A Critique and Analysis of the Decline-of-Ideology Thesis

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A CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE-OF-IDEOLOGY THESIS

By

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis have failed to provide a serious analysis of the political, economic and ideological trends of the period. They were wrong in their predictions that Marxism and radical ideologies would lose their power to motivate. They were also wrong in their predictions that the two great ideological systems were converging. Not only did they fail to provide an analysis of the political, economic, and ideological trends of the period, but they also failed to provide a serious analysis of ideology as a concept.

In an attempt to define ideology, I trace its appearance and usage in early, philosophical writings to such modern interpretations of the word as seen in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries philosophers: Marx, Mannheim, and Lukacs. A definition is presented:

"Ideology is any more or less systematic set of ideas and thoughts which have been converted into beliefs explaining man's attitudes towards life and his existence in society and specifying a pattern of political action responsive to, and commensurate with, such ideas and thoughts."

Another reason why attention is focused on the interpretation of ideology as presented by the above theorists is to demonstrate the validity of four propositions: First, ideology was part of a philosophical conception of politics critical of all pre-modern conceptions of the political arrangements under which society was organized and not any justification of the existing order of things. Second, all later ideologies are attempts to resolve the basic theoretical and practical
problems posed by the original theory of ideology. Third, the contemporary ideological climate of thought is mainly the result of the vulgarization of the concept by Marxist theorists who attempted to provide an analysis of ideology. Fourth, the views held by the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis are similar to those who have provided the basic ideas for the formulation of the concept.

The entire convergence thesis is based on the static assumption about the momentary state of world politics and economics, and the thesis tends to disregard more fundamental differences among social institutions and attitudes. There is a conceptual confusion which tends to obscure the many-sided reality of the contemporary world. The convergence theory should be dismissed because it does not provide any evidence that ideologies are declining. It simply lends justification to the accusation that the exponents of the decline thesis do not write as social scientists but as ideologues.

Ideology has been seen as declining as a result of the emergence of a post-industrial society in which scientific knowledge and technology play a central role. This society is also characterized by high and widespread levels of economic well-being and affluence which lead to the disappearance of dissatisfaction. In short, all the dimensions of the post-industrial society are non-political. But these writers have not elaborated the political implications of their concept. No systematic attention has been given to the nature of the post-industrial society.
Implicit in the writings of the exponents of the decline thesis is the assumption that there is an ultimate movement towards a static equilibrium of the social forces and a denial of moral and human ideals in the post-industrial society. But they have misconstrued what happens to man's political interests, behavior and attitudes towards politics as society becomes more affluent. Several plausible hypotheses are examined with respect to the attitudinal change that may occur in the post-industrial and affluent society.
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INTRODUCTION

The decade between 1950 and 1960 is characterized by certain features which mistakenly were interpreted as a moderation of ideological conflict. Many political scientists hastened to hail the arrival of what they thought was an era of non-ideological politics. Non-ideological politics, they believed, resulted from the arrival of the mixed economy guided by what was alleged to be Keynesian theory. They believed that Social Democracy was eroding the foundations of both Marxism and capitalism. The politics of Social Democracy took on a messianic value because, it was believed, it would cure the evils of pure capitalism and marxist practice and theory. Just as in past apocalyptic and messianic periods, it was proclaimed that nothing but the sober truth was being told. This led many to proclaim the "end of ideology" thesis which was first advanced by Edward Shils at the Congress of Cultural Freedom which met in 1954 and later was endorsed and developed by Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset. The central message in this thesis was that ideology was at an end because fundamental social conflict was at an end. The advocates of this thesis maintained that there were no longer any social roots for politics which proposed a revolutionary transformation of the social order. Bell asserted that critics who had articulated the revolutionary impulses of the past had abandoned the chiliastic hopes, millenarianism and apocalyptic thinking which signified the end of ideology.
The advocates of the thesis of the decline of ideology argued that after World War II there was little concern with the conflicting political ideologies that had guided the masses and parties of the past. Societies, it was further argued, were overcoming the tensions and contradictions that had threatened the stability of the past. Societies were adapting rapidly by their high standards of living, full employment, and by means of economic expansion to social problems that had beset them in the past. Societies, including the Soviet Union, appeared to be following a pattern of stabilization. The political scientists who took up this approach were less interested in knowing the mechanisms of social change than they were in discovering the mechanisms of social equilibrium that would ensure continued stability. Thus their conception of society was not dynamic: it was functional and integrative.

In the third chapter of this paper I will consider the debate of those who maintained that politics is a matter of pragmatic compromise within an agreed framework of basic values, a framework which depends upon a consensus which has arrived by means of the institutions of the Welfare State and the economic and political domestication of the working class. In support of their thesis they have argued that the rival and competing interests which had been allowed expression within the official political order would no longer breed disruptive conflict. They also asserted that the presentation of ideological world views which might guide and inform politics of passionate conflict would henceforth be out of place in the advanced industrial society.
This industrial society would be capable of absorbing disruptive conflict by its capacity to satisfy basic needs. But the issue has been misconstrued in several ways and these writers failed to diagnose correctly the nature of that to which they were sensitive. A consensus and low political participation in active politics promotes democratic and peaceful political and social processes while conflict and widespread participation tends to go hand in hand with totalitarianism and authoritarianism and therefore in both cases it is meaningful to speak of ideological politics. Liberalism in the United States, in its effort to promote its values, has succeeded to a large extent to create a consensus by adopting certain policies which are advocated by its rivals.

Science and technology which, according to these theorists, will free decision-making from distortions and which will insulate politics from the influence of ideology, are likely to be influenced by ideological convictions and be limited or inhibited by the dominance of particular ideologies. Also, once man is liberated from the economic and, in general, the material needs he will be preoccupied with the fulfilment of spiritual aspirations. In short, the advanced industrial society is likely to generate tensions and contradictions which will threaten any stability that we might have enjoyed in the past or may be enjoying at the present.

The writers of the decline-of-ideology thesis also appear to have confused the exhaustion of ideology with the exhaustion of Marxism, radicalism and, in general, revolutionary politics. At times it appears
that the end-of-ideology thesis, far from proving that ideologies have ended, is itself an expression of the ideology of the time and place where it arose. One is reminded of the claims of classical Marxism. It was Marx who argued that the social roots of ideological thinking will be destroyed, that ideology will wither away with the arrival of communism. Similar assertions are found in the convergence theory which holds that a coming together of liberalism and Marxism eventually will lead to the emergence of the politics of social democracy.

To support the thesis that the end-of-ideology thesis is itself part of an ideology, and thus is self-refuting, we must examine what Bell, Lipset, Shils and others understand by the expression "ideology". In chapter two I will be discussing these points at greater length.

In the first chapter I will discuss the concept of ideology, dealing mainly with those writers who have seen ideology as being the reflection of base and super-structure of the society. To substantiate the thesis that the end of ideology hypothesis is itself ideological it is important to look at the concept of ideology as it was viewed by Marxists. Despite some differing views that we find among these theorists, their conceptions of ideology bear striking similarities. Equally important, we find a striking resemblance between those who formulated the concept and most of the writers who have argued that ideologies have declined. According to those theorists whose conception of ideology will be discussed, the chief forces which determine
the features of society and shape the thought and ideas of men is the mode of production. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual process in general. The production of material wealth dominates the production of ideas. When the base (the mode of production) changes there is a change in social views. Ideological activity is directed by the superstructure, the institutions of society. Consequently, as the causes which give rise to class differences are abandoned, as society moves toward socialism, as capitalism is undermined, man's ideas become less and less distorted. Man acquires gradually knowledge of the historical laws which he applies to social relations.

The manner in which most of the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis treat the subject suggests that ideologies disappear with the creation of certain social and political institutions and norms. For these exponents, ideology comes to an end with the arrival of the mixed economy guided by socialist principles, in other words, with the arrival of the politics of Social Democracy. Whether distortions of reality, which supposedly are caused by ideologies, disappear with the emergence of the communist society or the emergence of Social Democratic society is not important. What is important is that as a certain type of society emerges, people dispense with illusions.

The similarities become apparent when we look at the de- finitions of those who have provided the principal ideas for the development of the concept. As will be seen, according to those theorists ideologies are for the most part post facto justifications or rationalizations
for the existing organization of society. Most of the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis hold similar views. For the leader of these exponents, Daniel Bell, ideology is an illusion. Ideologies, he asserts, are organized systems of belief with ready formulae for the manipulation of the masses. The manner in which Bell defines ideology, of course, can cover all ideologies, not just the "bourgeois" ideology. However, the elements of falsity, rationalization, distortion, and justification are the fundamental components according to many contemporary political scientists. Ideology is seen as that set of ideas with which a society justifies and mythologizes itself. Talcott Parsons is closer to the Marxist view than anyone else. For him, ideology is the deviation from scientific objectivity.

As stated previously, the equating of ideological theorizing with totalitarian and revolutionary politics is a central theme in most of the writers who deal with the decline of ideology and I will devote considerable attention to this theme. The viewing of ideology as revolutionary has given rise to the claim that the age of ideology has ended in a static, affluent social equilibrium and that this equilibrium and stability can be perpetuated by means of identifying the mechanisms of accommodation and equilibration. Such an analysis of the situation is faulty as I shall demonstrate by identifying the sources which act as agents of social change and which exert pressure on society to move forward rather than remain static. I will also try to identify the causes that bring changes in the political attitudes and behavior of individuals and groups and thus upset any equilibrium that might have existed.
CHAPTER ONE
THE DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGY

When it comes to the definition of ideology there is so much variation that the term almost loses its meaning. There are those who hold the view that ideologies obtain, or aspire to obtain, their effects entirely through distortion and illusions, and a few who employ the term in a more neutral fashion. If we accept temporarily that ideologies are systems of partially oriented beliefs and attitudes associated with social groups, then it is clear that the theoretical interest in the concept of ideology has not arisen only in modern times. In fact, interest in this area is older than the emergence of the term ideology itself. Bacon's criticism of the "idola", idols or preconceptions that deceive men and constitute obstacles in the path of true knowledge, is the earliest theoretical concern with the concept. Bacon regarded "idola" as being mainly the consequence of man's psychological constitution but he also attributed them to social factors.¹

This line of thought has remained almost unbroken in the European intellectual tradition starting with Bacon and continuing to the modern concept of ideology. The term, however, first appeared in

the seventeenth century and during the eighteenth century the writers of the French Enlightenment contributed a great deal to the discussion of ideology. Ideology became the central concern of the philosophers although the term was not yet used widely. The philosophers were disturbed by the way in which nations, in fact, entire historical epochs, could be circumscribed by systems of beliefs, how belief systems prevented nations and entire populations from breaking the state of ignorance in which they were kept. Yet the term was destined to be associated with that mentality of thinking which is characterized by irrationality and has little appreciation for thought as an instrument for grasping reality. Not only were the philosophers disturbed but they were also fascinated and this aroused their interest in the study of belief systems. The philosophers believed that the root of all civil discord was the prejudicial quality of man's ideas about the nature and objects of political life.

The question they wanted to answer, then, was how these prejudices could be eradicated and replaced with scientific and universally acknowledged ideas? The answer would be provided by a new education which would be based on the science of ideas which they called ideology.

During the period of the French Revolution, Europe was enmeshed in illusory traditions that were distilled and promoted by what the philosophers believed to be despots, the priest caste, and for purposes of keeping the masses in a state of ignorance. It was during this period that many devices were designed to break the grip of the
familiar, to destroy the spell of prejudice, and, in general, to 
emancipate the masses from the force of habit and custom. Those who 
undertook this task were men like Descartes with his methodology of 
doubt which was directed primarily against the prevailing conceptions 
of reason and all claims that were made uncritically in its name, 
Rousseau with his ideas about the state of nature, and Montesquieu 
who introduced the inductive and historical approach to the study of 
politics and destroyed many traditional arguments used in justification 
of many prevailing conditions.

We may say that although these men became interested in the 
study of belief systems, in reality they were becoming ideologues 
themselves. It is no wonder, then, that when ideology first made its 
appearance, its reputation was different from that of today.

When De Tracy coined the word ideology he wanted to transform 
the mundane into knowledge. The use of ideology was the particular 
method that he proposed as universally applicable. Ideology was the 
science of ideas which was to provide the true foundation for all 
other sciences. It enabled thinkers to investigate and describe the 
manner in which human thoughts are constituted. De Tracy defined the 
science of ideas as follows:

The science may be called ideology, if 
one considers only the subject-matter; 
general grammar, if one considers only 
the method; and logic, only if one con-
siders the purpose. Whatever the name, 
it necessarily contains those three 
subdivisions since one cannot be treated 
adequately without also treating the 
other two. Ideology seems to be the
Thus ideology began its career as an attempt to dispel illusions, to break the grip of illusions and the spell of prejudice. Ideology emerged as a reaction to the world in all realms of experience and gave a new impetus to the historical perspective. The ideologues felt that intellectual and political authorities were so strongly attached to prejudices that they were unable to understand reality. Ideological analysis was used to unmask preconceived notions and challenge established assumptions. It aspired to judge opinions and examine them critically. Even ideologies which appeared later were used to unmask the supposed hidden motives of their adversaries. But, of course, this was not the exclusive privilege of a certain group of thinkers or political men. Nothing could prevent the opponents of any group from availing themselves of the weapon and applying it to their opponents. Ideology acquired a pejorative connotation, the connotation that has been assigned to it by most writers, when the liberals, the philosophical group in France who sought to base the cultural sciences on anthropological and psychological foundations and the Institute they had formed, faded away. Napoleon labelled as ideologues all those

philosophers who stood in the way of his centralizing policies. "Thereby the word took on a derogatory meaning which, like the word 'doctrinaire', it has retained to the present day."3 It is used in contrast with all that is supposed to be realistic. Its more encompassing sense, to characterize the belief systems of social groups, dates back to the early writings of Marx. Marx wanted to trace "bourgeois" thought to ideological foundations and thereby to discredit it. Of course the first one to notice that social groups carry with them systems of outlook was Hegel. These systems of outlook were often more implicit than explicit. They were systems which limited conceptual horizons and influenced the answers men find as well as the very questions they tend to ask. However, it was through Marx who attached the word "ideology" to social belief systems that the concept became more generally understood. Ideology has been given different interpretations. One is that ideology is a reflection of the economic infra-structure. Marx states:

The production of ideas, of conceptions of consciousness is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life, Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men appears at this stage as the direct afflux of their material behavior. The

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same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics of the people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.-real, active men as they are conditioned by a definite development of the productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its further forms.\footnote{Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1947, p. 274.}

Ideology has been seen as a false consciousness which is the totally distorted mind and everything that comes within its range. Thus the "end of ideology", as Engels used the phrase, meant the time when men would achieve "true" consciousness, or the awareness of the direction of history and the material basis of society. But ideology can serve only as a masquerade. It is associated with illusions, dogmatic dreamings, and distortions of men. Ideology serves to mask from men the real nature of their condition as historical actors.

According to Marx, however, ideology can not be expected to serve as an illusion for ever and to conceal the condition of man. The ruling class in the capitalist system would not be able to deceive men for ever. The systematic contradictions within the capitalist system would slowly awaken the working class from the "nightmare" of the past.

Workers would begin the revolution by experiencing their grievances separately, each worker within the confines of his individual life. The factory system would provide a communal context for these grievances. Slowly the workers would become enlightened, connecting
personal grievances with group grievances, group grievances with social concerns, and social concerns with a scientific knowledge of social change. At each step, the workers would gain subtlety in their appreciation of the connection between their personal conditions, the conditions of their fellows and the nature of the system in which they played a part. Their grievances would eventually acquire a dynamic quality, leading them on in a problem-solving manner into social struggle and organization building. The working class would become the agency of its own liberation because ordinary men would acquire a sense for reality, a clear-sighted and determined appreciation of the "true conditions for working-class emancipation". The workers have remained unaffected by ideologies.

Ideology, according to Marx, expresses the interests of a definite class and the fundamental features of all the forms of the social consciousness of this class. The ideology of the working class is Marxism, but this ideology refers to a harmonious scientific system of views expressing the fundamental interests of the proletariat and revealing the law-governed character of the social development that inevitably leads to communism. Once the workers are in power they will continue to exhibit the problem-solving scientific orientation they developed in the struggle. They are men who can dispense with illusions because they are dealing with the real problems of life from a historical perspective and not from an ideological perspective.

While Marx asserted that his set of ideas was a science and not an ideology, Lenin reluctantly admitted that Marxism was itself an
ideology. He used the term ideology to mean the combat of ideas. In the hands of the people ideology becomes a means of revealing the opinion of the people and of training the masses in the spirit of the high ideals of industriousness, equality, fraternity, internationalism, peace, revolutionary irreconcilability towards tyranny and oppression. Public opinion is a powerful educational weapon of people who are imbued with the moral qualities laid down in the ethical code of the builders of communism. Ideology is also necessary in organizing the masses to liberate themselves from the fetters of capitalism. Not only is Lenin responsible for casting Marxist ideas into the role of ideology but also for giving Marxism its totalistic framework and made these ideas synonymous with total belief. Lenin had argued that "since there can be no talk of an independent ideology being developed by the masses of the workers themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is: either the bourgeois or the socialist ideology." Nevertheless he insisted that Marxism is guided by science and he maintained that Marxism was replacing politics by a strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory which would emancipate the world from spiritual enslavement. People would be equipped with a scientific method of cognition which they would apply in explaining social life.


Other writers have depicted ideology as a deformed and inverted reflection of the real. They have conceived of ideology as being an illusion that ignores its own material foundations. This, of course, leads to a very restricted definition of ideology. The boundaries of ideology are constituted by what it is not: knowledge, "true consciousness". This position was adopted by Lukacs in his *History and Class Consciousness*. Lukacs has defined ideology as a "false consciousness". The element of falsity derives from the partiality of ideology. Ideology is unable to seize the "total meaning" of society and history. He contrasts ideology with "true consciousness". The bearer of this true consciousness is the proletariat. Only the proletariat has the ability to escape ideology and know the whole truth. It is the prerogative of the militant proletariat to use ideological analysis to unmask the hidden motives of its adversaries. Unfortunately, however, this potential capacity to transcend "false consciousness", or ideology, is not actualized in proletarians as such, but only in party intellectuals such as Lukacs. As he has admitted, one must never ignore the distance which separates the level of consciousness of even the most revolutionary workers, and the true class consciousness of the proletariat. Here Lukacs implicitly identifies himself as one of the bearers of "true class consciousness of the proletariat" and a member of that group which has access to the truth.


8. Ibid., p. 75.
The proletariat, according to Lukacs, possesses the knowledge of the total socio-economic process. The imminent victory of the proletariat will supposedly abolish all particular standpoints. Lukacs' position here contrasts with Lenin's espousal of science, for to identify "false consciousness" with all partial or restricted outlooks is to cast doubt on the specialization that any science necessarily implies. Scientific information can only be disseminated by the upper classes who are not part of the proletariat and, secondly, it can only confuse the proletariat whose role it is to create the Marxist revolution.

Marcuse joins forces with Lukacs and criticizes the application of science in freeing men from the "fetters" of ideology. According to Marcuse, science cannot function as the basis of a critique of the prevailing state of affairs. The form and content of scientific concepts remain bound up with the prevailing order of things; they are static in character. Philosophical cognition is superior to experience and science. The rationality of science, instead of being used for the attainment of a rational order of life, creates those conditions which mask irrationality. He states:

The principles of modern science were a priori structured in such a way that they could serve as conceptual instruments for a universe of self-propelling, productive control;

theoretical operationalism. The scientific method which led to the ever-more-effective domination of nature thus came to provide the pure concepts as well as the instrumentalities for the ever-more-effective domination of man by man through the domination of nature.10

The interpretation of ideology as a mere reflection of the economic infrastructure was accepted also by Bernstein. Ideology, according to Bernstein, is reduced to an epiphenomenon, a mechanical reflection of the movement of the economic base. He accepts the Marxist thesis that the method of production of the material things of life settles generally the social, political, and spiritual process of life.11 Although Bernstein believed that man had a moral will which enabled him to ease class antagonisms, which is a non-deterministic view, he believed that ideology obediently follows the fatalistic unfolding of history without itself possessing any force. Ideologies, for Bernstein, neither implied social progress nor did they contribute to the maintenance of social stagnation. Development is accomplished without or against the will of man.15

Marxists do not have the intellectual monopoly over the term "ideology". Ideology has been associated with the sociology of know-

12. Ibid., p. 15.
ledge and has received close attention from Karl Mannheim. Mannheim labelled as ideology the conservative, interest-based and biased ideas of the dominant class in society. It is a self-serving set of ideas designed to promote the interests of the advantaged.13 This is the particular ideology which is a reflection of the special interests of competitive groups in society. From this particular ideology develops a total ideology or sociology of knowledge, "an all inclusive principle according to which the thought of every group is seen arising out of its life condition".14 There will be a time when society would be ruled by an intellectual elite trained in the sociology of knowledge which would be capable of transcending the bias of particular ideologies. This elite is a "socially unattached intelligentsia" which operates critically because it is not firmly situated in the social order.15 In a way Mannheim adopts Lukacs' concept of the proletariat as being capable of knowing the truth thus leading the discussion of ideology back to de Tracy's original concept. The main goal of the sociology of knowledge is to show objectively how the social setting decisively controls the content and purpose of thinking, to unmask and lay bare the unconscious sources of intellectual existence and the unconscious motives that lead men to adopt particular viewpoints. According to Mannheim, modes of thought cannot be properly understood outside of their social

15. Ibid., p. 137.
context. "The powers of perception of the different perspectives are conditioned by the social situations in which they arose and to which they are relevant."\(^{16}\) Thought is conditioned by the life situation of the thinker and his group. The individual becomes bound into a system of relationships, which hamper his will and rest upon his uncontrolled decisions. He becomes free to choose only when he is made aware of the motives hidden behind his decisions. The task of discovering these motives belongs to those intellectuals who are trained in the sociology of knowledge.

When sciences, such as mathematics and physics, reach certain conclusions, these conclusions have validity only for the groups of people who are similar situated, who see things from the same perspective. The individualistic assumption of classical epistemology receives a harsh criticism from Mannheim. He maintains that the perspective from which men's ideas are formed is the product of social circumstance. Social circumstances form men's ideas and not the reverse. But this view of Mannheim creates a serious problem: what is the status of this sociological theory that claims all such theory is relative? This difficulty has come to be known as Mannheim's paradox. Mannheim here attempts to save his theory by insisting that just because a mode of thought is socially determined, it is not to be discarded and condemned as false. This provides Mannheim with some flexibility but his theory must be elaborated further. Thus, like Lukacs, he attempts to locate

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\(^{16}\) Karl Mannheim. *Ideology and Utopia*. op. cit., p. 255.
a particular social group that is prone to the truth because of its lifestyle. For Lukacs, as we have seen, such a group was the proletariat. For Mannheim it is the intelligentsia. As we saw, this social group has the ability and hence the chance to perceive the truth because it is "unattached" and is best suited to rise above the distorted perceptions and see the reality.

Mannheim's paradox, however, remains unresolved. The unresolved paradox renders his descriptions and theories immune to empirical evaluation. Since his hypotheses are untestable in principle, they are useless for scientific analysis and research. But even if we did not insist on strict adherence to scientific methods, we could still argue that it is very debatable whether any social group is free of partiality and unattached. Even here Mannheim is not consistent though he strives for clarity of definition as he distinguishes between two uses of the term. He calls them the particular conception of ideology and the total conception of ideology. The particular conception of ideology reflects the special interests of eclectic, competitive groups in a society, and a structure of values that expresses the felt needs of the groups. Thus, in the particular conception, ideology is used simply as a negative evaluation. An opponent's arguments are dismissed as lies and deceptions. The particular conception of ideology remains on the psychological level. With the total conception of ideology Mannheim becomes concerned with world outlooks, with the belief systems of an age of an historical, social group. Unfortunately it is not always clear whether Mannheim is using the term
in its particular or total application. He states that the "particular conception of ideology signifies a phenomenon intermediate between a simple lie at one pole, and an error, which is the result of distorted and faulty conceptual apparatus, at the other. It refers to the sphere of errors, psychological in nature, which, unlike deliberate deceptions, are not intentional, but follow inevitably and unwittingly from certain determinants." The total conception of ideology is obtained when men surrender the static conception of consciousness. Now "the growing body of material discovered by historical research does not remain an incoherent and discontinuous mass of discrete events. This conception of consciousness provides a more adequate perspective for the comprehension of historical reality." More importantly, Mannheim is capable of using the term in senses that are not exactly reducible to either the particular or total conceptions. For example, at times ideology means conservative as contrasted with utopian thinking.

Mannheim's theory of total ideology suffers from many deficiencies as a tool of analysis. His theory is so sweeping and so radically relativistic that, despite his efforts to find a way out, he is unable to do justice to the multitude of economic, social, and psychological forces that mediate between society and its values and modes of knowledge.

18. Ibid., p. 63.
19. Ibid., p. 102.
Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* has failed to inaugurate a series of theories. It has been followed by the deterioration of analysis of ideology and by a tendency of writers in this area to pursue divergent courses.

In modern American theory, the term ideology has normally been associated with consciously formulated, political outlooks. Within this general perspective there has also been a great variation in the definition of the concept. Shils associates ideology with rapid, fanatical, closed systems which are typified by communism and fascism. For Shils, ideology is the "creation of charismatic persons who possess powerful, expensive, and simplified visions of the world." Ideologies are always opposed to the status quo, even where their advocates happen to be in power. The New Left in America depicts ideology as the cunning construct of the big conglomerates and their political lieutenants.

According to Daniel Bell, ideologies are forms of legitimation. Society has to justify itself in one way or another to its members. It has to establish some justification of the coercion; it has to transform power into legitimacy in order to govern without turning an entire society into a concentration camp. If one of the functions of ideologies were this, the leaders of the Soviet Union and other societies would not have to resort to brute force to remain in power.

Bell further asserts that ideology is an instrument for rationalization. It also serves as a mechanism for the internalization


of values, beliefs and purposes. "Within every operative society there must be some creed, a set of beliefs and values, traditions and purposes which links both the institutional networks and the emotional affinities of the members into some transcendental whole and there have to be some mechanisms whereby those values cannot only be internalized by individuals...but also made explicit for the society...."\(^{23}\) If ideologies performed such functions, ideally, each member of the Soviet society would subscribe to this belief system and would have internalized the goals and values that derive from communist ideology. Each person would have accepted the decisions of the party and the role of the communist party in society, and would display an eagerness to become a highly productive member of society. Yet this is not the case.

In his study of ideology and totalitarianism Brzezinski uses the following as a working definition of ideology:

> It is essentially an action programme suitable for mass consumption, derived from certain doctrinal assumptions about the general nature of the dynamics of social reality, and combining some assertions about the inadequacies of the past and/or present with some explicit guides to action for improving the situation and some notions of the desired eventual state of affairs. Ideology thus combines political action with a consciousness both of purpose and of the general thrust of history.\(^{24}\)

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While these formulations are generally sophisticated, they reflect some of the conceptual confusion in the study of ideology and underplay the crucial role of theories of reality and the interplay of such theories with social structures and value systems.

Geertz has argued for a more neutral conception of ideology, neutral as to its particular, political complexion as well as to its veracity. According to Geertz, ideology can be seen as one of the forms of cultural patterns which provide practical orientations and enable individuals to give some coherence to their social circumstances. Ideologies tend to be schematic. However, because they perform a practical function, the schematization does not necessarily lead to distortion. Thus the defining characteristic of ideology is function and not distortion.25

Another definition according to which ideology is seen in a neutral manner and one which gives ideology great scope and utility is provided by Macpherson. He says:

I use ideology in a neutral sense, neither implying, with Marx, an idealistic philosophy and "false consciousness", nor with Mannheim, contrasting ideology and 'utopia'. I take ideology to be any more or less systematic set of ideas about man's place in nature, in society, and in history (i.e. in relation to particular societies), which can elicit the commitment of significant numbers of people to (or against) political change. This does not exclude a set of ideas essentially concerned with merely a class or

nations, if it relates the place and needs of that section of humanity to the place of man in general. Ideologies contain in varying proportions, elements of explanation (of fact and of history), justification (of demands), and faith and belief (in the ultimate truth or rightness of their case). They are informed by, but are less precise and systematic than, political theories or political philosophies.

Ideologies, according to the above quotation, not only do not have sweeping visions but also seek to answer the questions regarded as important for the society to which they appeal, the society which they must seek to transform or maintain. Moreover, Macpherson suggests, they do not make universal statements about human life but are kept fairly close within the bounds of human possibilities.

Furthermore, we should realize that an ideology is not to be taken to mean irrationality or intellectual dishonesty. As has been pointed out, "we have to face the fact that ideas, whether they may at times serve as part of myths, are independently subject to the standard of truth." The major function of ideology is to produce fusion of thought and action, not to infuse ideas with passion which blinds men from understanding their own limitations. Ideology does not attempt to hinder the rational abilities of man but it attempts to place passion under the control of reason, to apply intelligence, the fusion of passion


and critical reason, to the problems of the modern world. We have to make a distinction also between ideology defined as a system of ideas concerning the existing social order together with actions to be taken regarding it, and a revolutionary or totalitarian ideology defined as the total rejection of the existing society and programmes of total reconstruction. As Aiken remarks, "the general idea that concerns us is not...the identification of ideology with revolutionary activity, especially of the more bizarre and feckless sort," an ideology which in its vision of the future cannot distinguish possibilities from probabilities, but the issues over which men in societies will continue to quarrel.

I propose to define ideology as any more or less systematic set of ideas and thoughts which have been converted into beliefs explaining man's attitudes towards life and his existence in society and specifying a pattern of political action responsive to, and commensurate with, such ideas and thoughts. Political ideologies are mainly concerned with the distribution of political power; they are concerned with the more equitable distribution of resources among the various classes constituting the society.

FUNCTIONS OF IDEOLOGY

Ideologies are employed to facilitate or even achieve the transitoriness from those arrangements in which unthinking acceptance of poverty, prejudice, superstition, unquestioning submission to authority,

irrational in themselves, are permanent features of society.  

An ideology is a uniting and persuasive force. It functions as integrating values around which individuals or societies become organized and exist as coherent entities.

An ideology is an activating instrument. It enables people to put ideas into application. Ideas require the persuasive qualities of ideologies; otherwise ideas would remain meaningless abstractions. Ideology is the major dynamic force in history. For a dynamic factor, however, to have historical significance it must meet certain prerequisites. Only rational ideas can have historic effects and only to the extent to which they correspond to the empirical trends of events. More precisely, the role of ideology is to give the forces of history rational, communicable form so that they may become effective and not to be dissipated in a series of short-lived explosions. The condition for the permanent effectiveness of an ideology is the validity of the ideas. To be valid, an ideology must read correctly its social and natural environment, must be cognizant of its direction, and must be applied in action. Its aims and goals are to conquer the irrational forces. Another requirement for its success is to reformulate its aims with each passing wind. An ideology restrains, stimulates and guides action by its intellectual force and it carries ideas beyond the age and the social circles in which it expressed a living experience.

An ideology operates in a dialectical manner, as a process in which contrary and defective truths are harmonized. The synthesis

of thesis and antithesis results in a more complete truth. Societies reach a point where the prevailing outlook and ideas are inadequate to explain things and to justify the condition of people or guide their conduct and thus the prevailing outlook has become unacceptable. Ideologies, then, will seek to redefine man's perspective regarding the place of man in society.

Ideologies in the past were the conspicuous vehicles for change. As Hoffer remarks, "Islam, when it emerged, was an organizing and modernizing medium. Christianity was a civilizing and modernizing influence among the savage tribes of Europe. The Crusaders and the Reformation both were crucial factors in shaking the Western world from the stagnation of the Middle Ages." 30 Again the phenomenal modernization of Japan "would probably not have been possible without the revivalist spirit of Japanese nationalism." 31 Lenin and the Bolsheviks plunged recklessly into chaos in their attempt to create a new world because they had a blind faith in the omnipotence of Marxist doctrine. If hope and faith are not backed by reason, the ideology will generate the most reckless daring. This type of ideology has a millenial component.

CONCLUSION

Ideology, at least in its philosophical sense, appeared as a radicalization of the early modern critique of medieval philosophy, natural and political. It was an attempt to reconstitute the sciences on the basis of a new theoretical understanding of the human mind. Soon


31. Ibid., p. 5.
it became more concerned with social and political criticism. How­
ever, as soon as ideology made its appearance, a strong reaction, political in nature, occurred. Subsequent ideologies came to consider every opposing or any previous "ideologies" (or opposing "scientific" facts) as false "ideologies". Gradually it came to be regarded as empirical sociology or a science by those who criticized other ideas. This empirical sociology in turn was called an ideology by its opponents. Marxism, like all "scientific" theories designed for social action, is itself an ideology par excellence. The problem with Marxism is that it makes absolute claims and pretends to know the ultimate truth. But the charge of being ideological is not a label of which the Marxists could retain possession; it is being used against all and sundry, including the followers of Marx themselves.

The treatment of ideology by the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis has a number of striking parallels with the treatment Marx has provided. One of these parallels is that they regard Marxism as the prime example of ideology just as Marx regarded capitalism.

The term ideology has come to mean something shady, a kind of falsity. Also the manner in which the term has been used suggests that each historical stage has less falsity. But only the last historical stage which, for Lukacs and Marx is the arrival of communism, is free of ideologies. When we reach a particular historical stage or some particular political arrangements, we transcend ideology. Ideology ceases to perform its function, which is the unmasking of its opponents' lies, since the reasons for its existence have disappeared. Here we find another
important parallel. According to the exponents of the decline of ideology, we reach the point where ideologies serve no purpose when the politics of Social Democracy have triumphed. Thus, instead of providing a conceptual analysis of ideology, the exponents of the decline thesis cast themselves into the role of the ideologue. This contention will be elaborated later.
THE DECLINE OF IDEOLOGY: 
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

The decline of ideology has been assigned several meanings. Each of the authors who has taken the position that ideologies have ended has seen the disappearance of certain characteristics of ideology as constituting evidence that ideology itself is declining or has declined. They have argued that radical ideologies have lost their relevance. Some see the coalescence of certain issues of traditionally antagonistic ideologies as constituting evidence that ideologies are losing their power to motivate.

Aron has emphasized that the passing of fanaticism in political belief has eroded ideologies that were at one time sharp, distinct and explicit. He asserts that ideological controversy is dying down because divergent demands today can be reconciled.

The impetus to the decline of ideology thesis was provided by the Milan conference on "The Future of Freedom", sponsored by the Congress of Cultural Freedom in September, 1955. The intellectuals who attended the conference reached a consensus along the following lines: rhetoric has been replaced by reason and ideologies have lost their religious fervour; total or extremist ideologies have disappeared; passion has replaced practical analysis; objective criteria in the


evaluation of goals and aims have replaced distortion; and Bolshevism
and other fanatical movements have disappeared. They argued that
radical movements of the past have ceased to exist in the West and
that perverted Marxism, which has provided the basis for certain ideo-
logical movements, has been abandoned. The important factor in the
decline of ideology for these intellectuals is the abandonment of a
revolutionary alternative. Adjustments or reforms, the adherence to
democratic values, conservatism and liberalism entered into the dis-
cussion only peripherally.

It is therefore pertinent to ask whether these writers may not
have confused the presumed demise of Marxist ideology with the demise
of ideology as a whole. To ask this question suggests that we ought
to inquire into what they meant by ideology and the end of ideology.
Certainly the exhaustion of Marxism and Marxist ideas cannot substantiate
the decline-of-ideology thesis. As long as there is commitment to
democratic values, commitment to conservatism, liberalism or socialist
ideas or other ideologies, it is meaningless to speak of the end of
ideology.

For Seymour Lipset, liberal and socialist politics can no longer
serve as the arena for serious criticism from the left. The critical
works of intellectuals, he claims, are sociological rather than politi-
cal.\(^3\) Ideological politics can only exist in the underdeveloped countries
where the leader must find a scapegoat to blame for the ills of the
society if he is not to lose his hold on the masses "who need the hope

\(^3\) Seymour M. Lipset. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.
implicit in revolutionary chiliastic doctrine—a hope the Communists are ready to supply." He admits, then, that ideological politics are characterized by the attribution of absolute value to any programme, means of action, by a tendency to act radically without regard to circumstances.

Daniel Bell claims that ideologies are exhausted because ideologies have lost their truth and their power to persuade. He states:

Few serious minds believe any longer that one can set down 'blueprints' and through 'social engineering' bring about a new utopia of social harmony. At the same time, the older 'counterbeliefs' have lost their intellectual force as well. Few 'classic' liberals insist that the State should play no role in the economy, and few serious conservatives...believe that the Welfare State is the road to serfdom. In the Western world, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of the Welfare State: the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended.

But let us examine the argument that ideology has declined. How does Bell define the liberal and the conservative? Classic liberalism and conservatism hardly met all the requirements of the definition of ideology. Secondly, non-ideological politics, according to Bell, exist

4. Ibid., p. 415.

within the framework of a political society that has rejected, intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and chiliastic visions. Thirdly, ideological belief is the commitment to the "isms" of traditional thought which fails to take into consideration the evolution these "isms" have undergone. Thus he concludes that if a society is not committed to these traditional ideas, issues cannot be formulated any more in ideological terms. Or, to put it in different terms, issues are not seen through ideological prisms. This, however, should be dismissed as unacceptable. Fourth, Bell underestimates the strength of classical liberalism and conservatism in the United States. If Bell had gone to the trouble to look a little further, he would have recognized the simple fact that the American Constitution is a conservative document very fearful of surrendering traditionalist parochial values rather than ensuring progressive values. He would have seen also that socialism is strongly opposed by both liberals and conservatives because it is seen as a serious threat to their interests. This is attested by the fact that the social measures which have been instituted by the government do not constitute any comprehensive social policy. He would have seen that communism appears as an evil to the Americans because it remains an expanding totalitarian imperialism.

Bell goes on to say that if the end of ideology has any meaning, it is to ask for the end of rhetoric and rhetoricians.6 However, the

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use of such arguments to support the claim that ideologies have ended is naive when there are people who are making serious indictments concerning the stupidity, brutality, and inhumanity of the affluent classes and the influence they exert on governments. It is meaningless to speak of the end of debate and rhetoric when there is a demeaning world the affluent classes have forced upon the poor amid hollow proclamations of a just society. Those who take such a position ignore the fact that there are serious criticisms and questioning by the public and intellectuals which makes Bell's argument that rhetoric has ended and therefore ideology has ended a naive claim. Such an argument would imply:

a conception of human relations which would deprive us of the right to address one another except for the purpose of comparing notes about matters of fact. Consider what would happen were such fantasy to come true. In any ordinary sense, it would mean a virtual end to discourse, to communication, and to argument. Indeed, the image of man implicit in Bell's dream of the end of ideology is precisely one of academic grind or functionary to which he himself, as a counter-ideologist and counter-rhetorician is unfortunately unable to conform.7

Perhaps we do not have to reach the point where we address each other for the purpose of comparing notes about matters of fact in order for us to claim that ideologies have ended, but we do at least require the existence of a society in which social problems have been solved to

the general satisfaction, moral issues do not exist and a consensus has been reached on the goals to be pursued. However, the fact remains that politics is still very much concerned with the justification of political action and organization because of strong criticism. There are issues that trouble the public and we live in societies which require an image of a world better than the one in which we live, a world which will be better not by material abundance, but by an improvement of the quality of life, by being more just, free and equal.

Apparently Bell believes that the end of rhetoric and rhetoricians has come about because, as he believes, the debate between left and right is dead. In other words, according to Bell, left and right reflect the scale by which we evaluate debate and rhetoric and therefore ideological thinking. Here it is also assumed that political direction by which we attempt to solve social problems is ordered along the left-right continuum and since, according to Bell, the ideological positions of the left and right are converging, ideological thinking declines.

Another inference that is contained in what Bell says is that socialism is replacing the "inadequacies" of the capitalist system, that socialism will bring a more equitable distribution of goods, and under it everything will be established on the basis of reflection and rational reconstruction and decisions will be subject to scientific

criteria. Twentieth century history compels us to ask whether the socialist system is capable of removing injustices and the causes of conflict, and whether it will be able to replace the "irrationalities" of the capitalist system. The record of socialism deserves just as careful a scrutiny as does capitalism. What Bell says sounds like a reassertion of the utopian vision of the heavenly kingdom on earth. Bell is engaged in the most profound ideological thinking.

Another argument that Daniel Bell advances in support of his claim that ideologies have ended is that the left is no longer preoccupied with the attainment of the utopian society. It has abandoned its rigid dogmatism and is more interested in progressive reforms. However, the left covers a myriad of overlapping forms of socialism and it all depends on which of the main varieties of socialism we speak. Marxism-Leninism still remains a secular religion, preaching the necessity of class warfare, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the concentration of all power in a tightly structured party that is supposedly the vanguard of the revolutionary masses. It is dogmatic in its determination to abolish private property and nationalize the means of production, it has an ultimate goal-the classless society-and today it has no fewer adherents than it ever had before. Social Democracy is the most liberal version of socialism. It has accepted a multiparty political system and believes in gradual peaceful means of reaching its socialist goals. It has been more concerned with alleviating what it regards as hardships created by capitalist economies than with directly restructuring societies according to a blueprint and its tenets are the same as they were a century
ago. It is highly critical of Marxism and has attacked the theory of economic determinism, arguing that ideas and values are independent of economic conditions, and are themselves important causal agencies in determining economic evolution.

Secondly, ideologies do not have to be rigid. They may well have an elastic quality to cover very different social groups, to unite them within a common terminology. For any ideology to survive, it must be sufficiently flexible to allow this kind of multiple interpretation otherwise it will be simply an historic occurrence. It will be a short-lived phenomenon. Ideologies must allow for adaptability to new circumstances. They must be prepared to abandon old notions and accept new ones and must not claim to supply all the answers to all questions. An ideology must not claim to have the exclusive solution of man's socio-political problems or to refuse to admit the validity of other competitive ideological solutions. Thus, if the left has modified its position, it is coming closer to meeting the criteria of an ideology, rather than disappearing as an ideology.

THE CONVERGENCE THEORY AND THE THESIS THAT THE END-OF-IDEOLOGY THESIS IS ITSELF AN IDEOLOGY

At this point we come to the question whether the end-of-ideology thesis is itself part of an ideology which makes the phenomenon self-refuting. The ideological character of the thesis is clearly apparent in Lipset's, Bell's and Mannheim's arguments. The key notions which carry ideological weight are those of the convergence of the two
great ideological systems, as already has been seen. It is this convergence which leads to the emergence of a new social order: Social Democracy. Most of these writers appear to hail the arrival of the mixed economy allegedly guided by Keynesian theories. Whether Keynesian theories are themselves true is very debatable. Some of the writers seem to attach to Social Democracy a messianic value. Social Democracy will cure the evils of society and will remove the cause of conflict and inequalities. Bell is quite clear as an advocate of Social Democracy and he believes in the "necessity of constant, incessant pressure from the left upon the establishment and the status quo in order to rectify grave social wrongs: injustices, inequalities and other miseries that are removable through collective social action." In any case the convergence of the two economic systems, it is assumed, leads to the convergence of the two ideologies which leads to a lessening of conflict and consequently to the decline of ideology.

The first writer to predict the arrival of Social Democracy was Keynes. He believed that the arrival of Social Democracy was inevitable and that social justice could be promoted through Social Democratic institutions. Keynes believed that "the battle of Socialism against unlimited private profit is being won in detail hour by hour."10


Economic progress could be achieved through collective action and consequently through collective politics. Experience, he argued, shows that individuals, when they make up a social unity, are always less clear-sighted than when they act collectively. Therefore, several economic matters should not be left to the chances of private judgment and private profits.¹¹

The debate on whether or not the socio-economic systems of the East and the West are becoming more similar and may gradually converge was quite vivid during the sixties. Especially was this true of those in the West who were impressed by the apparent drive for greater decentralization in the Soviet Union. The decline of ideology resulting from this convergence has been seen from different angles by the various participants in the debate, especially by Mannheim.

For Mannheim, it appeared that the sober truth was at last being told because of fundamental changes in the superstructure and the base. As we have seen, Karl Mannheim defines ideology as beliefs which express the interests of a particular social group and as such it only provides a partial and distorted view of reality. However, he claims, there is the individual intellectual who is committed to the ideal of objective, disinterested, undistorted and independent knowledge. Mannheim sees the superstructure as being undermined. The political, juridical, religious and moral views, of which the superstructure consists, are reflecting less and less the "distorted" ideas of the

¹¹. Ibid., p. 15.
bourgeoisie system due to a change in the base: the mode of production. Thus, Mannheim sees the emergence of a group of intellectuals which is developing an objective and unbiased knowledge of man's social condition, one that rises above the distorted perspectives of the masses. This group of intellectuals is employed by private and public bureaucracies. These men are given freedom of thought and inquiry.

Aside from his definition of ideology which should be dismissed as inaccurate, this concept suffers from some serious weaknesses. Why will these men not become the intellectual spokesmen for vested interests? Private bureaucracies represent vested interests and unless these intellectuals reflect the ideas and support the interests of these bureaucracies they will not be employed by them. Even if they do not reflect their ideas at first, eventually they will be transformed into administrators and will be subordinated to the bureaucracies that employ them. Even if they are employed by public bureaucracies, will they be allowed to follow the kind of direction they want?

There is another implicit assumption here. Since Mannheim considers as "emancipated" intellectuals those who come from the ranks of the left, it follows that the political myths of the left are gaining appeal, which, of course, is taking place at the expense of the right. Therefore, we cannot speak of converging ideological positions, as many theorists have argued, but of diminishing and increasing appeals. If this is the case, ideological positions will be hardened because the side that loses will perceive the other as a threat, thus dividing society into hostile and competing classes.
If there is a depoliticization of intellectuals, which is necessary if they are to rise above ideologies, it would be precisely the result of indoctrination and intensified manipulation by a group of ideologically sophisticated but cynical professional persuaders—the kind of ideologists Daniel Bell has described.

One cannot escape the temptation to argue that Mannheim is here echoing the thoughts of Compte, who believed that politics would become a sort of applied social physics and would rely on the spiritual guidance of the elite of social scientists. Compte denied that there are forms of rational activity other than those which conform to the procedures of empirical science. The only standard of rationality is that of science, and his refusal to regard philosophy or metaphysics as domains of knowledge was based merely on the fact that their cognitive claims cannot be justified by scientific methods of inquiry. His "law" of the "three stages" of human intellectual development prescribes the direction which a progressively enlightened mankind ought to take. These stages are treated by Compte, just as Hegel did, as inescapable "moments" in the historical development of human thought. Just as Mannheim's intellectuals, Compte's theories are intended to transcend all earlier and lower forms of thought.

The guidance of politics by an elite of social scientists was also the dream of Lester Ward who predicted the coming of a sociocratic

world in which the primacy of knowledge over power would finally be achieved. In a similar manner Karl Mannheim movingly argues for the need of an elite of intellectuals to put their hands on the tiller of the state. He also sounds like the nineteenth-century men of the left who declared their allegiance to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, believing, as they did, in human progress through science. These men sought to provide the basis for a new scientifically oriented ideology which would replace altogether what remained of the outlook of medieval thought. What they aspired to was a completely humanistic culture, securely based on the foundation of modern science.

The "end of ideology" theorists are also placing a great emphasis on the decline of political radicalism and the decline of Marxism. They seem to argue that it is radical ideologies that have declined. Edward Shils is explicit. He says: "The very heart which has sustained ideological politics among intellectuals over the past century is gradually losing its strength. Marxism is decomposing." Unfortunately Marxism by no means has lost its appeal among intellectuals and the public. But even if Marxism were being deflated, politics by no means would be rendered non-ideological. The disappearance of radicalism and the deflation of doctrinaire Marxism cannot substantiate the thesis that ideologies have ended. On the contrary, politics become more ideological. Radicalism leaves little, if any, room, for debate and

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controversy. The end of radical ideological systems has resulted in a proliferation of sects that have intensified the ideological debate. As Raymond Aron remarks, on second thought, "Ideological discussions are incomparably richer now than during the cold war, when we had apologias for the democratic-Keynesian-liberal synthesis. Today the very foundations of contemporary society are subject to debate." 14

The writers to be discussed below see the decline of ideology mainly as the result of the alleged similarities which can be observed in the two political systems. But what are these similarities? How are the two systems converging? These writers have suggested that the degree of government intervention into a capitalist economy and the abandonment of demands by the left for total nationalization of the means of production can be used to measure the trend toward convergence and they claim that the trend is strong. However, the convergence thesis, as will be seen, disregards more fundamental differences among social institutions and attitudes.

Daniel Bell has stated that, "Today our entire society is committed to change, and in a direction which was first pointed out by the Left." 15 In the East, communism no longer serves as the official ideology for intellectuals who have lost faith that its goals can ever be attained. In the West, faith in classical liberalism has waned and socialism today


provides the perspective on modern history which emphasizes that the achievement of freedom and the defense of the individual constitute a permanent revolution; and it tells us that this revolution resists any final definition.16 However, socialism in the United States is outside the bounds of political possibility. Socialism requires that the control and operation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange should be in the hands of society rather than in the hands of private individuals, groups, or corporations. Any attempt to bring about socialism in the United States would involve a very sharp disensus with the whole industrial-business-government establishment. The entire institutional set-up in the United States is from a practical standpoint incompatible with socialism and precisely for this reason Lipset has declared that socialism in the United States is politically and ideologically dead.17

Galbraith considers the end of ideology as being the consequence of the convergence that supposedly is taking place gradually of the two economic systems but he sees this convergence from a different standpoint. He states:


Industrial Societies have an economic system which, whatever its formal ideological billing, is in substantial part a planned economy. The initiative in deciding what is to be produced comes not from the sovereign consumer who, through the market, issues the instructions that bend the productive mechanism to his ultimate will. Rather it comes from the great producing organization which reaches forward to control the market....One of the conclusions that follow from this analysis is that there is a broad convergence between industrial systems. The imperatives of technology and organization, not the image of ideology, are what determines the shape of economic society.18

The alleged convergence of the two systems, according to Galbraith, results then from some similarities that he sees in economic planning. Galbraith, however, admits that the sense of political direction this system imparts is wrong. It confuses and distorts, so that man is directed into the very conflicts and pitfalls he wants to avoid.19 If such is the case, the new order that emerges will accentuate social conflict and ideological controversies. Aside from the problems into which he runs in his efforts to support his thesis, his notions carry a considerable ideological weight. He advocates that socialism should be the guide in social thought and we should strive towards the achievement of this goal. But he advocates his own brand of socialism, a social-


19. Ibid., pp. 113-115.
ism under which power in public enterprise would not be exercised by parliament or by its directly responsible agent, as has been the case under democratic socialism, but a system with autonomous public corporations.

An attempt to portray the two systems as converging is made also by Raymond Aron who maintains that "over the past thirty years the extreme 'right' and 'left' disclosed identities which were more impressive than their differences. British socialism has not resulted in tyranny and has materially weakened the ideologies of thorough-going socialism and thorough-going neo-liberalism." Aron's arguments seem to be rather a criticism of the Marxist ideology and of traditional conservatism. He more or less argues that Marxism has lost much of its appeal and only few believe that Marx's ideas can find practical application. He also appears to be defending the status quo against two different kinds of critics.

Aron believes that the Left has modified its position on many issues and has departed considerably from the Marxist line. It has come to believe, according to Aron, that the reduction of inequalities is the main objective and goal of the Left, whereas Marx believed that the improvement of the human condition under a capitalist system can only prolong its collapse. The intellectual debate now between Left and Right, Aron argues, revolves around issues such as the extent to which planning should take place and the kind of socialist measures to be instituted. Aron's emphasis is on the passing of fanaticism in political belief and

the erosion of ideologies which were at one time sharp, distinct, and explicit.22 There is an increasing awareness that "the political categories of the last century-Left and Right, liberal and socialist, traditionalist and revolutionary-have lost their relevance."23 His observations of the various societies, Western and non-Western, led him to believe that "in most Western and non-Western societies, ideological controversy is dying down because experience has shown that divergent demands can be reconciled."24

Aron's predictions about ideological trends proved to be premature. The rise of the new left in Germany in the 1960s, the radicalization of students all over the world, widespread assassinations of political leaders, the sudden rise of Marxist, Maoist and Marxist-Leninist parties, the civil war in Ireland and other events forced Aron to reconsider his ideas.

The problem with the debate of the convergence of the two systems is that it has remained plagued by conceptual confusion. As has been pointed out, any convergence of ideologies is out of the question and any trend toward apparent convergence could at best refer to greater

24. Ibid., p. 25.
similarity on the level of institutional practices and techniques.\textsuperscript{25} Or, as another writer has commented: "It is conceivable that two initially divergent systems increasingly come to resemble each other, as common environmental problems force similar solutions on them.... In practice, however, such convergence of systems with highly distinct ideologies is not very likely...unless the two antithetical or distinct ideologies themselves converge or are watered down or 'dis­missed', any lasting convergence of the respective economic systems themselves is not to be expected."\textsuperscript{26} In the West we can naturally expect considerable departure from the strictly capitalist system because interests of different classes have produced different ideologies—the two major variants being conservatism and liberalism—and therefore it is not impossible to regard any single ideology as the determinant of the system. But we are not to assume that a lasting deviation can be afforded from the optimal one since public opinion and the competition between systems would not permit it.

We do. have to admit that the economic role of Western govern­ments has been on the increase, but not in the direction of Soviet-type planning. In other words, the systems have been growing more similar in


some respects and less similar in others. In both cases the systems keep undergoing substantial changes in their policies, even in the underlying assumptions, though not so readily in their phraseology. But this process does not mean in itself that they are getting closer to one another in fundamental respects. We may notice some similarities in specific patterns of income distribution but the basic difference in the disposition of capital incomes and gains persists. Also, if economic similarities had become more convincing than they actually have, the political, ideological and psychological barriers to anything resembling convergence would remain unchanged. Each system would remain committed to its institutions which would prevent any real trend toward a convergence of the two systems.

Others\(^{27}\) have emphasized the substitution of the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist thesis with the substitution of "peaceful co-existence" and "peaceful competition" and the abandonment of the Leninist thesis of the inevitability of war with capitalism. However, a weakening of political tensions proves very little with respect to a convergence of socio-economic systems. Even an intensive long-range exchange of scientific and technological experiences with co-operation on specific projects could very well be possible between countries with divergent socio-economic systems. Certainly the constant emphasis by Eastern countries on the impossibility of ideological adjustment and compromise on fundamental principles, let alone convergence, is more than a straw in the wind.

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The fact that the Soviet Union has adopted some kind and degree of economic planning in a less than absolutely centralized manner and the West has adopted some social policies, as well as the fact that the West approves of some government intervention and the nationalization of some industries, points to the ongoing transformation of each system, rather than a growing similarity between them. It does not point to the convergence nor the arrival of Social Democracy. The whole issue here is obscured by a semantic and conceptual inertia that forces us to classify systems as capitalist, socialist or social democratic. There is a pluralism of socio-economic arrangements. There will continue to exist an endless and constantly changing variety of 'systems' with different socio-economic and attitudinal arrangements; British socialism will continue to differ considerably or rather fundamentally from Soviet socialism and British capitalism from American or French. Each country will represent a given set of arrangements but they will not converge. Swedish socialism will be different from African socialism and British socialism will differ from American socialism. In the Western countries we cannot even be certain that within each country the existing socio-economic arrangements will remain permanent. It must be pointed out also that a controlled economy is not identical with a mixed economy.

However, even if democratic socialism has re-examined and revised some of its ideological premises and the West has adopted some social democratic policies, that is not sufficient to substantiate the claim that ideologies have disappeared or even that ideological conflict has abated. It matters little if the overriding aim of social democrats is
to adapt themselves to changing conditions or that they have revised their positions on nationalization. The social democrats have realized that no large-scale intervention of the government in the private sector can be advocated without losing adherents. They are unable to provide the ideological justification which would be accepted by the public. We cannot speak meaningfully of convergence as long as the Communist attitude, even in the age of the supposed detente, has been that no convergence between socialism and capitalism is possible.  

For the communist mind the only real way to terminate the existing pluralism of systems is the final victory of communism everywhere. 

When we speak of convergence of political orientations we must remember that "convergence is neither complete, nor stable, nor new. It bears witness to the pacification of some sectors of the ideological fronts and perhaps also their shortcomings, but not necessarily a general abatement of ideological fervor and commitment....Rather ideologies which still differ in doctrinal postures and in the emphasis of priorities reflect sooner or later the spread among part of their leaders and among mass publics of genuine agreement about formerly disputed principles and policies."  

This kind of ideological agreement has been seen as the de-ideologization of politics. Agreement on political alternatives and, in general, ideological agreement often is reached through national exigencies. For example, we have the case of England which was ruled for thirty-four


years by coalition governments which handled questions and issues such as the foundation of the Welfare State, the depression, total mobilization and other equally controversial issues, which can divide political parties.

National exigencies have forced political parties in Italy to reach an agreement on certain ideological issues. The inability of the Christian Democrats to capture the majority of the votes has compelled them to seek co-operation with the socialists. In turn, the Christian Democrats were compelled to modify their position on several issues and the socialists, in order to share the power, put aside doctrinaire Marxism and modified their demands.

It would be more realistic to talk more modestly about a co-existence of democratic socialist ideologies and capitalism and about a truce between Marxism and Western ideologies. There is no evidence which points to the convergence of the two socio-economic systems that can enable one to speak meaningfully about the decline of ideologies.

The end of ideology has, however, not been proclaimed only by intellectuals of the left but also by intellectuals of the right, some of whom are high government officials. Their motives for dismissing ideologies as a thing of the past are different from those which come from the ranks of the left. Much of what they consider as a decline in ideology, however, is simply ideology. They want the creation of a new ideology that advocates commitment to technology. They want the creation of a society ruled by high-level political administrators and bureau-ocrats.
Today societies are highly committed to industrialization. In the industrial society, science and technological knowledge have high values. The industrial society is dedicated to hard work and a keen sense of individual responsibility for performance of assigned tasks and norms. Ideology, to a considerable extent, is the cement that will hold such a society together. But it is an ideology which states the new technology and defines the economic and social relations which are sought to be most compatible with its fullest development. "Since an ideology is at the center of this class, there must be 'highpriests' to interpret and apply this ideology to current development."30 The function of these "high priests" is to create a consensus, to make this consensus into a reasonably consistent body of ideas. They must formulate and restate the major values, premises, and consensus of a society. To achieve this consensus, one has to extol the dominant values of the society and to deprecate the opposing ideologies, ideologies which would prevent the attainment of the consensus.

Government officials in the United States, for example, have gone a long way toward de-emphasizing the role of ideologies, ideologies which are opposed to the dominant American values. While they claim that ideologies have ceased to exert any influence in the policies of the government, they assert that the Administration is motivated by a "spiritual view of

man and the ethic that mankind is moving towards higher standards, towards God." In other words, Carter's diplomacy, says Brzezinski, is "non-ideological in thrust but based on certain philosophical values".31 Brzezinski continues by saying that the alternative the United States offers to the concept of historical inevitability is one based on greater pluralism and an increasing fulfilment of global aspirations for human rights. Thus ideology for him is anything that is not consistent with the dominant American values, any belief system which is characterized by rigidity, dogmatism and fanaticism. This becomes more obvious if we read some of his definitions of ideology. An ideology, according to Brzezinski, "seeks to promote a particular system on the basis of rigid doctrine....Ours is a philosophically rooted policy, based on fundamental notions about the nature of man, morality and justice, but it does not seek to promote specific systems."32

The argument that these political thinkers are the exponents of a new ideology becomes more credible as we look at the views of other writers. They seem to express an ideology which advocates devotion to duty and responsibility for performance and an ethic which motivates individuals to espouse the ethical valuations toward work and accumulation. Spengler employs the term in the sense that ideology provides an all-

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32. Ibid.
embracing picture of social reality, that it interprets the entire future development of mankind from a single view and has consequences in relation to the course of history. For the ideologue, history is predetermined and its aims and values emanate from fundamental theoretical prerequisites. Ideology is a totality of dogmatic ideas cut from the living reality. The adherence to ideological principles prevents the individual from assessing correctly specific measures that are taken to correct social problems. Consequently, "Ideology...retards both economic development and political development."33 Thus, ideology is seen as an obstacle to the espousal of the values of hard work and accumulation.

Schlesinger holds a similar view as he says: "By ideology I mean a body of systematic and rigid dogma by which people seek to understand the world-and to preserve or transform it."34 Therefore, he asserts, programmes undertaken by governments to increase overall production, to resolve problems of unemployment and, in general, the technological approach to the solution of problems, are more effective than policies guided by ideologies, if ideologies are to be understood in this manner.


THE INFLUENCE OF THE "WESTERN" IDEOLOGIES

If exponents of the decline of ideology thesis search for the kind of "ideological" thinking that takes a rigid and dogmatic approach to politics, one that has a doctrinaire perception of politics, they will be completely unable to demonstrate that ideologies have declined. There are the other values of ideology which revolve around such important norms as liberty, equality, humanity, freedom, democracy, etc. There are goals which individuals seek to promote but within the framework of an open society. There are values and goals which are championed by ideologies that do not posit an ultimate value, a final goal, a utopia. These are ideologies which do not insist on the realization of the ideal, which is contained in the sacred, and do not seek a total transformation of society.

Geertz, who does not conceive of ideology as being radical, dogmatic, or revolutionary, writes that "we may wait as long for the 'end of ideology' as the positivists have waited for the end of religion." But Geertz views ideology as one of the forms of cultural patterns which have provided practical orientations whereby individuals are able to give some coherence to their social circumstances.


36. Ibid., p. 51.
Lipset and Bell have seen ideology as playing a role only in areas in which there is rapid transformation while its impact is marginal in the developed societies of the West. Ideologies, they maintain, exercise appeal only in those countries which were colonies or political dependencies. According to them, ideologies in such countries were used as instruments for waging the fight for liberation from foreign domination. Ideologies were and are needed to arouse the people against foreign rulers. But such arguments do not provide sufficient explanation of the political extremism that we find, for example, in Latin America. The entire revolutionary package includes such standard components as the growth of industrial cities, the proliferation of science and secularism, and the drastic broadening of the base of political participation.

In the United States, where most of the attention of the exponents of the decline thesis has been focused, doctrinaire Marxism and extremist movements may exercise very little appeal and only on a small number of people. However, it cannot be argued that commitment to an ideology is weak. In the United States, faith in liberal democracy still remains strong despite some claims to the contrary. Liberal democracy exercises strong appeal and inspires the public. As Selinger points out:

> There are no valid logical or empirical reasons for denying that democratic liberal belief systems can inspire intense commitment. The foundation of such a commitment is provided by the demonstrable reference to central values in all political belief systems. Both
fascism and communist condemnation of bourgeoise morality in society and politics has its counterpart in the unashamedly moral rejection of the two totalitarian systems by reform-minded liberal democrats and democratic socialists.37

Indeed, American liberalism today displays a high level of abstraction and evokes strong conviction. American liberals view freedom as participation and effective choice and are much closer to the "constructive rationalism" of Rousseau and Voltaire. This is also attested by the fact that communism and socialism have had no important effect in the United States as alternative political philosophies.

Sometimes liberalism appears as merely a ritual preference for the middle of the road which leads many to believe that it is dead. But liberalism is much more than that for those who adhere to it and its adherents are not few. For its adherents, liberalism "is a coherent social philosophy which combines the ideals of classical liberalism with the psychological and political realities of modern pluralistic society."38 The reason why it may appear not as a force capable of eliciting the commitment of individuals and it may seem to have become a common denominator of American political rhetoric is that people have espoused the belief that liberalism survives "basically in a situation where long-range goals are feasible and where these goals can be actualized by a consensus apparatus. But to have long-range goals presupposes the

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social system that has time, and presupposes a network of fundamental agreements and a series of disagreements on tactical questions. The system, then, must be based on harmonies and equalities and where inequalities exist it must attempt to reduce them. There must also be an equilibrium between the powerful and the powerless because otherwise its capacity to achieve its goals will be seriously reduced. The attempt to create a network of fundamental agreements has given rise to the misapprehension that politics is non-ideological, that there is a convergence of political orientations.

The impression that Western politics is in the process of losing its ideological character stems also from the existence of a growing belief in democratic institutions. If democracy is to flourish, stability is an essential prerequisite. Democracy requires that extreme positions be reconciled and politics be conducted in an atmosphere that is not conducive to the sharpening of conflict. The events of the last thirty-five years have given rise to a fear of too much politicization, a suspicion that intense political commitment and passionate politics automatically eventuates in "total" politics—a conception of politics advanced by theorists of National Socialism and communism. This fear by the public forces political parties to avoid extreme positions because most likely they will be penalized by the public. The avoidance of extreme positions has been equated by the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis with the decline of ideology.

What we are actually witnessing today is "the ruling trend of contemporary theory (which) has been reacting against the more optimistic philosophies of ideologies of the past two centuries; consciously or implicitly, it has been set about deflating the larger ideas of human possibilities that recommended themselves to many thinkers in the past, and has engaged in the job of cutting our notions of man's nature to size."40 The choice today is not between all-inclusive and mutually exclusive alternatives. The writers who believed that ideology is declining or has declined have assumed that every important characteristic of a society is connected with a single governing mechanism, that a society can be transformed from a central point. They have assumed that ideological thinking is totalistic and it adopts global views of social structure and political action. It is true that in the past attempts were made to transform society and eradicate social evils from a central point. But the characteristic of ideology is not the aim to transform society from a central point.

Many people today are convinced that society cannot be transformed globally because such attempts have never been successful. Attempts to bring about total transformation lead to perpetual force. Social transformation will not be achieved by ideologies that consist of myths, superstitions, dogmatism and fanaticism. There is nothing rational about such ideologies and for one to claim that such characteristics could bring about social reforms and social improvement, "would be as

strange as to say that an earthquake is a good way of producing a lake."41 The French Revolution did not succeed in producing the results that "ideologists" believed would be achieved because they were incompatible with the social reforms it espoused. The totalistic illusion has been a cause for many upheavals. All attempts to transform society globally resulted in failures and destruction on a monstrous scale. If this totalistic illusion is being abandoned, it would be because those who were possessed by such an illusion are becoming convinced that the idea of total transformation leads to perpetual force and fanaticism which blinds people and prevents them from understanding their own limitations. It would also constitute evidence that rational ideologies are winning ground by gaining adherents; rational ideologies are those that do not exclude the possibility of alternative choices and alternative means to achieve social reforms.

It has been argued that there is an acceptance of the belief that industrialism, technological innovation, and uninterrupted expansion of resources should be the main purposes of social life. It is assumed that the acceptance of such a belief renders politics non-ideological. However, such a belief is still very much ideological. Man is committed to certain purposes which are ethical in nature.

It has been argued also that today's societies are committed to the politics of pragmatism, to the politics of incremental improvement.

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rather than thorough reforms. However, even if one prefers a system that is committed to incremental improvements rather than improvements which can be achieved through thorough reforms, he is making an ideological choice. Even Lipset, one of those who forcefully has argued that ideologies are declining, admits that this constitutes an ideological commitment. He states:

> Clearly, commitment to the politics of pragmatism, to the rules of the game of collective bargaining, to gradual change whether in the direction favored by the left or the right, to opposition both to an all powerful central state and to laissez-faire constitutes the component parts of an ideology. The 'agreement on fundamentals', the political consensus of Western society, now increasingly has come to include a position on matters which once sharply separated the left from the right. And this ideological agreement... has become the ideology of the major parties in the developed states of Europe and America.42

Even if ideology is to be seen in terms of conflict of ideas, in terms of intellectual conflicts among groups representing different views, as Lipset sees it, still it cannot be argued that ideologies have declined. The disappearance of doctrinal Marxism, if indeed is has disappeared, has resulted in more ideological debate. This decline has brought a proliferation of sects, each incriminating the other and all of which are engaged in a fervent search for alternatives that can ful-

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fill men's desires for communion although none of these groups has elaborated a new ideological system or has been able to provide the theoretical framework for a mass party. As Aron remarks, ideological discussions are incomparably richer now than during the cold war, when we had dogmatic assertions from one side and, from the other, apologias for the democratic-Keynesian-liberal synthesis.43

Despite the fact that the right and left have taken as their goal the increase of production and a more equitable distribution of the fruits of economic progress, there remains plenty of room for social and political conflict between the right and left, between socialism and liberalism. Aron, in an attempt to clarify his earlier formulations, states that:

The dual allegiance of democratic nations to liberalism and egalitarianism creates an inevitable and immense disparity between what democracy is and what it is supposed to be. Only...ideology purports to bridge this gap between the real and the ideal. The end of ideology meant not the end of ideas but the end of pseudorational or rationalistic millenarianism of which Marxism-Leninism furnished the most recent example.44

Ideology should not be seen only in terms of adherence to the great ideological systems but also in terms of preferences, expectations and values not necessarily constituting an elaborate system and one which


44. Ibid.
is along the lines of the great ideological traditions. When we see ideology in such terms, we find that the common people have political opinions, in many cases fairly specific ones, and are often critical of government action and inaction. Poor and less educated people find ways to orient themselves to the political arena and develop points of view which we would expect to be fairly consistent over time. They may lack ideological clarity, as Converse argues, but we should not mistake any absence of clarity for a total absence of views and concerns which are ideological in nature.

CONCLUSION

The writers who have argued that ideologies have declined have confused the decline of something they have found objectionable, namely, dogmatism, fanaticism, and in general, those ideologies which have the above characteristics such as revolutionary Marxism and Fascism. This narrow focus fails to include a broader conceptual framework that would permit analytical attention to other aspects of ideology. They have sidestepped the fascinating subject of a broader ideological analysis and have concentrated instead on the central proposition that runs through much of their writings, namely, apocalyptic and revolutionary ideologies have lost their power to inspire the masses. They also have concentrated on the proposition that ideology tends to wane as societies reach levels of social and economic modernization typified by several Western countries.
Their arguments seem to rest on the assumption that socio-economic and political developments are moving in a deterministic and unilinear direction and towards a kind of society which will espouse the Social Democratic values. This leads to another interpretation, namely, that most of the writings are not an analysis of ideology but simply more ideology. This has been most forcefully stated by William Delany who says that "the end of ideology writers write not just as sociologists or social scientists but as journalists and an anti-totalitarian ideological cabal. Their work is ideology but, almost like all Western ideologies since the 18th century, with a heavy 'scientific' component to give respectability and a sense of truth." These are harsh judgments but if we look at the developments everywhere and at the literature about the decline of ideology, their assumptions suggest exactly that. One is led to this interpretation by the convergency theory that they have expounded, that the two systems are converging giving rise to a society which is governed by the principles of Social Democracy. The social democratic society allegedly emerges from the convergence of the capitalist and communist systems. However, this thesis tends to disregard more fundamental differences among social institutions and attitudes.

The writings of the exponents of the decline of ideology thesis seem to reflect also a desire to reject something which they see as dogmatic, inflexible, and passionately articulated prescriptions of reality. But ideology cannot be defined in this manner and cannot

necessarily be seen as an obstacle of human progress. The striving towards ultimate ends and the sense of responsibility and purposes are not to be regarded as polar opposites, the one being associated with chiliastic politics and the other with practical politics or the lack of any commitment to an idea. If the politician is to act as the agent of social progress, he has to take into account the consequences of political action but at the same time have a vision in mind. "Certainly", says Weber, "all historical experience confirms the truth that man should not have attained the possible unless time and again he reached out for the impossible."46

The exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis have failed to demonstrate that ideologies have declined. It is obvious that the exhaustion of political ideas in the West refers to the particular case involving the disillusionment that was experienced by Marxist intellectuals when it became apparent that many predictions of Marxism did not materialize and when the atrocities of the Stalinist regime were publicly revealed. This led to an ideological reappraisal. But as La Palombra has remarked, "to limit the meaning of ideology to absolute utopias, to concentrate one's analytical attention upon what some Marxist socialists may be up to, and to equate certain changes in rhetoric with ideological decline is to narrow the meaning of the central concept to the point where it has very limited utility for the social scientist."47


Among those intellectuals who experienced a disillusionment were many of the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis. These intellectuals became disillusioned with the inability or the refusal of other intellectuals to effect radical change. The totalitarianism of Soviet Russia forced most of them to move away from Marxism as a viable alternative for change. By expounding the decline thesis, they were expressing their own feelings. Since Marxism no longer inspired them, they went further to assume that Marxism no longer inspired others. Thus these intellectuals moved towards an ideological vacuum. Being themselves in an ideological vacuum, they hastened to proclaim the end of ideology. Having been strong ideological believers, however, they could not sit back and observe the political phenomena with indifference. They began to look for an alternative to the two systems. The alternative was found in the politics of Social Democracy, at least by some. Social Democracy, by stressing the need for a mixed economy and by explicitly recognizing the private sector, seemed to offer an alternative to those who had lost faith in the two great ideological systems. Thus they hastened to hail the arrival of Social Democracy which led them to formulate the convergence theory.

It is ironic that while these political theorists were proclaiming the end of ideology and while they were making the assertion that Western democracies were experiencing the "end of ideology", those who determined public policy in the United States were making statements that the Western world was living through a time of troubles that could very well be called the Age of Ideology. In 1964, the Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara
testified before a Congressional Committee that the Communist threat "is political, it is ideological, it is economic, it is scientific; and it extends even into the cultural sphere." Eisenhower said in his Farewell Address to the nation, "We face a hostile ideology-global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method."  

I have mentioned these examples to dramatize the argument that the writings of these political theorists about the decline of ideology expressed the desire to see the emergence of a new ideology. Their writings could not be a serious analysis of the political, economic and ideological trends of the period when awareness of ideology permeated the thoughts of high government officials, of those who determine the ideological direction of their countries. Not only did they fail to provide a serious analysis of the political, economic and ideological trends of that period but they also failed to provide a serious analysis of ideology as a concept. They failed to see ideology as a set of values, expectations, aspirations and prescriptions. They insisted on seeing ideology as something dogmatically articulated regarding class conflict, revolution, and mass movements which is not the essential nature of ideology. The global concept of ideology as a utopian vision or a well-developed sense of justice encompassing a thorough world view should not


obscure more common, mundane concerns. The absence of radical ideologies has led the advocates of the thesis that ideologies have declined to conclude too quickly that because there were no revolutionary or mass movements, there were also no concerns or bitterness. Clearly, many people are not satisfied with the existing order although they may have some difficulty articulating their criticism. There are people who have a series of dissatisfactions with the kind of politics pursued by their governments and the activities in which these governments are engaged. They are concerned with economic equality, justice, human rights, the foreign policies pursued by their government, and other issues. One way to reconstruct the concept of ideology is to see it as an expression of concern about the distribution of resources, economic or political, as the individual sees this distribution. Individuals may see the distribution of resources as best achieved through the Welfare State, communism, liberalism, Social Democracy, or any other system that incorporates elements of the other social systems.
CHAPTER THREE

THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

The participants in the Conference on the "Future of Freedom" attributed the presumed decline of ideology largely to the emergence of an industrial society in which politics would be conducted from a non-ideological standpoint. How did they define this post-industrial society? Is there such a thing as post-industrial society? How does it differ from the industrial society?

According to the participants, the constituent element of this type of society is a movement towards a democratic socialist system. Western societies will move through a process of socialization and Soviet societies will move through a process of liberalization. Thus we should expect the mutually hostile and antagonistic systems to come together at some unspecified date in a form of democratic socialism. The key notion which will render politics non-ideological is that conflicting interests will be reconciled within the framework of the Welfare State. This post-industrial society will be defined mainly by its scientific spirit. It will have science and technology as its basic preconditions. The principles of science and technology will be applied to the solution of social problems, thus leaving little scope for ideological controversies. Most of the participants of the Conference envisioned a post-industrial society which will be capable of incorporating disruptive movements by meeting immediate demands. This society will be capable of satisfying discontented people, people who are prepared to join and support any movement because it promises to relieve their
grievances. It will prevent the emergence of opposition movements, movements which consist of an integrating critique of society, because there will be a distribution of wealth and a reduction of inequalities of any political significance. Thus, movements which have radical goals will become important.

Therefore, the advancement of industrialization is seen as the process that logically necessitates the decomposition of social classes by causing a growth of affluence which makes possible "a social system in which class conflict is minimized" and consequently also ideological conflict. As a result, cleavages disappear and a consensus will have been reached. Such an assumption, however, is erroneous because the "industrial" society will never reach a final equilibrium, even if differences among classes are minimized, because the contest between the forces for uniformity and diversity will give it life and movement and change.

Lipset has also argued that intellectuals in such a society will function only as critics of that society because "domestic politics, even liberal or socialist politics, can no longer serve as the arena of serious criticism from the left." The intellectual in this post-industrial society will reject the radical commitment required by an "ethic of consciousness which creates true believers with pure, unquench-

able flame and can accept no compromise with faith."\textsuperscript{3}

Lipset further claims that radical movements in the West have ceased to exist because:

The fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship... the democratic left has recognized that an increase in overall state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems. This very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic politics for those who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action.\textsuperscript{4}

In sharp contrast to Lipset's arguments stand the arguments advanced by some that there will be an increasing intervention in the economic sphere by governments to achieve rapid economic growth. The public is becoming less apprehensive of strengthened state power and is prepared to sacrifice some of its freedoms for the attainment of economic growth. Labor organizations will cease to be component parts of class movements urging programmes of total reforms but will be a part of a web of rules set mainly by the state.\textsuperscript{5} Contrary to what is being argued, however, people today are more troubled by the apparent lesson of history that the more the state, in whatever form, attempts to control

\textsuperscript{3} Seymour Martin Lipset. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. op. cit., p. 408.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., p. 406.

society, for whatever desirable ends, the more the individual is smothered.

These political writers have also argued that the post-industrial society will be a knowledgeable society. Social objectives and goals will be determined by rational criteria. Knowledge and rationality will be the criteria by which we will judge policies and political action. Knowledge, they imply, will compel a rethinking of value positions by challenging assumptions with a reliable knowledge of empirical reality. Technology and science will permeate social institutions and will transform them.

The theme was developed first at the Conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom out of which the theme of "the end of ideology" developed. The participants came expecting, and in a way inviting, a great confrontation of world views. During this Conference it was admitted that under the pressure of economic and social knowledge, a growing body of research, and the increasing experience of society, ideological argument tended to give way to technical argument.6 These men must have experienced the effects of ideology in the very narrowing sense of the term as used by Rokeach in The Open and Closed Mind. According to Rokeach, the manner in which the characteristics of a knowledgeable society reduces ideological thinking, is through the reduction of dogmatic thinking. Dogmatic thinking can be conceived as a

selection and interpretation of information so as to reinforce a previously established creed, dogma, or political ideology. Information is used not so much as a means of understanding the world as it is in reality, but as a means of defending against conflict and uncertainty. 7 The knowledgeable society puts a greater stress on the use of information, relying on its truth and not on any defence. This should be associated with the decline in dogmatic thinking. For the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis, the decline of dogmatism apparently implies the decline of ideology.

The theory of the knowledgeable society was picked up and developed further by Robert Lane who asserts that the criteria and scope of politics are shrinking while those of knowledge are growing. As a consequence, ideology declines. According to Robert Lane, public policy in the so-called knowledgeable society will be characterized by the displacement of politics and ideology, caused by the constant expansion of "knowledge":

If one thinks of the domain of 'pure politics' where decisions are determined by calculations of influence, power, or electoral advantage, and a domain of pure knowledge where decisions are determined by calculations of how to implement agreed-upon values with rationality and efficiency, it appears to me that the political domain is shrinking and the knowledge domain is growing, in terms of criteria for deciding, kinds of counsel sought, evidence adduced, and the nature of the 'rationality' employed. 8


With respect to ideology Lane asserts:

If we employ the term ideology to mean a comprehensive, passionately believed, self-activating view of society, usually organized as a social movement rather than as a latent half-conscious belief system, it makes sense to think of a domain of knowledge distinguishable from the domain of ideology, despite the extent to which they may overlap. Since knowledge and ideology serve somewhat functional equivalents in orienting a person towards the problems he must face and the policies he must select, the growth of the domain of knowledge causes it to impinge on the domain of ideology.9

There is, however, another side of the argument, a side that Lane does not elaborate. Ideology and politics are just as likely to impinge upon the domain of "knowledge" as "knowledge" is likely to impinge upon the domain of ideology and politics. The neglect of this part of the knowledge-politics-ideology relationship stems from a view of knowledge as being a monolithic commodity with a fairly uniform impact upon public policy. By not distinguishing among kinds and uses of knowledge, such a view tends to confuse "knowledge" with the process of bureaucratic administration.

When Lane describes "knowledge" as a domain distinctive from ideology and politics, it becomes similar in concept to bureaucracy in the traditional Weberian sense.10  The operative definition of knowledge


which is characteristic of highly developed bureaucracies, according to this concept, is bureaucratic epistemology. This is the screen through which all information must pass to be examined before it becomes knowledge. This screen is one of the basic agencies by which the autonomy of process is ensured.11

Furthermore, according to this concept, bureaucracy is a value-free instrument, just a tool, which men must decide how to use by standards drawn from some other sources than the realms of science, technology, and bureaucracy. However, it is misleading to say that bureaucracy or science are neutral means that can be used to achieve an end. Here the means profoundly shape the ends. Bureaucracy may have no ultimate values, but it has a host of instrumental values, and among these is a conception of what counts as knowledge or useful information. This bureaucratic epistemology shapes so decisively the outcomes that if we assign a certain task to the bureaucratic agency, we can say beforehand how the bureaucratic epistemology will constitute and alter the task itself.

The error in the first arguments, that industrialization will produce structures and processes which will decompose classes, lies in the assumption that a particular value system leads necessarily to particular processes and structures and that this value system is spread evenly through the society. What happens, however, is the contrary. Industrialization produces conflicting orientations. It produces value

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patterns which are not shared by all classes in the industrial society. It has been demonstrated that the adoption of equality of opportunity as the norm in the middle class is likely to inspire opposite, compensating values in those who do not reach a socially acceptable standard of success.\textsuperscript{12} Robert Lane has found also that industrialization, as far as the working classes are concerned, is not accompanied by values that distinguish them from agricultural or feudal societies.\textsuperscript{13} Industrialization not only does not resolve fundamental problems but it is likely to accentuate class conflict and social turmoil. Economic differences do not clearly decrease and can even be maintained or subjectively increased by industrialization. As Robert Lane remarks:

\begin{quote}
It is important to remember that the affluent society still includes a large number of very poor people: the average income of the poorest fifth of the families...in the United States in 1962 was $1,662 and this had to provide for a little over three people on the average. The term 'affluence' is clearly relative both to other societies and previous periods.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Advanced industrialization may widen the gap that exists among various classes in society. Advanced industrialization requires specialization and high skills which can be acquired by education. However, since education is more accessible to the affluent classes, the distance between

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{14} \textit{The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence.} \textit{American Science Review}, 59:4 (December 1965), p. 876.
\end{itemize}
the low and the upper classes will become longer. In fact it may increase discontent and sharpen conflict.

Industrialization, then, cannot provide any guarantee that economic barriers separating social groups will be removed and that the political significance of economic inequality will disappear. A rise in the level of production and consumption is basically what can be achieved but this is not of overriding importance. As soon as the basic economic issues will be resolved, other issues will emerge. Indeed, the realignment that took place in the United States between 1968-1972 reflected ideological differences on newly emerging issues. As the importance of basic economic issues declined, a consensus was not achieved. Usually, after a realignment takes place, the losing party moves toward the position of the victorious party to reattract the lost voters. Thus, the parties converge ideologically and a consensus is achieved. But this did not happen during the above-mentioned period. With the resolution of basic economic issues, other issues came into the surface which are referred to as social issues.\textsuperscript{15} The new issues that may emerge can be more serious than the economic issues that are resolved as soon as the public ceases to be preoccupied with such issues.

Not only does economic development not lead to the disappearance of ideological conflict or a consensus on issues but it can accentuate

ideological conflict. One of the consequences of an increase in affluence, which will result from economic development, will be an increase in literacy, education and exposure to the information which will promote greater political activity and interest in politics. Expansion of participation will result in an increase of political efficacy and an increase in the knowledge of political and social problems. This, in turn, will increase the need for the society to do something about these problems and if it is unable to resolve them, more political conflict will be generated. Effective government action will be more difficult and increased demands for social change and innovation will be more difficult to satisfy. The conflict will be in proportion to the gap that will exist between what the government can accomplish and the ideas people will have as to what the government ought to accomplish. Such a conflict will place enormous strain on political parties to meet the various demands. Thus, instead of a convergence of ideological positions of the political parties, we may have a divergence of ideological positions. This will be the case because political parties will be forced to espouse the cause of the social groups that will demand social action and innovation, a more equitable distribution of the benefits of the industrial society and an improvement in the quality of their lives. On the other side will be those who will have every reason to defend the benefits that have accrued to them from industrialization.

Education and increased exposure to information will give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations. If these aspirations and
expectations are not satisfied, people will be motivated to be involved in politics to exert more and stronger pressure on their governments. Thus, the economic development and improvement which is supposed to satisfy needs and fulfill certain aspirations, may, in fact, exacerbate these aspirations and generate others.

Social mobilization is another consequence of economic development and industrialization. In turn, the consequence of social mobilization is that classes are no longer composed of individuals whose social position is an inherited and inescapable fate. Individuals begin to realize that they have the power to advance their claims and alter social conditions. Thus, industrialization "increases capacities for group organization and consequently the strength of group demands on government, which the government is unable to satisfy."\(^\text{16}\)

Economic development must be accompanied by an increase in equality of conditions otherwise the process of economic development is itself a shock to the integrative functions of society.\(^\text{17}\) What happens, however, is that industrialization increases the income of some people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases their dissatisfaction with the existing order.\(^\text{18}\) Furthermore, industrialization

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17. Ibid.
disrupts social solidarity by abolishing the differentiation of social roles. People come into contact with more heterogeneous groups, the flow of information is facilitated, and an openness is created. The cost of this openness is a weaker set of affective ties linking individuals to the social system.\(^19\) The question is, then, if developed societies can afford the costs in social solidarity of these weak ties.

Industrialization and economic progress reduce the number of the propertyless and increases private ownership which gives increasing numbers of people something to defend and therefore gives them a stake in the social system in which they live. Furthermore, the gradual improvement of living conditions arouses a hope that the revolutionary fervour decreases as well as the desire to drastically reform the existing social system which is undesirable for the left. Thus, the left would be preparing its own demise by abandoning its intransigence, which has been interpreted by some as a convergence of ideological positions. Consequently, the left may be forced to adopt again a radical stand on social issues and abandon its previous moderate stand. Indeed, Robert Lane has found that more people are now looking towards the future as a period which offers a greater promise of a happier life.\(^20\)

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An increased optimism, however, which is generated by industrialization and economic development, may have other consequences. As it has been remarked, "...the technological society has produced unprecedented freedom from want, from insecurity, from poverty, hunger, and disease, and...these real gains make possible the most radical visions of a possible future." The problem is that, when one envisions a brighter future, he tends to become more dissatisfied with the current state of affairs and thus becomes anxious to change things. Also, when a society becomes more affluent, it abandons traditional orientations. A great sense of mastery over fate emerges and individuals cease to see themselves as helpless objects of forces beyond human control and acquire a faith that great goals can be attained. As a consequence, they may agitate for radical reforms.

Agitation for radical reforms can result from our efforts to achieve goals through rational and efficient calculations, from efforts to subordinate qualitative dimensions to the common, external, and quantifiable. In that case people will require power which strives to become authority that will respond to human needs, to those questions which have meaning for men. The uprisings, the challenging of established institutions and processes that we have witnessed are the cries of people who feel that the processes and powers which control


their lives are inhumane and unresponsive to their needs and aspirations. Before the "Age of Affluence", a survey was conducted to determine what percentage of the American population was happy. The findings revealed that forty-three percent of the respondents were very happy. In 1957 an almost identical question was asked and only thirty-five percent reported themselves to be very happy. This suggests that economic prosperity is not the only criterion of happiness and satisfaction. Economic development will provide mankind with a sufficient surplus of wealth and leisure and consequently with more time than the present for activities of the mind.

But once the body and mind "have been liberated, at least partially, from the tyranny of the environment, they have still to be liberated from the subtler tyrannies which society, morality and science itself exercise over them for their own good." Science has tended to limit human participation in control. It reduces the human role to supplying the machines with inputs and data materials. Decision-making is increasingly taken away from men and given over to machines and routine processes. Technical rationality becomes a dominant orientation of thought which tends to limit the freedom of social perception. But once it ceases to be the dominant orientation of human thought, the human mind will strive for the attainment of other ideals and goals and this may be manifested in higher political interest.

Modern societies have become like self-regulating machines and as the system grows more and more complex, each individual is able to


understand and control less and less of it. This kind of society is bound to provoke reaction and an increased political interest and concern because it is destructive. We can expect increased political interest and concern "because these attitudes are generally related to higher income and an improved capacity to take an interest in matters other than immediate day-to-day breadwinning problems."25

All the writings about political developments in the post-industrial society appear to rest on the assumption that socio-economic and political developments are moving in a deterministic unilinear-cultural-specific direction whereby the future will be free of dogmatic, inflexible, passionately held and articulated prescriptions of reality and perceptions of the future. All these writings are reminiscent of classical Marxism. For Marx saw Marxism as having an independence of existing social structures and hence an objectivity which rescued it from the relativity of the ideological thought which he diagnosed in his opponents. It was only in the communist future, that the social roots of ideological thinking would be destroyed and ideology would finally disappear. These writings are also reminiscent of the Marxist view that the state will wither away. The predictions that were made with respect to trends in the European Community reinforce this impression. It was frequently assumed and stated that Europe was becoming depoliticized, and that the great rifts that had split the continent over the past years were disappearing. Ideologies, it has been stated, have lost their hold. Europe was gravitating towards a new kind of society; it was becoming a

consumer society, a classless society. In these circumstances, a "consensus government" would emerge and several persuasive generalizations were made. This "consensus government" would break national barriers and dissolve national loyalties, opening the road towards political integration. Lipset asserted that "The dominant structural trend in Europe involves the final triumph of the values of the industrial society, the end of rigid status class derivative from the pre-industrial world."26

Aron also expressed the view that the workers are becoming satisfied with material well-being and are inclined to support a new European government which offers the material advantages. He states: "Throughout Western Europe the type of society some call technical and others scientific, has come into existence and it disputes the system of human relations inherited from the ancien regime or from the bourgeois property-oriented of the last century."27 However, integration in Europe is very unlikely to come from a shift of loyalty to a new center because the Community will be seen as providing material benefits to people. More than anything else, it will depend on the Community's ability to fulfill spiritual aspirations but not by becoming a powerful productive unit which will raise the standard of living. This will only castrate the Community of its political ideals and render it incapable of animating and inspiring the new generations.


The various theorists have seen common fears, common interests, co-operation in economic areas and common economic policies as the integrating force but they have overlooked or have not stressed enough the creation of an ideology as being essential to the integrative process.

Just as the Soviet State has not withered away, despite Marx's predictions, so the major problems of the European Community or any other society have not been solved to the satisfaction of the general public. Political and socio-economic developments, whether in Europe or in America, have not moved in a deterministic way. Lipset had predicted also that an increase in economic productivity in affluent industrial societies would bring about an equitable distribution of gratifications, material and non-material. This redistribution in turn would mitigate against hostility and tensions and thus ideological consensus would be achieved. However, the age of political consensus has not been achieved and this has created the need for a new perspective that would explain the political cleavages that are still persisting and even increasing in the face of affluence.

Perhaps the age of political consensus has not come about because advanced industrialization produces a changing stratification system which alters older forms of political conflict and provides the basis for the emergence of new forms. These conflicts have serious consequences for collective problem solving, and they may be so aggregated


as to produce pervasive strains. There are built-in limitations in the trend towards a greater equality, as far as material benefits are concerned. If redistribution of income continues, we may reach the point where productivity will decline and this appears to be taking place in some countries that have attempted to redistribute income in a more equitable manner. Workers will be less motivated to work and consequently they will produce less. As the income of the worker increases, he will be motivated to substitute work for leisure. Furthermore, the new middle class that will emerge from increased economic prosperity, instead of contributing to political consensus, will become a potential combatant. The upper-working class and the lower-working class will be pitted against those above them and those below them. 30

On the other hand, as people become more prosperous, they take on the known attitudes of prosperous individuals in an earlier period. That is, they become conservative and they will oppose any important social change and reforms, thus producing more cleavages. In the first case, the two extremes, which are the result of stratification, become potential forces for change. Those who are in the middle of the distribution will want to consolidate their gains and will oppose any attempts for change, thus becoming conservative; they create a force of conservatism which reacts to the institution of any social measures and reforms.

Perhaps programmes based on ideological postulates of nineteenth-century socialism or liberalism have lost their appeal and many people

have espoused the belief of incremental improvements and have abandoned the instrumental conception of the state. This, however, by no means implies that ideologies exercise no appeal or that we have reached an age of non-ideological politics. The world has acquired a vast amount of experience and in the light of this experience old ideas and beliefs are reconstituted. Many of the old assumptions have been abandoned, such as the faith in the common man and his powers to understand complex problems, as well as many of the rationalistic assumptions.

The conservatives have abandoned the notion that evil exists independently of social or economic maladjustments and that we should search for the sources of our discomforts in the defective human nature rather than in the defective social order. Many of the reforms that have been accepted as a compromise constitute evidence that politics are not characterized by the attribution of absolute values to any programmes. This is mainly because liberalism and conservatism were founded on democratic principles. The ideology of democracy is not committed to any particular ideas but only to those processes of freely given consent which enable human beings to determine what kind of economic life they want. Under a democratic system, individuals are free not only to choose any system they prefer but also to abandon it. Democracy is experimental in its outlook and sees many possible solutions rather than those given by doctrinaires. Totalitarian ideologies, such as Marxism, on the other hand, become a matter of religion. They are characterized

by the tendency to act dogmatically without regard to circumstances.

Although we may be bereft of ideologies in the sense of explanations of the world which serve to bring order out of chaos, people have not ceased to look at political matters through ideological prisms. The optimism of the "end of ideology" ideologues, like Daniel Bell, Lipset, Shils and Brzezinski, comes only from their naive belief that professional social scientists have developed paradigms to explain and direct social changes and that such social scientists will be the "technotricians" of the coming (?) post-industrial age. Alas, such faith appears without merit, and brute nominalism makes more sense.

If social issues were directed by science and technology, the result would be an ever-increasing loss of basic political control and social direction. If science and technology held sway, they would remove the total social framework in which ends are chosen from the scope of reflection and rational reconstruction. Technical control requires a type of action that implies domination. It would be synonymous with the institutionalization of a form of domination whose political character becomes intolerable. Furthermore, the very concept of applying scientific criteria in political decisions is very much ideological. As it has been remarked, "the place of scientific thought in ideological formulations is an empirical question that should not be begged by the assumption that science and ideology are incompatible."

Implicit in the discussion of the industrial society is the notion of an ultimate movement toward a static equilibrium of the social forces and a denial of the continued relevance of moral and human ideas. But societies are not moving toward an ultimate static equilibrium; there is nothing unavoidable about the direction of social development. Every society contains fluidity and dynamism; it is not closed to change. People are reappraising values and goals and are constantly exploring new conceptions of the good society and the means which will bring about this good society.

CONCLUSION

From what has been discussed, the conclusion can be drawn that the political writers who have argued that ideologies have ended have misconstrued what happens to man's political interests, behavior, and attitudes towards politics as society becomes more affluent. Several plausible hypotheses have been examined with respect to the attitudinal change that may occur in the affluent society.

They also have misconstrued another trend in the so-called knowledgeable society, a trend according to which social thought would strive towards a search for a new objective, scientific basis for social theory. Consequently, radical critics who would see a need for some more comprehensive social doctrine which would shape particular criticisms and reforms to a clearly perceived end, which would lift us out of the present "malaise", would disappear. But let us see what one of the exponents of this theory, Seymour Lipset, has to say today:
"There are more radical teachers who are openly political in the classrooms today than, say, 15 years ago."33 This statement is based on surveys conducted by Dr. Lipset himself and according to which forty-five percent of today's college professors in the United States consider themselves leftists.34 "If you take the young social scientists, you will find that a total of maybe 20 to 25 percent are Marxists", he says.

This dramatic surge of Marxism is bound to provoke strong reaction from the opposite side and intense ideological debate. Not only is the domain of ideology not shrinking, as Robert Lane asserted, but it appears to be expanding. The strong challenge of liberal democracy may have yet to come. Perhaps Sartre was right when he said that "Marxism is still very young, almost in its infancy. It has barely started to develop."35

The discussions on ideology by the proponents of the decline thesis have also overlooked or slighted the obvious preferences of the poorer members of society for an increased degree of economic well-being and a more equitable distribution of the society's resources. In particular, if we reflect on the analysis of ideology that has been offered by Lane, we can draw the following conclusions. A large segment of the population has many grievances concerning both what the government

34. Ibid., p. 5.
does and what it fails to do, ranging from civil rights, to taxation,
to racial integration, to space programmes, to foreign wars, etc.

Redistribution of income in a more equitable manner remains a
very serious issue and arouses strong sentiments. Increased productivity
has resulted in lessening the harsh contrasts between the rich and poor;
but it has by no means done away with the differences, or with the
strong sentiments they arouse, in the United States or other countries.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To summarize what has been discussed so far with respect to the analysis of the decline-of-ideology thesis, we can say that the fundamental problem associated with that perspective is the misplaced reliance on a presumed convergence of the great ideological systems. The problem that haunts these writers' analysis of the strength of ideology is the consequence of their failure to view ideology as something other than rigid dogma, blind faith and "apocalyptic beliefs that refuse to specify the costs and consequences of the changes they envision." Thus, the convergence (?) of the two major ideologies, according to the decline thesis, signifies an abandonment of such apocalyptic beliefs, a convergence which, it is assumed, is the consequence of (a) an increase in affluence, (b) an increase of the strength of the politics of democratic socialism and (c) the victory of science and the application of scientific criteria in political decisions. This concept has placed the emphasis on knowledge, technology and rationality. According to it, a society will emerge in which the governing of man is replaced by the administration of things.

The concept of science and rationality in the application of politics has an old and respectable intellectual history and has a strong ideological connotation. It was developed in the nineteenth century as a result of man's efforts to transcend the conflicts and irrationalities

1. Daniel Bell. The End of Ideology. op. cit.
of power. It was believed that a society should be constituted in a manner that would be consistent with the principles of science. The theoretical foundations of Social Democracy are based on science. Social Democrats were declaring that in striving to attain their aims and goals, they were following the principles of science. The formulation of any theories which aimed at solving social problems should be based on objective proof. If the methods employed to solve social problems were not capable of such proof, it was no longer science but it was resting on subjective impulses, on mere desire or opinion. The concept has been revived today as similar efforts are being made by socialist or non-socialist intellectuals to prescribe such a society. In the West, intellectuals are making serious efforts to develop the theory that industrialization will achieve this goal. Bell believes that politics will be insulated from socio-economic change and will reflect its own dynamic. Such ideas are reminiscent of Marx's theory according to which scientific understanding is objective and free from the distortions he reserved for legal, political, and social theories.

The concept is not only ideological in the sense that it prescribes a particular form of social organization, but it is ideological in the sense that it has been the subject of intense controversy and has been criticized for the moral consequences it entails. Habermas has argued that science and technology have become a form of ideology, a distortion of reality, which serve vested interests and prevailing

institutions. In other words, science has itself become a social institution which no longer serves the interests of man but instead makes man its servant, enslaving his critical faculties, perpetuating the existing state of affairs.

According to Habermas, when science attains a monopoly in the guidance of human action, all relations to life will be blocked out under the slogan of neutrality or value freedom. According to the criteria of technological rationality, agreement on a collective value system can never be achieved by means of technological discussion carried on in public politics, by a way of a consensus rationally arrived at. A society that integrates science within it as a productive force only insulates itself from critical insight. The danger of an exclusively technical civilization should be clearly grasped; it is threatened by the splitting of its consciousness, and by the splitting of human beings into two classes—the social engineer and the inmates of closed institutions.

Marcuse has followed a similar line of criticism. He argues that technology provides the great rationalization of the unfreedom of man and demonstrates the technical impossibility of being autonomous, of determining one's life. Technological rationality protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination and the instrumentalist horizon of reason opens on rationally totalitarian society.

4. Ibid., p. 282.
The arguments that the two systems are converging have been presented very lightly by the political theorists who have expounded the decline-of-ideology thesis. These arguments do not provide any evidence that ideology is declining. Even if we assume that the West and East are modifying their positions on certain issues, it would not mean that issues are not seen through ideological prisms, that individuals have ceased to be motivated by ideologies or that societies have abandoned values and principles. If, on the other hand, a departure from nineteenth-century ideological orientations is taken to constitute evidence that ideologies have declined, the exponents of the decline thesis are committing a serious error. This cannot provide the basis for an argument that ideologies have lost their relevance. Conservatism, for example, has taken a dual path. It has taken the form of modern conservatism and remained within the mainstream of liberal democracy. If intellectuals today made any efforts to propagate conservative ideas based on eighteenth-century postulates their efforts would be doomed to failure. Liberalism, too, has followed different paths. In modern history it has been concerned about, and has been pressing for, the goals of greater freedom, social equality, and more meaningful democracy. The same goals, however, have been espoused by socialists although they believe that these goals can only be attained within a different institutional framework. Thus, the liberals today are more concerned with preserving and successfully defending those institutions which already exist rather than creating more liberal institutions. Liberalism has taken a conservative attitude. Liberals are reluctant to expound the
philosophy of liberalism because this would give their enemies a weapon with which to attack the society of liberalism.\textsuperscript{6} This attitude is reflected in their refusal to institute comprehensive social policies, to reform existing institutions, and to press for greater freedom. To argue, then, that liberals are modifying their ideological positions to the point where we can speak of convergence of the positions of Marxism and liberalism is very absurd.

Not only can we not speak meaningfully of convergence of Marxism and liberalism, but we cannot speak of the disappearance of radicalism and radical movements in the West. The Communist Party has a mass base in Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Germany, although in Germany it is suppressed. In the United States there is a significant number of radicals but their cause has not been espoused by any political party. The reason for this is mainly the fact that an opposition party to the existing political parties cannot exist because of reasons such as election laws, the existence of plurality of groups which serve as a cushion to absorb disruptive conflict and divide the focus of individuals. Also, there has always been the "foreign threat" which has been used to discredit any communist movements.

I have also considered the argument that high and widespread levels of economic well-being and affluence lead to a decline in the strength of ideologies because they lead to the creation of a society that is non-political. But this argument suffers from many weaknesses

and fails to provide any evidence which would support it. Economic
development and economic progress, which is the consequence of
industrialization, will produce serious cleavages. Some social
classes will gain in social status and economic positions, whether
these gains will be relative or absolute, and others will lose in status
and economic positions, either relatively or absolutely. This will
sharpen the sense of injustice among the public and intensify demands
for a more equitable distribution of resources.

Another consequence, which will result from increased economic
prosperity, is that as economic issues are becoming less important,
as man becomes less preoccupied with economic problems, his attention
will be released for other submerged issues and conflicts, such as
human rights, foreign and military policies, ethnic issues, etc.

In summary, it can be stated that the Marxist view of ideology
underlies the thinking of most of the exponents of the decline thesis.
However, they have gone beyond Marx in extending the pejorative
connotations of the term, such as fanaticism, chiliastic optimism,
radicalism, etc. The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime and, in
general, the disastrous consequences of the Second World War made many
realize that ideologies tended to split the world into hostile camps and
they hastened to denounce ideologies. They committed the error, however,
of judging all ideologies en bloc and not in the light of their own
respective practices and envisageable consequences. Thus, the discussion
of ideologies was altered from one of analysis to that of a concern for
their effects. Many of the political theorists, specifically Bell, concluded that the power of ideology lies in its ability to generate passion. This is evident when Bell says that those who speak of the end of ideology mainly mean to reject the kind of commitment which had such a disastrous effect on the thought and policies of the radical movements of the past two generations. Thus Bell thought that this kind of passion had diminished during the 1950s and hence he proclaimed the end of ideology. At the same time he was expressing the hope that ideologies would be replaced by the objectivity of social science without taking into consideration the possibility that social sciences could be "politicized", that ideologies could influence the social sciences. Marx thought that the repository of objectivity was the proletariat. Bell and others thought that social scientists were the repository of objectivity.

It can be further stated that the exponents of the decline thesis have confused the exhaustion of ideologies for the radical intellectuals with the obsolescence and disutility of ideologies as instruments for the creation of the utopian society.

The end of ideology occurs only within two very narrow circles: the new intelligentsia of bureaucrats and social scientists and the disillusioned and exhausted ex-militants of the Left. Having lost faith in miraculous changes, these intellectuals espoused the principles of Social Democracy. Also, since they lost faith that ideologies can be

7. Daniel Bell and David Aiken. "Ideology-A Debate". Commentary, 38 (October 1964); pp. 69-76.
employed as vehicles for the formation and guidance of social behavior, they replaced the role of ideology with science and technology in ordering human attitudes. Thus the decline-of-ideology thesis becomes more of an ideology rather than serious social science.
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GLOSSARY

Capitalism: Under Capitalism the economy is organized in a manner in which the means of production are privately owned. In addition to the private ownership of the means of production, there are the following elements:
1. a multitude of competing producers,
2. no government interference in the economy,
3. the market is the regulator of the competition,
4. no responsibility by the state for the people's economic welfare.

Communism: Communism is the name appropriated by Marx to his own very different kind of socialism. He chose the word Communism to distinguish his "scientific" socialism from "utopian" socialism of earlier theorists. In a narrower use, "Communism" is that state of affairs which will prevail when the Marxist scheme is accomplished with the principle of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs".

Consensus: The notion that people and parties are ideologically close to one another on basic issues. A far-reaching agreement on political alternatives and the adoption by people and parties of similar standpoints on social and political ends, according to the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis, signifies a retreat from ideology.

Conservatism: A human attitude or a predisposition to resist change which was turned into a political doctrine because of challenges that developed in recent Western history. These challenges resulted from the growing fashion for proposing radical changes in society by deliberate design and manipulation. The main argument put forward by the Conservatives was that men bore a heavy responsibility to preserve much of the past for generations to come.

Convergence Theory: The theory that has been expounded by some of the proponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis that the socio-economic systems of the East and West were becoming more similar and gradually would converge. The theory was used in support of the argument that ideologies were declining.
Democratic Socialism: Democratic Socialism accepts the value of the parliamentary approach to power and rejects the Marxist belief in the inevitability of the collapse of Capitalism as a result of its supposed inherent tendency to concentrate economic power with its consequent impoverishment of the workers. On the other hand, it rejects the classical liberal idea that the general good flows from individual competition. It advocates an economy that is often planned although it does not advocate the complete abolition of private property.

False Consciousness: False consciousness, according to Marx, is the notion that human thought is the distorted reflection of reality. The understanding of reality is deficient and needs to be remedied by persuasion if possible and by coercion if necessary.

Keynesian: According to Lord Keynes, the faith in laissez faire was vanishing and society was growing more doubtful of the wisdom of the old economic ideas because of the serious breakdown of economic life during the Depression. Democratic Socialists are in agreement with Lord Keynes in his belief that the state ought to, and is able to, formulate policies that serve the community rather than one particular class or group.

Leninism: Lenin formulated certain theoretical propositions according to which: revolutionary action must always be based on a doctrine which can be scientifically determined; the working class by itself cannot achieve sufficient social consciousness to carry out its historic task of social revolution; spontaneous action by the workers can only lead to defeat of the revolution. The revolution must be organized by professional revolutionaries of both proletarian and intellectual origin.

Liberalism: Liberalism can be understood as an economic and political system which rests on the idea of liberty which is to be understood almost wholly in terms of freedom from state interference in the actions of an individual. It also means participation in government, rather than being left alone by the government.
Mannheim's Paradox: According to Mannheim, all knowledge is relational; and hence knowledge itself is to be understood in terms of the relation of the possessor to the particular historical and social context in which he is thinking. But the paradox arises: what is the status of the theory that claims that all such knowledge is relative? The paradox is resolved by modern social theory because the social scientist now can probe any aspect of human organization as dispassionately as physical science observes chemical reactions.

Marxism: The philosophical ideas expounded by Marx which attempted to provide insights into the working of history and society that transcend a particular period. Marxism represents an especially powerful blend of general propositions about man and society, a pungent criticism of the society of its time, the advocacy of policies of radical change, and a view of a millennial world.

Peaceful Co-existence: Refers to the condition of international relations in which states with dissimilar social systems and antagonistic ideologies live side by side without fighting. While "peace" normally implies some measure of positive international co-operation, "co-existence" may mean little more than that the states concerned refrain from war.

Pragmatism: A theory of truth that holds that an idea is true if it works satisfactorily; that is, if it leads to an anticipated experience. It has been used by political scientists to distinguish the "objective society" from the ideological society. According to these theorists, the pragmatic society is the opposite of the ideological society.

Socialism: Socialism and Communism are used by noncommunists in a radically different sense. Socialism is understood to involve a moderately planned economy (with some nationalization of industry) under a democratic government. According to this distinction many European parties are socialist - that is, they ascribe to social democracy - and the Soviet Union and China are communist.
Stalinism: Insofar as theory is concerned, what can be said is that Stalin laid greater emphasis than Lenin ever did on the possibility of achieving "socialism" in one country. Since 1956, the term "Stalinism" has been used by exponents of communism in the Soviet Union to designate abuses of Leninism which Stalin practiced.

Technology: For the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis, technology will come to shrink the domain of ideology because decisions will be determined by the scientific criteria as well as technological criteria. The critical role in the economy and politics will be played by technical workers and the role of political institutions will diminish.

Totalitarianism: Total rule which allows just one party. It is based upon a single party which retains its name from the time it was fighting for power. The party remains a minority, controlling and purging itself. The rule of the party knows no legal opposition, only opponents who must be "liquidated" because they are ill-natured or ill-disposed.

Welfare State: The welfare state has fairly explicit commitments to the broad goals of economic development; full employment; equality of opportunity for the young; social security; protected minimum standards as regards income, housing, health, and education for all regions and social groups.