studies.
CHAPTER 2 – MANUSCRIPT 1:

INTEGRATING ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AND AFFECT:

NEW INSIGHTS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES
ABSTRACT

Building on the foundation offered by Cropanzano, Stein, and Nadisic (2011) in their recent book titled *Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion*, we argue that further integrating the literatures on organizational justice and affect has the potential to create important insights that can further our understanding of both literatures. In order to capitalize on these opportunities, however, we argue that justice scholars must increase the clarity of our constructs, address critical gaps in the literature, and question underlying assumptions in the field as well as within the paradigms that have traditionally been adopted to explore justice issues. We propose a number of research avenues that can not only facilitate our understanding of organizational justice by addressing challenges and gaps in the literature, but can also help further integrate the organizational justice and affect literatures. We conclude by discussing methodologies and approaches that can help organizational justice researchers explore these new research opportunities.
INTEGRATING ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AND AFFECT:
NEW INSIGHTS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

When dealing with people, remember you are not dealing with creatures of logic, but creatures of emotion.

- Dale Carnegie

It is difficult to describe the experience of (in)justice without acknowledging the vital role of emotions. Yet, in the field of organizational justice, the role of emotions has long been underappreciated and has received little systematic examination (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 2002; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano 1999). In Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion (2011), Cropanzano, Stein, and Nadisic argue that by excluding affect from our conceptual models, the organizational justice literature risks developing an incomplete and inaccurate theoretical picture. By reviewing and critiquing the extant research that bridges the literatures on affect and organizational justice, the authors offer a foundation for the integration of these two literatures.

Cropanzano et al. begin by providing a historical overview of research on social justice and affect that cuts across disciplines and covers a wide range of theoretical perspectives. Following a general introduction to the social justice and affect literatures, the authors focus on organizational justice and provide a review of the various theoretical approaches that explain why organizational justice might be related to affect, including models that (a) view cognitions as the cause of affect (e.g., equity theory, Adams, 1965; referent cognitions theory; Folger, 1986), (b) explore affect as emerging from moral judgments (e.g., the deontic model; Folger, 1998, 2001), and (c) emphasize the relationship between justice and the needs of the individual (e.g., the multiple needs model; Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001). The authors conclude
by exploring promising research streams that have only received limited consideration in the literature, including examining affect as a cause (as opposed to an outcome) of justice perceptions and research on emotional regulation.

Cropanzano et al. provide a thorough review of research integrating affect and organizational justice and offer a critique of the different theoretical approaches and frameworks that have been proposed to date. As such, their book provides a solid foundation for understanding the relationship between organizational justice and affect. Moreover, using Ashkanasy’s (2003) five-level model of emotions as a starting point, Cropanzano et al. discuss future research directions and integration opportunities related to within-person variation, between-person differences, interpersonal interactions, group-level emotions, and organizational emotional climate. Although other issues are briefly overviewed (e.g., identifying new justice antecedents, consequences, and moderators), the future research directions offered by Cropanzano et al. seem to be primarily generated by exploring how the affect literature can apply to organizational justice.

We agree with Cropanzano et al. that significant benefits can be realized by further integrating the organizational justice literature with the literature on affect. We suggest, however, that it can also be fruitful to take a justice perspective to identify opportunities for integration – for example, by exploring gaps in the organizational justice literature as well as opportunities that have been overlooked and/or received less research attention by justice researchers. Therefore, we build on the foundation provided by Cropanzano et al.’s review by identifying several perspectives that are gaining momentum in the organizational justice literature and by suggesting avenues for future research. We begin by arguing that before we can fully benefit from the insights provided by the affect literature, justice scholars must first clarify key
constructs, including “justice” and “injustice”. Specifically, we propose that affect is likely to have different relationships and roles with these constructs and it is important to refine our constructs in order to capitalize on these distinctions. We then highlight several opportunities that may emerge when research attention is expanded to include: (a) negative and positive affect, (b) the effects of discrete emotions within the context of (in)justice, (c) the emotional terrain of overall (in)justice versus the justice dimensions, (d) the dynamic nature of (in)justice and the interplay between (in)justice and affect over time, (e) the concept of “(in)justice episodes” and how this concept can help researchers to organize experiences of (in)justice, and (f) the influence of third parties in the (in)justice/affect relationship. We conclude by discussing the importance of shifting our methodological approaches in order to capitalize on these new directions.

Clarifying Constructs: Injustice versus Justice

Cropanzano et al. briefly mention that it would be worth investigating the differences between justice and injustice in their discussion of future research directions and allude to the idea that justice and injustice may in fact be different constructs. This point, however, is downplayed by the authors. In contrast, we believe that this point warrants serious consideration. Specifically, we argue that the ambiguity of our constructs is a critical issue hampering our field and needs to be resolved before the opportunities identified by Cropanzano et al. can be fully realized.

Currently, the justice literature often uses injustice and justice interchangeably, as though these constructs are on the same continuum. Cropanzano et al., too, mostly refer to the relationship between “justice” and affect and use the terms justice and injustice interchangeably throughout the book. However, there have been numerous suggestions that justice and injustice are, in fact, distinct constructs (e.g., Bies, 2001) or at the very least operate differently at extreme
levels (e.g., Gilliland, 2008). Bies and Tripp (2002) argued convincingly that justice and injustice are not only two distinct constructs but also that separating these constructs can lead to additional and important insights (similar to when trust researchers distinguished between trust and distrust, e.g., Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). Within the literature, however, few researchers explicitly make this distinction and this issue has been muddied by theories and research that purports to study justice but actually examines injustice (or vice versa) and by measures that focus on justice but are used to study injustice (e.g., Colquitt, 2001).

We argue that it is critically important to address this issue since we cannot successfully integrate these literatures until we understand what it is that we are trying to integrate. Moreover, there is ample evidence within the literature that justice and injustice may be two different phenomena. This distinction, for example, was abundantly clear in early theorizing by Cahn (1949) who characterized justice as “some ideal relation or static condition or set of perceptual standards” (p. 13) whereas injustice was defined as the “sympathetic reaction of outrage, horror, shock, resentment, and anger, those affections of the viscera and abnormal secretion of the adrenals that prepare the human animal to resist attack” (p. 24). This distinction highlights the more cognitive nature of justice and the more emotional nature of injustice.

Interestingly, although the distinction is rarely made explicit, the literature has also tended to focus on justice as a cognitive or perceptual phenomenon (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001) whereas injustice has been conceptualized as inherently emotional (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 2002; Mikula, 1986, 1987). We propose that if justice and injustice are separated, emotion may play different roles in these constructs. For instance, it may be that justice is a primarily “cold” cognitive process in which people evaluate events and entities according to a set of standards or criteria – although emotion may play a role in these
perceptions, it is likely to be ancillary to the experience of justice (i.e., cognitions are influenced by emotions that happen to be present at the time of the cognitive process as opposed emotions driving the cognitive process). In contrast, injustice likely involves a “hot” cognitive process in which emotions can be infused throughout the perceptual process and may even drive the process, such as when individuals start with a strong visceral emotional reaction. For example, individuals may experience an initial emotional reaction to injustice that is unitary and undifferentiated (e.g., “I feel unfairly treated”; Bies & Tripp, 2002; Folger, 2001). This unitary emotional reaction may be deconstructed as individuals engage in sensemaking to determine why they feel unfairly treated; this unitary emotional reaction may drive cognitive evaluation and yield discrete emotions as individuals process the experience. As we discuss below in our section on Overall (In)Justice and Affect, emotions and cognitions may also become intertwined at the time of the violation as individuals appraise events. For example, individuals may evaluate events, decide that they feel unfairly treated, and experience a corresponding discrete emotional reaction (e.g., “I didn’t receive the outcome I deserved so I feel angry”). Alternatively, in reaction to an event, individuals may experience an emotional reaction and by labeling this emotion, they attach a cognitive appraisal (e.g., “I feel angry – I must have deserved better than this treatment”). There is also likely to be a dynamic interplay between cognition and emotion as individuals unpack and process the experience.

Regardless of whether the initial emotional reaction is unitary or involves a discrete emotion, however, this suggests that justice and injustice are likely to be phenomenologically distinct constructs not only with respect to their emotional tone but also with respect to the interplay between cognitions and emotions. Whereas justice may be accessible by tapping into individuals’ evaluations of justice criteria, injustice may require a more comprehensive approach
that taps into the *experience* of injustice and the integration of cognition and affect (Barclay & Whiteside, 2011). In other words, although it may be appropriate to assess justice by evaluating adherence to justice criteria (i.e., one’s perceptions; e.g., Colquitt, 2001), it may be inappropriate to ask individuals to assess injustice by relying solely on these criteria (i.e., simply reversing the items; e.g., asking whether procedures are consistent for justice and inconsistent for injustice). Instead, it is critically important to tap into the *experience* of injustice (i.e., a process that integrates perception, affect, and beliefs; cf. Barclay & Whiteside, 2011). Taken together, we argue that researchers need to re-examine our definitions of justice and injustice and create new measures that can tap into the distinctions.

**Positive versus Negative Affect**

Teasing apart the differences between justice and injustice will also have significant implications for the type of affect that is explored. Given that much of the literature has focused on injustice (despite calling it justice; Bies & Tripp, 2002), it is perhaps not surprising that most research has focused on negative, as opposed to positive, affect (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008; Colquitt, Scott, Rodell, Long, Zapata, Conlon, & Wesson, 2013). This state of the literature is reflected in Cropanzano et al.’s (2011) book, which dedicates an entire chapter to the relationship between justice and moral emotions (e.g., anger), as well as outcomes such as retributive justice and revenge. However, given that positive and negative affect can be associated with different antecedents and consequences, a better understanding of both negative and positive affect has the potential to greatly contribute to the theoretical understanding of individuals’ reactions to perceived (in)justice.

A number of potential research directions warrant consideration. First, although the emphasis in the literature has been on negative emotions, evidence is mounting regarding the
importance of positive emotions for justice. Despite the common assumption that studying negative emotions is sufficient, the emotions literature has established that positive emotions have important theoretical differences that are worthy of study in their own right (cf. Fredrickson, 2001). There is considerable evidence, for example, that positive affect plays an adaptive function by facilitating approach behavior and encouraging people to engage with their environments (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). In the justice literature, however, it has often been suggested that justice is not at all or only weakly associated with positive affect. Scholars have argued, for example, that justice is unlikely to trigger the primary appraisal that can lead to positive affect because people are generally treated fairly and expect to be treated fairly (e.g., Rupp & Spencer, 2006). However, Barclay and Kiefer (2014) found that positive emotions played a significant mediating role between justice perceptions and a number of important organizational outcomes (e.g., helping, performance). Moreover, in a recent meta-analysis, Colquitt et al. (2013) found that justice was moderately positively associated with positive affect. These findings have implications for the justice literature that have yet to be fully explored. Moreover, it may be important to examine positive and negative emotions simultaneously in order to identify the effects of each type of emotion as well as explore the differential effects of these emotions on behavioral outcomes (Barclay & Kiefer, 2014).

Second, studies conducted to date have examined a limited set of outcomes of positive affect, including task performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and counterproductive work behavior (see Colquitt et al., 2013). Examining a wider variety of positive outcomes is important, as it would allow one to test whether individuals are indeed more likely to engage with their environment (e.g., their organization) when they perceive that they are treated fairly,
as theoretical models of positive affect predict. Furthermore, a better understanding of the role of positive affect in the experience of justice would enhance the ability to explain and predict the effects of justice perceptions on employee reactions.

Third, an important characteristic of positive emotions is that they can facilitate the acquisition of personal resources (e.g., social, physical, intellectual, and psychological resources). As such, the benefits of positive emotions are often indirect and adaptive in the long term (Fredrickson, 2001). This has implications for the justice literature, since it suggests that the positive emotions that people experience in reaction to justice can contribute to the acquisition of resources that may buffer the impact of subsequent injustice. Moreover, positive emotions may be a resource that can be capitalized on in the wake of injustice. Research in positive psychology, for example, has demonstrated that building individuals’ resources and fostering positive emotions can help individuals cope with negative and challenging experiences (e.g., Sin & Lyubomirsky, 2009). Thus, it is possible that positive emotions may represent an important resource that can be utilized to facilitate coping with experiences of injustice.

Positive emotions may also affect employees’ responses by influencing their sensemaking processes. Sensemaking refers to the process by which individuals interpret and assign meaning to events, usually in response to unexpected or ambiguous circumstances (D.A. Jones & Skarlicki, 2013; Weick, 1995). Although it is currently unclear how past (in)justice affects sensemaking, it is plausible that the same event may be interpreted differently depending on employees’ past experiences with justice and injustice. Employees who are usually treated fairly, and thus tend to experience positive emotions in the context of justice events, may interpret ambiguous events in a more positive light than employees who are treated unfairly. It is
therefore important to not only study employees’ reactions to unfair events and the negative emotions that they entail, but also fair events and positive emotions.

Finally, the affect literature suggests that individuals aim to obtain and maintain positive moods and avoid experiencing negative moods (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; Clark & Isen, 1982; see also Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). The processes by which these goals are pursued are known as positive mood maintenance and negative state relief. Research has demonstrated that individuals in a negative mood exhibit behaviors that may help them feel better, such as helping others (e.g., Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). Similarly, individuals in a positive mood usually engage in behaviors that are associated with positive feelings and tend to avoid engaging in behaviors that may induce a negative mood (Wegener & Petty, 1994). The implications of mood maintenance have yet to be explored in the context of organizational justice.

Some research, however, has examined the influence of individuals’ affective states on their justice perceptions. For instance, as Cropanzano et al. discuss, it has been demonstrated that individuals may use affect as information when they experience uncertainty regarding the fairness of their treatment (Van den Bos, 2003). We suggest that mood maintenance may serve as a complementary mechanism by which individuals’ affective states can influence their reactions. For instance, when in a positive mood, employees may be more inclined to “let go” of a negative experience and to refrain from engaging in negative behaviors such as retaliation, in order to preserve their positive mood. Thus, a better understanding of individuals’ affective states – including their positive affective states – is important to predicting employees’ reactions to (in)justice. Furthermore, it has previously been proposed that individuals may attempt to maintain a positive mood or alleviate a negative mood by acting in a generous and friendly
manner (Van Kleef et al., 2010). This has interesting potential implications for the justice literature, which has recently seen an increased interest in why individuals treat others (un)fairly (i.e., justice as a dependent variable; Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). A greater emphasis on both negative and positive affect, together with a consideration of principles such as mood maintenance, may help identify moderators that influence when individuals act (un)fairly toward others.

Discrete Emotions

As Cropanzano et al. note, it is not only important to explore affect, but it is also important to distinguish between different types of affect. Specifically, in their Introduction, the authors explain the differences between moods and emotions and note that awareness of the different predispositions associated with specific emotions is important for predicting behavior. Building upon this argument, we focus on the importance of examining both positive and negative discrete emotions. Unlike moods, discrete emotions are directed at a target and associated with specific action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Anger, for instance, is associated with a motivation to attack, fear with a motivation to escape, and guilt with a motivation to make amends (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Whereas negative emotions are generally thought to narrow people’s thought-action repertoires, urging them to act in a certain way (e.g., to attack, to flee), positive emotions (e.g., love, interest, and joy) broaden people’s momentary thought-action repertoires (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). For instance, pride, a positive emotion that is triggered by personal accomplishments, has a broadening effect that encourages individuals to picture even greater accomplishments in the future, joy is associated with an urge to play and to be creative, and interest creates an urge to explore and process new information (see Fredrickson, 2001). Thus, although positive emotions generally have a broadening effect, they are all associated with unique thoughts and behavioral
urges. This suggests that distinguishing between positive and negative emotions is critical for understanding the differential effects of these emotions.

Moreover, it may also be fruitful to distinguish between different discrete emotions, including emotions of the same valence (e.g., negative emotions). Although there has been substantial interest in the relationship between perceived injustice and anger or moral outrage (e.g., Bies, 1987; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005), the focus on anger has appeared to have come at the expense of examining other emotions that may be also be predictive of individuals’ reactions. For instance, while it has been found that perceived injustice frequently leads to the experience of fear (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998), it is currently unclear precisely under what circumstances fear is elicited and how this affects individuals’ reactions and ability to cope with the experience. Similarly, very little research has examined the relationships between injustice perceptions and emotions such as shame or sadness. Examination of a wider range of emotions may result in interesting and informative findings. Skarlicki, Hoegg, Aquino, and Nadisic (2013), for example, recently examined the relatively under-researched emotion of disgust and found that interpersonal injustice (i.e., being treated with a lack of dignity and respect) can trigger reactions of disgust in both victims and third-party observers. It is currently unclear, however, whether violations of other justice dimensions (e.g., procedural justice) can also lead to disgust.

Despite the predictive advantages of discrete emotions, in the justice literature, these emotions have tended to be ignored at the expense of more general affective states (e.g., moods). For instance, a considerable amount of research has focused on state positive/negative affect, which is typically measured with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see Colquitt et al., 2013). Other studies have measured discrete
emotions, but rather than analyzing the outcomes associated with each emotion separately, have combined these discrete emotions to create measures of “average” positive and/or negative affect (e.g., Barclay & Kiefer, 2014). Thus, as Cropanzano et al. point out, specific emotion-driven behaviors have not received a great deal of research attention. However, given the nature of discrete emotions and their associations with specific action tendencies, the theoretical understanding of emotions as a mediator between experiences of (in)justice and employee reactions would greatly benefit from a better understanding of discrete emotions. Fear and anger, for example, are both emotions that may be triggered by perceived injustice (e.g., Mikula et al., 1998), but they are associated with very different action tendencies (i.e., the urge to attack and the urge to escape, respectively). However, because previous studies have tended to examine mood or aggregates of emotions, it is currently unclear when each of these emotions is most likely to be triggered and how these emotions subsequently influence employees’ attitudes and behaviors. Taken together, we argue that it would be beneficial to more widely explore discrete emotions, since these can be associated with different action tendencies and may have differential effects on important attitudinal and behavioral outcomes of (in)justice.

**Overall (In)Justice and Affect**

From Cropanzano et al.’s review of the literature, it is evident that the vast majority of studies conducted to date have focused on the relationship between affect and the dimensions of organizational justice (i.e., distributive, procedural, and interactional justice). For instance, the authors discuss how unfair outcomes can generate unpleasant affect as well as how the justice dimensions interact to predict employees’ affective states. Yet, there have been repeated calls in the justice literature for a greater focus on overall justice judgements (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005; Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Lind, 2001a, 2001b; Törnblom & Vermunt, 1999), since overall justice (a) accounts for variance beyond the separate dimensions (e.g., Fassina, Jones,
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Uggerslev, 2008; D. A. Jones & Martens, 2009; Rupp & Paddock, 2010), (b) can provide a more phenomenologically accurate and parsimonious depiction of employees’ actual experience of justice (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Shapiro, 2001; Törnblom & Vermunt, 1999), and (c) is a more proximal driver of reactions than the individual justice dimensions (Greenberg, 2001; Kim & Leung, 2007; Lind, 2001a, 2001b).

As noted above, individuals may have a unitary or discrete emotional reaction to injustice. Moreover, studies that have examined overall justice with affect have demonstrated that experiencing overall (in)justice can be associated with a range of emotions, including anger, fear, sadness, and disappointment (Mikula, 1986, 1987; Mikula et al., 1998). Moreover, research has demonstrated that both positive and negative emotions can be experienced simultaneously in reaction to overall (in)justice (e.g., Barclay & Kiefer, 2014).

We argued above that it may be fruitful to explore discrete emotions and how individuals process their emotional reaction over time (e.g., how a unitary reaction is deconstructed into discrete emotions through processing). It may also be beneficial to explore the general emotional terrain that individuals experience in response to (in)justice. Similar to the way in which overall justice represents more than the sum of its parts (i.e., the justice dimensions), it may be that the emotional response that individuals experience in reaction to overall (in)justice differs from simply combining the emotions associated with each of the dimensions. For example, it may be possible for individuals to experience anger in reaction to an unfair outcome, guilt because the procedure was biased in their favor, and indignation at the person who was enacting the procedures. Overall, however, the person may feel strong resentment. In other words, although reactions to the dimensions of injustice have created a cluster of emotions, the cluster is characterized by one theme or emotion that can guide the overall response to the (in)justice.
Moreover, there are likely to be significant differences when, overall, individuals feel resentment versus outrage versus sadness etc. Thus, it may be advantageous to not only examine the cluster of emotions that individuals experience but also the theme or emotion that summarizes the cluster, since this theme may be particularly influential for individuals’ subsequent attitudinal and behavioral reactions.

We also propose that asking people about their emotions may result in different responses depending on whether individuals consider overall justice versus the dimensions. For example, individuals often respond that they “feel unfairly treated” as a global assessment. They may not describe the specific discrete emotions until they deconstruct what it means to feel unfairly treated. Specifically, in order to articulate their assessment, they may question what led to the sense of injustice and, through a sensemaking process, begin to explore the dimensions to determine why they feel unfairly treated. For example, they might consider the treatment they received and feel sad that their manager did not make them feel valued as well as angry that they did not receive the promotion they deserved. Conversely, an employee may first evaluate the separate justice dimensions (e.g., Was the outcome fair? How about the procedures?), experience emotions in response to these evaluations, and only subsequently form a judgment of overall justice (which, as described above, may be characterized by a different emotion or theme than the discrete emotions associated with the individual dimensions). In other words, the emotions that an individual reports will likely differ depending on when their (in)justice judgments are assessed, the process through which the judgments were constructed, as well as where they are in the sensemaking process.
The Dynamic and Episodic Nature of (In)Justice

Throughout our above discussion, it should be clear that integrating justice and affect is a complex task that goes well beyond simply relating perceptions of (in)justice to an emotional outcome. Rather, emotions can precede, accompany and/or infuse, as well as serve as an outcome of (in)justice perceptions. Moreover, multiple emotions can be present at any point in this process. Further adding to the complexity is the notion that both (in)justice and affect are dynamic phenomena (Holtz & Harold, 2009). Thus, it is also important to explore how both (in)justice and affect change over the course of time and how changes in one can dynamically influence changes in the other and vice versa. Taken together, clearly, a more comprehensive approach to studying (in)justice and affect is warranted in order to understand the integration of these constructs and the processes underlying them.

Given the dynamic nature of justice, Cropanzano et al. call for a paradigm shift that moves away from the use of cross-sectional designs and towards methodologies that will allow researchers to (a) tap into the change that can occur over time and (b) explore the dynamic process through which justice and affect are related. We argue that it is important for researchers to take this suggestion even further by also exploring (a) “episodes” and (b) dyadic influences. With respect to “episodes”, this concept originated in the emotions literature where the term refers to a single event that leads to an unfolding of a series of related sub-events with affective significance and that are organized around a central theme (cf. Frijda, 1993). Although each of the sub-events can produce their own distinct emotions, the full episode is organized around a core theme and the individual remains in a heightened state of emotional engagement throughout the episode (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).
Drawing upon this research, Whiteside and Barclay (2015) recently proposed that (in)justice researchers should expand their investigations beyond single events to exploring “episodes of (in)justice” – a circumstance in which an initial (in)justice event may lead to a series of transactions with the environment, each of which may be characterized by different emotions but are organized around a theme. Throughout the episode, perceptions of (in)justice may be created, used, and re-considered over the course of time; however, they are all tied to the initial precipitating event. Taking this idea further, the notion of “episodes of (in)justice” can help researchers capture, structure, and organize an experience of (in)justice. This includes allowing researchers to tap into the cluster of emotions that are initiated by the initial event as well as how these emotions change over the course of time as the individual continues to interact with the environment. This conceptualization can also facilitate the investigation of the dynamic interplay between affect and (in)justice as the episode unfolds. Moreover, it can help facilitate a deeper understanding of how emotional themes may develop for individuals and how this can influence their subsequent reactions. In short, by integrating the notion of episodes into the justice literature, it can expand our understanding of (in)justice-related events, which will undoubtedly yield a deeper understanding of the dynamic relationship between (in)justice and affect.

We also concur with Cropanzano et al.’s argument that research should focus on the dynamic nature of within-person perceptions. However, research should not stop there. Instead, it is also important to explore how dyadic and contextual influences can shape (in)justice experiences over the course of time. Whiteside and Barclay (2015), for example, recently argued that (in)justice perceptions can be negotiated and influenced through encounters with others (e.g., managers). Specifically, the authors argued that by exploring both employees and
managers as active participants in a justice process (cf. Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008), researchers can better understand how employees and managers dynamically influence each other, which cannot not only influence both parties’ perceptions but also how the event or episode unfolds. That is, the authors suggested that (in)justice perceptions do not occur in a vacuum but rather are influenced by the dynamics and context that surround the individual as well as the interactions that occur with others. Although the authors did not explore the role of emotions, it would seem appropriate to assume that witnessing the emotions of others may also influence this process. For example, employees who confront their managers when they feel unfairly treated are likely to be influenced by whether their manager reacts to these accusations with anger, surprise, or disgust. This will likely influence employees’ perceptions, how they interact with their manager, and how they interpret future (in)justice-related events. In other words, it is not only important to explore (in)justice and affect as dynamic phenomena at the within-person level but also to consider how these phenomena may be influenced by dyadic and other contextual factors, including third-party observers, as discussed below.

Third-Party Justice Experiences

Throughout their book, Cropanzano et al. primarily focus on the relationship between justice and affect as experienced by individuals. This approach reflects the traditional focus of the organizational justice literature; despite a long-standing awareness that justice issues arise in social interactions (e.g., Bies, 1987; Greenberg, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Smith, 1998), research has tended to investigate individuals’ justice perceptions in isolation (DeGoey, 2000). In recent years, however, there has been an increased appreciation for the role of third parties and a number of studies have provided evidence that the justice perceptions of employees are influenced by the perceptions of their coworkers (e.g., Brockner, Wiesenfeld, Stephan, & Hurley, 1997; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). It has been demonstrated, for instance, that justice
judgments can be communicated amongst coworkers by means of talk and messages (e.g., Brockner et al., 1997; D. A. Jones & Skarlicki, 2005). Even though - as Cropanzano et al. illustrate - there is clearly a strong relationship between (in)justice and emotions, we still know surprisingly little about the influence of third parties’ emotions on employees’ perceptions of (in)justice.

To better understand and predict how others’ emotions may influence employees’ experiences of (in)justice, we propose that it is helpful to take a closer look at the theoretical developments in the emotions literature. Just like justice scholars have predominantly focused on intrapersonal perspectives, psychological research on emotion has traditionally focused on intrapersonal effects, examining the interplay between emotions, behaviors, motivations, and cognitions within individuals (see Forgas, 1995). However, this literature, too, has seen a relatively recent development toward a more interpersonal approach (see Van Kleef, 2009). One view that has been influential in explaining the interpersonal effects of emotions is the social functional perspective (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000). According to this perspective, expressed emotions serve a social function by communicating information to an observer. This information, in turn, may influence the perceptions and behavior of the observer. As Cropanzano et al. discuss in their Conclusion, the justice literature has only seen a very modest and sporadic incorporation of this social functional perspective. What is lacking is a unified, systematic examination of the ways in which others’ emotions may influence one’s perceptions of and reactions to (in)justice. To address this gap, we suggest that the justice literature would benefit from further integration with the emotions literature. An example of a theoretical model from the emotions literature that could help make predictions about how third parties’ emotions might influence employees’ perceptions of (in)justice is the Emotions as Social
Information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010). This model identifies two processes by which others may influence an individual’s behavior: inferential processes and affective reactions.

The proposition that others’ emotions may influence an individual’s perceptions and behavior by means of inferential processes is based on well-established findings that emotions are directed at a target (Frijda, 1994) and associated with specific evaluations of an event (i.e., appraisals; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Since discrete emotions are associated with specific evaluations, observing an emotion in another person has the potential to provide information about this person’s evaluations of an event. This proposition has been supported by a number of studies on social decision making (see Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010). For instance, it has been found that individuals in a negotiation setting can draw inferences from their opponents’ emotions, which subsequently influences their behavior (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). More generally, it appears that individuals often rely on others’ emotions for information when they do not have sufficient insight about the structure of social situations (Van Kleef et al., 2010). Given that justice issues typically arise in complex social situations that are associated with high levels of uncertainty (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) and that perceived injustice is strongly associated with the experience of emotions (see Cropanzano et al., 2011), emotion-based inferences may well play an important function in the interpersonal communication of (in)justice perceptions. While this proposition has yet to be fully examined, there is some evidence that this may be the case. In one study, it was found that individuals are more likely to make dispositional attributions for the unfair behavior of an authority (i.e., to perceive the authority to be a generally unfair person) and also perceive their own treatment as less fair when a third party expresses anger as opposed to guilt (De Cremer,
Wubben, & Brebels, 2008). This suggests that individuals can infer information about others’ perceptions about an authority from the emotions that these other individuals express.

Cropanzano et al. explain the influence of emotions on individuals’ perceptions from the perspective of uncertainty management theory (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), according to which individuals are motivated to reduce uncertainty regarding the fairness of their treatment and may use affect as a “heuristic” when they lack adequate information to make fairness judgments.

The implications of the EASI model for understanding the impact of third parties’ emotions on employees’ justice perceptions have yet to be fully explored, however. For instance, it currently remains unclear to what extent justice information can be communicated to others by means of expressed emotions. For instance, we currently do not know whether employees can infer information about others’ perceptions of (in)justice from the emotions that these other people express. Since it has been established that justice perceptions can lead to the experience and expression of specific emotions, such as anger (see Cropanzano et al., 2011), it follows from the principles of the EASI model that employees should indeed be able to make such inferences. In addition, it is important to investigate whether employees – provided that they can infer information about justice from others’ emotions – can subsequently use this inferred information in forming their own judgments and perceptions. Specifically, it has yet to be examined whether information that is communicated to employees by means of others’ emotions subsequently influences employees’ own reactions, including their perceptions of procedural justice, their satisfaction with their own outcomes, and their behavior.

The second process by which others’ emotions may influence an individual’s behavior, according to the EASI model, is by eliciting affective reactions in the observer (Van Kleef, 2009). Affective reactions may be elicited by emotional contagion, a process by which
individuals “catch” the emotions of others. This process is thought to occur through unintentional and automatic mimicking of others’ facial expressions, postures, movements, and vocalizations (e.g., Hawk, Van Kleef, Fischer, & Van der Schalk, 2009). Thus, individuals who observe another person expressing an emotion, say guilt, may catch this emotion and start feeling guilty themselves. The implications of this process are underexplored in the justice literature, but are potentially far-reaching. Cropanzano et al. provide a rather extensive discussion of mood and emotion as causes of justice perceptions, which clearly demonstrates that moods and emotions are not only caused by (in)justice, but may also contribute to one’s perceptions of (in)justice. For example, in ambiguous situations, individuals may consult their own feelings in order to form (in)justice judgments (Van den Bos, 2003). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that affective states can prime thoughts and memories that are part of the same associative network as the affective state. For instance, research on negotiation has found that being in a positive mood may lead individuals to focus more on cooperation and make them more likely to reach agreement (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). However, whereas Cropanzano et al. focus on the impact of individuals’ own affect on their justice perceptions, we contend that others’ affect may play a similar role and that emotional contagion may be a second mechanism by which others’ emotions might influence individuals’ perceptions of (in)justice. Employees working with an angry coworker, for example, may “catch” the coworker’s emotion, start feeling angry themselves, and subsequently use their feelings as a heuristic to interpret the fairness of their own treatment.

Finally, the justice literature would benefit from a better understanding of the circumstances under which each of these two mechanisms – inferential processes and affective reactions – are more or less likely to influence employees’ justice perceptions. Sometimes, both
processes may result in the same judgment. For example, an employee may infer from another’s expression of anger that procedures are unfair. Similarly, catching the other’s anger may also lead them to perceive lower levels of procedural justice. Other times, however, the two processes may work in opposite directions. For example, an employee who infers from another’s expression of guilt that organizational procedures are unfair may feel angry at the organization and be less willing to engage in helping behaviors, whereas an employee who “catches” the other’s feeling of guilt may try to alleviate this feeling by engaging in more helping behaviors. We propose that a better understanding of the mechanisms by which others’ emotions impact employees’ justice perceptions is critical to predicting how employees will perceive and react to organizational justice issues.

**Methodologies, Paradigms, and Perspectives**

In order to capitalize on these new research directions, it is clear that justice researchers need to move beyond cross-sectional research, which has been a mainstay in the justice literature, to different methodologies and approaches that can parlay these research questions into new theoretical and empirical insights. With respect to methodologies, Cropanzano et al. propose a wide range of methodologies that can be helpful to justice researchers – from neuroscience techniques to experience sampling methods (ESM). With respect to neuroscience, we believe that techniques from this field may be particularly helpful for disentangling the relationship between cognition and affect within the context of justice, whereas ESM methodologies and longitudinal approaches can help us better understand the interplay between (in)justice and affect as well as how processes related to these phenomena dynamically unfold over the course of time (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003; Holtz & Harold, 2009). With respect to approaches, Cropanzano et al. advocate the use of multi-level models in order to delve into the
layers that can impact the interplay of (in)justice and affect – this approach would enable us to understand not only the within-person experience, but also how dyadic, group, and organizational contextual variables can influence one’s experiences.

In addition to the methodologies and approaches proposed by Cropanzano et al., we argue that researchers can also benefit by considering different perspectives and paradigms. Since the publication of Cropanzano et al.’s book, one approach that has gained momentum is the person-centric perspective (cf. Guo, Rupp, Weiss, & Trougakos, 2011; Weiss & Rupp, 2011). This perspective delves into the within-person experiences of justice and highlights the dynamic psychological and experiential processes that influence and shape individuals’ changing experiences of (in)justice. This perspective is likely to become extremely valuable for research integrating (in)justice and affect given that it can effectively tap into the within-person experiences of these constructs over time.

Additionally, as discussed above, it is imperative that (in)justice researchers re-examine our measures and ensure that our measures reflect the constructs that we are trying to assess and operationalize distinctions that allow us to differentiate between our constructs. Moreover, when designing studies, it is imperative that researchers critically assess the appropriateness of measures for their particular research questions. Rather than relying on measures that have been extensively used in the literature, researchers (and reviewers) should take a step back and reflect upon which measure is likely to be the most useful and valid for the question at hand (Shapiro, 2010). Moreover, as our above discussion highlights, it is also important to measure these variables at the appropriate time since the time of measurement is likely to have significant implications for the conclusions that can be drawn. In sum, the onus is on researchers (and
reviewers) to question the measures, methodologies, and perspectives that we draw upon and ensure that they are able to provide the answers for the questions that we ask.

**Conclusion**

Numerous fields within organizational behavior and industrial/organizational psychology have undergone an “affective revolution” that has resulted in countless new insights and theoretical/empirical developments (cf. Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003). Although the field of organizational justice has under-emphasized the role of affect, Cropanzano et al. have made a strong case that the time has come to give affect the attention and appreciation that it deserves within the context of organizational (in)justice. Integrating these literatures will not only help ensure that our theoretical models more accurately reflect the experience of (in)justice but it can also open new opportunities and insights into both fields. Although some of the opportunities can be realized simply by incorporating emotion theories into the justice literature, the greatest opportunities are likely to be found by fully integrating these literatures and exploring the interplay between these important and influential constructs. Along with Cropanzano et al., we have offered numerous future directions – however, these are likely to be only the tip of the iceberg. As scholars work on integrating these literatures, new questions, insights, and theories are bound to arise. In order to fully capitalize on the insights, justice scholars must ensure that they are ready for the challenge by refining our constructs and measures as well as being open to adopting new methodologies, paradigms, and perspectives. Clearly, the time has come to “do justice” to affect within our field. As Cropanzano et al. note (2011, p. 228): “As people, we intuitively recognize the emotional nature of fairness. It is time for scholars to do the same.”
CHAPTER 3 – MANUSCRIPT 2:

COMPARING INTEGRAL AND INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS:
TESTING INSIGHTS FROM EMOTIONS AS SOCIAL INFORMATION THEORY AND ATTRIBUTION THEORY
ABSTRACT

Studies have indicated that observers can infer information about others’ behavioral intentions from others’ emotions and use this information in making their own decisions. Integrating Emotions as Social Information (EASI) theory and attribution theory, we argue that the interpersonal effects of emotions are not only influenced by the type of discrete emotion (e.g., anger versus happiness) but also by the target of the emotion (i.e., how the emotion relates to the situation). We compare the interpersonal effects of emotions that are integral (i.e., related to the situation) versus incidental (i.e., lacking a clear target in the situation) in a negotiation context. Results from four studies support our general argument that the target of an opponent’s emotion influences the degree to which observers attribute the emotion to their own behavior. These attributions influence observers’ inferences regarding the perceived threat of an impasse or cooperativeness of an opponent, which can motivate them to strategically adjust their behavior. Specifically, emotion target influenced concessions for both anger and happiness (Study 1, N = 254), with perceived threat and cooperativeness mediating the effects of anger and happiness, respectively (Study 2, N = 280). Study 3 (N = 314) demonstrated the mediating role of attributions and moderating role of need for closure. Study 4 (N = 193) outlined how observers’ need for closure influences how they attribute incidental anger. We discuss theoretical implications related to the social influence of emotions as well as practical implications related to the impact of personality on negotiators’ biases and behaviors.
COMPARING INTEGRAL AND INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS:
TESTING INSIGHTS FROM EMOTIONS AS SOCIAL INFORMATION THEORY AND ATTRIBUTION THEORY

Research has highlighted the interpersonal effects of emotions – emotions serve an important social function by communicating information about an individual’s state of mind and possible behavioral pursuits to others (e.g., anger can signal a readiness to harm; Averill, 1982). Recently, Van Kleef (2009; see also Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010) expanded on this notion in Emotions as Social Information (EASI) theory by postulating that observers can infer another person’s behavioral intentions from the emotion that this person expresses and use this information in making their own decisions. In the context of a negotiation, for example, individuals who observe an opponent expressing anger about an offer may infer that the opponent is unyielding and lower their own demands to avoid an impasse (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, 2004b).

However, this raises questions regarding when emotions convey strategic information and how they shape observers’ reactions. Integrating EASI and attribution theories, our general argument is that the target of an emotion can shape the attributions made by the observer, thereby influencing the emotion’s interpersonal effects. Specifically, whereas integral emotions are directly targeted at something in the immediate situation, incidental emotions are unrelated to and/or lack a clear target in the immediate situation (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). We argue that differences in the target of an emotion can convey different strategic information, which can influence observers’ attributions, inferences, and behaviors.

We aim to make three theoretical contributions. First, although studies have examined both integral and incidental emotions, few studies have explicitly compared the interpersonal
effects of these emotions. We argue that emotion target (integral versus incidental) can convey disparate information, which can differentially influence observers’ strategic judgments. By examining the influence of emotion target on observers’ reactions, we respond to calls in the literature to explicitly compare the social effects of integral versus incidental emotions (cf. Van Kleef, 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2010). We also further distinguish between ambiguously incidental (i.e., emotions with an unknown target) and explicitly incidental emotions (i.e., emotions with a target that is known to be unrelated to the situation at hand) to capture distinctions in incidental emotions that are likely to be relevant from an observer’s perspective. By empirically comparing the effects of these three types of emotion (i.e., integral, ambiguously incidental, and explicitly incidental) on observers, we contribute to the understanding of the social functions of emotions by highlighting the importance of considering emotion target.

Second, we examine how others’ integral and incidental emotions influence observers’ judgments and behavior. By further integrating EASI and attribution theories, we propose that the target of an emotion (i.e., integral, ambiguously incidental, or explicitly incidental) can influence observers by shaping their attributions. Further, we argue that observers are more likely to make behavioral adjustments to the degree that they attribute others’ emotions to their own actions. However, the way that people adjust their behavior is likely to relate to the type of discrete emotion and the target of the emotion. We examine anger and happiness – two emotions that have been emphasized in the literature on the interpersonal effects of emotions (cf. Van Kleef, 2016). We demonstrate how the target of an emotion can influence observers’ attributions to their own behavior. Further, these attributions predict observers’ inferences related to the perceived threat (for anger) and cooperativeness (for happiness) of their opponent, which can influence individuals’ tendency to adjust their behavior in strategic ways.
Third, an underlying tenet in EASI theory is that the interpersonal effects of emotions depend on observers’ motivation to engage in information processing. Extending this notion, we propose that individual differences in the motivation to engage in information processing are likely to impact attributions for another person’s emotions in the absence of a clear emotion target. Specifically, we argue that the need for cognitive closure (NCC; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) can influence how observers attribute ambiguously incidental emotions and that there may be differential effects depending on the type of emotion (e.g., anger versus happiness) that is observed. By examining a theoretically relevant moderator, we provide insight into when emotion targets are likely to influence attributions.

Our overall goal is to contribute to the understanding of the processes through which one’s own behavior is influenced by others’ emotions. We test our hypotheses in the context of negotiation. Due to its highly interdependent nature, negotiation provides an ideal and commonly used context for studying interpersonal processes (Van Kleef, Homan, & Cheshin, 2012). We examine the interpersonal effects related to the target of anger and happiness across four studies. Study 1 explicitly compares the effects of integral and incidental emotions on observers’ behavior. In Study 2, we examine the mediating roles of perceived threat (for anger) and cooperativeness (for happiness). Study 3 includes the mediating role of attributions and the moderating role of NCC. Finally, Study 4 provides a closer examination of the effects of NCC.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Drawing upon a social-functional approach to emotions, Van Kleef (2009) outlines in EASI theory that people not only experience emotions but can also express these emotions to others, which can influence others’ decisions and behavior (see also Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Manstead, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). In this section, we briefly overview EASI
theory’s key tenets regarding how emotions can influence observers, including the pathways through which observers process emotion information as well as how the type of emotion (e.g., anger versus happiness) being communicated can signal different information.

**EASI Theory: Communicating Information Through Inferential versus Affective Pathways**

In EASI theory, Van Kleef (2009) argues that emotions can influence observers through inferential or affective pathways. In the inferential pathway, emotions can enable observers to infer another person’s attitudes and behavioral intentions from the emotion that this person expresses (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010). For example, anger is a negative emotion that arises when someone or something is blamed for blocking one’s goals, whereas happiness is a positive emotion that arises when one’s goals are being met and one has favorable expectations (Lazarus, 1991). When individuals express these emotions, they are communicating this information to others. That is, observers can draw inferences from others’ emotions (De Melo, Carnevale, Read, & Gratch, 2014), which can be used to inform their own judgments and behaviors (e.g., Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010). For instance, an observer may infer from another person’s expression of anger that this person blames the observer for impeding his/her goals, thereby motivating the observer to adjust his/her own behavior to prevent potential harm. Conversely, happiness can communicate satisfaction, which may encourage observers to pursue their own interests (Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

Observers can also be influenced by others’ emotions via affective reactions (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010). For instance, observers may experience emotional contagion, in which they “catch” an opponent’s emotion (e.g., feel happy when another person expresses happiness; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Affective reactions can influence observers’ behavior differently than inferential processes. For example, a negotiator who experiences anger
as a result of emotional contagion may become more competitive and retaliatory, which can prompt them to withhold concessions (Friedman, Anderson, Brett, Olekalns, Goates, & Lisco, 2004; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). Conversely, a negotiator who feels happy may become more cooperative and more likely to increase concessions (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a).²

However, the relative influence of inferential processes versus affective reactions on observers’ behavior depends on the context in which an emotion is observed. Whereas affective reactions are more predictive of observers’ judgments and behavior in cooperative situations, inferential processes are more influential in competitive situations (e.g., negotiation) where individuals are motivated to understand the strategic meaning of each other’s emotions (Van Kleef et al., 2010; see also Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Given that our research question emphasizes the strategic use of information, we focus on inferential processes. However, we also explore the influence of observers’ own affective reactions as a potential alternative explanation underlying observers’ reactions to integral and incidental emotions.

**Emotion Target: Integral, Ambiguously Incidental, and Explicitly Incidental**

By definition, emotions are targeted reactions that emerge in response to an event – that is, emotions have event or object specificity (cf. Frijda, 1994). Integral emotions are targeted at the immediate interaction (e.g., Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003); for example, a person may express anger towards another person’s behavior in a social interaction. By contrast, incidental emotions are triggered by an object or event that is unrelated to the situation at hand (e.g., Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; see also Forgas, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).

² Affective reactions may also occur in the form of complementary emotions (e.g., fear in response to anger). However, in negotiation, these reactions have only been found in exceptional cases (e.g., when anger was expressed by a high-power opponent; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012). We measured participants’ fear in Studies 1 and 2. In both studies, participants’ own fear in the anger condition did not significantly differ from the control condition. In addition, participants’ fear was uninfluenced by anger target.
From an observer’s perspective, we propose that it is important to further distinguish between two types of incidental emotions. We define *ambiguously incidental* emotions as emotions that occur when it is unclear to the observer where another person’s emotion is directed (i.e., the emotion lacks an explicit target). For example, a person may express an emotion but does not clearly indicate the target of this emotion to the observer. By contrast, *explicitly incidental* emotions are defined as emotions that occur when the observer knows that the emotion is unrelated to the situation. For example, the observer may be aware that the other person is happy due to a pleasant experience that is distinct from the situation at hand.

Although numerous studies have separately examined the interpersonal effects of integral and incidental emotions, the interpersonal effects of emotion target have not been empirically compared (cf. Van Kleef, 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2010). In the context of a negotiation, studies examining the interpersonal effects of integral emotions have emphasized *behavior-oriented* emotions, which are clearly targeted at an observer’s offers.³ For example, in Van Kleef et al.’s (2004a) frequently used paradigm, participants received written feedback from a simulated opponent who expressed an emotion targeted at the participant’s offers (e.g., “This offer makes me really angry,” Van Kleef et al., 2004a, p. 61). These studies indicate that observers can strategically use the information inferred from others’ behavior-oriented emotions.

However, emotions in negotiation need not be integral – emotions that were triggered by unrelated events are also likely to enter the negotiation (cf. Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999). Specifically, although negotiators may try to control irrelevant emotions, attempts to suppress one’s emotions often fail (e.g., Wegner & Bargh, 1998). Thus, negotiation scholars have

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³ Studies have also examined other targets within the situation (e.g., Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011; Pietroni, Van Kleef, Rubaltelli, & Rumiani, 2009; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008). Consistent with the emphasis of previous research in this context, we focus on behavior-oriented emotions targeted at offers.
concluded that “although negotiators might try to avoid bringing their earlier emotions with them to the negotiation table, this is not always possible” (Thompson et al., 1999, p. 141).

Ambiguously incidental emotions occur in a negotiation when a negotiator expresses an emotion but does not clearly indicate the target to his or her counterpart. Studies have shown that ambiguously incidental emotions may communicate information and elicit behavioral changes in negotiators (e.g., Côté, Hideg, & Van Kleef, 2013; Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani, 2011; Kopelman et al., 2006; Pietroni, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008; Sinaceur, Adam, Van Kleef, & Galinsky, 2013; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Wang, Northcraft, & Van Kleef, 2012). Although ambiguously incidental emotions often seem to have similar effects as behavior-oriented emotions, these effects have not been empirically compared in the same study, which makes it difficult to disentangle the influence of emotion target.

Finally, explicitly incidental emotions in a negotiation occur when an observer knows that the opponent’s emotion is not targeted at his or her behavior. Past studies have shown that emotions that are explicitly not targeted at an observer’s behavior are less likely to elicit behavioral changes than behavior-oriented emotions (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2011; Steinel et al., 2008). However, given that past research has not explicitly distinguished between ambiguously and explicitly incidental emotions, it is unclear whether these theoretically distinct types of incidental emotion have disparate interpersonal effects. Drawing on EASI theory, we propose that behavior-oriented, ambiguously incidental, and explicitly incidental emotions have distinct effects on negotiators’ judgments and behavior.

**STUDY 1**

Given that emotions are targeted at a specific stimulus (e.g., an object or event; Frijda, 1994), they can communicate information about a person’s appraisals (i.e., evaluations) of that
stimulus to observers (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010). In EASI theory, Van Kleef (2009, 2016) proposes that emotions that are clearly targeted at the immediate situation can be informative for observers by communicating information about the expressor’s appraisals of the situation. This information can be inferred by observers and guide their behavior. For example, anger has been shown to elicit smaller concessions from an observer when it is targeted at the observer as a person as opposed to the observer’s offers because the former conveys little strategic information about the negotiation (Lelieveld et al., 2011; Steinel et al., 2008).

In a negotiation, anger that is perceived to be targeted at one’s behavior (i.e., behavior-oriented anger) communicates that one’s opponent is unsatisfied with one’s offer and has ambitious goals (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Observers typically increase their concessions in response to this type of anger since an agreement may not be reached unless they adjust their behavior (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Consistent with past research, we predict that observers make larger concessions when an opponent expresses behavior-oriented anger relative to when no emotion is expressed.

In contrast, behavior-oriented happiness can communicate that one’s opponent is satisfied with one’s offers (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Negotiators typically aim to find a balance between being demanding enough to satisfy their own interests yet cooperative enough to reach an agreement (Schelling, 1960). By communicating leniency and cooperativeness, behavior-oriented happiness can signal to an observer that there is an opportunity for the observer to pursue their own interests (e.g., by withholding concessions) without risking an impasse (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Thus, we predict that observers make smaller concessions when an opponent expresses behavior-oriented happiness relative to when no emotion is expressed.

Unlike behavior-oriented emotions, explicitly incidental emotions should convey little
useful information for a negotiator given that they are clearly not targeted at one’s behavior. Thus, we propose that individuals are less likely to adjust their behavior (i.e., to increase their concessions in response to anger and withhold concessions in response to happiness) when an opponent’s emotion is explicitly incidental as compared to behavior-oriented.

**Hypothesis 1:** Behavior-oriented anger elicits larger concessions from observers than explicitly incidental anger (H1a) and no emotion (H1b).

**Hypothesis 2:** Behavior-oriented happiness elicits smaller concessions from observers than explicitly incidental happiness (H2a) and no emotion (H2b).

Ambiguously incidental emotions may also elicit behavioral changes from observers. For example, studies have shown that people make larger concessions when an opponent expresses ambiguously incidental anger as compared to when no emotion is expressed (e.g., Côté et al., 2013; Kopelman et al., 2006; Pietroni et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2012). However, few studies have compared ambiguously incidental versus behavior-oriented emotions. For instance, although Pietroni et al. (2008) included both types of emotion, their effects were examined in different studies, thereby preventing comparison.

Drawing upon EASI theory, we propose that emotions that are directly targeted at the immediate situation should convey more strategic information about the interaction and therefore have a stronger influence on observers than emotions with an unclear target or that are not targeted at the interaction. Given that ambiguously incidental emotions are less clearly targeted to one’s behavior than behavior-oriented emotion, we expect ambiguously incidental emotions to be less influential for observers’ behavior. Thus, we hypothesize that ambiguously incidental *anger* will elicit smaller concessions than behavior-oriented anger, but larger concessions than explicitly incidental anger or a neutral expression. Conversely, we hypothesize that ambiguously incidental *happiness* will elicit larger concessions than behavior-oriented happiness, but smaller
concessions than explicitly incidental happiness or a neutral expression.

**Hypothesis 3:** Ambiguously incidental anger elicits smaller concessions from observers than behavior-oriented anger (H3a) but larger concessions than explicitly incidental anger (H3b) or no emotion (H3c).

**Hypothesis 4:** Ambiguously incidental happiness elicits larger concessions from observers than behavior-oriented happiness (H4a) but smaller concessions than explicitly incidental happiness (H4b) or no emotion (H4c).

**Study 1 Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

Participants \((N = 267)\) were recruited from a North American university and received course credit for participation. They were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (emotion: anger versus happiness) x 3 (target: behavior-oriented, ambiguously incidental, explicitly incidental) factorial design or a control condition in which no emotion was expressed. An adapted version of Van Kleef et al.’s (2004b) buyer-seller negotiation scenario was used and participants imagined themselves in the role of buyer. During the negotiation, participants “overheard” a conversation between their opponent and another person, which contained the emotion manipulation (see Appendix). After reading the scenario, participants indicated their offer, completed the other measures, and were debriefed. Nine participants were removed from the analyses because they did not provide a numerical response to our dependent measure. Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), 4 outliers that were more than 3 standard deviations from the mean (on concessions) were also excluded. The final sample \((N = 254)\) was 43.7% female with an average age of 20.33 years \((SD = .90)\) and average work experience of 2.94 years \((SD = 1.87)\).

**Measures**

**Manipulation checks.** We assessed our emotion manipulation check with three scales. Anger (“angry,” “aggravated,” and “irritated”) and happiness (“happy,” “satisfied,” and “joyful”)
were measured with scales from Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, and Manstead (2006). Given the inclusion of a control condition in this study, we also assessed emotion neutrality with one-item (“neutral”). The question stem was “Sam, my negotiation partner, appeared…” and responses ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Participants in the anger and happiness conditions also responded to a target manipulation check by selecting the statement that best described the target of the opponent’s emotion (4 items; e.g., “Sam indicated that his feelings were due to something that happened outside of work,” “Sam did not indicate what his feelings were related to”). Concessions were assessed as the amount offered (i.e., in dollars). Own anger and own happiness were measured along with eight other emotions (to limit demand characteristics) using a modified version of Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano’s (1999) scale. These emotions were assessed to rule out the alternative explanation that participants’ responses were driven by affective reactions. The question stem was: “Please indicate to what extent you experienced the following emotions during the negotiation.” Responses ranged from not at all (1) to very much (5). Participants provided the offer first and then completed the manipulation checks followed by the measures assessing their own emotions.

**Study 1 Results**

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations for all the variables in the study. Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for the emotion manipulation check. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that participants in the anger conditions rated their opponent as significantly more “angry” than “happy” ($t(107) = 17.19, p < .001, d = 1.65$) or “neutral” ($t(107) = 10.89, p < .001, d = 1.05$). Participants in the happiness conditions rated their opponent as significantly more “happy” than “angry” ($t(106) = 17.11, p < .001, d = 1.65$) or “neutral” ($t(106) = 11.76, p < .001, d = 1.14$). Participants in the control condition rated
their opponent as significantly more “neutral” than “angry” (t(37) = 3.34, p < .01, d = .54) or “happy” (t(37) = 3.66, p < .01, d = .59). Thus, our emotion manipulation was deemed effective. Further, 83% of participants correctly identified the target of the emotion in their condition. We conducted our analyses with all participants because the majority of those who failed the target manipulation check (26/37) were in the ambiguously incidental conditions. Given that ambiguously incidental emotions, by definition, do not have a clear target, participants in these conditions may have perceived their opponent’s emotion to be directed at a specific target (e.g., their own behavior) even though the target was not explicitly stated in the scenario.4

Table 3 presents the full results from our hypothesis tests. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests was used to test the hypotheses. Results indicated that anger target predicted concessions, $F(3, 143) = 5.96, p < .01, \eta^2 = .11$. Concessions were significantly larger when the opponent’s anger was behavior-oriented relative to explicitly incidental or when no emotion was expressed. H1 was supported. Consistent with our prediction, ambiguously incidental anger elicited intermediate concessions. However, ambiguously incidental anger did not significantly differ from the other conditions. H3 was not supported. Explicitly incidental anger and no emotion did not significantly differ.

Happiness target also predicted concessions, $F(3, 141) = 11.81, p < .001, \eta^2 = .20$. Concessions were significantly smaller when the opponent’s happiness was behavior-oriented relative to explicitly incidental or when no emotion was expressed. H2 was supported. Concessions were larger in the ambiguously incidental happiness condition than in the behavior-oriented condition but did not significantly differ from explicitly incidental or the control conditions (which also did not significantly differ). H4 was partially supported.

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4 Results were substantially unaffected when participants who failed the target manipulation check were excluded from the analyses.
We also examined the influence of participants’ own anger and happiness. Results indicated that own anger was significantly influenced by the target of the opponent’s anger, $F(3, 143) = 4.38, p < .01, \eta^2 = .08$. Participants reported feeling more anger in the behavior-oriented anger as compared to the explicitly incidental anger and control conditions; the ambiguously incidental condition did not significantly differ from the other conditions. Participants’ own happiness was also significantly influenced by the target of the opponent’s happiness, $F(3, 140) = 4.53, p < .01, \eta^2 = .09$. Participants reported feeling more happiness in the explicitly incidental happiness as compared to the behavior-oriented and control conditions; the ambiguously incidental happiness condition did not significantly differ from the other conditions. To rule out alternative explanations related to the influence of affective reactions, we reran our analyses while controlling for participants’ own emotions. The results were substantively unaffected.

**Study 1 Discussion**

Study 1 demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between integral, ambiguously incidental, and explicitly incidental emotions when considering the interpersonal effects of emotions. Consistent with past studies (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004a), our results indicated that behavior-oriented anger elicited larger concessions than an emotion-neutral control condition whereas behavior-oriented happiness elicited smaller concessions. Further, our findings support EASI theory (e.g., Van Kleef, 2009, 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2010) by showing that observers’ reactions are more likely to be influenced by emotions that are related to an ongoing social interaction than those that are targeted outside of the interaction. Specifically, observers did not adjust their behavior in response to emotions that were explicitly directed at an irrelevant target; explicitly incidental anger was associated with smaller concessions than behavior-oriented anger and did not differ from the control condition. Similarly, explicitly incidental happiness was
associated with larger concessions than behavior-oriented happiness and also did not differ from the control condition. This suggests that behavior-oriented emotions may be more influential because they can communicate information about an opponent’s judgments whereas explicitly incidental emotions lack this diagnostic quality and are more likely to be ignored.

The effects for ambiguously incidental emotions differed depending on the type of discrete emotion. Ambiguously incidental anger elicited intermediate offers that did not significantly differ from those associated with either behavior-oriented or explicitly incidental anger. In contrast, ambiguously incidental happiness had a similar effect as explicitly incidental happiness and was associated with larger concessions than behavior-oriented happiness. This suggests that ambiguously incidental emotions may convey different information and have differential effects depending on the discrete emotion that is being communicated. In Studies 2 and 3, we examine how emotion target can influence perceived threat versus perceived cooperativeness of the opponent for anger versus happiness, respectively.

Finally, our results provided support for the inferential pathway (cf. Van Kleef, 2009). Whereas an emotional contagion explanation implies that people would “catch” the emotion of their opponent (e.g., feel more anger or happiness across the experimental conditions as compared to the control condition), our results indicated that individuals’ own emotions varied depending on the condition. For example, people reported feeling more anger when their opponent expressed behavior-oriented anger (as compared to the other anger conditions), perhaps as a result of having to concede more. In contrast, people were less happy in the behavior-oriented happiness condition (as compared to the other happiness conditions), perhaps because they perceived that they had provided too many concessions (cf. Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995). Importantly, controlling for participants’ own anger and happiness did not substantively
influence their reactions, which appeared to be largely determined by strategic considerations.

Study 1 demonstrated that emotion target predicts observers’ offers. However, our findings suggest that it is important to explore the processes through which these effects occur. Specifically, our findings suggest that observers may have inferred different levels of threat and cooperativeness from their opponent’s emotion depending on the emotion target, which in turn influenced their concessions. We examine these potential mechanisms in Study 2.

**STUDY 2**

The goal of our second study is two-fold. First, we re-test our hypotheses regarding the effects of emotion target on observers’ concessions in a different population – individuals who report being full-time employees as opposed to students. Second, we examine how integral and incidental emotions influence observers’ behavior. Drawing on EASI theory (Van Kleef, 2009), we propose that different discrete emotions (i.e., anger versus happiness) communicate different information to observers as a result of the appraisals and action tendencies associated with these emotions. Whereas anger may communicate a threat of an impasse, happiness may communicate a willingness to cooperate (e.g., Sinaceur, Van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). However, we also propose that observers infer different degrees of threat (for anger) or cooperativeness (for happiness) depending on the target of the emotion (i.e., whether the opponent’s emotion is behavior-oriented, ambiguously incidental, or explicitly incidental). These inferences, in turn, can influence observers’ reactions to the emotion.

**Anger Target and Perceived Threat of an Impasse**

One of the social functions of anger is to convey a threat to others (Averill, 1982). In the context of negotiation, anger can signal that one’s opponent strongly values the issue that is being negotiated and is unlikely to settle for a suboptimal outcome (e.g., Van Kleef et al.,
2004a). That is, anger in negotiation can communicate a threat that the negotiation is likely to end in an impasse (Daly, 1991; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Sinaceur et al., 2011).

However, we propose that the target of an opponent’s anger influences the extent to which it communicates a threat of an impasse. When anger is clearly targeted at their offers, observers should infer that the negotiation may end in an impasse unless they adjust their behavior. Conversely, when the opponent’s anger is explicitly incidental to the negotiation, it should convey little negotiation-related information to an observer and the observer should be unlikely to infer that an impasse is imminent. Given that the target of ambiguously incidental anger is unclear to an observer, we predict that it conveys more threat than explicitly incidental anger or an emotion-neutral expression, but less threat than behavior-oriented anger.

Further, because an impasse can be costly, negotiators tend to increase their concessions when they believe their opponent to be unyielding (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, 2004a). Thus, the threat of an impasse may motivate negotiators to increase their concessions (Sinaceur et al., 2011). We hypothesize that the perceived threat of an impasse mediates the relationship between the target of an opponent’s anger and observers’ concessions.

**Hypothesis 5:** The target of an opponent’s anger predicts the perceived threat of an impasse such that ambiguously incidental anger is perceived to convey less threat than behavior-oriented anger (H5a) but more threat than explicitly incidental anger (H5b) or no emotion (H5c).

**Hypothesis 6:** Perceived threat of an impasse mediates the relationship between anger target and observers’ concessions.

**Happiness Target and Perceived Cooperativeness**

Unlike anger, happiness conveys satisfaction and encourages observers to continue their course of action (Parrott, 1994). In the context of negotiation, happiness can communicate that the opponent is satisfied with the offers that are being made in the negotiation and does not have
ambitious goals (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). That is, previous research has demonstrated that negotiators infer that their opponent has relatively low limits (i.e., unambitious goals) when the opponent expresses behavior-oriented happiness (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). We argue that happiness can also convey that one is “soft” or cooperative with respect to the negotiation.

However, we propose that the target of happiness can influence the extent to which it communicates cooperativeness. When happiness is targeted at their offers, observers should infer that their opponent is satisfied and willing to cooperate by making concessions. Conversely, when happiness is explicitly incidental, it should convey little negotiation-related information and observers should be relatively unlikely to infer that the opponent is cooperative. Given that the target of ambiguously incidental happiness is unclear, we predict that it communicates more cooperativeness than explicitly incidental happiness or an emotion-neutral expression but less cooperativeness than behavior-oriented happiness. Further, when an opponent appears cooperative, observers have an opportunity to pursue their own interests (i.e., by withholding concessions) without risking negative consequences (Pruitt, 1981). Thus, we hypothesize that perceived cooperativeness mediates the relationship between the target of an opponent’s happiness and observers’ concessions.

*Hypothesis 7:* The target of an opponent’s happiness predicts perceived cooperativeness such that ambiguously incidental happiness is perceived to convey less cooperativeness than behavior-oriented happiness (H7a) but more cooperativeness than explicitly incidental happiness (H7b) or no emotion (H7c).

*Hypothesis 8:* Perceived cooperativeness mediates the relationship between happiness target and observers’ concessions.

**Study 2 Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

We recruited individuals who report being full-time employees \((N = 289)\) from the
United States via Amazon’s MTurk (cf. Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Participants were paid USD $1.50. The procedures were identical to those of Study 1. Four participants were removed from the analyses for failing to follow the instructions. Five outliers that were more than 3 standard deviations from the mean (on concessions) were also excluded. The final sample \((N = 280)\) was 50.7\% female with an average age of 35.25 years \((SD = 11.19)\) and work experience of 15.28 years \((SD = 10.61)\).

**Measures**

*Concessions, manipulation checks, and own emotions* were assessed using the same measures as Study 1. *Threat of an impasse* was measured with a three-item scale (“I feared that my negotiation partner would quit the negotiation,” “My negotiation partner’s reactions were threatening,” “My negotiation partner’s feelings made it seem like we might not reach an agreement”). The question stem was “Please think about how you felt about your ability to reach an agreement with your negotiation partner during the negotiation. Then indicate how much you agree with each statement.” *Perceived cooperativeness* of the opponent was measured with a 3-item scale: “eager to please,” “cooperative,” “agreeable”. The question stem was: “Based on the interaction in the negotiation, my negotiation partner seemed...”. Response scales for the threat and cooperativeness measures ranged from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (5).\(^5\)

Measures were completed in the order described above.

**Study 2 Results**

Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations for all the

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\(^5\) In the absence of existing measures, we developed our own measures to assess perceived threat of an impasse and cooperativeness. An exploratory factor analysis (oblimin rotation) indicated that the threat versus cooperativeness items loaded on two separate dimensions that accounted for 74\% of the variance; there were no substantial cross-loadings. A confirmatory factor analysis indicated excellent fit for the two-factor model, \(\chi^2 (8) = 11.86, p > .05; \text{CFI} = .99; \text{RMSEA} = .05.\)
variables in the study. Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations for the emotion manipulation check. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that participants in the anger conditions rated their opponent as significantly more “angry” than “happy” ($t(116) = 17.68, p < .001, d = 1.63$) or “neutral” ($t(116) = 13.03, p < .001, d = 1.20$) whereas those in the happiness conditions rated their opponent as significantly more “happy” than “angry” ($t(120) = 18.47, p < .001, d = 1.68$) or “neutral” ($t(120) = 10.97, p < .001, d = 1.00$); participants in the control condition rated their opponent as significantly more “neutral” than “angry” ($t(41) = 6.94, p < .001, d = 1.07$) or “happy” ($t(41) = 4.04, p < .001, d = 0.62$). Further, 87% of participants correctly identified the target of the emotion in their condition.\(^6\)

We tested our hypotheses with ANOVAs with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests. Table 6 presents the full results. Anger target predicted concessions, $F(3, 153) = 4.37, p < .01, \eta^2 = .08$. Consistent with Study 1, concessions were significantly larger when the opponent’s anger was behavior-oriented relative to explicitly incidental or when no emotion was expressed. Explicitly incidental anger and no emotion did not significantly differ. H1 was supported. Consistent with Study 1, ambiguously incidental anger elicited intermediate concessions that did not significantly differ from the other conditions. H3 was not supported.

Happiness target also predicted concessions, $F(3, 158) = 6.83, p < .001, \eta^2 = .11$. Concessions were significantly smaller when the opponent’s happiness was behavior-oriented relative to explicitly incidental or when no emotion was expressed. Explicitly incidental and no emotion did not significantly differ. H2 was supported. Consistent with the results of Study 1,

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\(^6\) Consistent with Study 1, we conducted our analyses with all participants because the majority of those who failed the target manipulation check (21/30) were in the ambiguously incidental condition. The results were substantively the same when individuals who failed the manipulation check in the behavior-oriented and explicitly incidental conditions were removed. Removing all participants who failed the manipulation check (including those in the ambiguously incidental emotion conditions) resulted in marginal effects, due to extremely uneven condition sizes for ambiguously incidental emotions.
concessions in the ambiguously incidental happiness condition were significantly larger than in the behavior-oriented condition and did not significantly differ from the explicitly incidental or control condition. H4 was partially supported.

Anger target significantly predicted perceived threat of an impasse, $F(3, 154) = 14.49, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$. Perceived threat was significantly lower in the ambiguously incidental anger condition than in the behavior-oriented anger condition, but significantly higher than in the explicitly incidental anger and control conditions. Explicitly incidental and the control conditions did not significantly differ. H5 was supported.

Happiness target significantly predicted the perceived cooperativeness of the opponent, $F(3, 159) = 3.46, p < .05, \eta^2 = .06$. Perceived cooperativeness was significantly lower in the ambiguously incidental happiness condition than in the behavior-oriented happiness condition, but did not differ from the explicitly incidental happiness or control condition. Explicitly incidental and control conditions did not significantly differ from each other whereas the behavior-oriented condition was significantly different from the control condition and marginally different from the explicitly incidental condition ($p = .07$). H7 was partially supported.

To test H6 and H8, we used bootstrapping (10,000 resamples) to calculate bias-corrected confidence intervals for the hypothesized indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Emotion target was dummy-coded and entered as the independent variable; the ambiguously incidental condition was used as the comparison condition. Results indicated that the indirect effect of ambiguously incidental versus behavior-oriented anger on offers through perceived threat was significant, [95% CI 20.63, 1973.56]. The indirect effect of ambiguously incidental versus explicitly incidental anger was also significant, [95% CI -1923.88, -12.51]. Thus, perceived threat of an impasse mediated the effect of anger target on concessions. H6 was
supported. The indirect effect of ambiguously incidental versus behavior-oriented happiness on concessions through perceived cooperativeness was significant, [95% CI -1488.93, -60.27]. However, the indirect effect of ambiguously incidental versus explicitly incidental happiness was non-significant, [95% CI -485.31, 507.68]. H8 was partially supported.⁷

Finally, we explored the effects of participants’ own emotions. Participants’ own anger was significantly influenced by the target of the opponent’s anger, $F(3, 155) = 8.53, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$. Participants reported more anger in the behavior-oriented anger condition as compared to the explicitly incidental anger and control conditions. Participants also reported more anger in the ambiguously incidental anger versus the control condition. However, as in Study 1, controlling for own anger did not significantly affect any results. Participants’ own happiness was not significantly influenced by the target of the opponent’s happiness, $F(3, 158) = 1.78, p > .05, \eta^2 = .03$. Further, controlling for own happiness did not significantly affect any results.

Study 2 Discussion

Study 2 replicates the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that integral and incidental emotions can have different interpersonal effects. Both studies showed that observers make behavioral adjustments in response to behavior-oriented emotions but fail to do so in response to explicitly incidental emotions. Although consistent effects were found for the ambiguously incidental emotions, the effects differed for anger and happiness. Ambiguously incidental anger consistently elicited intermediate concessions that fell between those in the behavior-oriented and explicitly incidental anger conditions. Ambiguously incidental happiness, in contrast, failed to elicit behavioral changes from observers. In both Studies 1 and 2, concessions in the ambiguously incidental happiness condition were larger than in the behavior-oriented condition

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⁷ Further, the effect of anger target on concessions was mediated by threat but not by cooperativeness, whereas the effect of happiness target was mediated by cooperativeness but not by threat.
and did not significantly differ from the explicitly incidental or control condition.

Study 2 also extends the findings from Study 1 by demonstrating that the interpersonal effects of emotion target on concessions are mediated by observers’ inferences. Consistent with past findings, our results demonstrate that anger can communicate a threat of an impasse, which motivates observers to increase their concessions (cf. Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Further, integral and incidental emotions communicate a threat to different degrees – behavior-oriented anger was perceived as significantly more threatening than explicitly incidental anger. Interestingly, ambiguously incidental anger conveyed intermediate levels of threat that did not significantly differ from the other anger conditions. A possible explanation for this finding is that individuals may differ in how they attribute ambiguously incidental anger (e.g., some people are more likely to attribute this emotion target to their own behavior than others). We examine this possibility in Study 3.

Consistent with the theoretical tenets of EASI theory (cf. Van Kleef et al., 2004a), the effects of happiness target on concessions were mediated by the perceived cooperativeness of the opponent. However, the extent to which observers inferred cooperativeness from happiness was predicted by the target of the emotion – an opponent expressing behavior-oriented happiness was perceived as more cooperative than one expressing explicitly incidental happiness. Interestingly, perceived cooperativeness in the ambiguously incidental happiness condition did not significantly differ from the explicitly incidental happiness condition. This is consistent with our finding that observers do not adjust their behavior in response to ambiguously incidental happiness, which suggests that observers may be inclined to attribute ambiguously incidental happiness to a cause that is unrelated to the negotiation as opposed to their own behavior.

Taken together, our results suggest that individuals may attribute ambiguously incidental
anger and happiness differently, which can influence when these emotions are likely to have interpersonal effects. We further examine why these differences may emerge in Study 3.

**STUDY 3**

By further integrating EASI and attribution theories, Study 3 aims to investigate the role of observers’ attributions in explaining the interpersonal effects of emotion target. Our general argument is that the target of an opponent’s emotion (i.e., behavior-oriented, ambiguously incidental, or explicitly incidental) influences the degree to which an observer attributes the emotion to their own behavior. Attributions to one’s own behavior, in turn, can influence observers’ inferences regarding the perceived threat of an impasse (for anger) or cooperativeness of an opponent (for happiness), which can motivate them to strategically adjust their behavior. Further, we argue that individual differences in the motivation to engage in information processing (i.e., need for cognitive closure, NCC; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) can influence how observers attribute ambiguously incidental anger.

**Attributing Integral and Incidental Emotions**

Research examining attribution theories has demonstrated that individuals are motivated to explain events by attributing them to a cause (e.g., Heider, 1958; E. E. Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1985) and this motivation can also apply to others’ emotions (Weiner, 2014). For example, studies have shown that observers make different attributions for disparate discrete emotions (e.g., anger versus regret; Van Doorn, Van Kleef, & Van der Pligt, 2015). Building on this, we propose that observers’ attributions for the *same* discrete emotion can also differ depending on the target of the emotion.

In some situations, it should be relatively straightforward to determine to what extent one’s own behavior caused another person’s emotion. For instance, when an opponent clearly
expresses an emotion about an observer’s offer (i.e., expresses a behavior-oriented emotion), the observer should be inclined to attribute the emotion to his or her own behavior. Conversely, when an observer knows that an opponent’s emotion was caused by an unrelated event (i.e., expresses an explicitly incidental emotion), the observer should be unlikely to hold themselves responsible. In contrast, ambiguously incidental emotions do not have a clear target from an observer’s perspective. Thus, when an opponent expresses this type of emotion, an observer has to make an attribution in an information-poor environment (cf. Weiner, 2014). Given that there are often multiple potential explanations for others’ emotions, observers may fail to consider all potential explanations (Trope & Gaunt, 2000). Instead, observers may overweight the influence of salient explanations (e.g., Fiske, Kenny, & Taylor, 1982; Krull, 1993; Trope & Gaunt, 2000), especially in dyadic interactions (Taylor, Crocker, Fiske, Sprinzen, & Winkler, 1979).

We propose that one’s own behavior is a salient potential cause for anger. Given that anger is an outward-focused emotion that arises when one blames something or someone for blocking one’s goals (Lazarus, 1991), an observer of anger should be likely to look for a cause outside of the person who expresses the emotion. Further, since anger can communicate a threat, an observer should be motivated to determine to what extent their own behavior caused the anger. Specifically, anger signals that a norm for acceptable behavior has been violated and that negative consequences may ensue (Daly, 1991). Thus, observers are likely to be motivated to assess their own potential for threat by determining if their behavior caused the anger.

We predict that observers will attribute an opponent’s anger most strongly to their own behavior when it is behavior-oriented because the target is clear and unequivocal. When an opponent’s anger is ambiguously incidental, individuals may perceive that their own behavior is a potential cause and therefore attribute the anger to their own behavior. However, due to
ambiguity with the target, we predict that this effect will be less strong than for behavior-oriented anger. Further, we predict that observers will attribute ambiguously incidental anger more strongly to their own behavior than explicitly incidental anger.

_Hypothesis 9:_ The target of an opponent’s anger predicts observers’ attributions such that ambiguously incidental anger is less strongly attributed to an observer’s behavior than behavior-oriented anger (H9a) but more strongly than explicitly incidental anger (H9b).

Finally, given that anger that is directed at an observer’s behavior can communicate to the observer that negative consequences may follow unless they adjust their behavior (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004a), we propose that negotiators will perceive a greater threat to the extent that they attribute their opponent’s anger to their own behavior. That is, we propose that attributions mediate the effect of the target of an opponent’s anger on observers’ threat perceptions, such that observers perceive more threat to the extent that they attribute the anger to their own behavior.

_Hypothesis 10:_ Attributions to one’s own behavior mediate the relationship between the target of an opponent’s anger and perceived threat.

Happiness is a positive emotion that arises when one makes progress towards one’s goals (Lazarus, 1991). Unlike anger, which is associated with an appraisal of blame (i.e., anger arises when someone is blamed for harmful actions; Lazarus, 1991), people do not need to hold someone else responsible for certain actions to experience happiness – happiness can be caused by a variety of positive events that may not involve the actions of another person. In other words, happiness is not associated with an appraisal component of credit or blame (Lazarus, 1991). As such, happiness tends to be less threatening and self-relevant to observers and observers tend to feel little pressure to identify a cause for this emotion (Liu, Karasawa, & Weiner, 1992; see also Krull & Dill, 1998). Thus, when individuals observe happiness without a clear target, their own behavior is unlikely to be perceived as a salient cause. Taken together, we predict that an
opponent’s ambiguously incidental happiness is less likely to be attributed to one’s own behavior than behavior-oriented happiness, which is clearly targeted at one’s behavior. Theoretically, we do not expect ambiguously and explicitly incidental happiness to differ. Thus, we explore these relationships in an exploratory fashion.

**Hypothesis 11:** The target of an opponent’s happiness predicts observers’ attributions such that ambiguously incidental happiness is less strongly attributed to an observer’s behavior than behavior-oriented happiness.

Further, when an opponent’s happiness is perceived to be targeted at one’s behavior, this may communicate to a negotiator that the opponent is satisfied with this behavior and does not have competitive goals (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Thus, we propose that negotiators will perceive their opponent to be more cooperative to the extent that they attribute their opponent’s happiness to their own behavior. That is, we propose that attributions to one’s own behavior mediate the effect of the target of an opponent’s happiness on observers’ perceptions of cooperativeness.

**Hypothesis 12:** Attributions to one’s own behavior mediate the effect of ambiguously incidental versus behavior-oriented happiness on perceived cooperativeness.

**Need for Cognitive Closure as a Moderator**

In EASI theory, Van Kleef (2009, 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2010) postulates that the interpersonal effects of emotions may be influenced by observers’ motivation to engage in information processing. In support of this tenet, studies have demonstrated that individuals are more likely to draw strategic inferences from others’ emotions when they are more motivated to process the information that is associated with these emotions (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004b). We propose that the motivation to engage in information processing may also moderate the interpersonal effects of emotions by influencing the attributions that observers make for others’ emotions, particularly when the target of the emotion is unclear (i.e., ambiguously incidental).

Previous studies have indicated that there are individual differences in the motivation to
develop and maintain a thorough and accurate understanding of the world (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Kruglanski, 1989). For example, individuals’ need for cognitive closure (NCC) can influence the tendency to engage in deliberate information processing (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). At the high end of the NCC continuum, individuals are cognitively impulsive; they are motivated to avoid ambiguity, consider little information before reaching judgments, and are reluctant to reconsider existing judgments. By contrast, those low in NCC prefer to postpone judgment; they are motivated to search for information and generate competing alternatives to any existing hypothesis before drawing a conclusion (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987; see also Kruglanski, Orehek, Dechesne, & Pierro, 2010; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).

We propose that individual differences in the motivation to engage in information processing may influence the extent to which observers make attributions to a salient cause as opposed to considering alternative explanations, particularly when the emotion is ambiguously incidental (i.e., lacks a clear target). Specifically, we propose that observers who are low in NCC are likely to consider multiple potential explanations for ambiguously incidental emotions. By contrast, observers who are high in NCC should attribute ambiguously incidental emotions to the most salient cause in the situation. However, the most salient causes for ambiguously incidental emotions can differ for anger versus happiness.

With respect to anger, as argued above, the most salient cause for this emotion is likely to be the observer’s own behavior. This is because anger is an outward-focused emotion which prompts the observer to look for causes outside of the person who expresses the emotion. Further, anger communicates threat, which individuals are motivated to detect and avoid. Thus, we predict that observers who are high in NCC will attribute ambiguously incidental anger more
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Hypothesis 13: NCC interacts with the target of an opponent’s anger in predicting observers’ attributions, such that observers with high (versus low) NCC will be more likely to attribute ambiguously incidental anger to their own behavior.

In contrast to anger, one’s own behavior is not a salient explanation for an opponent’s ambiguously incidental happiness. Thus, NCC is likely to have little influence on the extent to which observers attribute ambiguously incidental happiness to their own behavior. Nonetheless, we examine the interaction between NCC and happiness target in an exploratory manner.

Study 3 Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants ($N = 333$) were recruited from a North American university and received course credit for participation. They were randomly assigned to one of six conditions of a 2 (emotion: anger, happiness) x 3 (target: behavior-oriented, ambiguously incidental, explicitly incidental) factorial design. Participants completed a widely used negotiation task by Van Kleef et al. (2004a). Participants entered the laboratory in groups and were told that they would be randomly assigned to the role of buyer or seller of a consignment of mobile phones. In reality, they were all assigned to the role of seller (the buyer role was computer-simulated). Participants negotiated three issues with different utilities (i.e., price, warranty, and service period) and were given a payoff chart showing how many points they could earn for each level of agreement (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a, p. 60). The buyer’s payoff chart was not shown; participants were only told that it differed from their own. To enhance the psychological realism of the task, participants were told that their points would be converted to raffle tickets, giving them a chance to win $100. To capture the mixed-motive nature of negotiations, participants were told that they would only be entered in the raffle if they reached an agreement. Thus, there was an incentive to reach
an agreement while earning as many points as possible. Participants were told that the negotiation would continue until they reached an agreement or ran out of time.

Just before the negotiation, participants were told that an additional goal of the study was to examine the impact of having information about a buyer’s intentions. At some point during the negotiation, the buyer would be asked to answer some questions and enter the offers that they were planning to make in the next round. The buyer would not know that the participant would receive this information and, as a seller, the participant would not have to provide information about their own intentions. In each round, the buyer and seller submitted offers for each of the negotiation issues. The buyer made the first offers. The buyer’s offers were programmed to have face validity and be perceived as neither cooperative nor competitive (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a). A demand by the participant was accepted if it met or exceeded the offer that the computer was about to make. The negotiation was interrupted after round six.

After the second round, participants waited while the buyer allegedly completed a survey about his/her intentions. After a brief delay, participants were shown the completed survey. In addition to the buyer’s intended offers (which matched the buyer’s actual offers in the next round), the survey had prompted the buyer to “please describe how you feel right now in one word”. The buyer’s answer was “[angry/happy]”; the experimental manipulation is shown in square brackets. The second prompt on the survey was “Please use the space below for any additional information you would like to provide to the researchers.” The buyer’s response included the target manipulation and varied across conditions (ambiguously incidental: “I feel [angry/happy]”; behavior-oriented: “I feel [angry/happy] because of the offers I am receiving”; explicitly incidental: “I feel [angry/happy] but it has nothing to do with the negotiation”).

Nineteen participants were excluded from the analyses (12 whose questionnaires could
not be matched to their offers and 7 who failed to follow the instructions). The final sample \((N = 314)\) was 45% female with an average age of 20.23 years \((SD = 1.08)\) and average work experience of 2.60 years \((SD = 1.98)\).

**Measures**

With the exception of our target manipulation check and dependent variable (see below), all variables were measured with Likert-type scales ranging from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (5). Measures were completed in the order in which they are described below.

Consistent with previous research (e.g., Adam & Brett, 2015; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), the dependent variable, *concessions*, was calculated by subtracting the potential earnings associated with participants’ final offers from those associated with their first offers, with larger numbers reflecting larger concessions. The *anger* and *happiness manipulation checks* and the *target manipulation check* from Studies 1 and 2 were modified to fit the current context (e.g., “Sam” was changed to “the buyer”). Participants’ *own emotions* were measured as in Studies 1 and 2. *Attributions to own behavior* were assessed with a three-item scale (“My negotiation partner’s feelings were caused by my offers,” “I caused my negotiation partner’s feelings,” “My negotiation partner’s feelings were caused by something I did”). *Perceived threat* was assessed with a 3-item scale modified from Sinaceur et al. (2011; “The buyer made me feel threatened,” “The buyer’s reaction was threatening,” “I did not feel intimidated by the buyer” (reverse-coded)). *Perceived cooperativeness* was measured as in Study 2. *Need for cognitive closure* was assessed with Roets and Van Hiel’s (2011) 15-item Need for Closure Scale.

**Study 3 Results**

Table 7 presents the means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations for all the variables in the study. Table 8 presents the means and standard deviations for the emotion
manipulation check. The manipulation check indicated that participants in the anger conditions rated their opponent as more “angry” than “happy” ($t(152) = 16.07, p < .001, d = 1.30$) whereas those in the happiness conditions rated their opponent as more “happy” than “angry” ($t(154) = 8.42, p < .001, d = .68$). 77% correctly identified the emotion target.\(^8\)

Table 9 presents the full results for H9 and H11. Results indicated that emotion target significantly predicted attributions for anger, $F(2, 156) = 46.26, p < .001, \eta^2 = .37$; the opponent’s anger was attributed less strongly to one’s own behavior in the ambiguously incidental than in the behavior-oriented condition. Further, ambiguously incidental anger was more strongly attributed to one’s own behavior than explicitly incidental anger. Behavior-oriented anger was also significantly different from explicitly incidental anger. H9 was supported. Mediation was tested following the same procedures as Study 2. Results indicated that attributions to one’s own behavior mediated the effect of ambiguously incidental versus behavior-oriented anger [95% CI 0.02, 0.23] and ambiguously incidental versus explicitly incidental anger [95% CI -0.51, -0.07] on observers’ perceptions of threat. H10 was supported.

Emotion target also significantly predicted attributions for happiness, $F(2, 152) = 31.99, p < .001, \eta^2 = .30$; the opponent’s happiness was attributed less strongly to one’s own behavior in the ambiguously incidental than in the behavior-oriented condition. Although we did not hypothesize any differences, we also compared ambiguously incidental to explicitly incidental happiness; attributions in these conditions did not significantly differ. Behavior-oriented and explicitly incidental happiness were significantly different. H11 was supported. Further, attributions to one’s own behavior mediated the effect of ambiguously incidental versus

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\(^8\) We conducted our analyses with all participants because the majority of those who failed the target manipulation check (41 out of 72) were in the ambiguously incidental condition where the target is ambiguous by definition. The results were unaffected when participants who failed the manipulation check were excluded.
behavior-oriented happiness on the perceived cooperativeness of the opponent [95% CI .11, .50]. H12 was supported.

To test H13, the emotion target variable was dummy-coded and interaction terms were created by multiplying NCC with the emotion target variable. Following Cohen et al.’s (2003) procedures for interactions involving multi-categorical independent variables, the components of the interaction term (i.e., NCC and the two dummy-coded emotion target conditions) were included in the regression model as independent variables (covariates). Attributions to own behavior were entered as the dependent variable. With respect to anger, the interaction between target and NCC had a significant effect on attributions to one’s own behavior, $F(2, 153) = 3.51, p < .05, R^2 = .03$. Following Aiken and West (1991), we probed the interaction at low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of NCC. Ambiguously incidental anger was more strongly attributed to one’s own behavior at high levels of NCC ($\bar{y} = 3.91$) than at low levels of NCC ($\bar{y} = 3.19, t = 2.68, p < .01$). H13 was supported. We also explored the effects of NCC on attributions for explicitly incidental and behavior-oriented anger. As expected, attributions for these types of anger were not significantly influenced by NCC ($p > .05$).

Although we did not hypothesize an interaction between happiness target and NCC in predicting attributions to one’s own behavior, we explored whether any effects emerged. The results indicated that the interaction was non-significant, $F(2, 149) = 2.36, p > .05, R^2 = .02$.

Finally, we tested the significance of the overall models for anger and happiness. The emotion target variable was dummy-coded and the ambiguously incidental condition served as

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9 In an exploratory manner, we also compared participants’ attributions for ambiguously incidental anger to their attributions for explicitly incidental anger and behavior-oriented anger. At low levels of NCC, ambiguously incidental anger ($\bar{y} = 3.19$) was more strongly attributed to one’s own behavior than explicitly incidental anger ($\bar{y} = 2.32, t = -6.70, p < .01$) and less strongly than behavior-oriented anger ($\bar{y} = 3.89, t = 2.40, p < .05$). At high levels of NCC, attributions for ambiguously incidental anger ($\bar{y} = 3.91$) were also stronger than for explicitly incidental anger ($\bar{y} = 2.00, t = -6.76, p < .01$) but did not significantly differ from behavior-oriented anger ($\bar{y} = 4.15, t = .87, p > .05$).
the comparison category. The two dummy-coded emotion target conditions (i.e., behavior-oriented and explicitly incidental), the mean-centered moderator (i.e., NCC), and the two interaction terms were included in the regression model as independent variables. Attributions to one’s own behavior were entered as the first mediator and inferences (i.e., perceived threat and cooperativeness, respectively) as the second mediator.

With respect to anger, the indirect path from target to concessions through attributions and perceived threat was significant for ambiguously incidental versus behavior-oriented anger [95% CI 2.00, 23.91] and also for ambiguously incidental versus explicitly incidental anger [95% CI -62.17, -5.24]. Further, as predicted, NCC significantly moderated this indirect effect – the effect of the interaction term (i.e., NCC x Target) was significant. The overall model for anger was supported. Figure 1 displays the full results.

With respect to happiness, the indirect path from target to concessions through attributions and perceived cooperativeness was significant for ambiguously incidental versus behavior-oriented happiness [95% CI -4.81, -.97]. As expected, NCC did not significantly moderate this indirect effect. Consistent with our repeated null-findings for ambiguously incidental versus explicitly incidental happiness, the indirect path was non-significant for ambiguously incidental versus explicitly incidental happiness [95% CI -.45, 22.91]. Figure 2 displays the full results.

Finally, we explored the potential effects of participants’ own affective reactions. Emotion target did not significantly influence participants’ own anger ($F(2, 156) = .26, p > .05, \eta^2 = 0.00$) or happiness ($F(2, 151) = .12, p > .05, \eta^2 = 0.00$) and controlling for participants’ own emotions did not significantly impact any results.
Study 3 Discussion

By further integrating EASI and attribution theories, Study 3 demonstrated the mediating role of attributions in the process through which behavior-oriented, ambiguously incidental, and explicitly incidental emotions influence observers’ inferences and behavioral reactions. Observers’ attributions to their own behavior varied depending on the emotion and the target of the emotion. Consistent with our argument that one’s own behavior can be a salient potential cause of others’ ambiguously incidental anger, observers attributed ambiguously incidental anger less strongly to their own behavior than behavior-oriented anger, but more strongly than explicitly incidental anger. Observers also attributed ambiguously incidental happiness less strongly to their own behavior than behavior-oriented happiness, but attributions for ambiguously incidental and explicitly incidental happiness did not significantly differ. We propose that these findings are due to the characteristics associated with happiness. Given that happiness is not associated with appraisals of credit or blame (Lazarus, 1991), one’s own behavior is an unlikely cause for an opponent’s ambiguously incidental happiness. Thus, our findings highlight the importance of considering the type and target of the emotion for understanding the interpersonal effects of emotions.

Further, attributions mediated the effects of emotion target on observers’ inferences. For anger, observers were more likely to perceive a threat to the degree that they attributed an opponent’s anger to their own behavior, which ultimately led to increased concessions. For happiness, observers were more likely to perceive their opponent to be cooperative to the degree that they attributed an opponent’s happiness to their own behavior, which led them to withhold concessions. These findings highlight the importance of attributions; whereas past studies often focused on understanding the effects of disparate discrete emotions, our results indicate that the
same discrete emotion may have different effects depending on how it is attributed.

However, our results also demonstrate that observers’ motivation to engage in information processing can serve as an important boundary condition for these effects. As predicted, NCC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) influenced the extent to which observers attributed ambiguously incidental anger to their own behavior – observers with high (versus low) NCC more strongly attributed ambiguously incidental anger to their own behavior, which indirectly led them to make larger concessions. Indeed, behavior-oriented and ambiguously incidental anger were found to have similar effects on the attributions of observers with high NCC, but elicited significantly different attributions among those with low NCC. In contrast, observers’ NCC had little influence on the extent to which they attributed an opponent’s ambiguously incidental happiness to their own behavior. These findings demonstrate the impact of observers’ attributions and personality on inferential processes. In addition, they highlight the importance of considering the specific characteristics of the discrete emotion that is being observed for predicting observers’ reactions.

**STUDY 4**

Although Study 3 demonstrated that observers are inclined to attribute an opponent’s ambiguously incidental anger (but not their ambiguously incidental happiness) to their own behavior, we explicitly asked participants to indicate to what extent they believed the emotion had been caused by their own behavior. In Study 4, we examine whether individuals spontaneously make these attributions when they are not provided with a potential cause.

Building on our arguments in Study 3, we predict that negotiators will perceive that their own behavior is the most likely potential cause of an opponent’s ambiguously incidental anger and will be inclined to attribute the anger to their own behavior rather than an alternative
explanation. This is because anger is an outward-focused emotion that can communicate a need for behavioral adjustment (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Thus, observers’ own behavior is likely to be particularly salient and observers should be motivated to assess their behavior to prevent potential threat or harm.

Hypothesis 14: An opponent’s ambiguously incidental anger is more likely to be attributed to one’s own behavior than to an alternative cause.

Further, we propose that NCC influences the attributions that individuals make for ambiguously incidental anger. Specifically, we predict that relative to observers with high levels of NCC, observers with low levels of NCC are less likely to attribute an opponent’s anger to its most salient potential cause in this context – their own behavior.

Hypothesis 15: Observers with low NCC are less likely than those with high NCC to attribute an opponent’s anger to their own behavior.

In contrast, happiness is not associated with appraisals of credit or blame (Lazarus, 1991) and one’s own behavior is therefore unlikely to be a salient cause of another person’s happiness. However, we examine the potential influence of NCC on observers’ attributions for ambiguously incidental happiness in an exploratory manner.

Study 4 Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants (N = 243) were recruited from a North American university and received course credit for participation. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: ambiguously incidental anger or ambiguously incidental happiness. Participants completed the same negotiation task as in Study 3 and received the emotion manipulation corresponding to their condition (i.e., “I feel [angry/happy]”). They then completed our measures (described below) and were debriefed. We removed the following participants from the analyses: 4 whose
questionnaire could not be matched to their negotiation data, 6 who failed to follow the
instructions for the attributions measure, 11 because only one or two other participants showed
up to their session (i.e., participants thought they knew who they were negotiating with), 27
participants who had also participated in Study 3, and 2 outliers that were more than 3 standard
deviations from the mean (on NCC). The final sample ($N = 193$) was 45.6% female with an
average age of 20.55 years ($SD = 1.10$) and average work experience of 2.71 years ($SD = 1.73$).

**Measures**

The *emotion manipulation check* was assessed as in Study 3. *Attributions* for the
opponent’s emotion were assessed using a commonly-used free-response format (see Malle,
Knobe, O’Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 2000). The prompt was: “Please think about the feelings
that the buyer expressed in the Buyer’s Intentions Survey. What do you think is the most likely
explanation for these feelings? Please describe in one or two sentences.” *Need for Cognitive
Closure* was assessed as in Study 3. Measures were completed in the order described above.

**Study 4 Results**

Table 10 presents the means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations for all the
variables in the study. Table 11 presents the means and standard deviations for the manipulation
check. The manipulation check indicated that participants rated opponents as more “angry” than
“happy” ($t(98) = 20.84, p < .001, d = 2.09$) in the anger condition and as more “happy” than
“angry” ($t(89) = 4.61, p < .001, d = .49$) in the happiness condition.

Two coders who were blind to the conditions rated whether the opponent’s emotion was
attributed to the participant’s *own behavior* (i.e., their offers; coded as ‘1’) or not (coded as
‘0’). The coders agreed on 95% of the decisions; discrepancies were resolved through

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10 To ensure that our categories were mutually exclusive (i.e., participants were only included in one category),
participants who indicated an attribution to their own behavior plus an additional cause were coded as 1.
For H14 and H15 only participants in the ambiguously incidental anger condition were included in the analysis. H14 was analyzed using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. Results indicated that 86% of participants in the ambiguously incidental anger condition attributed the opponent’s emotion to their own behavior whereas 14% did not; this difference was significant, $\chi^2 (1, n = 101) = 52.76, p < .001$. H14 was supported.

For H15, we compared participants with high (1 SD or more above the mean) versus low (1 SD or more below the mean) levels of NCC. Specifically, a 2 x 2 contingency table was used that crossed NCC (high versus low) with attributions (own behavior versus not own behavior). Among participants with high NCC, 96% of participants attributed ambiguously incidental anger to their own behavior whereas 4% did not. Among participants with low NCC, 67% attributed ambiguously incidental anger to their own behavior whereas 33% did not. As some of the expected values were smaller than 5, we used the more conservative Fisher’s exact test of independence as opposed to chi-square to examine the effect of NCC on attributions. Results indicated that participants with high (versus low) NCC were significantly more likely to attribute the opponent’s ambiguously incidental anger to their own behavior, $p < .05$. H15 was supported.

Finally, we also explored participants’ attributions for ambiguously incidental happiness. As expected, participants were not significantly more likely to attribute the emotion to their own behavior versus an alternative cause, $\chi^2 (1, n = 92) = 2.13, p > .05$. Further, attributions for ambiguously incidental happiness did not differ depending on NCC.

**Study 4 Discussion**

Study 4 provides further insight into the attributions that observers make for others’ ambiguously incidental emotions. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the
characteristics of the emotion that is observed – discrete emotions can have different salient potential causes to which the emotion may be attributed. Consistent with Study 3, our results indicate that one’s own behavior is a salient potential cause of another person’s ambiguously incidental anger in the context of a negotiation. Specifically, a large majority perceived that the anger had been caused by their own behavior even though individuals were not explicitly asked to indicate the extent to which their offers had caused the opponent’s anger. In contrast, consistent with the appraisal structure of happiness, individuals were not more likely to attribute ambiguously incidental happiness to their own behavior relative to an alternative cause.

Study 4 also sheds further light on the importance of one’s motivation to engage in information processing. Whereas individuals with low NCC tend to consider alternative potential explanations before drawing conclusions, those with high NCC are motivated to avoid ambiguity and are willing to make judgments based on limited information (e.g., Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987). Our results suggest that these personality differences may influence the likelihood that an observer will attribute another person’s ambiguously incidental emotion to its most salient potential cause – individuals with high (versus low) NCC were more likely to attribute anger to their own behavior than an alternative explanation. These findings extend our understanding of the effects of information-processing motivation on the interpersonal effects of emotions. According to EASI theory, the interpersonal effects of emotions are influenced by observers’ motivation to engage in information processing – the stronger this motivation, the more likely it is that individuals will infer and be influenced by the information associated with emotional expressions (for a review, see Van Kleef, 2016). Our findings suggest that an additional way in which information-processing motivation may influence these processes is by moderating the attributions that observers make for others’ ambiguously incidental emotions. These attributions,
in turn, can influence observers’ inferences and their behavioral reactions to these emotions.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

Although studies have shown that observers can infer information from others’ emotions and use this information to navigate social situations (see Van Kleef, 2016), critical questions remain regarding when emotions communicate strategic information to observers and how they shape observers’ reactions. Integrating EASI and attribution theories, we address these questions by empirically comparing the interpersonal effects of integral and incidental emotions. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the type and target of an emotion and the processes underlying how and when differential effects may occur. These findings have a number of important theoretical and practical implications.

First, although the emotions examined in past research varied in the extent to which they were targeted at something in- versus outside the immediate situation (Van Kleef, 2016), the interpersonal effects of these emotions have rarely been compared within the same study. Theoretically, the target of an emotion has critical implications for its interpersonal effects since emotions with disparate targets are likely to convey different information to observers (Van Kleef et al., 2010). The present research is the first to empirically compare the interpersonal effects of integral (i.e., related to the situation), ambiguously incidental (i.e., having an unclear target), and explicitly incidental (i.e., targeted outside of the situation) emotions.

Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that behavior-oriented emotions (i.e., integral emotions that are targeted at an observer’s behavior) are particularly likely to elicit behavioral changes from observers, whereas observers may disregard others’ emotions that are explicitly incidental to the negotiation. These findings support a key tenet of EASI theory (cf. Van Kleef, 2009) – emotions should be especially informative for observers when they are directly targeted at the immediate
situation because they can communicate information about another person’s appraisals of that particular situation (Van Kleef, 2009).

Our findings for explicitly incidental emotions are also interesting when contrasted with the *intrapersonal* (i.e., within-person) effects of emotions. Specifically, studies examining *intrapersonal* effects have shown that negotiators’ behavior may be influenced by their own incidental affect (e.g., moods and emotions). For example, positive affect increases concession-making (Baron, 1990) and the use of cooperative strategies (Forgas, 1998) while decreasing the use of contentious tactics (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). In contrast, negative affect increases the use of competitive strategies (Forgas, 1998) and reduces joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). Based on these findings, one might have predicted that an observer should anticipate their opponent to be tougher when the opponent is angry and more cooperative when the opponent is happy (cf. Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), regardless of the target of that emotion. In other words, extrapolating from an *intrapersonal* perspective would have led to the prediction that behavior-oriented and incidental emotions have similar interpersonal effects. In contrast, our findings support EASI theory (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2010), which explicitly focuses on the interpersonal effects of emotions and the inferential processes by which these effects can occur. Given that explicitly incidental emotions are not directly targeted at the situation, they should communicate little strategic information to observers. Accordingly, our findings suggest that observers’ behavior is largely uninfluenced by such emotions.  

*Ambiguously incidental* emotions lack a clear target from an observer’s perspective. We argue that to understand the interpersonal effects of these emotions, it is especially critical to consider observers’ attributions. According to attribution theories (e.g., Weiner, 1985, 2014),

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11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
individuals are motivated to make sense of events (including others’ emotions) by attributing them to a cause. Whereas emotions with certain targets (e.g., behavior-oriented and explicitly incidental emotions) should be relatively straightforward for an observer to attribute to a cause, we propose that observers’ attributions for ambiguously incidental emotions can be influenced by the characteristics of the specific discrete emotion that is observed. Consistent with the theoretical notion that anger is an outward focused emotion that can communicate a willingness to harm (e.g., Averill, 1982), observers were inclined to attribute ambiguously incidental anger to their own behavior (Studies 3 and 4). Conversely, happiness is not associated with appraisals of blame (Lazarus, 1991) – this emotion was relatively weakly attributed to the observer’s own behavior (Studies 3 and 4). Taken together, these findings highlight the importance of considering both the type and target of an emotion for understanding its interpersonal effects as well as the insights that can be gained by further integrating EASI and attribution theories.

Second, our research demonstrates that attributions can influence observers’ inferences (e.g., of threat or cooperativeness) and behavioral reactions (Study 3). Although previous studies have indicated that anger and happiness in negotiation may convey information about an opponent’s (un)willingness to concede (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), our findings demonstrated that anger and happiness more strongly communicated a threat or cooperativeness to the extent that observers attributed the emotion to their own behavior. These inferences, in turn, predicted observers’ concessions. This is consistent with the principle of “mismatching” (i.e., making larger concessions when an opponent appears demanding and withholding concessions when an opponent appears conciliatory; see Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Previous studies have demonstrated that mismatching emerges from observers’ interpretations of their opponents’ behavior rather than the behavior per se (e.g., De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, &
Van de Vliert, 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Extending this, our results indicate that an opponent’s emotion may have different effects on observers’ interpretations of their opponent’s behavior (i.e., the extent to which the opponent’s behavior is perceived as threatening or cooperative) depending on how the emotion is attributed, even when the opponent’s offers are held constant. These inferences, in turn, are critical because they motivate observers’ behavior.

Third, our research contributes to the understanding of the effects of observers’ motivation to engage in information processing on the interpersonal effects of emotions. According to EASI theory, emotions can influence observers by communicating information about the expressor’s evaluations, goals, and behavioral intentions. As such, the interpersonal effects of emotions may be influenced by observers’ motivation to process this information (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2010). Our research demonstrates one potentially influential way in which this motivation may affect individuals’ reactions to others’ emotions – by influencing their attributions. These effects appear to be especially strong for ambiguously incidental emotions, which do not have a clear target from an observer’s perspective (Study 3). Specifically, our results suggest that observers with relatively high NCC (who are chronically unmotivated to process information and tend to jump to conclusions; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) are inclined to attribute others’ emotions to the potential cause that is most readily accessible in the immediate context (e.g., their own behavior in the case of anger; Studies 3 and 4), whereas observers with low NCC consider alternative potential causes. Thus, our findings extend our understanding of the influence of information-processing motivation and also highlight the importance of considering the type of emotion that is observed – different discrete emotions may have different salient causes and thus elicit different reactions from observers with high versus low information-processing motivation.
Finally, our findings support EASI theory’s tenet that others’ emotions can influence one’s own behavior as a result of inferential processes (Van Kleef, 2009). Theoretically, inferential processes are one path through which one can be influenced by others’ emotions whereas affective reactions (e.g., emotional contagion) represent an alternative path. To rule out affective reactions as an alternative explanation, we assessed participants’ own anger and happiness (Studies 1-3). Participants’ self-reported own emotions correlated with their opponent’s emotions, but controlling for these variables did not significantly affect the results. Further, our results from Studies 1 and 2 indicated that individuals’ own emotions varied depending on the target of the emotion, which cannot be explained by emotional contagion. Rather, our findings are consistent with research demonstrating that negotiators can strategically use information derived from others’ emotions (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004a). These findings can also help explain why integral and incidental emotions may have different interpersonal versus intrapersonal effects (cf. Van Kleef, 2016). Specifically, intrapersonally, individuals’ judgments tend to be more strongly influenced by their own emotion when they are unaware of its cause; that is, incidental emotions may have a stronger effect than integral emotions (e.g., Forgas, 1998; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; see also Van Kleef, 2016). In contrast, our findings demonstrate that integral emotions can have stronger interpersonal effects than incidental emotions. We propose that this is due to the inferential processes that may underlie the effects of emotions at the interpersonal level. Given that integral emotions are directly related to the immediate situation, they convey more strategic information, thereby influencing observers’ judgments and behavior.

Our findings should be viewed in light of their strengths and limitations. First, we used experimental designs for our studies, which can provide a high degree of control and internal
validity (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968). Further, we enhanced psychological realism (Carlsmith, Ellsworth, & Aronson, 1976) by including real outcomes (Studies 3 and 4). Our results were generally replicated using samples of full-time employees (Study 2) and students (Studies 1, 3 and 4). Although our studies did not involve face-to-face interactions, a central tenet of EASI theory is that emotions provide similar information regardless of whether they are expressed through facial expressions, the voice, body postures, or with words (Van Kleef et al., 2011). Empirical research has provided support for this tenet (e.g., Van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011). Nonetheless, future research should assess the generalizability of our results with other methodologies. In addition, research should examine the verbal and non-verbal cues that people may use to determine whether others’ emotions are integral or incidental to the situation. Past research has demonstrated that there are individual differences in the ability to identify others’ emotions (see Van Kleef, 2016). However, people may also differ in their ability to correctly attribute others’ emotions, which may influence their ability to strategically respond to these emotions. These issues provide potentially fruitful avenues for future research.12

Second, although our results regarding threat were consistent across Studies 2 and 3, we measured threat of an impasse versus general threat, respectively. On one hand, assessing threat in a general manner in Study 3 may have introduced error by incorporating other factors into the measure (e.g., other threats, such as aggression; Averill, 1982). On the other hand, the highly consistent results across the two studies suggests that participants may have interpreted the threat items in Study 3 as being directed at the threat of an impasse, even when the items did not explicitly state this (cf. Daly, 1991; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Sinaceur et al., 2011). Future research should further examine how individuals perceive threat in negotiation.

12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
Finally, we focused on individual differences related to the motivation to process information. Previous research has demonstrated that the motivation to process information can be influenced by situational variables, such as time pressure, the attractiveness of the task at hand, or the amount of power that the observer has relative to the expressor (e.g., De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). Although past research has indicated that dispositional versus situationally-induced motivation to process information can have similar effects on how negotiators process opponents’ emotions (Van Kleef et al., 2004b), future research should examine whether situational factors also impact the interpersonal effects of emotion target.

Our research also has important practical implications. First, within the negotiation literature, there is debate about the benefits and costs of suppressing emotions (cf. Thompson et al., 1999). For example, whereas intrapersonal happiness may spark creativity and integrative solutions (cf. Thompson et al., 1999), expressing happiness to others (i.e., interpersonal happiness) can result in less favorable outcomes (Van Kleef, 2016). Our findings argue for a nuanced approach that takes into consideration both the type and the target of a negotiator’s emotion. For instance, expressing behavior-oriented happiness in negotiation may be unadvisable, given that it can communicate cooperativeness and encourage one’s opponent to take a tougher stance. However, happiness may not have these detrimental effects when it is ambiguously or explicitly incidental to the negotiation since observers appear to ignore these emotions as opposed to relying on them for strategic information. Thus, our findings suggest that the positive effects associated with happiness (e.g., creativity) may outweigh its negative effects (e.g., risk of exploitation) as long as the emotion is not targeted at an opponent’s behavior (cf. Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004).

Second, our findings also have implications for the strategic use of others’ emotions in
negotiation. Negotiators should be aware that their motivation to engage in information processing may bias the inferences that they draw from their opponent’s emotions and influence their own negotiation behavior. For example, negotiators high in NCC may over-attribute an opponent’s ambiguously incidental anger to their own offers, thereby reaching suboptimal outcomes. Conversely, negotiators low in NCC may be less likely to hold themselves accountable for an opponent’s ambiguously incidental anger, thereby increasing their risk of reaching an impasse. Given that these effects appear to be especially strong for ambiguously incidental emotions, negotiators may be able to overcome these biases by reducing the ambiguity of their opponent’s emotion. One way in which this may be accomplished is by maintaining copious information exchange (cf. Thompson, 1991), which can allow negotiators to obtain additional information about their opponent’s interests and make more accurate attributions for any emotions that are observed during the negotiation. Negotiators may also seek additional information about their opponents’ emotions towards the negotiation from secondary information sources, such as media reports or conversations with third parties (Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

In summary, considering the target of an emotion is critical for understanding its interpersonal effects – the same discrete emotion can have vastly different effects on an observer’s inferences and behavior depending on how the emotion relates to the immediate situation. Moreover, our research highlights the benefits that can be gained by further integrating EASI theory and attributions theories and illustrates how personality can influence people’s reactions to others’ emotions. These findings can enhance our understanding of the interpersonal effects of emotions and ensure that negotiators do not inadvertently lose value in the negotiation.
Figure 1. Study 3: Results for the Overall Model for Anger

Notes.
Results before and after the slash represent the effects of ambiguously incidental relative to behavior-oriented anger and explicitly incidental anger, respectively. Values are unstandardized coefficients. *p < .05. **p < .01.
Standard errors are presented in brackets next to the coefficients.
Figure 2. Study 3: Results for the Overall Model for Happiness

Notes.
Results before and after the slash represent the effects of ambiguously incidental relative to behavior-oriented happiness and explicitly incidental happiness, respectively. Values are unstandardized coefficients. †p < .10. **p < .01.
Standard errors are presented in brackets next to the coefficients.
Attributions of the opponent’s happiness to one’s own behavior were uninfluenced by the observer’s need for cognitive closure; .32 (.30) / -.41 (.33).
Table 1

**Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Concessions</td>
<td>89734.25</td>
<td>7139.85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anger (manipulation check)</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>(.93)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Happiness (manipulation check)</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>-.79**</td>
<td>(.92)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Neutral (manipulation check)</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Own anger</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Own happiness</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes.*
* *p < .05.*  
** *p < .01.*  
Reliabilities are shown on the diagonal, where applicable.
Table 2

*Study 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Emotion Manipulation Check*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion condition</th>
<th>Angry</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

Study 1: Participants’ Concessions and Own Emotions as a Function of the Opponent’s Emotion and Emotion Target

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion condition</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Emotion target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiguously incidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Concessions</td>
<td>92027.03&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (4159.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own anger</td>
<td>1.86&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>Concessions</td>
<td>88513.51&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (6858.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own happiness</td>
<td>2.86&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (.99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes.

Means not sharing a subscript differ significantly at \( p < .05 \) (according to Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests).

Standard deviations are presented in brackets next to the means.
Table 4

Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Concessions</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anger (manipulation check)</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Happiness (manipulation check)</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.75**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Neutral (manipulation check)</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Own anger</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Own happiness</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Perceived threat</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>-.40**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Perceived cooperativeness</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td>-.42**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>-.31**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>-.42**</td>
<td>(.85)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
Reliabilities are shown on the diagonal, where applicable.
Table 5

Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Emotion Manipulation Check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion condition</th>
<th>Angry</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6

**Study 2: Participants’ Concessions, Inferences, and Own Emotions as a Function of the Opponent’s Emotion and Emotion Target**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion condition</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Ambiguously incidental</th>
<th>Behavior-oriented</th>
<th>Explicitly incidental</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Concessions</td>
<td>90268.29&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (7123.99)</td>
<td>93675.68&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (4521.88)</td>
<td>88864.89&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (6033.07)</td>
<td>89952.38&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (6176.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>2.81&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (.93)</td>
<td>3.32&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (.78)</td>
<td>2.19&lt;sub&gt;c&lt;/sub&gt; (.87)</td>
<td>2.23&lt;sub&gt;c&lt;/sub&gt; (.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own anger</td>
<td>1.95&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (1.29)</td>
<td>2.46&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (1.04)</td>
<td>1.62&lt;sub&gt;bc&lt;/sub&gt; (.98)</td>
<td>1.36&lt;sub&gt;c&lt;/sub&gt; (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>Concessions</td>
<td>90377.78&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (3961.69)</td>
<td>85054.05&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (7680.95)</td>
<td>89552.63&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (5406.19)</td>
<td>89952.38&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (6176.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperativeness</td>
<td>3.46&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (.97)</td>
<td>3.95&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (.65)</td>
<td>3.48&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (.71)</td>
<td>3.46&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own happiness</td>
<td>2.71&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (1.18)</td>
<td>2.81&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (1.24)</td>
<td>3.05&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (1.14)</td>
<td>2.45&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (1.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes.**

Means not sharing a subscript differ significantly at \( p < .05 \) (according to Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests).

Standard deviations are presented in brackets next to the means.

Mean levels of cooperativeness in the behavior-oriented happiness versus the explicitly incidental happiness conditions differ marginally significantly \( (p = .07) \).
Table 7

*Study 3: Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Concessions</td>
<td>159.29</td>
<td>107.77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anger (manipulation check)</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Happiness (manipulation check)</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.68**</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Own anger</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Own happiness</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Attributions to own behavior</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>-0.20**</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Perceived threat</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>(.70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Perceived cooperativeness</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Need for cognitive closure</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
Reliabilities are shown on the diagonal, where applicable.
Table 8

*Study 3: Means and Standard Deviations for Emotion Manipulation Check*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion condition</th>
<th>Angry M</th>
<th>Angry SD</th>
<th>Happy M</th>
<th>Happy SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9

*Study 3: Participants’ Attributions to Own Behavior as a Function of the Opponent’s Emotion and Emotion Target*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion condition</th>
<th>Emotion target</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiguously incidental</td>
<td>Behavior-oriented</td>
<td>Explicitly incidental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>3.54&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (1.11)</td>
<td>4.02&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (.68)</td>
<td>2.17&lt;sub&gt;c&lt;/sub&gt; (1.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>2.17&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (1.04)</td>
<td>3.23&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (.87)</td>
<td>1.86&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (.86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes.*

Means not sharing a subscript differ significantly at $p < .05$ (according to Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests). Standard deviations are presented in brackets next to the means.
Table 10

**Study 4: Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Anger (manipulation check)</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>(.88)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Happiness (manipulation check)</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-.76**</td>
<td>(.87)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Need for cognitive closure</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes.*

** p < .01.

Reliabilities are shown on the diagonal.
Table 11

*Study 4: Emotion Manipulation Check Means and Standard Deviations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion condition</th>
<th>Angry</th>
<th>Happy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

During much of the 20th century, the central role of emotions in organizations was underrecognized and underappreciated by management scholars (cf. Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). In recent decades, however, the study of emotion has quickly developed into a major domain of organizational behavior research – a development so rapid and influential that it has been described as “a veritable explosion of interest in the study of affect and emotions” (Ashkanasy & Humphrey, 2011, p. 214) and an “affective revolution in organizational behavior” (Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003, p. 3). In spite of this considerable progress, I argue in this dissertation that the literature on emotions in organizations still contains a number of theoretical gaps, which limit our ability to (a) accurately predict individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, and behavior in the workplace (e.g., fairness perceptions and reactions to (un)fairness), (b) predict the effects of individuals’ emotions on other people (e.g., third-party witnesses of unfairness; negotiation partners), and (c) understand employees’ subjective experiences of workplace events.

The manuscripts presented in this dissertation addressed these gaps by providing a critical analysis of the extant literature as well as integrating theoretical perspectives from the literature on emotions in the workplace with theories from other research domains, thereby creating novel theoretical predictions (Manuscripts 1 and 2). Furthermore, this dissertation presented a series of empirical studies aimed at testing some of these predictions, in particular those related to the interpersonal effects of integral versus incidental emotions (Manuscript 2). In the following sections, I situate the present work in the extant literature and outline how the manuscripts in this dissertation together contribute to a better understanding of the role of emotions in the workplace.
Interpersonal Effects of Emotions

As a package, the research presented in this dissertation extends the emotions literature in several ways. First, by examining the effects of emotions on other people (e.g., third-party observers of unfairness – Manuscript 1; negotiation partners – Manuscript 2), this dissertation contributes to a rapidly growing literature on the interpersonal (i.e., between-person) effects of emotions in the workplace (for a review, see Van Kleef, 2016). The interpersonal approach to studying emotions is rooted in a social-functional approach to emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Keltner & Haidt, 1999), which explicitly recognizes the inherently social role of emotions – emotions do not only influence the person who experiences the emotion but may also be observed by other people and influence them. Although other scholars have examined the interpersonal effects of emotions, the organizational literature has traditionally focused on understanding the *intrapersonal* effects of emotions. For instance, Hochschild’s (1983) work on emotional labor (i.e., how employees manage their emotion expressions in response to organizational display rules; see also Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988) is often credited for having sparked considerable interest in emotions in organizations, contributing to the “affective revolution” that characterized the end of the 20th century (Barsade et al., 2003). Another major impetus to the study of emotions in organizations in the mid-1990s was the development of Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), which outlines how events in the workplace can elicit affective reactions from employees (e.g., moods and emotions), which can in turn predict employees’ attitudes and behaviors. This theory provided a foundation for an extensive line of research aimed at understanding how employees’ *own* affect can predict a wide range of outcomes, including job performance, decision making, problem solving, and prosocial behavior (for a review, see Ashton-James & Ashkanasy, 2005).
Despite this initial emphasis on intrapersonal effects, research on the interpersonal role of emotions in organizations has attracted a great amount of scholarly interest in recent years, spurred in large part by the development of Emotions as Social Information (EASI) theory (Van Kleef, 2009, 2016), which has provided a unifying framework for this rapidly developing stream of research. This research has demonstrated that understanding the interpersonal effects of emotions is critical to predicting how one’s behavior and attitudes can be influenced by others during social interactions and provided considerable insight into how these effects occur – insight that is critical to understanding social interactions across a wide range of organizational domains, including leadership, negotiation, and customer service (for a review, see Van Kleef, 2016). However, a number of key questions remain unaddressed, which limits our understanding of the interpersonal role of emotions in organizations.

This dissertation addresses several of these issues. First, by proposing different processes through which third parties’ emotions may influence employees’ fairness perceptions (Manuscript 1), this dissertation research extends EASI theory into the justice domain (see also Hillebrandt & Barclay, 2017). In doing so, it answers calls for research into the interpersonal effects of emotions in a variety of social and organizational domains, which is critical for the continued development and refinement of EASI theory (Van Kleef, Homan, & Cheshin, 2012). Further, by integrating EASI theory with theoretical insights from attribution theories (Manuscript 2), this dissertation also highlights the importance of considering both the type (e.g., anger versus happiness) and target (e.g., integral versus incidental) of an emotion for predicting its interpersonal effects. Moreover, the present research contributes to our understanding of how these effects occur, shedding further light on the cognitive processes underlying the effects of emotions on other people as well as how these processes may be influenced by individual
differences related to information processing. As such, this dissertation answers calls in the literature for research examining how the interpersonal effects of integral versus incidental emotions differ and what processes underlie these effects – issues that are critical to address as they have implications that “cut across the various [social and organizational] domains” (Van Kleef, 2016, p. 223).

Further, this dissertation identifies a number of critical remaining gaps in our understanding of the interpersonal role of emotions and identifies avenues for future research. For instance, future research should not only examine how the interpersonal effects of emotions are influenced by individual differences in the ability to correctly identify others’ emotions (cf. Van Kleef, 2016), but also consider potential individual differences related to the ability to correctly attribute others’ emotions (Manuscript 2).

**Emotions in Justice and Negotiation**

As outlined in the previous section, this dissertation contributes to the emotions literature by developing novel predictions regarding the interpersonal effects of emotions in the contexts of justice and negotiation (Manuscripts 1 and 2, respectively). At the same time, it also makes significant theoretical contributions to the justice and negotiation literatures, both of which have traditionally been dominated by a highly cognitive perspective and neglected the role of emotions (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 2002; Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2011; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). As argued in Manuscript 1, for instance, applying an emotion perspective to the justice literature can help clarify the distinction between justice and injustice by demonstrating the different roles that emotion is likely to play across these constructs (i.e., justice is likely to be a primarily “cold” cognitive process, whereas injustice may be an emotion-infused “hot” process), which has important implications for the
measurement of both constructs. Similarly, integrating the concept of “episode” from the emotions literature in the justice literature may help explain how individuals’ experiences of unfairness unfold over time and influence their reactions.

With respect to the negotiation literature, understanding emotions is vital as it can help predict negotiators’ behavior and ensure that they do not lose value. Initial research on this topic focused on the intrapersonal effects of affect in negotiation (i.e., how negotiators are influenced by their own moods and emotions; cf. Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a). In contrast, this dissertation (Manuscript 2) contributes to a growing understanding of the interpersonal effects of emotions – how negotiators respond to their negotiation partners’ emotions. Specifically, it demonstrates when and how negotiators can infer information from their negotiation partners’ emotions, which they can use to optimize their own negotiation strategies. This research also has important practical implications for negotiators, as it outlines when and why expressing specific discrete emotions (e.g., happiness) can be costly versus beneficial. Further, this dissertation demonstrates how negotiators’ reactions to their partners’ emotions may be influenced by their own motivation to engage in information processing and how these biases may be overcome – information that is valuable to negotiators aiming to reach optimal negotiation outcomes.

**Discrete Emotions**

Across both manuscripts, I contribute to a better understanding of the role of discrete emotions (versus less differentiated affective states such as moods). Traditionally, discrete emotions have received little attention in the organizational literature relative to other types of affect (Barsade & Gibson, 2007). However, understanding emotions is very important, given that they are by definition targeted at a specific object or event and associated with specific sets of appraisals and action tendencies (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). As such, emotions of the
same valence (e.g., negative or positive) may predict very different employee reactions depending on the specific action tendencies associated with the emotion. Perceived unfairness, for instance, has been associated with a variety of negative emotions, including anger, fear, and disgust. I propose that employees’ attitudinal and behavioral reactions to unfairness are likely to depend on the specific discrete emotion that is experienced (Manuscript 1). Further, given that emotions are targeted and associated with specific appraisals, they may communicate information to other individuals who observe these emotions, thereby potentially also influencing observers’ cognitions and behavior (Van Kleef, 2009). Manuscript 2 demonstrates these effects in the context of negotiation and provides further insight into how different discrete emotions influence observers (e.g., via attributional and inferential mechanisms) and how these processes may differ for different discrete emotions.

Taken together, the research in this dissertation underscores the importance of studying discrete emotions in organizations and also empirically compares and explains the effects of emotions of different types and with different targets. In addition, it highlights gaps in our current knowledge with respect to the effects of discrete emotions in the workplace and calls for further research examining a wider range of different discrete emotions, which is important given that these emotions may have differential effects on organizationally-relevant outcomes.

**Understanding Employee Experiences**

Finally, by focusing on individuals’ emotions, this dissertation also contributes to an ongoing shift in the organizational literature from a manager-centred perspective, which is concerned with predicting outcomes that are relevant to an organization’s goals, towards a greater emphasis on understanding employees and their subjective experiences of workplace events (e.g., Guo, Rupp, Weiss, & Trougakos, 2011; Weiss & Rupp, 2011). The emotions
literature has long recognized that workplace events can affect employees’ ability to achieve goals, which can influence employees’ moods and emotions as well as their subsequent organizationally-relevant attitudes and behaviors (Ashton-James & Ashkanasy, 2005). A person-centric perspective emphasises a somewhat different reason for examining emotions – emotions are important because they can provide insight into employees’ lived experiences at work, thus helping us understand “what it is like” to be human and to experience workplace events (Weiss & Rupp, 2011, p. 87). However, to date, relatively little research has examined employees’ emotional experiences in the workplace and how these affect outcomes that are relevant to them (cf. Barclay & Kiefer, in press). This dissertation highlights the central role of emotions across several organizational domains and also offers methodological recommendations that will allow us to better tap into employees’ work experiences, including experience sampling methodologies and longitudinal approaches that can contribute to our understanding of how the relationships between workplace events and employee experiences dynamically unfold over time.

CODA

Emotions play a central role in organizations – they influence individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors, communicate information to other people during social interactions, and characterize employees’ experiences at work. Although critical questions about the role of emotions remain to be answered, this dissertation provides a step towards a more complete understanding by empirically addressing important gaps in the emotions literature and creating avenues for further research. It is my hope that this dissertation will inspire others to contribute to the “affective revolution” that has already provided much critical insight into emotions in the workplace.
APPENDIX

Manuscript 2: Study 1 Protocol

Participants were instructed to read the following scenario carefully and imagine themselves in the role of the employee. The scenario was adapted from Van Kleef et al. (2004b, 2006).

You have been assigned by your manager to update your organization’s website. The website has become dated in terms of both presentation and content, which has led to a strong decline in the number of visitors that the website receives. It is your job to contact an IT company that can update the website according to the latest technical standards and that can professionally manage the website’s content. You estimate that $90,000 per year is a reasonable price for these services.

As you are researching options, you find a company that is able to provide the services you are looking for. You request a quote from the company and find that they are asking $120,000 per year for the services that you need. Because this is more than you were planning to spend, you decide to contact the company by telephone to discuss the price. You are transferred to Sam, who was responsible for providing the quote. You tell Sam that the quote meets your needs, but that you want to negotiate the price. Sam indicates that he is willing to negotiate. You explain that you have estimated that $90,000 per year would be a reasonable price.

Just as Sam is about to respond to your offer, you hear a mobile phone ring on the other side of the line. Sam apologizes and asks you if you could excuse him for a moment. Sam then tries to place the telephone on hold, but something apparently goes wrong in the process. You are surprised when you realize that you can hear Sam’s conversation word-for-word. You try not to listen, but you still overhear the following:
“Hey Jamie, I’m sorry, I don’t have time right now. I’m in the middle of a negotiation with a client. (.........)

Yes, I know I sound [angry/happy]. (.........)

I feel [angry/happy]... I will call you back right away.”

Following this short conversation, Sam apologizes for the interruption. You decide not to tell Sam that you overheard the conversation. Sam then continues to talk about the price for the assignment. He says that he is willing to continue negotiating with you and encourages you to send him another offer by email. You decide to email Sam right away.

The emotion manipulation (anger versus happiness) is shown in square brackets. The sentences printed in bold contained the experimental target manipulations and varied across conditions, as follows:

**Ambiguously incidental anger/happiness:**

“Yes, I know I sound [angry/happy]. (.........) I feel [angry/happy]... I will call you back right away.”

**Behavior-oriented anger/happiness:**

“Yes, I know I sound [angry/happy]. (.........) I feel [angry/happy] because of the offer I just received. I will call you back right away.”

**Explicitly incidental anger/happiness:**

“Yes, I know I sound [angry/happy]. (.........) I feel [angry/happy] because of something that happened outside of work. I will call you back right away.”

**Control (emotion-neutral):**

“(.........) I will call you back right away.”
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