The Origin of Ideology: Marx’s Method of Human Liberation and Husserl’s Investigation of Judgments

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Abstract

This thesis begins by asking how alienation can be distinguished from objectification. By examining the first chapter of Capital I and the Grundrisse it is discovered that Marx's theory of labour hinges on an understanding of the psychic process of the subject. In order to universalize Marx's method the thesis shifts to Husserl's examination of the subjective process of judging. The latter is understood in this thesis as structurally equivalent to Marx's understanding of labour. It is discovered that the meaning of any act of judging/labour is irreal. Alienation is thus discovered to be the naive belief in the factual existence of irreal objects of consciousness.
The Origin of Ideology:
Marx's Method of Human Liberation
and Husserl's Investigation of Judgments.

by

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Chapter One

Introduction.

It is self-evident, therefore, that it ((Marx's method)) must be constantly applied to itself, and this is one of the focal points of these essays.

Georg Lukács in the "Preface" to History and Class Consciousness.

Doing good theory is the art of describing things clearly. At the same time, we might add, it is necessary to have a clear idea of what it is one wishes to describe before the actual process of description can take place. In this way, clarity of thought becomes the a priori condition to any clear description. If ideology is understood as illusion, then an ideologized understanding of the phenomenon which one wishes to describe may lead to a clear description of the phenomenon in question, but it will be a clear description of an illusion, not a description of the actual phenomenon. The question of how to move beyond such ideological illusions is the central question in relation to Marx's method.

At the same time, the question of how to arrive at a clear understanding of phenomena is not restricted to the
realm of theory, for not everyone is interested in putting their understanding of things down on paper. But understanding things clearly is as much a desirable thing in day to day life as it is in the world of intellectual discourse. Theory expresses clarified understandings in a particular way. Clarified understanding may be expressed in other ways as well. What theory shares with these other activities is the initial grounding in clarified understanding. This understanding acts as a foundation or what Marxists refer to as an infrastructure which is invisible in factual terms but which acts as the sense bestowing presupposition for any particulars which are predicated on this infrastructure. This infrastructure will remain invisible to those who restrict themselves to a knowledge which one-sidedly directs itself to facts, the meaning of which is presupposed. The actual source of the meaning of these facts lies in the infrastructure itself and so the infrastructure must be clarified initially if any description of what is predicated upon it is to make sense.

Just as in the building of a house, where the quality of the foundation will determine the edifice which rests upon this foundation, the quality of a theoretical foundation will determine the quality of what is predicated upon it. Some foundations are sound. Others are not. It is
the initial understanding of the nature of this infrastructural norm which is the prior necessity to the creation of theory or any other activity. It is this understanding of the character of norms which grounds any true understanding of the world which we as subjects share mediately or which we have individually as the worlds which we imagine in the free play of our fancies.

While a clarified understanding may be expressed in mediate form, an ideological illusion, that is the misperception that facts are self-explanatory, may find expression not only in theoretical way. Just as it is with clarified understandings which may find expression in many ways, an ideological illusion is as likely to find expression in other aspects of our lives as it is to find expression in a the objective form of theory. Precisely because an ideological illusion is just that, the person who finds himself understanding his world ideologically stands the chance of being caught in the contradictory situation of believing that what is not true but is only illusory is actually true. The transcendence of ideological illusion will correspondingly be a liberating thing. A theoretical description of something which is clearly and truthfully understood carries with it the implication that this freedom from illusion has been accomplished. It can stand as an
example for how such a move may be performed. We understand the moving impulse in Marx's theory to be this transcendence of illusion.

The justification of this point of view is difficult to provide since Marx never wrote anything on such a transcendental move itself. If one assumes, as we have, that Marx does point towards the liberation of mankind from the illusions of ideology, then this should be implicit in his work. The problem which this essay addresses itself to is the question of how what is implicit can be made explicit. As well, since it is assumed that Marx relates a clear idea of what capitalist society actually is, the first moment of Marx's method of description itself would be the performance of such a transcendental move. What Marx provides us with in his descriptions is the second moment. In approaching the problem of accounting for the first moment of Marx's description, we will address ourselves to the second moment first. This may seem to be a confused way of approaching the issue. However, what we hope to accomplish in this paper is the clarification of a confusion which seems inherent to those who move from Marxist texts to explain Marx's texts. Since it is assumed that an explication of Marx's method is primarily of concern to Marxists who themselves will be starting from Marx's
follow the dictates of an arbitrarily devised system. In this way, Marx's dialectical description may be understood as a description of process and as such, is phenomenological description. While it is true that Marx's description refers to material objects, we shall treat these as objective indicies to Marx's description rather than seeing them as an explanation of Marx's description in and of themselves. The illusion which Marx discusses in relation to the generation of the mode of production is an illusion which is created in the subject's own mind and by the subject himself. This will be demonstrated in chapter two of this essay. If Marx's description is not understood as a description of a consciousing process through which an alienating illusion is generated, then any interpretation of Marx's theory which understands what Marx describes as something other than consciousing process will be caught in the countersense of maintaining that the illusion which he describes really takes place. Thus, if we are to make sense of Marx, the dialectic must be seen as process. If this is not done, Marx's theory will be absurd from the outset.

But if Marx's theory can be made sense in this way, it should be compatible, at least in methodological intent with Husserl's theory which finds its project in the description of process itself. What we hope to show in this
thesis is the methodological compatibility of Marx's method and that of Husserl.

The first problem with which we are confronted, however, is one of how we can move beyond the parochial restrictions which can take place if what is understood as important to Marx's method is its economic and political content rather than its essential meaning. In effect we are confronted at the outset with the problem of ideologizing Marx's method, as seeing it as merely the ideological reflection of an appearance.

3. The Marxist problematic.

Thus, at the outset, Marx's method presents us with a dilemma: Marx claims that theory is simply the ideological (1) reflection of the mode of production. As ideology, theory is invalid. Marx himself does theory, however. It follows that Marx's theory, qua theory, is ideological. Hence, Marx's assertion concerning theory is itself invalid.

This is a tidy dismissal of Marx. However, this assignment of Marx's theory to the trashbin, and on his own terms at that, is a superficial one. To begin with, such a dismissal of Marx on Marx's own terms must accept Marx's
assertion concerning the invalid nature of theory before we can apply it to Marx's theory as a case in point. Such a carte blanche acceptance of Marx's assertion avoids the premise which underpins this assertion.

Implicit in Marx's theoretical claim that theory is invalid lies the question of what ideology is, to begin with, and how theory would lose its credibility by being ideological. By dismissing Marx in the above way, the essential question of the problem Marx is speaking about is completely circumvented.

To be fair, however, it must be noted that if Marx himself cannot show what it is that he means when he uses the term ideology, any attempt to do Marxist theory will eventually end up in skepticism since nothing can be said about society from such a theoretical perspective without being ideological. It would therefore be absurd to assert anything as true in a theoretical way. The knife cuts both ways here.

Nevertheless, in Marx's own theoretical assertion lies an implicit claim to the validity of theoretical assertions. True, this is a tacit assertion, but nevertheless, it is there. If we can find out what it is about ideology that invalidates its claim to truth, then we may be able to draw into focus what it is that would lend a theory validity.
The second differentiating aspect in relation to Marx's theory is what makes it a different kind of theory from the ones which Marx criticizes as ideological. Marx claims that what the theory which he criticizes as ideological does is accept a state of affairs which men themselves create as if this state of affairs was itself objectively valid simply by merit of its "existence". What exists "now" (2) is accepted as pregiven. It is accepted as if it were heaven-sent, as if it were dictated from above. In such a theoretical approach to questions of knowledge the factual state of affairs itself is accepted as a self-explanatory phenomenon which acts as a norm for any system building or discussion which follows on the acceptance of the meaning of these facts. This norm itself remains unquestioned, however. It stands as an unexamined presupposition. Marx's analysis of the mode of production does not accept the mode of production as pregiven. Rather, Marx asks how it is that this state of affairs, which men themselves have created, has come into being. The key concept in Marx's theory is thus labour.

Marx claims that man realizes (verwirklicht) (3) himself in the social world through his material activity. Through this activity man creates objects which are useful. For Marx these objects can have any use-value whatsoever.
However, they must be material objects, for unless we are about to allow the intervention of a spiritual being like Hegel's Geist, men must make their intentions manifest in a material way to make themselves socially understood. In positing himself in the social world through the material objects which he creates, man objectifies himself. Such an objectification can be alienating if the labouror sees what he has created as something which takes on a "being for itself". As such, it becomes a fetish object. Society, which is the product of men's labour as well, can similarly become a fetish object. In actuality a fetish object has its origin as meaning what it does for the subject in the subject's own constitution of it. Part of the meaning of this object, as a fetish object, is that it is conceived of as determinant of its own meaning. The subject himself constitutes this as the meaning of the object, however, and so the acceptance of an object as self-determinantly meaningful, as a being for itself, is countersensicle. If the subject accepts this countersensicle or self-contradictory state of affairs as valid, then we can say that the subject's understanding is premised upon mere appearance and as such, is ideological. This applies both to his understanding of the world in which he lives and to the place which he understands himself to occupy in such a
world. A theory which similarly accepts the appearance of the social reality without enquiring into its origins in the subject's constitution of it as standing outside of him in a pregiven way, will only be a reflection of an ideological appearance.

Thus, ideology, has its material referents in the social world, but it itself is not a material question. It is a question which concerns itself with the awareness which the subject has concerning the objects which he produces in his labour. Marx's method is therefore implicitly one which differentiates between the ideological and the non-ideological as a function of the consciousing processes of the subject involved. What inevitably draws this analysis into the social world is the concrete object which is produced by the subject's labour and which a number of subjects may share in an empirically evidencible way. The question of ideology, however, is one which is concerned essentially with the psyche of the subject.

If we look back to the dilemma which initiated this discussion, we can see that the necessary differentiation between Marx's theory and the theory which he criticizes will also be one which finds its basis in terms of the awareness of the subject qua producer. The differentiating moment will correspondingly be one of
whether or not the subject as the producer himself is alienated in his activity, or whether the material objectifications which he produces through his material activity can stand as they are with no hypostatization or reification occurring in relation to such objects. However, Marx himself never explained how it is possible that objects can be realized without such an hypostatization occurring. The prime example of the application of Marx's method is that of the critique of the fetishization of commodities which occurs in the first chapter of Capital I. But, as with Marx's statement in regard to ideological theory, which is the explication of an ideological understanding of reality in abstract and theoretical terms, only the implication of something which reflects a non-ideological consciousness is present. There is no clarification of what it is that makes such a transcendence of ideology possible. Finding no textual evidence on this issue, Marx's reader may either reject what Marx has to say out of hand, or else he may accept what Marx has to say in an equally straightforward and naive fashion. However, it is possible to read what Marx has to say and to judge for oneself. This implies that the reader himself has transcended whatever assumptions of pregiveness he may have concerning the social world which Marx describes. What this
amounts to is a transcendence of the ideological mode of understanding which Marx ostensibly criticizes. The reader's own consciousing processes are, in this way, a functioning equivalent for the potential transcendence of the ideological presuppositions which is implied in Marx's method.

In this way, we are confronted with a question for Marx. But, as well, this question is a question for the reader of Marx. The final measure of whether or not Marx accomplishes what he sets out to do rests with the reader as he too is a potentially ideologized subject.

We must remember, however, that Marx does a negative critique, not only a negation, but a critique which says "not this" in its description of an ideological mode of understanding. But if "not this", then what? Marx leaves this up to the person who reads his works, which is both a blessing and a curse, for it assumes that the right decision will be made by the reader. Marx, however, never indicates what such a transcendental move beyond the realm of presuppositions would entail. It is this lack of any clear statement of what this would entail which puts Marx's whole enterprise in question. Without such a statement, Marx can be made to mean virtually anything that one wants him to mean, and in no small part, this may account for why so many commentaries have been written on his works.
But there is a point at which the interpretation (4) of Marx's work must decide what it was that Marx intended to do. Clearly, Marx was politically motivated. He may have had some deep-seated urge to kill his father in a sublimated fashion. Perhaps he had a miserable sex life and wanted to take this out on the bourgeoisie by means of his acid wit. Such speculation can go on ad infinitum without ever resolving the question. What we are interested in here is not some sort of psychological rationalization for what Marx did. Rather, we are interested in what may be seen as the intention behind the work which Marx realized. As Lukacs puts it in the "Preface" to the original edition of History and Class Consciousness:

The goal of these arguments is an interpretation, an exposition of Marx's theory as Marx understood it. (5)

And again in "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" in the same collections of essays:

Our intention here is to base ourselves on Marx's economic analyses and to proceed from there to a discussion of the problems growing out of the fetish character of commodities, both as an objective form and also as a subjective stance corresponding to it. (6)
What follows in this thesis is an attempt to move within what we understand as the spirit of Marx's method. The intention which we assume that Marx had as the moving force behind the writing of his works is the liberation of man from the alienation of the world of appearance.

This thesis, then, is in sympathy with Lukacs's project in *History and Class Consciousness*. Although we do not wish to dwell on this for long, we can learn something from Lukacs's attempt. We are aided in this respect by Lukacs's own self-critique of the collection of essays which was published as a new "Preface" to the 1967 edition of this work. In this self-critique, Lukacs says that he failed to distinguish between those objectifications which were alienations and those which were not. In other words, he encountered the same problem, structurally speaking, which we did at the beginning of this introduction. The solution to the problem of alienation which Lukacs proposed in the original edition of *History and Class Consciousness* was the identification of the potential for the proletariat to become the "identical subject-object". Briefly stated, the proletariat was conceived of by Lukacs as that element of society which was totally negated in the relations of production. However, the proletariat was conceived of as human while at the same time it was totally negated in
in relation to its humanity. As the living embodiment of the contradiction of capitalist society in which people negate themselves in their objects (viz., alienate themselves), the proletariat had the unique role in the history of man to realise this contradiction within itself. While the bourgeoisie could, by means of the mode of production which it controlled, objectify the proletariat by forcing it to act out the part of a mere element of the machinery of production, the proletariat had no recourse to such an abrogation of responsibility. When the proletariat became conscious of the negation of the humanity which it had come to represent, this would mark the beginning of an awareness of what it meant to be truly human. The role of the proletariat would be to liberate mankind from its illusions. This would be possible because of the proletariat's previous historical role in the mode of production. Because the proletariat had been both the object of the bourgeoisie's reification and, simultaneously, an actual subjectivity, the dawning of the awareness of the proletariat would bring with it the knowledge of the system from the inside out, so to speak, and thus, the capitalistic system would hold no secrets for this class. Since the world of fetishized appearance would hold no secrets for the
proletariat and it would therefore be in the position to liberate mankind from its alienated state.

But as Lukacs says, such a solution to the problem of alienation failed to make the necessary distinction between alienation and objectification. With the transcendence of all alienation in the proletariat's becoming the identical subject-object, the object which had been alienated from man would be returned to him. However:

...when the identical subject-object transcends alienation it must also transcend objectification at the same time. But as, according to Hegel, the object, the thing exists only as an alienation from self-consciousness, to take it back into the subject would mean the end of objective reality and thus of any reality at all. (7)

What such a solution to the problem of alienation represents, to use Lukacs's own words, was an attempt to

...out-Hegel Hegel, ((and as such)) it is an edifice boldly erected above every possible reality and thus attempts to objectively surpass the Master himself. (8)

By not accounting for objectification in its non-alienating form, Lukacs must stop the dialectic in order to stop the alienation of capitalist society. The dialectic does not stop on a theoretical requirement, however, for the dialectic is not a "system" into which elements can be
jammed as into so many pigeon holes. The dialectic is experiential process, and if all objectification came to a halt, then there would be no objects to experience if what Lukacs proposes were true. Lukacs's solution therefore fails to give us a satisfactory answer as he himself points out.

However, Lukacs raises rather than solves the question of how a flow of experience is possible without alienating something. This remains unanswered. The question of what a reality free of alienation would be like is the central question in any attempt to describe the world which Marx ostensibly hoped for after the long-sought revolution of mankind. Since a reality in which there is no experience is unimaginable, some solution to this problem must be provided. If it is not, and this can only be provided by a description of objectifications which are not hypostatizations, then Marx's whole enterprise is for nought. Moreover, as part and parcel of this, we are faced with the problem of what kind of object can be posited without its status as an object acting as an inherent alienation to the subject.

We alluded above to the actuality that in reading Marx the subject himself must put aside any political considerations if he is to gain access to an awareness of
what a world free of pregivens would be like. Such an awareness would theoretically free the subject from any sort of ideological illusions about himself in relation to a reality which, prior to such a move, would present itself as a fait accompli. In this way, the consciousing processes of the subject who decided to make this move could act as a field of enquiry itself. Such an investigation would be necessary in order to theoretically describe such a move beyond the world of fetishization.

This is where our appeal to Husserl takes place, for Husserl's phenomenology is an attempt to employ the subject's own experiences as a field of enquiry. There is a clear distinction between Marx and Husserl in relation to their areas of interest: Husserl never concerned himself directly with questions of a particular social reality, nor did he restrict his investigations to questions which concerned themselves exclusively with material objects in the way that Marx did. However, it can be argued that unless we are willing to allow for some kind of metaphysical agency, such as Hegel's Geist or Rousseau's "General Will", material objects must act as the mediating factor between subjects who find themselves in material bodies and in the material world. With this stated, what we must attempt to do is to understand how these material objects themselves can
be understood without granting them some sort of ontological, metaphysical status as is the case with Feuerbach's sensualism. (9)

According to Husserl, objects exist as objects with meaning. The subject himself produces these. The irreal object which the subject produces has a meaning and may have a direct correlate in the form of an empirical object or fact. However, this material object cannot be seen as producing its own meaning. Husserl thus treats all objects as equal inasmuch as any object has meaning, and this meaning is produced by the subject. Two points arise here. First, Husserl is not a naive subjectivist. The meaning which I constitute of a material object, for instance, does not make it anything other than what it is. I may constitute (i.e., determine the meaning of an object as meaning whatever I posit it as meaning) a material object as an illusion. The reality of the situation for the judging subject is determined by the subject as a constituting agent. The object which the subject deals with in such a constitutive act is "his" object, inasmuch as the meaning which he constitutes the object of his perception to have is the meaning which he assigns to it. The object "is" for this subject, inasmuch as the subject has it as such. The subject may be wrong, but if what we are interested in is an object
which by its nature of being an object is not alienated from the subject, we now have one. In no way does this deny the factual existence of the material world. What it does is allow us to examine objectifications which are not alienations; it allows us to account for the ideal being of meanings. These meanings may have factual referents. However, these factual referents should not be used to account for the ideal being of the meaning which the subject has of them. In this way Husserl starts from a position from which we can observe the creation of objects with meaning, either as alienations or as objectifications free of a reified character. On the other hand, the existence of alienation can be presupposed, but then some sort of scheme must be devised in order to extricate us from a problem which is not actual but is rather illusory. Marx as wishing to transcend.

The presupposition of this illusion effectively posits it as a pregiven state of affairs and this draws together what we understand as the intent of Marx's method with that of Husserl, for the thrust of Husserl's "transcendental phenomenology" is the transcendence of all pregivens. To illustrate this point we will include a rather long quotations from his Experience and Judgment.
To speak more precisely, the retrogression to this transcendental subjectivity (the subject who has transcended all pregivens) constituting the pregiven world takes place in two stages: 1. In the retrogression from the pregiven world with all of its sedimentations of sense, with its science and scientific determination, to the original (the world of pure experience). 2. In the retrogressive inquiry which goes from the life-world to the subjective operations from which it itself arises. For the life-world indeed is nothing simply pregiven. It is also a structure which we can question regarding the modes of its constitution. Here, also, we already find logical operations of sense -- no logical, to be sure, in the sense of our traditional logic, which always has as a foundation the idealization of being-in-itself and being-determined-in-itself...but in the sense of an original logical operation which is primarily oriented to determination, i.e., on acts of cognition in the limited and relative horizons of experience in the life world. But the logical productions of sense are only a part of that which contributes to the structure of the world of our experience. Also belonging to this structure are practical and affective experiences, the experience of willing evaluating, and manual activity (my emphasis), which on its part creates its own horizon of familiarity involved in practical association, evaluation, etc. But belonging equally thereto are all the activities of sense experience, without which we could not arrive at the constitution of a world-time and a world-space, and of spatial things, co-subjects, and so on. If we follow this up to the lowest constitutive operations, which belong, first of all, to the constitution of a possible life-world, then what follows is the constitution of
objective time, of physicomathematical nature and its it-itself. The elucidation of the whole interpenetration of the operations of consciousness which leads to the constitution of a possible world (of a possible world: this means that it is a question of the essential form of the world in general and not of our factual real world) is the task of constitutive phenomenology. (10)

If the world which subjects share is the product of their material activity but this world is also a world of meaning, then the source of this meaning must as well be investigated so that meaning will not be accounted for by the "fact" of what is materially produced by these subjects. This means that imagination must be accounted for. It is clear that Marx draws a distinction between the concrete and the abstract, or what is another way of putting this, between the world of imagination and the world of social reality. This distinction, however, should not be seen as denying imagination, since the material world is itself the product of human labour, and as such, it is the end result of human imagination. What must be done in relation to any social reality if the appearance of this is to be transcended, is that society as it is objectively shared amongst subjects must not be thought of as the only possible social reality which subjects might share amongst themselves.
If Marx wishes to replace the society which he confronts, then a substitute for this old society must be conceivable as another possibility. We are not concerned in this essay with what this "new" society might look like in terms of its factual particulars. What we are interested in is establishing that it is possible to conceive of a society which is essentially different from the capitalistic one in which we now live.

Thus it is the abstract aspects of Marx's dialectic which demand to be drawn forward if Marx's method as the method by which illusion is to be transcended is to attain credibility. What we hope to accomplish by drawing this side of the dialectic forward is not a denial of Marx, but is rather an attempt to complete what we understand as the moving intention in his work. This intention finds its telos in the transcendence of alienation, not only as it can be evidenced in capitalist society, but as it can be evidenced in any conceivable situation whatsoever. This demands a move to the abstract, but a move which avails itself to an eventual "concretization" in the actual, lived experience of the subject; as a unity of the abstract and concrete facets of the subject's experience in any "now" of his becoming.
4. The structure of the thesis.

In order to do the above we must first make it clear that our interpretation of Marx's intention is not simply a fabrication. Since the method Marx employs attempts to raise the level of the subject's awareness, seeing it applied may give us the best access to what Marx's method is supposed to do. We have, as well, Marx's statement of method in the "Preface" to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. In this passage, Marx states that what conditions men's consciousnesses is the mode of production. But the "mode of production" is itself produced by men. It is not the same thing as the means of production which exists as a material fact. This too is produced by men, but Marx makes a distinction here which we want to hold to and to follow through. Since, according to Marx, (11) it is the mode of production which gives rise to the production of an ideological consciousness, the way in which men, as cognizant subjects, produce this mode of production will in itself be a production of sorts.

This is also a necessary distinction, because of the mechanistic interpretations which may be seen as moving out of Engels' deterministic "dialectical materialism" which tends to view the mode of production itself as a material and pregiven fact. (12)
To accomplish this, we shall trace the development of Marx's theory of the fetishism of commodities through the first chapter of *Capital*. However, we shall move from this text at this point to the working notes on *Capital*, the *Grundrisse* (13) because of Marx's eventual fetishization of labour which occurs in *Capital* (14). From this point, the production of capital in general as the mode of production will become the theme of our enquiry. We shall discover that the production of capital is performed by the subject, *qua* labouror, as a function of his consciousing processes; that is, in his lived-time. Capital, therefore, is no fact, although facts may be arranged in accord with the 'demands' which capital appears to impose upon those who function within a reality in which the pregiveness of capital is ideologically accepted as the actual. But at this point Marx leaves us at loose ends, for he does not explain how an act of production can take place without such a fetishistic positing of the meaning of a material commodity, or of capital, taking place.

It is at this point that we shall make the move to Husserl. In the text of the chapter on Marx, we will characterize labour as a judicative activity. The significance of this is two fold. First, it is, as Marx says, the quality of labour which is absorbed or occluded by
the appearance of capital as a pregiven state of affairs. Thus, it is the qualitative aspect of labour which the subject apparently reifies when he confronts capital as his negation in the production process. Secondly, the very real problem of developing a common categorial object between Husserl and Marx occurs at this point. In order to enable us to employ the concept of labour which is central to Marx's enquiry, we shall have to expand this concept to the level of any labour whatsoever. In its abstract, universal form as any labour whatsoever, labour presents itself as the activity of judging. This runs contrary to what, for an instance, Habermas claims as the region of Marx's concept of labour. (15) But such an expansion of this concept need not runs at odds to Marx's own particular application of it. As we saw in the above quotation from Experience and Judgment, material labour need not be eliminated in such a move. Neither would material labour lose any of its social import in expanding the category of labour in this way. In effect what happens if we do this, is that material labour becomes a subset of the universal category of any act of production imaginable. We believe that this is a necessary move if all pregivens are to be transcended, which strikes us as the ultimate intent of Marx's method, even if the political-programmatic aspects of Marx's particular aspects
which emerge from Marx's investigations of the particular problem of economics seem to contradict the possibility of performing such a transcendental move. However, if such a transcendental move is performed, then we can move into Husserl's investigations of judgments as judgments concerning anything whatsoever.

Before we get into this question in relation to what Husserl has to say about it in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (16) we shall have to make a digression.

Husserl's *Prolegomena to the Logical Investigations* (17) bears certain similarities on a paradigmatic level to Marx's critique of bourgeois theories of economics. Husserl points out that psychologism, (which is his characterization of the attempt by Hume and the sensuo-empiricists who follow in Hume's footsteps to ground logical principles in psychology), begs its own question by assuming that the facts of an experience can be used to justify the holding of logical laws. The facts, so it seems, are used as an explanation of the holding of logical principles. As Husserl points out, this puts logical principles in a position of contingency to the occurrence of particular sets of facts. By so doing, psychologism reduces logical principles to the level of probabilities. Such a
position is absurd because one of the logical principles involved here is truth. If truth is reduced to a mere probability, then the truth of this psychologistic contention must itself be no more than a probability. Hence, psychologism is absurd because it denies the holding of the principle of truth.

The relation which this holds to Marx is two-fold: First, as we have characterized it, sensuo-empirical objects which are accepted by psychologism as self-explanatory facts, have the same logical status as do the facts of commodities. Since commodities are understood within an ideologized mode of understanding as determinant of their own meaning, a similarity can be seen between the fetishism of commodities on one hand, and a fetishism of the facts of experience on the other. Secondly, what Husserl accomplishes in this critique of psychologism may be understood as a paradigmatic justification of the mutual exclusiveness of quality and quantity which Marx insists upon. Indeed, Marx claims that it is the "suspension" of the actuality of this essential difference which allows the production of capital to take place. (18) While Marx asserts this essential separation he does not demonstrate this anywhere. Husserl does. Because he does so in relation to logic, which is essential to understanding at no matter what
level, Husserl's analysis may be seen as holding in any particular instance whatsoever.

For Husserl, however, this justification of the Aristotelean "forms" is necessary but inadequate in itself. To see how Husserl extends this analysis we move with him into the investigation of judgments. This brings us back to the original line of argument. However, we return to this in the knowledge that Marx's admonition against any collapsing of the ideal and the real is logically justified as well as seeing that, on logical grounds, the collapsing of the ideal and the real is an essential moment to any act of reification.

In F.T.L., Husserl extends this analysis to the sciences. He claims that any judgment whatsoever, no matter what it concerns, deals of meanings. Meanings are abstract. As abstract they are irreal. Hence, what the scientist judges is not strictly speaking something concrete. However, Husserl is careful to point out that there is a difference between a technology and a science since science finds its telos in the clarification of the whether or not a judgment can be fulfilled as true or not. Since judgments are always made in relation to meanings produced by the subject himself, science advocates a move beyond the establishment of categories as ends in themselves; or, to
use Marx's expression, as fetishises. Technology does not acknowledge this and prefers to deal with categories as if they were really existent things, if not in theory, then at least in practice. This leads to a degeneration in scientific endeavour which is the theme of Husserl's Crisis (19), a book which has relevance to our present discussion, but which lies somewhat outside of it.

It is at this point that Husserl advocates his phenomenological reduction. Rather than attempt to move deeply into the actual workings of this phenomenological "move", we have chosen to briefly sketch the potential results of making such a transcendental shift beyond all pregivens to a level of awareness in which objects as they are perceived by subjects in their actual lived process may be apperceived essentially. Since in social life such objects of meaning will have really existent, or what Husserl calls transcendent as opposed to transcendental objects, as referents to any judgment made in the social sphere, we end up back in the social world of shared empirical objects. When "I", as a constituting subject, constitute the meaning of a perceived object I have this perceived object as that about which I constitute a meaning. This factually existent object cannot be held to be the source of this meaning constitution since I am the one who
in actuality constitutes my meaning of this object. In this constitutive activity, I produce a judgment which is given with this real object in my experience, but which is not this factual object as a being for itself. This much is clear because the qualitative and the quantitative are irreducible, one to the other. They are mutually implicative in any experience, but must be kept mutually exclusive in relation to any explanation. Nevertheless, in a social situation an empirical object will correspond to the meaning which I constitute this social object to have for myself. This empirical object can be shared in an empirical, and thus, social, way. Inasmuch as I have this factual object as meaning something, I can assume that the other has it as a meaning as well, because, amongst other things, we share language and material objects which sustain our lives such as food and shelter.

If we, as subjects, had no empirical objects to mediate between us, we could never communicate one to the other. For instance, I, as the writer of this sentence, constitute it to mean something. At this point in time, I am sharing it with someone else. If whoever is reading this thesis right now wishes to deny this, then, if I am to call him an ass, he should not be offended. While the meaning of these words cannot be accounted for by their factual
existence, they could not be shared without them. To demonstrate this,
and now we ask what I meant when I wrote the last line.

By means of empirical objects which are comprehended by subjects not as fetish objects, but as objects with meaning, we end up back in the social world in accord with what Husserl says in Experience and Judgment about the constitution of this as a phenomenon amongst others. But now, after at least indicating the potential for a clear explanation which a transcendental approach provides to us, we also have at our disposal, a new possibility for the "concretization" of Marx's dialectic as the concretization of this dialectic with the lived, intentional experience of the subject. This being the case social labour becomes judicative activity which has a material object of some kind as a correlate. In this way, we see a possibility for justifying Marx's statement in the Grundrisse that writing music is "damned hard work",(20) without having to contend with the objections of those who understand labour as something only productive of capital, which would seem to be the line which logically follows from Engels' bastardization of the dialectic.
Throughout this thesis, our intent is to radicalize Marx's method. What we do throughout is to apply Marx's method to his own theoretical constructs and deductive schemes. What happens to the programmatic elements of Marx's politics of class and interest the reader will find in the conclusions of this paper.
Chapter Two

The Production of the Mode of Production.

A. The Fetishization of commodities.

1. The mode of production as the factor which conditions men's consciousnesses and the methodological necessity to transcend this.

Georg Lukacs begins his essay on "Reification and Class Consciousness" (1) by saying that Marx's method, as it is put forward in the first chapter of Capital I, can be universalized. In other words, rather than this particular example of the application of Marx's method standing by itself as the ultimate culmination of Marx's work, it should be understood as a penultimate demonstration of the capacity of this method to get at the truth of given states of affairs. As we know from the "Postface" to the second edition of Capital in which Marx acknowledges his debt to Hegelian dialectical methodology, Marx also says that the method of enquiry and the method of description, while obviously interrelated, are different things. (2) What we have before us in Capital is the method of description but
what we need to draw forward from this description is the other aspect, the method of enquiry. This would be next to impossible unless we also had at our disposal Marx's own statement of method in the "Preface" to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. (3)

In this passage Marx claims that the social forms in which political issues are fought out are ideological reflections of the mode of production. The latter, claims Marx, is what actually conditions men's consciousnesses, but this conditioning process is not understood as such by those so conditioned. (4) But surely, the key to understanding the actual source of conditioning lies not only in the identification of the fact which conditions the prevailing social consciousness. The character of "capital" as the conditioning factor in capitalist society must be looked into in order to avoid the possibility of granting capital an objective status on its own account. If the latter were to be done, we would have effectively made capital into an abstract category devoid of content; its power to condition men's consciousness would have been granted a metaphysical status and what we would have on our hands would be a situation of alienation: The real power in society would be conceived of as being beyond man's grasp, just as an ontologically secured Geist would be.
There is plenty of textual evidence to demonstrate that Marx himself held the latter view. (5) However, what we are interested in in this essay is how man can be liberated from such a condition, which after all, would be the teleological end of any true revolutionary activity. Without this, there is no sense whatsoever to any of Marx's writings. We must also remember that Marx was writing for the proletariat, an element of society which he believed had been reduced to a cretinism through its role in the capitalist mode of production. (6) As he says in the "Preface" to the C.P.O., he feels that man is conditioned. Who could be more conditioned than the proletariat? And if, in fact, he is writing for those already conditioned by the appearance of the mode of production as something which stands as an irrefutable objectivity, as totally pregiven, how is he to raise the level of consciousness of this social group? If capital can be demonstrated as not being "pregiven" (7), then, hopefully this can be accomplished. This will be the light in which we will approach Marx's description of the generation of capital. However, we must remember that this will entail a penetration of the pregiven or objective character of capital as a fact. If this cannot be accomplished, then the facticity of capital as a conditioning force outside of man and hence, beyond man's
control, will not have been transcended. The alienation which Marx hopes to transcend through this exercise will remain intact.

The source of conditioning is capital. The source of capital will thus be the source of conditioning at what we might call a more primitive genetic level. (8) Capital, as a mode of production, must itself be produced in some way. It follows that the production of capital will also reveal the production of ideologized or conditioned consciousness.

Capital, however, is a particular mode of production. As Marx is careful to point out through his examination of the objective history of mankind, it is only one mode of production amongst others which have existed. (9) If we wish to broaden Marx's method so that it becomes universally applicable, we will therefore have to move to an abstract level of understanding since only an abstract concept is universally applicable. Clearly, the totalization process through which the abstract and the concrete are drawn together in a synthetic move, (10) can occur only when the abstract is concretized. However, the move to the abstract is a necessary one even though it must be remembered that it is not an end in itself; it is a place which demands visiting, even if one cannot live there in an authentic fashion.
2. Community as made possible by material realization.

We will start our enquiry into Marx's method by briefly citing what he has to say about his own starting point in the world of mediate facts. This world is the world in which subjects come together. It is the material basis for an intersubjective world. It would be clearly metaphysical to account for this intersubjective understanding by means of some kind of general will (12) and Marx insists that:

To be avoided above all is establishing "society" once again as an abstraction over against the individual. (13)

Marx accounts for community, or what is understood in this thesis as the general network of intersubjective understandings, by claiming that it is not an ontological Geist which acts a mediation between men who, but that it is men create their own mediations. (14) In realizing what one wishes to express in material form, in objectivating one's meaning, men factually create a world of material mediations which, at the same time, is a world of meaning. If, as it has been claimed, men understand each other through the mediations which they create, then an examination of these mediations or objective "expressions"
as the products of meaning understanding beings can lead to an understanding of how men, as knowing subjects, understand themselves as well as others. Thus:

It is apparent how the history of industry, industry as objectively existing, is the open book (viz. expression)) of man's essential powers, the observably present human psychology, which has not been thus far grasped in its connection with man's essential nature but only in an external utilitarian way ((sic. the subjective act of labour is occluded behind the appearance of the Objective)) because in the perspective of alienation ((sic. with the Objective accepted as pregiven)) only the general existence of man -- religion or history in its abstract-general character as politics, art, literature, etc. ((viz., grasped as self-determinantly meaningful))--was grasped as the actuality of man's essential powers and his human generic action. We have before us the objectified essential powers of man in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects in ordinary material industry ((Thus))...

A psychology for which the book, that is the most observably present and accessible part of history, remains closed cannot become an actual, substantial and real science. (15)

Marx asks us in the C.P.O. (16) to start from the particular product of capitalist production, the commodity. To refer to the commodity as a particular, however, is something of a ruse on Marx's part, because the commodity which Marx presents us with is not a fact, but is replete
with both its material or concrete aspects as well as its qualitative aspect as something which is judged to be useful by the subjects involved with it. Moreover, commodities are the end result of a human, productive process. So too, we might add, is capital. As we shall see, the commodity, as a material object, acts only as an index (17) to the production of capital. We shall return to the commodity as an index for our enquiry after we examine the relations of production out of which commodities arise.

3. Capital as apparently pregiven.

The productive process is not individual in the sense that one individual produces everything which he needs and all other individuals do similarly. Rather, as Marx points out, there is a collective effort amongst individuals which presupposes a division of labour. The development of the means and mode of production, (and the correlative development of the division of labour) is an objective historical and cumulative process. Its development spans many generations.

The individual comes into the world possessing neither capital nor land. Social distribution assigns him at birth ((because of his lack of capital and land)) to wage labour. (18)
If the wage-labour relation is simply accepted as 'the way things are', so to speak, and there is nothing which can be done about this, then these mediate circumstances, the 'facts of life' for the wage labourer, will appear as immutable; as objective restrictions to the labourer. However, the question now becomes one of how the apparent objectivity of these facts of life in capitalist society come to be 'objective'. How do they attain their apparently immutable status? Certainly the relations of the production of the worker's livelihood precede him in an objective historical way; he is born into a society which is pregiven inasmuch as he is confronted with historically embedded traditions. The worker must provide himself with a livelihood. Since he has no way of making a living except by hiring himself out by the hour, he either does this or he makes no money. In the latter case, he has no livelihood. Thus, along with those who find themselves in a similar situation, these workers

inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. (19)

Such a positing of the inevitability of this kind
of self-understanding by the labourer, as a knowing subject, is presupposed by Marx. In doing so, Marx presupposes the alienation of the labourer. This is in accord with his assumption of the cretonism of the labourer which is the result of his position within capitalist society. We must remember that at this point, the worker is unaware of the fallacy of the pregiveness of capital as an objectivity. In order to break free of this mistaken perception we must demonstrate at the outset that an unquestioned acceptance of the self-determining nature of capital as an immutable fact is mistaken.

4. The acceptance of the appearance of capital as pregiven leads to ideological explanation.

Although capital is not a machine, nor in itself anything material, it does have material effects. It is among other things, also an instrument of production: capital makes things possible within the material, and hence the social, world. To the person born into a society in which capital already plays the role of a facilitator in the productive process, it, too, may appear to be pregiven as a functioning element of that general, social relation. In relation to those who move within this apparently pregiven situation, capital may well appear as a
general, eternal relation of nature; (but this is if one were)) to leave out just the specific quality which alone, makes 'instrument of production' and stored up labour into capital. (20)

If one were to move within an attitude in which the pregiven, objective appearance of capital were to be accepted as actual, this would result in capital itself appearing as an alien power in relation to the labourer. Capital would have the status of being meaningful in itself and the meaning of the worker would be relative in relation to the fixity of the fact of capital. This apparent quality of capital to determine not only its own meaning, but also that of the labourer would be accepted by a labourer who accepts the appearance of the factual world as reality, as already there; as simply the way things are. Moreover, from a theoretical standpoint, this presupposition of the ontic quality of capital as a meaning for itself, and hence, as an objectively valid meaning, allows bourgeois theorists to treat this mediate phenomenon as a natural law upon which society is founded. (21) The presence of capital, accepted presuppositionally as an objective fact with a self-justifying meaning is felt in everyday life. (22) It has a behaviour which can be evidenced empirically in everyday life through fluctuations in the standard of living and
stock markets. This behaviour of objective facts forms the focus of study in what we know as economics. The social or intersubjective state of affairs with which one is confronted at this point is, however, a collective relationship amongst individuals. It is in this relationship that people sustain their lives.

The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation (infrastructure) on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general processes of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence which produces their consciousness. (23)

The capitalistic mode of production will therefore produce its own corresponding superstructural or ideological perceptions of reality grasped, in this case, in terms of its reified forms.

Thus, for Marx, ideas, conceptions and consciousness, as they are apparently understood, are reflections within the pre-given frame of reference. True, men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., but these are real, active men, as they are conditioned by the definite development of their productive forces and of the relationships
corresponding to these up to their highest forms. Consciousness can never be anything except conscious existence of men in their actual life process. If men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon is caused by their historical life-process. (24)

Existence, for Marx, is clearly prior to essence. The logic of this is straightforward: I cannot think if I am not alive. As one's life literally depends upon the means of production, the form which that means of production takes is easily identified as a normative good since it maintains one's existence. This good also appears to the subject (in this particular case, the labourer), as pregiven. Conflicts over what mode of production a society will adopt locate themselves in the superstructural world of men's objective expressions. Marx adds to this that people who are involved in these conflicts remain essentially unaware of the true cause of this conflict inasmuch as they understand the world around themselves ideologically, purely in relation to its pregiven objectivity — as appearance. We have yet to ascertain, however, just what this conditioning mode of production is. If it is not pregiven, how does it come into this position of acceptance as being so? If a subject confronts capital as historically pregiven, and his personal history is temporally preceded by capital's existence, then
simply accepting this as a fact of the times would be enough to justify capital's precedence. However, this does not account for the production of capital, it only accounts for the apparently objective pregiveness of capital. If we were to accept this account we would be involved in a begged questions since we would not have accounted for the initial historical production of capital.

5. The generation of capital "in general".

It can be argued that the production of capital at any one time must be identical at an abstract or universal level to the first objective historical moment when capital was produced. Capital in general may thus be seen to have a universal character which any particular capital also shares. (25)

Now, particular capitals, that is the capital realized in particular industries, interact on the money market. No distinction is made in the money market between capital realized in the steel industry or that realized in the manufacture of shirt buttons. We can see that this is the case in multi-national corporations: the capital realized in one industry can be reinvested in an enterprise which is in its particular aspects, totally different from
the enterprise in which it was originally generated. Similarly, capital realized in yesterday's production is as valid a form of capital as that realized today, or, ostensibly, tomorrow. Capital in general, while an abstraction, thus has an apparent existence (26) and its effects are felt in the economy. Structurally speaking, then, what can be said of one particular capital can be said of any other particular capital if this is raised to a level of abstraction. The meaning of capital remains constant throughout any particular moment of the productive process. This must hold, otherwise different capitals could not interact at a general level.

If it is possible to imagine the production of capital at a purely abstract level of discussion, then we will be able to ascertain how any capital at all can be generated. What is more, and this brings back to our original point of departure with concern to the apparent pregiveness of capital, the generation of capital, as what it is, would have to have been structurally identical in the first historical instance of its production as it is in any contemporary generation of capital. If this were not the case, we would not be producing capital, we would be producing something else. (27)
6. The bracketing of the pregiveness of capital as an objective, historical phenomenon. (28)

In effect, this makes the initial historical moment of the production of capital structurally equivalent to any other particular moment in which capital in general is produced. The argument that the labourer who comes into contemporary society is simply coping with the facts of life (29) in a capitalist world and so the acceptance of the pregiveness of capital is sensible thing for him to do, loses its objective historical weight in light of this. If what occurred in the original moment in which capital was generated was identical "in general", (that is, at the abstract level), to what is produced now, then the production of any particular capital in any moment, any "now" will be the same, theoretically speaking, as it was then. This is what allows particular capitals which are produced in different industries and at different times to interact in the economic reality of capitalism. Since capital produced yesterday can interact freely with capital produced today, and ostensibly, that which will be produced tomorrow, the responsibility for the generation of capital cannot be passed back historically as if the first objective historical moment in which capital was produced could be used to extricate the subject who produces capital "now" from any responsibility for what he is currently doing.
Consequently, any moment in which capital is generated can stand as a paradigm for the generation of capital. Since any moment in which capital is produced is structurally identical to any other, irrespective of its location in objective time, what we will be presented with in any moment, (that is, any "now"), in which capital is produced, can be seen to be identical to the first objective historical moment in which capital was produced. Thus, the insulation of capital behind the appearance that its initial generation, which we are now separated from in an objective historical or merely factual way, becomes absolutely neutralized; it has so significance. If capital at one time did not exist, then it at one time was not pregiven, either. What we will do if we create capital for the first time, at a theoretical level, is to create that appearance of pregiveness which appears to the ideologized labourer as if it has always been thus and so. This is essentially what Marx does in the first chapter of capital. As such, this explication can act as a paradigm of the generation of the apparent pregiveness of any phenomena.

7. The production of capital as a subjective performance.
Since what Marx is describing is the emergence of an appearance, it cannot be claimed that the sensuo-empirically existent objects to which Marx turns his attention in and of themselves demand that the labourer, understand them in the way in which the latter does. These objects, as material objects, have no will of their own and so cannot be seen to actively condition the subject who involves himself with them. Such a claim would be pure metaphysics. The emergence of this appearance must therefore be seen as something which may involve these factually existing sensuo-empirical facts, but which cannot be accounted for by these facts as beings "for themselves". To do so would attribute to inert material objects, the ability to dictate to subjects what they, the inert objects, mean. Marx points to the ludicrousness of such a conception of a world in which objects are active and subjects are passively conditioned by these apparently active objects. (30) The emergence of the meaning which I have of these objects therefore cannot be seen as being of these objects as objects "for themselves", since this would attribute to inert, sensuo-empirical objects, a geistige quality. Thus, what we are now looking at is a subjective process of the constitution of the meaning which the subject may assign to these objects, but which the objects themselves, as inert,
can never be seen to account for, as this would assign to inert, sensuo-empirical facts, the ability to determine their own meaning. (31)

8. Genetic. phenomenological description and psychological description in Marx. (32)

Marx describes this phenomenon from two different vantage points. One is a genetic phenomenological perspective which allows the description of the logical structures of this phenomenon; that is, the way in which the subject constitutes the sense of this phenomenon for himself. This is accomplished by tracing out the genetic development of how the meaning of an object, in this case, capital, emerges.

The second starting point is to describe the psychological effects which the subject undergoes as a result of having phenomenologically constituted the meaning of the capital in the way he has; and, one should add, in this subject's belief that his understanding of capital as pregiven actually makes it pregiven. Because the subject constitutes what capital means for him himself, this is a self-contradictory position to take. But, then again, Marx is describing a self-contradictory situation. The situation which arises as a result of naively accepting this
contradiction as sensible and what is more, in understanding oneself in relation to this absurdity, is what Marx describes as alienation. (33)

Both the structural, genetic, description of the generation of capital and the descriptive psychological description of the effects which such a naive attitude towards capital produces, have the same fetishised structure. In the former, the genesis of the fetish structure is described. In the latter, the results of the subject's belief in this fetishized appearance are dwelt upon by Marx.

i. The generation of money; the commodity seen as the basic unit of wealth in capitalistic society.

The generation of capital presupposes the money form. The money form is the symbolic expression of the fetishization of commodities. (34) Thus, the Capital begins with a discussion of the commodity as a straightforwardly accepted thing. Commodities, says Marx, have two basic characteristics: they may be understood as what they are, that is as use-values which, such as food, which satisfies the subject's hunger, or art, for instance, which satisfies the subject's aesthetic sense.
The commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs, wherever they arise, for example, from the stomach, or the imagination makes no difference. Nor does it matter here whether directly as a means of subsistence, i.e., an object of consumption, or indirectly as a means of production. (35)

But a commodity may also be understood as having its value in what it is not; that is, as something to be exchanged for a commodity with a different use-value. When these objects are understood as exchange-values relative to other commodities rather than as use-values in themselves, not only the characteristics of the object as a use-value are obscured, but also the particular form of human labour which has altered this object is obscured as well. For instance, when a bolt of linen is transformed into a coat, (36) the subject's labour through which this transformative process is realized is put out of sight, or occluded, if the commodity becomes an object of value as what it is not; that is, when the commodity comes to be understood not as a use-value, but as an exchange value.

ii. the commodity enters the exchange relation as the apparent measure of its own worth; the consequent occlusion of the quality of labour.

The quality of the transformative labour which
remains with this commodity as a different use-value is, as an exchange-value, expressed only abstractly as a quantity of human labour involved in the alteration of this commodity's use-value. The difference between a bolt of linen and a coat, viewed as a use-value, is the quality of the tailoring (37) which is invested in the garment by the tailor. The difference between a bolt of linen and a coat, viewed as an exchange-value, (that is, as its capability of transforming itself through exchange into something which it is not), is the quantity of objective or abstract labour-time required to effect this transformation from one use-value to another. Or put more simply, the former relates to craftsmanship, the latter to man-hours, understood as an analytic category devoid of subjective content.

The meaning of exchange-value is subjectively constituted, however:

...when Galiani said: "value is a relation between persons..." he ought to have added: a relation concealed beneath a material ((viz., occlusive)) shell. (38)

iii. Commodities confront each other in exchange as apparently self-determinant of their own value.

Moreover, this exchange relation is a relative
phenomenon in its measure, in that the quantative measure of commodity "A" is calculated relative to that of commodity "B", the latter being the commodity which the former 'becomes' in its exchange for the latter. That is, a commodity's market value, as the buyer's cost, is relative to what he, the buyer, offers in exchange for it, (sic., the buyer's own exchange commodity.) In the process of exchange the exchange-value, as a subjectively constituted relation which may be intersubjectively agreed upon, justifies the cost (viz. exchange-value) of commodity A relative to commodity B. The latter is relative to the former, as an exchange-value, and from the other side of the relation, that is of the other subject involved in the exchange, this relationship holds in reverse. (39). At this point, we are engaged in a simple barter process.

The cost to the producer of the product, however (and he need not necessarily be the merchant), is dependent upon the quantity of labour-time invested in the production of the commodity. The value of this magnitude of this labour time, is itself relative to the amount of labour time which another producer invests in his product, but this now appears to be a quality of the products exchanged, not of the labourer who enacts these transformations.
The simplest value-relation is evidently that of one commodity to another commodity of a different kind ((i.e., a different use-value. )) (40)

If this simple relation of exchange is approached from the position of one "pole" of the exchange relation of the other, either commodity can take the role of the equivalent to the role of the other pole of the exchange relation. The latter would play the part of the relative pole.

Whether a commodity is in the relative form or in its opposite, the equivalent form, entirely depends on its actual position in the expression of value. That is, it depends in whether it is the commodity whose value is being expressed, or the commodity in which value is being expressed. (41)

This relation might be otherwise expressed by saying that these two objects representing "congealed quantities of human labour", (42) but as the commodities themselves confront one another in the moment of exchange, it appears that in the value relation of one commodity to another the first commodity's value character emerges here through its own relation to the second commodity. (43)

iv. Digression: Within this thesis labour is understood as qualitative inasmuch as the distinction between one use-value and another is a judicative activity which involves a judging of use-values, where the latter are understood as themselves qualitative.
The assumption of the fact of this appearance is not aided by the actuality that, for Marx, human labour creates value, but is not value itself. (44) Labour creates the value of objects as commodities but this labour only appears in these commodities abstractly when they are understood as exchange-values. Marx will continue to describe the emergence of the factual characteristics of the commodity as an exchange-value. However, the presupposition which underpins this examination is the presupposition of the qualitative character of labour. True, in the labour process a material object is realized, but this is the material realization of an idea. (45) As well, if these material objects are the realization of ideas, then it is the labourer's (sic. subject's) meaning as an idea which is expressed in the labour process. In relation to the example of the transformation of the linen into a coat, the labourer must first distinguish the linen as a material object capable of expressing his "idea" in material form as the coat. In all of this, the objective facts of neither the linen nor of any other material use-value account for how it is that the subject, as a labourer in this case, can discern that these use-values are capable of being the material vehicle for his expression. It is the labourer who
inevitably makes this decision. The labourer must judge for himself since the facts do not undertake any activity for themselves in determining their own use-value.

It may be argued that production is mimetic; this, however, is a condition of mass production. The situation which we are treating at this juncture is a "first instance". If, in our present particular example of the linen and the coat, no coats existed before, then this cannot be a mimetic moment since there is simply nothing to mime or copy in this case. More will be said in relation to this, below. However, we can say at this point, that what disappears in the occlusion of the use-value by the exchange-value is not merely the utility of the objects concerned. As products of labour what is occluded is the human judgement involved in what, at base, is a creative act.

It is through this occlusive misperception that the exchange value of commodities appears to find its source in the act of exchange itself rather than in the act of creation or, as we have put it, in the act of the material realization of the subject's idea. The resulting collapsing of quality and quantity and the acceptance of this as a valid premise from which to deductively move is a necessary precondition for the production of capital. If this premise
is allowed to stand as valid, the precedent for the collapsing of the qualitative and quantitative will have been established and capital, which is an idea, will be seen as transubstantiable.

v. The emergence of the money form as the abstract expression of all possible exchange values.

Up to this point Marx has described what he calls the simple form of value. His analysis up to this point has not entailed any phenomena which could not be witnessed in a simple act of barter. However, the elucidation of this barter situation outlines the genetic structure involved in a fetishized understanding of the exchange of one commodity for another. In its expanded form, the exchange relation (through which it appears that exchange-value becomes a material fact which has an independence of meaning in relation to the subjects involved in it), is examined in regard to the exchange of a multitude of possible commodities. In this expanded relation, the function of the relative pole of the exchange process becomes the pole to which all exchange values become equivalent. The selection of a particular commodity as the relative pole is ad hoc. In this relation each commodity...figures in the expression of value of the linen (Marx's example of the relative pole of the relation) as an equivalent, hence, as a physical object possessing value. (46)
It is a small step from here to the establishment of the general form of value in which one particular commodity is chosen as a constant against which the equivalent value of all other commodities as values comes to be assessed. It is in this general form that commodities first play their role as objective meanings which relate to one another on the basis of their value as facts with a being for themselves rather than in relation to the value assigned to them by the subjects involved. In this moment, they all come to be measured, one commodity against another, as equivalent to one fixed standard, to which each of them is, in its own turn, equivalent. The commodity which acts as the constant in this relation, that is, the commodity to which the expressed value of all other commodities is relative, is still a commodity itself and therefore cannot measure its own worth. This means that if linen, for instance, is the socially accepted means of fixing the measure of exchange value, then linen cannot be used to express its own value.

Money thus comes into being through the social custom of designating one commodity, in the case of most cultures, gold, as the universal measure of all other commodities. (47) And, as Marx points out, there is a special difficulty in understanding money as a social (}
which is to say, abstract) (48) relation. The difficulty which Marx is speaking about arises because the money relation, which is actually an intersubjective phenomenon appears to be an interobjective relation which takes place between the objects (or money as the abstract expression of these) which subjects own. While it is true that money has a material presence gold and silver in the strictly objective character, are not money. In societies in which gold and silver were present in great amounts, such as Aztec Mexico or Incan Peru, gold and silver were not used as money (49).

Money, however, is not simply exchange-value since money is seen to have an objective existence:

...it is not only an ideal notion, but is actually presented to the mind in an objective ((sic., factual)) mode. A measure can be held in the hand...(50)

Money thus has two meanings: first, it is ideal in that it is the abstract expression of any commodity which is understood as an exchange-value, and as such it exists only in an ideal state; (51) on the other hand, it is re-presented in a material form, and hence appears as an objective, material thing. So while

exchange value is = to the relative labour time materialized in products, money for its part, is = to the exchange value of commodities, separated from their substance. (52)
Within a society in which the exchange relation, that is, the values realized in this relation, become what is valued by the individuals in that society rather than the use-values of commodities, the simple (and potentially innocent), function of money as a mediation between commodities ceases.

10. The alienation of labour as a logically necessary moment in the money relation; alienation of labour as the psychological parallel to fetishization.

While it is clear, in Marx's view, that a fetishism of commodities situation emerges as a matter of course from an exchange relation, money might function as a simple mediation which, if properly understood, could act in its abstract role in a money-commodity exchange quite harmlessly. This relation can be expressed as $M-C$ where "$M$"=money, and "$C$"=commodity. The subject, as a consumer, has money which he or she exchanges for a use-value. The subject's intention in this act would be the acquisition of a commodity for the satisfaction of some need or other of this subject. However, in its material form, money appears to be brought into real existence. $M-C$ relationship is examined, then we find that money loses its apparently innocent function because this relation presupposes that the
imaginative ideas may be realized through material productive process in a material form, but these factual commodities which are realized in such a productive process are not themselves judgments; they re-present or express in material form, the judgments which the labouring subject himself makes.

11. The occlusion of the qualitative (viz., judicative) ability of the labourer in the wage labour relation.

The wage-labour exchange takes place between the capitalist, (or, in a more contemporary setting, the corporation which is only the abstract legal form which represents the interests of the ideal capitalist), and the labourer. Within this relation it is presupposed that the labourer's ability to make judgments is quantifiable as an exchange-value as is any other commodity. Thus the commodification of labour as human labour is a self-contradiction.

In order to enter into an M-C relation, the labourer must enter into a social relation of production which is premised upon a self-contradiction. If the collapsing of the qualitative and the quantitative is allowed as possible at this level then the validity of the wage-labour relation will also appear to be the actual case.
Its pregiveness will have been tacitly accepted as valid. The acquiescence to the apparent pregiveness of the money relation _qua_ wage labour must be allowed if the wage labour relation is to be workable. Since this relation is founded on a fallacy, what follows upon it will, consequently also be a fallacy.

12. The pre-eminence of mediate (viz. factual) evidence in capitalistic society allows the capitalist to claim the complicity of the worker by merit of the worker's production of commodities as facts; the proof of the contention that quality can be transubstantiated into quantity.

What is more, the reproduction of this fallacy as what is socially viewed as true, need not involve the labourer as an agent who is aware of the actual or true conditions which are involved in the generation of the reification of his ability to make qualitative distinctions. That is, the labourer need not be conscious of what is in actuality occurring, since by his very participation in this wage labour relation, he is an accomplice to the affirmation of the apparent validity of this relation. Since his ability to make judgements has already been occlusively assumed in the emergence of the money form as valid, his capacity to make judgements will be presupposed at an occluded level throughout the whole process. This means that if only the empirical aspects of this productive process are examined
in order to theoretically explain the productive process, then the actual meaning of process will be occluded by the presupposition of the apparent self-explanatory nature of the objects; that is, the commodities and their abstract expression in the money form which are also involved in this process. Since the labourer's ability to make judgements is not in and of itself a fact, the actual meaning of labour is never even considered by bourgeois economics, enamoured as it is by "facts". As well, since the qualitative aspect of the labour process is invisible to such an attitude, the worker can be presupposed as a functioning part of the total machinery (and when this is viewed from both the "soft-ware" and "hard-ware" aspects of modern production, this could be referred to as the productive "system"), of the productive process. He need not make his ability to make judgments evident in his presence in the work place. As long as he does his job in the total process of mimetically duplicating objects, he will have satisfied the requirements of the wage labour relation. In this way, the corporation need not have the conscious co-operation of the labourer in order to implicate him in the contradiction which it perpetuates, since it buys his soul (his ability to make judgements) behind his back (56), so to speak, and uses the factual objects which the labourer produces as factual evidence to prove the labourer's assent to the process.
Of course, the labourer does not go unrewarded for his complicity in this act of production. He is paid a wage. This wage, as a sum of money, appears to have a factual validity of its own. However the validity of money is only an appearance and one which is derived initially from the negation of the labourer's ability to make judgements, either in the material, productive process itself, in which the labourer realizes material objects, or in the process of the generation of the money form. Thus, when the labourer exchanges his money for the commodities which he consumes in the course of his daily life, (an exercise through which, in the context of bourgeois society, the subject realizes himself), he is actually buying back his sense of self which was previously alienated by him in his acceptance of the role he was to play in the larger social money relation. In this way the labourer negates his own ability to make qualitative judgments in his participation on the wage-labour, money relation. This occurs in both his production of commodities and in his purchasing of them, since his participation in the money relation at any moment of this will appear as his validation of this relation.

13. The constitution of the capitalist social reality is not 'fixed' in an objective historical fashion, but is re-constituted in every phenomenological "now".
The social money relation, as an actually abstract intersubjective understanding, has no real existence. As in the case of money, however, this abstract meaning is symbolized in material form; for example, in the actual bank buildings and in the written legal records of debts paid and in laws, etcetera. These material objects, as facts, have no will of their own, and hence, can impose no meaning upon the subjects involved in social interaction. It follows, that as an ideal meaning, as an idea, this social reality must be recreated by the subjects involved in this social-abstract relation every day.

However, we might point out here that the money relation as the basis of capitalistic society, is not something which, once accepted as pregivenly valid, needs to remain as an unexplored premise. As an abstract phenomenon, the value of money actually is present only in the subject's imagination. True, this abstract idea may find expression in some way, but this quantitative expression is not the quality which it expresses. Because the validity of capital, like that of money, is derivative from a judgment performed by a subject, the validity of both capital and money, as they appear to be, must be the result of a decision made by those involved in the relations of production. To use
Husserl's expression, this apparent validity must be reconstituted by subjects as cognizing, but not necessarily fully conscious beings, from one moment to the next. As Marx says every new day the social world, (based as it is on the mode of production which cognizing subjects themselves constitute as a meaningful and valid phenomenon), is once again made manifest as what reality is through their participation in the social world of capital. (57)

16. The psychological description of alienation an its corresponding phenomenological correlates as hypostatizations: the fetishism of commodities.

The situation which Marx has posited and the one which we have been following, is that of a subject whose understanding of the actual remains at an apparent or ideological level of awareness: an awareness, (or more correctly, a lack of this) in which the subject who accepts the money relation in its fetishized form as objectively valid. In so doing, the subject reifies his own ability to make judgments. In this condition, the subject's understanding of himself presents itself as it does in religion, where

the spontaneity of human imagination, the spontaneity of the human brain and heart, acts independently of the individual as an alien, divine, or devilish activity. Similarly, the activity of the worker is
not his activity. It is perceived as belonging to another. It is the loss of his own self. (58)

The presuppositions which allow the above absurdity to hold together as a deductively coherent whole, are "numerically" (59) identical to the ones described in the development of the money form; that is, a reified understanding on the part of the subject of his own ability for judicative activity. What is different in the two descriptions is that in Marx's description of the money form, he describes the genesis of the delusion. In his description of alienation, he describes the results of the subject's believing that this delusion is actual. In the latter case Marx is describing what it feels like (77) to live an alienated life:

The results (of granting the pregiveness of a world of appearance as true)...is that man...feels that he is acting freely only in his animal functions -- eating, drinking, and procreating, or at the most in his shelter and finery -- while in his human (judicative) functions he feels only like an animal. The animalistic becomes the human and the human the animalistic. (60)

The irony of this reified grasp of one's own meaning, is that this lived fallacy would not only be a contradiction if I were to live it in such a fashion. It would equally be a
fallacy for anyone else to live it as well. This is so even if such a contradiction is not consciously understood as such by the subject. The subject might well feel the results of accepting a contradiction as valid even if he does not understand its source.

However, if the resolution of this contradiction which gives rise to uneasy or unhappy feelings, is sought by expressing oneself monetarily, then the whole cycle of alienation will be reinstigated since the alleviation which the subject seeks in the spending of his money to make him feel like a "somebody" will work only in as much as the subject believes that the commodities which he purchases have an ideal status which he can obtain purely through "owning" them. Thus, the artistic imbecile (61) purchases art at Sotheby's which, in its own right, may have been brilliantly executed by the artist, but which the new owner has no hope of ever understanding. Nevertheless, the physical ownership of this commodity gives rise to the appearance that its owner now possesses the quality of this work. Hence, he can impress himself (or his associates) with his newly purchased 'understanding' of art. Thus, individuals with greater purchasing power appear to have a greater ability to judge the quality of art. They are, within the capitalistic context, "better people".
With the money form presupposed in its fetishized form, that is in the subject's understanding of himself grounded in the acceptance of himself as a commodity and as someone who believes himself to be as understood in terms of others by the commodities which he "owns", the subject interacts with other subjects as commodities.

The mysterious character of the commodity-form ((its metaphysical property)) consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things...as a social relation between objects which exists apart from and outside the producers. (81)

It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. (62)

15. Bourgeois society as a cash nexus.

The social bond between individuals in this fetishized "reality" becomes money not as "measure" but as a social mediation: (63) intersubjective understandings are reduced to a a cash nexus. Thus, as Marx would say, the "individual carries his social power, as well as his bond with society in his pocket." (64) People "place in a thing ((money)) the faith that they do not place in each other." (65)
Indeed, in so far as the commodity or labour is conceived of only as exchange value, and the relation in which the various commodities are brought into connection with one another as the exchange of these exchange values with one another, as their equation, then the individuals, the subjects between whom this process goes on, are simply and only conceived of as exchangers. (66)

In this way, the subject's life is neatly dichotomized between the public world of exchange in which he can participate only if he is willing to alienate himself; and the private world, in which he can do whatever he wants, but which is effectively pointless because this is the world of the solus ipsa. There is an irony here because what is actually the social is lived at a fetishized level through the apparently ontologically secure and meaningful lives of exchange values and the actual social world is lived as if it were fantasy. The world of the purely fantastic (i.e., the world of self-determining objects), appears to be the actual and vice-versa.

The illusion, however, continues. The freedom of the individual who functions within this apparent reality is, as well, lived vicariously by the subject through his reification of himself as it is expressed in his money. However, according to Marx:
...it is merely insipid to conceive of this merely objective bond as a spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseperable from their nature. (67)

The bond is the product of men themselves, but, within the world of appearance, men conceive of themselves as the product of their own product. Thus:

In the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this semblence seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence, of distinctions of blood, education, etc. are in fact exploded, ripped up (at least, personal ties all appear as personal relations); and individuals seem independent (this is an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly called indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom. (68)

16. Description of the world of appearance as if it were actual leads to an ontologization of ideas.

If the world of appearance which gains its sense from fetish objects is presupposed as the actual world which the subject experiences then a theory which describes such a world will not penetrate below the surface of this reality. Such a theoretical description can only be a "reflection" of what is essentially a begged question since the validity of the premises upon which such an ideological reality is built
are assumed to be valid. In examining the really existing facts which correspond to a social relation, the meaning of these facts is presupposed. In effect, no distinction is drawn between these really existing facts and what they are interpreted to mean. Since an act of interpretation must be undertaken by a subject, but the facts appear to be self-explanatory, the actual source of the meaning of these facts is occluded. This sort of begged question can operate in reverse if the meaning of these facts is accepted as really existing. The latter understanding of social relations is idealistic; the former is materialistic. In both cases, however, the real and the irreal are collapsed. In the former instance, the real appears to function in place of the irreal; in the latter, the irreal is seen as accounting for the existence of the real. In both cases, ideas appear to be factually existent.

This mistake is compounded because any theoretical explanation of social relations must appeal to the use of abstract, theoretical concepts. As Marx points out, the theoretical explanation of social relations can be expressed, of course, only in ideas, and thus philosophers have deemed the reign of ideas to be the peculiarity of the new age...(71)
These "ideas", either as irreal beings, or as self-determinant facts, take on an apparent ontic status. They appear to become the 'is' as opposed to the 'ought'. In effect, they are both the is and the ought. What differentiates the is from the ought is not something essential, but is rather only a matter of focus. (72) Again, in relation to money:

It is not at all apparent on its face that its character of being money is merely the result of social process; it is money. ((my emphasis)) (73)

17. The apparently objective restrictions placed upon subjects within such a fetishized social reality are derived from the presupposition of the "is" of reality; abstract reality as ontologically pregiven.

The "is" which is not actually existent is interpreted as such. Because of this, it takes on the appearance of determining the limits of reality. For the subject who functions within the presupposition of the validity of this "is", all other possible ways of understanding social reality appear to be mere imaginings. This is ironic, since this is precisely what his understanding of social reality is but he simply will not admit this. But in transcending such a belief-fixated grasp
of reality the individual would accomplish a move beyond the presupposition of the "is" as pregiven. He would transcend the illusion that what he knows as reality is anything but a possible interpretation of what he is confronted with in his day to day living. However:

This ((transcendence of the pregiven character of the is)) is all the more difficult since ((money's)) immediate use-value stands in no relation to its ((social)) role, and because, in general, the memory of its use-value as distinct from exchange-value, has become entirely extinguished in this incarnation ((ontological positing)) of pure exchange value. (74)

The restrictions which an individual actually imposes on someone else by sustaining the cash nexus reality as valid appears to be constituted world, as "an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves." (75) The free movement and exchange of money thereby takes on the appearance of the freedom of the individuals in that society. Correspondingly, the more money a person has, the freer he is.

B. The procreation of new money by old money: capital.

1. Brief review of presuppositions in relation to money as a "static" form.
The emergence of money as a social mediation presupposes the alienation of the individual labourer. The phenomenological structure of the fetishized commodity, as well as that of alienation, are essentially the same and both are internally contradictory in the same way. The end result is the corresponding metaphysical delusion that objects maintain a meaningful existence for themselves. These objects take on lives of their own, which in actuality are reflections of the lives of those who believe in them as such. In maintaining the validity of such a self-contradictory state of affairs is a perceptual transubstantiation of the ideal into a material form. And, however fallacious such a way of understanding reality is, it nevertheless forms the deductive and analytic frame of reference within which decisions are made. The acceptance of the transubstantiability of capital effectively sets up an analytic norm by means of which the deductive continuity and consistency of judgments made within this presuppositional frame of reference can be determined. What follows is Marx's description of what occurs within, and appears to make sense within, these parameters when they are accepted as pregivenly valid.

2. Money enters the exchange relation as a commodity of a unique sort.
The money relation is one of C-M:M-C, in which the social relationship appears to be mediated by money and in which the subject understands himself as a commodifiable thing. Circulation, however, may be looked at not only as a set of alternating linear interactions, but as a true circularity. Thus:

\[
\begin{align*}
C & \quad / \\
/ & \quad M \\
M & \quad / \\
/ & \quad C
\end{align*}
\]

can be expressed as C-M:M-C, or as M-C:C-M.

In the former case money ((is)) only a means to obtain the commodity, and the commodity ((is)) the aim; in the second case the commodity ((is)) only a means to obtain money, and money ((is)) the aim. (77)

Inasmuch as the relationship is circular and it is an arbitrary decision as to which of these linear relationships to examine, it makes no difference which one is selected to illustrate this point.

However, a specific distinction does enter between a commodity in circulation and money in circulation. The commodity is thrown out of circulation at a certain
point and fulfils its definitive function only when it is definitively withdrawn from circulation, consumed, whether in the act of production or in consumption proper. The function of money, by contrast, is to remain in circulation as its vehicle, to resume its circular course always anew like a perpetuum mobile. (78)

3. Profit, or merchant's capital, is realized at the interstices of economic systems. Capital is the realization of reified "surplus-value" within the self-identical economic system.

In the first relation, C-M:M-C, money serves as a medium of exchange. As such, it is a symbolic place holder for commodities. If the exchange relation were to remain as C-M:M-C, then it would remain a self-enclosed one. Any increase in the number of commodities sold would necessarily presuppose that they would be bought with money. However, the money would have had to be acquired by the purchaser from a previous exchange. This previous exchange would also have been of the type C-M:M-C, and so the volume of money, viewed strictly within the deductive frame of reference which C-M:M-C allows us, could not increase since it would be a self-enclosed process. This is the classic situation of "merchant's capital", (79) which Marx is careful to point out, is not the same as industrial capital.

The profit which the merchant realizes is quite simply the difference between the cost of what he sells and
what he buys. Thus the adage: buy low, sell high. However, this only works if one transacts business on both sides of the relation; only if one acts as a 'middle-man' oneself. If, however, one is seen as a part of the total community, and the wealth of that community is expressed in monetary terms, the gain of one is also his loss since the loss of the other, as a co-member of the first actor's community, will also designate a loss for the first member. In this way we can see the absurdity of the enterprise of Milo Minderbinder, the archetypal entrepreneur in Joseph Heller's novel, *Catch-22*, (81) who claims that he can buy eggs at five cents apiece, sell them for three cents apiece and still make a profit because, according to Milo, everyone he does business with is a member of the same syndicate. If Milo were not a member of this syndicate, then he could either make a profit or realise a loss, but only because his transactions would cross community boundaries. But even here, the money which he would realise as a profit would have to have been produced by someone else in the first place which brings us back to our original problem of where the money could come from. Commodities are removed from the circulation process in their consumption; money, however, is not consumed. In this case, if Milo had started the exchange process with money instead of eggs, he would still have not
produced any new money in relation to his syndicate because the syndicate is a closed system. The puzzle, as Marx says in *Capital* (82) is that of $M-C-M'$, where $M'$ represents a greater quantity of money than was initially started with. The puzzle is one of "surplus-value".

4. The dynamic character of capital is its ability to generate more of itself by merit of being capital.

It is quite easy to understand how labour can increase use-value; the difficulty is how it can create exchange values greater than those with which it began? (83)

The question now arises as to how money, as capital, can become more than it is when the money in circulation remains arithmetically tied to the existence of the objects whose circulation it mediates? The production of capital, Marx points out, presupposes the alienation of labour (84). If we put this in an analogous form, we could say that in the fetishism of commodities and the alienation of labour the subject finds himself reflected in his material objects, as in a mirror. The world of appearance, the reflection, is what the naive individual believes himself to be, but the reflection is possible only because he looks into the mirror in the first place. In a situation in which the subject accepts the appearance, of which he is the actual source, as though it accounted for itself, he
will depend upon the image in the mirror to relate to him what the meaning of the facial expression reflected in the mirror means. Of course, this is a question which will receive no answer because the mirror will not say anything which is not first said by the subject himself. This is an absurd, but self-enclosed process. When the subject walks away, the image leaves the mirror.

In the relation of M-C:C-M, where money is not consumed in the exchange process, it appears that the image in the mirror carries on a life of its own. While this is actually false, this illusion allows capital to seem as if it is dynamic. It not only has a life, as the fetishized commodity does; it lives a life (85). Or, again, as Marx says in Capital (86), capital is its own process. Just as gossip cannot be born without lies, capital cannot be born without money. Or, more pithily put, capital is the tale of gossip which is the result of the lies which the fetishised commodities allow. As well, it is clear that in gossip, it is people who fabricate these lies (sic., fetishized commodities). It is also people who create the stories which make these lies hang together. The question which arises now is one which asks what it is about the subjects involved in the labour process which allows capital to act in their stead. What is capital the reified representation of?
5. Digression into bourgeois economics as the fetishized, analytic elevation of capital to the level of the actual and the resulting theoretical metaphysic.

Because bourgeois economists accept capital as factually pregiven, they fail to understand that capital, as an idea (87) is not factually existent. As Marx says in the "German Ideology", it is as if the idea of gravity was what kept people on the ground. In their acceptance of capital as both ideal and as capable of becoming real, the economists in effect see these two realms as inter-changeable, and so they are involved in metaphysics of the ontological sort, just as idealists such as Hegel were. For Marx, they are simply the high priests of a new religion which has money as its fetish object.

Hence the pre-bourgeois forms of the social organization of production are treated by political economy in much the same way as the Fathers of the Church treated pre-Christian religions. (88)

Thus:

Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of institutions for them, artificial and natural. The institutions of feudalism are artificial institutions, those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions. In this way, they resemble the theologians, who likewise establish two kinds of religion. Every religion which is not theirs...((the good side))...is an invention of men...((the bad side))...,
while theirs is an emination of God. (89)

In this we can see the basis for Marx's statement that within such an ideologized consciousness, it appears that:

...nothing ((is)) higher in itself, nothing is legitimate for itself, outside this circle of social production and exchange. Thus capital creates the bourgeois society and the universal appropriation of nature as well as of the social bond itself by members of society. (92)

As Marx points out, the telos which drives capitalistic society forward is not simply gain but to gain. This is an unfulfillable project. To think that it can ever be fulfilled in actuality is absurd. But this absurdity appears to make sense because it is premised upon the equally absurd notion that the qualitative can actually become quantified, and vice-versa. With this initial absurdity accepted, the telos of capitalist society appears to be justified, and the intention 'to gain' appears to be materially fulfillable. (93)

Marx's description of the process of capital's "becoming" is based upon the proposition that capital is

Only the ideal expression of the real ((actual)) movement through which capital comes into being. (94)
Within an ideological consciousness, in which quality and quantity indiscriminately take turns at occluding one another, (or, what is simply a different way of putting this, in which capital appears as a "general, eternal, relation of nature") (95) the acceptance of the pregiveness this mode of production presupposes the validity of money, a presupposition which already accepts the quantifiability of quality as it is expressed in abstract labour time. Capital itself is conceived of as an idea which is conceived of within a capitalistic attitude as being transubstantiable into the material. This is evidenced in the transformation of capital into money (96) which is conceived of as a material thing. In the production process, the capital which it is assumed is necessary as an a priori condition to the materially productive act, is transformed into the commodity. When this commodity is exchanged for money, capital appears to have become the money form and hence is both material and ideal. The transformation of commodities into money takes place in the exchange relation. In this moment, the symbolic objects which represent capital in this exchange are transformed into money. Thus, money which is presupposed as a self-determining fact, but which is actually a fantasy (97),
validates the corresponding presupposition that the idea of capital can be made manifest quantatively. (98)

Marx retraces the path of the commodity within the productive process at great length. However, he finds no moment at which capital can realise its money value in anything but an arithmetic way. The commodity remains within a simple fetishised condition of maintaining its character as a fetish object to the labourer's being. At only one point, Marx claims, can capital become more than the initial investment of money. This point, at which M becomes M', when the original investment becomes more than it initially is, lies in the actual labouring process itself. (99)

6. Objective becoming: subjective becoming; capital emerges as a being for itself.

The dynamic character of capital which is seen in capital's apparent ability to become may be contrasted to money's static being. Being may be conceptually frozen out of time, as, for example, when one says that God exists. But becoming is being in the flux of time. It is thus both concrete in its material facticity and abstract in its meaning. Becoming is experiential from the standpoint of the consciousness which becomes. And since only a conscious being can experience, capital comes to have a status as a self-determining phenomenon.
In relation to simple relations of production of any kind, we have seen that the subject has the ability to transform the use-value of a commodity into another use-value. These objects are material; this is the source of their intersubjective sharedness. It is only through human labour that these social objects are in fact transformed. In this labour act we can see, with Marx, that it is in material labour and only in material labour that the subject can become in social terms. Social labour, as a material process, necessarily takes place in the world of objective time and space. This labour

... is the living, form giving fire: it is the transitoriness of things, their temporality, as their formation by living time. (100)

The subject realizes his lived experience of becoming in the production process. For Marx, it is the man, the cognizing subject, in activity, who apprehends truth as an synthetic unity of the concrete and the abstract. (101)

However, in the production of capital, capital itself appears to be the necessary condition which precedes labour. Capital, which confronts labour as its anti-thesis in the wage-labour relation, appears, first, to drive labour beyond the limits of its merely human character, (its "paltriness"!) (102); and second, it appears as the
necessary precondition of the process through which truth is realized at the social level. Capital, as the embodiment of money which is grasped as immortal in relation to its role in the exchange-relation, appears to absorb the activity of the labourer and, through this metaphysical, soul-stealing contact, immortalizes the living process of the labourer in a reified form as the fetish object, capital. Thus, through its contact with capital and with the absorption of the geistige aspects of the subject's process, labour, as the material expression of this process, is conceptually transformed and sense of the activity of labour itself. In its now reified appearance, labour...

appears no longer as labour itself, but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared. (103)

In this it appears that capital, as activity itself, (104) has made possible the factual, material expression of labour as it embodies itself in the commodity (since capital appears to provide the real materials to be worked upon in the first place). As part and parcel of capital's apparent acquisition of the ability to act, capital acquires the appearance of having the ability to transform material objects itself, since the worker's ability to do so has already been paid for and consumed as would be the case with
any other commodity. The labourer's ability to qualitatively transform objects in a purposeful fashion is the end result of a judicative process. If the labourer is denied this ability, then this appears to be the ability of capital. Since capital now appears to be able to make such judgements, at least as they are evidenced at this level of deductive analytics (i.e., with the fetishism of commodities presupposed as a valid premise), capital must also be capable of experiencing since judgements can only be made by a cognizant being. Hence, capital itself appears to become; to have an existence in which the material and ideal are a unity.

7. Living labour as subjective process both preserves the capital invested and creates new capital. (105)

In the production of capital, capital is both preserved by labour, in that the capital invested in tools and materials (the means of production) is not lost, and, it is also created. (106) Through the use of the machinery of the means of production, the capital invested in this machinery is not lost, but is preserved by subjective labour. It would appear to the individual who perceives reality within the assumption of the pregiveness of the validity of capital, that it is capital which makes the
process possible by its original investment in the machinery, etc. However, without the labourers to put this system of production into service, the investment is spurious.

However, the act of engaging in the productive process on the terms of the capitalist (sic., corporation) also produces capital. Since capital is the abstract reflection of the subject’s own process of becoming and the former appears to be more real than the latter process because of its assumed immortality, the labourer’s actual lived process appears to be a subordinate phenomenon in relation to capital. However, in actuality, it is:

Living labour ((which)) adds a new amount of labour; however it is not a quantitative addition which preserves the amount of already objectified labour ((the currently "existing" capital)), but rather its quality as living labour ((accomplishes this preservation of the invested capital.)) (107)

8. Labour as qualitative and quantitative: Capital rests on the conceptual collapsing of the qualitative (irreal) and quantitative (real).

Living labour, the actual consciously lived experience of the labourer, viewed, by necessity as the labourer in the first person since to understand this in any other way would be to make a claim that lived experience had
something other than a subject as its experiencer,

...is not paid for this quality which it possesses as living labour...rather it is paid for the amount of labour contained in itself ((i.e., its fetishized form)). (108)

Indeed, this qualitative function which the labourer performs as a judging individual, can only be bought if it is conceived of in a fetishized way. Ironically

This quality ((of simply being 'living labour')) does not cost the worker anything either, since it is the natural property of his labouring capacity. (109) ((Therefore))

Within the production process, the separation of labour ((as an abstract, judicative process)) from its objective moments of existence ((its material-social expression or realization))... is suspended... The existence of capital and wage labour rest on this separation. (110)

This suspension, or repression of the actual irreducibility of quality to quantity, and vice versa, allows the capitalist to apparently purchase from the worker, his qualitative ability to make judgments, since the judgment, in this case, now appears to be an integral element of the commodity, the latter now understood in its hypostatized form. Hence, the commodity now appears to possess factual quantity as well as the quality of the judgment which the subject exercised in his realization of it; in his
transformation of it from its initial use-value into its present use-value. In its turn, capital appears to control the commodity, since it is presupposed that it is capital which makes the materials available for the productive process in the first place.

Since the capitalist controls the capital, he also controls the commodity. What is altered in the production of the commodity is its form as a use-value. The capitalist, however, only pays the labourer for his time as a quantity. He does not pay the worker for his time as a quality, as, indeed, this would be impossible. But in buying the worker's time, the capitalist appears to inevitably acquire, through his possession of the transformed commodity, this qualitative aspect as well as it appears to have been separated from the worker. As evidence, the capitalist 'owns' the commodity as a fact which has been transformed. The factual or real acquisition of the worker's experience of quality is actually an impossibility. But because both the worker and the capitalist fail to distinguish between the factual expression of the ideal as it is expressed in the commodity, and the ideal or qualitative character of what is expressed through the former, the idea which is expressed in the activity of labour seems to be invested in the factual commodity itself. Within this mode of
understanding, it appears that the qualitative aspects of the labourer's life process are at one with the quantitative aspects, and so, in purchasing the labourer's time as a quantity, the rest naturally comes with it, too. As long as only the empirical facts are considered, the collapsing of quality and quantity in relation to the activity of labour will not even be seen; the participants engaged in this wage-labour relation will not be aware of what is actually taking place. The facts of this relation, comprehended in their reified form, will appear to account for the sense of the whole process, with neither the worker nor the capitalist ever being aware of the actuality of this situation.

In effect, the capitalist gets more than he pays for. This appears in the wage labour equation as the transformation which the commodity undergoes. Since the worker as a mere quantity has been accounted for in this equation, what is left over, the qualitative-transformative aspect, reverts to capital. This is the separation which Marx is talking about and it is made possible by the failure to distinguish between the factually existent and the ideal, which is conjointly present at the same time in the labour process, but which is not reducible to the spatio-temporal particulars of that labour process. The
latter is the necessary exclusiveness of quality and quantity.

Neither does the ownership of the material commodity make any actual difference here, since throughout the production of capital the material commodity acts only as an index to the phenomenological breaking apart of the unity of quantity and quality which is experienced in the living time of the worker. This holds for money, and the particular amount of money which changes hands in the wage-labour relation as well. Since money is only the abstract equivalent to any commodity, possession particular commodity and possession of money are structurally equivalent, the latter being the openly abstract statement of any particular commodity. Money itself, as it depends upon the fetishism of commodities as its validating premise, presupposes the collapsability of the qualitative and the quantitative. Since what is at issue here is precisely this problem, the amount of money exchanged in the wage-labour relation is a pseudo question since it moves within the same presuppositions which create the problem of which we are treating. Thus, we can see the reason for Marx's relegation of Proudhoun and what has emerged from this movement as 'socialism' as for this kind of "money juggling" (111) solves nothing of the problem of reification.
In the production of a commodity, a material fact is produced which corresponds to this separation. The nature of the commodity is of no importance to what is actually occurring in this relation, since what is important is not the commodity as a use-value, but the fact that a commodity has been produced under a wage-labour situation. As Marx says in the Holy Family, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat both share the same delusion. (112) And as Marx points out in the Grundrisse:

The fact is that these workers, indeed, are productive, as far as they increase the capital of their master; unproductive as to the material result of their labour (since the commodity is of completely secondary importance to the production of capital, except as an index to the fact that capital has absorbed the qualitative aspect of the worker's living time). In fact, of course, this 'productive' worker cares as much about the crappy shit he has to make as does the capitalist himself who employs him, and who also couldn't give a damn about the junk. (113)

The suspension of the structural actuality of the labour act is at one and the same time the failure to transcend the naive belief in the pregiven validity of capital. In the realization of capital, this suspension

...take((s)) place ((not)) in the process of exchange with the worker ((i.e., in the paying of the wage itself)); but rather takes place in the process of work itself... (114)
in the labourer's activity itself which

...is a reality only in the immediate vitality of the worker. (115)

in the worker's own consciousing process.

Moreover, if the validity of money is accepted as pregiven the capitalist has the last word in this relation. When the commodity, which appears to be the result of the capitalist's investment of capital, is sold, the commodity becomes what it is not; it is transformed into money. If money is presupposed as valid, then this transformation of the commodity into the money form appears to validate the initial presupposition of the material or factual actuality of capital since, inasmuch as money is believed to be factually real, and the commodity which was apparently made possible by capital is transformed into money, the capital which was invested in this commodity correspondingly appears to become real. In its transformation into money, capital thus:

...no longer appears dissolved in its simple elements in the productive process, but as money; no longer, however, as money which is merely the abstract form of general wealth, but as a claim on the real ((actual)) possibility of general wealth...
9. The mode of production as a subjectively constituted "reality".

Quite simply, then, capital is an idea which is only apparently real. Within the capitalistic mode of production capital is accepted as real. This is possible because both the labourer and the capitalist believe it to be real. What conditions man is therefore his belief in the reality of an idea or an "ideal object" as a reified fact. What conditions man, and hence alienates him, is thus what he has posited as alienated from him in the first place. Since alienation demands that the subject posit something as exterior to himself which in actuality is not exterior to him, the subject, or collectively speaking, man, is conditioned by what he believes to be outside himself, but which, in actuality, he posits or judges to be there himself.

However, as Lukacs says, if what is alienated from man is reappropriated to man, if what is only apparently exterior to man is realized as not exterior to man, what happens to the exterior world? Does the end of alienation mean the end of what is "exterior" to the subject? Such a question, however, stems from a merely negative statement of
the problem of alienation. This is no more than the immanent contradiction to the problem of alienation. What was only apparently exterior to the subject is now posited as interior to the subject. In confronting this problem, we are forced back to Lukacs's inadequacy concerning the nature of objectification. However, we have found in this chapter that capital is produced in the consciousing processes of the subject. Nothing real is produced in the subject's mind. What is real in the labour relation is produced by the subject's hands or what ever else may be employed as a means of production. What the subject produces in the production of capital is an idea which he believes has material effects. It is the worker himself as who is actually materially active and who produces these material effects. And while the subject as the labourer alienates himself inasmuch he believes this idea to have control over him, what he produces in his mental activity and which corresponds to his material realization of this is an idea. What is reified, then, is an idea. To claim that an idea can be returned to the subject in a psychophysical sense, is to believe that it can actually be reified and posited as something alien to him from him in the first place. Such a conception does not reveal alienation as an actual impossibility, which is what makes it a self-contradictory
phenomenon, but accepts it as actually possible and to be avoided. In the latter case, alienation is actual. If alienation is actual, then it is no illusion. If it is no illusion, then it is not self-contradictory. If it is not self-contradictory, then the qualitative and the quantitative are actually reducible one to the other and then alienation is no illusion, but is an actuality.

On the other hand, if what is alienated is qualitative, and as such, is not factual and hence, can neither be psychophysically 'inside' nor 'outside' the subject, then it can neither be separated nor returned to the subject, and this position must be maintained if we are to be consistent with the intention which we understand Marx to have which is the intention to transcend alienation.

If we maintain the position that what is qualitative is not factual and hence defies any attempt to locate it spatially and temporally, (which are factual referents), then we avoid both the illusion of the pregiveness of capital as well as Lukacs's potential solopicism.


If we are to transcend the illusion of alienation, we must somehow account for ideas themselves, for it is the
reified idea of capital which alienates the subject. As the
idea of capital is produced as a function of the judicative
activity of the subject as he is involved in the labour
process, we must move to the production of ideas in the
judgment process itself if we are to understand how an idea
may be reified or turned into a fetish. As well, if we are
to take Lukacs at his word and see Marx's method as the
universal method, applicable to any instance of alienation
whatsoever, we must move to the abstract since only an
abstract concept will be applicable to any conceivable
situation. Before we move directly into our examination of
the production of ideas in the judging processes of the
subject, we will have to validate Marx's admonition that the
qualitative and quantitative aspects of a subject's
consciousing processes are not reducible one to the other,
for it is one thing to assert this and another to
demonstrate this in an explicit, logical fashion.

In so doing, we will maintain our analysis of
capital at the level of generality and as such, we may
approach the theoretical justification of capital at the
level of an argument form.

In the section which follows we will show that the
type of argument form which is employed to justify the
validity of capital is logically absurd. This will be done
by referring to Husserl's *Prolegomena* which is critique of theories which presuppose the validity of the norms upon which they deductively build systems without examining the validity of the norms.

The second section of the following chapter follows Husserl in his attempt to develop a method by which the sense of norms can be investigated as well as developing a theoretical justification of such a method.
Chapter Three

The Transformation of Theoretical Abstractions
from Cul-de-Sacs to Passageways.

A. The Prolegomena.

1. The paradigmatic parallelism between capitalism and psychologism as abstract argument forms.

We mentioned above that the presupposition of the fetishism of commodities acts as the analytic premise which constitutes the norm for judgments concerning the continuity and consequence within the capitalistic way of making sense of things. We also noted Lukacs's call for the universalization of Marx's method. If this method is to be universalized it must be applicable to anything whatsoever.

In this light, capital may be seen as making sense as an analytic argument. As with any other deductive argument, capital makes sense if its presuppositions are not questioned. Within these presuppositions (viz., fetishism of commodities and the alienation of labour), capital appears to be logically sound; that is, once the
presuppositions are granted as valid, the rest of the argument concerning the validity of the relations of capital production follow deductively. The point now becomes one of how to make sense of these presuppositions in and of themselves; that is, without appealing to the deductions which themselves are contingent upon the assumed validity of the initial presuppositions. As we shall see by following Husserl's critique in the Prolegomena, a theory which does not examine the origins of its own premises, but which attempts to justify these premises by referring to the deductions which are contingent upon the validity of the former, is logically inadequate.

Psychologism, which is the (logical) subject of Husserl's critique in the Prolegomena, is an attempt to justify the principles of logic as derivative from the facts relating to a subject's experience. The holding of logical laws in other words, is contingent upon the occurrence of particular sensuo-empirical data. At a paradigmatic level we can see a correspondance between a capitalistic approach to explanation and a psychologistic approach to explanation in that they both depend upon facts to explain meaning. As we saw with capital in the preceding chapter, the meaning of capital which, within a capitalistic frame of reference, is assumed to be inherent in the pregiven fact of capital
itself, actually originates with the subject. Capital, in its fetishized form, takes on the appearance of being meaningful in itself. In this way, the apparently pregiven fact of capital occludes the subject as its actual origin of its "being" as a meaningful phenomenon.

In psychologism, the meaning of logical principles is similarly accounted for not by the subject's consciousing processes, but by the sensuo-empirical objects associated with these processes subject perceives in his activity of understanding logical principles. The meaning of these 'facts of experience' is assumed as a pregiven property of these facts themselves. Thus, at a general level, psychologism and capitalism share a fact fetish in which factual objects which are psychophysically split away from the subject are seen as being meaningful for themselves. Husserl demonstrates such a position to be absurd. Since Husserl demonstrates this in relation to logic, and any theory necessarily depends upon the holding of logical laws, (1) Husserl's demonstration of the absurdity of such a fetishistic approach at a general, paradigmatic level can also be seen as a demonstration of the absurdity of any particular instance of such an approach to explanation, of which capitalism is an example.
Science as theory: theory as contextual interconnection.

Husserl points out that science exists objectively only in theory. (2) If the understandings which we have through science are to be explained, it follows that the comprehensibility of theory must be explained. A theory of science is thus a theory of theory, or less cryptically put, a theory of theory would be an enquiry into how one can know anything through science. It is clear that we know things with certainty through science. Science, or what we should properly call theory from now on, gains its sense from the way it holds together. (3) There is a certain sense to a theory that is comprehensible. This comprehensibility comes from the way the factual data are drawn together to form a meaningful whole. (4) Clearly, a comprehensible theory, one which conveys a clear meaning to the person who deals with it is not simply a random, amorphous collection of ad hoc data. The data which are assembled under the rubric of a theory are brought together as a contextual whole. In short, they have a mutual interconnection which can be validated by means of logical proofs. (5)
3. The dependence of theory upon the holding of logical laws.

Husserl begins the Prolegomena by asking how one may focus on the unity of the sciences. What is it that gives the sciences their sense? He discovers that any science whatsoever depends upon the validity of logical laws. Moreover, any theory which denies the possibility of the holding of these logical laws in effect denies its own possibility of being valid. Statements such as

"Every A is B, X is A, so X is B." (7)

hold for any scientific discipline whatsoever, regardless of any particular discipline's grounding norm. Such an empty logical structure would hold in either chemistry or in mathematics, as Husserl points out.

It is by means of these logical structures that science in general validates the results of its researches.

These validations, Husserl says, have

...in the first place the character of a fixed structure in relation to their content. (Secondly) connections of validations are not governed by caprice or chance, but by reason and order, i.e., by regulative laws. (Thirdly, these laws remain independent of their particular content or application, since) we may in fact say that they may be so generalized, so purely conceived, as to be free of all essential relation to some limited field of knowledge. (8)
Husserl refers to these limited fields of knowledge as normative disciplines. Examples of these would be physics or geography, and for the purposes of this thesis, we can include the study of economics and politics as well. These disciplines are organized around a central theme. Husserl uses the examples of Kant's categorial imperative and the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number which is the internally uniting normative principle of the Utilitarians. (9)

However, Husserl continues by stating that every normative and likewise practical discipline rests on one or more theoretical disciplines, inasmuch as its rules have a theoretical content separable from the notion of normativity whose scientific investigation is the duty of these theoretical disciplines. (10)

A normative science outlines what should be or ought to be. If we are to say that a certain situation is a "good" one, i.e., attribute to it a normative value, the counter position can be taken that it is a "not good" one. When we choose what is good or bad, we are making a normative decision. However, prior to stating this proposition, the person who states this must already have a conception of "good" or "not good".
To be able to pass the normative judgement 'A soldier should be brave', I must have some conception of a 'good' soldier, and this concept cannot be founded on an arbitrary nominal definition, but on a general valuation, which permits us to value soldiers as good or bad according to these or those properties. Whether or not this valuation is in any sense 'objectively valid', whether we can draw any distinction between the subjectively and objectively 'good', does not enter into our determination of the sense of should propositions. It is sufficient that something is held valuable, that an intention is effected having the content that something is good or bad. (11)

In the example which Husserl gives us here, the norm which grounds the internal sense of a particular discipline does not account for the distinction between the meaning of good and bad which remains intact independent of whatever normative decision is made. Husserl refers to such distinctions of meaning as theoretical relations. Theoretical principles determine the relations of the particular normative contents and the internal sense amongst complexes of normative contents. Any understanding of these complexes therefore presupposes a grasp of general theoretical structures which "connect" normative sets in relation to one another. The logical continuity and non-contradictory nature of these normative sets, both within themselves and in relation to other sets, is
dependent upon the holding of logical principles. In contrast to these latter principles, the demonstration of the validity of normative investigations is a mediate or logically predicated procedure, since these logical principles stand at the most primitive level of any validation process. (12)

4. Logical form and normative content.

While these theoretical principles are found to encapsulate particular normative contents, the validity of the theoretical structures is neither dependent upon, nor exhausted by any particular normative content. (13) The theoretical sense of such normative contents, however, depends upon the context within which one normative set relates to another and this context is lent to these sets through the understanding of theoretical principles.

5. Skepticism is absurd.

In order for any normative discipline to make itself comprehensible, for it to offer evidence of its validity, it must be capable of demonstrating that paradigmatically speaking, it holds to those theoretical principles upon which its own validity depends. However, a theory which itself
validates knowledge is itself a piece of knowledge: its possibility depends upon certain conditions, rooted in purely conceptual fashion, in knowledge and its relation to the knowing subject. (14)

Since all theories assert a claim to truth -- even if this is the truth that there is no truth -- skepticisms, which deny the possibility of truth, are self-contradictory. They not only deny the possibility of truth, but in so doing, they also deny their own possibility as valid.

6. Theory of theory as the theory of logical forms.

In constructing a theory of the possibility of validating theoretical knowledge we must move outside the realm of any particular normative content. The theory which must be developed to account for the possibility of any truth whatsoever must as well coincide with those conditions which it establishes as initially valid. If it does not coincide with these conditions, then it contradicts its own claim to the conditions which are necessary to realise truth and so collapses into skepticism.

Husserl goes on to state that:

If the judging person were never in a position to have personal experience and apprehension of his judgment's self-justifying character, if all his judgments lacked that inner evidence which distinguishes them from blind prejudices, and yields him luminous certainties, it
would be impossible to provide a rational account and a foundation for knowledge, or to discourse on theory or science. (15)

7. The thesis of radical empiricism: all knowledge is dependent upon empirical sensation.

Radical empiricism holds that there can be nothing in consciousness which is not first in the senses. If the question of validation is one of theory, independent of any particular mediate content, then the question concerning the evidential grounding of validations becomes a question of how one validates or 'grounds' the source of abstract, theoretical structures. These theoretical structures are logical structures inasmuch as their legal status derives from logical necessity. If empiricism is held as the theory by which any theory can establish its validity, then the onus falls to empiricism to show that the laws of logic come through the senses.

If all that consciousness has as its content is based upon sensory data, then the logic which the subject, (that is the knowing agent), must be conveyed by the properties or particulars, (the facts), conveyed by the empirical object as it presents itself to the consciousness of the subject. It follows that if there were no factual object exterior to the subject, then there could be no sensation of an object and the source of logical structures
could not be established. In this way, the empiricists' enquiry into the question of the grounding of logic becomes an enquiry which asks how the subject can grasp logical structure by means of sensory data. Since the study of logic moves to acts of knowing performed by the subject any enquiry into questions of logic reverts to the field of psychology. This move to the psyche is not unique to empiricistic enquiry, however. The move to the psyche, historically speaking, starts with Descartes.

Descartes' question is one of how it is that I can know something with complete certainty. If belief in an existing God is suspended, then the subject is left with only what he has in his own mind as certain as a field of enquiry. If knowledge is actually metaphysically guaranteed by a being which itself lies beyond, or transcends the subject, then the whole enterprise of theory which studies the psyche of the subject is a waste of time since guarantees of knowledge would be timelessly secure and, intersubjectively speaking, all subjects would be spiritually united. The intersubjective understandings shared by subjects and the unity of the knowing experience of the subject himself are thus closely related. However, the real problem at this point is to attempt to investigate how any continuity in comprehension is possible without a metaphysical guarantee.
But the psychological methodology of the empiricists models itself after the paradigm of the hard sciences to ensure the possibility of producing "scientific" results. The credibility of the methodology of the "hard sciences" is presupposed, however. Consequently the limitations of the "hard sciences" become the limitations imposed upon any understanding of the structures of logic generated through an objectivistic psychological approach.

8. Radical empiricism is absurd.

To remain consistent within the epistemological parameters set by sensuo-empiricism, no a priori can be established which is not contingent upon sensory experience. Thus the only way in which any law of logic may be established is by induction from the appearance of the factual, perceived object. But...

induction does not establish the holding of a law, only the greater or lesser probability of its holding; the probability, and not the law, is justified by insight. Logical laws ((as interpreted as a function of psychology)) must accordingly without exception, rank as mere probabilities. (16)

This interpretation of logic as merely probable and the consequent probability of truth as a logical principle, collapses into skepticism. This follows because
the epistemological grounding of any sort of theoretical structuring of the possibilities of sensible thought is, at its very core, is grounded in the possibility of truth. If truth can only be an approximation, then empiricism can only qualify as being approximately true. As well, by conceiving of logical principles as relative conditions of thought rather than as the self-evident grounding structures of validation which allow mediate data to be meaningfully assembled and comprehended, logical

... laws have first been confused with judgments, in the sense of acts of judgement: the laws, as 'contents of judgments' have been confused with the judgments themselves ((viz.the principles)). (17) Empiricism thus:

...destroys the possibility of the rational justification of mediate knowledge, and so its own possibility as scientifically proven theory.(18)

This is so because

...mediate ((viz., normatively derived)) knowledge ((is)) the product of various validating connections, (19)

and these connections are what lend the data assembled within normative theories their comprehensibility. The mediate knowledge produced by those involved in the generation of normative theories is accepted as valid by
Empiricism, by accepting these logical principles thus contradicts itself since if

...all proof rests upon principles governing its procedure, and if its final justification involves an appeal to such principles, then we should either be involved in a circle or in an infinite regress if the principles of proof used to justify the principles of proof were the same as the latter, in a regress if both sets of principles were repeatedly different. (20)

Extreme empiricism, therefore, since it only basically puts its full trust in singular judgments of experience -- a quite uncritical trust since it ignores the difficulties which so richly attend upon such singular judgments -- eo ipso abandons all hope of rationally justifying mediate knowledge. (21)

We can characterise the attitude which empiricism displays by saying that it puts the trust which it should place in subjects in mediate things or facts. (22) In this way, empiricism cannot explain how a subject, the consciousing agent who actually performs theoretical and normative judgings, actually performs this process of distinguishing what is certain from what is prejudicial.

Involved in this misperception on the part of empiricism is a conceptual splitting apart of the subject and the object of which the subject is conscious. The
ability of the subject to perform these judicative acts of
distinction appear to be the result of the limits pregiven
by the properties of the object, not something which is
accomplished by the subject. In effect, empiricism
presupposes the consciousing processes of the subject.(23)
The experience of the subject, from an empiricistic
standpoint, can only be a reflection of the mediate factual
data imposed upon it from the "outside", so to speak. The
prejudicial character of this perception arises because it
is this mediate factual data which demands evidential
clarification, and it is precisely this same mediate data
which demands clarification which is used as a validation
of other mediate states of affairs. The process of judging
which occurs in the consciousing processes of the subject is
completely by-passed; the question is begged by assuming the
validity of the object as something which is, in itself,
pregivenly meaningful and which, as a meaning, is seen as
being pregiven and ontologically separate from the subject.

But, if one asks what principles justify
such derivation, empiricism, forbidden to
appeal to immediately evident universal
principles, appeals, rather, to naive,
uncritical everyday experience, which it
hopes to dignify more highly by explaining
it psychologically in Humean fashion. It
therefore fails to see that, having no
justification, therefore, for the relevant
proof-procedures from the immediately
evident general principles that follow, its whole psychological theory, its whole
mediate known doctrine of empiricism is without rational foundation, is, in fact, a mere assumption, no more than a common prejudice. (24)

To continue:

As a genuine psychologism, it tends always to confuse the psychological origin of certain general judgments in experience, on account of some supposed 'naturalness', with a justification of the same judgments. (25)

Even moderate empiricisms which attempt to retain some type of a priori grounding for validation go astray:

Mediate judgments of fact -- we may compress the sense of Hume's theory into this phrase -- never permit of rational justification, only of psychological explanation. (So that)

The psychological premises of the theory are themselves mediate judgments of fact, and therefore lack all rational justification in the sense of the thesis to be established. (26)

9. The irreal is irreducible to the real.

The distinction which Husserl calls for between the irreal and the real is one which is consistent in one form or another throughout his work. As he says in the Prolegomena:

The psychologistic logicians ignore the fundamental, never to be bridged gulf between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal regulation, between
logical and real grounds, No conceivable graduation could mediate between the ideal and the real. (28)

This is reiterated in Formal and Transcendental Logic; there is an "essential separation between the real and the irreal." (28) Thus, if the real cannot be used to explain the irreal, then, correspondingly, the irreal cannot be used to actually explain the real, qua fact. This is of interest to us in this thesis, since it introduces now, in the case of Husserl, the same distinction which Marx makes in relation to the irreducibility of quality to quantity. (29)

10. Empiricism treats facts as "beings for themselves."

The sense of theory is itself abstract or irreal and the irreal cannot be explained within the paradigmatic frame of reference which empiricistic theory sets for itself. Since the sense of empiricistic theory is itself irreal, empiricistic theory cannot justify its own comprehesibility. Consequently, empiricism is a skepticism and as such is an absurdity. It follows that any theory which starts its enquiry from an object will end up in an absurdity if the meaning of this object is assumed as pregiven. In Ideas Husserl says that an approach which
cannot replace the practice of living in perception ((its)) attention turned towards the perceived object ((viz. mediate phenomenon)) both in observation and in theoretical inquiry...(30)

is bound to be capable of only of deduction within the limits defined by its own assumption of the pregiven. However, deduction alone can never explain the origin of its own premises.

As it has been indicated, this inability may be located in the failure of the empiricistic approach to examine the source of the logical connections which contextually tie facts together but which are not of these facts themselves. By attributing to objects of perception a "being for themselves",(31) empiricism culminates in a fetishism of the material fact.

11. The limitations of the Prolegomena.

As Husserl points out, the chief merit of the Prolegomena is that it attacks empiricistic psychology on its own ground and, for Husserl, it accomplishes the supremely important ((goal)) of making the specific province of analytic logic visible in its purity and ideal peculiarity, freeing it from the psychologizing confusions and misinterpretations in which it had remained enmeshed. (32)
But inasmuch as the Prolegomena moves against an objectivistic mode of understanding, and demonstrates this latter's absurd character on its own ground, the Prolegomena is simply the negation of thesis. This situation demands a completing synthesis which will allow a transcendental move to the source of validations themselves. In doing this, the immanent contradiction which potentially locks Husserl's theory into a mere critique of one set of deductive principles should be transcended. In as much as the Prolegomena moves on the level of traditional analytic logic, the limitations of traditional analytics will also realise themselves in the Prolegomena itself. Thus, a transcendence of the limitations of traditional logic at a paradigmatic level will be, correspondingly, a transcendence of the limitations of the Prolegomena.

B. The move to judging and judgment forms.

What Husserl points towards is a radical move to subjectivity. This is a necessary move since the perceived object, qua mediate fact, in and of itself, cannot be used to explain the meaning which the subject understands it to have. What we are interested in, then, is how a fact comes to have the meaning which it does, and to do this we will have to look into the question of how the subject produces
the meaning of any object. (33) In order to do this we will examine how Husserl fleshes out the role of traditional analytics as a critical methodology.

1. The relevance of this to Marx's theory.

If we look back to the last chapter we will see that in Marx's conception of the labour process, the labouror realizes his purpose (34) through the transformation of material objects as the realization of an idea. If we take as our example of labour, one which is original or creative and one that is not merely mimetic, the worker must exercise his judgment in the transformation of the material object.

If what is realized through this activity of material expression is the initial idea itself, and if the labouror grasps the object of his labour self-reflectively as the expression of his meaning, then this meaning itself is the a priori condition to this realization process. Since we have characterized labour as an activity in which the labouror is involved as a judging agent, then the clarification of the source of the idea towards which the worker proceedes in his material realization may also be seen as a clarification of the sense of the judging process. If this activity of material production involves judgments,
a priori, then the meaning or sense of this judgment itself is not to be found in the facts of the material activity of doing, but as conjointly given with the facts in the mental activity which directs the process of the realization of the material object. If we wish to move to a position which stands beyond the fetishized comprehension of facts, then we must attempt to understand how judgments come to be realized. Meaning thus logically precedes fact in the activity of realization because the production of material facts is contingent upon the a priori condition of having a judgment present in order that it may be fulfilled. (35) The universalization of Marx's particular example of labour thus turns to the logic of judgments, or what is known as apophantics.

2. Traditional analytic logic as a game; capital characterised as an analytic game.

Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* begins with a detailed critique of what he calls the traditional approach to apophantistics. A number of moments of his critique will help us to explain his approach to what he sees as having become the mere game of logic (36), a game which is played without a recognition of the foundation of its own teleological sense. Since we have characterized
capital as a deductive, analytical game, which, as one might say, is played on a social-material level, this will clearly be of interest to us in relation to Marx.

3. Levels of judgment as levels of critique.

Husserl distinguishes three levels of possible judging. Because the goal of judging is the fulfilment of the judgment as true or as false, these three levels of judging will have their corresponding levels of evidence by which the truth or falsity of a judgement will be deemed either true or false at that particular level of judging. Contingent, or factual evidence may hold occasionally, (i.e., in some situations), but its holding as ultimately self-evident depends upon whether or not it can find fulfilment at a higher level of evidencing. A description of what Husserl sees as these three levels of judging may clarify the relationship which the levels of judging hold to one another.

Husserl distinguishes judgments as being stratified in a subordinate relation. At the first level, what is established is whether or not something is devoid of sense.

We commonly say, for example, that we utter a series of words devoid of sense when we say: "King but where seems and"; but we say equivalently that the expression "a round square" is devoid of
Husserl reserves the word non-sense to designate the first type of expression without signification (meaning). Each word taken separately has a sense, but the totality of words does not form a genuine proposition. ... On the contrary, the expression "a round square" has a sense for this first logical stratum. (37)

This expression does not reach a fulfillment based on the evidence of the second level, however, which is the level of the distinct judgment. This level of judgment is the level of consequence-logic and depends upon the law of non-contradiction. As Husserl points out in an appendix to Formal and Transcendental Logic, non-contradiction includes within its province, "Questions of analytically necessary consequence ((viz. consistency)) of syllogistic consequence ((viz. continuity))" and these form the theme of traditional logic. (38) Husserl illustrates this by using the example of paying attention to the street in front of one's house "confusedly, all at the same time". (39) In the course of time such a "non-articulated" consciousness of the street can become articulated as I subsequently become conscious of the street.

...in "going through" it, as in an articulate manner, I become conscious of the windings of the street, the trees and houses along it... Thus a non-articulated empty consciousness can become converted into a "corresponding" articulated empty consciousness, the confusedly meant sense-content (while entering into
identifying coincidence of the sort of peculiar "explication") becoming "spread out" as the explicate the meaning proper of the previously confused content. (40)

The initial, vague experience, which lies at the first level of evidencing, is actually no more than an impression or something believably accepted at first glance, as it were. In such a form it remains unexamined. There need be no attempt to move beyond this level by going into what is truly meant by it. Judging remains at this level of muddy thinking if this first judgment is believed in. Such a belief fixes this ungrounded opinion ((Meinung)) (41) as valid, at least in the mind of the one who accepts such a judgment with no will to understand it at any thing but the superficial level at which it now stands. Not only is the internal sense of such a judgment left inexplicit; by naively accepting one's judgment at this level and presupposing its validity, the judging subject has no way of relating it to any other judgment which he makes. If such a judgment is challenged, I, as the judging subject, have no way of defending it. It makes sense, but only arbitrarily.

4. The synthetic move from opinion to proper judging: the distinct judgment.

I need not believe this initial judgment to be true, however. I may see it as an opinion, as something
which has simply come to mind, and through a change in my attitude towards my intial judging of this state of affairs which had its meaning "expectantly", (42) I can make it distinct. The initial judgment itself is, in this second moment, a "proper judgment" (43) and by making the judgment explicit, I make make distinct or explicate, " meaning proper of the previously confused unitary content." (44) The judgment itself, as the meaning which is present vaguely at the first level of judging and which has now become explicit at the second level of judging, remains the same, however, since the initial unitary experience from which the second level is produced was originally that of the initial, inexplicit judgment. At this second level, the judging subject alters the focus of his enquiry to one of explication and this allows the subject to make distinct to himself (and ostensibly, to others through his realization of this understanding in language, etc.) what was initially only a vague opinion.

Within vagueness itself, only blind beliefs are possible in the sense that the evidence which is available at this level of judging is completely vague. Within this first level of evidencing there is no possibility to make sense of anything except as an ungrounded opinion. As Husserl says," They ((vague judgings)) are indeed believing
and to that extent judgings; yet they are not 'proper' judgings." (45) Such a move, from the vague to the distinct may transcend the vagueness of the initial "belief". However, this is a synthetic move (46) which transforms the initial judging into an ideal object or categorial form. (47) By performing this synthetic move, the judging subject constitutes the judgment as a proper judgment. In doing this, the judgment which was present in the vague opinion is posited and understood in a different way. This performance takes place in the "judging subject's action as a sense". (48) The judgment proper is not being altered; it is being made explicit. To put this differently:

Explicit judging, "distinct" judging is the evidence appropriate to the "distinct judgment", as the ideal objectivity that becomes constituted originally in such a synthetic action, and identified in the repetition of such an action.

To continue:

This evidence is an original emerging of the judgment as it itself, but not yet an evidentially experiencing (act of) seizing upon and regarding it thematically. Subsequently, what has become constituted ((in this synthetic act of judging performed by the judging subject)) in this evidence, in this polythetic action, is graspable "monothetically", in one grasping ray; the polythetic formation becomes an object. (49)
The meaning of the judgment, at first judged in a non-explicit and confused fashion, now becomes distinct to the subject who now so judges it. In effect, a norm is produced at this second level of judging which provides the basis for constructing an analytic framework, the continuity and non-contradiction of which derive from the sense of this norm itself.

The third level of judgment is that of "clarity" as contrasted with that of distinctness. In distinctness the judgment as an ideal object becomes explicitly objectified. In this, the act of judging and the judgment as an ideal object can be distinguished. We will recall that it is the ideality of such judgment forms, of which logical principles are a species, which Husserl, in the Prolegomena, wishes to demonstrate as having their own efficacy. (50) Psychologism collapses the act of judging with the judgment itself, (51) (as an ideal object), and then claims that the factual data associated with the act of judging may be used to account for the holding of these laws. In doing so, psychologism asserts a self-contradiction. In demonstrating this self-contradiction, Husserl preserves for traditional logic its province as the "science" of the level of distinct judgments, of consequence logic.
5. The synthetic move to clarity; the clarified judgment as pure meaning.

We also must recall, however, that Husserl wishes to move beyond the level of analytics, the plane to which he claims the Prolegomena are restricted. The move beyond analytics is the move from the evidence of distinctness to the evidence of clarity.

Evidence of clarity is different from evidence of distinctness in that evidence of clarity is the evidence wherein that becomes itself given which the judging subject wants to attain "by way of" his judgment -- the judging subject, that is as wanting to cognise.

6. Traditional analytics as technology and science as teleologically directed towards clarity.

In relation to labour, conceived not in the narrow and particular sense as simply being the labour which is involved merely in the production of material objects, but in a universal sense, we can make the distinction at this point between the technician and the scientist. In attaining judgments as ideal objects, as norms, a corresponding technology may be established. The technician works within these as within a set of pregiven rules or norms. Distinct evidences have an ideal existence for
the technologist inasmuch as he understands them himself in a distinct fashion. Within these parameters, which need not be questioned in themselves for the technologist to perform a practical application of them, the technician can generate a meriad of calculations and deductions which have as the source of their efficacy, their corresponding distinct evidences.

However, it is the task of the scientist to enquire into the source of the efficacy of these norms themselves. The deductions which may be obtained by working within a paradigm of distinct evidences, however, are contingently grounded upon these distinctly evidenced ideal objects or norms. This means that if evidence of the sense of distinct judgments themselves is sought in these deductions, we will produce the same sort of situation which Humean psychology finds itself in when it attempts to justify the sense of the data generated by its method through an appeal to the presupposed validity of this method itself, and vice versa. Within the attitude of the technologist, one does not go beyond or enquire into the source of the sense of the distinct judgments (i.e., categorial objects, norms) in themselves. The norms are correspondingly assumed to make sense simply because the vagueness of random data may be ordered through an
imposition of the "rules" of the game and so be made sense of explicitly. Thus, a regressive inquiry into the source of the meaning of these deductive may seem pointless.

The normative organization of 'facts' which brings distinctness to confusion is seen as the teleological goal of the technician. Thus, if such a procedure works in organizing the facts (sic., data) to make sense, the technician will use his results to verify his initial assumption of the efficacy of the rules. An appeal to his mediate results will appear to him as the justification of his initial assumption. None of this, however, clarifies the source of the meaning of his norms, nor does it clarify the meaning of judgments as ideal objects. Only the applicability of such distinct evidences to the organization of vagueness is demonstrated. Moreover, the applicability of such distinct judgments lies precisely in the actuality that they find their originary source in the initial confusion, the vague opining, which they are used to organise. Since the judgment, as a sense, itself remains identical throughout the thematic shifts in the synthesis of progressively higher modes of judging, the technologist's defence is no more than a begged question.

The scientist, however, must clarify whether or not these "rules" are adequate not only in themselves as
distinct, but, as well, in terms of their meaning. Such a clarification strives towards "evidence as the having of the meant itself." (56) The technistic attitude coagulates into a presuppositional belief with no ultimate clarification of evidence. The meaning of the rules, for the technician, is not questioned. The fact that they produce results is enough. The meaning of such a system itself is not made clear.

In effect, what happens within such a technologistic attitude, which remains at the level of distinct evidence, is that judgments as ideal objects are transformed into beliefs. They are attributed to be the source of their own meaning and hence, are fetishized. By claiming that the ideal objects or norms account for their own sense, (which at least at this level of distinct evidence, they do), the possibility of clarifying the sense of this norm is occluded behind the appearance of this ideal object as the organizational principle of the facts concerned in the production of this distinct judgment.

If confusion is ordered by these principles and the ability to organise the vague is attributed to the ideal object itself, the have fetishized the meaning of this ideal object since the ideal object does not organise the vague into the distinct. It is the subject who through his act of
judging, organizes this confusion into distinctness. A classic case of this sort of fetishization is the illusion that capital itself organizes society as a social system, and that capital itself is responsible for the production of commodities.

7. Capitalism as an analytic technology.

The synthetic move from distinctness to clarity is seen, in this thesis, as the statement, in universalizable terms, of the transcendence of the pregiven appearance of the particular example of capital as the ordering norm of society. As we found through our investigation of Marx's method, the source of the meaning of capital is to be found in the subject's own production of capital, in the subjectively performed labour process itself. With the instance of capital as an example, the suspension or conceptual blotting out of the connection between the producer (sic., judging subject), and the object of his production (the clarified judgement which his constitutional, judging act produces), allows the capitalist to claim that the ideal object, capital, has an existence in its own right, independent of the labouror. The material fact of the commodity as a material object is employed as
the proof of capital's ability to realise itself, to become. The transformation of capital into the money form thus "proves" the truth of the the initial assumption of the onto-genetic, self-constituting nature of capital.

8. The limitations of traditional logic as a technology.

Husserl makes roughly the same observations concerning traditional logic when he says that:

The cognitional striving -- which often tends through a merely explicit judging and which the logician (with his interest in scientific judging -- correlatively, scientific judgments as judgments aimed in the direction of truth as cognition) has pre-eminently in mind -- remains quite beside the question in the sphere of pure analytcs; it is abstracted from ((my emphasis)). The identical judgments -- whether clarified, or even at all clarifiable, whether or not it can be converted into cognition, provided only that it is, or can be, derived actually from distinct evidence -- that is the theme...Thus the purely analytic logician has the essential genus, distinct judgement, with the sphere of possible judgments as his province. (57)

If we remain entirely within this province which is defined by the limits of distinct evidence, all that can be established in relation to judgments is:

...consequence (includedness); inconsistency (analytic contradiction, excludedness); and the tertium, judgment compatibility, which is neither one nor the other -- empty non-contradiction, as
the unifiablity of judgments that "have nothing to do with one another". (Or to summarize) the fundamental question of pure analytics can be formulated as follows: When and in what relations, are any judgments -- as judgments and so far as mere form is concerned -- possible within the unity of one judgment.(58)

If all these judgments are compatible, then we can say that they have a unity of meaning. But if this unity itself is questioned, independent of those particular judgings which share it as a unifying norm, formal analytics, within its provincial restriction to distinct evidences, cannot account for this.

In this regard, Marx's explication of the relative nature of the commodity as a measure of exchange in the simple exchange relation (59) is structurally identical to what Husserl is saying at this point. The norm, the essential meaning of all commodities is thus to be found in money. The meaning of money is explained, within the capitalist argument, by means of relating it to commodities as exchange values which clearly begs the question concerning the actual meaning of money. The reverse position, in which the commodity is viewed as the relative form, is simply this begged question in reverse. Neither the meaning of money, nor the meaning of the commodity as an exchange value is made clear by doing this, although the meaning of money is made explicit.
The unifying sense or distinct judgment which allows these individual instances to be understood as a whole, (and here we move back to the general case, with Husserl), is what is not accounted for in a purely analytic method. This character of continuity and consequence which allows one to understand these particular instances as relating as a whole (60) cannot be explained in itself by simply illustrating this meaning with endless non-contradictory examples. If this is done, this unity or the whole as a sense in its own right, must be presupposed for this exercise to make sense.

It is thus the sense of the whole, qua judgment, which must be made clear and this is the aim towards cognition which Husserl talks about. This aim towards cognition culminates in the clarification of the judgment; as a clarification of the judgment as itself a pure sense.

9. The sense of the judgment as a passage to clarity.

The clue to this clarification of the judgment as a pure meaning is inherent in the distinct form of the judgment. (61) Or, to put this in terms of the subject who must perform any clarification of a judgment by means of his judging activity, the clue to this clarification lies in the
activity of judging distinctly which itself yields evidence at the distinct level. As was the case in the synthetic move from the level of vague evidencing to the level of distinct or explicit evidencing, not all distinct judgments permit clarification, as, correspondingly, not all vague opinions lend themselves to explication. (62) On the other hand, all distinct judgments derive from vague judgments, and all clear judgments derive from distinct judgments.

In this way we have a sort of genetic ladder of evidencing in which we can move synthetically through the entire process of the clarification of a judgment as a sense. Each judgment, in this way, has its own genetic history. (63) However, formal analytics, which stops its enquiry at the level of consequence logic, proves incapable of moving to the level of clarity; because the sense of these norms or explicit judgments is accepted presuppositionally as pregivenly valid; or, at the least, this validity is not understood within such a provincially restricted attitude as the essential question which it actually is. However, when the truth of these judgments, as senses or meanings of these now explicit

... judgments are thought from the very beginning, not as mere judgments but as judgments pervaded by a dominant cognitional striving, as meanings that have to become fulfilled, that are not objects by themselves, like the data
arising from mere distinctness ((my emphasis)), but passages to the "truths" themselves that are to be attained." (64)

This demands a shift of theme of enquiry from one which focuses exclusively on the ideal, abstract structure of the judgment, to one in which cognition is the theme of enquiry. This demands that both the abstract form and the "stuffs" which are indeterminant and completely variable in traditional analytics, are drawn into focus. This introduces a new set of problems, since:

all the problems of formal logic, which, as formal, leave out all the non-formal "material of cognition," and, on the other hand, the somehow broader problems to be propounded by a logic -- problems that take into account precisely this non-formal material: for example, questions concerning the possibility of a cognition of real actuality or the possibility of fashioning truths about a real world. (62)

10. The fleshing out of formal analytics by formal ontology.

As Husserl points out, formal logic, as apophantic analytics in its traditional Aristotelian form, owes its "self-containedness" to the abstract character of judgment as an ideal form. (66) Any "'syntactical form'", for example, 'S is p' or 'A is b' as the representations of the same syntactical form, express the identical a priori
principle. What Husserl calls the "syntactical stuffs", are, within the traditional approach to formal logic, completely interchangeable; they are indeterminately optional.(67)
Chapter Four

The Formal Ontological Solution to the One-Sidedness of Traditional Logic and the Transcendental Turn.

1. Syntactical "stuffs" emerge as irreal objects.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Husserl believes that the traditional approach to logic is inadequate because traditional analytics concerns itself with the ideal mechanics of logic. What follows in this chapter is an outline of Husserl's proposed solution to what he sees as a one-sided approach to questions concerning the adequation of judgments as true or false. The issue of judgments leads Husserl to a situation in which an examination of stuffs proves necessary. Since the sense of labour as a human activity is to be found in the judging processes of the subject involved in the labour process, this study of judgments has a corresponding relevance to this paper as well. The necessity of this clarification which Husserl undertakes may be seen if we again look at a judgment executed by a subject as a function of his
The first section of this chapter will examine a hypothetical example of judging in which we hope to show why it is that the issue of judging demands a fleshing out of traditional logic.

If we take the ideal form, 'S is p', this form remains the same whether it has contents 'The sun is shining', or 'Grass is green'. The form remains the same in both statements. If what one is interested in is the ideal form of assertions, then both the assertions which we have used here may be understood as identical. In effect, they mean the same thing if what is focused on is their ideal form.

However, if what we are interested in is not the form of assertions, but is rather, what the contents of these forms mean we can see that these two assertions mean different things. The meaning of the assertion that grass is green is not the same as the assertion that the sun is shining if these assertions are now looked at in relation to the meaning of their content. Husserl's point is that the formal analytic way of focusing on phenomena is one-sided because within this way of looking at things, the meaning of the content is presupposed.

These contents, as Husserl points out, are regarded by traditional logic as indeterminantly optional.
To the formal analytician, the content of the ideal forms lack importance because what is important from the formal analytical standpoint is a grasp of abstract principles. The formal analytician encounters a problem here because 'green' means something different than does 'shine' or 'grass' or 'sun'. Considered in relation to what these words mean, they are abstract just as ideal forms are abstract. Nevertheless, they refer to ontological phenomena. It is the source of the meaning of contents which formal analyticians do not consider. This is what Husserl hopes to flesh out in considering the question of the meaning of contents. This he calls formal ontology. It is formal because meaning is abstract. It is ontological because the correlates to the abstract meanings are ontological. Husserl refers to the meanings of the contents of the forms as "stuffs".(1)

If we consider the statement 'Lead is heavy' from an analytic standpoint, what emerges is the form 'S is p'. However, if this assertion is looked at from the standpoint of whether it is a true assertion or not we need to know what lead means and what weight means. If the formal analytician judges the truth of this statement without accounting for how it is that he knows either of these meanings, he will have presupposed the veracity of his knowledge of the very things upon which the truth of his
judgment is dependent. Before any assertion can be judged in terms of its truth or falsity, the subject who judges must know what the meaning of the contents themselves is. Husserl implies that Aristotle presupposed a knowledge of the meaning of contents in the same way. As Husserl says:

Aristotle had a universal ontology of realities only; and this was what he accepted as first philosophy. He lacked also the cognition that formal ontology is intrinsically prior to the ontology of realities. (2)

The last sentence of the quotation may be explained by saying that before the subject knows that something exists, he must know what existence means because his judging that something exists is predicated upon knowledge of the meaning of the expression "existence". In everyday straightforward living, factually existent

...external Objects...are originally there for us only in our subjective experiencing. But they present themselves in it as Objects already factually existent beforehand (as Objects "on hand") and only entering into our experiencing...In other words: Physical things are given beforehand to active living as objects other than the Ego's own; they are given from outside.(3)

Here Husserl accepts the apparent certainty of everyday discovery, but if what we are concerned with is logical
explanation and we hold to Husserl's position that judgments concerning ontological objects are predicated upon an a priori grasp of abstract meanings, then any judgment concerning material objects is predicated upon knowledge of abstract meanings. Since Husserl claims that any act of consciousing is a consciousness of an object, it follows that meanings are experienced as abstract objects. For all intents and purposes these abstract objects

... are still taken as existent; one "returns to them" as the same formations, and does so repeatedly at will; one employs them in a sort of practice, connects them (perhaps as premises) and generates something new: arguments, proofs, or the like. Thus one does actually deal with them as with real physical things, even though they are far from being realities.\(^{4}\)

Thus the meanings of forms and of stuffs may be approached as if they were real but they are actually irreal.

2. Stuff relates to real objects but are the product of the subject's constitutive activity.

For Husserl, judgments are irreal. Knowledge of judgments as meanings is arrived at through the judging process of the subject. Judging is an activity; judgments are not active but are known through judging. One implies the other, however.
We may contrast judgments arrived at through a focusing on the form of a phenomenon as having no particular factual correlate.

Any judgment arrived at is a result of the subject's own judging processes and as such, this judgment is his "product". Ownership of such a product is absurd since something ideal defies temporal and spatial location and therefore cannot be the possession of any one person. The judgment which is arrived at through the subject's judging process, is, however, something which Husserl claims can be returned to. Such an irreal object can be treated as if it were an ontological object. However, the distinction between the object which is arrived at through the subject's own judicative processes and a material object is a necessary one. In effect, the distinction between these two phenomena of possession is premised upon an understanding of what this "as if" means. Knowledge of the meaning of this "as if" amounts to the distinction between imagination and reality which Marx insists upon if society is to be properly understood. In none of this is the efficacy of imagination in question. But simply thinking about the material world does nothing to change it materially. However, if the material is known through the ideal, a clear understanding of the irreal nature of stuffs
would be necessary before material changes could be meaningfully enacted.

3. Husserl uses Nature as an example of a meaning with a material correlate, (a stuff).

Husserl uses the example of Nature to illustrate the distinction between a straightforward way of understanding a stuff as a being for itself and the way of understanding a stuff as something arrived at through the subject's judicative activity or constitution.

To be sure, we call the unity pertaining to an all-embracing experience Nature, and that it exists and has such and such peculiarities in itself and that it is what or as it is, "before" our judging. A priori, however, it receives the "existing" and the "it is as it is ", the "properties", the "predicatively formed affair-complexes", and the like, only from our judging, and has them only for possible judging subjects. (5)

Thus, according to Husserl, Nature can have no pregiven meaning as a being for itself. The meaning which the subject arrives at in relation to Nature is arrived at through his judicative process.

But once again, the "as if" of imagination comes into question here since all meaning is abstract. If all the subject knows is abstract, then will the subject simply be lost in a world in which everything is known as simply being
"as if"? Husserl claims that he wishes to explain the "'I can'" (6) of a situation in contrast to Hume's "as if". Husserl, by his own admission, (7) does not accomplish this in an indisputable way. It should be pointed out here, however, that Husserl presupposes that the subject is in a normal, wakeful state of consciousness (8) and so he avoids the neurosis which is the logical conclusion of Hume's "as if". Nevertheless, if Husserl wishes to transcend the conclusions of a Humean "as if", he needs to make clear what the problem is which he hopes to transcend.

Inasmuch as we maintain the Marxist position in this paper that truth is experienced as a unity of quality and quantity, but logical explanation requires a move to the abstract, any explanation of truth will appear one sided unless the quantitative is either expressly cited or is implied. If explanation becomes an end in itself, then an "abstraction", in the Marxist sense, sets in.

We believe that it is this same problem of abstraction which Husserl speaks to. In relation to traditional analytics, he says that the

"abstraction" from the material content, this dropping of it with the variability of the merely identifiable, signifies correlatively that concept-forming in logic follows the categorial syntaxes exclusively. (9)
In other words, logic deals exclusively with irreal objects. The validity of these "forms" themselves is not an issue here. These forms, as it has been pointed out in the section of this thesis which deals with the Prolegomena have an ideal validity. The subject's knowledge of this, however, cannot be justified by merely positing these irreal objects as pregiven for to do so would be to fetishize them as self-determinantly meaningful. To continue with Husserl:

... as long as logic remains bound to this concept of the formal -- as long as all "terms" in the fundamental apophantic forms (and in the ((deductive)) forms that can be constructed out of these) are left as variables -- it can acquire only such cognitions about possible truth as are annexed immediately to the pure analytics of non-contradiction... Consequently it cannot make even such universal distinctions as that between individual and categorial objects, or among "mere things", valuable objects, practical goods, and so forth; nor can it make any distinction between universalities drawn from individual objects -- the universalities called genera and species in the usual sense -- and other universalities. (10)

At the level of explicit judging what it is that is judged about is made distinct. For the logician, the forms themselves become the objects judged about. But for the scientist, the formal ontologist, what is judged about
in such an act of explication, are the "stuffs" or "terms" which make up the contents of the "forms". But in either case, what is produced in such an act of explication is an abstract, irreal object. Thus, Husserl concludes by saying that:

Our result is therefore as follows. Like the sciences themselves, analytics as formal theory of science is directed to what exists (ontisch gerichtet; moreover, by virtue of its a priori universality, it is ontological. It is formal ontology. Its a priori truths state what holds for any objects whatever, any objects-provinces whatever, with formal universality, in whatever forms they exist or merely can exist -- as objects of judgments (urteilmässig), naturally...

But what follows is really the point which must be stressed:

since without exception, objects "exist" only as objects of judgments and, for that reason, exist only in categorial forms.(11)

5. Categorial objects as "beings for themselves" in traditional analytics and formal ontology.

This is where the significance of Husserl's syntactical stuffs begins to emerge. Material objects cannot be seen to determine their own meaning without engaging in a kind of animism of facts. Forms relate to stuffs and so, relate to materially existent objects. But, objects "exist" for
subjects only inasmuch as they are meaningfully constituted as being materially existent. Inasmuch as real objects only attain such a status for the subject as having the meaning of being existent in the subject's constitution of them as such, and this constitution involves judgments, judgments, in their turn, are concerned soley with meanings and hence, with irreal objects.

Thus stuffs are the meanings which the subject judges the object of his perceiving to have. As meanings, stuffs themselves are irreal objects. (12) In this case what is judged about at a distinct level in either formal ontology or in formal analytics is not the objects as beings for themselves, but rather, the meanings which I as the judging subject constitute them to have. In this way, one only makes judgments about what these objects mean. One can never judge objects for themselves since without some kind of metaphysical intervention, I can never know what this object means for itself. If it does mean something for itself, I certainly can never know anything about it except as I judge it to be. This meaning which I constitute is abstract. In formal analytics this is more easilly seen than in formal ontology, because in formal ontology, the judging subject always has a factual object as a referent to his meaning. For an instance, the geometrist can draw a line or
a circle to correspond with his idea of a line. In such a case the facts can carry a direct correspondence to his idea. (13) However, the idea remains irreal.

Irreality denotes something which has no factual existence. It follows that what natural science makes judgments about is not existent since natural science, as a formal ontology, is concerned with the judging of syntactical stuffs. To be sure, a material object may correspond to what the scientist judges, but the scientist judges a supposed (14) interpretation of what that really existent object may be understood to mean. Thus, both the traditional, formal analytician and the formal ontologist judge irreal objects, things which in themselves have no actual existence. As Husserl says in *Experience and Judgment*:

...the difficult problems which concern the relation of formal apophantics ((which has the syntactical forms as its irreal objects)) and formal ontology ((which has the syntactical stuffs as its irreal objects)), their correlation and their homogeneity, of even their inner unity, with regard to which their separation proves to be merely provisional, resting only on a difference of point of view and not of domain ((province)). (15)

The problem of abstraction which plagues traditional analytics will correspondingly be a problem for
formal ontology unless the formal ontologist moves beyond a strictly theoretical, and hence one-sidedly abstract, understanding of what it is that he is judging.

6. The hypostatization of exchange-value as an example of a fetishized stuff.

   Out of this we can see the emergence for a logical explanation of Marx's claim that capitalistic theory is a metaphysics. If I make the statement, 'This object is valuable,' it has the form, 'S is p'. The stuffs are 'object' and 'valuable'. 'Object' is substantive and 'valuable' is adjectival. Both are stuffs and as such both are irreal objects and their meaning is constituted or produced by the subject. They relate to one another as that which is valued and that which is predicated about the object. As irreal, neither stuff has a factual existence, although the substantive may have a really existent correlate in a material object. This object, as an inert material fact has no determining effect in this relation since to claim that it does would be animistic. Thus, the object comes to be valued through a judgment produced by the subject. It becomes a 'valuable object' in the subject's judging it as such.
For the merchant, however, the value lies with what this object is not. In this guise, the valuable object becomes an exchange value. The correctness of the merchant's judgment is, in turn, completely contingent upon another person's judging that this exchange value is indeed a valuable object. The merchant's initial judgment is validated in the sale of the commodity. This occurs when the commodity is seen by the purchaser as either a use-value, as would be the case in straightforward consumption, or equally, as an exchange value, as would be the case with someone who wished to work as a 'middle-man'. In the latter case, the merchant would perform yet another mercantile exchange using the commodity in question as the factual referent or index to the judgment which he has produces in his judicative activity.

In this entire relation the object itself has nothing to say. The veracity of the initial judgment produced by the merchant, that is, his judging that 'S is p', is itself fulfilled in his customer's judging that this is so. What is factually exchanged, however, is simply the inert material object which corresponds to the syntactical stuffs of the syntactical form 'S is p'. It is these syntactical stuffs about which judgments are made, and not the inert objects themselves.
7. Materialistic and idealistic metaphysics are structurally equivalent: the fetishization of stuffs; the fetishization of forms.

Now, it is clear how traditional logic, with its focus on syntactical forms can fall into the illusion that categorial objects have a being for themselves, and hence can become a metaphysical mode for the explanation of understanding. The categorial objects appear to take on lives of their own in the mind of the judging subject, but this subject conceives of these now conceptually existent forms as having an ontological status for themselves outside of the subject's own constitution of them as such. Since any positing of meaning is necessarily a doxic positing (16) and, at this level of awareness this positing is not clarified as an assumption, what is posited at this level is believed to simply be the case; to be the way things "are". However, the illusive thing at this level of awareness is that the positing of the way things are as being factually existent occludes the actuality that what has been posited is actually only an interpretation of the way things "are". Thus, Husserl says that within the naive and technistic attitudes the sense of the word "pregiven" is not even understood. (17) Thus, with Marx, we can say that in capitalistic society the metaphysics of the transactions
which take place in everyday life occurs behind the backs of those involved; people move within this world as fish in water, never knowing what the word 'wet' means. (18) Ergo Hegel's Geist. The metaphysics of this is clear since what has no factual existence is attributed an ontological existence. However, demonstrating that the irreal objects of formal ontology may themselves be fetishized and may achieve a metaphysical status, is a more illusive task, since every stuff has its corresponding factually existent material object. But it would be necessary to occlude the supposed meaning of the stuff behind the factual appearance of the really existing correlate of the stuff in order to make the supposed interpretation of the factually existent object (sic. the stuff) appear to be a really existing fact. This is precisely what Marx claims is done in the production of capital (19) and both Husserl and Marx maintain the irreducibility of the real and the irreal. For Husserl, an "essential separation between the real and the irreal," must be maintained. For Marx, quality and quantity, that is, essence and fact must never be seen as self-identical. (20)

8. The irreal object (idea) is posited as psychophysically exterior to the subject when it is occluded behind its objective referent.
As Marx points out, it is the conceptual suspension of this essential separation which allows the production of capital. When the ideal and irreal are not clearly differentiated but nevertheless understood as conjointly experienced, facts can appear to take on lives of their own, posited as psycho-physically outside of the subject's factual body. In this way, facts which are really outside of the subject's body appear to have a being as meanings outside the subject's body as well. Since facts are "understood", it is supposed that what is understood has been acquired from the 'outside' because this is where facts are to be found. However, this only follows if the initial assumption that facts determine their own meaning is presupposed in the first place. Since it is absurd to claim that the subject actually has facts as they physically exist inside his head, the inside/outside dichotomy appears to be sensible. But it is equally absurd to claim that meaning, which is abstract, can be accounted for by something which is actually psychophysically separated from the subject since this leads to the kind of absurdity which we saw in the Prolegomena section of this essay in reference to Hume. In the case of natural science, the assumption that the meaning of the factually existing data is known for itself is an equally absurd proposition. However, if this is
assumed to be the actual case, this puts the judgments of the technician in a position exterior to him in a psychophysical sense and allows him to say that what he judges things to be is simply a function of the way things 'really are'. This allows the technician a complete abrogation of responsibility for what he judges things to be. This abrogation of responsibility is structurally identical to that of the religious fanatic who claims that he is only an instrument of God's will which is something which has a factual existence exterior to himself in spatio-temporal terms.

Such an abrogation of responsibility on the part of someone who judges stuffs denies any responsibility for the judgments produced in his judging of material objects as stuffs. In so doing, the meaning of the objects as stuffs is presupposed. In all off this the suppositional character of the interpretation of the material world is lost, and in this way ones interpretation takes on not only the appearance of "reality". This "reality" now appears to be truly existent as both real and ideal in the appearance of the perceived fact as a being for itself. In this way it appears to be factually existent and hence, impervious to change.
It is within such an attitude that the subject is conditioned by the mode of production. The mode of production as a stuff is an irreal object produced by the subject in his own judging activity. If the subject is aware that his interpretation of the material world is only suppositional, then he need not be conditioned by the mode of production. It is because Marx never described how it is possible to shift one's attitude and thus escape from this world of appearance that his method remains illusive and incomplete from a theoretical standpoint. Marx never provides us with an explanation of how it is that he can produce the results which he does.

9. Idealism and materialism can be equally fetishistic in relation to their respective objects; the immanent contradiction between fetishistic idealism and fetishistic materialism.

It should be apparent from what we have said that the difference between a fetishistically premised materialism and a similarly premised idealism is only an apparent one. (21) When such forms-fixated theories (idealisms) and stuffs-fixated (mathematico-empirical sciences) confront one another in debate, they are caught in an irrevocable "either/or" since both are valid if their presuppositions are granted, but both have their grounding
normative premise in something which is a "holy cow" which cannot be doubted without plunging the whole exercise into complete chaos. As a norm, this grounding presupposition is what establishes the internal sense of the normative discipline in question. (22) It is what allows the scientist, for instance, to make judgments concerning the consistency and continuity of the domain of his enquiry, of his field of investigation.

But because the source of this norm itself may be converted or transmuted in the mind of the subject into a fetish object, the source of the meaning of this norm, (which in actuality lies with the judging activity of the subject himself), is occluded. The subject as the constitutive agent, the labourer viewed in a universal sense, disappears as the source of the meaning of these norms. Thus, when a debate between a formal analytician and a formal ontologist takes place, if neither one is capable of simply viewing his irreal object as a supposed meaning, they will become caught in an immanent contradiction in which the only way to resolve this conflict is the obliteration of the 'other side'. Since both the poles in this dichotomy are actually talking about the same thing, that is, their respective fetishes, and either fetish is equally absurd, no resolution can ever come out of such a
debate. Thus, as Marx points out, romanticism in its fetishized form will play the role of the negator to capitalism until capitalism dissolves. (23) The former is simply the relativistic reflection of the absurdity of the latter. The latter is an affirmation of the absurdity upon which it is premised as if it were the truth.

10. Formal ontology and formal analytics are valid enterprises as long as they do not become ends in themselves.

But Husserl denies neither formal analytics, which he refers to as the proper theory of theory with its province of consequence and non-contradiction as its proper sphere (24), nor does he deny the efficacy of endeavours which find their basis in a formal ontological fashion. The latter is what allows a mathematized approach to the study of nature, which is the approach which western science in general has adopted. What Husserl does condemn is a technistic approach in which the initial desire to cognise (25) has been set out of view occlusively through a fetishization of stuffs. In turning their norms into ends in themselves, formal ontologically focused science (and since they are structurally equivalent, we can include formal analytics as well here)...
Becomes a mere art of achieving, through a calculating technique according to technical rules...One operates with letters and with signs for connections and relations (+, x, =, etc.) according to the rules of the game, for arranging them together in a way essentially not different, in fact, from a game of cards of chess. ((Hence))...the original thinking that genuinely gives meaning to this technical process and truth to the correct results (even "formal truth" peculiar to the formal mathesis universalis) is excluded...(26)

But this "superficialization" which "'mechanizes'' (27) science, according to Husserl, is only a "tendency". It is not an inevitability. As Husserl says:

One is, of course, to some degree conscious of the difference between techne and science. But the reflection back upon the actual meaning which was to be obtained for nature through the technical method stops too soon. (28)

The problem with techne is that it is an historically embedded norm,(29) and so, as with capital as a mode of production of "wealth", techne, as a mode of producing an understanding of nature, appears as objectively pregiven (30) and hence, it "exists" as an ontos prior to my constitution of it.

11. Naive reflection does not transcend the apparent (sic., pregiven) but rather, moves within it.
The transcendence of this occluded attitude is thus equivalent to the transcendence of fetishization where we understand both occlusion and fetishization to encompass not only techne or capital, but any possible meaning whatsoever. Thus, a radical alteration of attitude (31) is called for. Reflections upon the abstract categories produced in formal disciplines and normatively applied in a techne will not provide us with what we need, if such a reflection itself moves within a naive or fetish fixated attitude. As Husserl says:

In the "natural reflection" of everyday life...we stand on the footing of the world as already existing -- as when, in everyday life, we assert: "I see a house there" or "I remember having heard this melody". (32)

But such natural reflections do not penetrate below the appearance of the categories. Such a reflection, while valid at its own level of evidence, can offer no explanation for the genesis of the constitution of the irreal object about which something is now judged.

Thus all occaisional (even "philosophical") reflections which go from technical...work to its true meaning always stop at idealized nature ((i.e., the potentially fetishized syntactical stuffs)); they do not carry out the reflection radically, going back to the ultimate purpose which ((science or
philosophy)) was from...((its historical)) beginning supposed to serve...a purpose which lay in this prescientific life ((i.e., that is, in terms of the activity of judging, the level of evidencing which genetically precedes the level of ontological explication)) and was related to its life-world. (33)

12. Categorial objects as "passage ways".

If the abstract forms and stuffs are not fetishistically fixed as opaque objectivities, as self-explanatory, Husserl feels that they can act as "passages" (34) or "pathways" which one can follow back to the sense which was initially present in the opinion which lead the judging subject to the level of distinct judging. This is consistent with Husserl's method, since, as we have put it, there is a 'ladder' (35) of evidencings provided to the judging subject by the judgment-sense or meaning which was vaguely or obscurely present in the initial opining but which was not explicit at this prior level of judging. Now, having made this meaning distinct by moving to the abstract, but remembering not to truncate this investigation of meaning sense in a fetishistic fashion at this level of judging, the subject can move back, in reflection, to the initial act of opining. However, having ascended to the
abstract, the subject returns to experience with the advantage of understanding distinctly what it was which he originally posited in his vague judging act.

13. The move to the "life-world" (36) and the potential for the emergence of 'phenomenologism' as the abstract statement of all technonologies.

It is important to note at this point that Husserl does not simply continue on towards a higher level of abstraction. If, indeed, what Husserl was interested in was simply the categorial forms or irreal objects, he could continue on in a straight line, so to speak, from the abstract forms and stuffs which are made explicit at the second level of judging. If this were the case, then Husserl would simply be involved in a "double-abstraction" in which he goes the formal ontologist and formal analytician one better by performing a kind of "I told you so" theoretical move in which he could re-state what the technicians in question had established, but in a new jargon. Phrases like "theory of theory" and "experience of experience" may lead one to understand Husserl's phenomenology as simply an undefined abstract statement of the already abstract. However, theory of theory is traditional analytics, not phenomenology. If phenomenology
were only a theory of theory, then all of Husserl's investigations after 1900 would only be footnotes to the Prolegomena.

It is possible to see Husserl's phenomenology in this way, and if understood in this way, a phenomenologism, with its new language, phenomenologese, can emerge. The phenomenologists can simply become the new high priests of the age of technologism because their new language makes it possible to express in universal terms, and hence, in any case whatsoever, some sort of universal "truths in themselves" which are the ultimate, formal statement of the universal fetish. Within such a reification of the already reified the phenomenologist would forever be one step ahead of the technician who would have only his one fetish object with its corresponding factual referent to which the phenomenologist could point to as a particularistic restriction. Because the phenomenologist could express all possible fetishes within the rubric of one mode of expression, he could correspondingly claim to be in possession of the universal explanation, and hence, would forever be advantaged. In this way, a knowledge of the facts of Husserl could lead the phenomenologist to think that he had in his possession, the ultimate tool, the ultimate, universal answer as it presents itself in the ultimate
fetish object -- the universals, the "Things in Themselves" -- these would be the ultimate fetish objects. And in their universality, they would be beyond the wit of anyone but the phenomenologist. We do not believe that Husserl has this in mind as the goal of his phenomenology. Whether or not Husserl can avoid such an abstraction is another issue which lies somewhat outside of the range of this paper. (37)

14. The zigzag (viz., dialectical flow) of the critique of reason.

In both the Logical Investigations and in Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl says that the critique of reason is a zigzag. (38) Having "zigged" up to the level of the abstract, so to speak, Husserl now "zags" back to the initial experiencing to repair the rupturing of experience (39) which takes place in abstraction. Husserl moves back to the initial, unitary state of affairs which, in the process of making the categorial objects distinct, has been torn asunder. It should be pointed out here that Husserl's description of this return to the life world is necessarily a theoretical one. Since we maintain the demonstrability of Marx's first "Thesis on Feuerbach", what we understand Husserl to be describing here is a unity of theory and praxis. This assumption which we are making seems to diverge
from a strict textual interpretation of Husserl. However, if Husserl is asking us to actually move to experience, even if this is an "experience of experience", this experiencing can only be performed by a consciousing subject. An experience of experience is no less an experience than the initial experience was. If this initial experience was an activity in the constitutive sense, then the experience of experience will similarly be an activity. Even the subject's participation in the reading or writing of theory is experiential, and hence, it is an activity in the constitutive sense. What we interpret Husserl to mean when he calls for a return to the life-world is a concretizing move which does not simply thrust the subject back into a naive attitude of accepting meanings as pregiven. If this were the case, then one could only know truth as an abstraction. If truth can only be known as an abstraction, then Husserl himself cannot be seen as transcending the problem which we believe he has pointed to in relation to both formal ontology and formal analytics. Husserl himself calls for a bracketing of theoretical considerations as part and parcel of the transcedence of pregivens. It follows that at some point Husserl himself will have to move beyond the purely theoretical and live.
14. The move back to the actual unity of lived experience moves through categorial objects to the original "it itself".

In returning to this unitarily experienced phenomenon, Husserl is not simply concretizing the abstract by shoving the "facts" of the experience back into whatever empty categorial object which the experiencing subject has since made distinct. What Husserl moves to to concretize such an abstract categorial object, is the subject's actual living, breathing, life experience of meaning replete with its hyle (40), with these now explicated in relation to what the subject initially and in a muddy way, posited them as being. The question of whether or not such a move can be performed in a reflective-passive mode is crucial at this point. However, we shall set this question aside.

15. The move to the the life-world does not lose the object but allows all objects to be understood equally as intentional objects.(phenomena).

At this point, we can say with Marx that

To be radical is to go to the root. For man, however, the root is man himself.
(41)

Man, for Marx, is homo faber. (42) Man is the labourer, and within the context of this thesis, man, as labourer, is a
judging subject. However, as long as Marx (and Marxists) leaves the phenomenon of judging, or of labour itself, for that matter, inexplicit and unclarified there will be no hope of moving being the sort of metaphysical interpretation of the dialectic into which Lukacs falls.

Only if we are no longer engaged merely in our simple judicative doing on the basis of experience (the doing in which we acquire the categorial formations (irreal Objects)) -- only if we go on to synthetically make our experiencing itself and its productions a theme of judgment, can we have original knowledge of the fact that this (harmoniously flowing) experiencing already bears "implicitly" in itself, "before" our thinking, the being-sense of Nature, as the same sense as thinking explications. (43)

To continue:

The naivete of speaking about "objectivity" without ever considering subjectivity as experiencing, knowing, accomplishing, the naivete of the scientist of nature or the world in general, who is blind to the fact that all that he attains as objective truths and the objective world itself as the substratum of his formulae (the everyday world of experience as well as the higher-level conceptual world of knowledge) are his life-construct developed within himself -- this naivete is naturally no longer possible as soon as life becomes the point of focus ((i.e. the lived experience of the subject)). (44)

This move to "life" is not always made successfully,
however. Some do not succeed in making such a move.

They do not succeed because they cannot replace the practice of living in perception, their attention turned towards the perceived object both in observation and in theoretical inquiry, by directing their glance upon the perceiving itself, or upon the way in which the perceived object with its distinguishing features is presented, and of taking that which presents itself in the immanent analysis of the essence just as it presents itself through the subject's lived experiencing.

By positing all objects of whatever kind as equal in relation to their a priori sense, and by positing the subject's understanding of the being of these objects as the product of the subject's constitution of these objects as being such and such, Husserl can treat all fetishes as equivalent. Thus, a solution a fetishization which involves a material object as something which "is" will be structurally the same as the solution to a fetishization of an ideal object as something which "is".

In both the case of an analytic empiricism and an analytic idealism, these objects to which the relative approach addresses itself, the axioms (46) from which deductions move, are accepted as pregiven. This pregiveness is actually the product of a judging performed by the subject. It has its sense as an object of a judgment. At the
level of distinctness, it is enough to explicate what this object qua categorial object is, but the origin of the meaning of this categorial object need not be clarified. According to Husserl, any judgment is meant inasmuch as it is posited as being such and such.\(^{(47)}\) Such a positing of the being of an object as meaning something is, for Husserl, an intentional positing. In any act of consciousing this intention acts as a matrix within which the hyle are meaningfully ordered into a sensible phenomenon. For Husserl, and act of consciousing (viz., process) must have an object which is held intentionally by the subject and, obviously, a subject who intends towards such an object. This is a unitary act which can only be split apart in abstraction. It has the character of ego-cogito-cogitatum,\(^{(48)}\) where the ego is the subject, the cogito is the intention and the cogitatum is the intentional object. Thus, as Husserl says, the intentional object, which is itself, irreal, acts as a "clue" \(^{(49)}\) or index which guides sense investigation from one level of judging to another level of judging.

The cogitatum here is the intentional object. Every cogito has its corresponding cogitatum. This cogito may signify 'I desire', 'I wish', 'I value', or whatever, and this intending towards the cogitatum, or object, is what is
posited as its being for me, as the judging subject. As Carr notes:

What Husserl seeks in *Erlebnisse* ((lived intentional experience)) is the 'origin' of precisely that *giveness* of objects...Not the ((factual)) being of objects, but their *being for me* is what is to be accounted for.(50)

Thus:

to say that something -- anything whatever -- is given is to say that it corresponds to or fulfils an intention -- objectivity cannot be given without intention, which is to say that something objective is given insofar as it is meant as being. (51)

The object was first understood as a result of the subject's constitution of it as meaning something; as an intentional object. Thus the manner in which the object is intended towards, as it is constitutively posited as being in the subject's judging activity is, at the first, straightforward level of evidencing, not questioned. It stands, for all intents and purposes, as it appears at first glance. By approaching the intentional object at the second level of evidencing, this object can be judged axiomatically, and it is these axioms which act as the unexamined presuppositions of deductive technologies. But the sense of these norms, or axioms, is implicit in the way the subject has the object of perception as being something meaningful in his first vague intentional having of the object; that is, as a *cogitatum*. 
16. The sense of the judgment acts as the connection between different levels of judging.

In terms of judging, the first encounter with the object will present the judging subject as "perhaps this". If I, as the judging subject, become curious about this object, I will move to the second level of evidencing to determine whether or not my first supposition or positing of this object as being what I initially supposed it be can be made categorically distinct. This demands a reflection on the \textit{cogitatum qua cogitatum}. \textscript{(52)} If I, as the judging subject, cannot free myself from the first positing of being, I will remain within the naive assumption that my first positing of the being of an object as of perception as meaning something is 'true'. Even if I succeed in explicating this meaning as a categorial or irreal object, if I maintain that my initial opinion is unquestionably true, I will correspondingly maintain the same prejudice in regard to the categorial object which is produced at the second level of judging.

If I find at the second level of judging at which I make this object as intended explicit, that my initial, vaguely posited opinion avails itself to explication as something distinct, this possibility exists not because of my abstract explication of it, but, rather, in the actuality
that I intended towards the perceived object (53) in such
and such a way in my first judging act at the level of
indistinctness. In other words, the sense which logically
bridges the first and the second levels of judging must be
implicit in the first level of judging itself. This sense is
not created at the second level nor is this sense the
product of a category which may itself be conceived of as
being active, (although this may appear to be the case to
someone who is lost in the fetish world which can develop at
this level of abstraction). The thing which is present at
the vague level and at the distinct level as well is the
product of the initial intentional having of the object as
something meaningful.

17. Genetic investigation and recovery of the sense
through this investigation.

If we turn our attention to the sense of the
phenomenon which we now hold reflectively we will find that
it is the intention with which this phenomenon was initially
constituted which lends this phenomenon its sense. If we
make this intention itself the theme of our enquiry,
something emerges for us here.
Confining our attention to the doxic (belief positing) reflection possible in every case, we see that something new becomes posited in it, namely the sense to which reflection is directed: the perceptual sense, the valuational sense, the practical sense, or the like -- in short, the supposed or meant as such. Everywhere, moreover, this sense must become thematic if "criticism" is to be instituted. All acts in a pre-eminent sense of the word, namely all intentional mental processes that bring about "positions" (positings, theses, position-takings)..., are subject to a critique of "reason"; and each to a genus of such a position a peculiar evidence corresponds, which, according to an eidetic law, can be transmuted into a doxic evidence. (54)

If we take as the theme of our reflection, acts in which the being of the meaning of an object is posited, (that is, intentional acts) the intention itself emerges as the sense or meaning of the object which is constituted as meaning such and such. This intentionally performed positing of the being of something as meaningful may be a positing of this object as having its sense as practical, valuable, and so on. But this is only its sense as the consciousness subject constitutes it to be. In order for criticism to be undertaken, this sense itself must be made the theme of our enquiry. For Husserl, all acts are either constitutive of meaning or are mediately dependent upon such "originary" activity (55). In this way, all acts are either acts in
which meanings are produced, or are dependent (viz., mediate) upon such acts for their originary sense. Thus, all acts, at one level or another, are intentional or meaning positing acts. It is therefore possible on principle to get to the intentional core of all acts if a full genetic enquiry is undertaken.

Those acts which are not originary of meaning themselves, but which depend for their sense upon prior acts of meaning constitution, still find their sense in this prior originary activity. Thus, every act has its own "history" (56) so to speak, which can be de-sedimented, presuppositional layer by presuppositional layer, until the initial or "first" originary constitutive performance is arrived at. It is clear that such a "history" may have correlative objective historical facts associated with it, (as, for instance, when one says "I first understood the Pythagorean theorem on such and such a day and in such and such a place," ) but the genetic analysis of this phenomenon in question, as a phenomenon of meaning, must be undertaken with an attitude which transcends the contingencies of any particular time or place.

Each intentional structure of consciousness has its own "peculiar evidence", for instance, all acts of valuing share the evidence of what it is to value. (57)
These evidences, as a matter of principle, can themselves be "transmuted" into evidences which can be "doxically posited". Since Husserl maintains that nothing can be expressed, except as a doxically posited something, (58) this simply means that these evidences can be put into expressable form. (59) The significance of this for Marx's conception of realization will be explored below.

18. The transcendental turn.

(i.) The move to the first person: the phenomenological "I".

Here we are confronted with a number of things: First, such a reflection requires a shift in attitude; Second, the theme of our enquiry is the act of intentional positing itself; third, what is derived from such a shift in attitude is evidence. These three things are closely interrelated.

This shift in attitude is referred to variously as the *epoché*, the phenomenological reduction, or simply as "bracketing". The first move of such a reduction is dictated by the demands of what it is wished to focus upon; that is, intentional consciousness. Since the only subject's intentional consciousness to which anyone has direct access is his own, this demands a move to the constituting ego as
an I, myself. Thus, Husserl follows Descartes' example by moving to the ego cogito. As Husserl states:

First of all, before everything else conceivable, I am. This "I am" is for me, the one who says it, and says it in the right sense, the primitive intentional basis for my world; and, at the same time, it must not be overlooked that likewise the "Objective" world, the "world for all of us" as accepted with this sense by me, is also "my world". But "I am" is the primitive intentional basis, not only for "the" world, the one I consider real, but also for any "ideal world" that I accept; and this holds without exception, for anything and everything of which I am conscious as something existent in any sense whatsoever that I understand or accept — for everything that I show, sometimes legitimately, sometimes illegitimately, to be existent — including me myself, my life, my believing, and all this consciousness-of. (60)

...that is, my whole intentionally posited being in the "objective" world as well as my "being" in imagination.

(ii.) The epoché as a radical bracketing of all being as posited by myself, including self-image.

Inasmuch as my life, my believing, and so forth are constituted by me, these phenomena as well must be bracketed, qua cogitationes. Their meaning, held by me to be the case, their 'being so' for me must be altered from a level of straightforward assertion to a level on which they emerge as suppositions which are not prior to my constitution
of them (sic. as pre-suppositions), but are my product. Now, in reflection, these acts are recognized by me as my psychic possession. This includes within it, my self-image; my imagining of what I am, for this too is constituted by me. True, this may be constituted by me relative to what someone else is, but this other person is for me what I make of that person to be. The other's meaning for himself remains his own business. The other constitutes his meaning on his own. I can constitute meaning relative to what I believe someone else is, but this is a constitution of my own "being", or properly put, meaning, relative to something I can never know without the intervention of some sort of metaphysical mediation.

If I believe that I "am" what "I am" (sic. mean), relative to what I believe the other is, I will depend on the other's meaning which, in actuality, is my own constitution of what I believe the other to be. In this way, I occlude my own being behind this fantasy of what I believe, but can never know, the other to be. Thus, I occlude my own meaning behind the appearance of the other which I myself have constituted. If, correspondingly, I believe what the other tells me he is, and accept this as true without judging this assertion myself, if I take someone else's word for what he says he is iand I believe
this presuppositionally, he can lie to me until the end of
time, and he will have the "ability" to make me believe
anything about himself or about myself. The latter follows
if I have constituted my meaning relative to what I naively
believe either what he tells me about himself, or what I
naively believe "him" to mean for himself. Thus, as Marx
says, the shopkeeper can discern a lie from the truth
because he does not take someone else's word for what he
claims to be; the shopkeeper judges for himself. This is
something, which Marx says, is still to be learned by
philosophers.(61)

In bracketing "my" being as a meaning constituted
by me, Husserl transcends Descartes' argument for the
existence of God as the perfect ontic counterpart to my own
imperfect being. (62) He also avoids the begged question of
Descartes' _cogito ergo sum_ (63) because this "sum" is
itself, something constituted by me. Thus we have
_ego-cogito-cogitatum_ -- I think thoughts.

(iii.) Experience remains complete within a
phenomenologically bracketed attitude.

However, I lose none of the experience of these
phenomena in bracketing their being, for what I have
bracketed is not the facts, but the meaning which I have,
genetically speaking, already constituted them to mean. Thus
the hyle are not "lost"; they remain. The world of facts is
not lost in this suspension of being (64), for facts in
themselves have nothing to do with how I understand them.
The world as a fact remains, but the world of meaning which
I constitute is bracketed. To think that the facts which I
sensuo-empirically experience are lost in a bracketing of
"being" is to collapse the irreal with what factually
exists. Facts may have an empirical existence, but this does
not determine how I will constitutively interpret them. And
to claim that the facts, for themselves, explain anything
about themselves is patently psychologistic and as such, is
absurd.

Such a bracketing calls rather for the

Ego's non-participation in the "posing"
(believing, taking a position as to being)
that part of the straightforward ((act of
perception)) in no wise alters alters the
facts that his ((the judging subject's))
reflecting experiencing is precisely an
experiencing experiencing of ((his own
initial act of perception)) with all its
moments, which belonged to it before and
are continuing to take shape. (65)

What such a bracketing accomplishes is a move
beyond what is posited by me as prior to my constitution of
it. A bracketing, however, does not deny the world. It
rather demands that I set aside any assumptions about
whether or not the world I constitute as being such and such
is or is not this way. Thus:

In transcendental-phenomenological reflection we deliver ourselves from this
((existentially posited, pregiven))
footing by universal epoché with respect
to the being or not being of the
world.(66)

Since any being is intentionally posited by the me as the
being of an object as meaning something, a counter-positing
of its not being is simply the negation, or immanent
contradiction, to this first positing of being. What is at
issue is not a negation of this or an affirmation of this
but a synthetic move to a clarified understanding of what
was initially meant. Through such a bracketing

...experience as thus modified, the
transcendental experience ((i.e., the
experience of that which is not contingent
to any temporal or spatial location))
consists, then, we can say, in a looking at
—and describing the particular
transcendently reduced cogito
((intention)), but without participating,
as reflective subjects in the natural
existence -posing that the originally
straight forward perception (or the other
cogito ) contains or that Ego, as
immersing himself straightforwardly in the
world actually executed. (67)

Thus, in this bracketing of the being of the world
as meant, I neither negate this world nor do I lose it in
any way. The world is retained, but it is retained as a
phenomenon which I have structured as meaning what it does which is to say how it has its being for me. Through this bracketing of all beliefs I ostensibly will have achieved a "disinterested" or detatched attitude towards "the" world and the place I understand myself to hold within this reality or any other which I may constitute. By doing this, Husserl claims that I can experience, go through the old process, not in the sense of merely repeating the old act (68), but in an investigative fashion. This initial experience, which within the naive or straightforward attitude is
taken as "normal", simply there, unbroken, existing in pure ontic certainty (69)...
is now the focus of my investigation. But in my present going through this previous act of "doxic positing", I now refrain from the positing which in the initial act of judging this phenomenon, made it what it 'was' for me. Because of this I am not simply repeating it in a kind of rote fashion. Having already made distinct what it was that I originally opined, I have something upon which to focus in relation to this initial act of judging. I now have the distinct or explicated categorial form, understood now not as the abstract embodiment of my initial idea, but as something which demands, to use the Marxist term loosely
here, to be "concretized". (70) The category can thus act as
a passage way to direct the focus of my attention. As
Husserl says, in the act of explication, the polythetic is
made monothetic. (71) By moving to the abstract, my
experience is ordered in a logically reconstructable way.
But the rote repetition of the initial act is not, as we
have pointed out, to be construed as the purpose of either
the move to the abstract, nor of the reduction itself.

Thus, in the move back to the original lived
experience, the initial unity of such an experience is
recovered by the experiencing subject. To the subject who
has never made a move to the abstract, this rupture will
never have occured. Mind you, such a subject will also
never have ventured past the stages of what Kosik (72)
refers to as "vegetative" consciousness which is perhaps too
cruel a way of putting this, but one which is nevertheless
to the point.

(iv.) What is evident when all pregivens are set aside is
"self-evident" or apodictic.

What I can attain in such a clear headed return to
the unity of experience, which now becomes my possession
again, is an apperception of pure meanings in unity with the
memory of the hyle which were conjointly given with these essences in my initial experiencing of them. What I now confront as meaningful will not be contingent upon any particular constitutive act or the particulars related to it, since, by having put out of play any positing of being whatsoever, (and this necessarily includes theoretical considerations as ends in themselves), what I will experience at this level of clarity must be essential in the strict sense of this word. What I will discover in what may also be called a totalization, (bearing in mind that all theoretical considerations have by this point been put out of play -- including Hegel's), will thus be atemporal, have no factual existence in the fetishized empirical or idealistic metaphysical sense, and will defy any attempt to define them in terms of original location. These essences or qualities or species, whatever name one chooses is immaterial, will display what Husserl refers to as self-evidence. They cannot be doubted since they are what remains after everything which can be doubted has been doubted through the radical application of the epoché; application, as Husserl says in the Crisis, which must occur at one blow. (74)

But as Husserl notes, this way of expressing what is atemporal or non-contingent of the experience, is
"actually ((an)) overblown" way of expressing what is obtained. (75) In this form of expression, we run the risk of making what should be the quintessence of clarity into a turgid and potentially fetishized irreal object.

"Self-evidence" means nothing more than grasping an entity with the consciousness of its original ...Selbst-da ((its there it is!, its "eureka" moment)). Successful realization of this project is, for the acting subject, self-evidence, what has been realized is there, originaliter, as itself. (76)

Or to put this in everyday language, "What more can you say?" about what you find what you do when you get to this point?

This self-evidence, for an instance, may be the evidence which I have of the apodictic certainty of logical principles, for logical principles relate

... not to what is given only in active evidence, but to the abiding formations that have been primarilly instituted in active evidence and can be reactivated and identified again and again; it relates to them as objectivities which are henceforth at hand, with which taking hold of them again, one can operate in thinking, and which, as the same, one can further shape categorically into more and more new formations.(77)

But self-evidence relates not only to the ideal forms of traditional analytics. It relates to any intentional having
of an object, any meaning which I either can or do constitute. In this way the self-evident truth of valuing an object, for instance, a cigarette lighter, is the same as that truth or the essential meaning of valuing which I experience in valuing my social position or my Mercedes-Benz. What that particular object means to me in the moment in which I constitute it as valuable, will be essentially the same as when I value any other object. Clearly, valuing too has its modalities within it, and these can be explored in a sense investigation of these different modes of the intention, to value. Thus, a norm can be established within which such an investigation may be undertaken. However, this norm cannot be fixed as itself the source of its own meaning, for to do so would be to fetishize this norm, this intentional structure of understanding, as an abstract but apparently self-determining irreal object.

Clearly, valuing is not the only phenomenon which may be explored in such a way. The same holds true for every way in which meaning can be posited, for instance, the "doxic modalities" of willing, trusting, being jealous, being afraid, loving, hating and so forth, ad infinitum. Thus:
Evidence quite universally, is indeed nothing other than the mode of consciousness -- built up perhaps as an extraordinary complex hierarchcal structure -- its intentional objectivity in the mode of belonging to the original 'it itself'. (78)

...where the "it itself" is the Selbst-da of the intentional experience, experienced by me in my conscious life.

(v.) Self-evidences are atemporal; as qualities they are equally valid as what they themselves are, and as such, are relative one to the other.

These self evidences are transcendental, to use Husserl's expression, because they transcend the contingencies of my experience of of space and time. True:

The particular formative processes of thinking are temporally outside one another (viewed as real psychic processes in real human beings, they are outside one another in Objective time); they are individually different and seperated ((and here we see the grounding conception for psychologism)). Not so, the thoughts that are thought in thinking. To be sure, the thoughts do not make their appearance in consciousness as something "external". They are not real objects, not spatial objects, but irreal formations produced by the mind; and their peculiar essence excludes spatial extension, original locality, and mobility. (79)

The reduction to these essences, which are witnessed in the unity of intentional-constitutive conscionising activity, says Husserl, opens up a conscious
...awareness of the world-whole ((what we have chosen to refer to in passing as the totality )) in its own peculiar form, that of spatio-temporal endlessness (( i.e., infinity)). Throughout every change in consciousness the universe -- remains as the existing background of our whole natural life. (80)

Thus, the reduction does not do away with the factual world. These facts simply bear no mention, since if they are mentioned they must be constituted as meaning something. In my experience lies a factual residuum, like the ground my feet rest upon of the wall which my eyes "rest" upon. In normal , wakeful consciousness (81) this hyletic data is always there -- not because I make it materially in my intentional constitution of it ; I do not create hyle in my imagination unless I am hallucinating -- but as inert.

What forms the materials ((hyletic data)) into intentional experiences and brings in the specific element of intentionality is the same ((;this infinite range of ideal possibilities Husserl calls the transcendental ego.)) as that which gives its specific meaning to our use of the term "consciousness", in accordance with which consciousness points eo ipso to something of which it is the consciousness. (82)

19. "The" world becomes my world as I constitute it.
With the relativization of all categories all notions of what the world which I share with others means are equally relativized. What this means is that they all become equally valid in their own right. While it should be clear that all such opinions are not equally evidentially fulfillable, each opinion nevertheless has its own validity. This also includes my opinion of the world. In returning the world to me as my meaning of the world, my idea of it, the "natural" order of things in capitalistic society where my world is my factual possessions has been reversed so that my own ideal world is now my possession.

20. The move to the social world.

What brings the"world", "reality" into being as meaningful is my , (or ostensibly any other subject's), constitution of it as such. It is imaginable that one could exist in a world without meaning. But in such a condition, it would be impossible for this existence to be known be me.

Caught within the world of straightforward constitution, in which my attention is always trained on the object which I perceive, this object appears as its own explanation. Within this attitude, the meaning of this object appears to be self-understood as pregiven. From a
phenomenologically reduced vantage point of detachment I can extricate myself from such a position. Because the activity to which I am currently (that is, genetically speaking, prior to the epoch*) attached is strictly speaking my activity and no-one's and nothing else's, I must perform this act of detachment in relation to my own meaning as I perceive it to have an existence prior to my knowledge of it as a phenomenon. In rather graphic terms, Husserl describes this as the "splitting of the Ego" (83), but this is not some sort of Olympian achievement. This occurs when someone finds himself proof reading something which he has written, as if it were not his work -- when this piece of work appears to speak for itself. Again, it can be experienced in the plastic and graphic arts when the stone cutter stands back from his work and lets the piece of stone with which he is working tell him what to do next. He confronts it anew with every new cut and lets his artistic intuition guide him as he judges where he will make his mark next. And lest we forget, in this discussion of the finer arts, this takes place in the process of labour of any kind which is not merely mimetic, but which is creative. It is not without reason that Husserl starts the Prolegomena with the example of the creative artist,(84) and again, in Ideas Husserl points to the work of the creative artist as the expression of an already clarified understanding. (85)
But such detachment is achieved

Only by virtue of this new attitude ...(through which) I see that all the world, and therefore whatever exists for me naturally exists for me only as accepted by me, with the sense it has for me at the time -- that it exists for me ((It may exist 'for itself' but I can never know this.)) only as cogitatum of my changing and, while changing, interconnected cogitationes; and I now accept it solely as that. (86)

Thus, within the stream of my own consciousness, I have the flux of particulars as well as the constancy of irreal formations, or ideas, which defy any attempt to categorize them in existential terms as either being or not being. They also defy theoretical description (86), being only expressible by analogy. However, these irreal formations:

Like other products of the mind ...admit...however to physical embodiment: in their case, an embodiment by sensuous verbal signs; and thus they gain a secondary spatial existence (that of a spoken or written sentence). Every sort of irreality, of which the ideality of significations and the different ideality of universal essences or species are particular cases, has manners of possible participation in reality. This in no way alters the essential separation of the real and the irreal. (87)

It remains only for Husserl to broaden this statement and say that ideas can as well be realized
sensuously in other empirical forms, and we are immediately again with Marx, if not in word, at least in spirit for Husserl has established the precedent for the instantiation of ideas in material form, of realization, with language. Thus it is not without reason that Marx says that industry, (and its products, as commodities, we might add), is the "open book" of the expression of the meaning which a society, now understood as a collection of constituting agents, or egos, expresses in material form. Thus, along with Marx, we can say that social relations are not pregiven facts, but are relations amongst subjects, not as some sort of vacuous flow but as a dialectic evidenced through objects which are virtually drenched in meaning.

As well, we have the makings of a dialectic of material creation which need not end with the coming of a revolutionary consciousness, as Lukacs, much to his own chagrin we are sure, found when he posited the proletariat as the "identical subject-object". (88) The dialectic of the flow of my own living experience will continue until I die. The dialectic need not end simply because of a theoretical 'requirement'.

Here we encounter the problem of how one can explain one's recognition of the other. Husserl comes closest to resolving this problem to his own satisfaction in
the Crisis (89). In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl cites the presupposition which plagues traditional analytics as precisely the problem of a shared life-world of intersubjective understanding. Ostensibly, it is this presupposition which Husserl hopes to phenomenologically clarify through his descriptions in Formal and Transcendental Logic, but apparently he is unsatisfied with his solution in this book as well. If, as we have argued, the problems which arise in relation to traditional analytics and formal ontology find their source in an ontologization (fetishization) of abstract forms, then this can be seen as the source of these theoretical approaches' presupposition of the meaning of the intersubjective world. If Husserl himself is doing theory, then perhaps his problem with the recognition of the other finds its source in the same kind of abstraction. While what we are saying here is clearly speculative, it is surprising that Husserl should have a problem with the recognition of the other if, indeed, what he is calling for in the return to the things themselves is a move to experience as a unity of theory and praxis, the latter now clarified in relation to their mutual inter-dependence but mutual irreducibility.

However, for the purposes of this paper, we will assume that Husserl is calling for a dialectical synthesis
of the irreal and real foundations of experience. It should be remembered that throughout this essay we have attempted to maintain a position which has denied the efficacy of metaphysical interventions. Unless we are willing to excuse ourselves from this position at this juncture, it must be maintained that any experience will have its hyletic referents, either as a memory or as an actual event. If this is maintained to be the case, and it must be unless we want to involve ourselves in a mysticism at this point, it would be reasonable to say that since I have access to my own meaning through artifacts which I realise in material form, (as we have argued in relation to artistic, creative activity), it is possible to conceive of myself as viewing "my" artifacts as if they were not mine, so to speak, through the "splitting of my ego". In confronting the material world, I find objects which I know that I have not produced but which I find have been produced in such a way that they are useful or beautiful, and so on. I recognise the intelligence of the other through his material activity as it is expressed in the material objects which he produces. He is not these objects any more than I "am" the material objects which I produce. But because I can have access to self-evident truths which hold universally, this means that they must hold for the other as well. To be sure,
I may be wrong about the apodicticity of these evidences, but that's life. Nevertheless, if these self-evidences are transcendental, then they will transcend my particular location and my particular instance as a living being. The same must hold for the other as well. Since these self-evidences are transcendental, they can never be exhausted by any particular material expression of them. However, they do admit to material expression.

We can say, then, that I may know the other inasmuch as I know the meaning which he expresses through the factual, material expression of this meaning which he realizes. This is in complete accord with Marx; the social world is the world of mediations which men themselves produce. Such a move to the social through a recognition of the object as the other's, requires me to again "split my ego" and bracket what it is that I would like these objects to mean and let them speak for themselves, not in a metaphysical sense, but rather, in the following way: In having these objects as objects of my consciousness, I already will have constituted them as meaning something. If I correspondingly see that these objects are the product of someone else's labour, I must bracket what I would like them to be, or how I would do differently what he has done, or how it is that this product may either aggrandize my own
perception of what I "am", or contrarily, how this product of the other's

of the other's labour may threaten my conception of what I am, and see that what it is that I now hold reflectively in my grasp is what I make it to be. With this stage of constitutive sense investigation being reached, I am now in the position to focus on the meaning of what I have constituted the meaning of this object to be and to move to the essence from their, ever mindful that it is still not my product. It finds its origin with the person or if you would prefer the abstract statement of this, the subject, who actually produced it as a function of his judicative activity, and as a result of his physical, material activity.

The facts of this activity -- how much did the materials cost, how long did it take, did he use a jack-knife or a jigsaw -- are as irrelevant here as they are in the Geisteswissenschaftliche example of psychologism. What all this amounts to in the jargon of the everyday reduces to two things: First, this recognition of the other is a simple "Putting myself in the other guy's shoes" (90); and second, in the social world, we judge people by their actions, which clearly may also include their words. But I
judge the other by his actions. Inasmuch as I judge the other, this judgment like any other judgment, may be reduced to its phenomenological or essential elements. If I can accomplish a splitting of my ego in relation to the other, then at least I will be capable of understanding what I mean when I judge other people in relation to their worth or what I understand to be their intent. All of this remains relative to my own experience and self-understanding, however. In a way, I can only know the other as an analogy of myself. However, if I can transcend what I suppose myself to be, I can discover the other as simply another expression of what I apperceive as the compossibility of any "I" whatsoever.

Obviously ((as Husserl says)) it can be said, that as an Ego in the natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental Ego, but that I know this only by executing phenomenological reduction. (91)

Nevertheless, the other is experienced by me as a real phenomenon, not as a spectre. But this other subject, who in one respect is a "fact", also expresses meaning which is there in the products which I perceive. Only a blind man refuses to see the existence of others. And one would be equally blind if one were to deny others the ability to express themselves meaningfully.
Here we have the possibility for a logical explanation of what Marx conceives society to be when he says that society is the mediations which subjects realise amongst themselves in material form. It is the intention which lies hidden behind the material appearance of these phenomenon which is not clarified within a naive or ideologized attitude. Within such an attitude the abstract appears to be concrete, and in the case of mysticism, this relationship is simply reversed. The source of ideology therefore may be seen as a question of attitude. In order for Marx to transcend such an attitude he must have performed a reduction. As Husserl says in *Ideas*, the ability to perform a phenomeonological critique implies that the reduction has already been performed. Marx's method, that ephemeral thing which we hoped to make clear, is the method of Husserl's reduction.

Clearly, certain modifications must be made to Marx's theory as we currently find it. Succinctly put, anything in Marx's theory which diverts us from an unattached perspective or that demands that we must believe what Marx is telling us simply by merit of the fact that Marx is telling us must be avoided or at least observed with a great deal of candor. Most of all, if we cannot find it in ourselves to rise above the ludicrous character of the
absurd world which Marx presents to us and have the ability to laugh at the extraordinary confusion which whirls about us in this everyday world of a capitalist society, we are most certainly lost in an existential attachment to whatever neurotically constituted circularity we may happen to find ourselves in.

Ideology, then, may be said to be a matter of attitude. Within an ideologized attitude the subject fails to clarify the meaning of his intentions, preferring to allow some sort of externally posited "system" to act as the source of the sense of his "being".

As well, by opening up the whole range of intentional possibilities as what may be expressed through material labour, Marx's economic and political studies may correspondingly be opened up to encompass the whole range of social mediations and expressions. In the same way, through the recognition of the judging, or more broadly stated, the intentional, activity which subtends material expression, the apparent problem which Husserl encounters in the expansion of the recognition of the other is at least breached even if not fully explained. Husserl's infinity is now complete; we have discovered to the other as a sentient being through the material objects of his labour.
Chapter Five

Conclusions

In the introduction to this essay we said that our examination of Marx's method was performed backwards. The second moment of Marx's theory was examined first in order to move from what Marx himself said about his method. With the nature of Marx's method now established as phenomenological, we are in a position to apply this method to itself.

Since the essence of this method is a radical shift in attitude we must now look at Marx's theory in a detached fashion. When this is done the programatic elements of Marx's theory which move primarily from his own fetishization of labour (1) fall away as contingencies. Included amongst these are the categories of class and interest which both depend upon a naive acceptance of "my" being and the relation of how I constitute this relative to the world of others. This does not deny the existence of class or of class interest. Rather, these phenomena should be understood now as existing only in an ideal and not in a real sense. They may exist, but they do so only in people's minds. As such, to treat them as really existent would
effectively fetishize these concepts. Thus, what we have left over in relation to Marx's method is a way of viewing the world which asks the performing subject to rise to the abstract but to then move to the concrete, not in a linear fashion, but in a synthetic way which allows the subject experience of an essential grounding for his understanding of phenomena.

The problem which Lukacs encounters in *History and Class Consciousness* may be resolved in the same way. What Lukacs lacks is an explanation for what it is that is reified by the subject. Since it is what the subject reifies which in turn alienates him the explanation of what it is in actuality which the subject alienates will provide us with a potential solution to Lukacs's remetaphysicalization of Marx's theory. From what we have seen in the preceding chapters of this essay, we can see that what is alienated is ideal. What is alienated is a conception or idea. When an idea is posited as existing outside the subject it will have effectively been granted an ontological status. This applies to the subject's idea of his own meaning as well. Getting in touch with the meaning or essence of such an idea is the teleological end of Husserl's epoché and, we feel, of Marx's method if the latter is properly understood as the move beyond the appearance of pregiveness. This applies either to
facts or to spiritual entities which are conceived of as self-determinant of their own meaning.

If the radical shift in attitude which Husserl recommends and which we have argued by inference that Marx must perform to achieve the sense of detachment necessary to do his critique of capitalism is carried out then meanings themselves may be encountered, unencumbered by presuppositions concerning what these ideas ought to mean. But we run into a problem here, for Marx claims that truth is realized in activity and Husserl claims that truth is realized in reflection. Indeed, in Capital Marx condemns reflectionist theory as post festum. But what Marx is condemning here is a kind of reflection that stops too soon, a kind of reflection that moves only to the categories which are generated at the second level of judgment and which become ends in themselves; to what Marxists refer to as abstractions. From what we have seen in relation to the telos of Husserl's method, this is not what Husserl intends to do. Husserl wishes to move to the things themselves. The question now emerges as to whether this can be accomplished in reflection or whether this must be accomplished in activity? We can answer this in the following way: If I want to realize the truths I understand within a social context this will demand expression in mediate, material
form. If I wish to clarify things for myself I need not do anything but reflect. On the other hand, in order to have knowledge of something which I wish to realise I must have clarified this meaning initially. The source of this meaning is to be found in my originary opining, however, and in this opining, barring the intervention of a mystical source of experience, there will have been a unity of quality and quantity; of the abstract and the concrete. There is no resolution to the question of whether the abstract precedes the concrete or vice versa. To understand these two ways of grasping phenomenon as opposed to one another can only lead to absurdity because the one mode cannot be properly understood without the other. What remains important here is the quest for clarity and this clarity can be had only if one is willing to accept the paradox of the dialectic of the abstract and concrete. Or, to put this another way, a theory may guide me towards a presuppositionless experience, but no theory can in and of itself ever claim to be presuppositionless since the very commitment of theory to paper tacitly assumes that it will be read and understood by others. Hence, any theory will be inevitably "one-sided" unless it is read with a desire to clarify its meaning.

The final move to clarity therefore demands a move beyond theory itself. It demands a move to the things
themselves but these things themselves are con-jointly concrete and abstract. How one can explain this situation theoretically without first adopting one pole of this relation as prior to the other I have no idea. But the selection of either pole as prior distorts the very reality which theory hopes to describe.
Chapter 1. (1) The term ideological is used in this thesis to denote a belief or set of beliefs which is premised upon the acceptance of an essentially unexamined presupposition. The presupposition of such an unexamined premise effectively sets this premise as immutable and beyond question. In effect, the subject who holds such a belief and who is thus responsible for the holding of it as valid abrogates responsibility for accepting this belief as valid. In so doing, this subject posits this belief as standing beyond his control, as something which is self-understood as objectively valid. In this way, the belief comes to appear as its own justification, or, as we shall refer to it in this thesis, as a being for itself. (See Herbert Marcuse Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954) pp.141-142.)

Related to this ideological believing is the phenomenon of reification or hypostatization. Both these terms derive from the same German root, Verdinglichung. In Marxist writings, for example Georg Lukacs History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin Press, 1971), this term takes on added significance, for it is this positing of something which has no factual existence as something which does have factual existence which creates the preconditions for an ideological understanding on the part of the subject involved in this process. When such an understanding remains untranscended, alienation of the subject occurs. This alienation is performed by the subject because he believes that what he has reified has an existence outside of his own. As we shall see, (chapter 4, sections 4 - 9) such an object takes on a being for itself in the subject's process. This reified object can have either a material object as a referent or it may have a purely ideal object as its referent. In either case, this object acts as a fetish object; it is something which has no ontological status in reality, but it is effectively attributed an ontological status by the subject. This difficulty in explaining such a situation arises because the subject himself may not be aware of his having done this. Indeed, if he were aware of what he had done, he would not be alienated by this fetish object which he himself has reified and which acts as his negation. Any explanation in which a fetish object, either ideal or real, is posited as psychophysically located or temporally moored and within which this object is correspondingly accepted as pregivenly valide may be said to be ideological. Thus, the terms ideology, reification, alienation, hypostatization, fetishization and objects which are referred to as naively accepted as pregivenly valid, and so on, are used interchangeably in this thesis because they are understood to be structurally equivalent.
As well, we should differentiate the use of the terms real and actual. The terms real is used to denote something which has a factual existence. Actuality is used to denote something which is truly the case. As we shall be dealing with irreal objects which are referred to variously as essences, qualities, ideas, senses or meanings, and judgments the distinction between the actual and the real is a necessary one.

As well, Husserl's idea of occlusion is viewed within this paper as equivalent to the Marxist use of the word reification, with the corresponding terminological implications which we cited above.

I want to take the opportunity at the outset of this paper to apologise for the turgidity of my style. In part, at least, this may be accounted for because I have for so long my sources in translation from the German been reading.

(2) This terms is used in the same sense as it is in Edmund Husserl The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), pp. 48-52.


(4) What follows in this thesis is interpretive both in relation to Marx and in relation to Husserl.

(5) Lukacs, p.xliii.

(6) Ibid. p.84.

(7) Ibid. p.xxiii-xxiv.

(8) Ibid. p.xxiii.


(14) Capital, pp. 283-284.


(18) Grundrisse, p. 363.

(19) Edmund Husserl The Crisis of the Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology translated with an introduction by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), from here forward referred to as the Crisis. Of the books by Husserl, this one has attracted the most attention by Marxists. See especially Enzo Paci The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man translated with an introduction by Paul Piccone (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972). In part, the attention paid to this text by Marxists is a result of the fact that this is the only work by Husserl which has as its principle theme something which is a generally socially shared object as its starting point. Because of this, orthodox Husserlians may tend to disregard what Paci attempts to accomplish in this book.

On the other wide, we have the radical Marxists who tend to view any other book by Husserl as a waste of time. In this thesis we do not wish to adopt either of these approaches.

(20) Grundrisse, p. 611.

Chapter 2.

(1) Lukacs, p. 83.
(2) Capital, p.102.


(4) Ibid., p.3.

(5) For an instance, see Capital, pp.283-284, where Marx re-fetishizes the concept of labour.

(6) "Economic and Philiosophic Manuscripts", p.291.

(7) See above, chapter 1, pp.21-22.

(8) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.250.

(9) For instance, Grundrisse, p.213-215, and so on.


(12) Grundrisse, p.84.

(13) Karl Marx "Economic and Philiosophic Manuscripts" in Easton and Guddat, p.306.


(15) "Economic and Philiosophic Manuscripts", pp.310-311.


(17) In anticipation of the results which we shall arrive at below, we shall say that the commodity acts as an intentional object. See below, chapter 4, section 15.

(18) Grundrisse, p.96.

(19) Critique of Political Economy, p.3.

(20) Grundrisse, p.86.

(21) Ibid., p.83.

(22) On this point, see Kosik, on the "Metaphysics of Everyday Life", pp.37-42.

(23) Critique of Political Economy, p.3.
(23) Critique of Political Economy, p.3.


(26) Ibid.

(27) On the eidetic inter-relation of different moments of production see Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp.154-155.

(28) The word bracketing is used here in its phenomenological sense. See, for instance, "The Origin of Geometry" included in the Crisis, pp.353-378. The move which we hope to outline in the current section of this essay is parallel to Husserl's move in relation to the apparent objective historical pregiveness of geometry. In our case, we are dealing with the historically embedded norm of capital.

(29) On "common sense", see Crisis, p.200.

(30) "These on Feuerbach", p.400, first thesis.

(31) In brief, a psychological description accepts the world as it appears to be and then describes the subject's psychological relation to this 'reality'. A genetic description describes how this reality comes into being in the subject's mind. These two approaches run parallel to one another, however. See: Edmund Husserl Cartesian Meditations translated by Dorion Cairns (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p.33; Crisis, sections 56-61; Ideas translated by B. Gibson (New York: MacMillan and Co., 1934), the entire "Preface" to the English Edition is dedicated to the clarification of this question.

(32) A good source of examples of alienation which occurs in inter-personal relations may be found in R.D. Laing Knots (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970). For example:

Jill: I'm upset that you are upset.
Jack: I'm not upset.
Jill: I'm upset that you're not upset that I'm upset that you're upset.
Jack: I'm upset that you're upset that I'm not upset that I'm upset when I'm not. (p.21.)

The deductive circularity starts with the assumption that something which cannot be known without a metaphysical ability is known. Hence, the other's mood is reified and the subject alienates himself in his belief of knowing what the other feels.
(34) This can be seen in *Capital* because money, for Marx, is the culmination of this process.


(36) Marx employs this example throughout the first chapter of *Capital*, but any other would do as well. See pp. 125-177, passim.

(37) *Capital*, p. 129.


(39) See chapter 3, section 8, on Husserl's criticism of a Humean attempt to justify the meaning of mediate data by an appeal to mediate data and the absurdity which derives from this. In the same way, Marx points out that exchange-values are mediate and as such can never express their own value except as something relative. For an instance, Marx says, "Two coats can therefore express the magnitude of value of 40 yards of linen, but they can never express the magnitude of their own value." *Capital*, p. 147-48.

(40) *Ibid*.


(47) *Grundrisse*, p. 239.

(48) *Grundrisse*, p. 160; also *Capital*, p. 165, "...the products of labour become commodities, sensuous things which are at the same time suprasensible or social."

(49) *Grundrisse*, p. 239.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Ibid., p.160. Or, as Marx says on page 155 of the Grundrisse "...this symbol has the property of not merely representing, but being exchange value in actual exchange." In relation to reification as the positing of the ideal as ontologically given, and as such as pregiven, see below, chapter 4, section 8.

(53) Grundrisse, p.201.

(54) Ibid., p.96.

(55) On the wage labour relation see the Grundrisse, p.284.

(56) Ibid., p.255. The citation from the Grundrisse deals with circulation as the circulation of commodities but inasmuch as labour is understood as a commodity within capitalist society, the comment holds here, as well.

(57) "The German Ideology", p.443.

(58) "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts", p.292.

(59) This term is used in the same sense as it is in Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.154.

(60) "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts", p.311." One basis for life and another for science is a lie." Marx is concerned with doing true science and for Marx this must be grounded in an understanding of the subject as he actually is; as a unity. This unity is evidenced in human activity as this draws the subject into social life. Thus, for Marx, "my essential activity is emotion which thereby becomes the activity of my nature." "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts", p.312.

(61) As an example of a similar observation concerning individuals who see no difference between quality and quantity in terms of the value of a commodity, we cite the following:

Gary: Do you like Americans?
Perowne: Five years ago you could still impress them by showing them a reproduction of Van Gogh. Two years ago you had to show them the real thing. Now you have to give them his ear.

(from AC/DC by Heathcoate Williams)
(63) *Grundrisse*, p. 160.
(64) Ibid.

(65) Ibid. Marx continues in this passage by stating that money can act as the pledge of society only "because of its social property; and it can have a social property only because individuals have alienated their own social relationship from themselves so that it takes the form of a thing."

(67) Ibid., p. 162.
(68) Ibid., p. 164; see also, *Capital*, p. 170.
(69) *Grundrisse*, p. 164.

(70) On analytic categories as fetish objects, see below, chapter 4, section 4.

(71) *Grundrisse*, p. 164.
(72) Ibid., pp. 164-65.
(73) Ibid., p. 164.
(74) Ibid., p. 239-40.
(75) Ibid., p. 164.
(76) *Grundrisse*, p. 201.
(77) Ibid., pp. 201-202.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Ibid.

(80) Ibid., p. 253; see also, *Capital*, p. 175.


(82) *Capital*, p. 251: "The complete form of this is therefore M'-M', where M'=M plus delta M, i.e., the original sum advanced plus the increment. This increment or excess over the original value I call 'surplus value'((Mehrwert))."

(84) Ibid., p. 307; see also, above, note 33.

(85) *Grundrisse*, p. 317.

(86) *Capital*, p. 1019.

(87) Ibid., p. 175.

(88) Idem., *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: Progress Publishers, 1976), pp. 120-21. Marx goes on to point out that in terms of European feudalism, the bad side, the anarchistic peasantry, won out over the good side, the feudal barons. Good and bad still remain normative and hence, relative categories.

(89) *Grundrisse*, pp. 164-165.

(90) "The German Ideology", p. 441.

(91) *Grundrisse*, p. 287.

(92) Ibid., p. 272.

(93) Ibid., p. 287.

(94) Ibid., p. 405.

(95) Ibid., p. 456.

(96) Ibid., p. 233.

(97) Ibid.

(98) In other words, the precedent for transubstantiability is already set in relation to the fetishism of commodities and the money relation.

(99) *Grundrisse*, p. 361.

(100) *Grundrisse*, p. 325.

(101) This unity is to found in the unity of theory and praxis, see "These on Feuerbach", thesis one.

(102) *Grundrisse*, p. 325.
(103) Ibid., p.

(104) Ibid., p. 349.

(105) Ibid., pp. 359-360.

(106) Ibid.

(107) Ibid.

(108) Ibid., p. 363.

(109) Ibid.

(110) Ibid.

(111) Ibid., p. 412.


(113) Grundrisse, p. 273.

(114) Ibid., p. 363.

(115) Ibid., p. 364.

(116) Ibid., p. 367.

Chapter 3.

(1) Prolegomena, p. 135.

(2) Ibid., p. 60.

(3) Ibid., p. 62.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid., pp. 63-64.

(6) Ibid., p. 67.

(7) Ibid., pp. 64-65.

(8) Ibid., p. 65.

(9) Ibid., p. 86.

(10) Ibid., pp. 81-82.
(11) Ibid., p. 85

(12) Robert Sokolowski *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 7. Here Sokolowski cites Husserl's *Philosophie der Arithmetic* (Halle a. S.: C.E.M. Pfeiffer, 1891), p. 103. "We are faced with the task of explaining 'such concepts... which because of their elementary character, are neither capable of a definition not in need of one.' Explanation of such critical concepts does not consist in defining them, but rather in providing a description of the way in which they arise."


(14) Ibid., p. 135.

(15) Ibid., p. 135-36.

(16) Ibid., p. 99.

(17) *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 102.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid., p. 115.

(20) Ibid., p. 116.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Marx makes the same observation in relation to political economists. See above, chapter 2 note 89.


(24) Ibid.

(25) Ibid., pp. 116-17.

(26) Ibid., p. 117.


(29) See above, chapter 2, p. 93.

(30) *Ideas*, p. 256.


(32) See chapter 1, note 1.
(33) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.15. For Husserl, ideal objects are produced in the subject's judging processes.

(34) Capital, p.284.

(35) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.69.

(36) Ibid., p.100; Crisis, p.46.


(39) Ibid., p.57.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Bachelard, p.xii; p.xlii.

(42) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.56.

(43) Ibid. (44) Ibid., p.57.

(45) Ibid., p.59.

(46) Ibid., p.69.

(48) Ibid.

(49) Ibid.

(50) Ibid., p.172.

(51) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.102

(52) Ibid., p.172.

(53) Ibid., p.60.

(54) Crisis, p.44.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.62.
Chapter Four.

(1) Ibid., p.72.

(2) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.80.

(3) Ibid., p.81.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid., p.118.

(6) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.257.

(7) Ibid., p.17.

(8) Crisis, p.187; See note 81, below.

(9) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p.119.

(10) Ibid., 72-73.
(11) Ibid., p.120.
(12) Ibid., p.298.
(13) Ibid., p.82.
(14) Ibid., p.123.
(15) *Experience and Judgment*, p.12.
(17) *Crisis*, p.145.
(18) See chapter 2, note 1.
(19) See above, chapter two, section 2.

(21) See above, re: note 15, this chapter.
(22) *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, pp.102-103.
(23) *Grundrisse*, p.162.

(25) *Crisis*, p.46.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid., p.48.
(28) Ibid., p.49.
(29) Ibid., p.303.
(30) As is the case with capital.
(31) *Crisis*, p.151.

(33) *Crisis*, p.50.
(34) See above, chapter three, section 9, part B.

(35) Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 71 and the moves from level to level of enquiry.

(36) What I want to outline here is a potentiality which exists in Husserl's formal ontologistic solution to the problem of the inadequacy of abstract, theoretical approaches to questions of knowledge. It is clear that Husserl himself is aware of this potentiality. However, without a concretizing move of the sort which Marx recommends Husserl cannot get out of the bind which he finds himself in. Husserl says that: "...it is wrong for a criticism of sensuous experience, which naturally brings out its essential imperfection (that it: its being at the mercy of further experience!), to end with rejecting it -- whereupon the critic in his extremity appeals to hypotheses and indirect arguments, with which he attempts to seize the phantom of some (absurdly) transcendent "In-Itself". All transcendental-realistic theories, with their arguments leading from the "immanent" sphere of purely "internal" experience to an extra-psychic transcendency, are attributable to a blindness to the proper character of "external" experience as a performance that gives us something itself and would otherwise be unable to provide a basis for natural-scientific theories." Formal and Transcendental Logic, pp. 161-162.

The tendency which Husserl condemns is one which abrogates sensuous experience, holus-bolus, to a position of inferiority in relation to experience of the transcendental. Of course, sensuous experience in and of itself cannot explain anything. Even Marx, according to Marcuse, (Reason and Revolution, p. 271) accepts the actuality that sensuous experience cannot be appealed to as a final seal of justification of anything. But the tendency which I see in Husserl's work derives from his perpetual residency in the abstract. If Husserl were a solopist, then this tendency would never need emerge. However, Husserl insists that phenomenology is not a transcendental solopism. (Cartesian Meditations, Meditation V; Formal and Transcendental Logic, section 96). It is one thing to make such an assertion. It is quite another to demonstrate it. Husserl asserts that the intersubjective is known as one knows his own subjectivity. With this I have no disagreement. However, I know this in reflection. In reflection I must reflect on something. What I reflect upon is something which I once sensuously experienced. If I have not sensuously experienced the other, then the other has been experienced in an absurd, transcendent experience of, to use Husserl's expression, a "phantom". When Husserl asks us to return to the things themselves, one thing which we must remember is the
distinction between that which occurs in imagination and that which occurs in social reality. This distinction can be properly drawn if we remember what it was that was derived from sensuous experience and what it was that was only imagined. If Husserl really wants to avoid a charge of solopcism, he must openly declare this distinction. This is something which, as far as I know, he never does, because the formal ontological solution to fetishization only goes as far as to point out the metaphysics which arises from not understanding the being of meaning as distinct from the being of facts. The formal ontological solution does not embrace the material world because it keeps the subject in constant reflection, which is abstract. It retains the theoretical attitude to the very end, which is the quintessence of the abstract, and so by necessity, never makes the radical return to the life-world which is necessary if Husserl's project is to be completed. On the other hand, Husserl does accept the material world, and so we are caught in the position of Husserl's presupposition of the material world just as Marx is caught on the material or sensuous side of the dialectic without a proper clarification of the abstract. Both Husserl and Marx, in their own ways, are aware, I believe, of this situation. Both Marx and Husserl establish the efficacy of one or the other poles of the dialectic. But the apparent phenomenologistic passion with deriding Marx as some kind of intellectual Facist and the Marxistic penchant for condemning Husserl as a know-nothing pipe-dreamer are both only partly true. The tendency which I hope to point to in the present section of this essay is the tendency of orthodox Husserlists to simply and conveniently overlook the obvious need on Husserl's part for a material foundation which can be provided with an intelligent understanding of what Marx was talking about. As with the died in the wool Marxists who deny that anyone but Marx had anything worthwhile to say, such phenomenologists will never find what they are looking for "within" Husserl, just as Lukacs ends up in confusion by claiming that all the answers can be found "within" Marx's works.

(37) Roman Ingarden On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism translated by Arnor Hannibalson (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975)


(39) Bachelard, p. 71.
(40) **I**deas, pp. 247-248. Hyle are sensory data.

(41) Karl Marx "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law" in Guddat and Easton, p. 257.

(42) S. Aveneri The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge; Cambridge at the University Press, 1969), pp. 65-95, passim.

(43) ***F***ormal and Transcendental Logic, p. 118-19.

(44) **C**risis, p. 175.

(45) **I**deas, p. 256.


(47) **I**deas, p. 246.

(48) **C**risis, p. 170-172.

(49) **C**artesian Meditations, p. 50.


(51) Ibid., p. 13.

(52) This thesis will suffer somewhat from this point forward because there is no proper delineation of the noematic and noetic modes of description. For an explanation of this difference, see: Cartesian Meditations, pp. 36-39.

(53) Ibid., p. 36.

(54) **F**ormal and Transcendental Logic, p. 135-36.

(56) Ibid., p. 250.

(57) Ibid., p. 135.

(58) See above, note 47 this chapter.

(59) Ibid., p. 155.

(60) **F**ormal and Transcendental Logic, p. 237.
(61) "German Ideology", p. 441.


(63) Ibid., pp. 70-71.

(64) Crisis, p. 176.

(65) Cartesian Meditations, p. 34.

(66) Ibid.

(67) Cartesian Meditations, p. 34.

(68) Ibid.

(69) Crisis, pp. 186-87.

(70) Kosik, p. 47; See also, note 73, below.

(71) See chapter 3, p. 129.

(73) For Husserl, may decision that material objects preceed me is my judging that this is so. However, if I actually start from this position then what is it which I am reflecting upon? If I reflect upon something which is "immanent" to my consciousness in its origin, then I will be involved in a mysticism, (see above, note ). The actuality of the situation is that both the qualitative and the quantitative are co-given as as unity. (Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 157) To arbitrarily "start" from one pole of experience or another is equally lop-sided which ever one I choose. But two things come into question here: First, what happen to the hyle in reflection? Husserl insists that the meaning I have of these hyle is valid and that they do not determine their meaning as beings-for-themselves. From this point of view it would appear that if one is to escape a collapsing of the ideal and the real, then one must acknowledge the a priori character of the abstract and hence, start from this pole. However, Husserl presupposes normalacy, and because of this, he also presupposes the ability of the subject to distinguish between the "as if" of phantasy and actual events. The second point emerges here, for "actual" events, barring mysticism in which a phantom of some sort is experienced by me, entail the material and this is unavoidably so in relation to the social. What this means is
that Husserl himself, in writing philosophy is involved in a
social enterprise. Since his writings must be shared by
others, this demands that he acknowledge the material as his
starting point and not only move from this to the abstract,
but he must return to this if he is not to leave his reader
in the abstraction which we have understood him to condemn
traditional analytics and formal ontology of never
completing. For an inferential arguement which may be seen
as an attempt to extricate Husserl from the kind of
criticism refered to in note see: J. Huertas-Jourda "On
the two foundations according to Husserl, the
epistemological or legitamizing, and the occaisional or
actualizing," presented at the Society of Phenomenological

(74) Crisis,p.150; Cartesian Meditations,p.37.
(75) "The Origin of Geometry",p.356.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Formal and Transcendental Logic,p.185.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Ibid.,p.168.
(80) Cartesian Meditations,p.37.
(81) Husserl accepts "normalacy". However, her asks how it
is that what is so "obvious" about normalacy can be
understood. See Crisis,p.187.
(82) Ideas,p.249.
(83) Cartesian Meditations,p.35.
(84) Prolegomena,p.58.
(85) Ideas,pp.200-201.
(86) Cartesian Meditations,p.37.
(87) F.T.L.,p.155.
(88) See chapter 1,pp.15-16.
(89) See Crisis, especially sections 51-55.
(90) Or, as Robert Zimmerman once said:
I wish that for just one day
You could stand here in my shoes,
And then you'd know what a drag it is
Just to see you.
from "Positively Fourth Street".

(91) Cartesian Meditations, p.37.

Chapter Five