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The Appropriateness of the Concept of the Individual

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by

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Abstract

The fundamental concepts of any discipline ought to be examined periodically, not only to understand what constitutes those principles or concepts but also to ensure that our basic assumptions are logically and empirically acceptable. This thesis calls for the reexamination of the concept of the "individual" and of its role as the basic or fundamental unit of human society. Two suggestions are made as indications that possible alternative views are logically consistent with the data presently at our disposal. The first suggestion is that the concept of the individual in Western culture was formed largely as a by-product of a theological development of salvation or redemption in the Judeo-Christian ethos. The second suggestion is that the basic or fundamental human unit is not the familiar concept of the "individual" but that of a "biological whole" consisting of the mating pair or the male and the female, and the child. Whereas the "individual" concept is related to the idea of the responsibility to, and the worship of, God by each soul, the "biological whole" concept is based on man's genetic and social inheritance.

The inheritance of the "biological whole" includes both the purely biological aspects and the psychical aspects. Man as an animal is genetically predisposed toward the maintenance and the transmission of life. Considering the sexual structure of man, any predisposition

must include an attraction for "members of the opposite sex". In other words, in order for life to continue from one generation to another, because the male or female is incomplete without the opposite member, a "whole" must include both. Such an orientation toward a whole in the purely biological aspect of man can be used as the foundation for a psychically organic concept. Carl Jung's theory of the "collective unconscious" can be readily adapted to descibe how such an organic theory would work. The "collective unconscious" is an inherited part of the psyche which permeates the other two layers of the psyche:the personal unconscious, and the conscious. Both layers of the unconscious form the basis for the organic concept of mind and society.

This thesis is more of a plea than an analysis, a measured argument or a diatribe. The plea is to those who use the forms I have mentioned, for much of what people accept as "factual" and use in learned papers and in everyday life as a "fact" ought to be re-examined with a critical eye. "Democracy", for instance, is a word or concept often used by political scientists and commentators in the same "factual" manner as biologists use "Ciconia ciconia". However, the biologist can go on to describe the "Ciconia ciconia" as the European white stork, and provide a detailed list of specifications of what constitutes a European white stork and it is a list accepted by any other biologist. S.I. Hayakawa, dismisses any list of specifications for "democracy". He has stated that when someone uses the word "democracy" that its "factual" content is so minimal and its value load is so great that to say "Lichtenstein is a democracy" is to indicate merely that the speaker approves of its system of government and very little more.

One concept that must be a keystone in the foundation of most political philosophy and theory is that of the individual. To speak of the state, of society, of culture, of community, of the nation, of the clan, of government , of authority, of freedom, rights, liberties and justice, of the public good and private interests, in fact, almost any social principle, one must be able to give a definition of both the individual and the supra- individual entity and the relationship between them and between individuals. Too often a commonly accepted (and sometimes vague) viewpoint is assumed and much of the analysis

and theory is based on unknown and unexamined principles. We have assumed many times, in Western philosophy, that the principles developed in Europe over the last five hundred years are universally held, or would be should other cultures attain our advantage of knowing the truth.

There are two purposes in this thesis: one, in section one, is to trace the development in Western European culture of the concept of the individual as the basic human unit. The other, in sections two and three, suggests another, more accurate basic human unit which is not that of the individual nor that of a holistic societal or communal unit in the traditional sense. Political philosophy examines a human universe and it is the human-in-the- world we take as a seminal or embryonic starting point in both sections two and three. As such, in order to present another view of the basic human unit, we ought to examine the biological aspects of man first and determine what biological principles are involved in the development of man. This examination, therefore, must be historical and descriptive because most of the biological development of man is beyond the empirical scope of the scientific method.

Section one of this paper attempts to accomplish the first purpose by tracing the historical development of the concept of the "individual" from earliest times through to the reformation and the

contract theorists. At first the "individual" as a concept did not exist in the minds of the tribesmen, nor did the word exist in many languages. Distinctions about the "individual" which we feel are fundamental could not be thought of by other cultures. Through various revolutions in thought, culture and language the basic concept, i.e. the individual as we know it, evolved and we find that "the individual person is the center of the value system."1. These revolutions in thought accompanied theological developments in thought and culture and it is the argument that as one traces the development of Judeo-Christian ethos, one of the tendencies has been the development of an individual soul, responsibility, salvation, and relationship to God. According to the teleological requirements, the "individual" acquired attributes which would suit the newest theological views. For the concept of the individual, the high point in the theological development was the reformation and the emphasis placed on each individual's priestly authority and his responsibility to God alone. The political individual is the by-product of the theological development. Then as the hold of religion weakened, the "Agnostic" God of the Eighteenth century removed the individual's responsibility to God. Locke's individual is responsible to or subject to the authority of his own judgment or reason alone. It was the religious tendencies that loosed the authoritative hold of the clans, the tribes, the states, the church, and other social institutions, until only God himself and the individual were left as

existent social concepts. By the time of Kant, Bentham and Godwin, reason or man's own judgment was the supreme seat of authority--the only existent social concept.

Before any attempt is made to examine the historical development of the individual, some attempt should be made to discover what the modern concept of the individual entails and what, if any, characteristics are commonly held as intrinsic to such a concept. In the introductory chapter, one tries to point out various principles or attributes that are associated most often with the concept of "the individual."

Notes

1. Dubos, Reve. Of Human Diversity. New York: Clark University Press, 1974, p. 10.

Introduction

Political science is a strange discipline in that the area of its study is known, i.e., man and his relationship to man, but the object of its scrutiny is unidentified. A chemist knows exactly what he is examining, as does the astronomer, the zoologist and the geographer. By "knowing", I mean that there are certain definite laws, principles, or parameters to the subject matter that he studies. The problem belonging to the humanities is that we are examining ourselves and we don't know who we are or what we are. We don't even know what is intrinsic and what is not. Do we have free will? are we rational? are we autonomous? do we have a soul? is the "I" me or in possession of me? do we have rights? Many more questions of a similar nature can be listed. In this paper, however, I want to examine what must be the primary question for the political scientist and that is: When we examine the "man-world", is what we examine as the basic unit (1) a separate, autonomous, or unique individual, (2) a holistic, conglomerate, total, inseparable or, social "man-thing", or (3)

something in between, such as a group, a family, an association, or a community. This paper is, in fact, an examination of the concept of the individual: to show how the concept evolved, what the concept is today, how the concept should be used, and whether or not the concept has any meaning to the political scientist.

The major stumbling block to philosophical thought today is the problem of solipsism, or how does one reach from the "I" to the "other". An example of the result of this strain is Robert Paul Wolff's statement:

> The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. It would seem, then, that there can be no resolution of the conflict between autonomy... and the putative authority of the state. 1.

Hobbes and Locke, starting as individualists, but with different views of the individual, tried to resolve that "conflict" and ended with theories anathema to each other. The major schools and theories today are attempts to bridge the chasm of solipsism by redefining the concept of the individual. These attempts have ranged from the extreme of accepting egoism and allowing for nothing more (e.g., Max Stirner and other extreme anarchists) to the more complex egoism of some existentialism (e.g., Jean- Paul Sartre), to the more collective yet inadequate theories of Marxism and Thomism, to the more extreme

mass concept of the idealists like Gentile and the Fascists and the "totalism" of some totalitarian ideologies. In other words, the answers have ranged from ignoring everything but oneself (Stirner) to ignoring the individual (Naziism). Yet, no matter how logical the theories may be, there is a sense of inadequacy that must strike every thoughtful examiner. It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to examine the various theories in turn to find out what is inadequate. That project is probably beyond the scope of any one examiner.

When someone speaks of the individual, one has to ask for greater explanations to understand precisely what he means. I have accumulated quite a variety of definitions of "individual" and of "individuality" (which seem to be interchangeable or dominating attributes of the other). "Individuals are units that have rights"; "Ontological concept of man has the concrete being of the individual and his relational existence"; and the individual is a "centre or spring of egotistic desire". The individual has any number of attributes: uniqueness, reason, will, material, moral unity, originality, historicity, independence, autonomy, unity, relationality (or the focus of relations), creativity and so on. Individuals are also described not so much by what they are but by what they do. Expressions such as self-expression of intent, self-assertion, self-regulating system, self-determinism, are common. The individual is subject i.e. acts on, for objects; the individual projects himself;

the individual lives his being, all indicating that there is no one definition of "individual" or that he is goal oriented, and that to know what the individual is, an observer must do his best to see the individual in practice. It is an open concept yet others insist on a more closed concept such as "self-sufficing", "self-subsistent", etc. it is confusing and disturbing.

> In investigating the relationships between the individual and society, our point of departure - only an empirical one - is the individual man; he thinks and acts and always co-operates with others within some social framework, but is a distinct individual.... When the individual is treated as the starting point of our analysis we must not forget that his autonomy is only relative. This is not a mysterious monad of will and consciousness, isolated and deprived of contact with others; this is a social individual, because, unable to live without society, he is - since the moment of birth - shaped by society and is its product physically and spiritually.2.

It is interesting that Adam Schaff is unable to state what it is he is talking about, except in negative tones. The individual is distinct yet acts and thinks socially: he is an individual empirically yet his autonomy is only relative, and he is unable to live without society, etc. He seems to be using individualistic terms holistically. In this section, I want to take a look at this being who is both distinct and not distinct at the same time.

The word "individual" comes from the Latin word "individuus" meaning "indivisible", i.e., "not-to-divide". As an adjective it has the following meanings:

1. Existing as a unit; single. 2. Separate, as distinguished from others of the same kind; particular: "individual" voters. 3. pertaining to or meant for a single person, animal, etc.: an "individual" serving. 4. Differentiated from others by peculiar or distinctive characteristics: an individual style. 5. Obsolete Incapable of being divided; inseparable.

And as a noun:

1. A single human being as distinct from others. 2. A person. 3. Biol. a. A plant or animal existing and functioning independently. b. A single member of a compound organism, especially one forming part of a hydrozoan colony. - Although "individual" is often used as a synonym for "person" many careful writers use it only when there is emphasis upon individuality or when a single person is in contrast with a body: The members of a group are also "individuals". 3.

From such a series of definitions, we can pick out certain tendencies or concepts that the word "individual" contains. Two tendencies dominate- "separateness", and, "completeness". Adam Schaff tries to impress the distinction between the two concepts on the mind of the reader. For him the individual is "distinct", i.e., he has separate-qualities that set one apart from others, yet the individual is "social", i.e., unable to live without society. However, he adds a third concept "Autonomy" i.e. "self-governing", claiming that the individual's "autonomy" is relative and linked to his "distinctness".

Schaff also notes that the empirical starting point for the concept of the individual is the "separateness" or "distinctness" linked to or synonymous with "autonomy".

The Thomists, such as Jacques Maritain, claim that the "individual" can be defined as being distinct from others (tree, horse, man, angel, stone) while a "person" is an individual of rational or intellectual nature (man or angel) and a "human person" is an individual of a human rational nature.4. In such a classification, the purely material or empirical considerations of the first level relate to "distinctness" or "separateness", while the next category relates to "autonomy" (Reason being the prime necessity for autonomy). The "person" is capable of responsibility (whereas the simple "individual" is not) and "freedom" is the distinguishing mark of man's nature.5. For the Thomist, and for Kant,6 autonomy has, as its foundation, reason and is, in turn, the foundation for morals. The "person", the social, moral, ethical, conceptual aspect of human kind, is distinguised by "freedom", a free choice, or as Jaspers puts it, the liberty or power of "self-transcendence".7. Heidegger's "lived-world" concept also expresses the idea of the "person" working on a canvass of material things of which the "self" or the empirical individual human is one.

Emmanuel Mounier and Thomas Hobbes speak of the "individual" in
negative, atomistic, egoistic tones. Mounier adds that the
"individual" is the selfish, materialistic personality isolated by
matter, while the "person" is the moral, spiritual human kind, having
conquered the mere "self". For Mounier, Maritain, Jaspers, the
existentialists and others, the distinction between "individual" and
"person" (or similar terms) does not result in two distinct beings. By
reason, or autonomy, or free choice etc., the "person" transcends the
"individual" but in no way separates from the "individual".

Now, we have four concepts that, unfortunately, are often viewed
synonymously: the individual has individuality, personality, autonomy
and being. At this point, the Thomist, the existentialists, and
others, would try to unravel the definitional problem by examining the
concept of "Freedom" and applying it to human kind. However, the
examination of the nature of "freedom" already includes several
assumptions about the human being and so we possibly can end in a
circular argument. We must try to deal with the concept of "the
individual" itself.

There are two concepts "individual" and "individuality" which are
often treated synonomously and at other times not. Individuality is
used in many ways: it is those traits that distinguish one person or
thing from others; or it is the state of having separate, independent

existence. However, authors use "individuality" in a great variety of

ways, from physical separateness:

> ...individuality means the presence of barriers and
> boundaries, a radical otherness with respect to
> individual centers and foci. Individuality denotes
> that   which   limits,   impedes,   and   disrupts
> homogeneity and continuity. 8.

to the personality in a physical being:

> ...individuality   is   the   personality   vis-a-vis
> society and the state. Individuality is   the   sign
> of the persona, and it always finds its claims in
> the higher sanctions of the latter. 9.

Individuality when it is identified as "the possession of

distinctiveness by members of the human family" 10 i.e., a variety of

uniqueness or as a "psychosocial phenomenon involving a complex set of

interactions between the normalizing influences of the social group

and the innate or acquired drive to be oneself," 11 has a similarity

to the Thomist definition of the person.   The individuality is an

achievement of life processess or the social persona which is involved

with the more material individual.   The individual has the more

metaphysical sense of being a separate and distinct existence. It is

the "thing" and "individuality" is the personality or the truly human

part of man. It is the individuality that provides man the logical

and moral unity that allows him to be an end in himself and not means

for something else. "Individiuality", then, is the basis for that

which is uniquely human, and uniqueness, as I will point out, is a variety of the concept of autonomy. On the other hand, whenever "individuality" is related more to the physical aspects than to the person, then it takes on a different value. "Separateness", "apartness", "distinctness", are more akin to its non- personality meaning. In this paper, I shall use autonomy for the personality aspect of individuality, and individual for the more physical aspect of individuality.

"Uniqueness" has the tone of unrepeatability, i.e. that the charactersitics or the set of characterstics which one individual contains will never reoccur again. The physical appearance, the genetic structure, the mental predispositions and processes , the memories and experiences will never occur exactly as they are in one person. For that reason, many believe we will never know what the human individual is because each is different from the others. When I look at my hands, I recognize that the left is different from the right, yet I would not treat a broken finger in the left hand while leaving a broken finger in the right untreated on the grounds that each is unique and I hadn't studied the right hand finger. No geologist studies but one piece of granite and not others on the grounds that each is unique. Research scientists do not study tuberculosis in each and every person on the grounds that each person or individual is unique. If a child is born without arms, we do not

say of that child he is not human or that he is of a different species, yet he would be unique. What then is meant when the individual is described as "unique"? The fact that no two people have the same fingerprints, voiceprints, or brainwave patterns may be useful cateloguing people or things but does little to help the study of man. It would be hard to find anything in this world that is identical in everyway (except time and space) to another thing yet we seldom bother to think of the minute differences when collecting new stamps or new coins, or when we examine a type of bacteria or virus.

When asked what an author means by "uniqueness" in human beings, I am sure that not one of them would demonstrate the uniqueness of fingerprints or elbows or hair numbers in the scalp. It is doubtful that they would suggest physical appearance as the source of the "uniqueness". The most common answer would probably be connected to the mind or the brain, or processes of either. Some would answer that the experiences of each individual are unique; or that the values of each are unique; or that the desire, goals, thoughts, etc. are unique. All we can do then is to describe the unique character to the best of our ability and leave it at that. The examination of those unique characteristics are best left to the biographers, poets and lovers (who are in turmoil over every thought of their loved one). Yet the authors are not content merely to point out the unique characterstics! More often than not, they wish to make a general statement about the

important or substantive uniqueness (i.e., uniqueness excluding differences like hair colour or fingerprints etc). The unique characteristic s contribute something or are instrumental in creating something important or essential for that individual, and even for every individual. (Often, whatever characteristic is unique in one individual is unique in every individual. For instance, everyone has fingerprints, yet each is unique to one individual.) I must conclude, therefore, that what is meant by uniqueness in individuals is that there are characteristics or attributes which belong to man as a whole but which exhibit themselves uniquely in every individual. The attribute of memory is in every human yet what each individual remembers is different. A statement then can be made about the importance of the unique exhibition of an attribute for the development, or existence of each individual and of man as a whole. When the original claim of the "unique individual" was made, some importance was attached to certain characteristics being allowed to exhibit themselves without hindrances, otherwise little or no importance would have been attached to "uniqueness". The attribute or characteristic may involve goals, self-achievement or fulfillment, values, decisions, morals and responsibility and so on. Each involves reason, judgement, will, choice etc. i.e., functions of the mind in and for itself. Consequently for the purposes of this paper, I treat uniqueness as a variety of the concept "autonomy" i.e., a self-regulating being.

Josiah Royce has an implicit concept of the individual that follows the reasoning that I have outlined above . He starts out as follows:

So that to exist implies...to be different from the rest of the world of existences. And since I must exist if I am to have any qualities whereby I can resemble another being, and must differ from all other beings if I am to exist, it naturally seems that my differences from all the rest of the world is, in a sense, the deepest truth about me.... By an individual...we mean an essentially unique being, or a being such that there exists, and can exist, but one of the type constituted by this individual being. 12.

Later on, however, he makes the following claims:

...I hold the concept of individuality...in itself, essentially and altogether, a teleological concept...implying that the facts of any world where there really are individuals express will and purpose. 13.

And, more baldly:

An individual is a being that adequately expresses a purpose. 14.

At first it was the uniqueness of characteristics that he claims make the individual. Later, in order to present a coherent theory, he choses what he deems to be essential and arrives at a teleologically oriented or purposive being, i.e. a concept closely related to, if not an attribute of, autonomy. Autonomy is a concept that includes such

items as self-regulation, self government, self -rule, etc., and it usually includes a vague notion of independence. An autonomous region, for example, will make its own laws and enforce them without aid or interference from outside governments, yet will still be considered a part of a whole. Kant had a more precise use of the concept when he applied it to humans and human thinking:

> ...subject only to his own, yet universal, legislation, and ... he is only bound to act in accordance with his own will, which is, however designed by nature to be a will giving universal laws. 15.

> ... man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. 16.

The independence that results from the autonomy of human thinking, is not a substantive concept in that the human mind has no choice to be independent. It simply is. For Kant, the human mind can only think in certain ways or patterns which he labeled "categories", and it is impossible to break through those patterns or categories. This does not mean that a human being cannot submit to another, it is just that the choice to submit is the result of an independent action, and that act of submission becomes the basis of the rules which the human has adopted for himself. His autonomy is still intact because he has chosen to adopt submissive rules for himself and he continues to choose the rules throughout his submission. The existentialists

picked up on this point and formed a new movement around that central core.

The inability of the human to break through the categories or patterns of the mind, indicates a definite limitation in the freedom of thought, and the range of human reason. These limitations indicate that the role of 'autonomy' must in turn be restrained if not drastically curtailled. Man cannot be autonomous or self-regulating, which involves an element of will or reason, if there are structural limitations imposed prior to reason, and prior to will. With such limitations, autonomy can occur when the structure of his own mind allows it. It is common knowledge, today, that many people suffer from cumpulsions whose source is the unconscious. The unconscious is outside the control of reason or the awareness of the conscious, and, as such, must be considered a further limitation on the rule of autonomy.

Autonomy, as a concept, is a view of man and his judgment that is more acceptable to the protestant view in which each individual is a morally responsible unit. Each soul is responsible for its own sins and its own salvation, i.e., responsible to have faith, to believe, to choose to be "born again". Calvin's doctrine of the elect is a more convoluted version of the same thing. Arminianism is an extreme view in which each soul must always choose because he is always responsible

for sins and for his choice to "be saved". The responsible soul
requires autonomy in order for it to choose faith and salvation. In
the Middle Ages, the scolastics required a fierce debate over "free or
autonomous will" in order to speak of God's relationship to man and
the meaning of the death of Jesus on the cross. By the sixteenth
century, the doctrine of "free will" had won universal acceptance. By
the time Deism had eliminated an all-knowing, all-caring God from the
concept of the individual, the basic characteristics of an autonomous
individual were well established. The individual had reason, will,
judgment, etc., and for those reasons he was subject to no other man.
The basic principle of man must be found within man himself, and not
in another man, entity, or being.

Peter McCormick claims that the concept of autonomy occurs
whenever there is a breakdown of a highly integrated society.
Historically and existentially, society comes before any individual
and assigns him an identity but with a collapse of that society the
individual is left on his own. The individual starts to perceive of
himself as an "autonomous, differentiated, self-starting individual.
However,

> ...the individual is not a raw datum, not a
> conceptual starting point, not a simple "given" to
> human experience, but a conceptual construction of
> considerable complexity emerging from a specific
> type of social experience, namely the experience of
> social breakdown. 17.

Should McCormick's claim (and that of Michael Oakeshott whom McCormick acknowledges as the source of the idea) have any validity, then autonomy has the similar root causes as some varieties of Durkheim's anomie. The problem, not discussed by McCormick, is whether or not such a collapse is in the natural order of things, i.e. , a natural step in the evolving nature of man.

As a consequence of defining the human individual as unique, distinct, autonomous, separate, etc., society has had to be defined in such a manner as to accommodate the meaning of the "individual". Society, then, becomes an aggregate of individuals, or of individuals and relations. Its existence is attributable to the creative mind of every individual, or in other words, society is a rational construct. The focus of what is human centers on the individual and society is the means or the instrument through which individuals live together and achieve values, goals, normally outside the grasp of any one individual.

To sum up the aspects of "individual", we have arrived at a postion where there are two streams of meanings. On the one hand, the individual is distinct, separate, complete in itself, unrepeatable, i.e., subject to spatio-temporal location. It is itself and not another thing ,physically finite, and as such a self-maintaining structure. 18 On the other hand, it is autonomous, unique, self-regulating, whose roots are in the human mind.

There are two objections to both streams of thought. As a
biological organization man is a living thing and any deep disturbance
in his "component parts is likely to affect the health and even the
viability of the whole organism". 19. Should a death, divorce, loss
of job, illness to a loved one, etc. occur in the life of the
individual, the health of the individual is affected - enough of such
incidents and the individual can die. Somehow, the biological man is
linked to entities outside the individual. The second objection is
that such definitions are static. The human is a "coordinated stream
of personal experiences" which is his "thread of life". 20. The
human individual is as much a continuity as is society. How the
process of both continuities are involved cannot be answered in the
static manner of an isolate individual.

We usually speak of "individual" in contradistinction to
"society", yet whatever "society" may be, it is linked more closely to
"person" and "personality". The concept itself had little meaning
until the end of the Middle Ages. The rise of the importance of reason
or judgement as an end for humanity gave each human an importance and
a value beyond the considerations of society. The Revolution in
thought, reflected in Descartes' Meditations, conceptually divided the
human into parts resulting in such problems as the mind/body dualism.

Conceptually, the ancient Jews (and perhaps the modern Semitics) were unable to divide the human into various parts. Only with the advent of the ancient Greeks and dialectic reasoning, could the various aspects of the human be thought of as things. The soul could exist, and, indeed, did exist without the body, according to Plato's teaching in the Phaedo. The concentration of man's search for knowledge on the human, advocated by Socrates and the Sophists, enabled the Greeks to divide the human into two basically distinct parts: 1) the body, i.e. the material, crass, entity of feelings and emotions, and, 2) the soul, i.e. the reasoning, contemplating, judging entity of logic, laws and knowledge. With the advent of Christianity and a new emphasis on personal salvation, the soul became the entity of primary importance, but it too was divided into two parts: 1) the soul, i.e., the eternal spirit encompassing the divine linking the individual to the "universalis fidelis", and, 2) reason or judgment.

The importance of these new conceptually distinct entities can be seen by the effect they had on medieval thought. St. Thomas wrote:

> .... the knowable object is proportioned to the knowing power. Now, there are three levels of knowing powers. One kind of knowing power is the act of a corporeal organ, namely sensation. Therefore, the object of any sensitive potency is the form as it exists in corporeal matter. Since this kind of matter is the principle of individualism, every power of the sensitive past of the soul is able to know particular things only. Another kind of knowing power is that which is neither the act of a corporeal organ nor in any way

associated with corporeal matter: the angelic
intellect, for instance. So, the object of this
knowing power is a form subsisting apart from
matter; although they may know material things,
they see them in immaterial beings - either in
themselves, or in God. Now, the human intellect
occupies a middle position: it is not the act of
any organ, yet it is a power of the soul which is
the Form of of the body, as we explained
previously.21.

St. Thomas, however, applied the name "man" to both the body and the
soul together and not to either one alone. The Platonic idea of a soul
"trapped" in a body was unacceptable to him but not to his
predecessors. St. Thomas did believe there was a real distinction
between the soul and the faculties. The faculties themselves were
divided into parts: the vegetative faculties, concerned with
nutrition, growth, reproduction; the sensitive faculties, such as
sight, hearing, smell etc. and imagination, memory, etc.; and the
rational faculties. He also claims that man is free because he is
rational.22.

Although St. Thomas differentiated various aspects of man yet
tried to keep man as a unit, Descartes rent the aspects asunder. The
bodily faculties and the mental Faculties could not be trusted. Only
the thinking "I" could be known as certain. Descartes spoke of the
relationship of the "I" and the body as comparable to that of a
"pilot" at the wheel of a ship. After his Meditations, and with the
advent of secularism, the mind or reason (soul) and the body were

considered to be two distinct entities, if not two distinct existents. Gilbert Ryle labeled the concept as "The Official Doctrine".23. In it, human bodies are in space and subject to mechanical laws of spacial objects, whereas minds are not in space or subject to mechanical laws. The body and its actions can be observed by others yet the mind cannot.

Without labeling myself as a Thomist or something else, and for the purposes of this paper only, I wish to assume that the "mind" or "person", is as inextricably a part of a human, as is the body. (Strawson's Individuals gives an excellent, if imperfect, argument for this position.) The "mind", the "will", the "consciousness", the "body" etc. are merely aspects of what is human and the splits or gulfs between them are without foundation in reality.

There is a sense of inadequacy in our concept of the individual. For hundreds of years, Western culture has sought to find the basic ingredients in the concept and has failed. The failure led to the "unbeing", the "Nothingness" of the existentialists (particularly Sartre) with its accompanying 'dread', 'nausea', 'fear and loathing unto death', that any peasant would reject with the contempt it deserves. The failure permeates all of western thought so that philosophical, humanist and cultural thought has stagnated. Using the newest technological instruments, we probe and examine the lump that

is man in the same manner as an archeologist probes and examines a shard of pottery. What fits with our preprogrammed assumptions is accepted. What does not is thrown back into the dirt. We examine the remains of man and assume that that is all there is to man.

Whitehead said once that scientists may examine a dead cat - measure and record all its organs, fibres, tendons, bones and flesh but when they are done they still would not have a cat, a live creature that purred, meowed, rubbed its coat against your leg or flicked its tail as it hunted. Using the scientific methods only we know so little of man. Concepts such as 'Reason,' 'Consciousness', 'Soul', 'Feeling', in fact, almost all the concepts that we consider human, lie outside the scope of science as we know it today. This is particularily so of the concept of human 'life' and the human 'individual'.

The concept of the "individual" has many meanings and variations of meanings but, when speaking of human beings, we usually have two things in mind: 1) being a distinct entity and 2) acting according to one's own will and for one's own ends. The human individual is regarded as a unit and as an agent at the same time. Other cultures and other time periods had different views of man. Tribesmen often are unable to distinguish themselves apart from the tribe. The ancient Greeks were unable to separate the "citizen" and the "state". The

tendency is to believe that other cultures are simply not as "advanced" as ours. A belief in "progress" allows us to assume that our culture is the most "civilized" and "advanced" the world has ever seen, and, as such, our concepts are much nearer to the "actual truth or nature" of man. A culturally "blind" man is also an ignorant man so any concept under analysis must be bared of all possible assumptions (at least to the best of one's ability).

The Jewish people were unable to separate the various parts of the individual, unlike the Greeks or ourselves. When we speak of the soul, the Semitic speaking person speaks of the inner aspects of the whole man, because the whole man is a unit. We can separate the mind, the soul, the body, the will, reason, etc. from the individual and from each other. The Old Testament Jews would find these concepts to be completely beyond their ken. The difference between the contemplation of the Greeks and that of the Taoists and other oriental groups was that, for the orientals, contemplation was a means of purging themselves of the material in order to be at one with the One, the Universal Being or Spirit; while for the Greeks, contemplation was a means of understanding nature and oneself. It is the difference between mysticism and science. The oriental desired to merge with the whole, beyond himself, while the Greeks thought of universals and particulars and man. The one relied on the non-rational and the 'Universal Being', the other relied on judgment and himself.

It is , of course, an exaggeration to polarize eastern and Greek
culture in such a manner yet the tendencies toward such polar results
were there. In the western world, Augustine and the early fathers of
the church were able to repress reason's or judgment's role in western
culture, but for St. Thomas and many other eminent thinkers of the
dying middle Ages and early Renaissance, judgement had become a key
concept. Augustinanism no longer dominated the western world.

Max Weber developed a theory around the Protestant work ethic to
explain the remarkable technological and economic differences between
countries such as Italy and England or Spain and Holland. However, the
Protestant Reformation reflected a crisis in Western culture. It is no
accident that the Reformation occurred after the printing press was
invented for learning was the key to its success. For Calvin, in
particular, the final earthly authority was the individual's
conscience, that is, his judgement concerning God's will. Each man had
to know what God wanted man to do, hence the need to read and study
the Bible, hence the need for education and printing.

Marsilius, William of Ockham and the Renaissance writers differ
remarkably from John of Salisbury and other thinkers of his time
because of a new identity of the human being through his judgement and
his reason. More's Utopia and Bacon's Novum Organum contain numerous
references to false myths, false idols and so on. Only man's reason

applied to the world was the final arbiter. Bacon consciously rejected Aristotle and Plato to found the basis for a new thought. Both More and Bacon, but more particularly Bacon, witnessed the change from the Aristotelian-Scholastic logical tradition to a newer or modern view in the British Universities, which depended on, as the ultimate authority, 'clear and distinct' ideas.

Descartes summarized the new attitude in a bare yet explicit proposition "cogito ergo sum". By his method, which is basically the method adopted by western culture, the only and ultimate authority for everything (and by this I do not mean the ultimate cause or creator or whatever) is reason: I'm reasoning, therefore I am. I know I exist because thinking is the one thing I can be sure that is absolutely beyond doubt. However, in order to follow Descartes' method, I had to place aside everything that I cannot be sure of: the senses, the body, the thoughts of my mind.

> I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing... And although possibly... I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in as much as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as much as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am , is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it.24.

Westen thought had reached the point where the 'individual' is divided. The Semitic people would find this concept completely beyond them.

Science at the present moment is able to make head transplants from one body to another. Soon, no doubt, scientists will be able to place the head of one person on the body of another. Should the body of the donor die, do we consider the person 'A' dead although his head will still be alive on another body? How would we solve the matter of identity? Descartes believed that the identity of a person was contained in the "I" that inhabited the body, and that the "I" did not need the body to exist. We, in our present culture, may believe that the "I" needs the body to exist, yet our science fiction is repleat with examples of mind transplants, souls or minds inhabiting other bodies etc. I am certain that should the life of the body be opposed to the thoughts and actions of the mind, most people would choose the latter. However, should a person try to kill his body to release his soul, we would judge him insane and send him to psychiatric treatment. A child, so severely retarded that it is more a lump of flesh than a human, cannot be mistreated or destroyed because of the "rights" it has, or the humanity it has, and so on.

Nobody doubts that every individual human being has a value simply because he exists as a human being. Variations of this theme have

existed throughout recorded history. However, the source or principle upon which the value is founded differ profoundly. In Genesis, God created man in his own image and for that reason man was valuable. He did not belong to himself - he belonged to God. For Aristotle, the individual was of value as a citizen, that is, he belonged to the state. While for Plato, in the Republic, the individual fulfills only part of the function of the state, he can do his part in the harmony of the state only when he himself has the self-control or temperance to be in harmony with himself.25. For the early Christians, he was of value because Jesus had died for man and every soul was sacred. In the Middle Ages, the individual belonged to the 'body of the Faithful', to the church which was now 'the body of Christ'. The believer was part of a unit.

Luther changed the concept, or at least, represents a change in the concept so that the individual no longer is a part of a unit. The concept of the individual stood out above the crowd and started to dominate the western cultural thought. Individual will and judgment were suddenly very important. The individual was important for two reasons: 1) Jesus had died on the cross for every sinner, and 2) every person could choose to believe and accept or not. In the Middle Ages, it was not the person who was important but the office he held. By the time of the Reformation, however, the individual was as important as the office he held, if not more so.

The concept of the "individual" seems to have evolved as a moral concept centered on the principle of "redemption" - a key principle in Christianity. "Redemption" required something to be redeemed - the soul, something to be redeemed "from" - sin, and a means of redemption - Christ's blood and an individual moral responsibility. No other major religion (that I know of) has such a program. As a result, there was no need to develop the concept of the "individual" with its accompanying moral accoutrements. Taoism emphasized individual contemplation and a good life, but this was required in order to "see" behind the "presented" world and merge with the "Universal Principle" or "Universal Being".

In the first part of the paper, the development of the "individual" as a moral concept, first with theological implications, then social implications, and finally with political implications, will be examined. The development of the "individual" benefitted from conceptual developments other than moral but these additions were used to augment the dominant moral theme. These additional concepts were a new view of nature and of the state by the Greeks, a different concept of law and of personal allegiance in the Medieval Age, and a new means of communication and a new view of science in the Renaissance. Part I of the paper, then, is a history of the development of the concept of the individual.

There is a problem of "identity". When we view "man", are we culturally "preprogrammed " to see an "individual" with all the emotional overtones that that concept evokes? Is the "individual" of value because he has an individual soul (as Luther claimed)? because he is a morally responsible being (as St. Thomas and Luther claimed)? or because he is an autonomous reasoning being (as Kant claimed)? Others, however, believe that the "individual", as depicted above, is a fallacy and that his value is only as a part of a greater entity. Part II examines the "individual" to discover his "true material" nature and whether or not he is an "individual" to begin with. Part III continues that examination, but focuses on the "higher faculties" such as consciousness, reason, conscience, and so on.

In our examination of the concept of the "individual", I shall try to avoid an error pointed out by Nietzsche:

> All philosophers share this common error: they proceed from contemporary man and think they can reach their goal through analysis of this man. Automatically they think of "man" as an eternal verity, as something abiding in the whirlpool, as a sure measure of things. Everything that the philosopher says about man, however, is at bottom no more than a testimony about the man of a very limited period. Lack of a historical sense is the original error of all philosophers....26.

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<u>PART</u> <u>ONE</u>

Individualism exists in many areas of study: political, religious, economic, scientific, etc. For the purposes of this paper, only the political aspects of the concept will be examined. This is not a claim that the political "individual" can be separated in reality, for man has many roles; it is only a limitation or a boundary for our examination or our focus of attention. The religious aspect will be brought into our focus only insofar as that aspect affects the political aspect. As a political concept, individualism is not a unit. There are a number of strands of thought running through the concept with numerous qualities or attributes with a theoretical range from German Romanticism to anarchistic individualism. Each strand has a basic root which we will examine and then we will examine the strands themselves. The hope is that we can see how the concept attained its basic structure today by examining its past roots as well as the more recent history in Europe and North America.

Traditional Man.

It is unfortunate that the ancient world is passed by in the realms of political theory and political history, for there occurred, in the ancient worlds, four significant changes, indeed revolutions, in thought that were to have great significance on the political life of the western world. That the political and social thought of the

western world is different from that of China or India rests on these four pillars. The Jewish people are usually credited for the gifts of "one god" and a religious tradition. The concept of "one god" is an important gift, yet two other concepts: an "individualized" God; and a separation of divine and civic law, - were also inherited from the Jews, and these latter two concepts are most important in political and social thought. Another nation, the Greeks, reinforced the concept of the separation of divine and civic laws, and added a third change, a bifurcation of the state, as a concept, and religion, as a concept. The fourth change involved man as a subject of study. In Greece, Socrates epitomizes a change in Greek thinking. Unlike Homer, Thales, and other older thinkers, Socrates did not study the gods, nor the world alone, he asked questions of man. As a result new ideas of "justice", "good", "community", etc., emerged on the forefront of man's intellectual questing. Jesus, with his emphasis on grace and personal salvation, reinforced the prominance of the fourth change in western civilization.

Hubert Butterfield recognized the importance of the individual's conscience throughout western civilization:

> ...the weapon that Christianity always holds in reserve, namely the willingness to accept martyrdom. In the last resort the Christian has had one thing to say to society in every age of history and sometimes he has had to say it to other Christians when they were untrue to their principles and were trying to force his conscience.

He has said: "I will worship God, even if you kill
me...1

The modern "relation" to that "weapon" must be the non-violent

campaigns of Gandhi and Martin Luther King. King wrote:

I submit that an individual who breaks a law that
conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts
the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience
of the community over its injustice, is in reality
expressing the very highest respect for law. Of
course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil
dis- obedience. It was seen sublimely in the refusal
of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to obey the laws of
Nebuchadnezzar because a higher moral law was involved.
2.

In both quotes, there are two principles involved: the conscience

of the individual, and the separation of divine and civil laws. At

one time, morality, ethics, conscience, and the worship of God, were

external to the personality of the individual. The tribe was the

whole for the individual. The individual's consciousness was confined

to, and submerged in, the tribal consciousness. Every member of the

tribe considered himself as the descendent of, the child of, in the

family of, etc., the tribal god or gods. The god was the god of the

tribe, not the individual. When a member was expelled or left the

tribe, he lost his god, and the tribe would say: "Go, serve other

gods." 3. Ruth performed a similar ritual when she said to Naomi:

"Interest me not to leave thee, or to return from following after

thee: for whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I

will lodge: thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God" 4. (emphasis added).

In the early civilizations of Mesopotamia, the individual had no intrinsic value as an end in himself. A "characteristic of these civilizations was a tendency to identify religious values with those immanent to the social order." 5. The state was governed by "the assembly of the gods"; "the gods own the land, the big estates"; and man was created by the gods so "his purpose is to serve the gods". (6) The whole aim of the state was to benefit the gods, not the members of the state. In Egypt, the religious institutions were almost as powerful. In the third kingdom, a god-king ruled the state and other national gods supported his rule. The temples owned one out of every five inhabitants, and one-third of the cultivatable land. (7) Opportunistic individuals, noble and poor, defied the rule of the pharaohs, until the strain broke Egypt into warring factions. (8) However, the new petty princes and land barons took to extremes the personal rule of the old pharaohs, and anarchy prevailed. Law, as a concept separate from the concept of divine proclamation or principles, was lacking, and never managed to be a part of Egyptian culture. As a result, law (and therefore order and stability) was always "part and parcel" of the divine order - i.e. the god-king and the temples. Egyptian political culture could not be conceived apart from the pharaohs as god-kings. It can be no accident that Egypt

remained relatively quiet under Roman rule after Cleopatra lost her kingdom to Augustus. Caesar had been made a god in Egypt and, after his death, throughout Rome; Augustus was his nephew and heir and he too was created a god after his death. Soon every emperor was made a god. The line of divinity was continued in Egypt and so was the law.

The Jewish nation was founded on the belief that God chose them as His people (belonging to Him) and a covenant (9) was set up between God and His people, i.e. the nation as a whole. "And I will make my covenant between me and thee, and will multiply thee exceedingly." The Jewish nation was called "the seed of Abraham". The God was the "God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" for these were the fathers i.e. leaders of the Jewish people. The law (Torah) was the divine proclamations that applied to the nation as a whole. The executions were done by stoning, in which all take part. (10) When a murder or other crime was perpetrated, the community or tribe was also responsible. For an unsolved murder, the elders of the community had to go through a purification ritual. (11) When the concubine of a Levite was raped and killed by a few men in Gibeah, a city belonging to the Benjamites, the Levite cut up the woman in twelve pieces and sent one piece to each of the tribes of Israel. The other tribes felt obligated to form an 'assembly of the people of God'. They asked the Benjamites to give up the men who had done the deed, but the Benjamites would not give up members of their tribe. As a result, the

other tribes fought the Benjamites, defeated them and burned their cities. The destruction was so great that it was feared the Benjamite tribe was finished. The other tribes had sworn not to give wives to any Benjamite yet they asked God to intervene on behalf of the Benjamites. "And the children of Israel repented them for Benjamin their brother, and said there is one tribe cut off from Israel this day." (12) The solution is strange to us but not to the Jews. One city had not sent any men to the assembly, and, because of this negligence, they were destroyed but their women (i.e. virgins) were captured and given to the Benjamites. (13) Each decision by the Israelites was sanctioned or commanded by Phineas the High Priest and keeper of the Ark.

The Levite had a claim on the whole people for justice under the Torah. The whole tribe of Benjamin was punished for breaking the laws about murder. The whole tribe was punished (and almost destroyed) for the sins of a few. However, the tribe of Benjamin was considered essential as a part of the whole, a "brother" in the 'family' of Israel. Later on, Solomon sinned, so the Jewish nation was punished. Earlier, Moses had three thousand men killed because they worshiped a golden calf. (14) All the law and the customs of the Jews was designed, not for the people of Israel, but for the continuing relationship between the people and their God. The foundation of the law was the covenant and the will of God. (15) Anyone breaking the

laws of the covenant brought punishment on the whole of Israel. It is for this reason that the scapegoat was slain. The goat represented the tribe as a whole and Aaron had to confess over him "all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins". (16)

In the early history of Israel, therefore, the individual counted for little. He was a part of a nation 'family' belonging to a jealous God. To rebel in the family, was to deny the will of God and the punishment was death. In fact, for a child to rebel against his own parents was also seen in a similar light. The rebellious son is taken to the elders of the city and "all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die." (17) However, the destruction and the dispersal of the Jewish nation brought about a change unique in its influence.

In Jeremiah and Ezekiel, a new concept was emerging. God was no longer just the God of the nation as a whole, for the nation no longer existed as a unit, He became a God for the individual. From the externally oriented religion, Judaism now was oriented to the inner man. God was individualized. Daniel prayed to and fought for God alone. Aaron could not think of defying the people of Israel when they asked him to build a golden calf. Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego defied Nebuchadnezzar because of their faith. In Jeremiah, God had

proclaimed a new covenant would be made when He brought the Jews back to Israel:

> After these days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them.... (18)

From now on, "everyone shall die for his own iniquity". (19) After the people returned, the new covenant was instituted. All souls are God's and every man is responsible for his own soul. (20) From now on, there was a direct link of each individual to his God, and of each person's responsibility for his soul to his own conscience.

As a result of this new 'covenant', two sets of laws were set for each follower of God: the higher, moral law of God, and the lesser civil law of man. Daniel and his friends obeyed the higher laws of God rather than the laws of their earthly rulers. Whereas before the exile, prophets had always linked the law, even a written law, (21) to God as being expressions of His will, after the exile, Ezra uses the law to bring the people together and to take them out of 'bondage' and the people gave up their foreign wives and children, and their lands in order to obey the law and go to Israel once again. (22) "From being a nation tied to the law Israel becomes a religious community gathered around the law." (23) The loss of the ark and the temple did not

destroy the Jewish religion because of the new emphasis on the law for its own sake. God's direct contact with the nation of Israel declines after this point. This change is reflected in the use of the word for 'law'. Earlier prophets used 'torah' not only for law but also for the divine word. It was a duty of the priests. It had divine authority, no matter the circumstances. Later on, others were involved in the law, such as scribes, yet the divine authority within the laws was still evident. (24) After the exile, the law becomes a more concrete concept. The law becomes more important than the temple and the scribes more important than the priests. (25) In fact, the Pharisees had come to believe that the law and the strict observance of the law was the only salvation for the believer. However, the same word is also used to describe the laws of other lands and even of military laws. It is Greek they used in Hellenic times and the word 'vouos' is not a strict translation of 'torah'. New elements have been included in the concept. (26)

The exile of the Jews in Babylon resulted in two radical changes in thought: God became individualized, and the law became a more substantive concept while being divided into the higher moral law of God and the lesser civil law of man. These changes are unique to the Jewish nation.

In China, one of the words for the 'state' is 'kuo-chia' which means 'state-family', and, as in a family, all the members, including the ruler, must work together. Within the state, the clans were of great importance. The clan was responsible for the behaviour of all its members, and whole families were fined or killed as punishment for the crime of one of its members. (28) In many ways, the ancient Chinese society of 500 B.C. was similar to the Jewish society at the same time. The individual thought of himself as a member of the family and not as an isolated entity. It was a crime for a son to set up his own household while his parents were living. Children were married according to their parents' wishes. No member of the household could be forced to testify against another member and any child that accused his parents should be put to death even if the accusation was proven to be true. Religious communities were also treated as families, so that a master and novice were treated as uncle and nephew. Each family was like a little kingdom. (29)

The religious movements usually emphasized the individual. The Taoists were almost anarchical in their value on human freedom. No government had any rights over the individual for the Taoist, but then they did not set a high value on society and often chose to be recluses. (30) Confucius, on the other hand, said:

It is not in the nature of man to find his social life
among the beasts and birds. If we do not remain in the
society of men, with whom else can we associate

ourselves?   Moreover, if the world were in good order,
I should not be trying to change it. (31)

Like Plato, he sought a prince who would put his ideas into practice but failed. The Buddhists reinforced the Taoists principles when they arrived in China. They declared that "monks owe no veneration to the king." (32) For all three religions, there was a sort of higher moral law to which the individual was responsible.

However, there were exceptions. The legalists tended to ignore the individual because the state was all important. The end was the state and the people were merely means to that end. There was no power or law greater than that of the state. They denied family relationships because the individual belonged, and owed his loyalty, to the state.   Lord Shang, one of the major founders of China as we know it today, was one of the major proponents. The Ch'in state, with such an ideology, was able to expand into an empire, the first in China (255-207 B.C.) (33) Later Confucianism was a wedding of the thought of Confucius and the thought of the Legalists.

The old legal system was set up in the Han period (206-23 B.C.) and settled in the T'ant Dynasty (618-905 A.D.) and remained basically the same until the end of the nineteenth century. There was no civil law, as all law was penal and linked to ethical or moral law. Because of the link, the law was always sovereign and not the emperor. All

had to obey the law. This principle was set by the Emperor Wen (reigned 179-156 B.C.). (34) The family was rigidly reinforced by the law (as noted above) and the individual was denied any conceptual existence. The Chinese philosophy was one which viewed the well-integrated individual as one who thought of his duties and not of his rights.

The Japanese had a similar cultural experience. The 'samurai' class were treated like a family and were called the 'children of the family', yet had a kind of lord/vassal contractual value. (35) The family "stood above the individual as the ethical reality. The individual was the secondary existence within the structure of the ie (family) to which he belonged." (36) India reflects the same principles with the addition of a caste system. (37) It, too, reflects a union of law with the divine. "The rajan, or prince, was an instrument of society, an upholder and protector of social law (dharma). But he had no authority either to make or to modify law, for 'dharma' was divine, ancient, revealed in words heard from God..." (38)

In the oriental world, the law remained joined to the divine, and the religion remained an external concept, i.e. 'outer-directed' and not directed inwardly to the soul. Form, duties, rituals, etc. remained more important than individual conscience. The attempts by

early Taoism, Confucius, and early Buddhists to link the individual to the divine directly failed and one of the reasons is that the 'law' was not a distinct concept and was not conceptually separated into the divine and civil laws.

In a monotheistic society like Judaism, it is hard to separate the church and the state as conceptual entities. In China and India, as well, the society was a means of enforcing the divine on earth. The early Jewish state was the same. The Egyptians found it impossible to conceptualize Egypt without the divine. Ancient Greece, however, was able to bifurcate the concepts. At first, the Greeks, like Homer, believed that the gods were involved in everything. By Plato's time, the two concepts were quite distinct.

Thales, one of the earliest philosophers, was able to say "all things are full of gods" (39) Hesiod looked at the city, he saw that those who "do not step at all off the road of rightness, their city flourishes" but "when men like harsh violence and cruel acts, Zeus ... ordains their punishment. Often a whole city is paid punishment for one bad man who commits crimes and plans reckless action." (40) For Hesiod, "Justice herself is a young maiden. She is Zeus's daughter" and "immortals are close to us, they mingle with men". (41) The state and the divine were conceptually indistinguishable. Even Solon thought of "Justice" in the same manner as Hesiod. (42)

Lycurgus, however, must have had a clearer conception of the state in mind when he set up the Spartan constitution. According to Xenophon, the two kings were considered to be of divine descent and as such performed religious duties on behalf of the state and led the armies. Items offered in sacrifice were often given to the kings. The kings were also the ones who consulted the gods on behalf of the state. The state, however, was run by a council called ephors. The ephors were chosen from all classes of the citizenry but had dictatorial powers. Only the ephors did not have to rise from their seats whenever a king was present. Every month, the ephors and the kings exchanged oaths, the ephors on behalf of the state, and the kings on their own behalf. The kings' oath was: "I will exercise my kingship in accordance with the established laws of the state" while the ephors swore: "so long as he (who exercises kingship) shall abide by his oath we will not suffer his kingdom to be shaken." (43)

In Sparta, the concept of the state was distinct from the concept of the divine. By the beginning of the Hellenic period in Athens, the same distinction was part of Isocrates' view of his state. "The soul of a state is nothing else than its polity". (44) Even in Plato's time, the distinction was beginning to become clear. At the beginning of Plato's Republic, Socrates waited until Cephelus left to perform his religious duties as archon in order to examine the concepts of 'justice' and 'good' and the 'state'. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle

believed that man was not self-sufficient so people associated in communities or in a polis. (45) Pindar believed that man has a temporary identity from god, but Plato details in the Laws how the individual derives his identity from society. In Plato's Greece, many children were given name endings that reflect public virtues or values, such as: 'agoras', 'the public speaker'; 'dikos' or 'dikaios', 'justified, just, etc'; 'demos', 'having to do with people'. (46) The most important person was the one who could influence and lead others.

That the concept of the state was perceived by the people of Hellenic Athens to be distinct from the divine can be concluded by looking at the literature of the time. However, the reasons for such a change are not grasped as easily. Leo Strauss believed that a new concept of nature had been 'discovered', and this 'discovery' was a necessary condition for the 'discovery' of natural rights. In Hebrew, there was no term for nature used in the Old Testament, so the concept of natural rights was missing completely. (47) Without natural rights, Strauss believed, the importance of the individual will be negligible. However, without 'nature' as another basis or explanatory foundation for the state, the divine was the only 'foundation' available. Thales had believed that the gods were in everything. Aristotle believed that it was in man's 'nature' to be social. He based his idea or justification for the 'polis' on the nature of man himself and not on a divine ordinance. Zeno, the founder of the Stoa,

wrote a book called <u>On The Nature Of Man</u> in which he stated that the end of life was to be in agreement with nature. (48) (The Stoics developed the concept of nature to such an extent that they introduced the concept of the 'original state of nature' which Hobbes and Locke used later on.) The end of life was 'to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural'. (49) The concept of man's nature was developed by Zeno to such an extent that, in his <u>Republic</u>, he described a utopian state where there was no government, no law, no rules, but those of nature. Zeno's 'Republic' was an early anarchistic state.

The Pythagoreans were also involved in an area of study other than the divine. However, their philosophical studies raised numbers into a religion. The Sophists of Socrates' time helped lay down the foundations for the concept of nature. Protagoras said that man is the measure of all things. The Sophists were convinced that a 'rational theory of human nature' was the first principle of philosophy. Man was to be the centre of the universe. For the Sophists, man was an individual, (50) but it was still a vague non-universal concept. The Sophists influenced many schools but the dominant intellectual force of Greek thought that survived in western civilization, was that of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Despite their divergence in views, these three men sought absolute values in which man, individually or as a society, could find true meaning.

Eric Voegelin expressed this view saying that the new idea was one of "a man who has found his true nature through finding his true relation to God". (51)

Nature, and human nature, had suddenly become legitimate, and, perhaps, the only legitimate, subject for study. The Babylonians had studied the stars and the Egyptians laid the foundations of math and engineering, but these were part of the divine. The Greeks studied the 'non-divine' for its own sake. It was during the study of man and his nature that there arose questions of how man could apprehend ideas such as 'justice', 'good', 'happiness', 'courage', etc. Plato, Aristotle and Zeno were led back to politics and the study of the polis. For Plato, the soul of the individual was tied to his social nature and they were inseparable. He devoted most of Book X of the Laws to the question of the soul. For Aristotle "the city-state is a perfectly natural form of association, as the earlier associations from which it sprang were natural." (52)

A revolutionary change had occurred. The state, as a concept, was perceived to be separate from the concept of the divine. A new foundation, nature, had been discovered to replace the old. The Jews were unable to think of themselves apart from God. The 'state' in Egypt was inconceivable apart from the divine. In Japan, the emperor was a descendent of the gods. In Chinese, the name for the emperor

was 'Son-of-Heaven'. Nature, for the Taoists and others, was to be studied because it was part of the 'divine', inescapably joined to the 'divine'. For the Greeks, nature had its own foundations. Even the gods were subject to their own natures. According to the surviving Greek intellectual traditions, the state was founded on the 'nature of man', and not on the pleasure of the gods.

The fourth and last change of the ancient world that we will be discussing was a meld of the two major traditions in Christendom: the Jewish and the Greek. Although Rome ruled at this time, it was the thought of Hellenic Palestine that dominates the New Testament and the thought of Christ. From the Hellenic, we have the individual and the state based on nature and justice on the stoic contract and agreement. The Jewish tradition presented the 'new covenant' and the importance of the law. As a result, Christ was able to say to a questioner: "Render, therefore, unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's." (53)

Christ's message, at that time, was directed at the individual. Sayings such as "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" (54) and "He that believeth on me hath everlasting life" (55) are common in the books of the Apostles. Any Concordance will show that "faith" is a common word in the New

Testament but almost missing in the Old. However, once the believer joins the Followers of Christ, he becomes part of a family or a whole. Paul uses words such as "philo-storgos" (56) in Romans 12:10: "Be kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love". The translation 'kindly affectioned' misses the tone of the original Greek. 'Storge' meant 'love' as in 'family affection'. The Christian community was considered to be a family and not a society. Christians could become the 'sons of God' (John 1:12), 'heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ' (Romans 8:17), "so we, being many, are one body in Christ" (Romans 12:5). In the Middle Ages, such concepts were picked up by most of the intellects of the age. The message was individual in nature, yet once it had been acted upon, the individual lost his individuality and became part of something else larger than himself, something more than a community or a society.

Other areas of the Roman world were also beginning to recognize the individual as a distinct concept. Following the Stoic trend of thought, Cicero and Seneca often used the word 'individuum', meaning 'that which cannot be cut or divided', and later, 'a unique thing'. (57) Yet, both were passionately involved in the state. Cicero, in particular, devoted his whole life to politics and to a concept of the state, the values of which were the old Republican values of selfless devotion to the state. Cicero tried to base his justification of the state on reason and nature, individual values:

> Therefore, since there is nothing better than
> reason, and since it exists both in man and in god,
> the first community of man and god is a society of
> reason. But those who have reason in common must
> also have right reason in common, and since right
> reason is law, we must believe that men are
> associated also with the gods in law..... Hence we
> must now conceive this whole universe as one
> commonwealth of gods and men. (58)

Another Stoic, Marcus Aurelius, believed that "judgement is the

central power in man, the common source of truth and morality." (59)

The individual was not yet an 'autonomous', 'unique', or

'distinct' concept, and the state was still more, or as, important,

yet the concept of the individual, as an important part of the human

makeup, had arrived. Where the ancient Greeks had no equivalent to

our concept 'person', but an extensive vocabulary for expressing

'community being', the later classical period was able to place more

emphasis on the individual apart from the state.

The ancient world presented us with many principles which we still

hold as fundamental to our set of beliefs. As far as the concept of

the individual is concerned, four of those principles are unique to

western culture. As we have seen, the Jewish nation was able to

'individualize God' so that the individual was responsible for his own

soul and conscience. The second change was the separation of the

concept of law 'based on the divine' and law 'based on man' or civil

law. Law, for the Jews, had become a concept independent of God, yet based on his moral law. This concept of law was reinforced by the Greek concept of law which had also originally connected law to the divine but later was in contrast to the divine. (60) The Greeks were able to add an additional change - the separation of the concepts of the 'state' and the divine'. A new foundation of the state was found in 'nature'. Taken to an extreme, the Stoics were able to conceptualize man without a government in the 'state of nature'. The general intellectual trend of the classical period, however, was to maintain the importance of the state but with an added emphasis on the individual. These changes in thought were to have profound influence on the Middle Ages, and on the modern world.

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The Middle Ages.

The Middle Ages (61) were noted for the breakdown of 'civilization', i.e. the intellectual tradition, for the dominance of the Catholic Church and the revival of the organic traditions, and the revival of tribal and the introduction of feudal traditions. In the intellectual realm, the writings of St. Augustine, Cicero and Seneca dominated entirely for almost eight hundred years. Only the Bible was more sacrosanct in the minds of the academia.

Inheriting, as it did, the parallel concepts of the church and state from the classical age, the Middle Ages are a history of the struggle between the two for temporal sovereignty. The upper hand was with the church in the beginning, but in the end the church was defeated, and it became a national institution. At the same time, the state developed a new justification for its existence, and that foundation was its own citizenry. The development of the individual into a citizen was a slowly developed and vague legacy of the Middle Ages. As a "foundation", nature has been shifted from the state to the individual. The Middle Ages (and the Renaissance which I include in the general term "Middle Ages") arrived at a conceptual level in which reason, judgement and the soul were the part of man's nature which induced him to live communally. The state was the result of man's nature and was not necessarily "natural" itself in that it had

its own nature. A fourth legacy of the Middle Ages was our perception of time. St. Augustine's authority eliminated the cyclical conception of time. Time was now linear and it had a purpose.   It was linear because a cyclical time concept would involve taking a happy soul with God and returning him to the earth to be saved all over again. It had a purpose, which was to reach the City of God. (62)

More than anyone else, St. Augustine represented the union of the Greco- Roman and the Judeo-Christian traditions of thought.   He had studied with Plotinus and his mystical Neo-Platonism, and he applied the principles of Plato to the teachings of Christ.   Plato's ideas became the transcendent qualities of God.   The separation of the divine and civil laws became "The City of God" and the "City of Man". The two were no longer reconcileable and man must endure the City of Man in order to reach the City of God. However, the only way to find the way to the City of God was through the revelation by God, and only the knowledge of God was important. "God and the soul, that is what I desire to know.   Nothing else?   Absolutely nothing." (63) The separation of the "City of God" and the "City of Man" was a principle in many areas of the classical christian church. Hosius, Constantine's adviser, admonished the Emperor Constantius during the Arian-Athanasius struggle:

Remember that you are but mortal; and be fearful of
the day of judgement and keep yourself pure with
that day in view. Do not interfere in matters
ecclesiastical.... but learn about them from us.
For into your hands God has put the Kingdom; the
affairs of his Church he has committed to us. If
any man stole the Empire from you, he would be
resisting the ordinances of God... We are not
permitted to exercise an earthly rule; and you,
Sire, are not authorized to burn incense. (64)

Hosius was insistent on the separation of church and state in

practical terms before St. Augustine was born. Taking his cue from

St. Paul (65), Hosius believed that either God allowed, or gave, the

kingdom to be ruled by its ruler. To disobey the ruler was to disobey

God. However, the ruler himself was not allowed to break God's laws.

This was to be a major contentious issue at the height of the Middle

Ages. One of the great battles that the Middle Ages is noted for,

then, is the battle between the state and the church, a battle which

ended in the defeat of the church.

The height of the battle occurred between Gregory VII and Henry

IV. Gregory claimed complete sovereignty for the church:

Especially to me, as thy representative, has been
committed, and to me by thy grace has been given by
God the power of binding and loosing in heaven on
earth. Relying, then, on this belief... I
withdraw the government of the whole kingdom of the
Germans and of Italy from Henry the King... For he
has risen up against thy Church with unheard of
arrogance. (66)
Later on he added:

> Shall not an authority founded by laymen - even by
> those who do not know God, - be subject to that
> authority which the providence of God Almighty has
> for His own honour established and in his mercy
> given to the world?... Who can doubt but that the
> priests of Christ are to be considered the fathers
> and masters of kings and princes and of all the
> faithful? Is it not clearly pitiful madness for a
> son to attempt to subject to himself his Father, a
> pupil his master.... (67)

Gregory used the concept of the family as well as moral arguments

to back his claim. Christendom was considered by many to be the

'Family of God' and the church as the 'body of Christ'. In opposition

to Gregory's claims, Henry tried to link his rule directly to God. He

wrote to Gregory:

> Henry, king not through usurption but through the
> holy ordination of God.... thou, however, hast
> understood our humility to be free, and hast not,
> accordingly, shunned to rise up against the royal
> power conferred upon us by God, daring to threaten
> to divest us of it. As if we had received our
> kingdom from thee! As if the kingdom and the
> empire were in thine and not in God's hands! (68)

There is a sense that the king is a steward or a guardian whom God has

placed in charge directly. However, in neither case do the combatants

think of or consider the ordinary person. Only the pope, the king and

God are important and everything else was to be disposed of by God and

his representatives on earth.

The attitudes of these two offices and the men who occupied them

gained adherants in the intellectual life on both sides. In the end,

of course the authority of the kings won out and the church was seldom able to exercise authority over a state again. However, although much of the literature that survives is concerned with the church/state conflict, other political and social trends, which concern the concept of the individual were growing.

Walter Ullman's magnificent book: The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (69) has helped to refocus medieval studies in fundamental ways. He feels that medieval students did not distinguish between the individual as a subject and the individual as a citizen. (70) He adds:

> In a rough sense one may well say that for the larger part of the Middle Ages it was the individual as a subject that dominated the scene, while in the later Middle Ages and in the modern period the subject was gradually supplanted by the citizen. (71)

Ullman claimed that from Rome, the Middle Ages inherited the concept of society as a corporation, and when this idea was added to ecclesiastical thinking, the Christian had become a member of an "all-embracing, comprehensive corporation, the church... a full member of the 'corpus Christi' was effected by his baptism." (72) This idea is not unique to Ullman, as Colin Morris also says: "The church is the body of Christ, each member a limb in it. All believers share in the one Spirit, all are stones in the living Temple." (73) What Ullman

does add to medieval studies is the emphasis on the individual that he perceived stemming both from Feudalism and from the church.

First, he gives what most medievalists have perceived before, that people were called the 'corpus Christi', the faithful, the church, the congregation- all words depicting unity, a oneness which denied the autonomy of the individual. "The individual's standing within society was based upon his office or his official function." (74) Their status, their identity depended on the grace of the king and without it they had no place in society. Henry IV had written to Gregory as if God had entrusted him directly with His people. Ullman presents the concept of the munt (75) of the king. He claims that this concept was crucial to all medieval kingdoms. The 'munt' was similar to a 'guardianship' over a minor. In Anglo-Saxon England, the 'munt' of a bride was transferred from the parents to the bridgegroom. The kingdom was considered to be entrusted into the hands of the king who was to protect and guide his subjects. The medieval jury was required to give unanimous decisions on certain occasions, and they were certainly functioning, not as themselves, but as spokesmen for the country. (76) Interdicts and Depositions give indications of the collective punishments common at the time. Other personal clues also point to the lack of individual identity: anonymity of writers, architects, etc., and the lack of individuality in hand writing. (77)

The attacks on heresy were important because faith, and the individual's obedience to it, were the bonds that held society together, so that an attack on the faith was an act of treason. (78) The Jewish respect for the law continued at this time:

> ...All the individual bodies may and will die, but
> what cannot die is the idea of law, the idea of
> right order, which holds the public and corporate
> body together and which, therefore, possessed
> sempiternity. (79)

Ullman's perception of an organic, corporate whole that was the society of medieval ages is supported by other scholars. The origin of the organic state has its source in the thought of Cicero according to some scholars. (80) Another states: "Medieval political thought was a stable compound of both organic and individualistic theory." (81) Everything that Ullman mentioned above is supported by other scholars with slight variations.

As for individualism, Ullman sees the source of our modern concept in the law, in feudalism, and in the advent of the study of Aristotle. There were two systems of law: customary or unwritten law, which had to have some participation by the people; and the written law from superior sources which contained the duty to obey. These systems were often in conflict. The code of Justinian contained a law by Constantine the Great that no customary law could abrogate any imperial or enacted law. (82)

Personal relationships and oaths of fealty were often cemented by holy relics: a piece of the true cross or the bones of a saint. When a man gave his oath, his whole relationship with God was also involved. The wealthy and the powerful soon found it relatively simple, later on, to find a priest who would absolve them of their obligation on condition that they would pay a penance (usually to the church and the priest) for their sin of breaking their oath or word. Common law was often based on the customs built up by the original reverence paid to oaths. Part of the unwritten or common law was the laws or principles of feudalism. The oath of fealty was a personal, religious relationship as well as a legal one. The contract could be repudiated if either side did not fulfill the obligations. (83) The feudal tendency was to reduce all social and political organizations "to a network of contractual bonds between pairs of individuals." (84) "The bonds of society were personal and tribal, and the idea of public authority progressively disappeared, to such an extent that early medieval Europe had no word corresponding to the _respublica_ of the Roman world or the in the modern age." (85)

There are many examples to support this thesis:

> I, Richard Altemir... swear that from this hour
> forward I will be faithful to you, the lord Count
> Raymond... (and he goes on to mention places and
> lands he pledges to leave to his lord)... But I
> shall give to you as many times as you ask it of
> me, personally or through your messengers...
> without deceiving you... (86)

Gadbert of Burges (1127) describes the earliest description of an act

of homage during the granting of a fief:

> The count asked each one if he wished to become
> wholly his man, and the latter replied, "I so
> wish", and with his his hands clasped and enclosed
> by those of the count, they were bound together by
> a kiss. Secondly, he who had done homage pledged
> his faith to the count's spokesman in these words:
> "I promise on my faith that I will henceforth be
> faithful to Count William and that I will maintain
> my homage toward him completely against everyone,
> in good faith and without guile.(87)

One result or culmination of the individualizing process of

feudalism was the thirty-ninth Article of the Magna Carta:

> No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or
> disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way
> harmed - nor will we go upon or send upon him -
> save by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the
> law of the land. (88)

This article is the legal keystone in individualism in the English

world. No longer did the king have the right to rule according to his

own will. The barons revolted because the king had set aside common

law that had arisen from feudal sources. Common law rapidly grew in

influence. Edward III's coronation medal in 1327 had inscribed "the

will of the people gives law" and in the 1300's Chief Justice Thorpe

said that parliament represented the 'body of all the realm' and "the

law of the land is made in parliament by the king and the spiritual

and temporal lords and the whole community of the realm." (89)

John's grandson, Edward I, accepted the reality of participation by the people in ruling the country. In his "Writ of Summons of Representatives of the Countries and Boroughs to Parliament", he says he "intends to have a consultation and meeting with the earls, barons and other principal men of our kingdom", and, more importantly, that these representatives "are to have full and sufficient power for themselves and for the community of the aforesaid country... then and there for doing what shall then be ordained according to the common counsel in the premises..." (90) The people of England were not only to be consulted, but also were to have power to implement their decisions.

The 'power of the people' was to be used by Richard II, almost one hundred years later, to end direct papal influence in Britain. National church offices were to be filled by free elections, national church money was to remain in the country, and so on, and all on the authority of "Our lord the King... with the assent of all the great men and the commons of the said realm." (91) Philip IV of France already had destroyed the authority of the papacy in that country, so now the only major country left where papal authority still held sway was the weakened Holy Roman Empire. Without a strong civil authority in Germany, that country had to wait until the advent of the Reformation to finish the authority of the church. Not only had the

church and the state separated conceptually and practically but the state had superceded the church so that the latter was now subject to the former, instead of the other way around. Now national authority was greater than papal authority and only the conscience of the individual was left for 'divine' influence.

A new awareness of the individual was growing in western civilization,d Art started to show individuals as opposed to idealized types. (92) A new distinction was made between the individual as a person and as a citizen. The first translator of Aristotle's works, William of Moerbeke, had to coin a new word, politizare, a verb, to mean 'an individual in his capacity as a citizen', in order to translate the original Greek. (93) Intellectual life in the Middle Ages is usually seen to be heavily oriented toward theological issues and away from the concerns of the ordinary individual. The organicism, corporativeness of the Christian society was perceived to be the only description of society possible. In addition, the intellectual life was seen to be without substantive conflict. In reality, however, the intellectual life was one of turmoil and conflict. Four streams of classical thought continued into the Middle Ages: Stoicism and Epicureanism; Old Testament thought; Platonism; and Aristotelianism. Each had its own perspective of the individual. Only Averroism fought against the individualizing process that was building in the Middle Ages.

One of the most potent conflicts revolved around the question of whether faith alone was the only foundation of knowledge. The Stoic and Aristotelian tradition emphasized reason as being a source of knowledge and that reason was, by nature, a part of man. (94) Marsilius of Padua looked to reason to discover knowledge:

> I shall divide my proposed work into three discourses. In the first I shall demonstrate my views by sure methods discovered by the human intellect, based upon propositions self-evident to every mind not corrupted by nature, custom, or perverted emotion. In the second discourse, the things which I shall believe myself to have demonstrated I shall confirm by established testimonies of the eternal truth.... (95)

Marsilius carried his belief in reason to the Bible itself. For him the individual must be free to interpret the Bible for himself. To accept the authority of the priests without question was unnecessary, because the individual could draw his own conclusions. "And it is indeed remarkable if we are obliged to believe the authority of the glossators rather than Christ, whoever be that glossator, even a saint, and especially since he makes this assertion not as glossator but on his own understanding." (96) Considering the fact that Marsilius was forced to flee the papacy to the court of Ludwig of Bavaria in Nuremberg after he had finished the book in 1324, it is an interesting coincidence that Luther should arrive at a similar, if more pronounced, conclusion almost two hundred years

later.

Aquinas also believes in the use of reason. For him law and justice involve the reason of man. "Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the external law." (97) William of Ockham went even further and adopted the 'original state of nature' concept of the stoics, where the earth belonged to all in common and all men were free, and claimed that 'natural rights' could not be put aside by positive law, and reason was the instrument used to ensure that natural law and justice were the foundations of any community. (99) This did not mean that Ockham did not see his world as a corporate society (99), but that that corporation was founded on man's own nature. Marsilius also saw his society as a natural phenomenon (100) but, again it was based on reason and man's nature. He also added that the state made its own laws, and they were made by or with the consent of its citizenry. Non-human laws could not be called laws properly because they lacked an element of consent (101):

> The authority to make the laws belongs... to the
> whole body of citizens or to the weightier part
> thereof... (102)

An opposition to reason as a source of knowledge was formidable. Petrus Damiani, Bernard of Clairvaux (103) and the papacy itself were determined that faith was to be the sole source of knowledge. A major thinker in Medieval Political thought, John of Salisbury, also placed

the foundation of the state on the 'divine', but he supported the kings, against the papacy. As Henry IV had declared himself to be directly appointed by God, so did John believe. He had no clear conception of the difference between the individual as person and as citizen. However, he did want to return to a 'state of nature' without kings and kingdoms but living in peace, but it was a 'state of nature' before the fall of man and sin necessitated rulers. The 'commonwealth' can only flourish "when the higher members shield the lower, and the lower respond faithfully and fully in like measure to the just demands of their superiors, so that each and all are as it were members one of another by a sort of reciprocity." (104) Because the ruler was appointed to rule by God, he could see no way in which a tyrant could be removed from office. To kill a king was to break your oath of fealty. (105) Yet, even he has a sense of the individual:

> Liberty means judging everything freely in accordance with one's individual judgement, and does not hesitate to reprove what it sees opposed to good morals. (106)

John's individual judgement was based on the believer's participation in a higher moral law. The individual was obligated to owe obedience to the higher laws before the positive laws of man.

John of Salisbury, however, lived long before John, the king of England. Medieval thought had changed considerably, as I have pointed

out. John's 'individual judgement' became a right to participate in the 'justice' of the state by participating in making and applying the laws themselves. By the early 1300's, Durandus de San Porciano, a jurist, declared that secular power had jurisdiction over men as citizens because there was secular legitimate power in non-Christian countries. (107) Even Peter Abelard, who was an older contemporary of John of Salisbury, had a more modern viewpoint of man: "Although people say that Socrates and Plato are one in their humanity, how can that be accepted, when it is obvious that all men are different from each other both in matter and in form." (108) Albert the Great made it clear that to rely on revelation for explanations of natural phenomena would be absurd. For him, experience was the only guide. (109) His pupil, Aquinas, believed the reason and revelation were two different expressions of the same truth. "The divine right does not abrogate the human right which originates in reason." (110)

By the sixteenth century, the struggles of the Middle Ages had resolved themselves. Having inherited the concepts of divine, or higher, and positive, or lower, laws, the medieval man had raised the positive laws to be equal to the higher laws and to have its own justification, inception and enactment - the citizens of the state. The battle for ultimate sovereignty between the church and the state ended in a rout of the church, particularly in the Avignon period. The church became a national institution subject, as an institution,

to the state. Emerging with powers to enact legislation, the commons became a self-sufficient justification for the state.

In the battle between the state and the papacy, the struggle over the conscience of the individual was the keenest. As a result, new ideas about individual judgement and the non-reliance on authority were introduced. Reason became as important as faith, and reason had its own judgement. Using the stoic concept of nature and Aristotle's declaration that man was by nature a social being, medieval thought had found the link between 'nature' and 'reason' sufficient justification for the individual to use his own judgement on social, political and theological questions. God had become further 'individualized'. Justus Lipsius, a stoicist, was able to believe that it was necessary not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while maintaining those, man had to follow his own particular nature, and the only way to understand this relatinship was through reason. (111)

Man, no longer an object of misery and wretchedness, had become "the most fortunate of creatures and consequently worthy of all admiration... to be envied... even by the stars and by minds beyond this world." (112) Another writer says, in a fable, that man mimics the gods and they marvel so at man that he is invited to join them and to be one of them. (113) Nicholas Cusanus believed that

participation in the divine meant that every spiritual being must have its centre within itself. (114) In order to attack and defeat Averroism, dominant in Italian Universities in the 14th, 15th and into the 16th century, other schools had to emphasize the self, the individual. Eventually, the idea that man was a spiritual individual, and that he recognized himself as such, prevailed. (115) A new concept had been introduced. The ideal of man included 'autonomy', but it was one that was intimately linked to the divine. Man's autonomy was related to his conscience, his soul, the religious centre of his being.

The emphasis of my argument has been on the concept of 'individualism', and as such it has emphasized those areas indicating its presence and growth. The concept was by no means clear to those of the late 15th and early sixteenth century, or even later. Sir Thomas Elyot, in his The Book Named the Governor, (116) viewed society as an organism:

> A public weal is a body living, compact or made of
> sundry estates and degrees of men, which is
> disposed by the order of equity and governed by the
> rule and moderation of reason. (117)

Order is found in society as it is in all things because God has willed it so. Without order, there would be perpetual conflict and society would be destroyed resulting in the perishing of the

individual.   Order reflects the diversity in intellectual gifts given by God.   Those with greater gifts of understanding, aid those with lessor gifts by "detaining of other within the sounds of reason" and to guide them.   Understanding and reason provide the means to 'virtue and   commodious   living'   when   shown   to   'others   of   inferior understanding' 'through the glass of authority.' (118)

Another Englishman also viewed society in a medieval sense, yet wrote his paper in 1606. (119)

> Plato imagined man to be an heavenlie plant; his
> head to be the roote; his bulke, the stocke; his
> armes and leggs the branches; and his root to draw
> his sapp from the heavens to Feede therewith the
> under   parts, spreading downeward towardes the
> earth. Such a plantation do I conceive in the
> institution of a State politique: the sovereigne
> head to be designed, inspired, depending, and
> protected from above, and the body with the
> out-growing parts thereof, to receive nourishment,
> strength, flourishing, and fruitfulness from that
> root of a rightful regiment. (120)

He does add provisos:

> These good duties of kindly subjection to kingly
> power, I leave to the consideration and conscience
> of every true subject... (121)

And:

> In man the soule ruleth by reason, and in the state
> the soveraigne governeth by lawes (122)

Both men relied on reason as one foundation of the state; and upon reason was founded the laws of the state. However, it was God's ordinance that there be a ruler and the ruled a natural order. Reason was to be used to perceive His ordinances.

The most important writer of the age was Niccolo Machiavelli. Many books on political philosophy start with Machiavelli because they consider him to be the beginning of the modern age. John Plamenatz's work is titled: Man and Society A Critical Examination of Some Important Social And Political Theories From Machiavelli to Marx: (123)

> ... it is with Machiavelli that modern social and
> political theory really begins. Indeed, he is
> often more modern in outlook, more theological,
> less a priori, and more down-to-earth than many of
> the great men who came after him. (124)

However, Plamenatz points out a 'great omission' of Machiavelli's: "he was not interested in representative government" and he paid scant attention to the question of freedom. (125)

That Machiavelli should be anti-theological ought to be no surprise considering the Averroist dominance of the Italian universities at that time. Averroes had proclaimed reason superior to revelation, even if it was a single active intellect for all mankind. (126) 'Political Averroism' had a number of emphases that are found in

Machiavelli:

> Skepticism about the ability of faith and religion
> to correspond to the demands and results of
> rational inquiry; veneration for Aristotle and
> denigration of traditional religious authorities;
> religious indifferentism; secularism and
> anti-clericalism; and determinism. (127)

The Averroists also made a sharp distinction between the masses and
the few that can understand knowledge. Throughout The Prince,
Machiavelli pays little attention to the masses except as subjects.
(128) They can be ruled by arms, (129) and money (130) but they
usually respond to a ruler who does not oppress them: "you can satisfy
the people, because, for their object is more righteous than that of
the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, whilst the former only
desire not to be oppressed." (131) Machiavelli was more interested in
the structure of the state and the power of the state than he was in
the moral ends of the state. (132) The state "contains within
itself... all the authority there is whithin the territory it
embraces" and "nothing is superior to it." (133) Justice was what
worked. "Hence, it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own
to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to
necessity." (134) He goes on to add that he will be speaking of
reality not some imaginary things about rulers.

While The Prince was widely read and widely condemned, another

book, written two years later, became almost as widely read: Sir Thomas More's <u>Utopia</u>. (135) More, however, was more inclined to think of the people and to trust them. Machiavelli found people 'variable' and, while easy to persuade, hard to 'fix them in a persuasion'. (136) More described the people as having notions about their society and values, partly by customs and habits and partly by education. All the inhabitants read and study and were not fooled by "chimeras and fantastical images made in the mind" (137):

> None of them could comprehend what we meant when we talked to them of a man in the abstract as common to all men in particular, (so that though we spoke of him as a thing that we could point at with our fingers, yet none of them could perceive him,) and yet distinct from every one, as if he were some monstrous colossus or giant. (138)

More was evidently attacking the common belief that mankind was not made up of individuals. For him, people should learn, study and use their own judgement. Everyone should have a right to everything belonging to the state, so "no private man can want anything". (139) His focus of study was on man, autonomous man, man as an individual governed by his own reason. That he had to fight for the concept indicates that it was not the common viewpoint of his age, but it was a concept within the human perception of his age so that others could understand.

The Reformation and Social Contract

Werner Stark has written that whereas Catholicism:

> is an incarnation of the principle... called
> community: the whole is before the parts.
> Calvinism, on the other hand, is a product of the
> principle of Association: the parts are before the
> whole. Catholicism thinks in terms of organic
> unity; it is collectivistic. Calvinism for its
> part thinks in terms of contractualism; it is
> individualistic. (140)

Max Weber came to a similar conclusion in his The Protestant Ethic.
(141) Religious individualism had arrived triumphant in the
Reformation. No longer was there to be any intermediaries between the
believer and his God. The responsibility for his soul was his alone
and he was to 'come' to God in his way. The covenant, mentioned in
Ezekiel, was the new spiritual contract.

Although others had thought of similar ideas before, this was the
first time when masses of people believed it. The printing press
brought literature to the masses, and Reinhold Niebuhr called it the
"predemocratic triumph of the written language over more parochial
loyalties of the tribe and dialect." (142) Education of the masses
was another cause of the spread of such a new concept. Luther and
Calvin both advocated and worked hard for mass education. The
individual had to understand and know what the Bible said in order to

interpret it for himself and find salvation through his faith alone. The individualistic, atomistic potential in religion erupted and destroyed the collectivist or organic idea of the church or the 'universalis fidelis' into a collection of Christians - a Fellowship of believers. People became part of the physical or mechanical order, having as much in common as a rock collection or potted plants.

It is at this point in the history of 'individualism' that we must reduce our area of study further. Of western society, those countries noted for their Catholic heritage must be left aside. The counter-revolution retained the organic overtones that are implicit in the Catholic churches of Spain, Portugal, Italy and so on, while the Orthodox church was resistant to individualism. Only parts of northern Europe adopted the new concepts and it is from these countries that almost all our political thought originates. Denmark produced Soren Kierkegaard who wrote 'if I were to desire an inscription for my toombstone, I should desire none other than "That Individual" '.(143) England produced Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, Mill, Ayer and so on. Germany presented the world a schizophrenic viewpoint with Prussia on one side and Kant, Luther, Stirner and Burckhardt on the other. France, too, was split in its allegiance to various concepts. Bodin, Rousseau and Saint-Simon were opposed to de Bonald, de Maistre and Balzac.

New concepts of man needed new concepts of the state and new justification for the state structure. Whereas the Middle Ages had looked upon society as a body, or a whole unit, the new concept saw society as an assembly of units, and the king was no longer the head of the societal body but something else - a unit or a man who rules other units or men. Calvin and Luther quoted St. Paul in Romans and believed the ruler was appointed by God and ought to be obeyed. Others felt that since each Christian was ruled by the Holy Spirit no one needs another temporal ruler. The justification for a society, and its source of justice, was the social contract, a concept that ruled Protestant influenced areas from 1600 to 1800.

The key to the new age belongs to Martin Luther when he said:

> ...we are all priests... and have all one faith,
> one Gospel, one Sacrament; how then should we not
> have the power of discerning and judging what is
> right or wrong in matters of faith? (144)

In another tract he added two propositions:

> A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all,
> subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly
> dutiful servant of all, subject to all. (145)

Luther himself did not realize what he was unleashing on the world. Others forgot the second proposition rapidly and talked only of the 'perfectly free lord of all'. It was the triumph of Autonomy.

John Calvin's doctrines took the concepts further than Luther would have wished:

> Now, since the consciences of believers, being
> privileged with liberty..., have been delivered by
> the favour of Christ from all necessary obligations
> to the observance of those things in which the Lord
> has been pleased they should be left free, we
> conclude that they are exempt from all human
> authority... (146)

Calvin wished to 'lock' the 'pre-elected' believer into the plan of God. Although he was not as subtle a thinker as Luther, his influence was as great, if not greater. Three major forces in Europe: Hugenot in France, Presbyterian in Scotland, and Puritan in England were deeply influenced by Calvin. Eventually the tone of absolute freedom to his arguments was carried to the new world, and his plan to chain the individual to God's plan dissipated in a new anti-religious world.

In England, it was the state that changed churches in the beginning, but soon the Puritans became most influential. In the end they were strong enough to enable Parliament to defeat, try, convict and destroy a king. Although a supporter of the king, the first great thinker to recognize the new political concepts, Thomas Hobbes, found any religious reason or justification for the state inadequate. Both the Stuarts and the Puritans founded their theories on God's will.

However, a new era in science had arrived, and the startling results in science had a profound affect on political attitudes. The grandest scientific design attempted in England was by Francis Bacon. He wanted to supplant all previous philosopies by a new philosophy founded on rigorous scientific observations:

> There was but one course left, therefore - to try the whole thing anew upon a better plan, and to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations. (147)

He wanted to:

> ...establish forever a true and lawful marriage between the empirical and the rational faculty, the unkind and ill-starred divorce and separation of which has thrown into confusion all the affairs of the human family. (148)

Hobbes was a philosopher long before he turned his thoughts on political theory and he was deeply impressed by the scientific advances of his age. With a background in science and philosophy, and influenced by both Bacon and Rene Descartes, he examined political thought and found it based on authoritative sources and not on empirical evidence. He decided to use scientific principles to examine the political spectrum.

In De Cive, Hobbes tells his readers that he wishes to describe

men "first as men; then as subjects, lastly, as Christians." (149) He does describe men as "made fit for society not by nature, but by education" and that although man may be born to desire society, he may not be born fit for it. (150) This is a grand break from the previously accepted doctrine by Aristotle. 'Natural' man is moved to society by the "mutual fear they had of each other". In the state of nature every man has a right to all, and because there are no laws in nature to break, everything is permissable. (151) Man, then, is driven by fear to make an agreement in which he trades many of his rights for security. It is in forming this agreement or contract that man creates the bonds of society. Breaking trust with the agreement is the source of injustice. (152) He also specifically points out that society i.e. the contract, is founded on reason and not on the nature of man. (153)

Man as man is a collection of individuals with little or no social or organic contact between them, driven by self-regard and natural desires. Reason rescues man and, seeking security above everything else, trades the natural rights for secure and well defined civil rights. The resulting contract supercedes the natural laws or the laws of God. Natural and moral laws are one but they are of no account except where the conscience is concerned. When positive and moral law conflict, then externally it is the positive law that must hold sway. (154) The contract, law and the Leviathan are all the result of man's reason, and they are artificial creations:

> With Hobbes the power of Christian tradition is for
> the first time fully broken by a clear-headed and
> cold-hearted rationalism. (155)

All temporal authority, and perhaps not only human authority, springs from the consent of the people subject to it, yet Hobbes was reluctant to permit the people to overthrow a tyrant. John Locke was not as reluctant. Rejecting the 'short nasty and brutish' aspects of natural man, Locke believed that man originally was good and that only conflict over rights forced man to seek society and the social contract. Man had perfect freedom to do as he wished concerning his actions, his possessions and himself, but he did not have license. Nature had laws and all men were subject to it, and reason was that law.   Man had only to consult his own reason to know he ought not to kill himself or harm others. (156) In Locke, reason has a much more central role to play than in Hobbes. The latter believed that reason was merely a means of determining the best means of satisfying the desires.   For Locke, reason was the foundation of natural law. Through his reason, man entered into the social contract, preserved his natural rights and freedoms. The social contract reflects the concept that all men are, "by nature, all   free,   equal   and independent". (157) The first principle of the social contract must be majority rule, and everyone must consent to the rule. Only in this manner can the society act for all yet retain as much of the natural freedom as possible. (158) A tyrant, by his very nature breaks the

spirit of that first principle, so on that basis, the people have a right to rebel.

Hobbes and Rousseau felt that life outside a state was unsuitable for human needs. Locke, however, believed that man formed a social contract to protect his possessions. (159) C.B. MacPherson latched onto this idea and presented his concept of 'possessive individualism' as the central assumption of liberal political theory:

> The core of Locke's individualism is the assertion that every man is naturally the sole proprietor of his own person and capacities - the absolute proprietor in the sense that he owes nothing to society for them - and especially the absolute proprietor of his capacity to labour. (160)

The rights, then, are for those with property, for it is among these that the state was made. It is interesting that in English society, until the late 19th century, there were that class which consisted of gentlemen, and another class which was the masses, however, it is not a central core to the concept of individualism. DesCartes viewed the "I" as the pilot of the ship i.e. the body. The "I" possessed the body. This did not mean that DesCartes viewed mankind as being divided into two classes: those "I"'s possessing bodies and those without.

Rousseau added to the social contract theory, the concept that morality is formed in the process of making the contract. Men have no rights or duties except towards other men, and only in society do men realize what these rights and duties are. (161) This 'morality' process affects men so that new ideas, new values and new goals exist that were impossible beyond society. The state of nature was not a bad place to be, according to Rousseau. He believed that the state was created by the rich to protect property. This has led men to be more succeptible to vice than virtue, and he has been corrupted. Yet the individual has new rights and status under the contract:

> Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole. (162)

However, a totalitarian element enters into his scheme. The individuals give up all their rights and freedoms in the contract, and in return each becomes a part of the whole - no part being greater than another. The whole becomes the general will and it represents every single part. As a result:

> ...the sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the sovereign power need give no quarantee to its subjects...

The social contract tacitly includes the principle:

> ...that whoever refuses to obey the general will
> shall be compelled to do so by the whole body.
> This means nothing less than that he will be forced
> to be free; for this is the condition which...
> secures him against all personal dependence...
> (163)

The Social Contract theory had gone through a metamorphesis. Hobbes believed that to escape a nasty and brutish natural state, all power had to be placed in the hands of a Leviatan. Locke found the state of nature more pleasing but reason persuaded men to place power in the hands of the aristocracy in order to ensure the privileges of property. However, Rousseau wanted to put all the power in the concept of the general will which was the will of all the people as a unit. Hobbes felt the state gave security in place of freedom while Rousseau felt the state gave a kind of freedom to the people. The state was now involved in an 'ought' or teleological situation. It is no longer the present tense 'Greatest Good' but a future tense 'greatest good for the individual'. Man had to have his nature changed by the state.

Walter Ullman has said that the Middle Ages produced a division of concepts between man as subject and man as citizen. In the development of the social contract theory, man as citizen seems to have gained the upper hand. In Rousseau we find man's nature and his bonds of citizenship are founded in society or the state. In Hobbes

we find indications that man as a worshipper is also found in a society, i.e., religious authority is due to the consent of the worshippers. Man as a citizen owes a number of his rights and freedoms to man in nature according to Locke, but Hobbes and Rousseau believed these were traded for civil rights and freedoms. Individualism had arrived at a point where the individual had within himself the necessary justification for morality for law and for the state. No other foundation was necessary. From the 18th century to the present, much of the development of individualism was due to the explanations of what the characteristics of an individual are. Kant found that the basis of man's autonomy was his reason; Bentham found that the state or society was but an aggregate of individuals brought together by the calculations of each individual. The only human entity was the autonomous, separate, isolate, atomistic, unique, or distinct individual. All other human concepts such as society, community, state, and nation are merely tools or constructs of each individual mind. All the ties that had absorbed the individual of the tribes had been broken in the religious evolvement of the individual relationship of the one soul and his God. With the advent of Deism, even that final tie with God had been broken for God no longer cared or took an interest in the world he created. Oakshott's thesis that individualism erupts after the breakdown of an integrated society is worthwhile if we narrow our scope to the last eight hundred years of western history. However, other integrated societies have broken

apart yet individualism as we know it had not occurred before. Individualism must have a cultural perception of its basic principles or viewpoint embedded in the previous culture before its eruption, otherwise a new form of an integrated culture will emerge again. Were class or other social forms the sole focus of study, then we can see the breakdown occurring. However, what I would claim, and I believe have shown, is that the change between the time of John of Salisbury and that of Kant, is a natural progression given the underlying themes and the drives within the culture itself. No breakdown occurred, only a transformation. The impetus for creating the concept of the individual as we know it today, came from the fundamental changes in the theological concepts in the last three thousand years:from the new covenant in the Babylonian captivity to the concept of salvation created by Jesus, to the Deistic God of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The concept of the individual as the basic human unit is largely the creation of, or the by-product of, the evolving theological concepts of the Judeo-Christian ethos.

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Notes.

61. For the purposes of this paper, I will include the early church fathers in the Middle Ages. Their influence was more important in the Middle Ages than in their own time.

62. Augustine. City of God, Bk XI, ch.21. Trans. David Knowles, Harmondsworth England: Penguin Books, 1972, p. 500

63. As quoted in The Myth of the State, p. 80

64. "A Letter from Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, to Constantius" in Henry Bettenson (ed) Documents of the Christian Church. 2nd. ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 19

65. Romans, 13:1-7. "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation."

66. "Deposition of Henry IV by Gregory Viii, February 1076." in Documents of the Christian Church, op. cit.

67. "Gregory VII's Letter to the Bishop of Metz, 1081" in Documents of the Christian Church. op. cit., p. 106.

68. "Letter of Henry IV to Gregory VIII, 1076" in Morton Downs (ed), Basic Documents in Medieval History, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959, p. 60

69. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966

70. Ibid., p. ix

71. Ibid., p. 5

72. Ibid., p. 7

73. The Discovery of the Individual 1050 - 1200, London: SPCK, 1972, p. 12

74. Ullman, p. 17

75. Ibid., p. 20-21

76. Ibid., p. 34-35

77. Ibid., p. 32-33

78. Ibid., p. 37

79. Ibid., p. 49

80. Carlyle, R.W. and A.J., A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West. Vol. 1. The Second Century to the Ninth. Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1950, p. 14

81. Lewis, Ewart, Medieval Political Ideas, Vol. I, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954, p. 193

82. Ullman, p. 60

83. Ibid., p. 63

84. Lewis, op. cit., p. 194

85. Morris, op. cit. pro.

86. "The Oath of Vassalage, From the Liber feudorum maior" in David Herlihy (ed), The History of Feudalism. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970, p. 99-100

87. Galbert of Bruges, The Murder of Charles the Good, Count of Flanders, trans. by James Bruce Ross, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967, p. 206-207

88. "Magna Carta, 1215" in Basic Documents in Medieval History, op. cit., pp. 127-8

89. in Ullman, op. cit., p. 80

90. in The History of Feudalism, op. cit., p. 280

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Part Two

Let us suppose that the concept of the individual as the basic unit of society, or the basic human unit, is indeed a derivative of a theological process. Should such a development of the concept be true then how we view the human and the human culture ought to be reviewed. What I would like to do in the following section is to present a picture of a basic human unit that is not the individual, nor is it the state, nor is it society. The idea is to present a plausible depiction of a human unit other than that of the individual, yet one which is not a societally holistic unit. Should a new human unit be depicted, and should it be an acceptable hypothesis warranting further investigation, then I shall have accomplished my purpose.

For the most part, the starting point for the study of man in society is that which the author believes to be uniquely human in contradistinction to all other things. For one it is "consciousness", for another it is "rights", for another it may be the ability to use tools, symbols, or nature, and so on. I wish to start by claiming that man(whatever the unit) is a creature, an animate being, an organism, a biological entity. It is not a claim that man is only an organism, it is but a starting point. As a biological entity, it has developed through a biological process and we must examine its origin, reproduction, structure, growth and development as a species. To begin, as Hegel does in his The Phenomenan of Mind, with one consciousness and then examine the process of awareness in an almost

spatially expanding manner, fails to grasp the duration of the human life process. It may be claimed that consciousness as such is not inherited, but there are few doubts that life itself is inherited. On a fundamental level are the biological processes. Should they cease, so does the all that is human. (I am in agreement with St. Thomas that the soul by itself is not a person.) Should consciousness cease under certain circumstances, the body can continue to live, to dream, and even to think. I do not intend that the body and the mind are two separate entities or even that they are entities. Consciousness is an ascription of the human.

Through the examination of the history of the life process and the biological development of the human, I hope to find some principles which will enable us to understand the "mind of man". From these principles, I hope to establish the foundation for the basic human unit, for man in community, and (in Part Three) for man in society. It may be that my definitions of "community" and "society" and my examination of the distinctions between the two concepts will be prejudiced for I use, what some people criticize as conservative, the concepts outlined by Jacques Maritain and Ferdinand Toennies. I have used their concepts because of the importance they attached to these two concepts and their differences, and their intense interest in these concepts in their theories. Toennies' work on these two concepts is exceptional in its scope and erudition. Each has an

exact, clear and consistent image of what the concepts mean and how they differ. It is for this reason I "purloined" their descriptions.

In the Introduction, it was claimed that there were four concepts linked to the "individual": 1) "individuality or separateness", 2) "personality", 3) "autonomy or self-governing", and 4) "being or completeness". The first concept involves the simple existent or the spatial element. One stone is a unit separate spatially from another stone. The boundaries of each stone are distinct and particular. Except for spatial relationships and the actual mineral formation, there is no necessary relationship between one rock and another nor its environment. An amoeba is also a unit separate spatially from another amoeba. The boundaries of each are distinct (although changing) and particular. However, there is a necessary relationship between the amoeba and its environment and between one amoeba and another. For the former, the amoeba must interact with its environment in order to live, and for the latter, the amoeba must interact with other amoeba in order to transmit life.

The "life" element of animate creatures prohibits the isolation of inanimate objects. There is no simple separate isolated animate being. However, our original definition could claim that the amoeba is existing and functioning independently, i.e. not dependent on something else. It uses various items to maintain its existence, no

one of them absolutely essential for the maintenance of life. As well, it is differentiated from other amoeba, i.e., separate. The life element did offer new complications: 1) in order to maintain it, the amoeba (all animate creatures) must interact with its environment, and, 2) in order to have life, the amoeba had to"receive" it from another amoeba. Without life, the amoeba would be reduced to myriads of inanimate substances. It is life that gives the amoeba its wholeness or unity.

When we speak of individual biological units, we are talking about units of life. To discuss any biological unit without taking into account life: the reproduction of life, the maintenance of life, the structure of life etc., is to lose sight of the whole core of animate creatures. Surely the continuation of life is the main purpose of the amoeba's existence. 1. Restructuring chemical and mineral substances and being a food source are by products of this purpose. (No "divine" or "rational" inference is meant in the use of the word "purpose".) The amoeba, therefore, is a "transmitter", taking life from that which anteceded it and created it, and passing it on to its descendents. The biologic unit, then, is a unit of life, or if we think of life as being a continuing event, a "life-moment". If the amoeba, is to be a biologic unit, it must hold entirely within itself the ability to transmit or continue life. As anyone who has studied high school biology knows, the amoeba has the ability to separate itself into two

new amoeba. It needs no other amoeba to help it produce new life. It is a biologic unit, i.e., an individual unit. It is complete within itself, because it performs its primary purpose independently.

When a more complex being like man is examined, we find that it is an animate creature that must interact with its environment in order to live, and it, too, must interact with other human beings in order to transmit life. At first perception, the human is separate, i.e., differentiated, from others of its kind. However, when we examine humans as "life-moments", we find that the human is not capable of transmitting life, i.e., reproducing itself, independently. The human being is not a complete biological unit. The human kind is divided into two parts: male and female. In fact, they are divided along lines that involve the reproduction and maintenance of life. The necessary requirements for the transmission of life are one male and one female within an anatomically and biologically correct time span. (And, of course, proximity.) The "whole" that is needed to transmit life consists of two human beings: one of each sex; of one of each separate reproductive physiology.

There are additional problems. The old amoeba disappeared as the two new ones appeared. Humans, being more complex, do not disappear in the process of reproduction but, because they must reproduce a highly ordered structure, they are required to aid the descendent in its

life-growth and life-maintenance. Part of the life process, then, is the maintenance of new life by the old life, i.e., a child is dependent upon adults for survival. Human life-transmitters must overlap in order for life to continue.

A biological unit, therefore, cannot consist only of one human being. If a biological unit is to be defined as the "whole" containing the essential elements necessary for the continuation of life, then the human biological unit must be the "whole" that contains the male and female (capable of reproduction) and the dependent infant. There must be a biological orientation in all three abstract parts to form the "whole" biological unit. The instances (i.e., the particular man, woman or child) of the abstract parts need not be the same in every "whole". For instance, parents reject and adopt babies, fathers reject mothers, etc. Nevertheless, the orientation toward the human biological whole must be there or human life would cease, and this orientation toward a biologic "whole" must permeate the entirety of the human. Our genetic structure, our feelings, our emotions, our thinking must reflect this fundamental orientation. Josiah Royce recognized an orientation toward the other although he did not give it the same substance as I do.

> As a matter of psychology, i.e. of the natural history of our beliefs, a vague belief in the existence of our fellows seems to antedate, to a considerable extent, the definite formation of any

consciousness of ourselves.... We are social beings
first of all by virtue of our inherited instincts,
and we love, fear, and closely watch our fellows,
in advance of any definite ideas about what our
fellows really are. Our more explicit
consciousness that our fellows exist is due to a
gradual interpretation of these our deepest social
instincts.... Our assurance about our fellows
arises by means of those very interests whereby we
gradually come to our own self-consciousness. 2.

Another indication of the inherited "orientation", particularly of

the child for the adult humans are the results of several empirical

studies. It is known, for instance, that a child will automatically

smile at any stimulus having a certain degree of resemblance to a

human face.3. An experimant with rhesus monkeys by H.F.Harlow,

discovered that by using various substitutes for real mothers the

development of the infant could be drastically affected. An

indication that the "need" of the infants for a "mother"figure was not

reinforced behavior, was one experiment where a wire frame with

nipples for food and a cloth covered frame without nipples for food

were placed in the same cage as the young monkeys. The young monkeys

went to the cloth covered frame although it gave them no food. Food

or food giving did not alter their almost instinctive behaviour.4.

When the process of life is considered, each man, woman and child

is merely a partial "life-moment". A whole human "life-moment" (the

basic unit for the transmission of life) orients all three parts

toward a biological "whole". What we normally consider an "individual"

must be considered merely a part or an aspect of a "whole". Each man,
woman and child cannot exist separately, and cannot be considered
complete in and of themselves. Only the "life-moment" or the human
biological "whole" can be considered as a human unit, as a distinct,
individual entity. The human biological "whole" is already a group.

Aristotle pointed out these facts in his The Politics. In the
second paragraph of the book, he says:

> We ... get the best view of the matter if we look
> at the natural growth of things from the beginning.
> The first point is that those which are ineffective
> without each other must be united in a pair. For
> example the union of male and female is essential
> for reproduction, since each is powerless without
> the other; and this is not a matter of choice, but
> is due to the desire, implanted by nature in both
> animals and plants, to propagate one's kind.5.

One could object to the words "pair", "union" because they harbour
visions of two complete and separate units, for on the next page he
adds:

> Our own observation tells us that every state is an
> association of persons formed with a view to some
> good purpose. I say "good" because in their actions
> all men do in fact aim at what they think good.
> Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good,
> that one which is supreme and embraces all others
> will have also as its aim the supreme good. That is
> the association which we call the state, and that
> type of association we call political.6.

For Aristotle, the mating pair (and slaves) form a "household", and households form a village and several villages form a state with some "good" in mind. The whole process was a natural evolution. The pair mated to reproduce according to the dictates of nature; villages formed over time from the extended family; and states were formed by villages because all the people were related or they needed security or self-sufficiency. The man ruled the household, the father the family, the eldest the village and the state. It was upon this foundation that much of medieval political thought was founded. It is still the foundation of Thomist thought today.

However, an association is a willed or voluntary idea consisting of units joined together, and Aristotle introduces the concept of "person" and a purpose i.e., the "good". He indicates that there is more to human than the biological existent. Richard M. Weaver describes the "person" as follows:

> It seems a threshold fact that personality is some kind of integration. The individual whom we regard as having authentic personality appears to possess a center, and everything that he does is in relation to this.... The true personality is a psychic unity, preserving its identity and giving a sort of thematic continuity to the acts of the individual.7.

Further on, he indicates that "the personality is a morally oriented unit". This opinion is reflected by Aristotle's use of "an

association of persons formed with a view to some good purpose".

Johannes Messner states: "The development of the human person is, in

light of Natural Law ethics, man's self-realization in accordance

with the order indicated in his nature ". 8. The "person" seems to be

rooted in ethics or morality and is each human's identity.

> The philosophical idea of the person is clearly of
> Christian origin. In the language of the Greeks,
> the word person has no application in philosophy
> because Greek Philosophy had no term that meant
> what we call the person. The Greek never prefixed
> the "I" to the verb to be, at least never with any
> significant value so that such a sentence
> constituted anything fundamental for religion or
> philosophy. It was Christ who said of himself that
> "I am the way, the truth and the life,"
> synthesizing in the unity of a real and living
> person this affirmation of a supreme interior life
> and of absolute independence which were impossible
> for Parmenides' Being or for Plato's Idea of Good
> and making possible, in a concrete, personal, and
> historical program, the function of truth, way, and
> life as the unity of persons.9.

Both ethics or morality and identity are related to "freedom" and

"choice". Felix Morley indicates that "what we really mean by

individualism is the latitude of a person to choose for himself among

the many fruits of a civilization in which he is an active

participant."10.

No man alone need worry about ethics, morality or identity. All

three are socially oriented concepts.

A human organism is individualized through a
learning or conditioning process within natural and
human environments. Through affiliations and
participations are produced abilities to
understand, to appreciate, and to perform within
environments. This complex of abilities constitutes
and characterizes an individual. As william James
pointed out, the "I" of self is a mine-ness of
relationships and functions.11.

The "person"-individual seems to be a focal subjective core

involving choice restrained by a social environment. The "person" also

involves "autonomy" and it is the autonomous character of each human

that creates individuality. "Autonomy", rationalism and individualism

are mutually interdependent. A society, then, would be

inter-subjective, or as Ferdinand Toennies puts it: "Human wills stand

in manifold relations to one another". 12. However, above we tried to

show that the human biological "whole" was already a group.

Jacques Maritain and Ferdinand Toennies were careful to

distinguish between the two concepts of "community" and "society". For

instance, Maritain states in Man and the State:

Both community and society are ethico-social and
truly human, not mere biological realities. But a
community is more of a work of nature and more
nearly related to the biological; a society is more
of a work of reason, and more nearly related to the
intellectual and spiritual properties of
man.... 13.

Coming from a Thomist viewpoint, Maritain insists on the moral or

ethical basis for both concepts. The "Community" is the "Fact" that

precedes reason and will and acts independently of them "to create a common unconscious psyche, common feelings and psychological structures and common mores". The "society" has a "project", "task" or "end" to be achieved and depends on reason and will. Toennies makes a similar distinction. The community involves a "real and organic life" while the society is an "imaginary and mechanical structure". "All intimate, private, and exclusive living together ... is understood as life" in a community, while society is public life. 14 . One is born into a family and is bound to it and this is a reflection of community. Societies are to be kept or formed for given purposes. The community is old whereas the society is new as a name and as a phenomenon.

Toennies goes on in Part II to claim that the foundation of 'community' is the "natural will" whereas the foundation of 'society' is the "rational-will". The "natural will" is an aspect of the "self" while the "rational will" is an aspect of the "person". The "natural will" of a group is composed of understanding, custom, belief, or faith or creed, concord, mores, religion etc., while the "rational will" in a group is composed of convention, legislation public opinion, contracts, regulations and doctrines. Basically these components reflect a break between the concepts of culture (natural will) and civilization (rational will).

Toennies was a critic of the organic theories, although he did recognize the importance of the continuation of life for human kind. It is easy to adopt his "natural will" and with a few modifications, apply it to what I had called the orientation of the human biological "whole". Feeling, such as love, liking, anger, kindness, passion, etc., are socially or other directed and necessary for continuing life, and these come naturally to human beings. An amoeba has absolutely no need for such feelings but man, through evolutionary chance, must adapt himself to a genetic "program" (this concept is not absolutely deterministic but has a meaning more akin to "preestablished pattern") which includes a biological "whole".

Noam Chomsky and his school of linguistic analysis feels that there is one basic "form" common to all human languages. This form, he believes, must be considered innate and part of the definition of the species. Linguistic capability, then, is due, not only to advances in culture, but also to man's physical evolution. Other evidence supports this claim. Studies have shown that children learn languages in basically the same manner and at the same times, without learning rules nor imitating adults. First they learn words then a syntax that is not mere imitation of the adults. There seems to be a universal "program" that is a part of the species. 15. If an evolutionary and genetic "program" exists for language skills, then why not other "programs" for the fundamental categories of cognition in man and

perhaps for other elements of the human that are less basic but of great importance to the relationship of the human and the human society.

> We cannot think outside the particular patterns
> that our brains are conditioned to.... It was this
> long evolution - not recent history, not the
> periods since the Romans or Greeks, for instance
> -that determined our basic physical and
> psychological characteristics. 16.

In any case, cognitive functions need language as an instrument or they would be of little use. The evolutionary and genetic "program" of mankind is the foundation and the Aristotelian "form" of all cognitive functions of the human, and cannot be hostile to the continuation of human life.

Nature, however, has neglected to be specific in its "orientation" because the "program" in existence has been more than adequate to insure the continuation of human life, and because man is such a complex creature. Each man and woman is oriented toward a biological "whole" yet the parts need not be specific. Despite the attitude that there is a "right" woman for each man and a "Mr. Right" for each woman and that couples were "made for each other", the mating pair can include any man and any woman. The next "mating" of each of the former pair may easily be with other "mates". Homosexuality can be seen as a distortion of the natural orientation to the biological

"whole". The parts of the "whole", then, are interchangeable, yet necessarily bound together by life and the "life-moment". Although John Dewey would disagree with most of my paper, he did indicate the "fact" of this communal orientation:

> Individuals who are not bound together in associations ... are monstrosities. It is absurd to suppose that the ties which hold them together are merely external and do not react into mentality and character, producing the framework of personal disposition.17.

(The non-rational tenor of the paragraph contradicts the rational undertones to the concept "associations".)

The non-specificity of the "orientation" allows the "orientation" functions (feelings, etc) to include a larger number of "parts" than are absolutely necessary for a "life-moment" or a biological "whole". It is for this reason that pictures of children in distress evoke such a strong response, or that a proximate human in danger usually will obtain our help. However, the "orientation function" cannot be stretched indefinitely. Toennies perception that "community" includes "all intimate, private and exclusive living together", "language, folkways or mores, or beliefs", and "locality" accurately notes the limitations of the concept and the limitations of the "power" of the orientation to the biological "whole". The importance of "proximity" and "locality" to the concept of community cannot be overlooked. The

alienation, isolation and loneliness of a person in a large city results from the barriers that separate the person from "community" and the biological "whole". Those barriers are lack of "proximity" and "locality", and the lack of a potential biological "whole"-- i.e., lack of intimacy. The people next door or at work etc. lack "humanity" for her because of the lack of "intimacy", a difficult thing to develop.

A major part of the psychological theories of Carl Gustav Jung lends itself to the idea of biological wholes and mental patterning. For Jung, man has three parts to his psyche: the ego or the conscious part; the personal unconscious ; the "collective" uconscious. It is the "collective" unconsious that is a peculiarly Jungian concept and one that has been heavily criticized by many psychological theorists. Yet Jung defended his concept throughout his life and there are indications of grudging agreement by his former mentor, Sigmund Freud.

> ...dreams bring to light material which cannot have originated either from the dreamer's adult life or from his forgotten childhoold. We are obliged to regard it as part of the archaic heritage which a child brings with him into the world, before any experience of his own, influenced by the experience of his ancestors. We find the counterpart of this phylogenetic material in the earliest human legends and in survivig customs. Thus dreams constitute a source of human prehistory which is not to be despised.18.

While both men were in agreement that there were instincts, drives or innate tendencies that provided material which could not have originated within the history of the particular individual, Jung exlored the source for this material to a far greater degree. Both men found material or images, symbols etc., in dreams which they had to attribute to a genetic history of experience and Jung called this the "collective" unconscious.

> The collective unconscious...as the ancestral heritage of possibilities of representation, is not individual but common to all men, and perhaps even to all animals, and is the true basis of the indivudual psyche. This whole psyche organism corresponds exactly to the body....19

While the "collective unconscious" is an ancient psychic heritage, it owes nothing of its existance to the present individual except as a carrier or medium.

> The collective unconscious is a part of the psyche which can be negatively distinguished from a personal unconscious by the fact that is does not, like the later, owe its existence to personal experience and cosequently is not a personal acquisiton. While the personal unconscious is made up essentially of contents which have at one time been conscious but which have disappeared from consciousness, having been forgotten or repressed, the contents of the collective unconscious have never been in consciousness, and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas, the personal unconscious consists for the most part of "complexes", the content of the collective unconscious is made up essentially of "archetypes".20

He adds a claim that his concept of the archetype is similar to that of "motifs" of mythological research; to Levy-Bruhl's concept of "representations collectives"; to the categories of the imagination concept of Hubert and Mauss; and the "primordial thoughts" of Adolf Bastian.

It is the "collective unconscious" which is the basis for the whole psyche of the individual. The individual's own conscious and personal unconscious are founded and formed by the "collective unconscious".

> ...the unconscious, as the totality of all archetypes, is the deposit of all human experience right back to its remotest beginnings...a living system of reactions and aptitudes that determine the individual's life in invisible ways...From the living fountain of instinct flows everything that is creative; hence the unconscious is not merely conditioned by history, but is the very source of the creative impulse.21

The strength of the foundation and its power over the rest of the psyche is not to be dismissed lightly.

> We only understood that kind of thinking which is mere equation, from which nothing comes outbut what we have put in. That is the working of the intellect. But besides that, there is a thinking in primordial images, in symbols which are older than the historical man, which are inborn in him fromthe earliest times, and eternally living, outlasting all generations, still make up the ground work of the human psyche. It is only

> possible to live the fullest life when we are in
> harmony with these symbols; wisdom is a return to
> them. It is a question neither of belief nor of
> knowledge, but of the agreement of our thinking
> with the primordial images of the unconscious.
> They are <u>the</u> <u>unthinkable</u> <u>matricies</u> <u>of</u> <u>all</u> <u>our</u>
> <u>thoughts,</u> <u>no</u> <u>matter</u> <u>what</u> <u>our</u> <u>conscious</u> <u>mind</u> <u>may</u>
> <u>cogitate.</u>22.

The "conscious" or the "ego" is almost dismissed not as an existent

but a substantive existent with its own creative power.

> ...the gifts of reason and critical reflection is
> not one of man's outstanding peculiarities, and
> even where it exists it proves to be wavering and
> inconstant, the more so, as a rule, the bigger the
> political groups are. 23

The collective unconscious contains the whole spiritual heritage

of mankind's evolution, born anew in the brain structure of every

individual. His conscious mind is an ephemeral phenomenon that

accomplishes all provisional adaptations and orientations, for which

reason one can best compare its function to spatial orientation. The

unconscious, on the other hand, is the source of the instinctual

forces of the psyche and of the forms or categories that regulate

them, namely the achetypes. all the most powerful ideas in history go

back to archetypes. This is particularly true of religious ideas, but

the central concepts of science, philosophy, and ethics are no

exception to this rule. In their present form, they are varients of

archetypal ideas, created by consciously applying and adapting these

ideas to reality. For it is the function of consciousness not only to recognize and assimilate the external world through the gateway of the senses, but to translate into visible reality the world within us. 24

Such strong claims, despite case and mythic examples, have been severly criticised, almost laughed at.   The contempt Philip Rieff holds for Jung's concept of the collective "unconscious" and his methodology erupts to the surface on almost every page of the chapter on Jung's theories in his book, The Triumph of The Therapeutic.   for Rieff, Jung's theory of the "collective unconscious" is a seedy attempt to renew and revamp antiquated romantic values and ideas, and to provide a new basis for a religion. However, he does hold Jung's ideas as a serious challenge and an important concept, though a false one.   The true nature of religion is "a private version of a deeply and even unconsciously held communal faith"25 and it "erupts, paradoxically, from the collective unconscious." The individual may have his own religious images yet they are "merely particular varieties" of the collective or communal faith.

> The colletive unconscious...is the predicate of
> individuation.   Jung's psychology of the
> unconscious is not...a version of the pietist
> doctrine of the inwardness of all religious
> feeling, irreducibly personal and almost
> uncommunicable. On the contrary, the unconscious
> is Jung's psychologically functional equivalent of
> communities and, in fact, derives its content from
> the culture.   It is in the sense of a derivation
> from, and individuation of the cultural community,

that the unconscious is "collective". The notion
is a daring advance on the far older one of an
invisible church. It has yet to be taken
seriously, the less so as the doctrine of the
church has fallen into disuse. The first question
is whether any test can be devised for it - that
is, whether this notion can be used. 26

It is a notion which Rieff believes not only to be wrong, but

untestable, unusable - in fact, to be "the language of faith", yet one

to be considered seriously because of the rest of its subtle and

appealing persuasiveness. Jung must speak for himself (and he does so

voluminously).

For Jung, then, there is almost a communal nature to man, i.e.,

the individual was born a community and not an individual. Yet, his

theory is not closed or substantively fixed in the same way as

B.F.Skinner's theories are.

A person is first of all an organism, a member of a
species and subspecies, possessing a genetic
endowment of anatomical and physiological
characterisics, which are the product of the
contingencies of survival to which the species has
been exposed in the process of evolution. The
organism becomes a person as it acquires a
repertoire of behavior under the contingencies of
reinforcement to which it is exposed during its
lifetime. The behavior it exhibits at any moment
is under control of a current setting.... A person
is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a point
at which many genetic and environmental conditions
come together in a joint effect.27.

Jung recognizes the reductionist arguement in such a position of Skinner's and refused to be trapped by it. The ego is an existent and it and the personal unconscious must be in balance or in harmony with the "collective unconscious" for a healthy psyche. Too great a submission to the collective unconscious is as harmful as repression of or opposition to it. "Directedness is absolutely necessary for the conscious process" yet this "directed" aspect hinders the unconscious tendencies from creeping into the conscious, producing a onesidedness that is unhealthy.28. The balance itself varies according to the type of personality or "attitude" types, which are the "introvert" and the "extravert". The introvert tends more to the rational or conscious, while the extravert submits to a greater degree to the collective unconscious aspects of his psyche. There is an overlapping of polar opposites: the "introvert" and the "extravert"; and "thinking" and "feeling" (the polar opposites of the mental processes of the psyche). The individual personality then can be placed on the scale between the complete introvert and the complete extravert, and on the scale between thinking and feeling (i.e., does he do much contemplation, or does he react instinctively and emotionally).29. Extremes on both scales must be considered:

> ... the individual ego ... is that continous centre of consciousness whose presence has made itself felt since the days of childhood. It is confronted with a psyche product that owes its existence mainly to an unconscious process and is therefore in some degree opposed to the ego and its

tendencies. This standpoint is essential in coming
to terms with the unconscious. The position of the
ego must be maintained as being of equal value to
the counter-position of the unconscious, and vice
versa. This ammounts to a very necessary warning:
for just as the conscious mind of civilized man has
a restrictive effect on the unconscious, so the
rediscovered unconcious often has a really
dangerous effect on the ego.30.

Jung's theory, then, in brief, is that each human being has two

major pshycic sources: the individual's conscious and unconscious,

based on his own individual experience or history; and the collective

unconscious based on an inherited , genetic, or innate tendencies

created by the common experiences of all human life history, or even

all animate life history. The latter is almost a genetic Avoerrist

soul, commonly shared by every human individual. The "collective

unconscious" is a genetic matrix from which the personal unconscious

and the conscious slowly and tentatively emerge. The personality of

the individual reflects to what degree the individual uses his

emotions or his reason to deal with the world, and to what degree the

individual identifies with the "collective unconscious" or the "ego".

A healthy psyche is one where there is a balance between the personal

and collective parts of the psyche, between the introverted and

extraverted attitudes, between emotion or feeling, and reason. That

this is a severely skeletal sketch of Jung's theory, and that it is

only a small part of the marvelous work of a great thinker, must be

understood. I cannot hope to present an adequate description of his

thories here.

Jung did not eliminate the purposive, intentional, creative man, for these are the concepts he himself applies to the conscious, but he did place severe restrictions on those aspects.

> No matter how beautiful and perfect man may believe
> his reason to be, he can always be certain that it
> is only one of the possible mental functions, and
> covers only that one side of the phenomenal world
> which corresponds to it. But the irrational, that
> which is not agreeable to reason, rings it about on
> all sides. And the irrational is likewise a
> psychological function - in a word, it is the
> collective unconscious; whereas the rational is
> essentially tied to the conscious mind.31.

The collective unconscious not only is the matrix, the foundation for the human psyche, not only surrounds and impregnates the whole psyche, but it almost totally dominates the young child, and resists the eruption of a personal conscious. At first, the child has sporadic consciousness, "limited to the perception of a few connections between two or more psychic contents", and there is no continuous memory. These "islands of memory" are the first stirrings of the ego.

> Only later, when the ego-contents - the so-called
> ego-complex - have acquired an energy of their own
> (very likely as a result of training and practice)
> does the feeling of subjectivity or 'I-ness' arise.
> This may well be the moment where the child begins
> to speak of itself in the first person.

Still the child is dependent on his parents.

> Psychic birth, and with it the conscious
> differentiation from the parents, normally takes
> place only at puberty, with the eruption of
> sexuality. The physiological change is attended by
> a psychic revolution.... Until this period is
> reached the psychic life of the individual is
> governed largely by instinct, and few or no
> problems arise.32.

The world of the collective unconscious contains primordial images
or "archetypes" which "are the most ancient and the most universal
'thought-forms' of humanity", and they are "as much feelings as
thoughts".33. The source of these archetypes are the "deposits of the
constantly repeated experiences of humanity."34. The contents of the
personal unconscious are "memory-images" personally experienced by the
individual, whereas the archetypes or primordial images are not
personally experienced but are genetic givens.35. The common
symbolism of the myths and legends, and of dreams, attest to a common
view of experience and to the collective psyche.

Ernst Cassirer, and his followers, have also discovered the
collective images or symbols concept in the myths and legends. For
Cassirer, man is a symbol maker, and it is this unusual activity that
is the basis for man's ability to conceptualize. "Man lives in a
symbolic universe". "Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of
this universe. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic
net, the tangled web of human experience".36. Man is to be defined,

not as _animal_ _rationale_ but as _animal_ _symbolicum_. There are some medical incidents to back up such a concept. Aphasia victims usually can perform many menial or everyday tasks, but have great difficulty in conceptualizing.

Myth and mythical symbols are also very important in Cassirer's philosophy. For him, myth is "an instrument of the great process of spiritual differentiation through which basic determinate forms of social and individual consciousness arise from the chaos of the first indeterminate life feeling."37. This process accomplishes two things which are not inseparable but are stages in the same development: a sense of community and individuality. The mythical-religious consciousness is the foundation for all society.

> The very existence and form of human society itself
> requires such a foundation; for even where we
> suppose that we have society before us in its
> empirically earliest and most primitive form, it is
> not something originally given but something
> spiritually conditioned and mediated. All social
> existence is rooted in concrete forms of community
> and the feeling of community. And the more we
> succeed in laying bare this root, the more evident
> it becomes that the primary feeling of community
> never stops at the dividing lines which we posit in
> our highly developed biological class concepts but
> goes beyond them toward the totality of living
> things. Long before man had knowledge of himself
> as a separate species distinguished by some
> specific power and singled out from nature as a
> whole by a life as a whole, within which each
> individual creature and thing is magically
> connected with the whole, so that a continuous
> transition, a meta morphosis of one being in

another, appears not only as possible but as
necessary, as the "natural" form of life itself.
38.

It is a remarkably similar description to that of Jung, yet in a
different field of study, and from a different viewpoint. It is even
more remarkable when Cassirer speaks of totems and other religious
symbols, which are "embedded in a universal mythical view",39 in many
ways in the same manner and representing the same concepts as Jung's
archetypes. I do not intend to claim that Jung's theories and
Cassirer's theories are identical, merely that, in many ways, their
description of the human in culture is remarkably similar. For Jung,
the collective is in the unconscious, for Cassirer, the community is a
condition for society and is grounded in the consciousness - in fact,
it seems to be a category of consciousness, i.e., the "feeling of
community".

P.F.Strawson, in his book Individuals, does not describe the human
in the same manner as Jung, and I believe he would abhor the linking
of his logic to Jung's theories. However, his brilliant essay on the
"individual" did present the concept of the primitive person. For
him, the mind and body were not entities but attributes of another
entity "the person".

What I mean be the concept of a person is the
concept of a type of entity such that both
predicates ascribing states of consciousness and

predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a
physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to
a single individual of that single type. 40.

For him, the person is logically prior to and is the ontological
foundation of, consciousness and the character of the body.41. It is
partly by this priority that he means "primitive", and, partly, that
as such, the "primitive person" falls outside the achievement or grasp
of the consciousness. Jung too believes that the collective
unconscious itself cannot be perceived directly be the conscious
because it too is prior to and the foundation of the personal
conscious. An extension of the concept of the "primitive person" can
be made to suit the requirements of the concept of the "primitive
human unit", which would be a biological whole, a "community" oriented
toward the whole through the collective unconscious. However, there
are many differences between the thought of the two men which I will
not go into here. By introducing the thought of such diverse
philosophers as Cassirer and Strawson, I wish to indicate that
concepts of other thinkers do indicate a similarity in attitude to the
problem of the human.

I had indicated that a "biological whole" or "life-moment" would
require a genetic patterning or orientation within each male and
female. Chomsky believes that a type of patterning was indicated by
the development of language skills in children, by a fundamental

similarity in all languages, and by the historic ability of man to
solve some problems answer some questions, but not others. The brain
has genetic paradigms, something akin to Kant's categories, and it is
nigh to impossible to think beyond those limits. Jacques Monod agrees
with Chomsky's conclusions but from the more scientific viewpoint of a
genetic researcher. Jung presents a more complete concept of genetic
patterning, with support, small though it be, from the father of
ps, c...-...l,..., Sigmund Freud. Cassirer, too, has a view of a
collective aspect in the human psyche or, as he calls it, the human
consciousness, for he never speaks of the unconscious at all.
Strawson presents a "primitive person" but applies it only to the
individual. I suggested that Strawson's concept could be developed
logically to incorporate the community as an aspect of the primitive
person.

The patterning of the "biological whole" would have to dominate
the collective unconscious, were the idea of a "life-moment" or a
"life-process" to survive as it has historically. Jung does introduce
archetypes of the mother and the father. In fact, at one point he
suggests just such a genetic patterning.

> There is no human experience, nor would experience
> be possible at all, without the intervention of a
> subjective aptitude. What is this subjective
> aptitude? Ultimately it consists in an innate
> psychic structure which allows man to have
> experiences of this kind. Thus the whole nature of

> man presupposes woman, both psychically and
> spiritually. His system is tuned in to woman from
> the start, just as it is prepared for a quite
> definite world where there is water, light, air,
> salt, carbohydrates, etc. The form of the world
> into which he is born is already inborn in him as a
> virtual image. Likewise parents, wife, children,
> birth and death are inborn in him as virtual
> images, as psychic aptitudes. These a priori
> categories have by nature a collective character;
> they are images of parents, wife, and children in
> general, and are not individual predestinations.
> 42.

In other words, we have a collective predisposition, a collective
psyche with unconscious content which are not the memory images of the
conscious (although he does not rule out collective memory images) but
which need individual experience to give it shape, to give it life for
the conscious.

The rational or conscious foundation for what is normally called
relations between individuals has not been examined as yet but,
considering the concept of human biological whole, such a foundation
is unnecessary for establishing a community. It is communal
attributes of the human that are the foundation of the community. The
"orientation" or the partial nature of the individual presumes the
community or the collective as its foundation. The collective psyche
is that "orientation" required by the genetic requisites of the
"process of life". Feelings, emotions, instincts, drives, etc., are
the functional or activating aspects of the orientation and the

archetypes are the substance of that orientation. The community is a "real and organic life" to a greater degree than Toennies had supposed. The individual is a creature of the community: for the original community, the "biological whole" is prior in principle and in fact to the individual parts into which it has functionally diverged itself. Should an individual die, its absence or death affects only the size of the community and not the substance, content, make-up, form, structure or any other attribute of the community. The community is in each human psyche but it is more than that. Not only is it in each human psyche but it must be the communal female oriented to the biological whole, the communal male oriented to the biological whole, the child oriented to the biological whole, the parent oriented to the biological etc. To examine the psyche of one individual is to examine only a part of the community, the individual can never grasp the "wholeness" of the community. Were there no individuals, it is true there would be no community. Where there is no community, however, there would be no individual for the process of life ceases. Were half the number of individuals eliminated the substance of the community would not be affected. Were a functional part of the community eliminated i.e. eliminate women, men, parents, or children, then the community would be damaged if not destroyed and with it the individuals, over historic duration, would be destroyed. If no children survived, or there were no females, then the adults, or the males, would live out their lives probably suffering from

alienation or anomie, and then mankind would cease to exist. In every biological sense man is a community of which the " individual" is an intrinsic and a functional part or attribute.

Because of the biological-organic foundation of the concept of "community", a definition of "community" with rational overtones misses the mark. Toivo Miljan wrote:

> The concept of community may be defined as the sharing of some values, beliefs, and interests to a greater or lesser degree. Ethnic community and political community may both be defined as the sharing of some values, beliefs and interests and founding myths and future utopias, to a greater or lesser degree. The difference between ethnic and political community is the addition of such specific political values as resourse allocation, resource arbitration and legitimacy. (Emphasis his.)43.

Later on he allows that "ethnic and political community are undifferentiated and organic in both conceptualization and operation", but he misses the point that man is community by definition and by nature. Man does not "share" in a community, for "share" has rational and voluntary values to its meaning while community is a basic organic "need" "orientation" and is not voluntary. Similarly, "founding myths and future utopias" have their roots in the "rational" and not in the organic. "Interests", too, has, in this context, a meaning of "involvement" or "concern" in "something" and that meaning has rational overtones. "Resource allocation, and resource arbitration"

are obviously rational projects and are part of society dealing with contracts, agreements etc. The almost total confusion of "rational" and "non-rational", "organic"and "contrived" does little to help us understand what a "community" is, whether ethnic or political.

To recapitulate, life, its maintenance and its continuation are the primary projects for all animated creatures. All biological units must reflect or include those three functions and are called "life-moments". An amoeba is a "life-moment" unit because it is a "life transmitter", and because it is fully capable of accomplishing the continuation of life within its own structure. A man or a woman cannot be called a "life-moment" unit because neither he nor she is capable of accomplishing the continuation of life within its own structure. Each man and each woman, therefore, cannot be considered a biological unit or "whole". In order for human life to continue, the biological "whole" must consist of a mating man and woman and two (male and female) children (because of the absolute dependence of the infant human.) As a result, the concepts of "separation" and "independence" as definitions or parts of a definition must be abandoned or given a new meaning.

Jacques Maritain and Ferdinand Toennies suggest that the concepts of "community" and "society" have two different meanings and foundations. The former has its roots in the biological nature of man

and is a more "natural" entity, while society reflects a more rational, mechanical and artificial nature. Dealing with the concept of the "community", I have claimed an even stronger biological base than either Maritain or Toennies could accept. The biological "whole" orientation in each man and woman is a community by definition. Additionally, the orientation requires or includes "other" directed feelings and behaviour. Consequently, each man and each woman is "programmed" genetically, as a result of the chance and necessities of evolutionary development, to have communal and social attributes. Language is an example where its acquisition is a result of a social or communal "program". There is reason to assume that all fundamental cognitive functions are genetically "programmed". The only conclusion, that I can accept so far is that the "individual" is a phantom and that mankind can only be divided into "life-moments" which are the final indivisible biological unit or "whole". Each man and woman are parts of a whole and that to be considered otherwise would deny the fundamental importance of "life" in all animate creatures.

The "individual" that we are accustomed to conceptualize has failed to materialize. In fact, the true biological human "individual" is, by nature, already a community. "Separation" "independence" and "completeness" are completely lacking in the human "life-moment." To consider the biological "part" (male or female) as an "individual" existent is almost comparable to considering the detached arm as an

"individual" existent, i.e., having life of its own. While the arm has an anatomical attachment to the body, the male or female has a "living" functional attachment to the biological whole. "Separateness", "independence", and "completeness" cannot be attached to the male or female except in a purely inanimate spatial relationship. "Autonomy", however, has not been eliminated because that which is purely biological is not "self-governing." "Autonomy" does not concern itself with "community" for rule-making is an activity of "society".

A view of the basic unit of human kind which includes the concept of the "life-moment" or the biological whole, would indicate that "community" is an a priori fact. It would give a new emphasis to the words of Bishop Butler when he wrote:

> That mankind is a community, that we all stand in a
> relation to each other, that there is a public end
> and interest of society which each particular is
> obliged to promote, is the sum of morals. 44.

Notes.

1. Monod, Jacques. Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology. trans. Austryn Wainhouse. New York: Vintage Books, 1972. Mr. Monod calls this concept a "teleonomic project". See pp.13-14.

2. Royce, Josiah. The World and the Individual. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959. p. 170.

3. Radford, J. and Kirby, R. The Person in Psychology. London: Methuen, 1975. p. 55.

4. Ibid. pp. 87-88.

5. Aristotle. The Politics. trans. T.A. Sinclair. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1970. p.26.

6. Ibid. p.25.

7. Weaver, Richard M. "Individuality and Modernity", in Essays on Individuality. ed. Felix Morley. Philidelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. pp.63-64.

8. Messner, Johannes. Social Ethics: Natural Law in the Western World. Sr. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1965. pp.90-91.

9. Legaz y Lacambra, Luis "The Human Person and the Rights of Man," in Contemporary Spanish Philosophy. ed. A. Robert Caponigri. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. p.94.

10. Morley, Felix "Individuality and the General Will, in Essays on Individuality, op. cit. p.83.

11. Strong, C.A. "Individualization and Individual Rights" in The Individual. Publications in Philosophy. Berkeley California: University of California Press, 1937. p.114.

12. Toennies, Ferdinand. Community and Society. trans. Charles P. Loomis. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963. p.33

13. Maritain, Jacques. Man and the State. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. p.2.

14. Toennies. _op. cit._ p.33.

15. See Lenneberg, E. _Biological Foundations of Language._ New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967.

16. Hoyle, Fred. "Can We Learn From Other Planets?" quoted in Reitmeister, L.A. A _Philosophy of Freedom._ New York: Poseidon Books, Inc., 1970. p. 139. 17. Dewey, John. _Individualism Old and New._ New York: Capricorn Books, 1962. pp.81-82.

18. Freud, Sigmund. _An Outline Of Psycho-Analysis._ Standard Edition. Vol. XXIII (1937-1939). London: The Hogarth Press And tThe Institute Of Psycho-Analysis, 1968, pp. 166-167. Freud was 82 years old when he wrote this work in 1938.

19. Jung, Carl Gustav. "The Structures Of The Psyche" in _The Portable Jung._ Joseph Campbell (ed). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1978, p. 38.

20. _Ibid._ "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious" in _The Portable Jung._ op. cit. p. 59-60.

21. _Ibid._ "The Structure of the Psyche" in _The Portable Jung._ p. 44.

22. _Ibid._ "The Stages of Life" in _The Portable Jung._ p. 21.

23. _Ibid._ _The Undiscovered Self._ Trans. by R. F. C. Hull. New York: New American Library, 1958. p. 12.

24. _Ibid._ "The Structure of the Psyche" in _The Portable Jung._ p. 45.

25. Rieff, Philip. _The Triumph Of The Therapeutic Uses Of Faith After Freud_ . New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p. 131fn.

26. _Ibid._ p. 131.

27. Skinner, B.F. Quoted in McCormick, Peter. "The Concept of the Self in Political Thought" in _Canadian Journal Of Political Science._ Vol. xii. #4. Dec. 1979. p. 721.

28. Jung. "The Transcendent Function" in _The Portable Jung._ p. 285.

29. _Ibid._ "Psychological Types" in _The Portable Jung._ pp. 178-269. As you can see I drastically simplified his theory for the sake of space in my paper.

30. _Ibid._ "The Transcendent Function". p.295.

31. Jung, C.G. Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. Bollingen series XX. Vol.7. New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1953. p.70.

32. "The Stages of Life" in The Portable Jung. p.7.

33. Two Essays. p. 65.

34. Ibid. p. 68.

35. Ibid. p. 76.

36. Cassirer, E. An Essay on Man. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956. p.43.

37. Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Mythical Thought. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. p.178.

38. Ibid. p. 194.

39. Ibid. p. 194fn.

40. Strawson, P.F. Individuals. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1964. pp. 101- 102.

41. Ibid. p.103.

42. Two Essays. p. 190.

43. Miljan, Toivo. Language, Society, Economics and Politics: Planning for Conflicting Objectives. Notes for a paper to be read to the Language Planning and Socioeconomic Development Section of the Sociolinguistics Program, Ninth World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, Sweden. Aug.1978. (Unpublished.) p.18.

44. Butler, Joseph. Quoted in the frontespiece of Harris, H.S. The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentille. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960.

PART 111

In the last section, we started with a basic biological principle: the reproduction continuance and maintenance of the life process. A participant of the life process is the fundamental biological unit, i.e. the instrument through which the reproduction of life continues. This "biological" whole consisted of the mating pair and children in the family. Any one part, the female, the male or the child, is unable to reproduce life without the other parts working together as a whole. In order for the "biological unit" to exist a genetic or inherited "orientation" toward the whole" must exist in each and every individual. In fact, the individual cannot exist properly without the "whole" because of this genetic orientation. The "orientation", however, does not have a fixed content, i.e., the individual is not genetically "oriented" toward one mate or even any type of mate, nor is the individual "oriented" necessarily to only one mate, nor to more that one mate. Such decisions are the result of cultural and personal experiences.

Carl Jung introduced a human psyche containing three major, fundamental parts or layers: the collective unconscious, the personal unconscious and the conscious. The latter two categories were ignited, created, filled out or aroused by the experience of the individual. The collective unconscious, however, was a genetic inheritance from the genetic experiences of the development of life and of the human species. its contents were called "archetypes" and

were described as primodial images, even primordial memory images shared by every human being. It was a community unconscious because everyone shared in it through their genetic being. The collective unconscious was the foundation, the matrix for the "personal" psyche and it formed and permeated both the personal unconscious and the conscious.

A biological requirement for a "biological whole" that was not the individual had been discovered, and the organic instrument by which this "whole" existed as a being is to be discovered in the "collective unconscious". The human unit is community in its being. It cannot be otherwise or the whole life process would have been disrupted and man would have ceased to exist. Definitions describing the individual as "separate", as a "unit", as "distinct" or as "complete" fail to have any meaning in the organic theory of the community described above. The human as community is logically, ontologically, and historically prior to the individual.

In this section, I want to erect the societal ediface on the foundations of the community just described. Society, according to Toennies and Maritain, is more closely rooted in the rational nature of man rather than in the biological or organic nature of man. While I have explored, in a superficial manner, the collective unconscious and its contents and purpose, I have not described the personal

unconscious nor the conscious and their contents. It is in at least
one of the two layers that society must be rooted, and it is in these
two sections that the concept of "autonomy" must find its meaning.

In his book Man and the State, Maritain states:

A society always gives rise to communities and community feelings
within and around itself. Never can a community develop into a
society, though it can be the natural soil from which some
societal organization springs up through reason. (Emphasis
mine)1.

At first glance, this claim of Maritain's seemed to be common sense.
A society, being an artifice, a "product of reason and moral
strength", sets up a mechanical framework (e.g. contract,
constitution, rules, etc.) which requires voluntary modifications of
behaviour of the participents. Over time, these modifications become
"second nature" and become habits of group behaviour - a more
"community" oriented function. On the other hand, a "community",
rooted in the biological or "natural will", is barred by its
non-rational nature to create something that was not "natural" but
mechanical.

However, there are problems with Maritain's conception of
"society". The Elks club or the Shriners are a "society" or an
association, i.e., the members voluntarily have participated. Yet, an

examination of the members will unearth cultural and communal similarities, e.g., language, social strata, education, religion, locality, values, beliefs, etc. Why should anyone associate with another for some time unless they had something in common? More than simple expediency or a contract attracts a person to the Elks. There must be a communal attraction before there is a "society" or an association like the Shriners. The same holds true for a religious institution. Whereas the belief and feelings of awe are communal functions the actual structure and theology are societal functions, i.e., are rooted in the "rational will". However, the structure or institution serves as a medium to satisfy the expression of communal functions, and theology is a rational explanation of the communal expression and functions.

The state, as Toennies claims, can be considered a "society" or at least a functional part of society. Much of the machinery (despite being bureaucratic) is rooted in the "rational will". A constitution is as much a product of the "rational will" as any other creation of a group of people, yet it is limited and formed by the community. When the Prime Minister of Canada stated publically that "Free enterprise" economy no longer existed in Canada, the resulting horrified outcry forced him to retract his remarks. It didn't matter that his remarks were accurate, he had "attacked" a belief that was sacrosanct for the general public. The same feelings and beliefs are involved in other

concepts such as "democracy" and "representation" etc. The constitution reflects the values, feelings and beliefs of the people to whom it will apply. In fact, it is a useless document (as in U.S.S.R.) unless it allows for and includes the community or communities. A constitution cannot be set up unless the community is prior to its construction.

The community must be prior to the "state" as well. Barrington Moore, Jr., claims that the type of "state" and political culture is determined by the type of political culture developed in the past, i.e. in a pre-industrial past.2. To graft a democratic form of government onto a culture without the traditions of a democratic society or the cultural roots necessary for such a society is an impossible task. It matters little whether or not the constitution or type of government is "right", any such attempt will fail because the "basic" community for such a society does not exist. No "society" is possible without a prior community.

For hundreds of years, Western philosophers and sociologists have been trying to "fit" the two concepts of the "individual" and "society" together. Hans Saner begins his book, Kant's Political Thought, by stating "Politics is based on reason. It begins with the use of reason, not with the political act." For such a broad claim to be true, the "fact" of "community" could not be prior to the

"individual" or to society. Kant's "autonomous" being or reason would require a "society" or "contract" in order to live as social beings. Saner's interpretation of Kant's thought results in the ultimate contract theory - a theory long since discarded as an inadequate (if not inaccurate) explanation for the origin of society.3.

Karl Mannheim, in his book Essays on the Sociology of Culture, states: "the individual is the seat of reality and the reality of groups is derivative", yet, that "the group approach to the individual is more effective than the direct"4. and that the principal thesis is "that mental processes have a social dimension."5. The first part of his book is devoted wholly to the relational problem of the individual and society, yet arrives at a conclusion which, in my view, merely blurrs the boundaries of each concept. Society is formed by the "vital autonomy, or living self-hood of the individuals as social units".

Often, the problem of origin and nature of "society" is "answered" in the very questions the author poses. J.T.J. Srzednicki makes a number of assumptions in his question:

... I begin by searching for the basic, groundfloor questions in the field, e.g. "What is the nature of communal co-operation?" - it then becomes quite clear that what one is asking about has a natural name in English, i.e. "co-operation"....6.

Such an analysis leads him to the "natural" conclusion:

> ... the communal bond typically leaves the individuals as separate
> as ever, they are independent though related.... Secondly, the
> relations must have a point and/or be desirable from the point of
> view of the individuals forming the community in question, for
> then and only then is there any real possibility of the
> arrangement working in its own right.7.

The question already assumes "distinct individuals in a mutually
willed relationship", and the answer to the question then shows or
proves the existence of "distinct individuals in a mutually willed
relationship."

Pitirim A. Sorokin was much more judicious in his analysis of
society. In his book: Contemporary Sociological Theories, 8 he
classifies the various views of the nature of society. At one extreme,
there is the "nominalistic or atomistic" conception in which society
is nothing but individuals. Next is the "functional" view in which
society is the system of interrelated individuals. Although society
has no reality beyond the individual members, society is different
from the reality of the same individuals isolated. At the other
extreme, there is the "mechanistic" view in which society is like some
kind of a machine system, and the "organic" view in which society has
a living unity and a reality beyond its individual members. Locke and
Rousseau had "atomistic views" of society, Karl Mannheim (and, some

claim, St. Thomas) had a "functional" view, and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera had an "organic" view. It is possible to label some of the systems theories as "mechanical," and, certainly, Comte held a variation of this view. Sorokin goes on to claim that the "organic" view was the most popular view amongst sociologists at that time.

In the last section ("community"), I tried to demonstrate that man, viewed as a "life-form," is not individual but communal by definition. An "Atomistic" view of society would fail to account for the "communal man." Others, however, (with the notable exception of John Rawls) also declare the "Atomistic" view as an inadequate explanation or theory. The "functional" view of the interrelated individuals allows each male or female to be an individual unit although related by the social propensities of their nature. Again, this view fails to account for man as a "life-form", as a communal biological "whole". The family is an organic "life-form". Comte comes close to this view when he states: "domestic relations do not constitute an association, but a union, in the full force of the term; and, on account of this close intimacy, the domestic connection is of a totally different nature from the social."9. He goes on to add that society is a social organism dependent upon "the special development of intellectual influences" i.e. enlightened reason. However, in society, some individuals are, by nature, superior in reason and can command others to submit to them. Society, then is hierarchical and authoritarian, due to the "natures"

of the people within it.   Comte's "society" fails to evoke a sympathetic response in the reader, who feels instinctively that his "mechanistic" view fails to include a sense of responsibility, or change etc.

The "organic" view has a basic principle that the social existance is primary and the individual being is secondary. It views society as a unity or as a body of which the parts are members. Society is an entity independent of any one individual or the mere sum of the individuals.

> Spain is NOT a territory. NEITHER is it an aggregate of men and women. Spain is, above all, AN INDIVISIBLE DESTINY. A historical reality. An entity, real in itself, which has accomplished - And will yet accomplish in future - missions of universal importance.   Therefore, Spain exists: 1. As something APART from each individual and from the classes and groups which constitute it. 2. As something SUPERIOR to each of these individuals, classes and groups and even to their sum total.10.

Usually one thinks of a bifurcation of the human into two parts "society" and "individual". However, for Marx, the individual was a part of a "class". Others substitute "the family" for the individual. Heinrich Von Treitschke did not speak of the "individual" or "society" at all:

The State is the people legally united as an independent power. By "people" we understand, briefly, a plural number of families permanently living together. When this is recognized, it follows, that the State dates from the very beginning and is necessary, that it has existed as long as history and is essential to humanity as language....11.

"Article Forty One" of the Irish Constitution (1937), states:

The State recognizes the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law. The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State.12.

In each case, however, the individual was part of an entity greater or superior than himself. In the last section, I indicated that the male or female was but a part of something greater (i.e., the biological "whole") and that the biological orientation and basic categories of cognition are programmed by the genetic code and are wholly biological in nature. Ancient China, as was pointed out earlier, attached so much importance to the family that no child could move out of the family home until both parents were dead. Other severe social and legal restrictions were imposed on the children and descendents in order to support the family. An extended family could

contain numerous generations and descendents. Tribesmen have been known to build whole social systems on the principle of "blood" or kinship. Even today Chinese names present the family name first. Patrician Romans not only had a family name but a tribal or kin name as well. Victorian ladies were known to say of a person "blood will tell," meaning that the "qualities" of the family (or other members of the family) will be in the particular person "individual".

Not only the biological community orientation was found in the human, but a psychical community also could be ascribed to the human. The unconscious consists of mental process involving a tendency behavior or impulse toward actions that, seemingly, are without purpose and which do not involve rational or conscious thinking. In the collective unconscious these impulses involve the inherited archetypes; in the personal unconscious, these impulses have their root in the experience of the individual. For Freud, these are partial childhood experiences which are repressed, and all "psychic material that lies below the threshold of consciousness." 13. It contains wishes, memories, fears, feelings, and ideas which are not subject to conscious awareness yet continually influence the conscious processes. We can observe the unconscious at work by observing the behavior of the individuals. For instance, a man may bite his fingernails, make repetitive gestures with his hands, follow the same routine dressing in the mornings, etc. More fundamental are the

reactions when a cherished symbol or belief is attacked, e. g. burning the flag.

C. H. Cooley was instrumental in creating sociology as a viable field of study in the United States. His theories are seldom studied today despite his influence on sociological thought at the beginning of the twentieth century. I suspect that a good part of the explanation for his neglect is the strong organic theory he holds. For him there is no distinction between the individual and society because "the mind is social, and society is mental." The individual not only has a biological or genetic inheritance but also a social inheritance. The social inheritance is the "stream of life" the absorption of which allows the individual to have all those attributes that are identified as human. Cooley talks of society in a manner similar to that of Toennies' community and fails to make a clear distinction between society and culture. Society provides the institutions, the family, the clan, etc; the tools such as language or communications; the ideas, values and mores. For him there is no distinction between the human mind and society yet the society is prior to the individual mind, moulds it, and provides for it a foundation. Cooley's theories, then, are an organic description of the personal psyche and its contents. In principle, his theories indicate that the personal unconscious is the adaptive part of the human psyche allowing the individual to absorb the culture about him

so that he becomes an integral part of the group to which he belongs. It also allows him to fill out those human attributes or tendencies which he has genetically inherited, and he "becomes" human as opposed to the children supposedly brought up by wolves etc. who never become human but remain an animal. It allows the inherited tendency toward the "self" and "self- Awareness" to find substance. The personal unconscious adapts the individual and his inherited instincts, tendencies and attributes to a loved world, to a human world. One could almost say that the personal unconscious mediates between the collective unconscious and the collective or social inheritance. Although Erich Fromm would appose the theories of C. H. Cooley and Jung, he nevertheless, expressed nicely what I believe to be the function of the personal unconscious.

> Man's nature, his passions and anxieties are a
> cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself
> is the most important creation and achievement of
> the continuous human effort, the record of which we
> call history. 14.

Lord Cecil held a view less organically oriented than Cooley's, yet he claimed that "the mind itself is largely formed and guided by the environment of civilization." 15. (Having a concept of civilization akin to that of culture). Cooley's claims are stronger. For him there were two major principles: "the mind is social, and that society is mental." 16. He believed that "both persons and

groups are organic wholes that move ahead by a tentative process" 17

and that what we usually associate as the individual is a fictitious

entity. The individual mind is a functional part of a whole.

> The view that all minds act together in a vital
> whole from which the individual is never really
> separate flows naturally from our growing knowledge
> of heredity and suggestion, which makes it
> increasinly clear that every thought we have is
> linked with the thought of our ancestors and
> associates, and through them with that of society
> at large. 18.

To think of the individual mind even as an abstracted concept is

impossible. The individual mind is so tied to the social, so much an

integral part of the social that any examination of the individual

must take place in the group. The individual does not exist apart

from the social.

> ...human nature is not something existing
> separately in the individual, but a group-nature or
> primary phase of society, a relatively simple and
> general condition of the social mind.... Man does
> not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it accept
> through fellowship, and it decays in isolation. 19.

> ...the individual has his being only as part of a
> whole. What does not comes by communication and
> intercourse; and the more closely we look the more
> apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of
> the eye and community the inner truth. 20.

The two major principles by which an individual is created are

heredity and communication. What a man does not have by heredity he

has from society through communication. It is society and heredity which give to him everything that is human. Society is the vital whole and society "may be as original or creative as anything else." 21. The creative individual is as much a part of the "general stream of life" as any other individual for creativity is also social in origin.

> Innovation is just as social as conformity, genius as mediocrity. These distinctions are not between what is individual and what is social, but between what is usual or established and what is exceptional or novel. 22.

The individual has no separate existence. He is bound into the whole of which he is a member by both heredity and the social factors in his life. Even his heredity in many respects is social as it has "a social history in that it has had to adapt itself to past society in order to survive" i.e. they have had to undergo "a social test in the lives of our ancestors." 23. "Even physical influences, like food and climate, rarely reach us except as modified and adapted by social conditions." 24. The society is prior historically, logically and ontically to the mind of the individual yet cannot be thought of without reference to the sum of all human life. Without society, the individual could live the life of an intelligent animal but his human faculties would be lost.

It is difficult to understand Cooley's conception of man. He considers human life to be a social and inherited process or "stream of life". Were we to think of a rope we find that strands are woven or braided into continuous lengths. Each strand has a beginning and an end and is not physically connected to other strands except in proximity. Each strand is virtually useless, having no strength, no purpose, no substantive identity on its own. Each strand carries the same limitations into the rope as it is woven yet the real whole or unit is created. It has strength greater than the sum of the parts. It has a purpose or use which it bestows on the parts (we discard frayed rope). It is also continuous yet to consider it apart from the component strands is impossible. Each strand is lost in the continuity of the rope, it gains strength from the continuity, it gains its purpose and value from that continuity.

> ...life is a creative process,...we are really
> building up something new and worth while,
> and...the human will is a part of the creative
> energy that does this. Every individual has his
> unique share in the work, which NO ONE but himself
> can discern and perform. Although his life flows
> into him from the hereditary and social past, his
> being as a whole is new, a fresh organization of
> life. 25.

The new, "fresh organization of life" is a new fresh organization in the individual mind of the social life process, yet individual judgement discerns and performs the work or role that individual performs. How is it that Cooley's theory allows for "a new being" or

a "fresh organization of life" and yet is so collectively oriented? Cooley's works failed to give me an answer yet I would hazard the following guess. While the mind of every individual experiences and absorbs the culture of the group around him, such experiences and absorption does not occur in a fixed or identical manner. Should we tell a group of children to mix paints in a bowl and each child has the same number and amount of colours, the mixtures would not be identical. The children will not start with the same colour or with the same amount and so on. In a more complex manner, the human psyche follows a similar hocus-pocus pattern. The personal unconscious grasps experiences and the experiences of each child is different. Such a concept does not take away from the collective aspect of theory. Wittgenstein's famous analogy of the games is an excellent one to explain how the two concept work within each other. All games have a sum of attributes but each game does not have every attribute. Let us say that the sum of attributes is as follows: ABCDE. The first game is a game because it has ABC and D; the second game has ACDE; the third BCDE and so on. They are games because they have so many of the set of attributes. Individuals behave in much the same manner. No individual has the whole social inheritance but he does have as many attributes as he can hold.

In order to allow the "social mind" to become his, the individual must inherit aptitudes for the social. Remarkably similar to Jung's

concept of the collective unconscious or my "biological whole orientation", Cooley claims that each individual inherits a social predisposition.

> ...the child has by heredity a generous capacity
> and need for social feeling, rather too vague and
> plastic to be given any specific name like love.
> 26.

Experience in the group fills out the social predisposition in somewhat the same way as water fills out a sponge.

In order for the individual to have a concept of what he himself is, the individual has inherited a predispostion for the self which in turn needs experience to fill it out. This predisposition is to be found in emotions or feelings.

> The emotion or feeling of self may be regarded as
> instinctive, and was doubtless evolved in
> connection with its important function in
> stimulating and unifying the special activites of
> individuals. It is, perhaps, to be thought of as
> a more general instinct, of which anger, etc., are
> differentiated forms, rather than as standing by
> itself. It is thus very profoundly rooted in the
> history of the human race and apparently
> indispensible to any plan of life at all similar to
> ours. It seems to exist in a vague though
> vigorous form at the birth of each individual, and
> like other instinctive ideas or germs of ideas, to
> be defined and developed by experience, become
> associated, or rather incorporated, with muscular,
> visual, and other sensations; with perceptions,
> apperceptions, and conceptions of every degree of
> complexity and of infinite variety of content; and
> expecially, with personal ideas. 27.

It seems that he is claiming that consciousness or the mind is an inherited aptitude, predisposition or instinct which is given value through experience. It seems to be a logical sequence when one thinks of biological development yet it is not a concept to be accepted by many theorists. For them, the consciousness transcends the biological and instincts.

> ...exist...refers to the being which man has conquered by transcending and living. 28.

> The individual is produced by the biological generic process; it is born and it dies. But personality is not generated, it is created by God.... 29.

Cooley's concept of the "inherited self" is not the only concept that others would attack. For David L. Miller the whole underlying thesis in Cooley's conception is wrong.

> Every worthy and significant change that is planned and deliberately undertaken in a society has its origin on the mind of an individual. The individual--not the community, not public opinion, not external environmental forces--is the source of new ideas that enable society to make changes for the achievement of ideals.... 30.

> Any human society, however primitive, is maintained by the intentions of its member maintain it.... Any human society is a moral entity. 31.

The whole concept of autonomous individuals in the works of Popper, Kant, Bentham and Adler are in fierce opposition to Cooley's theory.

Yet Cooley has some indications of support. Reinhold Neibuhr claims that

>   The individual draws the sustenance of his
>   self-conscious individuality from his organic
>   relation to his social group.... 32.

And:

>   It is the function of reason to relate life to life
>   in terms of harmony. 33.

In other words, reason has an adaptive function. In another fascinating little book, Sebastian de Grazia writes that while systems of beliefs are transmitted culturally and not biologically, they are rooted in man's prolonged childhood dependence and infirmity, and for all intents and purposes, "they might as well be transmitted through the genes. In many ways systems of beliefs may be likened to the social heredity of the species Homo Sapiens." 34. William McDougall speaks of psychobiological as instincts and sentiments of the individual person preparing him for his social relationships. It must be admitted, however, that none are as strong in the claims toward a collectivity as Cooley was.

What does all of the above mean? I must remind the reader at this point, that the purpose of section two and three was to provide a description of a possible alternative to the more commonly held view

of the individual as the basic human unit i.e. the basic unit of society. To defend Cooley's views would require effort, time and space, all of which cannot be granted in this thesis. I can, however, indicate the possible harmony between the theories of Cooley and of those discussed in the previous section.

In the previous section, I had described how the "biological whole" or "life- moment" could be considered the basic human unit and how as part of its identity, it was already a "community" and could not be thought of otherwise. Such a unit would require an inherited or genetic "orientation" toward the "biological whole" and Jung's theory of the "collective unconscious" provided an excellent avenue for the transmission of an inherited genetic orientation or predispostion from one generation to another. Feelings emotions, instincts, archetypes etc. were the functional means to implement the "orientation". However, all this involved only the unconscious and biological levels. The consciousness (and personal unconscious) and its contents were not described, although it was described as rooted in, encircled by, permeated by the collective unconscious from which it tentatively emerged. The community was the matrix, the foundation and guide for the consciousness. Jung stated that it is in the conscious psyche that direction intention and purpose were to be found. It is by using Cooley's theory and Rof's theory that I hope to describe the personal psyche and its contents.

For Cooley, the personal psyche is filled through communication by the inherited culture of the groups of which he is a part. The whole mind of the individual is created by forces not directed by the individual: the inherited genetic predispositions, and the inherited social mind. The individual mind is part of a greater social whole. The social mind is fed into the personal psyche during the prolonged childhood by the primary organic groups i.e. they are fundamental in forming the social nature of the individual, and consist of such groups as the family, the play-group for children, and the neighborhood or community of elders. 35. Fromm has a very similar notion which he calls "primary ties" 36. which are organic in the sense that they are a part of normal human development. Examples of such ties are the child and mother, the tribal man and the clan and nature, the medieval man and the church or social caste. However, for Fromm these are ties to be broken for self-actualization of the individual. Rof's view is closer to that of Cooley. 37. He claimed that the child's earliest dispositon is affected or modified by the reactions he awakens in the mother or another guardian figure and vice-versa, a process he calls "urdimbre". Because man is so premature at birth, he is particularly susceptable to "tutelar imprints". Rof's "urdimbre" processes continue well into the teenage years. In this he followed Jung's example who claimed that the individual emerged from the collective in stages and that the conscious finally matures in the chaos caused by puberty. 38. For

Cooley there is no emergence of the individual consciousness from the social mind. Instead, the "urdimbre" process continues through the individual's life and the individual awakens reactions in his communications and vice-versa.

There are indications that the brain structure itself is affected by the tutelar process. Kittens kept in cages with either horizontal or vertical bars alone are unable to see lines corresponding to the missing bars in later life--i.e., kittens from cages with vertical bars only will be unable to see horizontal lines and so on. 39. Children are known to have a far greater number of synaptic connections in the brain in the first two years of life but will lose almost half of them after two years. This no doubt helps them to learn but what is not used is lost. Abraham H. Maslow indicates that the learning process itself may affect the sturcture of the brain.

Habits are then conservative mechanisms, as James long ago pointed out. Why is this so? For one thing, because any learned reaction, merely by existing, blocks the formation of other learned reactions to the same problem. But there is another reason, just as important, but ordinarliy neglected by the learning theorists, namely, that learning is not only of muscular responses but of affective preferences as well. Not only do we learn to speak English but we learn to like and prefer it. Learning is not then a completely neutral process. 40.

Maslow was interested in behavior and saw only limits to other forms

of behavior. However, should the brain be more plastic than we thought, then the learning process through which the "stream of life" is absorbed places an indelible synaptic print on the brain. It may be impossible for anyone taught to speak English, an atomistically oriented language to view the world more holistically, as someone who was taught another language would: perhaps an agglutinate language which reflects a holistic world view.

Whether or not the actual brain structure is affected, the personal unconscious certainly is. This part of the psyche, according to Jung, requires experience for development and substance, but only within the parameters set by the "collective unconscious".. The face-to-face encounters or communications moulds the personal unconscious and provides it with attitudes, values, needs, drives, principles, a code of ethics, etc. which in turn affect the conscious. The psychological effect of the primary groups on the individual as the "result of intimate association...is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self...is the common life and purpose of the group". 41. That such a "conditioning" occurs can be demonstrated by the effect a glimpse of a woman's ankle caused in my great- grandfather's time and in my own; or the effect of crunching sheeps eyes while eating or of cooking the brains of someone you know. A physical reaction sets in that is culturally induced and the agent of such a reaction is the personal unconscious.

So far, my description of the human has been heavily organic and as such involved the genetic or the biological heredity of man. The personal unconscious is the adaptive and mediating function between the collective unconscious, a biological inheritance, and the social culture or "stream of life", a social inheritance. The former is innate, the later experiential, but both are found as a whole in the mind or psyche of the individual. Both layers of the unconscious psyche permeate the conscious and dominate it to a large extent yet most people recognize its existence. Jung indicates that the same process occurs in the unconscious psyche and in the conscious. When we are asleep, for example, or mesmerized, the consciousness or conscious awareness seems to withdraw into itself or is greatly restricted yet the psyche continues to exist and to act. Some sleepwalkers work at a desk and produce excellent and complex work.

Cooley said above that the self is: a feeling or emotion; instinctive in nature; and, a functional attribute evolved in order to stimulate and unify the special activities of the individual. As an instinctive idea, it has to be "defined and developed by experience" and deals with "muscular, visual, and other sensations; with perceptions apperceptions and conceptions of every degree of complexity and of infinite variety of content; and, expecially, with personal ideas." 43. Jung has a similar viewpoint about what it does: "Consciousness seems to stream into us from outside in the form

of sense- perceptions. we see, hear, taste, and smell the world, and so are conscious of the world." It also is involved in the processes of apperception, recognition, evaluation, volition and intuition. Apperception and recognition (identification) involve the function of thinking; evaluation also involves the function of feeling; intuition is the "perception of the possibilities inherent in a situation originating in the unconscious; and volition is directed impulses, based on apperception. Apperceptive processes may be either directed, e.g. "attention", or undirected--e.g., day dreaming. The former are rational the latter are irrational. 44. Jung, however, does not speak of the conscious as an evolved or inherited disposition or attribute. Consciousness, as a psychological term, involves an awareness of ideas and feelings, particularily the capacity to know, to perceive, or arrange ideas and feelings in order to have meaning. Jacques Monod believes that the capacity is the result of an evolutionary biological development. Charles S. Peirce dismissed "consciousness" as follows:

> ...consciousness in sometimes used to signify the
> "I think", or unity in thought; but that unity is
> nothing but consistency, or the recognition of it.
> 45.

And:

> A reasoning must be conscious; and this
> consciousness is not mere "immediate consciousness,
> " which...is simple feeling viewed from another
> side, but is in its ultimate nature...a sense of
> taking a habit, or dispostion to respond to a given
> king of stimulus in a given king of way. 46.

Sigmund Freud defined consciousness as that part of the psyche that reacts to the outside world and in a continuing interplay, is modified and reacting to both the outside world and the changes within. 47. However, all organisms "interact" with their environments, and is there any reason why the more complex the organism is, the more complex the mechanism of "interaction" would be? To "be Aware", to "perceive", to "apprehend" and to "comprehend" are functions of consciousness, yet some animals have all functions (to a more limited extent than man). Consciousness is not "a habit to respond", but a complex communal interaction. It is the intensity of the directed mediation between the external and the internal that seems to identify the human conscious. M. R. A. Chance postulated that the ancestors of man had such a variety of stimuli presented to them and such a number of fine decisions or judgements to make, that the animals had to control their emotional responses, such control requires the evolvement of enlarged neo-cortex. It was this anatomical development that allowed the human to evolve. 48. Chance's theory provides a nice foundation for the concept expressed by Rene Dubos:

> ...social groups; like individual persons, never react passively with environmental situations; instead they respond in a purposive manner. It has long been recognized...that the growth of civilization is favoured by variable and challenging environments--whether the challenge comes from topographic, climatic or social stimuli. 49.

Consciousness can be conceived as an inherited biological function which responds to stimuli in a "purposive manner" yet the permeations of both parts of the unconscious in the conscious severly restricts yet ignites the conscious functions. Should a problem arise, the individual can solve it <u>if</u> he is patterned to think along the lines necessary for solution; and <u>if</u> his personal unconscious has absorbed or found the themes of intuitive understanding in the social mind. Maslow indicated that language tends to adopt a certain view of the world which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to think of an opposite or more simply another viewpoint. Clyde Kluckhohn adds that many discoveries and inventions are made available to a group either as creations of their own members or as trade goods. "However, only those that fit the total immediate situation in meeting the group's needs for survival or in promoting the psychological adjustment of individuals will become part of the culture." 50. Each culture has its own set of trends of thought or set of predispositions to thought.

It is the usual case to describe the tension between the individual and society caused by the power of the larger entity to force the individual to conform and the struggle the individual has to maintain to be free. Freud paints a picture of an ego that must be strengthened until it is able to withstand the assaults of the society. I believe, however, that a case can be made that the cause

of tension in a society is not that of the individual to remain free, nor that of the individual who has remained totally a part of the whole (some tribesmen are unable to even think of the self, but are nevertheless happy). The tension comes when the individual has become more isolate, more of an individual. Of the three parts of the psyche, one is collective by difinition; a second is basically the creation of the collective in a locus; and the third, is the other two parts in and through it, as the ground of its existence and the power for its actions. When the third part, consciousness, represses the other two and becomes more individually oriented, an unhealthy psyche is created. feelings of anomie and alienation are the results of a breakdown or disruption of the harmony of the psyche, the process of life or the process of the "life-stream". People begin to lose their grip on the human as they become more individualized.

The human collectivity, however, is not static, fixed or determined. Cooley indicated that each person was new, was a fresh organization. Variation is the norm of the collective social entity in the individual minds. This variation is not great for it falls within the given social set and within the given social momentum. The social inheritance that we have is rippling, always responding to the biological development of man, to environmental changes, and to changes in technological principles (i.e., the electric toothbrush had a minimal affect, if any, on the social process, yet the computer did

because of the new principle of high-speed knowledge involved). The changes are tentative and meet fierce resistance unless they are changes easily accomadated by the existing social process (new stars on television, or more efficient gasoline). This resistance involves the basic nature of man. To make a drastic change in society would mean a change in the genetic pattern of man; to make a change of great but of lesser importance may mean a mere change in the whole psyche of the human, each and every individual. The reformation was a revolution in thought and viewpoint, yet before Luther stood defying both the council of the church and the Emperor, four or five hundred years of preparation had occurred. 51. The problem at this point is to account for change. For this I must present the thought of a Spanish humanist and synthesizer of the thought of Freud, and Jung and of biology.

Juan Rof Carballo has written extensively on psycho-biology and neuro-physiology and has been hailed as the first major psychoanalytic critic of the society and culture of his native Spain. In creating his biological and anthropological models, he introduces the theory of "urdimbre". A Spanish word that has no similar word or concept in English, it is usually translated as "web", "network", "texture", "weave", or "plot" (as in a story). Rof confuses the meaning for the English reader further by expanding and adapting the original Spanish concept.

"Urdimbre" as a theory, involves the child and the parents, and the dynamic and mutually modifying relationship involved. (Rof reduced the parents to the mother but I have included the father.) Rof defined "urdimbre" as "a texture of transactional and reciprocal influences between mother and child from the moment of birth." 52. It is not a dialectical nor a deterministic process but a "circular process which does not permit prediction or an a priori conception of which factors in the transaction will be decisive." 53. According to Rof, human beings are most susceptible to "transactional and programming influences" because, unlike other higher animals, man is notably premature at birth.

"Urdimbre" processes are conditioned by genetic factors but have specific functions and characteristics. It is "programmatic" i.e., it equips the child with a set pattern of behaviour; it is "psychosocial" because it determines the unconscious mechanisms that appear in the individual's choices in friendship, marriage, career etc.; and it is "transmissional" whereby cultural patterns are passed on from generation to generation and presents to the individual a sense of tradition. These are accomplished by three main "urdimbre" processes that occur at a fairly set time in the development of the personality of the child (reminiscent of Chomsky's theory of language development). The primary "urdimbre" process provides the foundation for character formation and is "woven" in the first few months after

birth. The "urdimbre" of order co-exists with the first process but becomes prominent in the fourth or fifth year. By this process, the child develops or absorbs social norms and moral patterns and organizes a hierarchical world for the child. The final process occurs in adolescence, wherein the child must "confront his self-image" with the image others have of him in order for him to develop a mature personality.

I have presented Rof's concept of "urdimbre" in some detail for I wish to take that same concept and expand it. Above I have indicated a gap between the primative community and the culture of the "life-moment" and society. Toennies and Maritain fail miserably to explain how such two distinct concepts with such divergent roots "merge". What has occurred between the time of the Tribes of Israel and the time of the State of Israel so that man separated by a mere four thousand years, could change (I do not say evolve) so drastically? What separates man from a primitive tribe and man from Toronto or Helsinki? Marx and Engels explain it as follows:

Some elements are found in all epochs, others are common to a few epochs. The most modern period will have certain categories in common. Pro- duction without them is inconceivable. But although the most highly developed languages have laws and categories in common with the most primitive languages, it is precisely their divergence from the general and common features which constitute their development. 54.

It was an arrogant assumption. Studies since have shown that languages of some tribesmen are as sophisticated (perhaps even more sophisticated in many areas) as any Indo-European language. In another place, Marx postulates the following:

... the "entire so-called history of the world" is nothing but the creation of man through human labour.55.

And:

In broad outline we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. 56.

The latter is a theme that Almond and Verba would have approved. Man develops through various stages in an almost predetermined pattern -for Marx, an economic pattern. As man's purpose and creative or transcending labour lifts economic man from one epoch to another, his society evolves and advances with him. Western Europe (and North America), of course, has evolved further along the path than other more primitive cultures. I recall that a primitive Indian tribe in Brazil was taken out of the jungle and introduced to "civilization." Not recognizing the superiority of the Europeanized culture, within a few years they returned to the jungle to avoid or stem the corruption of their people.

As mentioned before, Barrington Moore, Jr., does not believe that "societies" and man evolve in a similar manner. For instance, he

develops four distinct patterns of change from the pre-industrial to the industrial world. The Democratic-capitalist pattern can be seen in France, England, and the U.S., yet each had "profoundly different societies at the starting point" but went through "bourgeois revolutions" with different alignments of "class" players. For him, feudal societies lend themselves to democratic development; bureaucratic agrarian societies (Russia, China, Egypt) lend themselves to bureaucratic and undemocratic development.57. In other words, our society has developed from original societal types and they from prior societies until we reach the very primitive units.

The diversity of man's development, from the stone age tribes of the Philippines to the "punk rockers" of our "Atlantic" culture, do not indicate any predetermined pattern of development, or even that every society will or ought to develop. Yet processes of development have occurred. The introduction of the horse had profound consequences for the North American Indian. The development of the wheel, of iron, of money, etc., have had enormous consequences. The development of one god by the Jews also had profound results. The intellectual achievement s of man have been involved in the process leading to the development of our present political societies. Yet many concepts, drives, principles etc., particularly social and communal, have not changed. Technological and engineering advances are countless. Advances in food gathering (e.g. agriculture, fishing

etc.,) and transportation have not been as startling or as numerous. Advances in social relations (ethics, morals etc.,) would be hard to discover, let alone demonstrate. As a result, Plato is still relevent yet Ptolymy is not. Aquinas still challenges the intellect, while Reginbald of Cologne is an obscure footnote in an equally obscure book. 58. The "hard" sciences have had amazing success; astronomical compared to the social sciences or "soft" sciences. Noam Chomsky claims that such lopsided advances in certain areas of endeavor are the result of a genetic pattern of thinking. 59. We are unable to make advances in certain areas because we do not have the capacity to go outside the inherited set pattern of our brain. Kant's categories are another example of a set pattern of thinking.

However, two things must be admitted. Man can and does think resulting in innovations. Secondly, man's thinking within his genetic pattern is not pre-determined or fixed. Some tribes accepted the technological advances of the brass and iron ages but refused to settle in fixed areas (e.g., Afgan nomads). Others built magnificent cities without wheels, iron, or brass, etc. The "advances of progress" have not been uniform in their discovery or adoption. However, once discovered and adopted, these advances have been fundamentally incorporated into the woof and warp of the process of a social "urdimbre" - i.e., the process of civilization. (For the moment, I wish to use "civilization" and "urdimbre" synonymously.)

Society cannot be formed directly from the community, for basic fundamental communities are unchanging or at least extremely intolerent of change. Society (and we can use the "state" as a prime example of a societal institution) changes rapidly or at least is capable of rapid change and the state throughout the last three hundred years has suffered many changes. Society, rooted in the more rational or purposive part of man, is an artifact - a modification of what already is - nature, use or design knowledge, needs, ideas, and values. It is never a static artifact nor is it ever the same artifact. Each society is uniquely modified from or in a dynamic and on going process of civilization. No society can exist without reflecting not only the community and nature, but also the innovative advances and the accepted ideas of its historical past. These reflections are never pre-determined because society is based on, even created by, the process of civilization.

A fallangist architectural theorist, Gimenez Caballero, wrote in his Arte y Estado that the city "is the point of balance between the individual and society". 60. (The Spanish Fallangists were very interested in mathematical, particularly geometrical, theories and applications, hence the "point of balance" concept.) If one does not accept that the "point of balance" is static or fixed, then the city, more than any other creation of man, reflects the dynamic, circular, reciprocal, transactional process between man and his society. New

innovations are discovered and adopted more readily in cities than any where else. Society needs cities or has needed cities in the past with few exceptions (e.g., perhaps the feudal age). Cities allow for institutions and fixed objective rules or laws; for rapid communications; for specialized divisions of labour; etc., a variety of things that seem to provide fertile ground for innovation and social institutions. Philip Rieff makes this comment:

> As cultures change, so do the modal types of personality that are their bearers.... Yet a culture survives principally, I think, by the power of its institutions to bind and loose men in the conduct of their affairs with reasons which sink so deep into the self that they become commonly and implicitly understood - with that understanding of which explicit belief and precise knowledge of externals would show outwardly like the tip of an iceberg. 61.

However, this is but a part of the process which in turn had created the institutions, which changes or modifies them and which will supercede them. Culture itself, which Rieff considers as the primary "stuff" of social interaction, is an institution created by the urdimbre or civilization process. For example, John U. Nef, in his book, Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization 62 indicates that there were two distinct early industrial processes in Europe as a result of both conscious and unconscious patterns of thought. Because of economic, political, religious, and social institutions, an industrial process favouring quality and artistic

endeavors arose in France which was aided by conscious policies of the French crown. As a result of dissimilar patterns set by similar institutions in Britain and Holland, an industrial process favouring quantity and production was formed. The institutions, in turn, had their patterns set by war or lack of it, innovations or the lack of them, ideas, values institutions, accidents, etc., in previous times.

There was a process in which the environmental values and the mental or social values reciprocally influenced each other in a dynamic and continuous fashion, weaving the various social and environmental values into a new ongoing interaction, into a continual whole. It is an "urdimbre process" which involves the whole culture and society. The unconscious psyche is in constant mutually modifying relationship with the conscious, purposive psyche acting on the world. The human psyche takes into itself the surrounding environment (non-social environment) in order to cope with problems to provide solutions, and to maintain itself in a hostile world. By its perception, and apperception of the world, and by the unconscious psyche's "patterning" the human is able to adapt itself to change.

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