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HUNTING FOR 'PAPER GANGSTERS': AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING IN A CANADIAN CONTEXT

by

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B.A. (Honours), Wilfrid Laurier University, 2012

THESIS

Submitted to the Department of Criminology

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for

Master of Arts in Criminology

Wilfrid Laurier University

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Abstract

Contemporary police departments are facing immense pressure to preserve public safety while also remaining fiscally accountable. As a response to economic pressures, police services are turning to intelligence led policing (ILP). ILP promises 'smarter' and more efficient policing with the use of advanced technologies and data analysis for decision-making. The present study examines ILP implementation in one urban Canadian police department. Through in-depth interviews with fifteen patrol and middle-management members, fifty-five hours of observation, and an analysis of organizational documents, I examine how ILP reform has been understood and enacted by patrol officers on the ground. From this analysis, I uncover how officers' perceptions and practices are loosely coupled from organizational claims surrounding ILP. I argue that this loose coupling allows the organization to acquire social legitimation while allowing patrol work to remain largely unchanged. Further, I argue that patrol officers' perceptions and practices of ILP can perpetuate the policing of usual suspects and raise a number of concerns about implications of 'intelligence' practices involving citizens.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank Dr. Carrie Sanders, for your unwavering guidance, patience, and encouragement. You have been an incredible supervisor and mentor, and I am very grateful for this opportunity to work with and learn from you. Your wisdom and insight has been invaluable throughout this process. Thank you for always pushing me to go deeper in my analyses, to step outside my comfort zone, and for always challenging me to do my best.

I would like to thank my thesis committee for their time and support during this process. To Dr. Debra Langan, thank you for your thoughtful feedback and careful attention to detail. Also, thank you for your warmth, approachability, and your dedication to seeing your students learn and grow – I have very much enjoyed working with you. To Dr. Tony Christensen, thank you for your guidance as I navigated my theoretical and methodological framing, for your thorough feedback, and for your humour - especially on those days when this process felt the most overwhelming. To Dr. James Sheptycki, thank you for the time and insight you provided as my external reviewer. It is an honour to have someone so highly respected in this area of research engage with my work.

Thank you to the faculty and staff of the Department of Criminology at Laurier Brantford, for your dedication to fostering the success of your students. To Dr. Stacey Hannem, thank you for the immense support you provided as graduate coordinator, I move forward feeling lucky for the opportunities that this program provided. To Marg Harris, thank you for your constant support and remarkable patience. You always go far above and beyond for your students, and we are so lucky to have you.

To my mom and dad, thank you for always being supportive of whichever path I choose to take. I wouldn't be here without your unconditional love and encouragement. Thank you to my late grandfather Joe, for inspiring my passion for life-long learning, and for playing a significant role in shaping the person I am today - I hope that I've made you proud. Thank you to my colleagues, Krystle, Katy, and David, for sharing in the early mornings, long nights, and the countless coffee binges. Thank you for being there as we navigated all the joys and tears of the past two years. I could not have asked for better people to share this experience with.

Finally, thank you to the police organization who participated in this study. To Keiron and Ryan, thank you for your time and support coordinating access for this project. I would like to extend a special thank you to all of the police officers who took the time to sit down and share their stories with me. Thank you for welcoming me to ride-along on your shifts, for letting me into your worlds, for answering countless questions, for keeping me safe, and for not making me feel like a burden. I deeply respect the courage that you exhibit while facing the many realities of your position. You have an undeniably difficult role. Thank you for the risks you take every single day in the name of public safety.

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Chapter One: Introduction

In a time of fiscal restraint, law enforcement agencies are under increasing pressure to justify immense operating costs and reduce resource consumption wherever possible. Recently, the Canadian Summit on the Economics of Policing attested that "governments and police services must find more efficient and effective methods to sustain current levels of policing services to ensure public safety" (Public Safety Canada, 2013: 5). Meanwhile, heightened public expectations of safety and security measures further complicate this interplay of pressures. Pervasive feelings of insecurity, anxiety, and anticipation of danger characterize our contemporary hyper-vigilant 'risk' society (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Murphy, 2007). Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, fear of extreme behaviour by radical individuals or groups has remained at the forefront of public safety discussions. Recent tragedies such as the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and the 2014 slaying of a Canadian solider on Parliament Hill have contributed to rampant fear of radicalized violence. Fear has bolstered an interest in identifying and anticipating the conditions that precede such occurrences. As such, police services are turning to technological innovation for effective resource management and enhanced public safety (Public Safety Canada, 2013).

Increasingly, gauging 'pre-crime' indicators to reduce risk is given precedence over post-incident responses (Zedner, 2007, 2010; Mythen & Walklate, 2006; Wall, 2010; McCulloch & Pickering, 2009). This pre-crime ideology was ushered into law enforcement policy on the back of counter-terrorism procedures at the national security level amidst the 'War on Terror' (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009; Zedner, 2007). The recent enactment of Bill C-51 has further expanded police powers in regards to information collection and sharing, allowing and facilitating precautionary detainment based upon suspicion of impending behaviour. Anticipating

occurrences rather than responding post-hoc is regarded as a means to save lives, but also to preserve resources. Pre-crime ideology has penetrated law enforcement beyond the scope of national security issues, and is increasingly sought by municipal and regional police services as a means for approaching street crime (Boyd-Caine, 2007).

In response to growing threats to public safety and the economics of policing, police departments are turning to "smart policing strategies" such as intelligence-led policing (ILP) (Public Safety Canada, 2013). ILP emphasizes stringent performance management, efficient allocation of resources, and a rational, objective approach to decision-making. It refers to a management-by-objectives approach to governing contemporary police services (Ratcliffe, 2008, Sheptycki, 2013), as well as to a set of organizational practices involving rampant expansion of technological infrastructure, and an increasing reliance on information gathering and data analysis (Ratcliffe, 2008; Cope, 2004). Crime analysis is a central function within the ILP philosophy, providing the means of gathering, sorting, interpreting, and disseminating information that is intended to impact decisions (Ratcliffe, 2008). In the vision of ILP, engaging analysis to "identify patterns and relationships between crime data and other relevant data sources" enables the most informed and targeted allocation of police resources. From this, officers are said to engage in more 'proactive' rather than reactive policing styles (Cope, 2004:188).

Despite the rhetorical attractiveness of an ILP strategy, there is a lack of empirical knowledge about the efficacy of this approach when translated into practice by police departments. Even less knowledge exists on how ILP is enacted on the ground by patrol officers in their daily interactions with citizens and communities. Patrol officers are responsible for initial decisions which determine the trajectory of response to an incident. These decisions can hold

significant consequences for the individuals involved (Manning, 1992). For this reason, an analysis of how ILP shapes both perceptions and practices of patrol officers is vital for understanding how this reform may impact police-public interactions.

The present ethnographic case study provides a meso-level analysis of institutional reform in one large urban Canadian police department. Crypton Police Department (CPD)[1] has vocally attested their commitment to policing under an intelligence-led framework, and has taken several strides to implement ILP. The purpose of the present study is to explore both the organizational adoption of ILP as well as patrol officers' perceptions, understandings and enactment of ILP on the ground. To inform my analysis, I draw upon official organizational documents, fifteen in-depth interviews with patrol officers and middle-management personnel, and fifty-five hours of fieldwork observation. Employing new institutionalism, I explore organizational change as it is externally influenced by the social and political environment surrounding the organization. Using sensemaking as an analytical device, I explore the meaning-making processes employed by patrol officers to understand and interpret how ILP relates to their role.

At the time of ILP adoption, CPD was the subject of significant negative publicity and was in need of a reform that could rebuild legitimacy for the organization. ILP, I argue, was *organizationally* adopted as a means to acquire legitimacy by demonstrating accountability and 'responsibilization' (Garland, 1996). In practice, however, ILP operates as a 'rationalized institutional myth' (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) wherein the formal organizational claims concerning ILP are 'loosely coupled' to the everyday practices of policing. Patrol officers engage *selectively* in ILP practices, such as appeasing calls for tickets and street checks, without meaningfully

[1] Name has been replaced with a pseudonym in order to protect the privacy of the organization.

changing their everyday approach. This selective adoption, I argue, raises a number of sociopolitical concerns regarding the policing of the "usual suspects" and low-level offenses.

Chapter Outline

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework begins with an outline of current literature on ILP's theoretical application, detailing the rationales which drive this policing reform. I then provide an outline of the theoretical framing which informs this institutional analysis, describing how new institutionalism and sensemaking are employed to deepen our understanding of organizational change. I end this chapter with an overview of existing studies which have examined policing reform from an institutional theoretical perspective.

Chapter Three: Methodology provides an overview of the epistemological, ontological and methodological approach of this study. I provide a chronological account of the research process, from gaining access to the police department to data collection and analysis. I conclude this chapter with a self-reflexive account of my fieldwork experience.

Chapter Four: The Organizational Adoption of Intelligence-led Policing provides an analysis of how ILP has been presented and rationalized by the organization, situating this innovation within its social, historical and political contexts. This chapter illustrates how the claimsmaking rhetoric of ILP is used to infer accountability and acquire legitimacy.

Chapter Five: Intelligence-led Policing and Patrol Work provides a micro-level analysis of how patrol officers have made sense of ILP and the integration of crime analytics in the operations division. In this chapter, I illustrate how (1) the situational nature of patrol work, (2) a lack of organizational buy-in, and (3) cultural divergence have shaped the way that patrol

officers perceive crime analytics and new technologies. These insights suggest that patrol officers understand ILP and crime analysis not as a tool that was meant for their benefit, but one which predominantly serves an accountability function for the organization. The current state of ILP implementation has left patrol to embrace aspects of ILP which align with present occupational schemas while discarding those which do not.

Chapter Six: Intelligence-led Policing and 'Proactive' Patrol Work explores patrol officers' reported and observed practices under an ILP strategy. In this chapter, I provide an account of 'intelligence' practices and 'proactive' patrolling carried out by CPD patrol officers. This account illustrates how the present enactment of ILP may promote an emphasis on usual suspects and low-level offenses. I conclude with a discussion of the potential implications of such practices occurring under the pretense of ILP.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion provides a summary of the key findings and discusses the practical and theoretical contributions arising from the study. I conclude with a discussion of the limitations encountered in this research, and provide a number of future research directions to build upon the foundations of this study.

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

In what follows, I provide a description of the literature on ILP. I begin with an exploration of its theoretical form and proposed application as a guide for tactical and strategic decision-making within police organizations. ILP adoption has attracted notable scholarly attention which is both theoretical and practical in nature (Ratcliffe, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2008; Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001; Cope, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004; Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005; Carter & Carter, 2009; Sanders, Weston & Schott, 2015; Sheptycki, 2013). Next, I provide an outline of institutional theory which I use in my analysis to provide a deeper understanding of ILP implementation within the institutional environment of policing. Finally, a history of works that have examined policing from an institutional theoretical perspective is provided.

Intelligence-led Policing: The Adoption of an Organizational Philosophy

Intelligence-led policing as a management philosophy and organizational strategy of contemporary policing has been widely adopted across many countries (Ratcliffe, 2008). Although technical definitions vary, ILP can be defined "as a collaborative enforcement approach combining problem-solving, information sharing and police accountability, with enhanced intelligence operations" (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2007; as quoted in Carter & Carter, 2009). With a focus on gathering, compiling, and anayzing data to inform decision-making, ILP "aims to achieve crime reduction and prevention and to disrupt offender activity; [it] combines crime analysis and criminal intelligence, [...] uses crime intelligence to objectively direct police resource decisions, [and] focuses enforcement activities on prolific and serious offenders" (Ratcliffe, 2008: 87). A key tenet of ILP is the rationale that integrating data analysis practices to inform decision-making results in *evidence-based* decisions which are likely to be

more effective, longer-term solutions (Ratcliffe 2008). This approach to decision making is regarded as appropriate and legitimate among present societal schemas about how organizations should operate (Scott, 2003).

Legitimacy is in part contrived through a cultural emphasis on knowledge as capital for the making of "rational" and informed decisions, wherein police "are employing information technology to turn police officers into problem solvers and to leverage their intellectual capital to pre-empt crime" (Brown & Brudney, 2003:30). This shift towards creating "knowledge worker[s]" can be seen throughout public and private sectors (Brown & Brudney, 2003). Technological advancement has paired crime data with sophisticated software, allowing for graphic visual displays and algorithmic analyses of incident and socio-demographic data. The discipline of crime science places an emphasis on assessing patterns and trends in order to target crime through spatial and situational elements (Clarke 2004, 2009; Laycock, 2005).

A central component of ILP practice is the use of crime analytics to examine trends, identify concerns, and inform decision making (Cope, 2004). Crime analysis can be defined as the "collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats" (Carter & Carter, 2009: 317). Crime analysis draws together several data sources which may include police records of official criminal incident data, calls for service and occurrences of disorder that may or may not have resulted in an official charge, as well socioeconomic data including race and unemployment distribution (Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2004). In the vision of ILP, synthesizing, linking and spatially distributing the vast amounts of data compiled and stored

by police organizations will allow for the most informed and targeted allocation of police resources (Cope, 2004).

A common practice of crime analytics is the spatial plotting of recorded incident data in order to identify “hot spots”, or areas of concentrated criminal activity (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001). The identification of these areas lends itself to a patrolling strategy commonly used within an ILP model - a ‘hotspot policing’ approach - which distributes resources and surveillance in conjunction with the areas demonstrating a ‘need’. It is touted that hot spot policing allows for “focused police interventions, such as directed patrols [and] proactive arrests [...] [which] can produce significant crime prevention gains at high crime ‘hot spots’” (Braga, 2007: 4). This method of resourcing fits well with an ILP ideology, given that “the accurate targeting of police resources to the right problems at the right time is a fundamental aim of a proactive intelligence-led police service” (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001: 339). Calculated and purposeful allocation is believed to make best use of the limited resources at hand.

Fiscal responsibility and careful use of resources lends itself to a second central theme of the ILP movement, which is illustrating accountability for financial investment, action and behaviour. The collection and tracking of crime trends for analytic purposes serves the additional function of a comparative gauge, allowing trends and spikes to be identified and compared over time. This comparative measurement of crime trends and emphasis on statistics, commonly implemented under the name of a CompStat approach (Eterno & Silverman, 2012), meshes well with the data-driven values of ILP. CompStat (Comparative Statistics) is a philosophy which partners the close monitoring of crime statistics with monthly ‘accountability meetings’, during which district inspectors must answer for increases or spikes and provide a plan to address any issues ([Crypton Police Department], 2005). It is important to note that CompStat is arguably a

reform that is distinguished from ILP, and while this management philosophy may be used in conjunction with ILP, it can be adopted as a management philosophy of its own. While not all services adopt a CompStat system in the form of the original model implemented by the NYPD or Boston Police Department (Eterno & Silverman, 2012), the emphasis on tracking and comparing trends lends itself to adoption, in some form, in intelligence-led departments. Through the close monitoring and probing of crime spikes and declines, data analysis offers the ability to "hold officers accountable for implementing problem-solving strategies to control hot spot locations" (Braga, 2007: 6). Further, the police service as a whole is able to show "tangible objectives", illustrating needs and successive outputs to the public (Weisburd et al., 2008: 1).

The key components and principles of the ILP movement illustrate the wider penetration of private sector management techniques into law enforcement agencies. As Eterno & Silverman (2012) explain, "the language of managerialism and economic rationalism has accompanied this application [...] lock ups and convictions [are] supplanted by business plans and performance management, targets, and key performance indicators (Forward, xvii). The dominant cultural shift toward output-based policing places additional demand on management to assign priorities and coordinate action among patrol officers (Vito & Vito, 2013).

In a time when the rising costs of policing are unsustainable alongside public sector budget cuts, "law enforcement agencies face formidable organizational problems, the most important being how to justify their claim to more and more of the tax payer's dollars" (Chambliss, 1994: 191). Garland (1996) discusses how one adaptive strategy used by contemporary law enforcement challenges has been to 'responsibilize', or assign responsibility for crime control to those outside of the standard purview of law enforcement. This strategy centres on empowering non-state actors to take an active role in controlling and preventing

crime. As I will argue, this same process of 'responsibilization' can also be seen *within* policing organizations.

The aim of this thesis is to build upon empirical understandings of how ILP as an organizational philosophy has been implemented on the ground. Specifically, my analysis focuses on how ILP has been integrated into patrol work. Given that ILP represents an institutional shift for police organizations, I adopt an institutional theoretical perspective for my analysis of this reform.

Institutional Theory

Contemporary organizations face constant pressure to remain current, legitimate, and accountable in the eyes of the public(s) they serve. To this end, organizations engage in various modes of reform, including restructuring formal policy and ideology, implementing new rules and processes, and embracing technological innovation. Institutional theory emerged as an alternative to technical/rational models of organizational analysis, which predominantly assumes that rules, processes and innovations are adopted and applied rationally and literally as a means of improving performance and outcomes. Assessment through a technical/rational perspective emphasizes improving functionality and best practices, and does not ultimately question the motivation, purpose, or aim of rules or policies (Hoque, Arends & Alexander,2004). Contemporary institutional theory challenges this "assumption that organizations function according to their formal blueprints" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 342) and instead proposes that "institutional rules function as myths which organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 340). Institutional theory stresses the need to consider how the prevailing institutional, societal, and environmental

culture which surround an organization shape the rules and practices which it must adopt in order to remain viable.

Organizations adopt formal rules and structures which align with dominant societal and institutional beliefs about organizational work and how it should function. Yet in practice, these institutionalized rules often contradict with the conditions which produce efficiency under present organizational conditions. Thus, actual daily work activities often vary, or are "loosely coupled" to the formal rhetoric surrounding organizational practices (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In order to navigate the tension between an image which ensures survival, and processes which would create contradictions or tensions if applied literally, institutionalized environments may *intentionally and strategically* maintain such "gaps between their formal structures and their ongoing work activities" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977:341) and in practice, "rules are often violated, decisions often un-implemented,...have uncertain consequences,...problematic efficiency, and evaluation and inspection systems are...rendered so vague as to provide little coordination" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 343). Hallett (2010) found that an attempt to more strictly coordinate activities in order to facilitate a closer degree of "coupling" between formal programs and daily work activities lead to a state of "turmoil" amongst organizational actors. This turmoil created such disruption within the organization that even still, the efficiencies promised by what was once a rationalized institutional myth could still not be realized in practice (Hallet, 2010).

Although not always conceived of under the rhetoric of rationalized institutional myths, a number of works have identified how 'knowledge', 'intelligence', and information technologies often serve symbolic rather than literal functions within organizations. Brown & Brudney (2003) examined the use of information technology for decision-making purposes in police organizations who were heavily investing in this area as part of the 'learning organization'

paradigm. Although the role of IT in guiding the decision process is championed in the rhetoric of would-be "knowledge organizations", its practical capabilities and uses within the organization proved to be largely *symbolic* and ground-level functioning appeared contradictory to the aim of investing in these technologies. Feldman & March (1981) identify that the mass collection of information by organizations surpasses what can realistically be used or considered in decision making processes. This holds even greater relevancy as technological advancement has magnified the ability to both gather and store data. Despite impracticality, "the gathering of information provides a ritualistic assurance that appropriate attitudes about decision making exist" and are held by the organization (Feldman & March, 1981: 177). The significance of external perceptions about processes surpasses their literal translation.

Institutional theorizing has predominantly occurred at the macro-level, examining the wider cultural and societal forces which shape the form and adoption of institutional myths. Hallett (2010) identifies the analytic value of moving beyond the study of organizations' external, symbolic compliance with institutional myths, encouraging an inhabited approach in order to explore how these myths take tangible form on the ground. Employing a micro-level inhabited analysis of ILP allows us to "both analyze how external myths, such as accountability, pressure organizations *and to examine the internal manifestation of myths in organizations and their substantive (in addition to ceremonial) implications*" (Hallett, 2010:53, emphasis added). Powell & Colyvas (2008) stress the need to advance institutional theorizing with micro-level inquiry, identifying that "institutions are sustained, altered, and extinguished as they are enacted by individuals in concrete social situations. We need a richer understanding of how individuals locate themselves in social relations and interpret their context" (Powell & Colyvas, 2008: 276-

277). Thus, it is the way that organizational actors understand and *interpret* institutional rules and reforms which most significantly shape their manifestation.

Sensemaking

Undertaking organizational analysis through an institutional theoretical lens applies a social constructionist approach to understanding institutional behaviour (Quaid, 1993). Social constructionism posits that is it the social processes which individuals engage in that shapes the way they define reality and ascribe meaning to phenomena around them (Loseke & Best, 2003). This perspective takes interest in how organizational actors make sense of rationalized institutional myths and various states of coupling between formal rules and actual practice within their role. It is this production of meaning through social interactions which facilitates this "sensemaking" process, wherein organizational actors give meaning to events and actions (Choo, 1996). In fact, "organizational actors have to first make sense of what is happening in their organizational environments in order to develop a shared interpretation that can serve as a context for organizational action"(Choo, 1996: 329, 332; Manning, 1997). During times of change and uncertainty, such as an institutional paradigm shift, organizational actors must "try to make sense of uncertainties and disruptions and 'enact' their interpretations into the world to give it a sense of order" (Chan, 2007: 323). Sensemaking occurs in a social context; meanings are shaped through interaction with others. Such understandings also shape the way that technology is utilized in practice, independent of its stated or 'intended' uses (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2005). Given the significant technological component of ILP, it is vital to consider how officers' understandings shape the way they engage with information technologies as part of ILP.

Institutional Analysis of Policing

Police institutional research has largely maintained a macro-level focus, placing emphasis on the symbolic function of institutional myths at work in police organizations (Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Crank, 1994; Crank, 2003; Burruss & Giblin, 2014). Crank & Langworthy (1992) assert that the concept of innovation itself serves as an institutional myth, and note the tendency of contemporary law enforcement to - at least outwardly - embrace a multitude of innovations. It is suggested that practices such as rapid response systems, preventative patrolling strategies and police internal review boards have been widely implemented based on perceived efficiency or accountability improvements, despite lacking empirical support for these functions (Crank & Langworthy, 1992). Kochel (2011) reaffirms this assertion, noting that "policing reforms appear to spread...without any theoretical grounding or scientific evidence about effectiveness, if the approach appears anecdotally to produce positive results or is simply well liked" (p. 352).

A small number of scholars have conducted analyses of police organizations which offer empirically-driven, ground-level accounts of the tangible functions of institutionalized myths. Institutional theory has been applied to empirical analyses of the community policing movement (Manning, 1997; Maguire & Katz, 2002; Chapell, 2009). Instances of loose coupling were found between community policing in philosophy and in practice (Maguire & Katz, 2002; Chapell, 2009). Chappell (2009) found that while "the administration has adopted at least the rhetoric of community policing... their beliefs (or rhetoric) have not trickled down to the patrol officers" (p. 23). Experiences of officers on the street indicated a struggle to negotiate and make sense of their role in this new policing context (Manning, 1997; Maguire & Katz, 2002). Empirical assessments of CompStat management techniques have revealed a selective adoption of elements

which conferred legitimacy, over an actual shift to the philosophy in its entirety (Willis, Mastrofski & Weisburd, 2007; Weisburd et al., 2008; Dabney, 2010). Similarly, Hoque et al. (2004) found that the accountability structure (accounting control systems for resource management) in an Australian police service predominantly served a legitimating function to appease external constituents rather than a technical-rational function of actually increasing accountability in practice.

Carter, Philips and Gayadeen (2014) used a 'loose coupling' theoretical perspective to assess the how closely ILP recommendations made by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan resembled practices in local and state law enforcement agencies. As they appropriately identify, to date there has been a lack of both empirical assessment and theoretical application employed in the examination of intelligence-led policing. While their findings suggest that adoption closely resembles, or is 'tightly coupled' to ILP philosophy (Carter et al., 2014), I argue that the self-report survey research design was ill-equipped to study this phenomenon. Study participants were key individuals responsible for representing intelligence functions within their services who had received specific training in ILP, presumably having a vested interest in illustrating the success of a program they were tasked to implement. Officers performing police work on the street were not included in this sample. Carter et al. (2014)'s sample constitutes only higher level organizational claims, not participants who are directly carrying out ILP implementation on the ground. Assessing the degree to which practices are coupled with official claims requires an inhabited approach which can account for how a reform is functioning in practice. This gap is illuminated in the present study, offering an alternative to the conclusions made by Carter et al. (2014).

Chapter Three: Methodology

Epistemological and Ontological Framework

In this chapter, I provide a personal account of my experience throughout the research process, from conceptualization to the collection and analysis of data. I describe my methodological decisions, the rationales behind structuring the study in this manner, and the challenges I encountered in the field.

As described in the literature review in Chapter one, this study aims to uncover how frontline patrol officers make sense of and enact intelligence-led policing. My goal was to uncover how patrol work had been affected amidst the introduction of intelligence-led practices. I wanted to learn about how patrol officers perceived this shift in organizational philosophy, and what this meant for the way that they carried out their day to day work. Chan (2007) explains that the understandings of those on the frontline can subvert and shape the practical outcomes of police reform. For this reason, I felt that a focus on officers' understandings could shed valuable insight on the organizational realization of ILP. Given that my emphasis was on how patrol officers *understood* ILP and its relevance to patrol work, a social constructionist framework (Loseke & Best, 2003) provided an appropriate lens.

Social constructionism is interested in individuals' perceptions or understandings of reality, positing that 'truths' are dependent on the individual, situation, and context that they occur within (Holstein & Gubrium, 2008). It regards notions of 'reality' as contextual, constructed through social processes which serve to "develop, transmit and maintain" human 'knowledge' (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 15). It pays "empirical attention to the ordinary, taken-for-granted reality-constructing process of every life", placing its focus on *meaning making* processes which shape one's perception of the world (Holstein & Gubrium, 2008: 3). At a micro-

level, constructionism takes interest in how meaning is "created, negotiated, sustained and modified" through interaction in social contexts (Schwandt, 1994: 120).

Neo-institutional theory employs a social constructionist approach to the study of organizations (Quaid, 1993), providing a suitable fit for this study of organizational reform. Social constructionism is well suited to the study of organizations (Samra-Frederick, 2008). An organization as an entity presents a continually shifting set of claims which construct its meaning, purpose and processes (Samra-Frederick, 2008; see also Parker, 1997). Constructionism is attentive to the claimsmaking of organizations, interrogating the social, political and cultural context of claims about purpose and practice (Loseke & Best, 2003). Attending to the language used by organizational actors contributes to an understanding of "the construction of workplace identities....occupations or tasks", and how workers make sense of their role in relation to others (Samra-Frederick, 2008: 132). Of interest to constructionism are the processes that create this 'knowledge,' as this knowledge guides conduct and individuals act in accordance to meanings they have assigned to various phenomena (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Further, in an institutional context, these meanings have the potential to become habitualized, "embedded as routines" and taken for granted as part of a specific role or action (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 71).

Exploring how officers have 'made sense' of ILP and crime analysis as part of their role contributes to an understanding of not only their current perceptions and dispositions, but *how* these perceptions have been shaped. Under ILP, officers find themselves encountering reports, expectations, and technologies that were not previously part of their role and engage in sense-making to integrate these new experiences into their daily reality. Thus, in order to understand how ILP has taken shape in patrol work, I examined how officers have ascribed meaning to ILP

and crime analysis within their daily routines. As such, an ethnographic case study provided an appropriate methodology for uncovering the perceptions, experiences and practices of patrol officers in an intelligence-led department. When drawn together, these insights illuminate both meanings and consequences of ILP within an operational patrol context.

In what follows, I provide a brief description of the case study location. I then describe the initial conceptualization of research questions, and the process of gaining access and preparing to enter the field. Next, I outline the data collection process. I then provide a reflexive account of how I analyzed the data, how insights emerged from this process, and how the research aims shifted in an emergent form within the circular data collection and analysis process of inductive qualitative inquiry (Warren & Karner, 2010). I conclude with a personal reflection on the interpersonal dynamics and challenges of conducting fieldwork with police, including the implications of these challenges on the construction of research findings.

Case Study Description: The Crypton Police Department

The CPD is a large urban police force which employs approximately 1300 sworn members and 400 civilian personnel. As a municipal force, CPD is responsible for maintaining public safety and law enforcement in a Canadian city with a population of 600,000. The department consists of three major divisions, including operations, investigations, and support services divisions (Crypton Police Department, 2014). The core values of CPD are identified by the organization as integrity, professionalism, accountability, and respect (Crypton Police Department, 2014).

The City of Crypton is comprised of a unique interplay of features which impact the policing environment. As a major urban center, the number of individuals within the city is often

much higher than the official population; both business and tourism draw many people into the city (Crypton Police Department, 2012). When compared to areas with more extreme variations in temperature, the moderate climate of the city lends itself to a more endurable environment for homeless individuals. As such, the City of Crypton is home to one of the largest concentrations of homeless individuals in Canada, and subsequently a significant number of individuals suffering with both addiction and mental health issues (Wilson-Bates, 2008). These demographics contribute to an array of criminogenic factors which often lead to the involvement of law enforcement.

In recent years, the service has announced a commitment to being intelligence-led, and has invested significantly in the development and implementation of ILP infrastructure. Further, as will be described below, the service embraced the opportunity to discuss their organizational adoption of ILP. As such, The Crypton Police Department provided a suitable location to conduct a case study of ILP adoption.

Gaining Access and Preparing to Enter the Field

Crypton Police Department was selected as the case study site for this research study for two central reasons. First was the organization's purported prominence regarding ILP practices in the nation (Prox, 2013). CPD appeared to have taken vast strides toward both technology and personnel to support an ILP approach. The philosophy was prominently touted by the organization and, as such, the state of ILP reform in CPD appeared to be further along than other services in Canada. The second major reason for studying CPD was the ability to attain organizational access. Research access to Crypton Police Department was acquired through my thesis supervisor, who secured access through a superintendent to study ILP implementation

across the department. The superintendent supported the study and informed individuals working within the department that various units would be participating. Attaining the support of this significant gatekeeper facilitated a large degree of access, and encouraged the participation of organizational members (Warren & Karner, 2010). Research has found that securing support from those in charge of an organization is especially necessary in settings such as police services, which operate under the centralized control of a paramilitary structure (Fox & Lundman, 1974). Marks (2003) identified an increased willingness to accept external researchers during times when an organization is seeking to illustrate *accountability* measures. When considering that this condition may be conducive to the executive-level support of research access, the political context surrounding the CPD at the time (see Chapter Three) may have contributed to this receptive attitude toward the study.

Before entering the field, I developed a number of research questions to guide my inquiry:

I) How do patrol officers define and understand crime analysis?
II) What education and training do patrol officers possess in regards to using crime analysis in their role?
III) How is crime analysis 'valued' by patrol officers?
IV) How do patrol officers perceive the 'organizational fit' of crime analytics?
V) How, if at all, are analytical products being used by patrol officers?

In keeping with the emergent nature of qualitative inquiry (Charmaz, 2006), these questions were changed and refined as I collected data and followed interesting leads. The details of this analysis process and subsequent final research questions will be outlined in the data analysis section of this chapter.

I received ethical clearance for the study from the Wilfrid Laurier University Research Ethics Board (REB# 3927) prior to entering the field. Both anonymity and confidentiality measures were employed to protect the identities of participants of this study. While anonymity

cannot be fully maintained due to the interview/observatory nature of the methodology, several steps were taken to protect the confidentiality of the individuals who engaged in interviews or observation. As with much qualitative fieldwork, “case study research shares an intense interest in personal views and circumstances” (Stake, 1994: 244). Due to the nature of the research and its focus on organizational practices and behaviours, participants were asked to share their personal views and experiences of their place of employment, risking formal and informal repercussions should unfavourable viewpoints be revealed (Warren & Karner, 2010). Employees risk potential backlash from superiors and colleagues if they were to speak negatively about their position or organization. This creates an ethical risk of potential professional and peer consequences (Warren & Karner, 2010).

In order to mitigate the risk of identification, interviewees were provided with a number at the outset of the interview, and were thus identified only by this number on the digital recording and subsequent transcript. Digital files and transcripts were stored on a password-protected computer, and voice recordings were destroyed immediately following transcription. Consent forms containing identifying information were stored in a locked filing cabinet. Anonymity is protected in this thesis as all participant references and quotes refer to their position and participant number, with no identifiable information.

Given that this research provides a case study of one specific organization, the name of the organization was replaced with a pseudonym in all references within this thesis, as well as in the bibliographic entries for organizational documents. Descriptors which provided identifiable information were rendered vague in order to disguise the organization and city of focus. It must be noted that the case-study nature of this study, and organizational selection of some participants maintains some level of risk that others within the organization, namely those who

selected participants, may be able to infer their identify (Warren & Karner, 2010). This risk has been mitigated through the anonymization of quotes, and participants were made explicitly aware of this risk prior to participating. Participants were provided with both a letter of information and verbal prologue which explicitly outlined the motivations, areas of interest, privacy measures, participant rights and potential risks of engagement. Officers were required to sign an informed consent document prior to engaging in an interview, or allowing me to observe them on a ride-along.

The first time I entered the field was on a week-long research trip that had been organized in conjunction with the organization. Myself, my supervisor, and my supervisor's research associate spent several days with CPD. Seven interviews with patrol officers and middle-management personnel in operations were scheduled for me ahead of time by the department, and snowball sampling was used to recruit additional participants through contacts made within the department. I had been provided with the name of an administrative staff member of the operations division who met me in the lobby of the station, and took me upstairs to a boardroom that had been booked for my interviews. Officers had been directed to meet me at this location at scheduled times throughout the day. I conducted ten interviews in-person during this trip, and five telephone interviews once returning home. Permission to conduct observation ride-alongs was provided by CPD, following a review of the research objectives, and a background check of my criminal record history and any recorded incidents with police. I participated in one ride-along during this initial round of data collection.

Thanks to a contact that was made during the interview process, I was able to enter the field once again one year later to conduct additional participant-observation data. As will be described in my section on data analysis, this gap in fieldwork time allowed me to analyze my

data and return to the field to ask follow-up questions and clarify emerging insights. I engaged in a circular process of data collection and analysis, returning to the field to collect additional data to support or refute developing theories. This method of inquiry is central to the emergent nature of qualitative inquiry (Charmaz, 2006).

Data Collection

The level of organizational access allowed the opportunity to conduct an ethnographic case study of patrol work in an intelligence-led service. This ethnography draws on organizational document analysis, in-depth interviewing and observation. These three data sources were chosen with the intent to allow for an analysis of the official claimsmaking surrounding ILP innovation, as well as for an *inhabited* micro-level analysis of institutional change (Hallet, 2010). Drawing upon these data sources addresses both macro and micro components of the ILP paradigm. This triangulation of data sources "serves also to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen" (Stake, 1994: 241). As such, the comparison of organizational documents to the interview and field data allows for an analysis of the varying ways that this phenomenon is presented, understood and enacted. Triangulation, a "process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning", is frequently employed in the case of qualitative case studies, to "reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation... [and] verify the repeatability of an observation or interpretation" (Stake, 1994: 241). Theoretical sampling was employed to select the documents, interview participants, and observation settings that I used as data sources to inform this research. A theoretical sampling approach means that I selected data that was directly relevant to informing the area of interest of this study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). For example, given my interest in exploring how intelligence-led policing has

impacted *patrol* work, I conducted interviews with patrol officers and managers responsible for overseeing patrol units. In contrast, interviewing individuals from investigative units, for example, would have provided little insight into answering my research questions.

Organizational Documents

This study drew upon several publicly available organizational documents concerning the adoption of ILP, such as technological development initiatives, implementation, and success stories. Strategic planning documents and recent government inquiries and recommendations relating to the service's conduct were also incorporated. Document analysis is "particularly applicable" to qualitative case studies as part of creating a "rich description" of the organization of interest (Bowen, 2009: 29). For example, the documents offered rich background information, context, and supplementary data about CPD that provided an opportunity to interrogate the claims being made within CPD and the meaning contained within these claims (Loseke & Best, 2003; Bowen, 2009). Analyzing the organizational documents was particularly relevant given the constructionist, institutional theoretical orientation of the study because institutional theory is attentive to the degree of alignment, or 'coupling' between official organizational rhetoric and the day-to-day realities within organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Words, such as those contained within the organizational documents, are recorded "to *do things* as well as to say things – they have *practical and social impact* as well as [a] communication function.... meaning does not reside in a text but in *the writing and reading* of it" (Hodder, 1994: 394, emphasis added). These documents constitute part of the official public rhetoric surrounding the service's engagement in ILP. From an institutional theoretical perspective, the analytical value of organizational documents extends beyond the claims made

about the organization's adoption of ILP, and directs consideration towards the *external* value of the way that ILP innovation is presented in official organizational releases. While the documents were used to understand the organizational presentation of ILP, I conducted in-depth interviews with patrol officers to understand how they make sense of ILP reform.

In-depth Interviews

In-depth interviews were conducted with fifteen members of the police department. Although the focus of this study was on patrol officers' perceptions of and experiences with ILP adoption, the service also arranged a number of interviews with middle-management personnel from the operations division who are responsible for supervising patrol officers. These interviews remained focused on ILP practices as they relate to patrol work, shedding light on how ILP is perceived to fit within patrol operations from the perspectives of those managing patrol units. The complete sample (n=15) is made up of ten patrol officers and five middle-management personnel. Patrol officers' years of service range from less than five years (n=5), six to ten years (n=4), to over ten years (n=1). Middle-management participants (n=5) include four sergeants and one district superintendent, with all but one having worked in policing for over twenty years.

Qualitative interviewing provided me with an opportunity to learn about the observations and experiences of others, providing rich description of their daily lived realities, including the routines, processes, encounters, and challenges they face (Weiss, 1994). I used a semi-structured interview guide to conduct the interviews[2], asking questions pertaining to both officers' understandings of, and experiences with, ILP and crime analysis as part of their service. The aim of the semi-structured interviews is to elicit detailed narratives that can inform us about

[2] See Appendix A for complete interview guide.

occupations or existences that we ourselves have never experienced or felt, such as the expectations felt by patrol officers or the considerations and dynamics of patrolling the street. Thus, the interviews provided insight into people's "*interior* experiences...what people perceived and how they interpreted their perceptions...how events affected their thoughts and feelings....[and] the meanings to them of their relationships...their work, and their selves" (Weiss, 1994: 1, *emphasis added*).

Interview questions were initially designed around existing literature on ILP at a patrol level, aiming to address gaps in knowledge about patrol officers' perceptions and engagement with ILP and crime analysis. Additional questions were added following the receipt of organizational documents which provided case-specific information, including the solely civilian make-up of the analyst team, and the recent installation of a crime-mapping dashboard into the patrol cars. Initial interviews provided information - such as the organization's use of CompStat - which led to the addition of questions surrounding this process. Further, questions which appeared to cause confusion, or elicit minimal response by officers, were re-worded or removed as the interview process continued.

The semi-structured nature allowed me to direct the conversation toward topics of interest, such as how officers use crime analysis, while allowing flexibility for additional questions to be asked when officers' accounts contained new insights. The interviews ranged from twenty minutes to one hour in the length, with the average interview lasting about forty-five minutes. Ten interviews occurred face-to-face, and five were conducted over the telephone. In-person interviews were conducted individually, in private, in the boardroom of the police station. With the consent of participants, interviews were digitally voice recorded and transcribed verbatim. While interviews provide valuable insight into the processes by which officers make sense of

ILP, they did not provide insight into their '*in-situ*' practices. As Warren & Karner (2010) explain, interview narratives "are embedded in temporal, geographical, political, cultural and social fields – all of which lend shape and form to the story" (p. 27). These narratives are constructions of events and experiences informed by the context, obligations and culture which surround the participant. Thus, I used observation to supplement my understanding of patrol officers' *use and engagement* with ILP and crime analysis.

Observation

Observation allowed me to learn about and record descriptions of events and behaviours as they occurred with participants in their natural settings, offering a look at day-to-day or routine activities and practices (Kawulich, 2005). I completed approximately fifty-five hours of observation for this study, including attending the organization's monthly CompStat meeting, and five police ride-along shifts. Ride-along shifts ranged from six to twelve hours in length. While conducting this research, I adopted an observer-as-participant level of participation in the setting (Gold, 1958). My presence and intentions as a researcher were known to the officers with whom I attended shift briefings and participated in ride-alongs. Although I joined officers on the ins and outs of their shifts and attended calls, my presence was not "natural or normal" (Gold, 1958) as part of the setting. In addition to providing the opportunity to directly observe officer engagement with ILP and crime analysis, conducting field research with officers helped to contextualize the daily realities of patrol work. This was of significant value for myself as a researcher - having never personally engaged in patrol work - as this provided depth and context to an analysis of officers' described experiences within the interview data. Following the initial

round of data collection, I began to analyze the data gleaned from the three data sources outlined above.

Data Analysis: Constructivist Grounded Theory and Sensitizing Concepts

I utilized a constructivist grounded theory method (Charmaz, 2006) to approach data collection, analysis and theory development. Built upon the foundations of Glaser and Strauss' (1967) grounded theory, constructivist grounded uses an inductive analytical approach which allows theory to emerge from the data itself (Charmaz, 2006). The research process was not rigidly defined from the outset, but was guided by notable concepts and themes which emerged. Consistent with a theoretical sampling approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), data collection and analysis occurred as a circular process. Initial themes guided areas of inquiry for further data collection, directing the questions that were asked and the topics that were pursued. This approach to data collection and analysis allowed for me to refine and clarify concepts for theory development (Charmaz, 2006).

Constructivist grounded theory draws upon existing literature and theoretical frames to shape project design and analysis in an emergent fashion (Charmaz, 2006). Blumer (1954) first referred to the use of existing theoretical schemes to inform inquiry as "sensitizing concepts". Sensitizing concepts "give the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. [...] [Rather than] prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look" (Blumer, 1954: 7). Sensitizing concepts are not meant to be definitive but exploratory (Charmaz, 2006). They are used as analytical devices, and may be refined, changed or discarded, depending on their congruency with the data at hand (Blumer 1954; Charmaz, 2006).

As I conducted preliminary analyses, I found that my data were aligning with previous work that asserted ILP had not been operationalized in practice in the way, or to the extent, that it was claimed to be (Ratcliffe, 2004; Cope, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004; Manning, 2008; Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005; Taylor, Kowalyk & Boba, 2007). At the suggestion of my supervisor, I looked to literature on institutional analysis to see if I could locate existing theoretical insights which could inform what I was seeing in my findings. Through immersing myself in literature on organizational and institutional analysis, I identified several concepts which I came to employ as sensitizing concepts in my data analysis. The concepts of "rationalized institutional myths", "loose-coupling" and "sense-making" (complete descriptions are located in the literature review in Chapter Two) provided a way of analyzing the disconnect between ILP's philosophical claims and ground-level manifestation. These concepts contributed to an analysis which moved beyond a critique or an assertion that this indicated a failure to fully implement ILP. Instead, this discrepancy between organizational claims making and officers' practical experiences was analyzed for how it may be *strategic* on the part of the organization. I looked to organizational motivations such as establishing accountability and legitimacy to explain why ILP appeared under-implemented on the ground. Thus, I refined my research questions to align with the findings that were emerging, having adopted an institutional analysis framework. The new research questions were:

I) How closely aligned, or "coupled", are ILP's theoretical applications to the perceptions and experiences of patrol officers working within the service?
II) How do patrol officers understand and 'make sense' of the organizational philosophy of ILP?
III) How do patrol officers define, understand, and experience their engagement with 'proactive' policing practices as part of an intelligence-led service?
IV) What concerns or potential implications arise when considering the practical application of ILP practices illustrated in this study?

Collecting additional field research one year after my initial data collection allowed me to identify supplementary questions, and seek clarification about emerging ideas. For example, much of crime analytic and statistical dissemination to patrol officers seemed to be about redistributing responsibility for crime control to frontline officers (See Chapter Four). Several officers mentioned that districts were divided into "geographic areas of responsibility" (GARs), which they were assigned as their 'own' to manage. During the second round of data collection, I had the opportunity to ask officers if and how they experienced this responsibility, what were the consequences (if any) of controlling crime in their GAR, and to probe further about how GARS are implicated in their daily work. The findings which emerged from my data contained concepts which I could not have anticipated while drafting initial research questions. The emergent nature of a theoretical sampling approach (Charmaz, 2006) allowed me to pursue prominent concepts in greater depth and re-shape my research questions to better reflect the resultant findings.

Coding

Data was organized and analyzed with the use of Nvivo 10 Qualitative Data Analysis software. Interviews transcripts, typed field notes and organization documents were imported and organized within the program. I began initial coding by using the incident-to-incident coding method (Charmaz, 2006) for the first four transcripts, and reflected on the prominent and recurring codes that emerged in this process to create a number of focused codes. I operationalized each of these codes, creating a definition which outlined the parameters of what each code described or contained. For example, the code "disseminating crime analysis to patrol" captured any instances of analytic data being distributed to patrol, whether it be through email, posters, verbal communication, etc. A related but distinct code, "interacting with the analyst",

conversely captured instances of actual interpersonal contact or communication between the analyst and the officers, and excluded report dissemination that was one-directional and electronic.

I then coded all of the interview transcripts and field notes using the focused codes that had emerged from the initial coding process, adding new codes when incidents arose that did not fit into a category, and removing codes if they no longer made sense or held significant relevance to the data. Several in-vivo codes (Charmaz, 2006) that captured the participants own language, such as “going hunting”, “cops on dots”, “paper gangsters”, and crime mapping as a “history report,” emerged. Organizational documents were coded into separate focused codes which denoted that they were broader organizational claims rather than reported experiences. Although some of these codes overlapped, such as “engaging in proactive policing”, creating a distinction in these bucket categories allowed for comparison between how participants discussed these elements of ILP in relation to how they were discussed in a public nature by the organization. For example, “proactive policing” in the organizational rhetoric was portrayed as frequent and commonplace, enabled by the analytic and technological advances of ILP, and informed by crime analysis. For participants, “proactive policing” was a luxury rarely found amidst the situational pace of responding to the call board. When “proactive policing” did occur for participants, it referred to ‘going hunting for usual bad guys’ and pursuing crime categories which ‘interested’ individual officers, with little regard for information from the crime analyst.

Following focused coding, I used axial coding (Charmaz, 2006) to connect and draw links between codes, creating a number of prominent themes which were comprised of several focused codes. For example, the theme of “analyst credibility” emerged upon analyzing several focused codes which all seemed to be related to how analyst credibility was constructed by

officers. Codes including “interacting with the analyst”, “analyst location”, “data quality” and “storytelling about the analyst” all tied into the larger theme of how analyst credibility was shaped in the minds of patrol officers. The links that were drawn between codes during axial coding provided a basis for exploring the nature of the relationships among concepts, and a basis for beginning to reflect upon and understand these relationships.

Memoing and Concept Mapping

Once I had completed axial coding, I began writing memos about the themes, drawing in the words of participants to define and operationalize them. I began creating rough memos containing initial thoughts and ideas that came up while playing back the interview recording during transcription. These initial memos were underdeveloped, noting possible preliminary trends. For example, the following was written in a memo while transcribing interview #11,

> …descriptions of what intelligence led policing means to the officers in both interview #10 and #11 suggests that they see intelligence-led policing and even crime analysis as information sharing *between officer*s, *between squads*, and externally *when necessary*. It is viewed as the officers making a conscious decision to share among one another; it is largely *not analyst-centred* or analytic, *but an increased sharing of subjective incidents/experiences*. It is them *choosing* to share intelligence when appropriate (Analytic memo)

As I began focused coding, I wrote memos that were more detailed and thorough, digging deeper into codes to explore similarities and differences within the way that participants referred to the concept. For example, those of different ranks - patrol versus middle-management - shared notably different accounts on the importance of crime analysis in the service. While middle-management saw it as essential to their role, patrol saw crime analysis largely as an optional tool that was not encouraged or enforced. This led me to reflect on the differing motivations and

expectations placed on middle-management versus patrol, and why bolstering crime analysis may serve the interests of one over another. Notable differences were identified when analyzing the way ILP was discussed in official organizational rhetoric versus personal accounts of individuals working with the service. In Figure 1, I outline the multitude of claims made about ILP practices in organizational documents, and contrast these with their related claims as made by organizational actors. This exercise proved useful for creating an integrated picture of how the organization presented ILP, and theoretically developed the notion of which daily experiences were 'decoupled' from their official blueprint (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Analytically, this assisted me in developing an empirical argument which could illustrate both the *strategic purpose* of these 'decoupled' claims (Chapter Four) as compared with the micro-level practical experiences of officers (Chapter Five).



***Figure 1*: Organizational Claims Versus Participants' Experiences**

In addition to memoing, I created a number of concept maps to draw links between interrelated codes and themes. Concept maps assist me in focusing on meaning, as they reduced large amounts of data to a conceptually manageable form, and provided a visual illustration of how officers have inferred relationships between concepts which contribute to their own meaning-making about ILP (Daley, 2004). Figure 2, is one of my concept maps that explores the questions: “How do patrol officers make sense of the analysts’ role, function, and value? How have patrol officers created a shared understanding of the analysts’ value?” In answering these questions, I concluded that the value (or lack thereof) attributed to the analyst was linked to the low level of credibility that officers’ ascribed to crime analysts. From here, I linked codes and themes which had been implicated in constructing notions of credibility, including interactions with the analyst, the perceived accuracy and utility of analytic reports, and notorious ‘horror stories’ that were told among officers about analysts’ errors. These larger credibility-producing (or inhibiting) concepts were broken down further. For example, interactions with the analyst have the ability to shape credibility, yet officers found that they had very minimal interpersonal contact with the analyst, and thus the ability to build rapport was diminished.



***Figure 2*: Concept Map - Making sense of the analysts’ function and value**

Using concept mapping to visually display prominent themes and codes allowed me to decipher relationships among concepts and determine three overarching ways that officers' understandings are shaped. The concept map above illustrates that officers' perceptions are shaped by spatial dynamics which inhibit integration and interpersonal relationship development. A lack of interaction with the analyst paired with informal discussion and storytelling among officers about the analysts' abilities contributes to understandings about analyst credibility. Reflecting on and analyzing my research data also led me to reflect back on the research process, and how my role as a researcher shaped the interpretation of my data. In what follows, I describe some of the challenges I faced while completing my data collection in the field. I then discuss the implications of such challenges to the analysis and interpretation of data and, ultimately, the construction of knowledge.

Emotionality, Dissonance, and Containment in the Research Process

Ethnography enabled me to observe, learn, feel, and understand an unfamiliar world. Immersing myself into patrol policing provided me with an opportunity to observe contexts, cultures and perspectives shaping the officers' understandings and experiences. While there are many benefits to adopting an ethnographic approach, there were also a number of challenges. For example, Gary Alan Fine (1993) discusses the 'underside' of ethnography - the interpersonal facets which are seldom mentioned when discussing this methodology (p.228). These lesser acknowledged features draw attention to *how* the researcher may shape the environment and outcomes of a research study.

The police organization is a closed setting[3] (Warren & Karner, 2010) and therefore access is a negotiated privilege that can be withdrawn at any time. I felt acutely aware of the importance of how I presented myself throughout the research process. In what follows, I provide a reflexive account of how my positionality (Rose, 1997) as a researcher influenced this study. I will describe the challenges of crafting a self-presentation congruent with the attitudes of some participants in the field. This necessity became challenging at times when observing the realities of police work elicited difficult or negative emotions. I then discuss the potential research implications resulting from the challenges I faced while conducting fieldwork in a police setting.

Constructivist grounded theory purports that researchers play a role in *constructing* the theories which emerge, "offer[ing] an *interpretive* portrayal of the studied world, not an exact picture of it" (Charmaz, 2006: 10; Shwandt, 1994). A researcher's *positionality* – their age, race, gender, socioeconomic status, political stance, motivations, assumptions and personal experiences – exert influence on the research site and the individuals who are being studied (Rose, 1997; Widdowfield, 2000). These aspects have the power to shape the degree of acceptance, openness, honesty, and behaviour of participants. What is said, shared, indulged, or masked, can be vastly swayed by who the researcher is, and how they present themselves (Rose, 1997). When considering my position as a young, female student with little experience in the daily realities of police work, my status as an 'outsider'[4] (Brown, 1996; Warren & Karner, 2010) in the environment was evident. My presence infringed on the usual privacy of the patrol parade room and patrol cruiser. There has been significant recognition that the researcher's presence affects the environment in question, as participants naturally respond and adjust based on the

[3] Closed settings are locations that are not accessible to the general public. Researchers must acquire access through a 'gatekeeper', an individual with the power to grant permission for the researcher to enter the environment.
[4] An 'outsider' refers to a researcher who is not a member of the group being studied, for example, I have no personal policing experience, or experience working within a police organization.

characteristics regarded to the outsider (Fine, 1993). Horn (1997), Marks (2003), and Diphoorn (2012) have written on conducting police research as a female in a hyper-masculine environment, and how this role elicits both positive and negative outcomes. Females are often perceived as trustworthy but powerless. As I noted in one fieldnote,

> *An officer asked sharply, "if you find we don't use it [crime analysis], are they gonna take it out?" I was caught a little off guard and said "no, it doesn't mean that they'll get taken out." (Field notes, Ride-along)*

Admitting to this officer that my research findings may not initiate such a concrete change felt like I had failed to sell the purpose of the study to this officer, suggesting the lack of influence this research may have on the organization. Yet at the same time, I believe this perceived powerlessness allowed officers to let their guard down a bit. Many officers were readily willing to share their critiques of crime analysis within the organization.

Police culture's marked male dominance has been widely illustrated, and even female officers face presumptions of weakness and reduced credibility until they prove their abilities (Horn, 1997). Like Horn (1997), I found myself laughing along with sexist jokes that I would have objected to in another setting. The need to build trust and rapport exceeds that to object or debate. Horn (1997) discusses how police assumptions about women can be used strategically by female researchers to garner more information, but questions the ethics of this approach.

Fine (1993) called attention to the roles played by ethnographers to build trust among participants, but also to the idea that this relationship is reciprocal. Just as the researcher impacts the setting, the environment affects the researcher, with part of this effect being the generation of feelings or emotions regarding what is taking place in the observed setting (Kleinman, 1991; Rose, 1997; Widdowfielfd, 2000). This effect influences how we understand, analyze and write

the outcomes, shaping the production of knowledge (Kleinman, 1991, Widddowfield, 2000; Pellatt, 2003; Diphoorn, 2012).

Establishing credibility and earning trust is essential to police research. The power is in the hands of the organization to end access at any time, or prevent future access. The researcher must display congruence with the participants' opinions and behaviour, proving their support and trustworthiness (Fine, 1993, Bakker & Heuvem, 2006). During one particular interview, I found that laughing along felt especially difficult as the officer referred to people persistently as 'creatures'. I feigned strong enthusiasm toward their ILP endeavours, and nodded favourably when asked by a district inspector if I was enjoying the CompStat meeting. Often, researchers must adopt various personas and roles in order to mediate their relationship with the participants (Fine, 1993). Expressing enthusiasm and awe toward the department's progress encouraged buy-in from middle-management personnel. This enthusiasm to learn about how they have implemented ILP at a more 'advanced level' than many services (Prox, 2013) was, in some ways, misleading them about my research intentions (Fine, 1993). I neglected to mention my growing apprehension about how well-integrated ILP truly was in the organization, or my interests regarding the sociopolitical implications of what the department was doing. Interestingly, I found my approach to be opposite when spending time with patrol officers. Rather than expressing enthusiasm about ILP, patrol officers appeared skeptical about its value. Thus, I found that adopting a stance which supported their skepticism about crime analysis evoked more open conversation.

Police officers are expected by society to present a detached, impersonal and matter of fact attitude that constrains and suppresses expression (Bakker & Heuven, 2006; Martin, 1999).

While we stood waiting in a rundown single room occupancy building for an ambulance for one resident, I remarked to one officer,

> *'It seems like this job would be very emotionally draining.' He said, 'you know, my wife thinks I'm a horrible person, but I just don't give a shit. You can't, you'd go crazy.' (Fieldnotes #5, Ride-along)*

I found myself trying to align my reactions during ride-alongs to be congruent with the indifferent attitude displayed by officers. This management of displayed emotions, or emotion work (Hochschild, 1979), can create emotional dissonance within a researcher (Bakker & Heuven, 2006; Diphoorn, 2012). Emotional dissonance "refers to the structural discrepancy between felt emotions […] and the emotional display that is required and appropriate in the working context (Bakker & Heuven, 2006: 426). Emotional displays are expected to "comply with organizational rules concerning emotional expression" (Bakker & Heuven, 2006: 426; see also Grandey, 2000).

Emotional dissonance in policing often involves suppressing passionate or negative emotions, in favour of indifference (Bakker & Heuven, 2006). While smiling and nodding along became commonplace, one ride-along incident struck an emotional chord which proved challenging to contain and process. I reflected on my feelings toward the incident in a journal entry following the ride along:

> *A call came over the radio that a young male and female had been seen taking clothes from a clothing donation bin in the neighbourhood. As we drove to the scene, the officer I was riding with commented that "stealing from the charity bin isn't really theft". The officer triggered the cruiser lights as we approached a young male walking away from the bin. The male was respectful and cooperative as the officer took his ID and ran it through the system. Inside the car, the officer told me that he had come across this individual before, and that he was an Armenian orphan with a traumatic past of extensive abuse. The officer ordered the young man to empty out the duffel bag and backpack he was carrying, and a number of sweaters, dress shirts, and jeans were pulled from the bags. The young male admitted he had taken them from the donation bin. The male appeared transient, and from my perspective would likely have qualified for donations from wherever these clothes were headed. The*

officer told the man he would need to return the clothes, and proceeded to follow him in the cruiser back to the large metal bin located on the edge of a park. The young man fumbled as he pulled clothes out of the bags and threw them back. He paused and told the officer that several remaining items, including the backpack, had not come from the bin but already belonged to him. The officer proceeded to order him to throw all of these belonging into the bin as well, leaving the man with nothing but the clothes he was wearing. The young man cooperated, and apologized to the officer as he walked away from the scene. The officer commented, 'with a background like his, how could you not be messed up'. The man waved as he walked away, and the officer muttered 'yeah, fuck you' under his breath from inside the car.

This interaction was difficult not just to watch, but to absolutely avoid letting on that it bothered me. I went on to write,

I felt horrified watching this young man forced to throw everything, including his own prior belongings into this bin, knowing he was walking away empty-handed and with nowhere to go. I thought about the level of desperation that one must feel to climb into a donation bin for clothes, and sadness that it ignited such a response from law enforcement - these were donations, after all. I felt anger and disgust that the officer – knowing the individual's difficult background – could make him throw away everything that he had.

Despite the objections that I felt to this interaction, I knew that I needed to disguise my discomfort and maintain a supportive appearance. If I were to object to the situation, I could jeopardize the positive relationship which facilitated research access to the setting. The officer could end the ride along at any moment he chose, and the organization could provide as much or as little access as they feel comfortable. As such, I felt pressure to please the gatekeepers and 'play the game' (Fine, 1993).

Interestingly, the dissonance between felt and displayed emotions is also experienced by officers (Bakker & Heuven, 2006). Many officers likely object to some behaviour that their superiors, colleagues or even they themselves engage in as part of police work, whether it is a mandated or a culturally produced response. As I recorded in my field notes,

While out for coffee, one officer shared that he'd just given a ticket. He mentioned that the sergeant had been on his back to increase ticket numbers. I asked what the ticket was for, and the officer hesitated and said 'failing to signal a lane change', he

> *paused and said 'I know, I was so embarrassed, I walked away with my face hidden in my coat' (Fieldnotes, Ride-along)*

Officers too are expected to constrain such feelings of discomfort. While sharing this experience of dissonance surely does not mean that I could fully understand what it is like to be a police officer, the chance to *experience* this containment process allowed me to better understand the daily realities of these officers. The emotional discomfort of observing the donation bin incident was different from the emotional labour I am familiar with from my professional experience in a social work environment. As I wrote in a journal entry,

> *Maintaining composure is also expected as a social worker, but presenting indifference is not. Expressing compassion is encouraged, and emotions are treated as something to be addressed, not hidden away. The culture among colleagues is more accepting of emotion – as staff, we regularly debrief our feelings with one another as we work with clients navigating significant hardships. Police do not seem to have this opportunity or freedom. The dissonance is magnified and with no outlet.*

My positionality as a researcher, and my own experience with emotional work of a different kind, allowed me to identify difference in the emotional containment performed by police (Bakker & Heuven, 2006). Background professional experience has the power to impact how research is carried out, and the role a researcher assumes (Pellatt, 2003). A journal entry about the influence of my own professional background reads,

> *I felt upset and emotionally triggered by the incident with the orphan. While I knew that reacting was out of the question to protect my professional interests, the officer's response struck a feeling of such discomfort that I struggled to maintain the appearance of support. I have worked closely with many individuals on the other side of the system, individuals who have faced difficult pasts and homelessness just as this orphan faced. I've had the chance to get to know many of these individuals, I have heard their stories, and met their families. My own organizational culture breeds an attitude of acceptance and empathy toward individuals in such circumstances. They are humanized in my mind, exacerbating the emotional strain of observing the officer's behaviour toward this young man.*

As became quite clear from my experience, fieldwork with police has the potential to elicit significant elements of emotionality for the researchers involved. Yet, it is important that we consider how these emotions shape the way that we collect, interpret, analyze and present findings (Kleinman, 1991; Widdowfield, 2000). As Becker (1967) notes, researchers necessarily give precedence to one voice over another, placing greater emphasis on the story of either the dominant or underdog in an organization. As I discovered, a researcher's background and disposition may shape 'whose side they are on' as incidents are interpreted, remembered and documented.

Reflections and Conclusion

Reflecting on my research approach and experience I realize how vital it is to remain reflexive and cognizant of how our inner objections influence the research process, as "emotions play an important role in situating knowledge" (Widdowfield, 2000: 205). Emotions have the power to shape how we interpret a scene, and the actors within it. We may hold pre-existing dispositions toward police behaviour, or the individuals in question. The validity and generalizability of uncovered 'truths' must be considered in relation to the role that emotions may play in the interpretation of findings (Fine, 1993). Validity in qualitative research refers to making interpretations which align as best as possible with the meaning conveyed by the action (Warren & Karner, 2010). If negative emotions skew perceptions about the participant, their subsequent behaviour may be interpreted more negatively as well. In remaining mindful of validity, we must be aware of this implication as we interpret and document.

This emotion work - specifically the containment of expression (Bakker & Heuven, 2006) - branches into the way that findings are presented as well (Van Maanen, 1979). While

emotional reactions may paint a negative light over another's intentions, containing this reaction becomes essential (Van Maanen, 1979; Kleinman, 1991; Fine, 1993). Findings, especially when researching powerful groups such as the police, may be presented as gentler or more ambiguous claims than what was observed (Fine, 1993). Police officers constrain emotion to adhere to career expectations (Bakker & Heuven, 2006) as must police researchers in order to protect concerns about future research access and subsequent career vitality. The institutional power of police organizations shapes what is written about them, as researchers must write with the organizational gatekeepers as a potential reader in mind. The gatekeeper must be pleased to secure ongoing and future access, and to facilitate connections. Given that I was conducting my first police research study, and intending to continue in the field for my doctorate, I knew that carefully navigating relationships and being tactful about the way things were written was essential to maintaining approval for future research. This reliance thereby shapes the knowledge that is produced about policing. Knowing the implications of breaking this respect places boundaries around what I write about (Van Maanen, 1979).

Now that I have provided a detailed account of my data analysis and illustrated how the theoretical position is both connected to and compatible with the methodology employed, I move on to an analysis of how ILP has been presented and rationalized by the organization.

Chapter Four: The Organizational Adoption of Intelligence-led Policing

In this chapter, I explore how CPD has presented and rationalized the implementation of ILP in the department. At the time of adoption, CPD was facing significant negative publicity for their involvement in a serial murder investigation. As such, I argue that embracing ILP was a means through which CPD could demonstrate accountability, responsibility, and restore trust. Drawing on an analysis of organizational documents, published articles, news media releases, industry trade magazines, and five interviews with management personnel from the operational patrol division, I examine the organizational claimsmaking surrounding ILP. Employing Strauss' (1982) work on social legitimation processes, I demonstrate how organizational claimsmaking around ILP, including claims of worth, distancing, purporting professionalism, and boundary setting, provide a means of acquiring legitimacy.

For CPD, there are several audiences from whom it is vital to acquire legitimacy. These include various levels of government, other law enforcement agencies, community stakeholders, and the public at large. The documents and articles drawn upon in this analysis are authored by or contain statements from CPD staff or associates. These documents illustrate organizational claims which promote CPD's ILP adoption in a publicly accessible format, available from the organization's official website, or through industry web pages. Further, statements from management personnel represent claimsmaking of a public nature to government and community members, as well as internal claimsmaking to CPD officers about ILP and its purpose.

I begin with a discussion of organizational rationality and accountability as they relate to acquiring legitimation. I then provide a description of the social and political contexts surrounding the implementation of ILP. I then move to an analysis of CPD's claimsmaking

activities. I conclude by discussing how the organizational claimsmaking places increased responsibility on patrol officers to prevent *future* incidents.

Defining Organizational Rationality, Accountability and Legitimacy

As outlined in the literature review in chapter two, institutional theory examines how the prevailing institutional, societal, and environmental culture shapes the rules and practices of an organization. Organizations adopt formal rules and structures which align with dominant societal and institutional beliefs about organizational work and how it should function (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). ILP refers both to a management philosophy for governing contemporary police departments (Ratcliffe, 2008; Sheptycki, 2013), and to a set of organizational practices involving rampant expansion of technological infrastructure to support an increasing reliance on information gathering and data analysis for decision-making (Ratcliffe, 2008; Cope, 2004). ILP advocates for improving resourcing decisions, economic efficiency, and accountability while simultaneously promising heightened crime control and community safety (Ratcliffe, 2008).

Given that ILP is an example of a change in institutional paradigm, neo-institutional theory provides a framework for exploring this shift. Neo-institutionalism (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) argues that organizational reform activities are used as a means for acquiring legitimacy by aligning the organization with processes and values perceived to be legitimate. For instance, contemporary reforms often emphasize rationality and accountability as desirable organizational qualities. Rationality is defined as “the extent to which a series of actions is organized in such a way as to lead to predetermined goals with maximum efficiency” (Scott, 2003: 33). It is understood as an orderly, systematic, and calculated approach which prevails

over decisions driven by emotions, feelings or personal insights (Swidler, 1973). In a rational organization, action is believed to be controlled, intentional, and purposeful (Scott, 2003). Rational organizations function with strong "authority, control, coordination, rules, directives and performance programs," with organizational actors coordinated and constrained by directive processes with clear limits (Scott, 2003: 34).

These tightly controlled processes are governed through both goal specificity and the formalization of roles (Scott, 2003). Goal specificity refers to the use of detailed performance gauges to guide behaviour toward specific goals. Goal specification controls decisions regarding action and consequences (Scott, 2003). Formalization involves implementing "precise and explicit" rules designating task and behaviour expectations of organizational actors (Scott, 2003: 35). The formalization of a role distinguishes conduct and responsibility, attempting to render the behaviour of organizational actors standardized and predictable (Scott, 2003). Formalization infers *objectivity* of organizational structures, roles, and relationships, suggesting that behaviours are regulated by the role one holds, and are "external to the participating actors" themselves (Scott, 2003: 36). It is within goal specificity and formalization that notions of accountability emerge.

Accountability "…implies an obligation to explain to someone else, who has authority to assess the account and allocate praise or blame for what was done or not done (Jones & Stewart, 2009: 59). Establishing expectations for both role-specific behaviour and performance suggests that deviating from these structures would be both detected and addressed. Organizations are expected to enact both internal and external accountability mechanisms by monitoring the work of those within the organization through supervision and oversight, while also maintaining accountability to the groups served by the organization (Haas & Shaffir, 1977). Organizations

make claims about the rationality and accountability of their policies and practices in order to acquire social legitimacy.

Legitimacy is constructed through determinations such as: *who* has the right or obligation to carry out certain activities, *how* they are to be carried out, and *when* this behaviour is acceptable or expected (Strauss, 1982). For example, police officers possess the right to make an arrest when a citizen has broken the law. They are obligated by citizens to intervene in situations of disruption or danger. There are formal rules for arrest behaviour such as acceptable levels of force and clearly articulating rights upon arrest. When an officer makes an arrest which defies standard guidelines, the legitimacy of the arrest may be questioned. In the context of policing, legitimacy involves perceptions around "the right to exercise power" (Tankebe, 2013: 103). The police hold a considerable level of power over average citizens, and citizens must perceive that police power is being used appropriately in order for a department to acquire legitimacy.

Issues of legitimacy may pertain to technological, spatial and organizational facets (Strauss, 1982). Where technology has become commonplace to accomplish a desired end, an organization that does not use such tools is regarded as less legitimate. For example, police reports are entered electronically into a database system. If a police organization were to revert to pen and paper reports stored in filing cabinets, this would damage perceptions of organizational legitimacy. Legitimacy promotes a sense of worthiness and value, attributes that - if lacking - may threaten the viability of an organization (Strauss, 1982; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Acquiring legitimacy in the eyes of the public is essential for police departments who depend on support and active cooperation from citizens (Tankebe, 2013).

Strauss (1982) identified how legitimacy is acquired through a set of social processes. These processes of legitimation include discovering and claiming worth, establishing distance

from past practices, and conveying an image of professionalization through standard setting, boundary setting, and evaluation. The process of discovering and claiming worth involves identifying different or nascent activities or strategies, and establishing that they are *worth* doing. That is, that they are distinctive from other approaches in a positive way. It also involves clearly asserting that "*we",* the organization, are engaging in said worthwhile activities (Strauss, 1982). This legitimation process is used to "mark distinctiveness, argue for resources," and illustrate "legitimacy for its activities, ideas, [and] technologies" (Strauss, 1982: 175).

The act of distancing builds upon discovering and claiming worth, involving claims that an organization's activities are not only legitimate and worth pursuing, but they are *even more* legitimate than others' (Strauss, 1982). This process of distinguishing oneself from others can be both internal (claiming distance from past management, past organizational actors) and external (claiming distance from other organizations). Quaid (1993) discusses how promoting change to institutional processes requires the organization to discredit past methods in order to justify the need for a new approach. This degradation process, discrediting the 'old' to bolster support for the 'new', helps to facilitate this distancing (Quaid, 1993). Distancing can be used to convey notions of competence over others who may have been regarded as ineffective (Haas & Shaffir, 1977). New policies, practices, and behaviour are promoted as *superior* to those of the past, and of other organizations.

Finally, an organization can bolster legitimacy through professionalization and formalization which is accomplished through the creation of formal definitions and boundaries around roles and responsibilities (Haas & Shaffir, 1977; Strauss, 1982; Scott, 2003; Sanders, 2014). This means distinguishing who has a 'legitimate' right - and a *responsibility* - to act, and what the appropriate action is (Strauss, 1982; Scott, 2003). Expanding and heightening

responsibility for crime control has been a prevalent adaptive approach taken by contemporary law enforcement agencies (Garland, 1996). Formalizing roles within an organization facilitates official assignment of such responsibility. Further, professionalization and formalization involves setting standards to measure actions and results, and subjecting both organizational actors and the organization itself to evaluation criteria (Strauss, 1982).

Organizational Context: Embracing ILP in a Time of Need

Having defined the theoretical concepts that frame this chapter, I now move to a description of the social and political contexts surrounding the implementation of ILP. The decision to restructure policies and programs, invest in new tools or information technologies, and even reconfigure ideological aspects of organizational functioning is often motivated by an interplay of external forces which institutions operate within. At the time of ILP implementation, CPD was the subject of significant negative backlash because of their involvement in a highly publicized serial murder case. The case received notable attention as allegations of mishandling led to a public inquiry into CPD's conduct. The organization also faced responsibility for maintaining public safety and security during a major upcoming international sporting event. These factors, I argue, placed pressure on CPD to restore public confidence in the department's competency.

Prior to implementing ILP, CPD had been investigated for its involvement in a notorious serial murder case. The handling of the case was subject to a public inquiry that pointed to a number of errors and oversights. Significant public criticism centred on the many victims who had been reported missing yet minimally pursued (Parsons[5], 2012a). In a review of the

[5] A pseudonym has been used in place of the public inquiry report in order to protect organizational anonymity.

investigation the inquiry asserted that technical, procedural, and cultural circumstances in the CPD contributed to the mishandling of the case (Parsons, 2012a).

The inquiry claimed that technological limitations hindered the department's ability to manage the case. It pointed to unimplemented Major Case Management (MCM) technologies, as well as a failure to follow MCM procedures once a serial offender was suspected (Parsons, 2012a). Inadequate technologies were implicated in the department's failure to link disparate information sources and identify that a trend was emerging. The report argued that the systems in place were not able to handle such a complex case (Parsons, 2012a). During the course of the investigation, the use of information technology was becoming increasingly prominent in police work. However, initial notes for the case had been taken by hand, and email was used inconsistently for communication. The report drew attention to the fact that the lead investigator for the case was not equipped with sufficient technology – or even a computer – during the early period of inquiry (Parsons, 2012a).

From a procedural standpoint, the inquiry cited poor report taking, including issues of timeliness and comprehensiveness, during initial documentation when individuals were reported missing (Parsons, 2012a). The details, or lack thereof, contained in these reports were seen as contributing to delays in detecting similarities between cases. According to the report, this insufficient reporting coincided with inadequate risk assessment procedures which failed to link the incidents, or trigger early concern of foul play. Without a systematic process to determine risk, "patrol was only deployed based on the *perception of urgency* of the person taking the report" (Parsons, 2012b: 26, emphasis added). Incidents were either not followed up on, or investigations were deemed to be low priority, proceeding slowly and with minimal effort. It appeared that responsibility for the case, and decisions made throughout, was indistinctly

defined. The report asserted that responsibility became contentious within the hierarchical organizational structure and ownership offhandedly passed between ranks and titles. Many officers who were interviewed by the inquiry believed that it was beyond their realm of responsibility to have questioned actions or responded differently (Parsons, 2012a). Further, the review identified a lack of proactive behaviour by the department to cultivate awareness among at-risk individuals (Parsons, 2012a).

The significant delay establishing concern was also linked to information sharing procedures, specifically a lack of information sharing between police jurisdictions (Parsons, 2012a). Incidents had arisen across several police jurisdictions in the area and a failure to share information between departments was argued to contribute to insufficient detection and a hindered investigation. The management of information, including both reporting and sharing practices were cited as contributing to a flawed risk assessment and delayed suspicion of a serial killer in the area (Parsons, 2012).

Cultural factors within the organization were also identified as a contributing factor to the delay in resource allocation for the case (Oppal 2012). The report attributed a lack of information sharing not only to procedural failures, but also to behaviour rooted in a culture that values secrecy (Parsons, 2012; see also Sanders & Henderson, 2012; Sanders et al., 2015). Beyond the failure to *detect* a crime spree, it was suggested that systemic bias toward the socio-demographics of the missing individuals contributed to a lack of concern over and attention to the case (Parsons, 2012). The inquiry stated that "the [police departments involved] relied on preconceived notions [of the individuals] rather than seeking out available information. This stereotyping contributed to a faulty risk assessment, which in turn delayed suspicion of foul play" (Parsons, 2012b: 231). Discriminatory views related to the socioeconomic background and

lifestyles of the missing individuals was argued to have contributed to decisions regarding resource allocation, or lack thereof, for investigating these disappearances (Parsons, 2012a). The extended length of time over which incidents remained uninvestigated led the inquiry to conclude that basing priority on *perception* meant that "the investigations [of the missing individuals] were not treated as urgent" (Parsons, 2012b: 24). This inadvertently allowed a much greater span of time over which more and more victims were targeted. The department faced harsh critique that community safety was left in jeopardy and many individuals lost their lives as a result of police inattention, discrimination, and neglect.

In light of findings of systemic discrimination, the inquiry went on to discuss perpetual issues of distrust between members of marginalized groups and the police. Of particular concern was the fact that certain groups, such as those who were victimized in this case, feel hesitancy to report information or suspicious occurrences to the police (Parsons, 2012a). The inquiry recommended that in order to improve communication with disadvantaged groups, CPD should reduce the number of tickets issued for minor offenses. It identified that tickets and warrants for transgressions such as breach of probation *further marginalize* those in question. The inquiry advised that,

> One important avenue for reform is to reduce the likelihood that a vulnerable [individual] will be subject to a court warrant by minimizing ticketing for minor offenses and bail conditions that are difficult to live up to… This could be achieved first, by using police discretion during the charging phase to reduce the number of tickets handed out; and secondly, by making greater use of existing diversionary measures to deal with minor offenses (Parsons, 2012a: 131)

Improving relations between the police and vulnerable groups was recommended in order to promote reporting in the future. Incessant ticketing was cited as jeopardizing trust and thus reducing the likelihood of attaining valuable information from vulnerable populations.

The inquiry concluded that the department lacked proper internal and external accountability mechanisms to assign responsibility and monitor performance (Parsons, 2012a). The errors and oversights outlined above were enabled by a failure to review and correct both case management and individuals' practices (Parsons, 2012a).

At the time of the report, the city of Crypton was set to host a major upcoming international sporting event, and thus CPD had an opportunity to rebuild trust and credibility in a highly publicized manner. Since 9/11, responsibility for maintaining security during high profile events has involved an increased pressure to anticipate domestic or international terrorist threats (Murphy, 2007). When it comes to counter-terrorism efforts, police are considered to be a frontline defense in detecting and investigating suspicious activity (Murphy, 2007; Boyd-Caine, 2007). The department found itself under pressure to ensure adequate public safety measures were in place for the event. The impending responsibility of hosting this event, I argue, accelerated the resourcing and implementation of ILP in the department (Crypton Police Department, 2008). In what follows, I examine the organizational claimsmaking activities surrounding ILP adoption. I argue that the organizational claims focused on *demonstrating* rationality and accountability as a means to acquire social legitimation.

Organizational Presentation and Rationalization of ILP

A significant part of acquiring legitimacy depends on how new policies, programs or tools are *perceived* by those external to the organization. Given that most of what occurs within an organization remains out of public sight, it is the claims made about such organizational endeavours that shape the understandings of how a given organization operates (Weick, 1976, Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In this section, I explore how CPD presented and rationalized their

adoption of ILP practices and the organizational interests served by this claimsmaking. First, I describe how CPD positioned itself as an organization at the forefront of ILP innovation, committed to organizational development and change. I then illustrate how organizational claimsmaking, such as claiming worth, distancing, and purporting professionalism, were used as a means to acquire social legitimation.

Discovering and Claiming Worth: CPD as Leaders in Innovation

A predominant theme found within the organizational claimsmaking was that of 'claiming worth' by identifying CPD as an international leader in police innovation. In fact, the organizational claimsmaking provided an opportunity for CPD to identify how their organizational reforms address previous technological, procedural, and cultural failures.

On a technological front, the department recruited a number of industry "high flyers" to design and develop a database system to support their analytical capacities (Allen, 2013). This interface is used to extract incident data from the department's records management system (RMS) which can then be drawn upon for analysis. This advancement earned CPD "an honorable mention...for outstanding technical achievements" from a prominent technology innovation awards committee (Brewer, 2008: 1). CPD has since gone on to licence this software to other departments, fostering an image as a leader in police innovation and suggesting other "police agencies should take note of the system and strive to head in the same direction" (Chang, 2013: 10). Entering industry competitions and making claims about promoting these technologies to other police departments cultivate an image of prestige for CPD.

Further, in conjunction with this software, CPD designed a graphic mapping interface, allowing officers to

> pull up any quadrant of the city [and] enter search parameters…so their first day back on shift, they wanted to see what happened over the last 4 days that they've been off, they can pick all the crime categories that are offered, they can pick one crime category in particular, they can set a time frame, they can look at the district and see where that crime happened, and they can drill down specifically and pull up each individual report of those crimes happening in the district to get more information (I4, District Inspector).

This technology is available in both desktop and mobile format, granting officers the ability to use the program directly from a patrol car. CPD claimed that this ability "offers field staff some GIS-based crime analysis and query capabilities" while on the street (Allen, 2013: 6). Such claims about technological innovations in policing convey notions of social capital, and provide an aura of prestige for the organization, given the wider cultural confidence in the promises of technology (Manning, 1992; Leman-Langlois & Shearing, 2009).

The significant publicity surrounding the forthcoming sporting event provided an opportunity to highlight and showcase "the value of an analytics-driven approach to policing" (Prox, 2013: 2). To support their analytical capacity, the department developed a database system to extract data from the larger RMS that CPD reports are initially inputted. This database system was claimed to provide an 'early warning system' during the event and claimed an ability to identify indicators or incidents that may foreshadow an intensification of concerning behaviour. Predictive analytic technologies were also employed to anticipate time lapse and severity if various explosive substances were to be discharged (Chang, 2015). A public declaration by an FBI member overseeing these security measures exclaimed that, with the intelligence-gathering and advanced warning systems in place, "if something is going to happen at [the event], the police already know about it" (Plecas, Dow, Diplock & Martin, 2010: 20). After the event concluded without incident, the department was praised by government officials and other agencies for the planning and execution of these security measures, with a CPD executive

claiming that the agency “won gold” for their successful operation (Plecas et al., 2010). An industry article bolsters this claim, stating that CPD “used GIS analysis to ensure the safety of millions of people” during the event (ESRI Canada, 2011). Technological advancements are framed as an integral tool for maintaining community safety and preventing harm.

In addition to investing in technological development, the department hired 25 new crime and intelligence analysts, which set them apart from other departments of similar size in the nation (Chang, 2013). With one analyst assigned to each of the four patrol districts in the operations division, these individuals are responsible for tracking crime trends within district boundaries. The creation of a centralized crime analysis unit provides additional support for monitoring crime statistics across the wider jurisdiction. Those designated as 'crime analysts' are assigned to report on a broad range of crime types, while 'intelligence analysts' are stationed within speciality investigative units to assist in a focused, crime-specific manner. For example, district crime analysts track occurrence rates and types in a designated quadrant of the city, creating reports which highlight patterns and hot-spots. Intelligence analysts, on the other hand, provide assistance to a specified unit (for example the Gang Crime Unit), and assist with collating data, such as wireless tower pings to track the location of a particular suspect (Field notes #1, Meeting with CPD Analytic Services Coordinator).

Complementing a commitment to data-driven methods of police management, CPD implemented an “intelligence-led CompStat policing model” ([Crypton] Police Department, 2013: 1). CompStat is designed to promote accountability by requiring each district inspector to explain crime trends, justify strategic responses, and illustrate accomplishments. In CPD, each of the four patrol divisions holds weekly meetings to compare and discuss crime statistics, and a department-wide CompStat meeting is held every 28 days (I1, I4). Although not open to the

general public due to confidentiality concerns, a superintendent explained that "key stakeholders from the community" are regularly invited to sit in and observe CPD CompStat meetings (Fieldnotes #3, CompStat meeting). The following excerpt from my field notes outlines the CompStat approach:

> Each district inspector takes a turn stepping up to the podium, facing a large table of police executives and representatives from each investigational unit. Beyond the table sits the audience of approximately thirty individuals from throughout the department. Everyone at the meeting is given a handout detailing the monthly and year to date statistics for each division. A superintendent seated in the middle of the table is chairing the meeting. The inspector is questioned about each major crime category individually, including robbery, assault, sexual assault, theft of auto, and theft from auto. Three large projection screens stand next to the podium, two screens contained maps indicating incident locations from the current and previous month. The third displayed a bar graph with month-by-month incident rates for the last twelve months of the crime category at hand. For each crime category, the inspector describes a few select cases, explaining the incidents that occurred, and the response, or planned response, to address the issue. The inspector is praised by the superintendent when numbers are favourable, and must provide a justification and plan of action when they are not. For example, district one faced increased rates for commercial break and enters. The superintendent called upon the inspector to 'tell us what you've been doing about commercial break and enters'. The inspector acknowledged the increase, citing a known offender who had been operating in the area but had since been arrested. He went on to discuss the steps he has taken, such as consulting with the Business Improvement Association of the area to promote education programs about target hardening and encouraging businesses to install security cameras. He asserted that commercial break and enters would remain a 'priority' for next month. The superintendent nodded along as the inspector outlined these remedial approaches. After each crime category is covered, the district is assessed based on number of tickets issued, street checks written, and number of 'call outs', or sick days taken. (Field notes #3, CompStat meeting)

As the first law enforcement agency in the nation to implement this performance gauge, the organization aligns itself with the formalized, accountability-centred values of CompStat-style management. In the example above, we see these elements of accountability as the inspector is obligated to justify his approach. He is expected to provide an explanation for current rates, and

an action plan to control next month's outcomes. As a superintendent explained after the meeting, the CompStat model was appealing to the organization because,

> ...it's about instilling *layers of accountability*. It forces inspectors to stay on top of what's going on in their district. It's been very effective in the United States, and the department was inspired by the results in New York and LA (Superintendent, Field notes #3, CompStat meeting)

Thus, CPD is among the first to claim the worth of CompStat in the Canadian policing sphere. The notion of being first and *leading the way* emerges as a prominent theme throughout the organization's presentation of ILP. Organizational claims include citing CPD as "Canada's leader in innovative policing" ([Crypton] Police Department, 2012b: 7), and "one of the Canadian leaders in using intelligence-led policing methods" (Chang, 2013: 10). The department highlights that they are "*pushing institutional boundaries*", incorporating analytics in a way that has yet to be seen across the policing sector (Allen, 2013, emphasis added). Further, CPD has claimed immunity from challenges reported by other prospective intelligence-led departments. Common challenges to ILP implementation include a lack of training for management and officers, ongoing resistance to information sharing, inadequate technologies, ambiguous roles of analysts, and organizational cultural apprehension toward the introduction of civilian analysts. However, CPD claims to have overcome these barriers and claims to be embracing ILP across the organization (Ratcliffe, 2007; Prox, 2013).

Organizational claims around ILP are used to claim organizational worth as a leader of police innovation. The department presents itself as having more sophisticated technology, infrastructure, personnel and procedures to carry out ILP than other police organizations in the nation. Such active attempts at claiming worth are used by CPD as a means to acquire social legitimation.

Distancing: Rationalizing New Methods, Improving on the Past

In order to generate support for their new organizational reform, CPD engages in processes of distancing by presenting ILP as distinct from their previous management philosophies, as well as those of other Canadian police departments. The public inquiry itself played a significant role in discrediting the adequacy of past practices and provided an opportunity for CPD to claim that such weaknesses have been remedied by new technology and procedures.

The technologies of ILP, such as advanced records management systems, geographical information systems (GIS) and analytic capabilities are touted as superior to previous technologies. As the following organizational document claims,

> There were too many silos of information ... There was a clear need to collect, collate, evaluate and analyze information in a timely manner with the greatest impetus being the overwhelming volumes of evidence and information (Brewer, 2008: 2).

The investment in technological development by the organization is cited as a solution:

> [The department] developed and deployed a sophisticated crime and intelligence analysis system ....[and] using GIS mapping plus spatial, temporal and link analyses, [this] solution helps the department's crime analysts make sense of location and event-related data. By tracking and mapping crime events and its movement over time, the department can better identify and understand any underlying patterns and trends common to a crime series... (Prox, 2013: 2)

Organizational claimsmaking of ILP touts that "web-based crime mapping and analysis capabilities provide considerable improvements over previous paper based methods of information dissemination" (Herchenrader & Myheill-Jones, 2014: 146). According to the organization, the development and use of new technologies promises a way of detecting patterns in a more systematic, efficient way. According to the organization, this "early detection of crime trends leads to *preventing crime from continuing* as opposed to simply reacting to crime trends

after they have occurred" (Brewer, 2008: 1, *emphasis added*). By leveraging technology, it is suggested that the early identification of trends will detect risk, ignite action and even reduce the degree of harm. The organizational claims concerning leveraging technology address technological failure and provide distance from previous organizational practices.

Technologies such as those developed and implemented as part of ILP are sold on the basis that the potential downfall of not using them exceeds the possible implications which accompany them (March, 2006). The organization credits ILP infrastructure and new technology with the apprehension of a serial child sex offender. The organization posits that "without the system it is possible [perpetrator's name] would have never been caught" (Chang, 2013: 11). This claim evokes fear that dangerous predators may roam free without assistance from advanced analytical technologies. Engaging the highest level of sophistication possible is viewed as the most responsible choice. Framing these technologies as the *key* to solving this case creates distance between present investigative capabilities and those that would have been employed before such technology was developed.

The CPD publicly credited the inquiry for identifying failures related to information sharing. The organization cited that "the aftermath of the inquiry and the public backlash against what had happened ... was critical .... as one of the issues it raised was the lack of multi-jurisdictional analysis capability" (Allen, 2013: 1). The department acknowledges that during the case, they "were operating in a... department bubble, as were other jurisdictions… the [CPD] opted for development of analytics capability that could ultimately scale province wide" (Allen, 2013: 1). Technological improvements are argued to enhance information sharing processes, thus ameliorating this problem. According to the organization, the development of ILP technologies in the organization "has truly revolutionized the way police officers in [the province] use

technology to share critical information in real time from their police vehicles" (Brewer, 2008: 2). The use of advanced technology is framed as a remedy to the failures of the past, facilitating sharing and access that was not previously available.

In addition to distancing itself from old and inept technologies, the organization also portrayed present management personnel as more innovative and forward-thinking than executives of the past:

> Current executive level deputy chiefs are also more inclined towards "risk taking in this area" ... or at least more determined to leverage technology ...This top-down cultural shift really had an impact on the organization's approach to the use of technology (Allen, 2013: 2).

The claim above clearly demonstrates processes of distancing as CPD actively distances its new reform from the past management ideologies and circumstances. Specifically, the above claim purports that the CPD is being run under management which supports innovation. Such claimsmaking provides a means to acquire legitimacy by bringing the past into disrepute.

Further, establishing distance from practices which may be susceptible to bias or discrimination was also pivotal for the CPD following the inquiry. Discriminatory views of the individuals involved and the nature of their lifestyles were shown to have contributed to decisions regarding the lack of resource allocation and investigation (Parsons, 2012a). In contrast, ILP, as one superintendent describes "is a philosophy that is the use of *information* to guide the deployment of resources" (I4, District Inspector). As another officer puts it, under ILP "what we do *comes from* statistics that we develop" (I3, Constable). CPD frames information as the catalyst for decision-making and organizational action under an ILP approach. ILP is claimed to provide an assessment which relies on information and technology, and is presented as a more *objective* tool, a safeguard against human biases. This is believed to allow CPD to develop policies driven by "data, information, and *evidence*" (Garrett, 2011).

Information management and reporting procedures were cited as flawed by the inquiry. When working under an ILP framework, the organization directly acknowledges the need for adequate report taking on the part of officers, as

> system integrity hinges on quality information submitted by front-line officers and investigators. The old adage "garbage in, garbage out" has never been so true. *Front-line officers* who are tied to a radio and typically run off their feet *need to understand the necessity of complete and accurate information for initial reporting* (Brewer, 2008: 3, emphasis added).

Employing a system which relies upon the collection of detailed information and intelligence communicates an organizational commitment to adequate report taking measures. The organization outwardly acknowledges a need to ensure frontline officers fulfil these duties.

In order to acquire legitimacy, CPD engaged in claimsmaking that asserted distance from previous technologies, procedures and practices and provided a picture of a rational and accountable organization.

Professionalization and Formalization: Taking Responsibility by Assigning Responsibility

While CPD engaged in processes of claiming worth and distancing, they also put forth claims of professionalization and formalization. Professionalization involves assigning clear responsibilities, standards and expectations to each role (Strauss, 1967; Scott, 2003). For example, as the number and function of analysts has expanded in recent years, the role is predominantly filled by civilian staff. In the past, sworn officers on modified duty frequently filled analyst roles in the department. The decision to civilianize the analyst role was advocated by the organization to allow for cost-saving and expertise-garnering; analysts are now civilians educated in analysis rather than officers with ground-level experience (Griffiths, 2006). Claims about the professionalization of crime analysis cultivates perceptions of *competence* in the work

of these new civilian analysts (Hass & Shaffir, 1977). Professionalization also involved implementing CompStat – a formal evaluation procedure which claims to provide internal accountability by strictly monitoring and coordinating police resources. As an inspector is quoted on a publicly accessible CPD document, CPD looked to "new ideas and better ways to solve crime", and CompStat provided a means of "policing *smarter*" ([Crypton Police Department, 2005: 1)

The integration of CompStat and its reliance on analytics allows the organization to invoke the rhetoric of accountability through claims about implementing benchmarks, goals, evaluation, and oversight measures. As an organizational document explains:

> Analytics have provided the basis for *monitoring* key performance indicators, such as solve rates, 911 response times, the *achievement of department delivery goals*, resources for patrol units, *measurements that can serve as the basis for performance improvements* (Allen, 2013: 1, *emphasis added*).

The quotation above illustrates how evaluation measures are promoted within the framing of ILP. Achieving specific goals and seeking improvement upon performance are indicative of a rational, accountable organization (Scott, 2003). Middle-managers must justify their targets to executive management and then encourage their patrol teams to impact the identified problems.

CompStat embodies an explicit evaluation mechanism, and district inspectors are called upon to address output expectations:

> Following a review of District One's crime statistics, a chart displaying the number of tickets issued and number of street checks written is displayed on the screen. The superintendent called attention to the fact that ticket numbers were down and reminded the room that they were to focus on distracted driving tickets this month, and went on to say 'consider this a gentle reminder, or a not so gentle reminder' that they need to be issuing these tickets (Field notes #3, CompStat meeting)

Management personnel in charge of patrol units must illustrate accountability for how their resources are being used. They are assigned responsibility for encouraging proactive policing behaviour from officers tasked with impacting 'their' problem areas. Problematic areas flagged through crime analysis are translated into targets and goals for officers to address. As the following sergeant explains,

> We're going to develop [and] propose the weekly priorities to our executive, and *I will articulate why, and this is something that I will have worked through with the analyst*. And we'll say for our ...shift projects and weekly priorities we have commercial break and enters, and we've identified that they're all happening between say 9pm and midnight …. We want to give that special consideration. As well as we have a string of indecent exposures ... So we want to make those our two weekly priorities, and our analyst will be able to paint the box. *We will create a box for the officers to be working towards*.... So we have an electronic parade briefing board, so that's gonna be posted for them. And we're gonna be posting hard copies on there as well (I1, Sergeant).

The Sergeant's claims above identify several ways in which crime analysis is used within the operations division to display professionalism and accountability. First, it provides middle-managers with an account for their superiors. It enables middle-managers to show and articulate *why* the weekly priorities have been chosen. Second, it allows managers to communicate expectations and goals to patrol officers under their command, both electronically and in parade briefing rooms. Beyond the common goal of keeping wider trends in the district under control, patrol teams are each assigned designated areas within the district.

> I have divided the district into *geographic areas of responsibility*, so there's 4 quadrants, and each quadrant has a team... So *they are assigned specifically* sometimes a crime category *based on the analysis that's happened of where we need them to focus*, what time frame the crime is happening, what type of crime it is, what objects are being stolen (I4, Inspector, *emphasis added*).

These 'geographic areas of responsibility' instill notions of ownership over specified quadrants of a district, and patrol teams are tasked with addressing problems that occur within their areas.

The up-close and regular monitoring of statistics and incident rates forms a measurement gauge for how teams are *performing.* As the following sergeant explains,

> ...you can go back to a team and you can say look, *this is a snapshot of the analyst's map prior to your projec*t, the week prior... *and this is a snapshot happening after your project*.... so they get to see some positive outcomes, and there's a bit more positive reinforcement there. So you get to kind of see some effects of your work (I1, Sergeant)

Officers are shown the outcomes of their own quadrants, as well as the larger picture of crime rates in the district:

> there's a section for parade briefing… that allows them to view the crime maps and that sort of thing. There's a whole section in our intranet on CompStat and reports for CompStat and the maps associated with CompStat and statistics for the 7 crime categories that we report out on. So that is all readily available for [patrol] (I4, District Inspector).

Performance evaluation hinges on numerical outcomes; officers are positively commended for reducing the number of incidents or the degree of 'hotspots' on crime maps. Conversely, increased rates become equated with blame toward the officers 'responsible' for addressing the affected area. Furthermore, there is an expectation that patrol officers are in-tune with running crime trends and statistics, and these measurement outcomes are regularly posted for their consumption. The CompStat process, therefore, conveys notions of strict managerial oversight to both external audiences subject to claims about CompStat, as well as officers working within the service. As one superintendent explained, patrol officers are encouraged to attend CompStat so that "they can see how much the inspector knows about what's going on in their district" (Superintendent, Field notes #3, CompStat meeting). This reasoning suggests that making officers believe they are being closely monitored will improve behaviour and performance.

Technological advances, such as the crime mapping dashboard, are purported to be accessible tools to assist officers in achieving favourable outcomes. The organization claims that with the dashboard,

> ...officers will have more ubiquitous access to data and crime analysis capabilities. Once a user-specified crime analysis query is completed, the results are presented alongside a standardized set of charts. A benefit of this simple, pre-defined interface and analysis capability ensures that *users require little to no training* in order to submit relevant crime analysis queries, create charts and view pertinent crime data ... Removing barriers to real-world use and making it as *easy as possible for officers to access relevant data and crime analysis* serves the overarching goal of *helping [officers] become more proactive in their policing workflows* (Herchenrader & Myheill-Jones, 2014: 145).

The distribution of crime analysis reports and maps to officers, as well as the capability of officers to access and query information on the road creates the impression that officers are entering the field equipped with real-time intelligence. It is argued that this intelligence allows officers to engage in more proactive police work. Further, officers are expected not only to consume the information that is provided to them before their shift, but to conduct 'crime analysis' on their own while on the street:

> It was hypothesized that *by providing basic crime analysis capabilities to the patrol officer* they could combine bigger picture data with their own instincts and experience to be more proactive in their patrol...[and] *Crime analysts would be freed to pursue more complex crime analysis rather than responding to routine inquiries* (Herchenrader & Myheill-Jones, 2014: 143).

Moreover, responsibility for conducting these inquiries is *redirected* to the patrol officer. The installation of this technology accompanies the perception that officers are equipped on the road with up to date 'intelligence'. Thus, organizational claimsmaking about the implementation and enactment of ILP places *increased responsibility* on patrol officers.

In an attempt to acquire social legitimation through processes of formalization and boundary setting, CPD is presented as a leader in proactive and predictive policing.

Proactive work, a keystone of ILP, sees efficiency of patrol resources to be best realized when officers are doing more than simply reacting to calls. Under the new organizational reform, frontline officers become responsible for controlling and reducing crime rates within their district as well as their 'geographic areas of responsibility'. Such proactive practices, I argue, passes responsibility down through the ranks, suggesting an onus on officers to pre-empt and prevent crime. Claimsmaking around this increased responsibility presents the organization as making better use of all of their resources – notably, patrol time – in order to prevent crime.

Discussion and Conclusion

The sociopolitical climate surrounding the implementation of ILP created a situation in which CPD needed to rebuild trust and acquire social legitimation. The organizational claimsmaking surrounding the adoption of ILP, I argue, illustrates an effort to acquire legitimacy. For example, organizational claimsmaking framed the department as leaders in policing innovation by distancing the organization from past practices and failures. Further, claims surrounding professionalization and responsibilization presented CPD as a rational and accountable organization.

Drawing upon and reconceptualising Garland's (1996) concept of 'responsibilization', I argue that the organizational framing of ILP serves to 'responsibilize' patrol work as an adaptive response to contemporary law enforcement pressures. Garland (1996) describes the responsibilization strategy as exerting crime control influence through non-state agencies or organizations, assigning responsibility for crime control to individuals, groups, and institutions whose primary purpose is not traditionally law enforcement. Given the organizational

claimsmaking of ILP, I argue that ILP co-opts the responsibilization strategy, directing an increased responsibility toward patrol ranks. Patrol officers have been 'responsibilized'. They are equipped with expectations, tools, technologies, and resources which aim to extend their ability beyond merely responding to crime, but pre-empting it. Rather than using 'governance-at-a-distance' to increase power through non-state agents of crime control (Garland, 1996), ILP's performance measurement facets facilitate management-by-objectives (Vito & Vito, 2013). This management philosophy joins hand-in-hand with the responsibilization of patrol. Under CompStat, the organization is able to *redefine success* through the close monitoring of internal performance measures (Garland, 1996). Further, by redefining success, the organization claims to have redirected responsibility toward frontline officers, making patrol both better equipped and more accountable for addressing crime.

Thus, in the face of considerable scrutiny, CPD responded with a number of claims regarding ILP's technological and procedural superiority. Yet, while inept reporting structures and technological capacities may bear some blame for past mistakes, the ability of informal police cultures to dictate decisions was also made glaringly clear in the inquiry (Parsons, 2012a). For example, the systemic bias which discouraged resource investment to pursue the missing individuals is the product of a culture built from shared beliefs and experiences among officers (Chan, 1996). Further, the lack of inter-jurisdictional information sharing is attributed not only to inadequate technology, but also to a culture of secrecy among police services (Manning, 1992, Parsons, 2012a; Sanders & Henderson, 2012; Sanders et al., 2015). Despite official programs or policies, the way that organizational actors understand and enact police reform is of critical importance as this is culturally influenced (Manning, 1992; Chan, 1996; Chan, 2001). I now

move to a micro-level analysis of ILP to better understand how patrol officers' make sense of ILP reform.

Chapter Five: Intelligence-led Policing and Patrol Work

Having explored the organizational claimsmaking regarding ILP, I now move to an analysis of patrol officers' perceptions and understandings of ILP. As illustrated in Chapter Four, ILP is presented as a strategy which enhances patrol work to be more purposeful and proactive. Patrol officers are equipped with intelligence and innovative technologies, and tasked with the responsibility of impacting crime in a measurable way. Although organizational claimsmaking may suggest that an innovation has been enacted in a certain way, practical outcomes of reform often differ from official claims (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Manning, 1997; Maguire & Katz, 2002; Chapell, 2009; Sanders et al., 2015). As such, police organizational change is best understood through an ethnographic approach which captures the natural setting of policing, and provides access to conversations and casual exchanges (Marks, 2004). It is within these social settings that meaning is constructed and understandings are shaped. Drawing on in-depth interviews with ten patrol officers, five middle-management personnel, and fieldnotes from five police ride-alongs, I explore how patrol officers have made sense of ILP reform and the integration of crime analysis in the department. I analyze how the 'responsibilization' of patrol occurs in practice, and how officers make sense of this responsibility.

I begin with a review of the research on ILP and the identified barriers to implementation (Ratcliffe, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2008; Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001; Cope, 2004; Sheptycki, 2004; Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005; Taylor, Kowalyk & Boba, 2007; Carter & Carter, 2009; Sheptycki, 2013; Sanders et al., 2015). I then outline how and why formal rules and policies may differ from actual organizational functioning. Consistent with existing research, I identify a number of situational, organizational and cultural barriers to the implementation of ILP. Using

sensemaking as an analytic device, I build upon past analyses of ILP in practice by exploring how these barriers shape patrol officers' *perceptions* of ILP's *purpose and value*. I demonstrate how patrol officers' daily experiences remain disconnected or 'loosely coupled' (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) from the 'responsibilized' patrol work described in organizational claimsmaking. Moreover, I suggest that this discrepancy may not be a failure to fully implement ILP, but rather a strategic state of organizational affairs. I argue that ILP's present implementation in CPD functions as a rationalized institutional myth, allowing the organization to acquire legitimacy while minimizing cultural resistance or 'turmoil' (Hallett, 2010).

Rationalized Institutional Myths and Loose Coupling

Formal rhetoric regarding organizational behaviour, as illustrated in Chapter Four, is used for the purposes of acquiring legitimacy, securing resources, and promoting survival of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, institutionalized policy seldom translates directly into practice (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Thus, these official claims become "rationalized institutional myths", conveying an image of organizational functioning regardless of whether these processes are enacted on the ground. Further, official rules or processes often run counter to actions that allow efficiency under present organizational conditions. Actual daily work activities often vary, or are "loosely coupled" to the formal rhetoric surrounding organizational practices (Weick, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In order to navigate the tensions between an image that ensures survival and the processes that could create contradictions if applied literally, institutionalized environments may *intentionally and strategically* maintain gaps between formal structures and daily work activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In practice, "rules are often violated, decisions often un-implemented...have uncertain

consequences...problematic efficiency, and evaluation and inspection systems are...rendered so vague as to provide little coordination" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 343). For example, Hallett (2010) found that an attempt to more strictly coordinate activities in order to facilitate a closer degree of "coupling" between formal programs and daily work activities led to a state of "turmoil" among organizational actors. Turmoil invokes feelings of epistemic distress for workers when organizational changes disrupt established routines, expectations, and challenge situational limitations. In response to this uncertainty, workers establish a collective understanding which stands in opposition to new policies or protocols (Hallett, 2010). Hallet (2010) found that this turmoil created such disruption within the organization that the efficiencies promised by the reform could not be realized in practice (Hallet, 2010).

Changing organizational behaviour requires more than introducing new rules or practices. These changes intersect with individuals and groups working in established and familiar structures and practical consequences are contingent on how those on the ground respond. For example, research on policing has identified the powerful role occupational culture plays in shaping, altering or resisting organizational reform (Manning, 1992; Chan, 1996).

To date, there is only a small body of qualitative or ethnographic literature that examines the integration of ILP as it relates specifically to patrol policing. Deficiencies in training (Ratcliffe, 2004; Cope, 2004), concerns regarding quality and functionality of analytical products (Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 2001; Cope, 2004), and a lack of "fit" between crime analysts and existing police culture at the patrol level have been uncovered (Cope, 2004; Innes et al., 2005; Sanders et al., 2015). Manning (2008) found that the implementation of information technology and crime mapping in three US police forces elicited little change among the daily routines of police work. Ratcliffe & McCullagh (2001) revealed that many issues exist regarding the

dissemination of intelligence information to patrol officers, finding that this information often failed to reach officers, or failed to attract attention in a way that could meaningfully impact the way officers conducted their day-to-day activities. In another UK study, Cope (2004) qualitatively explored the integration of crime analysis in policing, finding that analysts felt they "were not integral in practice" and "had become relatively 'silent partners'...theoretically essential, but their products were often overlooked" (Cope, 2004: 192). Taylor et al. (2007) provide support for these findings, arguing that analysts felt resistance from patrol officers regarding acceptance and use of crime analysis. It appeared that officers continued to favour "constructed experiential knowledge" (Cope, 2004: 199) over approaches or strategies recommended by crime analysts. Such research identifies the importance of attending to the way in which patrol officers make sense of ILP.

Sensemaking and the Role of Police Culture

During periods of organizational reform, those whose occupations fall under the purview of new rules, policies, and practices must negotiate and 'make sense' of what these changes mean for their daily work. This sensemaking process involves interpreting how and why practices or expectations have changed, and how these changes intersect with existing structures (Choo, 1996; Chan, 1996; Manning, 1997). These interpretive processes are shaped significantly by the social, as well as the cultural contexts in which they occur (Chan, 1996; Manning, 1997). It has been asserted that police culture plays a critical role in influencing, or obstructing, the way in which innovation is realized (Chan, 1996). Police occupational culture(s) can be understood as the widely held yet informal routines, cognitions, attitudes and behaviours shared among officers, which assist with and emerge from the shared experiences of their day to day role

(Manning, 1997; Chan, 1996). It has been suggested (Manning, 1992; Chan, 1996) that multiple cultures exist within the police force and these varying cultures may understand and adopt innovation differently. Similarly, the degree to which new technologies impact policing routines is highly dependent on the "existing cultural values, management styles, work practices and technical capabilities" of the organization (Chan, 2001: 147).

Of unique interest to ILP innovation is the role that civilian analysts have been assigned within an ILP structure. Civilianization within police forces has elicited notable tension surrounding the acceptance of civilian employees among sworn members (Wilkerson, 1994; Murphy & McKenna, 2007). ILP places analysts in a position where theoretically, they are embedded in intelligence-sharing and tactical and strategic planning (Ratcliffe, 2008). This intersection of cultures provides an intriguing point of analysis when exploring the way in which patrol officers, embedded in their own occupational cultures and values, make sense of and respond to civilian analysts taking on this role.

In what follows, I explore the implementation ILP as an organizational philosophy from the perspective of patrol officers in CPD. Of particular interest is how the *responsibilities* which emanate from organizational claims intersect with the pre-existing structures and conditions of patrol work. A number of situational, organizational, and cultural factors influence how officers' make sense of ILP reform and how it impacts their daily role. Officers' understandings and experiences with these organizational changes influence their uptake of tools and practices. From this, I illustrate how officers make sense of crime analysis as a tool to appease external accountability requirements, rather than for their own use. Given that daily organizational practices remain 'loosely coupled' to ILP's official mandate, I argue that ILP serves as a rationalized institutional myth in the department.

Situational Elements

Introducing new programs, changing processes or responsibilities, and implementing new technologies inevitably interacts with existing occupational expectations. Patrol officers have established routines for carrying out their jobs and a close familiarity with the behavioural routines of their occupation. Changing or shifting established norms without changing the pre-existing situational context of the role creates a conflict between ongoing expectations and new responsibilities. Patrol officers must make sense of these contradictions in order to navigate how ILP adoption relates to their occupation.

Information Overload

Many officers discussed how information consumption and information gathering requirements associated with ILP take away from the everyday requirements of patrol work. The move towards ILP and the integration of crime analysts into each patrol division has meant that patrol officers face a substantial increase in the amount of information that is disseminated to them. Officers are sent bulletins, reports, diagrams and charts with particulars such as recent incidents and trends, district hot spots, crime statistics, and persons of interest. These reports are disseminated through email, departmental intranet bulletins, and through printouts and posters in patrol briefing rooms. Patrol officers acknowledge that there is an organizational *expectation* that they consume the information that is provided. As one patrol officer explains,

> …the way it's tasked down, is most patrol members don't have time to check their email prior to being told to get out on the road and do stuff. So I mean there's an expectation, not an expectation, but there's a, I guess a want by upper management to have patrol members come in early before shift, check their emails, check their voicemails... in addition to prepping your stuff for your equipment, grabbing your car, trying to find parking, and pretty soon you're out of time. And then there's the demands of the call board and the demands of dispatch... So for everybody to

> effectively get the intelligence by email, I don't think it's entirely realistic (Constable, I5)

The officer above describes how the organization has placed an additional responsibility upon officers to adapt to an increased circulation of information. Patrol officers must continue to accomplish all of the existing preparatory and situational requirements of patrol work, while also finding time to satisfy the administrative requirements of ILP. Officers rationalize that it is 'not realistic' to keep up with information from the analyst prior to beginning shift. These expectations conflict with the responsibility to be active on the street and responding to calls. Another officer explains,

> We get quite a few emails, you know, almost daily from our analysts… *they fan emails out to us*, and then also to our sergeants…[the organization] wants us to check our email at least once a day…but you know, some days it just doesn't happen, cause we don't have email access in our cars, so we have to actually like go, park the car, go to the station, log-in, *and meanwhile we're not very operational* (Patrol officer, I2, emphasis added)

This quotation draws attention to the fact that while organizational policy may suggest that intelligence is consumed in a timely manner to inform and guide frontline practices, the experiences of patrol officers paint a different picture. Information from the analysts is most frequently communicated through email or hard copy briefing in parade rooms, yet retrieving this information becomes impractical for patrol officers who are primarily operating outside the station. Further, this quotation provides additional insight into how officers' reluctance toward this abundance of information is rationalized. Emails from the analyst are 'fanned' out at a frequency that officers cannot keep up with. This information is sent to everyone of varying squads and ranks, it is not *exclusive or privileged*. Moreover, spending time completing administrative tasks such as reading emails is considered *non-operational*, it is a task that takes away from patrolling, not one that is part of it.

Given that more information is compiled than can be practically consumed, determining *which* information is worthy of attention becomes "a balancing act of what's the most important information for the guys" (Constable, I5). Considering the impossibility of consuming all data, onus is directed to officers who become responsible for determining priority. The organization "put[s] out a lot of information, *essentially it's up to us* to review and take what we need from it" (Constable, I2). Under the situational limitations, officers understand that they can consume as much or as little information from the analyst, depending on its perceived relevance to their immediate needs.

Officers also conceive information gathering requirements as detracting from patrol work. Administrative expectations have increased in order to supplement the amount of data available for analytic purposes and, as such, officers find report writing to be increasingly demanding. One officer shares,

> when I go out on the road on patrol, I'm going from call to call to call to call, writing, writing, writing, writing, writing, and we are so bogged down with so much writing and filling out templates and doing paperwork (Constable, I13)

The above quotation identifies how documentation practices are understood by officers as a hindrance to patrolling. Officers feel 'bogged down' or burdened by informational requirements which have heightened under ILP. The following officer describes how collecting information for analysis purposes has meant significant increases in reporting content:

> The report writing tool that feeds into [the records management system] has hundreds of fields. And some of them are mandatory and some of them aren't. And at some point, someone had a genius idea of adding this field so that they could use it for analysis. It'd be really interesting to know what fields are redundant and aren't being accessed or aren't being used for any sort of analysis, and what fields are… if you sat down and you actually went to fill in every single box of every single thing, *we would see productivity drop huge* because you'd be spending so much more time on reports, and everyone would be busy writing reports if we were entering every single field… [Officers] won't fill in all [the fields], I mean *maybe someone right out of the academy*, but then they'll start wondering why it takes them an hour and a half

> to do a report that takes someone else 15 minutes to do, and it's because they're sitting there entering *these fields that no one's actually looking at*. And I really genuinely believe that no one's looking at those fields. (Constable, I9)

The officer above identifies several important implications of expanding information gathering requirements for patrol. First, he identifies how the size and scope of reports has the potential to be time consuming and jeopardizing otherwise '*productive*' time spent on the road. Second, he identifies how officers have responded to increased reporting expectations, circumventing any information that is not flagged as mandatory in the system. The existence of 'optional' fields sends a message to officers that this particular information is unnecessary or extraneous. Further, he identifies that neglecting fields to save time is an understood and *socially acquired* occupational norm among officers. Only officers who have not yet learned short cuts or efficiencies on the job ('someone right out of the academy') are perceived to complete all requested information, and once they realize that this is a burden on their time they will no longer be bothered. Finally, this officer offers important insight into how patrol officers rationalize skirting data collection procedures. Officers perceive that additional information will remain unused even *if* collected, operating under the conclusion that no harm is done by taking a shortcut.

The Reactive Reality

One of the most prominent claims surrounding ILP is a promise that analytics promote a more 'proactive' policing approach. Not only does gathering and consuming additional information conflict with the situational realities of patrol work, officers find that time on the road offers little space to engage in targeted behaviour. Officers' experiences suggest that responding to calls remains the most significant and consuming responsibility

for patrol. Above all, “as a first responder, we’re responding to any sort of calls for service, right. So the priority is in-progress calls always. If something’s happening, we’re going to that” (Constable, I2). Rather than an increase in proactive behaviour, many officers felt that unassigned time was increasingly scarce. During a ride-along, an officer shared that “the city has been holding vacancies since the [international sporting event] ended, so we’ve got fewer officers on the street, [which] leaves less time for projects” (Field notes #4, Ride-along). In the eyes of the officers interviewed, reducing manpower in order to conserve resources has left officers scrambling to keep up with calls for service. Moreover, officers felt that these cuts occurred in a strategic manner to protect against public scrutiny. As a second officer explained,

> these vacancies are positions that have opened up - whether it be from retirement, resigning, personal leave, etc. - which they are not hiring officers to fill. He described how this is politically strategic on the part of the city. The mayor promised during the election that there would be no cuts to policing, and this was a popular promise with the public. Holding these vacancies allows less money to be spent on policing without formal cuts or layoffs occurring. This way [the mayor] is able to say that there were no cuts made. (Field notes #4, Ride-along)

This officer identifies the vested interest in maintaining public approval, even when the material realities contradict organizational claims. Further, the excerpt above highlights an inherent contradiction between claims that ILP facilitates a more efficient use of resources, and the fact that reducing resources has meant that officers remain “tied to the call board” (Constable, I10) and too busy to take interest in new tools. While discussing whether the district crime analyst is used as a resource, one officer commented,

> to be 100% honest with you, I think that the direction that we’re in right now with policing is that it’s so reactive… going to my crime analyst to talk about how information could better serve me on the road to be more proactive is not at the top of my priority list (Constable, I13)

For patrol officers, crime analysis remains of minimal concern because it is not usable under the situational expectations of their role. Existing expectations of patrol take precedence over new responsibilities, such as conducting their own crime mapping on the dashboard in the cruiser. With regard to this recently installed technology, one officer stated, "you can't have your head buried in your laptop all day long. *That's not what we're here to do*" (Constable, I2). Patrol work is understood by officers as being engrossed with responding and reacting – ILP tools and technologies are considered extraneous to patrol's central purpose. Although more information is theoretically available to officers under ILP, the enduring reactive essence of patrol work negates perceptions of value for officers. As another officer explains,

> you can have all the intelligence in the world, but if you're running from call to call it's not going to be put to use, and you're likely to miss everything that comes across your path. (Constable, I11)

In contrast with the organizational claims of proactive, intelligence-led patrol work, from the perspective of the officers, the situational conditions of patrol work do not allow for much unassigned time.

Organizational Factors

In addition to the influence of situational occupational elements, decisions made at the organizational level about how to implement change or reform also play a significant role in shaping the way that workers interpret and respond to new rules or processes. Organizational resource decisions and oversight signal what is and is not important. If workers recognize that a program or strategy is not prioritized by the organization, this will influence their understandings about its necessity and significance.

Lack of Training and Follow-up

Although crime analysis has been built into the organizational structure there has been little training provided to patrol officers concerning the purpose, value, and use of crime analytics. For example, formal training has not been built into initial police academy training, nor does the organization directly train patrol officers how to leverage crime analysis as part of an ILP approach. Interestingly, many officers became aware of analytics through trial and error. As the following officer explains,

> You know what, there's not [training on using crime analysis]. It's something that, it's there in front of you... to figure out for yourself. Sometimes a senior officer or somebody who was in an investigative area before will take 15, 20 minutes or even an hour to show other officers and newer people, um, how to go about using the tools. But unfortunately a training module or training course, there's nothing that I'm aware of (Constable, I12)

The organization has not prioritized training patrol officers on how to benefit from the analytic information that is available to them.

Officers describe the absence of a formal introduction to the mapping software developed by the organization:

> There's times where I remember it would just pop up on our laptop before I knew what it was, and I was like *oh this is just a map, close*…I think it's important that it's brought forward and the training is informed to the police officers, but it's a matter of allocating time and resources for it (Constable, I12).

The quotation above identifies two significant themes. First, it illustrates that without training to accompany new processes or technologies, they may remain largely overlooked. Lacking context for why the mapping program had been installed, officers infer its value, or lack thereof, based on present occupational schemes. This officer rationalized that this was 'just a map' and thus not worthy of further attention within the usual patterns of his role. Second, it identifies how ILP has been implemented without prioritizing resources to promote its execution. Instead, routines have

continued as per usual, with the increased presence of information stimulating minimal change in approach:

> My partner and I participated in the [Dashboarding] introductory study so we, as far as formal training, there was like a 5 minute video on how to use it, sort of thing. But not so much, right. Like we're, you know the information's there, we're just the worker bees, we kind of just go out there and do our thing (Constable, I2)

Even though organizational claims suggest that the mobile dashboard technology was developed and installed predominantly for use by patrol, it appears that little investment has been made to promote its use in practice. Many officers had not used (I7, I8, I10, I11, I12, I13) or even heard of (I14) the dashboard mapping program which was developed and implemented by the organization. Regardless of mobile accessibility, the context of patrol work limits officers' ability to take advantage of such technological infrastructure. Instead, making it accessible to officers allows for the *appearance* of officers who are conducting their own analyses right from their cars.

Moreover, training around proper data *collection* processes to support ILP also lacks standardization. Even if patrol officers are not actively using crime analysis themselves, it is their reports which are drawn upon as 'intelligence' by the analysts. However, the organization has not provided support or training to stress the importance of proper reporting practices:

> We haven't been trained on what types of details would be most useful to the analyst. So um honestly it's kind of trial by fire. You just work with it and you learn by reading other people's street checks… In terms of actual training on how to write street checks, there hasn't been any protocol in terms of that (Constable, I14)

> I've never been formally instructed as to what is useful to the analyst, but I mean as your police years add on you, you know, become aware as to what's pertinent and what isn't… So it's basically intuitive learning. But there is no formal training in terms of this is what the analysts want… And some people are more detail-oriented, some people are less (Constable, I11)

As illustrated in the quotations above, report writing remains largely uncoordinated, with the degree of detail varying widely among officers. The need for high quality information for sufficient analysis it not ingrained in the practices of officers. Officers continue to write for the practicality of one another, not the utility of a crime analyst:

> We write reports based on our perception of what's relevant. So we're not writing necessarily that report for the analyst… so if we're writing a street check or an intelligence report, …[it]… is based on what we perceive to be relevant to other police officers (Constable, I9)

Data and intelligence gathering practices do not appear to have meaningfully changed despite organizational rhetoric surrounding the *importance of thorough reporting practices* for usable intelligence. In fact, officers believe that there is little effort on the part of the organization to encourage or coordinate ILP procedures. For example, when discussing the information needed for a street check or intelligence report to be useful, one sergeant commented that,

> Nobody makes [patrol officers] do it. It's really funny, 'cause I bug guys all the time right. You know, like you said details details details… you've got a guy's name but you don't have a physical description… *Nobody makes anybody do it*… in policing *they talk accountability but they won't walk it. And you only get in trouble when it hits the front page of the paper*. And then everybody points at everybody else, *who can we blame?* (Sergeant, I6)

The Sergeant above calls attention to the lack of organizational concern for ensuring that report writing procedures are *followed*. Rather, he illustrates that officers understand requirements as flexible and unenforced, aware that the organization is more concerned with *assigning* responsibility than following up on it. There is a lack of coordination for daily practices, and report quality only becomes a concern when there is a need to assign blame for a mistake. Reporting expectations – even when largely unenforced – allow an *individual* to be held liable for neglect, rather than an absence of organizational procedures.

Interestingly, it appears that officers have come to understand analytic reports as discretionary and avoidable. As one officer explains, the choice to use crime analysis "all comes down to the individual user, if they see a merit, or if they determine that there's any merit in using it" (Constable, I10). Even during unassigned time, officers may choose to avoid the administrative burden of analytic reports because "sometimes it's just easier to drive around in the car and wait for something to come across the board" (Constable, I11). Officers have identified that keeping up with communication from crime analysts is left to their discretion, with processes loosely implemented and weakly enforced:

> I mean … there's as much or as little use as you wanna do with it. If you just wanna come to work and just respond to the board and not, I mean, *nobody hounds you, nobody says you know, 'have you checked those recently?' A lot of it is self-generated* (Constable, I10)

The lack of organizational concern as to whether or not officers are actually consuming information from the crime analyst leads officers to understand these reports or bulletins as optional rather than integral.

Moreover, officers described how even during 'project' shifts, when there is allotted time for proactive police work, it remains unlikely that they would draw upon the analyst as a resource for project decisions. A patrol officer identifies that when the crime analyst

> *should* be [utilized] is when it comes to projects. That should be what's happening is we should be going to [the analyst] to say you know, this is the type of information that we need that could be more useful to us, are you able to give it to us? That should be happening" Yet when asked if it does, the officer replied "No for me specifically, no. *And I don't think anyone else in my squad does it*" (Constable, I13)

The quotation above strongly communicates patrol officers' disinterest in using the analyst as a resource. The ability of crime analysis to facilitate proactive policing is a predominant argument in support of ILP. Yet even when there is unassigned time, officers do not perceive crime

analysis as valuable for supplementing proactive work. Rather, officers continue to pursue proactive projects based on their own interests. In addition, this quote draws attention to the social nature of organizational sensemaking, wherein justifications and rationalizations are based on perceptions of what others are doing. If patrol officers as a group overlook the analyst, this becomes the socially acceptable occupational approach. Operating against official processes does not seem defiant because *no one else is doing it either*.

Furthermore, officers who do engage with the analyst are perceived as an *exception* rather than the norm. As one officer shared, "I'm probably the only person who emails our analyst (laughs). Which is probably why I'm here [participating in the interview], but that's okay" (Patrol officer, I3). It is understood among officers that this is not usual practice. As a second officer describes,

> I probably email back and forth at least 2 or 3 times a week, based on if, so for example if I gather intel or if I take photographs of any known suspects, cause clothing is always important, I'll uh, email it to her just to maintain that continuity. But I would say that *I'm the exception to the rule*. (Constable, I11)

These two examples identify how interacting with the crime analyst has not been accepted as part of the role, but rather distinguishes select 'others' who differ from the norm of most officers. Without formal training or coordination, officers are left to navigate the use and value of ILP based only on existing conceptions about occupational norms. Further, lack of enforcement communicates organizational indifference for coordinating patrol officers' behaviour and engagement with analytics.

Situating the Analyst

The introduction of civilian crime analysts into the operations division has meant that officers must make sense of the purpose and function of this role in relation to their own. The organizational structuring of district crime analysts affects the way that they are perceived and integrated into existing patterns. Organizational placement and the accessibility of analysts affect patterns of interaction and subsequently how officers understand their role in the department.

Although located within the operations division, the analysts are positioned on a separate floor from the patrol briefing rooms, working in closer proximity to management than to patrol (Constable, I7). Much of the communication between crime analysts and officers consists of email briefings disseminated by the analysts. There is infrequent face-to-face contact, and infrequent reciprocal communication. This distance has meant that analysts remain disconnected and unfamiliar to officers. When asked about their interactions with the analysts, several officers were not able to identify where the crime analyst for their district was located within the service:

> Ummm…. this is probably gonna answer the question - I don't… he's within our station, I think he's on the 6th floor, I'd have to look it up, exactly where he is. But I know he's in our same building that patrol works out of. Pretty sad eh? (*laughs*) (Constable, I13)
>
> I don't even know where their office is actually. (Constable, I9)
>
> I wouldn't say there's much contact. And to be honest I don't even know where they are (Constable, I10)

The remarks above illustrate the lack of integration and interaction among the district crime analysts and patrol officers. It further illustrates a lack of interest in seeking out the analyst for information or assistance. This organizational separation has limited interpersonal relations between the two groups. As another officer explains,

> I know if I wanted to look for them and I wanted to email them I could certainly email them, and I know who the analyst is, but *I don't often see her, like I wouldn't have a lot of face time with her*. (Constable, I14)

This physical separation promotes an understanding that the role and tasks of the analysts are distinctly removed from that of patrol officers:

> So like I know that they're on the 5th floor in this building. So they're nearby but I think *they have their own office where they all kind of hang out and do their thing*. ….So I know they're there. But you know, 75% of our shifts start after 2 in the afternoon so we're just not around to see them lots. But they're nearby (Constable, I2)

The quotation above conveys a perception that analysts' responsibilities are symbolically distanced from the work of officers – they do '*their thing*' and patrol does their own. This understanding promotes separation rather than collaboration. Further this officer identifies how organizational shift structures contribute to the separation between officers and analysts. As another officer describes,

> We don't work closely whatsoever. You know, they're on a day shift schedule, they work you know, Monday to Thursday or Tuesday to Friday sort of thing, our shifting is all different hours all different days, so *we don't see them often*. You know, we know who they are, they know who we are, "hi, bye, nice to see you", that kind of thing. Um, but for the most part the communication we have with them is just via email, um, and yeah *they're spamming out those emails to the entire district, it's not on any sort of a personal level or anything like that.* (Constable, I2)

The officer above draws attention to the weekday, dayshift schedule of the district crime analysts. In contrast with the 24/7 nature of police work, analysts' schedules align with administrative and management positions, and suggests a non-essential function. This example also highlights the lack of personal relationship that is cultivated among officers and the analysts – a factor which plays into building credibility. Further, this officer's language describing the analyst ('*spamming* out those emails') indicates that these reports are equated with junk mail rather than valuable information. Officers do not frequently interact with the

analyst in a manner which allows for the building of informal personal relationships, and thus, rapport. As I will illustrate in the following section, this lack of interaction consequently contributes to a rift between patrol and analytic cultures.

Clash of Cultures

Occupational culture influences how organizational actors respond to changes in their environment. Establishing ILP has involved introducing an analytic culture that must operate in relation to existing police cultures in the department. In this section, I illustrate how the cultural understandings of patrol have shaped perceptions of the credibility of crime analysts and the products they provide. From here, I illustrate how a cultural divide exists between patrol's and middle-management's perceptions of crime analysis. Further, I demonstrate how this divide contributes to patrol's understanding and selective adoption of ILP.

Devaluing the Analyst

Informal social interaction among officers shapes the way officers make sense of crime analysts, including their function, abilities, and their value. During interviews and field observations, officers often spoke of the analysts in a sarcastic way. As illustrated above, interactions are infrequent, and jokes emerge on the basis of infrequent contact or unfamiliarity with who they are.

> '[Name] is our analyst… is she here today?' one officer laughed. 'Who's that?' another officer asked jokingly. I looked to the officer beside me who said, 'we like to give her a hard time because we never see her… she hates us. One time we hadn't seen her in a couple months and she came to parade and we were like 'who are *you*?'' (Fieldnotes #2, Ridealong)

> At dinner break with the patrol squad, I asked who the analyst for their district was. They looked around at each other and didn't know. The officer to my right said 'oh is

> that that model who walks around acting like she's better than everyone else?' The others laughed. The officer continued, 'but really, the one with her hair always all done up and curly?' The others chuckled, and one replied that they thought that was someone different, but none were sure, and none of the officers were able to name the analyst. I asked if the analyst ever came to their parade briefings, and they said she did not. (Field notes #4, Dinner, Ride-along)

The examples above illustrate how officers have come to understand the analyst as an infrequent and insignificant presence. The sarcastic and even demeaning jokes suggest that officers do not hold much respect for the analyst and her role within the organization.

Another recurrent factor regarding analyst credibility stems from a shared understanding that information from the crime analyst is less reliable and less accurate than information from other officers. Analysts are perceived to lack the knowledge or insight that *real cops* possess, and their products are treated with skepticism as a result. During a ride-along on a patrol shift,

> I asked the officer I was riding with if he often used products from the analyst in his proactive time to determine projects. He said no, that he prefers to use *his own information*. He described his information as *current*, and he *gets it at ground-level* from talking to people. He stated that he preferred to use his own information because he *knows the source of his information*. He has his informants from *working in the area*. He does not know the source of the information coming from the analyst, or if it is *reliable*. He discusses how 'credibility and trust must be earned. And *there's a level of credibility among officers that is not applied to the analyst*' (Constable, Field notes, Ride-along)

The analysts' disconnection from *the street* and the *source* of information serves to reduce trustworthiness of the intelligence they provide. As another officer admits, "I'm old school, I have trouble accepting that *a person in an office* is going to tell me what to do" (Constable, Field notes, Ride-along). Officers rely heavily on relationship building to attain information, cultivating interpersonal relationships with informants to garner intelligence. Street credibility and experiential knowledge is situated as more valuable than analytic data.

In the words of another officer, “if you want to know what’s going on in the district, asking members of the squad will produce more information than crime analysis can tell you” (Constable, Field notes, Ride-along).

When analysts make recommendations or assessments that officers do not agree with, officers often attribute these to the analysts’ perceived deficit in knowledge that a *police officer* would possess. In the following example, an officer expresses skepticism for the analyst’s ability to accurately identify and rank prospective targets:

> There was a call, an arson call I think a couple years ago, and an analyst had, they had 4 suspects. One of them was a kid that was sitting on the sidewalk and they were setting fire to some papers on the sidewalk. They weren't consistent with the arson crime that was happening, it didn't really match… And so, in that case once you start digging *as a police officer* you're like oh wait a minute, out of these 4, 2 are pretty weak and 2 are really good (Constable, I7)

This example suggests that officers feel that experience facilitates a level of knowledge - and an ability to rank suspect likelihood – that is not possessed by non-police personnel. A similar view is shared in relation to understanding *why* crimes or trends are occurring:

> I remember being at a CompStat and they were talking about robberies right. And they were saying robberies had gone up significantly in this district. And they were also talking about how assaults had gone up in this district in this specific area. *So this analyst... she sort of gives the explanation to the inspector and the inspector presents it, right*. And later on the inspector says to me, what'd you think? I *said I think you need to start getting better advice*. And he said what do you mean? I go well, *any street cop worth his salt knows the reason why street robberies have gone up* is because there's a new crew of guys selling dope in district 1, and if you don't pay your dope deal, they'll torture you... (Sergeant, I15)

There is a perception that the experiential knowledge developed on the ground leaves officers with a thorough understanding of the conditions which produce various crime trends. Officers consider themselves most qualified to not only select targets, but to explain *why* incidents are occurring. This knowledge is taken for granted by ‘*any street cop worth his salt*’, but is something an analyst is less equipped to advise upon.

When sharing their experiences with crime analysts, officers frequently referenced times when their analysts had made mistakes. Stories of analyst errors are passed along among officers as anecdotal support for discrediting information provided by the analyst. Crime analysts are ridiculed among officers, and stories of failure promote the devaluing of their abilities among officers. While chatting with a squad of officers in the parade room, discussing my interest in their use of crime analysis, one officer critiqued that,

> The analyst approached me earlier asking who the persons of interest should be…like isn't that your job' (laughs). Shaking his head, one officer stated, "some of them, the things they say, it's like, *we don't know how they got hired* (Fieldnotes #2, Ride-along).

These stories and attitudes, when shared among officers, breed a culture of skepticism toward the capabilities of the analyst. Officers learn from one another and trust the opinions of one another. These social contexts and sharing of stories facilitate sensemaking about the analysts' role and reliability. Another story that was repeated on separate occasions described an uninformed recommendation on the part of an analyst:

> At parade, the platoon discussed how the analyst had once given them a person of interest to focus on. They hadn't heard this name in a while, so they looked him up and it turned out he was in custody, and had been in custody for months. They laughed about how the analyst had encouraged them to focus on someone and not checked to see if they were in custody (Field notes, ride-along)

These stories of failure may hold significant sway when officers have little else from which to develop opinions about the crime analyst. Officers develop and perpetuate the discrediting of analysts among themselves in a social context, sharing stories of analysts' inaccuracies. Given the minimal interaction that officers have with the district analysts and subsequent lack of rapport, these stories of *mistakes* have greater power to define perceptions of these individuals and their competence.

Perceptions of Analytic Products

The cultural understanding that analysts possess inferior knowledge about the realities of policing has meant that officers are distrustful of the content of the reports that they receive. For example, persons of interest recommended by the analyst are perceived as uninformed guesswork. One officer shared that he feels as though "they throw out 10-12 persons of interest, probably just based on who was in the area, they just shotgun a bunch of random POI's" (Field notes #5, Ride-along). Another officer expresses similar concerns:

> She'll [the analyst] come out with a list of potential suspects. Um, for me, I think the suspects are kind of out of date, and I think they kind of just shotgun a whole bunch of people. … I don't really know where those targets come from... I don't find those helpful. But I know who's out there and I know kind of who's active. Like we'll monitor who's in jail and who's not, and if somebody's getting out, you know, I'll run him before I ever see him, just so I know his conditions. So if I see him I don't have to like put my hand on the computer and look him up…. I'll just know (Patrol officer, I7)

The quotation above highlights concerns regarding the currency, accuracy and source of information from the crime analyst. Further, this officer contrasts the analysts' information against his own street knowledge, which is suggested as more reliable and more useful.

In addition to issues of credibility, officers expressed that the *type* of intelligence that they receive from the analyst provides little utility for them. Officers frequently conceptualize crime analysis as a post-hoc briefing or "history report" (Sergeant, I6), not tactical information from which to act pre-emptively. Put bluntly, "crime analysis is regurgitating numbers back to us. The idea was to regurgitate it in a meaningful way, but it's really not all that meaningful" (Patrol officer, Field notes, Ride-along). Officers describe how analysts' reports offer a bird's eye view of incidents, but lack both timeliness and an analysis of *why* certain crime types or hotspots may be occurring:

> The way that it comes through, I don't find it particularly useful… I think [we need] a lot more useful information. Like…a couple variables to make the information more complete, if that makes sense. So not just the, what type of crime, where it's occurring and when it's occurring, But also um, variables such as why it might be occurring, who may be involved in it, and more current up to date information (Constable, I13)

Officers state that the analytic reports they receive are lacking *actionable* information. In order for the analysis to be deemed worthwhile, officers argue that the analyst must be able to add *value* above and beyond a summary of events. As one officer explains,

> The biggest problem is that the *analyst isn't providing information that we can do anything with*. It's usually just regurgitating street checks that were done the night before, for example, I'll take a street check and I'll see the intel in the bulletin the next day. Anyone can InDesign me a brochure of what I do, a secretary can pull the information from the overnight reports. *What I need is for them to tell me what I don't already know – to use their connections to get information that I don't have access to*. Tell me *why* people matter or why things are important, if I checked someone last night, why do they matter? (Constable, Fieldnotes, Ride-along)

This officer reiterates the missing actionable component within the information provided by crime analysts. He identifies a recurrent complaint that analytical reports are largely a summary of past events, and do not provide anything of use to officers.

> Realistically, it can be frustrating sometimes because it takes 30 seconds to break into a car, 5 minutes to break into a house. We can't see through walls, if they're already inside we might be driving by and we have no idea. *Catching these guys is the hard part, knowing that it's happening is the easy part* (Constable, I2)

The above quotation identifies the frequent challenge of operationalizing incident or occurrence-based analysis. Further, it alludes to the perception that patrol work is much more complex and challenging than following trends of reported incidents.

Beyond a perception that statistical reports provide minimal practicality, officers also expressed difficulty with using pictorial data in a meaningful way. Data displayed in parade rooms is inaccessible on the road, and station-based intelligence is impractical for officers

because “you see this picture for 10 seconds, and then you’re driving around for the next couple days and uh, things like that doesn’t make it easy to identify someone” (Patrol officer, I2). In fact, many reports were perceived as inaccessible and impractical. As the following officer describes,

> in our squad room there’s posters that have gotta have probably 200 faces on them. So you know it’s, some people are gifted at facial recognition and some aren’t, and sometimes it just becomes information overload (Patrol officer, I11).

This example illustrates how disseminating information is one thing, but communicating it in a digestible manner is another. *More* information does not mean officers are better equipped if it cannot be absorbed and utilized.

A notable exception to patrol officers’ attitudes towards reports from the crime analyst involves the receipt of information about recent offender releases. Analysts are repeatedly credited for being “extremely valuable in digging up who’s been released from jail” (Sergeant, I1). A number of officers reiterated this point, noting “they do a little report that says 'this person's out, this person's out'. That's useful.” (Patrol Officer, I9). Officers are able to choose the aspects of ILP that they find useful, and are not bound to practices which may contradict their usual routine. The potential implications of this selective use of crime analysis will be discussed in depth in Chapter Six. Officers are able to circumvent aspects of ILP that do not fit with their chosen policing style.

For the most part, officers appear to ascribe little credibility to both the analyst and the information they disseminate, stating that analytical products show the lack of street knowledge possessed by analysts. Further, officers rationalize that many of the analysts’ products provide no utility or basis for action.

Making Sense of Crime Analysis: "It's Not For Us"

As I have illustrated above, officers working under an ILP framework are inundated with information, tools, and reports that they perceive to hold little value within their present situational, organizational, and cultural contexts. Officers must make sense of the organizational presence of these phenomena and rationalize their resistance to engage with new processes.

Rather than a tool for patrol, officers have come to perceive analytic products as tools for middle-management. As the following officer explains,

> We get emails to our district, from our district analyst [...] the information that we get is, my honest opinion, is that the information is more tailored to the management team, to be able to focus on crime stats. (Constable, I9)

Patrol officers have reasoned that the information distributed by the analyst is catered to the interests of management personnel. This understanding provides officers with a rationale for why emails are not prioritized, as illustrated previously. Officers believe their requests for supplemental information come second to the analysts' primary purpose of providing statistics for CompStat. While waiting in the parade room before one ride-along shift, an officer described an instance when he tried to request a change to the crime maps which were regularly posted in their briefing room:

> I've been fighting to get more detail, like the MO [modus operandi], added to the maps. They did it for a couple weeks and then stopped... It's too labour intensive I guess... *It's well known that the analyst is for CompStat, not for us*. The analyst doesn't [adjust the map for us] because CompStat is what matters, it's bullshit. *It doesn't help us catch bad guys...* it's about CompStat, not about us (Constable, Field notes #2, Ride-along)

This officer identifies how the needs of patrol are not prioritized when it comes to resourcing of the district analyst's time. He also states that this is a shared understanding among patrol officers – that the analyst is not there for their purposes. A district inspector affirms the sentiment by stating,

> I don't think they [patrol officers] generally understand the full capacity of what [the analyst] can do for them... Quite frankly I don't want them going to her with individual requests for analysis... She's busy enough with our everyday crime analysis happening in the district. (District Inspector, I4)

This viewpoint of management contributes to shaping officers' perceptions of crime analysis, discouraging rather than encouraging patrol's interaction with the analyst. Finally, the constable's remark above draws attention to the perspective that the CompStat process is disconnected and irrelevant ("bullshit") in relation to the policing mission of patrol. Instead, CompStat is understood as a process used to "justify what the police are doing and the management is doing" (Patrol Officer, I12) and to "build accountability into crime management" (Sergeant, I15). The organizational interests served by CompStat are described by the following officer. He explains how

> The logic behind it has a lot to do with funding. It's money and budgets. If we wanna get more money, well then we need to keep statistics to explain to our city council why we need more money. So I think *that's the primary purpose behind it, is it's for funding* (Constable, I13)

The quote above draws attention to patrol officers' understanding of CompStat as a political manoeuvre - a *reaction to political and economic pressure* rather than a practical strategy:

> There's a divide between the management and the worker bees ... I guess the upper management talks about the intel-led policing and blah blah*, it's funny because they react to political pressure, and what's topical* (Sergeant, I6)

The notion that officers perceive ILP as a *reaction* is made more interesting by the sociopolitical context (See Chapter Four). Based on the experiences and perceptions of patrol officers, ILP appears to be understood more as a *trend* than as a meaningful shift in police work. Several officers explained how the targets and expectations that are assigned by this policing-by-outcomes perspective make little sense in regards to patrol capabilities. For example, the

following officer describes how responsibilities are assigned based on trend spikes, regardless of their feasibility to be addressed by patrol units:

> Domestic violence went up one month. And they told us to bring it down. I thought, how are we supposed to bring domestic violence down? Like we can't patrol apartment buildings, like listen in, knocking on doors and all that. So they really hammered home that we need to get the numbers down for domestic violence. And they didn't care that we... at a patrol level we really can't do it, but they didn't really care about that, they just wanted it done. And … I think it went down the next month. We didn't do anything, we're just kind of doing our job and it went down and they were all happy about it. So, as long as the numbers reflect… what they want us to do, they're happy. But it doesn't really, I personally don't really change the way I do things based on what they want. (Constable, I7)

As illustrated by the officer above, there is a substantial disconnect between management objectives and patrol practices. Such assignments produce distance between patrol and management culture, and allude to contradictions between the organizational expectations of each group. Regardless, officers are *tasked* with the responsibility for impacting a crime category that they may be unable to act upon. If subsequent rates are favourable, officers are praised absent of any concrete change in policing behaviour. Patrol officers may not be able to alter their approach, as in the case of domestic violence, yet they become responsible for the outcomes.

Officers readily identify the ambiguous nature of statistical reporting. The following sergeant describes an instance of statistical ‘accountability’ deemed to be devoid of meaning, and even humorous:

> This morning we released stats for our district... theft from autos, and night time commercial B&E’s have gone up. But it’s like, what’s ‘gone up’? Funny thing...the guys up in district four... The bar [graph] says 28 incidents and the bar next to it was 38. So increase of 10. But that’s 30%. So he’s getting yelled at, ‘He had a 30% jump in theft from autos! What is he doing about it? What’s the plan? This is a huge jump in crime in his neighbourhood!’ Then it’s my turn our district, well I’ve got the same size lines except the numbers beside mine, one is 394 and one is 412 or something. More than his 10. But percentage wise, miniscule. *So he’s praising me. And I’m trying not to laugh, cause he got yelled at because one guy went into one parking lot and whacked 10 cars, so somehow he’s ‘not addressing crime’* (Sergeant, I6)

This quote draws attention to how the statistical understanding of management fails to contextualize rates relative to the larger picture. Rather, notions of accountability – or lack thereof – are reduced to anomalies such as an individual spree of ten incidents. Further, these remarks suggest that officers do not buy-in to the idea that such measurements are indicative of successes or failures, and do not believe that such gauges exemplify 'good police work'.

Under present situational, organizational, and cultural contexts, officers have come to understand that ILP is not fully operationalized at the patrol level because in fact, it was not intended for their use. Rather, officers perceive ILP and crime analysis as a tool for management personnel to demonstrate accountability for crime control.

Navigating the Clash: Patrolling By Numbers

As I have shown, the 'loosely coupled' state which characterizes ILP in the CPD has meant that patrol officers remain largely disengaged from ILP practices. However, organizational pressure on management personnel has led *selective* aspects of ILP to penetrate patrol work. Using ticket and street-check counts as CompStat success indicators has translated into pressure on patrol to achieve desired counts. Officers face reviews such as, "how many violation tickets did you write this month? Okay well you only wrote x amount so okay well that's gotta increase" (Constable, I12). Patrol sergeants and officers express apprehension toward these practices, feeling that they are disconnected and at times inappropriate in relation to the demands of the job. As one Acting Sergeant explains,

> After CompStat yesterday the inspector comes back and says we need to increase tickets. This month there's a focus on distracted driving tickets, so I'm told as acting sergeant to let the guys know that ticket numbers are low. I'll pass along the information, but I filter some of it from the supervisors. If the guys have had a hectic shift like they did yesterday and then I go to and say 'we need more tickets!' they won't respond well (Field notes #4, Ride-along)

Officers make sense of these responsibilities by acknowledging them but not internalizing them as deserving such importance. Nevertheless, complying with expectations for output measurements illustrates an example of how ILP has been selectively embraced by patrol. While on a call in an apartment building, a few officers were standing around waiting in the hallway while two others were inside speaking with the tenants. One officer exclaimed,

> ‘Guess what? I got a distracted driving ticket biiiitches!’ as he gestured in a celebratory, fists-in-the-air motion - his voice enthusiastic but sarcastic. Another officer laughed and turned to me and said, ‘*the corner office* wants to see more tickets’ (Field notes, Ride-along)

The fieldnote example above illustrates how officers can respond to ticketing requirements in order to appease management, although responding to these tasks can become a joke among officers. Moreover, the quotations above illustrate the disconnected and clashing expectations between patrol culture and middle-management.

Discussion and Conclusion: ILP as a Rationalized Institutional Myth

As illustrated throughout this chapter, a number of situational and cultural barriers have shaped the way that patrol officers have made sense of ILP and its relevance, or lack thereof, to their daily practices. The conditions under which ILP has been organizationally implemented have ultimately led officers to understand that crime analysis was not predominantly intended to be an operational tool for them. The organizational emphasis on intelligence-led practices and data analysis is instead understood by officers to be a *trend*, a tactic by management to align with growing public calls for police transparency and accountability.

Institutional theory provides a means to understand reform not as a *failure* to operationalize the philosophy, but as a strategic state of operating. Organizational claimsmaking may support a process of acquiring and maintaining legitimacy, while internal operations may

remain largely unaffected. A disconnect, or 'decoupling' of rhetoric from practice allows for the production of legitimacy without the investment, complication or resistance of forcing drastic change upon the status quo (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The degree to which practical changes occur rests on understanding "how people in organizations construct meaning and reality, and then exploring how that enacted reality provides a context for organizational action (Choo, 1996: 337). Although the organization has implemented both personnel and technological infrastructure to support analytical capacities in the operational patrol division, these practices appear to be largely 'decoupled' from officers' perceptions, understandings, and practices.

Despite how the role of IT in guiding decision processes is championed in the rhetoric of would-be "knowledge organizations", its practical capabilities and uses within the organization have shown to be largely *symbolic.* Ground-level functioning often appears contradictory to the aim of investing in these technologies (Brown & Brudney, 2003). Feldman & March (1981) identify that the mass collection of information by organizations surpasses what can realistically be used or considered in decision making processes. This holds even greater relevancy as technological advancement has magnified the ability to both gather and store data. Despite impracticality, "the gathering of information provides a ritualistic assurance that appropriate attitudes about decision making exist" and are held by the organization (Feldman & March, 1981: 177). The significance of external perceptions about processes surpasses the importance of their literal translation. CPD is able to benefit from *ceremonially* equipping officers with intelligence, maintaining the appearance of an intelligence-led patrol team, regardless of whether officers actually engage with the material. The tools have been provided and *responsibility* for leveraging them is thus placed upon patrol.

Institutional theory posits that institutional programs and policies - when applied literally - create contradictions and inconsistencies which can *undermine* rather than promote efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Instead, organizations operate in a 'loosely coupled' state to allow the organization to benefit from the *legitimating* features of organizational change, while not sacrificing efficiency to enact literal coordination (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Coordinating patrol work in a way which forces the consumption of all information that is provided would, as demonstrated above, decrease the amount of time officers are on the street fulfilling the emergency response role of patrol. As illustrated throughout this chapter, the dissemination of intelligence does not ensure consumption or use by the end user - nor would this consumption appear to breed increased efficiency if it were to occur. Given the reactive nature of patrol work which leaves little time for proactivity, there may be minimal return for enforcing the consumption of analytic data. The lack of actionable information contained in crime analysis reports for patrol officers further negates the value of strictly coordinating this behaviour. Similarly, the decision *not* to invest in training may have been made in the interest of using resources efficiently, given present organizational conditions. Rather, it appears that ILP has affected patrol work most notably through output evaluations, such as ticket or street check counts.

Interestingly, it is this emphasis on outputs that allows ILP in its 'loosely coupled' state to 'work out backstage' (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Officers do not need to accept the analyst as part of the team or pay attention to analytical reports in order to issue tickets and write street checks for CompStat counts. Management may leverage crime analysis for accountability purposes, while officers can rationalize their minimal engagement because the situational, organizational, and cultural conditions have led officers to believe it's "not for them". Officers

work within ILP requirements by achieving numerical expectations without fundamentally changing their approach. As a result, the challenge of trying to change patrol culture and attitudes toward the analyst is avoided. Information from the analyst which suits their existing occupational schemas and activities (for example, the 'recent release' reports) is acknowledged, while the remainder can be overlooked. The organization is able to benefit from the legitimating processes of ILP claimsmaking while not producing *turmoil* by exerting drastic change upon patrol officers. Instead, officers *selectively* embrace aspects of ILP which do not disrupt established occupational or cultural norms.

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of how officers have made sense of ILP, and how this sensemaking process has shaped perceptions of ILP's purpose and value. In Chapter Six, I move to an analysis of how officers enact ILP on the ground.

Chapter Six: Intelligence-led 'Proactive' Patrol Work

In this chapter, I explore the reported and observed practices of patrol officers operating under an ILP framework. Despite patrol officers' resistance toward engaging with ILP innovation and crime analysis on the front end (as illustrated in Chapter Four), they have embraced *select* aspects of ILP. For example, patrol officers engage in a number of practices which fall under the banner of 'proactive' police work. These include collecting street check reports, achieving output expectations assigned by management, and leveraging select information from the analyst which fits with their established occupational routines (such as 'recent release' reports). In what follows, I explore patrol officers' reported experiences and observed practices engaging with 'intelligence' and 'proactive' approaches as part of ILP. I then analyze how these practices may impact police-public interactions, raising several concerns about some of the 'proactive' patrolling approaches occurring under an ILP framework.

I begin with a discussion on ILP and CompStat policing. I outline existing literature on the adoption and implementation of 'intelligence practices' on the ground, including the socio-political concerns which have been raised in relation to these practices. I then move to an empirical analysis of 'proactive' patrol practices in the CPD, the organizational pressure to conduct street checks and an occupational emphasis on 'recent releases'. I argue that the reported experiences and observed practices of CPD patrol officers raise concerns about the policing of the usual suspects and identify the need to be attentive to how risk is constructed under an ILP model. I conclude with a discussion of the potential socio-political implications of these 'intelligence practices.'

Partnering ILP and CompStat

Although ILP and CompStat are frequently implemented together - as they have been in CPD - the problem focus of each approach is distinct (Ratcliffe, 2008). Combining the two ideologies has resulted in a policing strategy which is concerned with targeting specific types of offenders, as well as certain criminal events. As outlined in the literature review, ILP places its emphasis on repeat and prolific offenders (Ratcliffe, 2008; Leman-Langlois & Shearing, 2009). It operates from the perspective that a small number of individuals contribute to a large portion of incidents, and that targeting select individuals through increased surveillance and monitoring will effectively disrupt crime (Ratcliffe, 2008).

As opposed to a focus on specific offenders, CompStat policing takes interest with criminal events, identifying and addressing clusters and hot spots, and tracking crime statistics by incident type (Ratcliffe, 2008). CompStat frequently targets "minor quality of life offenses in the neighbourhoods where violent crime occurs" (Fabricant, 2011:373), working from a belief that addressing less serious crimes will help to reduce overall criminal occurrences, including those which escalate to more serious crime. The emphasis on proactivity as part of ILP, and the targeting of crime types associated with CompStat has meant that "proactive approaches previously applied to major and organized crime have moved into realms of petty, persistent offending, low-level drug dealing, [and] public disorder" (Maguire, 2000: 318). The focus on clusters and hotspots within the CompStat review system has meant that intervention becomes targeted geographically, which "inevitably leads to 'over-policing' of selected areas, while others, given limited resources, are 'under-policed'" (Leman-Langlois & Shearing, 2009: 37). Ratcliffe (2002b) has identified concerns regarding accuracy and anonymity in crime mapping that is released into the public domain and discusses the risks of labelling certain areas as

dangerous or undesirable. Hotspot policing strategies have evoked concern surrounding the disproportionate targeting of lower socioeconomic areas, and potential consequences for police-community relations and legitimacy (Kochel, 2011; Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega and Ready, 2011; Neyroud & Disley, 2008).

Additional research on the integration and utilization of information technologies and crime analysis have uncovered that although these tools provide pre-interaction *access* to intelligence information, they are often "used in line with traditional modes of policing" (Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005: 39). Technologies that were intended to increase the delivery of 'intelligence' information to officers for real-time decision-making did not appear to increase the rationality or objectivity of decisions, but instead provided a means of "technologically augmenting" the policing of "usual suspects" (Sanders & Hannem, 2012: 402). Similarly, crime analytic reports have been found to provide "a way of claiming 'scientific objectivity' for police actions" without actually changing such practices (Innes, Fielding & Cope, 2005: 39). As such, proactive policing measures have ignited concern about the potential for discriminatory profiling and civil liberty infringement (Mythen & Walklate, 2006; Phillipson, 2011; Ferguson, 2012). For instance, labelling processes employed by analysts to ascertain gang members have come under scrutiny for their subjective nature and residual implications to the "life chances" of those erroneously identified (Fraser & Atkinson, 2014: 158). Thus, such practices risk becoming legitimized as an "objective science" (Sanders & Hannem, 2012).

Finally, research surrounding intelligence-led policing raises important questions about what constitutes 'intelligence'. For example, do street checks (also referred to as 'carding,' 'stop-and-documents,' 'field information reports' etc.) constitute intelligence? Street checks are police stops during which officers collect information about persons not engaged in a criminal incident.

These stops are utilized by police departments across Canada, including CPD, to gather information for the purpose of intelligence-led policing (Fabricant, 2011). Brown (2007) identifies that while there is little consensus on what is meant by 'intelligence' within law enforcement, there is a common sentiment that 'mere data' or raw information, such as street checks, are not intelligence in and of itself. Rather, data becomes intelligence when it is made significant or actionable through an analytical or methodical process (Brown, 2007). Manning (1992) defines intelligence as "information gathered for anticipated events, rather than gathered in response to an ongoing event" (p. 352). This definition appears better suited at least to the *rationale* behind street check practices. As I illustrate in this chapter, street checks need not be analyzed or collated prior to behaving as a catalyst for subsequent assumption or action. In what follows, I provide an empirical account of proactive patrolling practices occurring under an ILP framework.

Proactive Policing Under ILP

Proactive approaches carried out by patrol officers in CPD emphasize data-collection practices such as street-check and 'intel' reports, as well as a concentration on pursuing known offenders. In what follows, I provide an analysis of the street check practices of CPD patrol officers, including a discussion of data collection processes, and how these processes may contribute to the construction of risk. Next, I explore officers' prioritization of 'recent releases' within their unassigned or 'proactive' time. Both of these practices are examined in context with organizational performance measurement procedures in place under an ILP CompStat model. From this, I argue that the reported experiences and observed practices of CPD patrol officers raise concern about the policing of usual suspects. Moreover, I argue that present conditions may

encourage information gathering which poses concern for problematic constructions of risk. I end with a discussion of the potential socio-political implications of such 'intelligence practices'.

Street Checks and the Construction of Risk

Officers put in street check reports after interacting with a citizen wherein no criminal offense occurred, but an officer - for any number of reasons – may decide to complete a report which documents the interaction. Street check reports become sources of intelligence that are drawn upon by crime analysts, and are used to inform potential suspects or persons of interest. As an inspector describes,

> What crime analysis allows you to do then is to look at for example the street checks of individuals that were made in the area where all of these crimes are taking place. So the crime analysis would involve looking at the crime, looking at the checks of persons in the neighbourhood where the crimes are taking place, and trying to merry the two together to give us a list of possible suspects that we could focus resources on. (Inspector, I4)

The decision to complete a street check is left up to the officers' discretion, however, street check quantities per district are tracked for monthly CompStat review. Thus, inspectors must encourage their squads to input street checks in order to meet this monthly quota.

Given that street checks occur amidst interactions where no criminal offense has taken place, gleaning data, such as personal identification, is not always a straightforward process. Individuals engaging in casual interaction with officers are not obligated to provide information, and officers must navigate this challenge in order to collect the data that they are seeking. A sergeant explains,

> Oftentimes we want to be able to stop them through lawful means, right. So um, and that's where we can use some of the city by-laws, you know, like the jaywalking, the riding their bikes without helmets, we're able to kind of you know, think outside the box a little bit to you know, give us a chance to stop and talk to them. But you know

> we're able to stop and chat with somebody, not everyone has to give us their information, right, just normally. (Sergeant, I1)

Officers are able to utilize minor, procedural or quality of life by-law offenses in order to glean personal identification from citizens. Using by-law enforcement as a means to collect data provides officers with some protection from accusations of arbitrary detention or violating privacy rights. Another officer shares his similar approach to street checks,

> All I'm doing is I'm painting a picture. At some point, once I've got enough tick boxes, you know, check check check check check, okay that's enough to at least, I now have a suspicion. I don't have any grounds for anything. Like I could stop him and talk to him and say hey how's your day going if I was working, but if he said pound sand, I can't do anything other than say alright, see ya. You know. I might wait until he j-walks, and then now you've committed an offense, so now I can do something. Now I can identify you. (Constable, I10)

First, the remark above identifies the propensity to street check on the basis of suspicion, challenging claims of rapport-building as the driving force. Second, it identifies how officers may find ways to force an individual to provide identification if they are initially uncooperative. As I observed in the following excerpt from ride-along field notes, Motor Vehicle Act offenses are also used to instigate searches and garner information to complete street checks or 'intel reports':

> The call board was quiet, so we were unassigned and driving around the district. [The officer] told me that in this down time, he often runs plates to try and find gangsters to do checks. We drove around running plates for any cars we passed that the officer thought may belong to a gang member. As we headed back toward the centre of downtown, he entered the licence plate of a black SUV which was parked outside a drugstore. The RMS search indicated that this vehicle was linked to a known gang member. The officer noted that the vehicle was missing a front licence plate, giving reason to pull the vehicle over. We waited in the car until a man and a woman exited the drugstore and headed towards the SUV. The officer then turned on the cruiser lights and approached the male. The officer confronted the man about the missing plate, requested identification, and requested to search the vehicle. The officer called for backup, and three officers conducted a thorough search of the

> vehicle. Following the search which yielded nothing of interest, the officer completed a 'gang intel' report on the interaction. (Field notes #5, Ride-along)

The scenario described above illustrates how information technologies, such as the RMS, shape the way that officers respond to minor offenses. In this case, a missing plate yielded a vehicle search because of RMS information about an individual, not because of the offense itself. The policing of offenses has become the policing of individuals, with enforcement acting as the means rather than the end. Interestingly, this particular officer shared his aspirations to work in the gang unit, telling how this personal interest is what drives his unassigned time (Field notes #5, Ride-along). Rather than proactive time which is strictly coordinated by an analysis of needs, patrol officers appear to pursue proactive projects which fit their individual motivations.

As described in the previous chapter, the information captured in a street check varies in detail between officer and circumstance. At the very least, it provides a documented account that an individual was at a specific location at a specific time. As one officer explains,

> …Street checks are interesting because, a street check, all it is it's a report that just says at this place, at this time, I spoke to this person, what he was wearing, and depending on what's relevant to you. So if you think that this person was involved in crime, maybe you give a very detailed description of what he was wearing, so that later, someone says well this crime happened, we found out about it a week later, and then they search the street checks. It's just a way of documenting interactions (Constable, I9)

The quotation above identifies the variance, and more importantly, the subjective nature of how much detail is collected when conducting a street check. The officers' perception of the individual and their potential criminality can greatly impact whether or not time is taken to collect details, such as a clothing description. A record of past criminality also shapes officer

suspicion, as well as the level of detail warranted in a street check. One constable reflected on what might trigger him to conduct a street check, stating

> Um, [a] person's background. Potentially could be because they're flagged as being of interest. So like on CPIC, somebody could get flagged as having a special interest police flag. So this person is known, or is a high risk sex offender, please document all details about the stop… so you would just, alright, well he's wearing blue pants and black shoes, and, write it all down. Cause you might not have thought to do it on him until you see it on CPIC and then you say oh geez, *turns out he's a much worse guy than I thought, so you'll go into a lot of detail on that*. (Constable, I10)

Above, the officer identifies how the construction of an individual and the 'type' of person they are plays an important role in how much data is collected and stored within a street check. Another officer reiterates the discretionary process by which information may or may not be documented and entered into the system:

> …We do quite a few street checks. … we definitely check a greater percentage of people than we document. And that's, you know, *if there's valuable information in the check then we'll put in the street check*, but you know we're constantly checking people. You know whether it's vehicle checks, pedestrians or cyclists, you know, we're constantly dealing with people. (Constable, I2)

This officer identifies the selective nature of whether or not a check becomes formally documented as a street check. An officer may interact with an individual, check their identification or run them through the system, but this may only be documented if that person triggers suspicion for the officer. Thus, the street check data entered in the system consists largely of people categorized as warranting documentation, and is not a comprehensive snapshot of the people who may have been in any given area. Officers may deem an individual suspicious if their behaviour or whereabouts do not match what the officers perceive as 'normal behaviour'. As the following sergeant explains,

> we have a lot of stones getting unturned, and a lot of people who need to be checked at 2:00 in the morning, so it's *not a lot of regular people out*… these people are all being identified (Sergeant, I1).

Officers create typifications about the behaviour of law-abiding versus problematic citizens, and categorize people on the basis of these perceptions. The following officer describes how he determines whether to put in a street check on someone:

> If it's just a, hey this guy's here all the time and he's, he looks shady, he looks like he's doing shady things, he's giving off all the shady flags, but he hasn't done anything wrong yet, yeah then you'll put in one. Um, a lot of what we do really comes down to discretion though. I mean a huge amount of what we do is discretion, where, it'll be like my own personal experiences and my kind of background and my life will tell me that like, you know… the age, the facial expressions, the clothes that you wear, they matter. I mean if you're wearing the typical 'I'm a criminal' you know, Dussault hoodie, um, and all these things, middle of the afternoon walking with your hood up, it's not really all that cold outside right now, you know, the baggy sweatpants, and then has a flip phone (Constable, I10)

The remarks above describe how officers use a number of demographic and physical indicators to infer whether an individual warrants suspicion. This officer rightfully alludes to the subjective nature of such interpretations, acknowledging that such perceptions are a result of an officer's personal experience over a calculated assessment of risk. Additionally, suspicion may be inferred from past documentation about an individual. One officer provided an example of how decisions regarding street-checks are determined:

> …If we had something like… we stop a guy, maybe he's been involved in a prowler call a year ago or 3 years ago, and he didn't really have a good reason for being there and he was really nervous and jittery, suddenly we're like oh this is interesting. Um, if we don't have anything in terms of any crime at that time we might put in intelligence information that says, this person was checked near a bus stop, he was checked because of these high incidents of sex crimes at this time, there's no evidence to link him to those crimes, however he's a person of interest…So what happens is the next police officer that runs into him will read that intelligence and go hmm, and might pay a little bit more attention…. Because he's read the report. (Constable, I9)

This officer describes how prior recorded interactions with the police may change the way that present officers perceive the individual ('suddenly this is interesting'). This may pertain to involvement in past incidents, but also to *the existence of previous street checks*. This officer

identifies the potential for street-checks to act as a catalyst for future suspicion. Suspicion by one officer which led to a street check may trigger further interest and subsequent street checks. Further, the fact that this officer regards previous checks as 'intelligence' identifies the credibility ascribed to previous checks.

The proactive collection of intelligence information through street-checks is intimately linked to notions of targeting and saturating specific areas of concern. It is within these hot spots that officers are especially encouraged to conduct street checks. Both street checks and violation tickets are tallied for CompStat purposes. Officers are assigned responsibility for engaging in these 'proactive' tactics while management interpret their execution as indicative of good police work. An inspector describes how they designate specific geographic locations for officers to complete street checks, and is able to follow-up and track if this assignment is accomplished:

> We'll often ask a team to go and increase the number of people they check on the street in order to identify persons of interest for particular crimes. Um, if we've had an increase in a geographical area of residential break and enters and we don't know who it is […] We'll ask the members to go and do some … street checks or person checks, and so I can see overnight if they've done 5 or 6 street checks in that neighbourhood, and I can see that because they're reported in [our records management system], then I know that they've gone out into that neighbourhood and they've done their job that we've asked them to do (Inspector, I4)

The number of street checks that an officer collects in an assigned area is used to asses an officer's level of performance ("it tells me they're doing a lot of work" (Seargeant, I1)). For management, addressing trends and patterns involves instructing their squads to pursue street checks in the area. Achieving sufficient street check numbers allows management personnel to illustrate that they are actively working to impact the hotspot.

On the ground, patrol officers are expected to comply with numerical output expectations assigned by management. This often results in an abundance of street checks, as one constable explains:

> Our inspector who runs our district, a lot of his philosophy is saturate the area and check people, identify people who are walking around, identify people who are up to no good, well okay that's great and all, but what is that gonna do? It's either gonna shift the problem somewhere else, or, a lot of the time what's happening is because they want us to build statistics, they want us to do street checks, they want us to be on people and checking them. So a lot of time's what's happening in a night is, I'll check John Doe and put in a street check report on him, and an hour later my squad mate will check John Doe and put in a street check on him, you know what I'm saying? We're just checking people and putting in check reports on them because that's what our inspector wants or that's what our supervisors want, well they want stats, they want us to saturate an area, they want us to check anyone and everything. Okay we'll that's great and everything but *we've just checked the same guy in an hour and gotten two reports out of it, but we're no closer to resolving the problem* (Constable, I13, *emphasis added*)

The officer above identifies how quantifying street check goals may appease quotas, but questions the utility of such practices. Repeatedly checking the same individuals does not yield new or actionable intelligence. Further, this raises concern about the assignment of risk to individuals who are repeatedly checked, given that prior street checks may trigger greater interest in an individual.

The relationship between street checks and perceived risk raises concern about how intelligence practices are contributing to risk construction. The street check expectations in CPD create conditions where an abundance of street checks may be conducted as a formality for management. One constable identifies how a heavy emphasis on street check quantities may jeopardize information quality:

> …Last year they tried to get us to write more street checks, as a whole district right, because we were falling down in our numbers. So they said write more. So we did...

> people are just throwing intel reports, that's a criminal, I'm gonna check him. Just to get the numbers. So my partner and I, we kind of, made a point of showing how ridiculous it is. We left the station to go and get coffee, and every person we saw that we knew we wrote a street check on. And so we saw like 40 people we knew. So we just wrote it down, we wrote them all down, went back to the office, and they loved it… I had nothing to add on any of them… they like to think that we're gathering all this intelligence on people. When they weren't gathering shit. But that's what they like right, numbers are up, so it's fine (Constable, I7)

First, the excerpt above identifies that assessing street checks by quantity does not mean that new or useful information is contained in each check. This remark insinuates that management regards street checks as 'intelligence', regardless of their content or quality. Second, the quote raises concern about the policing of usual suspects and known offenders ('every person we saw that we *knew*'). Although this officer identifies the erroneous nature of conducting street checks of this manner, his actions illustrate that officers are appeasing their supervisors and contributing to vast 'intelligence' stores. An abundance of street checks constructs notions of risk about an individual and their perceived behaviour. As one officer describes,

> …You start building this information and intelligence about this individual that might be relevant down the line, because maybe he isn't doing anything criminal now, but his *behaviour is escalating*. And that's where it really is, that information becomes useful. Sometimes that information does get out of hand, with gang intelligence. So for example this person was checked with a gang member in this bar, okay, he was checked again with this gang member in this other bar. Well the guy might be a law-abiding citizen that has really terrible friends, and we see that all the time. This guy's got like 15 intelligence gang information, you're like oh this guy's a pretty big gangster, but then when you start actually reading the intelligence information, yeah, he was just talking to gangsters, and he's associated with those type of people, but he's never been involved in any sort of crime and he's never been a suspect in any sort of crime. So that's the only time it can get a little bit, at first glance you might think this person's worse than they are. (Constable, I9)

The officer above identifies several critical concerns related to street check 'intelligence' and the construction of categories of risk. First, he identifies that street checks are

understood as a pre-emptive indication that an individual may become problematic or engage in criminal behaviour ('his behaviour is escalating'). Second, he identifies the self-fulfilling nature of street check 'intelligence', identifying that the existence of a street check or gang flag itself stimulates officers' interests which often results in subsequent checks. Third, he identifies concerns about street check 'intelligence' and the associations it creates. Street checks link people to one another when they are checked together, which results in the potential for someone to appear to be involved in activities that they are not.

Crime analysis also creates the potential for the misattribution of risk to people. Analysts disseminate bulletins with persons of interest which officers are encouraged to pay attention to. During a patrol ride-along shift, the two officers I was riding with discussed how,

> ...Often, the analyst is 'going on a hunch'. One officer stated, 'the thing with crime analysis is that it can be skewed by poor policing'. He described how the analyst may definitively say to focus on one person, but it doesn't always make sense or isn't always supported. The officers discussed how *emphasizing focus on a certain person leads to repeated street checks on that person, which can create a 'paper gangster'.* An individual comes to appear to have significant interest and gang links based on street checks, leading officers to check the individual every time they run into them. The individual becomes a 'paper gangster', but does not actually warrant that level of interest. (Field notes, ride along)

The excerpt above identifies how an individual may appear to be a significant concern *on paper* or *in the system* based on street check documentation. However, the reality is that they are perpetually checked based on the existence of an initial interest or check. The process can become cyclical, where identifying a person of interest stimulates street checks, and street checks are used to identify persons of interest. Further, one can become a 'paper gangster' through association with someone who is flagged as a 'known gangster'. Those who are stopped or checked with other individuals become linked to one another in

the system. These associations are used to draw inferences about the risk and behaviour of others. As I learned during one ride-along:

> Following a vehicle search of a known gang member, the officer I was riding with was writing a 'gang intel' report regarding the search. The individual's girlfriend had been in the vehicle with him, and the officer linked the report to her name as well. We discussed more about how gang associations were linked in the system. I mentioned that it was unfortunate for the girl that was with him, as she would always be flagged as linked to a gang whenever she was pulled over in the future. The officer replied that was true, but that she should be. He then described that *these sort of links do have the potential to cause 'paper gangsters'*, for example, 'if the girlfriend's nephew had been in the car as well, and had given attitude or done anything for which the officer decided to put in a check for him, he would then be linked to a gang member'. *This would mean that every time he was stopped in the future this association would lead to continued street checks on him, when really he may not be involved in the gang at all* (Constable, Field notes #5, Ride along)

The quotation above raises further concern about the construction of risk through associations. It identifies how a youth only vaguely connected to a gang member may face incessant surveillance after being documented in the same vehicle on one occasion. The collection of street check and 'intelligence' data which occurs as part of 'proactive policing' under ILP poses significant concerns regarding labelling practices and the attribution of risk or criminality.

Conducting street checks based on geographic areas of concern also contributes to construction risk of an individual. As another officer describes, an individual may become a person of interest based on a wide net of street checks in a specified area. The following quotation illustrates how location-driven checks can result in a number of 'suspects' that may not warrant substantial interest.

> [W]hen we get information, often I find that out of four suspects in the area, when you actually start to dig to see if um these are viable suspects, you find that well, 3 of them they were checked in the area and one of them was binning, or they're not really

> viable suspects. *But they're part of this whole catch of people that were checked or live in that area* (Constable, I9)

Given that officers may be assigned to conduct street checks in specified geographical locations such as frequent hotspots, residing in a 'risky' areas can increase the chance of being designated a 'person of interest'.

Policing the Usual Suspects

Tasking officers with the responsibility for controlling crime rates under a CompStat model has facilitated the selective adoption of intelligence information which assists officers in the policing of usual suspects. Although the practices of patrol officers have remained largely unchanged under ILP (see Chapter Five), officers show enthusiasm for a report document which provides information about individuals who are being released from incarceration. As one officers outlines,

> The crime analyst keeps track of who's been put in jail, who's been checked with who, who's getting released from jail… a hard copy and an email copy of a poster will come out saying they're being released, this is where they usually target, be on the lookout for them (Constable, I11)

Officers are provided information and pictures of known offenders who will be re-entering the community, and are advised to keep a heightened watch for these individuals while on patrol. In addition to information about the individual's offense history, officers are provided with addresses and community supervision conditions:

> So there's photos, there's grids, grid patterns, and there's usually the photos of potential suspects and names and the information of where they live, their conditions that they are to abide by within all these fan outs, and these posters and emails.(Constable, I12)

Providing officers with probation or patrol conditions allows officers to target known offenders based on minor breaches, rather than wait for an individual to actively commit an offense.

Several officers referred to this approach as a staple of their unassigned time. One constable described how,

> [The analyst] tell[s] us about recent releases, so, like there's a guy who *every time he gets released, me and partner arrest him within 2 days for breaching, right*. So we just found out that he's out, which is great information, because you know, telling us who's out is great because otherwise we'd have to run them and kind of see what they're up to and have they been checked. Now that we know he's out, now we're on the hunt for him again, so that's good information. (Constable, I2)

The officer above identifies how information from the crime analyst is employed to aid in the 'hunting' of usual suspects. This tactic moves beyond the pursuit of 'known' individuals who are wanted for crimes. Instead, hunting for community supervision breaches (which may be instances such as missing an appointment with a parole officer or interacting with others who have criminal records) is an attempt to pre-empt crime by re-arresting and detaining individuals *before* criminal events are necessarily occurring. Further, this officer stresses that in contrast to other information provided by the analyst, bulletins containing recently released individuals are *useful*. Another officer shares this sentiment, explaining how the analyst provides them with "an updated list of fresh warrants, which is *probably the only thing that I use that's extra* [from the analyst]" (Constable, I7). Officers' positive regard for this specific tool from the crime analyst indicates that this tool is *actionable*. Providing conditions and addresses of known offenders allows officers to actively 'hunt' these individuals. The following two interview excerpts illustrate how officers use such information in their everyday practices:

> …If we knew exactly where they were gonna be residing once they were released, let's say they're going to a halfway house or if they have an apartment, and we know if they're a chronic offender [….] *if there's time we would set up on the residence and see if we could follow them leaving the residence and see what they do*, is usually one approach. Or another approach is our patrol unit may see this person walking about and call in a plain clothes unit to follow them and see what they do. (Constable, I11)

> I can see who was arrested over the last 4 days, and I get a brief synopsis of what the events were… if I see a major file or a prolific offender or a good target, oh okay, *he did this at this location, and he's gonna be out again so, I'm gonna be in that location too looking for him* (Constable, I10)

Above, the officers describe how proactive time may be used to monitor individuals with criminal records. This monitoring is supplemented by information provided by the crime analyst. Interestingly, the 'recent release' report does not constitute an 'analytical product' in any regard. Information about releases is provided to the analyst by correctional services, with the analyst acting as a middle-man disseminating these bulletins to the officers.

A focus on repeat offenders, I argue, is reinforced by a policing model which assigns pressure to prevent increases in incident rates. Repeat or prolific offenders wreak havoc for inspectors who must justify crime trends. During a CompStat meeting,

> The inspector from District One was called upon to explain a string of break-ins. He noted that although the numbers were up, *the 'silver lining' is that a prolific offender had been caught* – he recognized members of his district who had played a part in securing evidence which had resulted in a conviction – and they were now '*free from him' for a while*. He noted '*the difference that one individual can make to the numbers'* (Field notes, CompStat)

CompStat's performance measurement approach, I argue, perpetuates the persistent targeting of known offenders, and securing re-incarceration thus '*frees*' the district *from* the individual while they are detained. Later in the same meeting,

> The inspector for District Four stood at the podium while his monthly rates for property crimes were depicted on the projector screens. While addressing clusters and changing patterns, he noted several names in relation to the property crime occurring in his district, commenting that 'those are names you don't want in your neighbourhood' (Field notes, CompStat)

Both of these examples serve to illustrate how under the CPD's implementation of ILP and CompStat-style management, repeat offenders become *known threats to favourable statistics* which must be addressed. Further, the individualized responsibility attribution is

highlighted in the comment by this inspector regarding 'names you don't want in *your* neighbourhood'. Interest becomes focused on district-specific results - perhaps at the expense of the larger picture – while known offenders are ping-ponged between districts.

The pursuit of known offenders, however, is not a practice that is *triggered* by crime analysis, but is rather a routine patrolling practice that becomes *enhanced* by information from the crime analyst. Officers are able to seek out this information on their own initiative through the RMS. One constable shares his approach, describing that

> I know who's out there and I know kind of who's active. Like we'll monitor who's in jail and who's not, and if somebody's getting out, you know, I'll run him before I ever see him, just so I know his conditions…that's something I personally look into, cause I like to know who's out there (Constable, I7)

The officer goes on to describe how this practice is passed down through senior officers:

> …The senior guys when I first came out, they showed us how to do that. It wasn't like, *it's not part of our training, it's just like peer guidance.* And so we try and pass that on when we work with other people, because…*most people arrest, like a partnership would arrest maybe 40 people in a year, my partner and I arrested 300 last year*… And that's because of, like *we've been guided to do that.* Know people's conditions, know who's wanted, know where to look (Constable, I7)

The quotation above identifies that 'hunting' known offenders, equipped with a knowledge of their restrictions, is a culturally transmitted practice among frontline officers. Further, the quote draws attention to the significance placed on *making arrests*. When asked what the purpose or value of crime analysis is, one officer stated, "trying to identify criminals responsible for specific crimes, and *trying to keep them in jail.* Yeah, simple as that" (Constable, I5). Pursuing recent releases provides officers with a good chance for a catch, an arrest, a *win.* Further, this 'intelligence practice' aligns with culturally accepted ideas of 'proactive policing' and is legitimized by the distribution of recent release information from the crime analyst.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored patrol officers' observed and reported experiences with proactive policing approaches and 'intelligence practices' under an ILP model. I illustrated how street check practices and an emphasis on 'recent releases' risk becoming legitimized by their function as performance indicators under an ILP CompStat model. In Chapter Three, I illustrated how ILP rhetoric is used as a means of acquiring legitimacy for the organization. This rhetoric of rationality and accountability legitimizes both the organization and the practices which occur under the purview of ILP. However, as Willis (2013) warns, "measuring the *quantity* of police work an officer performs tells us very little about its *quality*" (p. 9). A call to increase street check quantities may contribute to problematic risk construction, while the *selective* adoption of crime analysis information by patrol officers has the potential to promote the policing of the usual suspects.

The social costs which may result from such practices have the potential to damage the legitimacy that is sought by CPD. For example, in Canada, street check practices are under scrutiny for discriminatory behaviour, racial profiling, and privacy violation (Oleynik, 2008; Fabricant, 2011). The Toronto Police Service in particular is facing significant criticism for street-check practices perceived as racially-driven and discriminatory (Rankin & Winsa, 2012). Visible minorities and those in marginalized neighbourhoods experience a disproportionate number of stops as compared to the general population (CBC News, 2015a; Cole, 2015). Concerns have also been raised about the power dynamics at play when officers engage citizens for the purpose of street checks (Winsa & Rankin, 2013). In the instance that no offense has occurred and the individual is not under investigation, there is no obligation for citizens to provide information or identification to the officer. Several Toronto communities have alleged

that street check practices are ignoring individuals' rights, accusing officers of using intimidation or threats to elicit cooperation for street checks (Rankin & Winsa, 2012). Street checks have also been challenged for Charter rights violations including section eight rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and section nine rights against arbitrary detention (Stuart, 2008). For example, a street check conducted in Toronto in the name of 'proactive policing' in a known 'hot spot' was found to have resulted in the arbitrary detention of a youth, violating both sections eight and nine of the Charter (R. v. D. (J.), 2007; Stuart, 2008).

Yet, police departments defend street check practices as a way to "build rapport" with the community through these interactions (Bennet, 2015). Negotiating lines of appropriation for street check practices has been an ongoing challenge for the courts as they work to keep up with changing contemporary police practices (Stuart, 2008; Oleynik, 2008). There has been a recent call to standardize carding practices across the province as a response to damaged trust between the public and the police (CBC News, 2015b). Mistrust of police was cited as a significant factor which inhibited at-risk individuals from seeking police assistance or sharing information in the early days of the serial murder case (Parsons, 2013a). The inquiry stressed that the CPD work on building trust and rapport with marginalized groups in order to promote open communication in the future. Despite recommending that CPD "minimiz[e] ticketing for minor offenses and bail conditions that are difficult to live up to" (Parsons, 2012a: 131), the practices which define ILP on the ground appear to not be conducive to this recommendation. The present exploration into intelligence practices of CPD patrol officers raises two significant concerns. First, the organization may risk damaging trust with marginalized groups if they become disproportionately subjected to street check practices. A heavy emphasis on 'recent releases' through the targeting for minor offenses can further marginalize groups who already face

disadvantage (Parsons, 2013a). If the department wishes to do everything possible to reduce future risks to public safety, concerns about legitimacy and trust must extend to the populations who face the most risk.

Second, the storage of data or 'intelligence' about individuals raises concern about how this information may be used to construct risk. There remain unanswered questions about who may have the potential to access 'intelligence' such as street check reports, and in what format this access may be provided. For example, a growing number of citizens are reporting that erroneous associations documented by police – with no official charges ever laid – have tarnished record checks resulting in lost jobs and blocked opportunities (Cribb, 2014; Cribb & Rankin, 2014). The use of technology for information management has the power to transform the *meanings* attributed to the information which is stored, collated, or retrieved through its use (Manning, 1992). Under ILP, 'raw information' and 'intelligence' are at risk of being conflated, and subsequently contributing to the construction of risk categories. As demonstrated in this chapter, this 'intelligence' has the potential to misconstrue risk, as in the case of 'paper gangsters'. These designations are not necessarily checked for accuracy or subjected to a formal review, and thus labels may be assigned with no means of contesting them. As instances emerge of informal or unconfirmed 'intelligence' resulting in risk constructions which block opportunity and impact the lives of those who are labelled, we must be attentive to the material consequences of the way that data is collected, stored, and managed by law enforcement (Cribb, 2014; Cribb & Rankin, 2014).

Organizationally, CompStat policing fits well with the traditional and accepted pursuit of known and repeat offenders (Herbert, 2001). The performance objectives of CompStat are suited to the 'proactive' approaches identified in this chapter. ILP legitimizes policing approaches

which define success in terms of quantitative outputs, such as the policing of the usual suspects. Chambliss (1995) discusses the systemic targeting of the police toward marginalized individuals (be they marginalized based on race, socioeconomic status, offender status or a combination). He asserts that these practices act to *appease* public opinion, as it is "*organizationally effective"* for the targeted population to be "relatively powerless" (Chambliss, 1995: 191). In contrast with more powerful groups, whose opinions hold political sway, and who have the means to legally challenge the behaviour of the police, disadvantaged groups hold no such weight (Chambliss, 1995). Thus, it is in the interest of the service to target the least powerful of the publics they serve. In light of the CPD's interest in acquiring legitimacy in the eyes of the public (see Chapter Three), the targeting of 'usual suspects', it seems, may contribute to acquiring this legitimacy among some stakeholders.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

In recent years, police organizations have been called upon to be more accountable to the public(s) they serve. Contemporary economic conditions have challenged law enforcement to provide justification for the significant amount of public resources they receive. Police are looking to new and innovative approaches in order to maintain services while decreasing operating costs (Public Safety Canada, 2013). In addition, police are being held accountable for heightened public safety expectations. Rampant fears of radicalized behaviour and large scale violence have tasked police with the early identification and mitigation of risk (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Murphy, 2007; McCulloch & Pickering, 2009; Zedner, 2007). The expansion of police powers in recent legislation such as Bill C-51 cements the expectation that police be attentive to pre-crime conditions and take pre-emptive action. Meanwhile, enforcement actions face escalating levels of public scrutiny as citizens grow increasingly intolerant of police decisions that appear to be subjective or discriminatory in nature (Choudhury, 2014; Taibbi, 2014). Police must be able to justify finance, safety, and enforcement decisions to the public in order to maintain the appearance of a just and legitimate organization. The ILP philosophy provides a strategy that addresses the intersection of these needs.

ILP is based on the principle of information-driven decision making. The collection, storage, and analysis of large amounts of data using sophisticated technologies is believed to allow for the most informed and responsible approaches. ILP promises a method of resource distribution which is targeted to the problems and areas that need it most (Ratcliffe, 2008). It advocates for focused resource management through the monitoring of statistics and outcomes to illustrate the impact that resources have had on an area. Beyond economic reasoning, ILP's emphasis on advanced technologies to detect patterns or trends promotes the idea that such

innovation improves and enhances the ability to pre-emptively identify risk. Further, the use of advanced technologies and analytics communicates notions of *objective* decision making. In contrast with human decisions which may be impacted by prejudice or biases, ILP boasts a neutral means of storing and categorizing information from which 'rational' decisions can be made and justified. In this theoretical form, ILP addresses the confluence of accountability crises faced by contemporary police departments. This thesis contributes to policing scholarship by providing a theoretical, as well as empirical, analysis of the adoption and utilization of ILP as it is translated into practice.

CPD, a large urban police organization, has publicly attested their commitment to becoming intelligence-led. CPD has made significant investments in infrastructure and technological development to support an ILP framework. This thesis provides a case study of CPD's adoption of ILP with a specific focus on how ILP has been understood and enacted on the ground by patrol officers. In addition to the wider institutional pressures for increased accountability, CPD was the subject of a significant amount of negative publicity in the years preceding ILP adoption. The organizational presentation and rationalization of ILP provided a way for CPD to acquire legitimacy and rebuild public trust. A significant element of acquiring this legitimacy involves 'responsibilizing' patrol officers, raising expectations around patrol's ability to impact and prevent crime. However, implementation on the ground was met with a number of situational, organizational, and police cultural barriers which influence ILP actualization. Thus, ILP takes the form of a rationalized institutional myth in CPD, maintaining appearances without meaningfully changing daily practices. In order to maintain this myth, patrol officers engage *selectively* in ILP practices such as appeasing calls for tickets and street checks, without meaningfully changing their everyday approach. This selective adoption, I

argue, raises a number of sociopolitical concerns – specifically, the policing of the usual suspects and low-level offenses. In what follows, I outline a number of practical and theoretical contributions made by this study. I conclude with a description of research limitations encountered in the present study, and provide a program of research to guide future inquiry and empirical assessment of ILP.

The 'CompStat' Phenomenon and the Responsibilization of Frontline Workers

The move toward performance management programs similar to CompStat has permeated a multitude of sectors. Micro outputs are increasingly individualized and tracked to illustrate organizational accomplishment and justify funding (Eterno & Silverman, 2012). Thus, placing increased responsibility and expectation upon lower level organizational actors for purposes of organizational accountability and liability may be evident in several contemporary organizational structures beyond law enforcement. This study identified how this responsibility was largely rhetorical in nature as practical limitations prevented officers from utilizing many of the tools provided. However, the provision of this responsibility raises questions about how issues of responsibility or 'blame' may be handled if a future incident - such as that which sparked the public inquiry into the CPD - were to occur again. In a climate where *someone* must take accountability for mistakes, organizations may be trying to protect against the reputational costs of an inability to individualize blame or determine responsibility (Parsons, 2012a). The ability to assign blame to a specific individual or unit may be far less scathing than a finding of systemic bias in an entire organization (Parsons, 2012a).

This study builds theoretically upon Garland's (1996) concept of 'responsibilization', demonstrating how organizational rhetoric redirects notions of responsibility for crime control

toward frontline officers. Rather than enlisting those *external* to the organization, CPD, through the implementation of ILP processes, has responsibilized patrol officers to take a more active role in crime control and prevention (Garland, 1996). Garland (1996) identifies that non-state organizations or businesses are motivated to engage in crime control efforts as a means of protecting private interests, as street crime such as theft threatens profits and viability. For patrol officers, the motivation to achieve ticket and street check requirements of ILP may in fact share a similar motivation. If management has come to define success as incurring desired quantified outputs, it is the officers who adapt to this responsibility who will receive favourable performance reviews. These performance reviews will contribute to subsequent promotion and individual success. Thus, the motivations which encourage non-state entities to engage in crime control practices under Garland's (1996) conception share similarities with how motivation may be leveraged among patrol officers. Future inquiry may examine whether the responsibilization of frontline workers is occurring beyond the policing sphere in order to further develop this analytic concept.

Reforming Police Organizations: Intelligence-led Policing as a Rationalized Institutional Myth

This study contributes theoretically to the micro-level application of institutional theory (Hallet, 2010). The concept of rationalized institutional myths originated as a macro-level theory. Establishing credibility for this concept requires an inhabited approach through which ground level functioning may be compared with organizational claims. This study affirms the value of rationalized myths as an analytic concept, illuminating how the sociopolitical context of CPD motivated the adoption of ILP. This study also identifies intricacies in how organizational actors

maintain the *appearance* of reform in order to avoid 'turmoil' (Hallett, 2010). Patrol officers and middle management both acknowledge that ILP is not enacted in the way that official claims may suggest. However, the *selective* adoption of ILP practices allows these discrepancies to 'work out backstage' in order to maintain appearances (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These findings also affirm the value of institutional theorizing for understanding police reform (Willis et al. 2007). Rather than accepting organizational claims at face value, institutional theorizing highlights the need to empirically examine the efficacy of reform initiatives.

Organizational Change and the Role of Police Culture(s)

The findings of this study highlight the significant role of police culture in shaping how organizational change is perceived and enacted. Patrol officers make sense of ILP in relation to existing occupational norms and schemas. The role of culture in shaping officers' perceptions and enactment of ILP makes a significant contribution to the value of ethnography for understanding police organizational change (Marks, 2004). Ethnographic approaches such as this case study reveal cultural influences on sensemaking which may not be uncovered through other methodologies.

Findings of this study also draw attention to the complexity of organizational cultures, and how differing cultures within an organization (patrol, middle-management, civilian) have different needs and goals which may shape how change is enacted. Chan (1996) demonstrates that police culture is not monolithic, but rather multiple cultures exist within the police organization. As civilianization is increasingly leveraged to reduce operating costs, civilians are taking on a number of roles which move beyond administrative functions (Griffiths, 2006). The role of civilian crime and intelligence analysts is one prominent example of how civilianization is expanding within Canadian policing. The analytic culture which has been incorporated under

ILP has not only brought ideological changes, but an additional culture which interacts with multiple existing police cultures in differing ways.

Amidst evident tension between the varying cultures within the operations division, this study highlights concerns about the lack of credibility ascribed to civilian crime analysts. Manning (1992) identifies how the *source* of information shapes its meaning, and citizen information is the least trusted form within police organizations. Interestingly, patrol officers shared that they trusted information garnered from *their own street sources* above and beyond that of the analyst. In this case, citizen information appears to rank higher than information from the crime analyst – possibly as a result of the officers receiving the information *directly* rather than through 'spam' email. Both the analysts' status in the police department's hierarchy and the technologically mediated means through which information is distributed may influence how officers regard this information. The present study draws attention to the importance of examining how patrol officers make sense of an analyst's credibility, as this becomes a critical part of whether they value the crime analyst as part of the team.

Overcoming Barriers through the Eyes of Patrol Officers

This study also sheds important light on barriers that patrol officers perceive as limiting the enactment of ILP. Identifying reasons why officers do not perceive ILP and crime analysis as actionable tools provides insight into how structures or processes may be changed in order to make crime analysis a relevant resource for patrol. Officers identified how reducing the number of officers on the street is not remedied by ILP, but rather prevents them from engaging in proactive patrol time. Vacancies held by the municipality have contributed to the predominant reactive responsibility of patrol, negating information which may only be useful in a proactive or

unassigned context. Resourcing of patrol personnel remains crucial under the present situational context, and ILP does not appear to have alleviated the pressure felt by officers during this time of fiscal restraint.

Officers also offer insight as to how the content of analytic reports may be altered to become more actionable. Adding detail to crime maps, such as identifying the MO for a string of break-ins, is one example that officers cited which would make information more actionable. Further, the lack of organizational investment in training and oversight is identified by officers. Without training or encouragement to utilize new technologies, many officers disregard the new tools at their disposal. Police departments may seek to invest in training for officers regarding the use and function of crime analysis in order to promote an active interest in utilizing crime analysis as part of patrol work.

Finally, a number of officers drew attention to the lack of interaction or face time that occurred between themselves and the analyst. In an era when communication is increasingly mediated by technology, this study draws attention to the importance of interpersonal communication for information dissemination and establishing credibility. Email is a prominent means of organizational communication across sectors, but it seems that face-to-face interpersonal communication may remain a stronger and more impressionable way of communicating within police organizations.

Sociopolitical Concerns of "Pre-Crime" Policing

Finally, this research contributes a preliminary analysis into proactive policing practices occurring under an ILP framework. The pre-emptive targeting of known offenders, such as seeking breaches of probation in the interests of re-incarcerating before offending occurs reflects the growing shift towards 'pre-crime' policing, and "earlier and earlier interventions to reduce

opportunity" (Zedner, 2007: 265). The notion of prevention has become "co-opted and distorted" within contemporary policing practices (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009: 640). 'Prevention' is now understood as incessant targeting and detainment, moving further and further from a discussion of systemic contributors to criminality. Intelligence-gathering practices touted as motivated by 'prevention' raise concern about the labelling and further marginalization of entire communities (Fabricant, 2011).

Patrol officers "screen people and events for further processes; that is, their decisions differentiate between people, leading to a decision to do nothing or a decision to proceed further. Screening… enables police to manage justice and to conserve organizational resources" (Manning, 1992: 357). These decisions shape the information that is available to other officers, and on a larger scale, shape the information that the organizations *know* (Manning, 1992). Decisions made from an analysis of existing information are contingent on the content of the information that is *available* (Manning, 1992). The selective process by which information is documented and retained necessarily influences that which is available to inform decisions. This subjective process raises concerns about the framing of ILP as an 'objective' approach. While negotiating appropriateness of police responses is an ongoing challenge, a rhetoric of objectivity or neutrality raises concerns about how discriminatory behaviour may become rationalized or justified by a veil of scientific language (Sanders and Hannem, 2013; Sanders et al., 2015).

Limitations and Future Directions

Despite the theoretical and practical contributions made by this study, I acknowledge that several limitations exist. The sample size for both interview participants (N=15) and observation hours (N=55) are relatively small. The experiences of the officers in this study cannot be said to

represent the perspectives of the majority of officers in CPD. This study is also limited by its sole focus on one organization. The state of ILP implementation may vary between police organizations of different sizes, different locations, or with different management styles. Further, this study rests on the perceptions of patrol officers and does not provide perspective from the crime analysts within patrol districts. Future areas of inquiry should provide a more holistic organizational perspective of ILP and involve organizational actors from a broader range of levels and positions. They should move beyond a singular focus of one organization and study ILP implementation across several police services in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of ILP in Canada.

This study is also constrained by the timespan over which it occurred. Although interviews and observation took place during two weeks of intensive data collection approximately one year apart, organizational change is a slow and ongoing process. While the present enactment of ILP may be 'loosely coupled' from its philosophical claims, there is potential for practices to become more 'closely coupled' over time as ILP becomes further embedded within the organization. Future research should examine ILP implementation in various stages in order to provide insight as to whether enactment changes over time.

At present, discussion of potential socio-political implications of proactive policing approaches and street check practices remain largely theoretical and preliminary in nature. An empirical examination involving individuals and communities affected by these practices is needed in order to understand their impact on police legitimacy and trust. Future inquiry into street check practices is required to provide a thorough assessment of how information and intelligence practices impact police/pubic interactions. Further research is also needed in regards to how street checks are utilized by police personnel to inform risk assessment.

Finally, technological advances, such as the crime mapping dashboards developed and installed by CPD, continue to grow in capability and sophistication. Increasingly, analytics are promoted for their ability to not only identify but *predict* trends that may occur in the future. ILP innovation is rapidly moving toward an emphasis on predictive analytics; crime mapping dashboards which indicate locations of predicted rather than reported crime are undergoing installation. As technology rapidly expands there is a pressing need to continue assessing how these tools are shaping police work on the ground. Moreover, the role of these technologies in constructing risk of people or locations remains pertinent as we begin to react to 'predicted' rather than concrete incidents.

The challenges faced by contemporary police organizations continue to intensify. Meanwhile, innovation is occurring at a rapid pace, often implemented before any assessment of its efficacy is conducted. It is vital that amidst alluring claims of new efficiencies and capabilities we remain attentive to how organizational context may shape the practical adoption and material consequences of institutional reform.

APPENDIX A: Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Interview Guide

(i) General Introduction Questions

1. Could you start by telling me a little bit about your career in policing and how long you've worked in policing?

(ii) Knowledge, Training, Understanding of Crime Analysis

1. What would you say is the philosophy, or the approach to policing that is adopted by your service?
2. Are you familiar with the term 'intelligence-led' policing? How would you define an 'intelligence-led' policing strategy?
3. Can you define crime analysis? What comes to mind when you think of crime analysis?
4. Is there a difference between crime and intelligence analysis?
5. What do you see as the purpose and value of crime analysis? For example, is its value largely connected to strategic, business or tactical decision-making in your service?
6. Have you received training on crime and intelligence analysis? What type of training did you receive and when did you receive it? Have you received any training in relation to report writing or gathering data during occurrences that will be useful for the needs of analysts?

(iii) Constructed Perceptions of Value, Organizational Fit

1. How would you describe the use of crime analysis in your service? How is it used? Who are the main users of crime analysis data in your service?
2. Are you familiar with the crime analysts who work in your service? How often would you say you interact with them?
3. How is contact with the crime analysts initiated? Do they pass information along to you? Would you seek them out if you have a question? E.g. Would they come to parade? Would you go to their office?
4. Where are the crime analysts positioned in your service? Are they easily accessible to you?
5. Are the analysts in your service sworn members, former police officers? Or are they civilians?
6. Does crime analysis impact policing strategies? If so, how? If not, why not?
7. Is crime analysis (and analytical products) a useful tool for patrol officers?
8. Is crime analysis a useful tool for the police service as a whole? Can you explain how, and in what way, it is useful?

(iv) Current uses/Hot-spot perception/Impact on Strategy

1. How is the crime analyst's data communicated to you? Weekly reports? Do you receive it electronically while out on patrol?

2. What kinds of things are they normally communicating to you? Do you find it helpful?
3. Are the analytical products you receive from your analyst easy to understand? If so, what makes them easy / challenging to understand?
4. Are there areas of your regular beat that you would describe as 'hot-spots', or more problematic areas?
5. What might occur in an area that may lead you to define an area as a hot-spot? How do you decide which areas in your beat are your hot-spots?
6. Does the information that comes from the crime analysts / crime reports ever suggest which areas of your beat are the hot-spots? Do you find it to be accurate compared to what you experience while actually on the street?
7. Would you say crime analysis data impacts your day-to-say strategy? How?
8. Can you describe a time where you may have changed your strategy, or gone to a different area, based on data from a crime analyst or crime report?
9. Would you say the use of, or emphasis on crime analysis has changed over the course of your career in policing?

(v) Comptstat

1. Does your service work under a CompStat model? How does CompStat work in your service?
2. What is the purpose or the logic behind CompStat? What is the goal of using a CompStat model?
3. How does CompStat affect your patrol work?
   E.g. Street checks/measures of productivity?
4. Where so compstat numbers come from?
5. How does reclassification of call types get accounted for in the CompStat process? Does one crime override another?
6. What is the relationship between crime analysis and CompStat?

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