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AFRICAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Jo Ann Mourides

ABSTRACT

While we in the latter half of the twentieth century have been experiencing the emergence of a multitude of new 'developing' states, we have also come to realize not just a scholarly interest in governments different from our own, but a pressing need for greater understanding and constructive co-operation among states working in a rapidly shrinking arena. In the academic world, the coming to independence of close to two-score African countries stimulated a surge of interest. The field of comparative politics in particular was faced with a double-barrelled challenge: the development of approaches to the study of the African political experience possessing explanatory and predictive capacity; and the furtherance of understanding of African politics in a responsible fashion.

Since the early 1960's there have developed alongside systems theory and the legalistic-descriptive schools of thought a number of approaches designed to tackle the dynamic questions of modernization, political development, instability, and integration--in short, issues of change. Despite the momentary diversion created by the short-lived Pan-African movement, there is little doubt today that the state is the entity of the foreseeable future, and as such provides the major unit of analysis in the study of change.

If at the governmental level the direction of state affairs as the art of the possible has assumed a mocking and bitter flavour, in the area of theory development there has arisen an emphasis on process with an end to determining multiple causality and thresholds. On a more

general plane, explanatory research has come to focus on relationships among variables within the societal environment on the assumption that if it is known how the system works then prediction becomes possible.

It is the phenomenon of political instability, however, which has highlighted some of the most complex and theoretically puzzling problems. The processes of integration and modernization, already critically important to African leaders, become theoretically vital vis-à-vis the fragmented or 'syncretic' nature of African political systems. While the coup d'état, revolt, and rebellion provide the dramatic symptoms, the issue of political instability reaches right down to the grass-roots--to a non-integration within and between modern and traditional sectors. Further complicating factors include economic unpredictability, cultural or religious pluralism, anomalies arising out of the colonial experience, and the nature of the military.

The design of the following pages, rather than attempting to construct a paradigm for the analysis of political instability, is to explore the realm of instability from the viewpoint of one interested in discovering conceptual tools and analytical foci consistent with a problem-oriented theoretical base. As the state constitutes the arena within which political stability or instability derive meaning and impact, it is accordingly through investigation of change among those elements which comprise the state which holds out the greatest promise for explanatory and predictive research.

AFRICAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY:
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

By

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Political instability, as an issue of academic interest is, upon close examination, the reverse side of a coin, the face of which portrays a simmering controversy regarding the concepts and empirical realities of modernization, political development, development theory, and political change. Initially, the aim of this paper included an examination of political instability as a theoretical focus linked to an empirical problem. Perhaps the more correct outlook, however, is that of the problem of political instability, the empirical fact, as it relates to theoretical positions:--its implications and its dilemmas. Unfortunately, the scope of such an investigation could require a work of several volumes. It is therefore possible within the following several chapters only to outline the barest skeleton of what in probability ought to be a full-length theoretical study.

In the interests of clarity and brevity then, the present work is divided into three general sections: introduction, frame of reference, and the systems-theory-structural-functional framework upon which much empirical study is predicated; an examination of the systematic and societal characteristics of the states in question; and a brief discussion


of political instability as part of a larger body of works largely categorized as development theory: that is, regarding political change.

Frame of Reference

Any study of a comparative nature which focuses on the developing states of Africa is forced immediately to take into account a well-known fact; African states are truly comparable only in the magnitude of their diversity. A casual examination of the national boundaries negotiated across the African continent reveals over forty-odd states and a half-dozen colonial holdings (see Figure #1). There are some twenty former British colonies and territories, slightly fewer former French territories, and a handful of Spanish, Italian, Belgian, and Portuguese. Spain still lays claim to the Spanish Sahara, France to French Somaliland, and Portugal to some four scattered territories. Out of the former colonial confusion, no particular sense can be made by superimposing political system type, ethnic groupings, linguistic patterns, religious holdings, or resource bases.

Accordingly, a study of the phenomenon of political instability in African states as a general and diffuse occurrence demands a reference area as large as possible within the population of developing states in order to improve upon the chances for validity of any generalizations that might be made. This stems logically from the hopelessness involved in trying to delineate blocks of comparative units which show

Figure # 1: Overview



characteristic similarity on one or more crucial variables. African nations are afflicted by an entire range of inconsistencies, paradoxes, and diversities in the extreme. Further, in the interest of a meaningful analysis it is necessary for data from reference states to be sufficiently reliable, abundant, and comparable to permit extrapolation of readings on general characteristics common to more than one state from the multitude of the unique. Without such a procedure, inductive reasoning becomes impossible.

From this perspective it is desirable to find a number of states that are comparable in the range of one or more variables in order either to hold these variables constant and reduce the total number of factors under consideration, or to permit the study of other phenomena in relation to the variables in the key selection criteria. This is the bread and butter of comparative analysis.


Generally speaking then, these considerations reduce to three imperatives: pick as large an area as possible; fairly represent the systems characteristics of the developing states; and, keep the reference area analytically workable and within the bounds of comparative data.

The problem then becomes one of elimination. What can generally be regarded as the South African block must be deleted on the grounds that the white governments of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia are still, in a sense, an extension of the colonial experience. Similarly, Southwest

Africa falls under the aegis of minority white government. None of these have autonomous rule of the indigenous peoples. The colonial territories that still exist can likewise be ignored.

Morrison and Stevenson, the co-authors of the published results of the African National Integration Project (ANIP), have dealt simply with the rest of the continent.¹ "Black Africa" consists of the thirty-four sub-Saharan states that were independent sovereign entities at the time of the writing of the book by the same name, Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook. The north African nations were not included in their study as, technically speaking, they are not 'black'. For the purposes of this study all computer work will follow the lines of the thirty-four nations of the ANIP reference area. Further, for the purposes of general analysis, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia will be included (see Figure #2). Justification for this inclusion lies in the fact that these three nations are a substantial part of the French colonial African experience and in order to keep the reference area as large as possible, may be included without substantial alteration of the terms of reference. Although it may be stated that these states are not black, this line of argument is rather unfruitful as large portions of sub-Saharan Africa similarly are not entirely black in composition. By adding these three states a large section can be added to the former French African colonial experience without entailing problems

Figure # 2: Thesis Reference Area



such as those found in the consideration of Egypt (A.R.E.) which was only superficially colonial, is Middle Eastern as much as it is African, and was itself an imperial power long before the coming of the British. Libya as a satellite of Egypt is also omitted.

In conclusion, there are thirty-seven states to be included in this study. They all share a colonial history (with the exceptions of Liberia and Ethiopia), have autonomous indigenous rule, and have achieved independence for the most part peacefully and by negotiation with the colonial power within the last two decades (the earliest being Sudan, January 1, 1956, and the most recent Equatorial Guinea, October 12, 1968). Included are: Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, Ghana, Guinea, Cameroon, Togo, Zaire, Somalia, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African Republic (C.A.R.), Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Gambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.

Theoretical Framework

Treatment of political instability in the developing states of Africa is sufficiently involved and pit-fall ridden to have absorbed some of the best behavioral researchers in America in contradictory channels and debate for the past two-and-one-half decades. Roughly speaking, most of the present

behavioral literature on the subject attempts, from one orientation or another, to link political instability to other systems phenomena and characteristics (for example, cultural-pluralism, systemic frustration, or dependence on foreign control).² A great deal of the variation in the conclusions reached is the result of divergent definitions, primary analytical assumptions about the nature of African political systems, and differences in operationalization. Unfortunately for the study of the politics of development, not only has much of this literature an orientation almost entirely lacking in theoretical organization, but that which may lay some claim to theory in many cases is only one step removed from other disciplines, notably psychology, sociology, and economics.

Although there is much to be said for the discovery of relationships among variables and basic data research generally, without definitional consistency and firm linkage to the main body of developmental theory, much of the potential for enriching our understanding of developmental politics as a field of study is lost.

It is as a result of this fact that the design of this first chapter is toward outlining the basic theoretical tenets found behind much of the starkly realistic outlook of current behavioral research. Although empirical studies of African political instability suffer acutely from definitional disparity and operational diversity, the very fact of their

hyperfactualism forges such a strong bond with raw statistics that the reasons behind the relationships found in the data are often obscured. Bluntly stated, these studies are at best eclectic and at worst an unsuccessful attempt at analytical empiricism.

On the other side, much of the writing toward building development theory still sits squarely on the not-so-appropriate biological concept of the system. While general systems theory has served many years as an analytical tool, its characteristics of status quo maintenance and monistic system orientation have long been and still remain stumbling-blocks to fully-developed theory. It is needless to repeat that indiscriminate borrowing from other disciplines produces dull tools unfit for political theory development.

A large portion of the studies directed at understanding African politics and political systems is based on a group of approaches, which, if they are viewed together, can be traced directly back to the structural-functionalism of Parsons, Almond, and Levy. These approaches embrace systems theory, 'functionalism', role theory, communications theory (cybernetics), and probability theory. That which can be closely linked to these as a methodology is the scientific outlook and the theoretically more modest orientation of modern behavioralism.

- - - - -

The simple act of evaluation of structural-functional-

ism opens a veritable Pandora's box of attitudes and alternatives. Paradoxically, it is the necessity of having to determine the most appropriate amidst this multiplicity which puts the lie to the claim that structural-functionalism is truly systematic, comparative, and even in fact, a fully-fledged theory.

Very generally, structural-functional theory is founded not, as in traditional approaches, on the particular history and the institutions of a particular society,³ but on the concepts of system, function, structure, interdependence, and equilibrium. As stated by Flanigan and Fogelman, there are three basic ideas: the whole system as a unit of analysis; particular functions as requisite to system maintenance; and the functional interdependence of diverse structures within the whole system.⁴ This is the structural-functionalism of Parsons and Levy.

The system has been defined as, "a set of parts or subsystems which interact in such a way that the components tend to change so slowly that they can be treated temporarily as constant".⁵ These components are the structures, and their "interactions and transactions in relation with each other, . . . if [they] turn out to be conducive to maintaining or reproducing the system . . . are called functions".⁶ Thus functions become "operational conditions that must be satisfied if the system is to continue to exist".⁷ It is important in this definition that functions, whether they be of

Parsons, Mitchell, or Almond characterize the political system; they do not characterize particular structures within the political system.⁸

Function becomes a crucial concept when it is considered precisely how this term is viewed by various theorists. Flanigan and Fogelman have divided functionalists into three groups based on their treatment of functions.⁹ There are the eclectic functionalists, who have only a casual interest in the function served by a structure, group or individual; the empirical functionalists such as R. K. Merton who show "little concern with functional requisites at the level of the system as a whole",¹⁰ and who are interested in what is labelled 'middle-range theory' formulation; and the third group of structural-functionalists. These analysts of the third group have postulated several famous sets of functional requisites including Parson's: pattern maintenance, goal attainment, adaptation, and integration;¹¹ and Mitchell's authoritative specification of system goals, authoritative mobilization of resources to implement goals, the integration of the system, and the allocation of costs and values.¹²

Almond has gone farther and has restated the scheme with a whole set of political and governmental functions.¹³ It is Flanigan and Fogelman's contention, however, that Almond shows little interest in reciprocal relationships and requisite analysis.¹⁴ He does not justify his selection of functions in terms of the requirements of the social system

for existence.¹⁵

Built into the structural-functional model are a number of specific concepts which require clarification. These include system, role, structure, and capabilities. It is normally accepted that there are two societal-wide systems: the social system, which is the "system of interdependent roles and social structures of the society",¹⁶ and a cultural system which is conceived as the pattern of inter-related beliefs and values of that society. This definition of the social system, however, as pointed out by Almond and Powell, raises the question of boundaries, especially when one divides the interaction process into phases of inputs, conversion, and outputs. The inputs and outputs, which involve the political system with other systems, are transactions between the system and its environment, whereas the conversion processes are internal to the political system.¹⁷ Therefore, in order to draw a boundary between a political system and its intra-societal environment it becomes necessary to employ the concept of 'roles' or 'modes of behavior'.¹⁸ Functionalism, then, becomes concerned with analysing modes of behavior and not with the individual, and the social system can be seen to be made up, for the purposes of conceptualization, not of individuals, but of roles.¹⁹

The concept of role has been developed to deal with the fact that "a given individual or behaving subsystem can be part of several systems at the same time, equilibrating at

least partially with all of them".²⁰ However, the concept has been criticized on the ground that roles are not autonomous sectors of behavior which lend themselves to conceptualization or theorizing on a very general level,²¹ and that roles may not only be subservient to personality but their study may, in some cases, actually overshadow the personal element.

The concept of structure has its greatest power when simply defined. Holt has defined it rather more tightly than most as "a pattern of inter-related roles", and a corporate structure is a "structure that can be defined in terms of its membership and which has central decision-making apparatus that enables it to act purposively as a collective".²² The logical outgrowth of functional ubiquity is the concept of structural alternatives. This phenomenon has led to a certain amount of optimism regarding its possible explanatory and predictive possibilities. However, this is only likely if such things as social roles, institutional patterns, and social processes, et cetera,²³ are kept off the roster as being structural alternatives. For this purpose it is handy to make it a condition that "social structures alone satisfy functions, and hence, only social structures are substitutes for social structures."²⁴

The idea of capability was no doubt introduced as a measure of comparative success. It also has the merit of bringing dynamism to that to which it is applied. Both

Parsons and Deutsch have come to discuss structural-functionalism in terms of capabilities; "the study of the subsystem polity is the study of the capacity of the society to attain its system goals".²⁵ This may also theoretically be narrowed to permit micro-studies of the "varying capabilities of the structures in the system to perform different functions with available resources".²⁶ The term capability itself implies conflict and competition and as such has been built into the model by Parsons and Mitchell as a characteristic of the system.²⁷ Parsons has stipulated that all systems turn out to devote part of their resources to one or more of the activities listed in his four functional requisites. In this way systems become classifiable and analysable in terms of these four characteristics.²⁸ Hence, if one were to use the Parsonian model, an analysis of capabilities would have to operate on two levels: pattern maintenance, goal attainment, and adaptation on one level, and integration on the other. Such a model is much better suited to the more advanced and differentiated societies than it is to African states. For the sake of developing nations sufficient functional requisites would more likely include: adequate formulation of collective goals, adaptation to severe system stress and conditions set by the non-human environment, appropriate response to demands for structural, organizational, and procedural differentiation, and some effort at institutionalization and national, territorial,

and value integration through stepped-up political socialization programs.

Criticisms of the model are legion and are more or less valid, depending on the nature and subject of its application. Basic criticisms include the extent of its organicism and the way it may be slanted to fit the definition of 'political' used by any particular theorist. The approach also implies a higher degree of interaction than is necessarily the case. And, structural-functional theorists have made little progress towards producing a model which is empirically operationalizable. On a more subtle level, however, there are two criticisms of a more serious nature. The first concerns requisite functions which may be defined entirely as the analyst wishes as also may be the level at which the system is being 'adequately maintained'.²⁹ The other has to do with the nature of function as opposed to dysfunction. It has been argued that dysfunction is an unnecessary appendage as equilibrium is the end result of a balancing of counter-forces.³⁰ However, a realistic version of the model demands some sophisticated refinements to be organized within this earlier and more rigid framework.

Serious criticisms have been made of the particular orientation of various theorists. Foremost among these is Almond whose greatest fault appears to have been myopia. Blondel has criticized Almond for having taken little consideration of norms in the development of political institutions.³¹ This is highly relevant with regard to totalitarian

states, and the omission is the cause of his conceptual scheme's being weak and unsuitable for the study of totalitarian regimes. Almond makes the assumption that behavioral patterns are directly reflected through structural arrangements. In this way structures become indicators of behavior. This assumption makes it impossible to consider the extent to which structures are related to norms and to study validly structural differentiation³² in which the same structures can be used to achieve different types of norms. Only where norms are natural norms may it be assumed that structures constitute "solidified patterns of behavior".³³ Even considering the origin of the structure it is necessary to remember that norms tend to develop alongside even deliberately imposed structures. Therefore it is necessary to be aware of the extent to which the role of the structure is "ambiguous", i.e. either performing a solidification or is instrumental in deliberate penetration.³⁴

Further limitations of Almond's model are found in the assumption that all systems fulfill completely all six functions, and also the nature of the concept of capability. This is a general term instead of a measure of a specific, e.g. the efficiency of the performance of a particular function comparative relatively with other systems and also with other points in time.³⁵ Therefore, Almond's model is probabilistic only in regard to the "relationship between each function and all the structures which help to perform that

function".³⁶

Unfortunately, even considering the hopefulness of probabilistic trends there is the further complication of functional equivalents. "The assumption of functional indispensability for a given item is highly questionable on empirical grounds for, in all concrete types of application there do seem to be alternatives."³⁷ The idea of functional equivalents has been assumed by writers such as Parsons and Merton for certain cultural items and reference to these has usually been in terms of functional alternatives, functional equivalents, or functional substitutes.³⁸ Insofar as functional equivalents are a part of the political phenomenon it becomes possible to predict through the use of functional analysis only to the extent that it "enables us to explain the occurrence of a particular one of the items by which a given functional requirement can be met."³⁹

Further, all functional analysis must have a working knowledge of the diverse aspects of culture. As expressed by Jones, "culture is manifested in all political behavior, but it is not the behavior itself, nor is it the observable result of such behavior. Political culture is a set of more-or-less common orientations toward political activity."⁴⁰

Apter also has given credit to the significance of culture:

The importance of their [Almond and Verba] book for me, lies in its advance from typologies based purely on matters of structural differentiation to a typology based on forms of cognition and meaning that exist in a particular culture. This leads them to an analysis of

"fit" or congruence between the ideals and values of the community and the forms by which it is organized.⁴¹

He further states that this congruence emerges most clearly in roles which are institutionalized forms of behavior defined by function. It is at this point that both the structural and behavioral approaches are needed. The structural deals with the organization of roles and their functional relationships. The behavioral deals with the ideas of right embodied in the roles and the consequences of those ideas in the formation of personalities. The behavioral deals with which choices are made by individuals or groups and why; the structural approach delineates what choices are available.⁴²

Despite the clarity and simplicity that can be built into the basic model for the purposes of conceptualization there are several very salient points of which account must be taken when the model is applied to the empirical. It is unfortunate, but it has been repeatedly found that the two are a very poor fit. Hazards involved include discrepancies between constitutional arrangements and the situation of group arrangements, misjudging the importance of the roles of formal governmental institutions such as legislatures and courts as opposed to informal groups, and specific to the developing nations, the low degree of institutionalization of governmental structures and the corresponding effect on the acts and policies of government officials. In nations in which there is a vacuum of political legitimacy norms or

political culture, the concept of system itself must be applied with extreme care. Equilibrium, one of the mainstays of the model, cannot be accepted as an assumption. Where a tendency toward equilibrium does not seem to be the case a large part of the time, then the question arises as to whether the state is indeed a system or is in a state of formation or disintegration. Blondel has astutely pointed out: "Political instability is an ambiguous concept which may refer to the stability of regimes or to the stability of governments; the distinction between these two components is not always as simple to draw as might be imagined."⁴³ Resolution of the distinction between these components would throw much light on the matter of system versus territorial entity.

Apter is prominent in demanding a systematic approach to developing politics. Foremost among his reasons is the fact that economic and technological change are among the most desired goals of political leaders in contemporary new nations. As a result, the relationship of political development to economic development is extremely relevant. Most governments today are desperately interested in which political forms are best suited to economic growth.⁴⁴ Apter focuses attention on the political strategies used to induce technological change and economic development. It is his contention that any inquiry which focuses attention on government and economics must not fail to take account of the "system" needs of government.⁴⁵ He feels that the behavioral approach and

the ad hoc approach of W. W. Rostow regarding the problem of development are merely probabilistic, whereas there is also a need for systemic theory.⁴⁶ Out of this conviction he has developed a three-fold typology of developmental types which are defined "in order to examine, dynamically, the relation of government to society". "The critical question centres around the capacity of each type to absorb change and generate further innovation".⁴⁷ The emphasis on the system needs of government stems from their indispensability to further existence, capability, and dynamism. "Economic development is a problem both of governments and members of society. To deal with these units in interaction, with respect to technological change and economic development, we want a theory which indicates the properties of the system that form the basis of the relationship between the two units".⁴⁸ For Apter, the three-fold classification is one way of introducing organization.

On a lower level of theory development, although one which is fundamental to the empirical development of any form of classification, there is the need, as expressed by Hempel:

to pursue the investigation of specific functional relationships to the point where they can be expressed in terms of reasonably precise and objectively testable hypotheses. . . . To what extent these objectives can be reached cannot be decided in a priori fashion by logical analysis or philosophical reflection; the answer has to be found by intensive and rigorous scientific research.⁴⁹

While structural-functionalists have tried to work

dynamism, social change, and competition into the systems model through the use of functional requisites, other literature has been written with an end to synthesizing the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic and functionalism in order to build specific types of change, stagnation, and paradox and their accompanying social conditions into the model. This effort must be saluted as it permits an examination of the social system both from the standpoints of the interdependence and independence of its parts and allows a consideration of dysfunction directly as the subject of specific relationships involving dynamic change, stagnation, and conflict.

The very basis of the social system, unlike its organic and biological counterpart is the individual or individual role which, whether it be the 'rational' man of the economist or the interacting role-playing social man of the sociologist calls for a concept of the system which makes definite provision for competition or conflict: that is, dysfunction. This provision, when built into the model, opens up doors for meaningful analysis.

Van den Berghe postulates three basic sources of change: adjustment of the system to exogenous change, growth through structural and functional differentiation, and innovations and inventions by members or groups within society.⁵⁰ There are two tenets of the functionalist model which he is forced to take to task. The first of these is consensus and,

while the value system is "the deepest and most important source of integration" and the "stablest element of socio-cultural systems"⁵¹ and most societies do indeed show a tendency toward stability, equilibrium, and consensus, they simultaneously generate within themselves the opposites of these.⁵² Further, consensus may be apparently on the wane in many well-integrated societies or may, if in too strong a dose, as with charismatic or revivalistic movements, precipitate disintegration.⁵³ Therefore, consensus can not be made a requisite of the social system as is held by Parsons. There are alternative bases of integration, for example economic interdependence or political coercion.

The concept of equilibrium or integration within the environment is similarly "logically gratuitous". The dynamic equilibrium model has a minimization of change built into it. Although adjustive change of the social system to exogenous or endogenous change in one of its parts is a condition to the maintenance of equilibrium, conversely, increasing disequilibrium can result from stability and inertia in certain elements of society. Hence, equilibrium and stability cannot be equated as not all change is adjustive.⁵⁴

Functionalism, nevertheless, has proven a powerful instrument in dealing with two major types of change: growth in complexity through differentiation, and adjustment to extra-systemic change. There are certain phenomena the equilibrium model cannot incorporate: reaction to extra-

systemic change is not always adjustive; change may be revolutionary, that is, both sudden and radical; and the social structure itself generates change through internal conflicts and contradictions.⁵⁵ In order to make provision then, van den Berghe stipulates two alternative sequences to change: gradual adjustment to external changes, and resistance to exogenous change or a failure to adapt leading to a final revolutionary showdown. The latter is "fundamentally a process whereby accumulated imbalances between major elements of society are eliminated and a new state of relative integration achieved".⁵⁶

When van den Berghe introduces the Marxist dialectic it is only the barest skeleton which is found useful. The concepts of the dialectic as the only source of change, and of the dialectic's necessary polarization of conflicts into pairs of opposites are rejected. Change is conceived as ubiquitous.⁵⁷ This dialectical import then permits a fourth type of change: "change, if of intra-systemic or endogenous origin often arises from contradictions and conflict between two or more opposing factors". These can be values, ideologies, roles, institutions, or groups.⁵⁸

It is van den Berghe's contention that these two theories of society have a potential for such fusion in several general meeting points. Both are holistic; both may be criticized for viewing society as being more holistic than it is. "Different elements of society can simply co-exist

without being significantly complementary, interdependent, or in opposition to each other".⁵⁹ The second major overlap concerns conflict and consensus. While each theory draws upon one, both of these factors can be found to have the opposite effect. Thirdly, both outlooks share a notion of evolutionary social change. Finally, both theories are fundamentally based on the equilibrium model;⁶⁰ one considers it the state of the normal and the other, the abnormal.

It is the crucial concept of equilibrium which, paradoxically, allows functionalism in a final analysis to account for lack of adaptation to external change. It was not possible for the dialectic to do this as it presupposed a closed system.

As a final point, functionalism must abandon the concept of the minimization of change.⁶¹ It is also necessary to reject any predisposition to consider either change or stability as either axiomatic or problematic. Indeed the capacity for change can be considered no less than the dynamism of the parts, and the basis of the social system, if not for endemic change, shows a high capacity for change.

CHAPTER TWO

BY WAY OF DEFINITION

There are a number of crucial concepts in the study of political instability which require the most careful definition. Even before independence African leaders displayed an acute interest in finding institutional structures most relevant for the integration, modernization, and political development of their states. In their search, the traditional focus on the family and nuclear groups was transformed into a newer focus on government. The problem then, as stated by Apter, is to define the field of behavior in such a way as to allow maximum consideration of the social variables while at the same time not producing a conception of politics as merely a determination of those variables.¹

In this connection, the input-output model is doubly deficient: it over-emphasizes the formal elements of the input-output process, and it tends to treat the governmental system as a dependent variable.² The Parsonian model is similarly culpable in the latter sense.

There are four basic concepts which are paramount in the study of the African continent: integration, political instability, modernization, and political development. The first two will be defined in this chapter, and the latter two

in the next. All of them, however, derive their relevance to the African scene from their focus on the direction and nature of change. It is this constant state of flux in the newest of states which makes an emphasis on constitutional arrangements or the separation of powers doubly anachronistic.

There are several minor concepts which need prior definition, however. The first of these is the concept of regime. Jones has specified that it be composed of the set of values, the formal and informal rules of the political arena, and a hierarchy of authoritative or institutional roles.³ This, then, must be contrasted with the concept of government, which refers only to those individuals who comprise the authorities and certain specific policy orientations. In this context it is possible to argue that French governments are extremely tenuous while the French regime or political ethos is relatively stable. African states, for the most part, do not possess strength of regime. In that there is little uniform national culture transcending their ethnic and linguistic differences or, as some would say, a minimal level of consensus, it is questionable if these states can really be called nations.⁴ As S. Decalo has so aptly stated, "It can be taken as axiomatic that most African states are afflicted with the whole range of systemic problems".⁵ Further, while it is possible to refer to the existence of states it is not possible to infer complete territorial control over all areas of some countries.⁶


Two further and related concepts are those of legitimacy and institutionalization. Generally speaking, legitimacy is related primarily to the concept of diffuse support. When this support exists it is possible to neglect the immediate satisfaction of demands for lengthy periods. However, a high level of diffuse support is not essential to the political system.⁷ Mechanisms which may be used to reduce the effects of cleavage include: direct action on the social structure (such as the reduction of class or racial barriers), the building of specific support for the regime through outputs (want satisfaction), and the building of diffuse support for the regime against times of stress, usually accomplished over a considerable period of time.⁸ It has been held by Morrison and Stevenson that the greater the legitimacy of the established political system then the less is the likelihood of political instability. In fact, this relationship is almost definitional.⁹ As Lipset has defined it, "Legitimacy is the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society".¹⁰

It is necessary to view the concepts of institutions and institutionalization together, according to Huntington. An appropriate definition accordingly becomes, "a stable, valued, recurring pattern of behavior".¹¹ It has been asserted that the level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,

autonomy (integrity), and coherence of its organizations and procedures. This four-fold taxonomy builds in more than the concepts of "stable" and "valued" imply and has since been abandoned by Huntington. However, any system which is to enjoy continuing legitimacy must also possess organizations and procedures with a requisite measure of each of the four attributes. For the purposes of this paper though, institutionalization will be used to describe organizations, structures, and procedures, whereas legitimacy will be used as a more general attribute of political systems, regimes, or governments (see Figure #3).

The twin concepts of power and force also require clarification. If we consider these two items in the light of two famous excerpts describing the essence of the political system: "legitimate force", and the "authoritative allocation of values", the two initial terms can be seen to be each side of the same coin. At its basest level, "the authoritative allocation of values" is the product of reliance on power while "legitimate force" is needed for the maintenance of order and for times of crisis. Talcott Parsons has stipulated that power is normally based on the overall social structure rather than on the monopoly of force which modern governments achieve.¹² In the instance of an inflationary spiral of demands on the system to fulfill its obligations then the response may be two-fold: an increasingly stringent scale of priorities may be set up; and there may be the im-

Figure # 3: Graphical Representation of the Sources of Authority



position of increasingly severe negative sanctions for non-compliance with collective decisions. In this way a process of power deflation occurs and force comes to take a prominent role. When this shift to force occurs it also brings about a shift in the importance of those structures which control a monopoly on force. Thus, in African states, political parties and civilian administrations have undergone a power deflation while the value of the military and of the police has vastly increased.¹³

Because of the nature of power and force, an excessive reliance on force does not improve but aggravates legitimacy crises. Zolberg has stated that in order for African states to achieve a shift back from force to power and authority, it must be accepted at the cultural level of a belief that conflict is a potentially manageable aspect of society, one of the prerequisites for a minimal level of consensus.¹⁴ (See Figure #3.)

A pair of terms easily confused are those of conflict and violence. Conflict is endemic to human society and often, though not necessarily, results in violence.¹⁵ Morrison and Stevenson have defined conflict as "a condition in which participants in a social relationship hold incompatible or mutually exclusive values". Political violence is defined as "behavior characterized by the physical injury or subjection of persons or property with intent to bring about an alteration in the structure of the political system".¹⁶

Political systems, then, are unstable when "conflict in a society can no longer be regulated and the existing authority relationships break down".¹⁷ It is Zolberg's unhappy prediction that while a focus on political instability in African states is not suggestive of a complete lack of institutionalization, until "such processes reach a particular level, force and violence are likely to remain salient features of political action".¹⁸

To define integration is easy; in all other regards it is stubbornly enigmatic. Myron Weiner has referred to integration as "that which holds a society and a political system together", and has identified several sub-types: national integration, territorial integration, elite-mass integration, value integration, and integrative behavior.¹⁹ Integration can be tied in with political development in that political development must be concerned with expanding functions of the political system, a new level of integration commensurate with the level of functional expansion or growth, and the capacity of the political system to cope with these new problems of integration.²⁰ A basic level of value integration, then, implies the existence of acceptable procedures for the resolution of conflict, and a legitimate authority structure at any given level of political development or modernization. The integration of masses and elites occurs not when differences between the two regarding goals disappear "but when a pattern of authority and consent is

established".²¹ If it is accepted that integration may be achieved through the judicious application of social control, the communication process (or political socialization) and a non-violent coercive process,²² then it is quite consistent to believe that both totalitarian and democratic regimes are capable of establishing elite-mass integration.²³

Morrison and Stevenson have identified four dimensions of national integration. Horizontal integration concerns the degree to which members of a social system who hold similar roles in the stratification system have facilities for communications and transactions. Vertical integration, often called the elite-mass gap, is a function of the degree to which the core values of the elite population are inculcated in the minds of the mass public on the periphery of the central decision-making institutions. For African states perhaps the best operationalization of elite-mass integration includes measurement of ethnic representation in the elite or the capacity for upward mobilization for ethnic groups.²⁴


Value integration concerns the degree of value congruence in a society and refers both to the extent of common values relating to the definition of the political community and its membership, and the structure of authority and the legitimation of the exercise of power.²⁵ "Centralization" is concerned with the extent to which individuals are subject to centralized institutions possessing both the capacity and legitimacy to enforce compliance with decisions. This

centralization may be measured either as the extent of the development of the centralized political institutions or as the degree of coercive potential available to those same institutions.²⁶

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Zolberg in several works has outlined the general systemic characteristics common to most African states. At this point merely a list of these must suffice. African states on the whole have extremely weak national centres, a periphery until very recently self-contained, and levels of social and economic development "approaching the lowest limits of international statistical distributions".²⁷ Although colonial administration applied a territorial mold within which social, economic, and cultural changes occurred, the rates of change varied greatly, and in the independence period most of the original sets of values, norms and structures still survived. Today then, African society contains both the new and the "residual" sets of norms and values. These two sets when superimposed produce what Zolberg calls a type of "unintegrated society" which may best be called "syncretic".²⁸ In these societies authoritative allocation of values by formal structures is only a portion of the total allocative activity (see Figure #4); the rest is allocated by traditional ethnic, or culturally-based means. This is equally the case where there are constitutional settlements in favour of the traditional, and also where traditional political structures have been abolished, as in Guinea or Mali.

Figure # 4: The Problem of Political Development:
 Graphical Representation of the Effects of Political Culture (specifically the minimal level of consensus) Political Development is defined as institutionalization, differentiation, and capacity.*



* Broken lines represent low levels of institutionalization of norms, structures, and governmental institutions (organizations). Overlap among structures represents the level of differentiation - the greater the overlap, then the greater the level of differentiation. Dotted lines represent weak popular support - groups, classes, ethnic and cultural units.

Further, this "syncretism" places strains on the institutionalization of African governmental structures and the credibility of the use of terms such as political parties, trade unions, and the military for phenomena which are peculiarly African. Therefore, as all African governments must work within this societal environment, there is a severe limit upon the range within which significant variations of regime can take place. The level of integration today, as it was at the time of independence, is very low in all four of Morrison and Stevenson's senses.

Two of the strongest demands on the new governments at the time of independence were the stresses of rapid but uneven modernization, and the need for self-institutionalization in office. Although these could theoretically be met by the satisfaction of demands through distribution, political socialization on the mass level, or the suppression of demands while at the same time punishing non-support (coercion and force) by far the commonest tendency was to rely on the latter. This preference arose as the result of two mutually complementary factors: the growing gap between the ideological aspirations and goals of the leaders and their capacity for implementation. This "socialistic" tendency of "mobilizing states" strongest in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali survived only until 1966. Until that time, however, African socialism had been considered a moving force.

Even had the initial political capital of legitimacy

accorded the new leaders been wisely spent, it is unlikely if it would have been sufficient to deal with problems arising out of the syncretic nature of the society, decolonization, and the character of the new institutions themselves.²⁹ These problems included the irregular politicization of traditional and ethnic groups accentuating ethnic cleavages as much as cross-cutting them, a low level of structural differentiation resulting in the politicization of almost all conflicts from all levels, inflation of demands from civil service employees, the army and police, and youth. The civil service employees, who constitute a disproportionate percentage of the labour force outside of agriculture and accordingly are in a position to create severe financial crises felt acute relative deprivation in the post-independence period. The police and army, over whom the government had little control over socialization rapidly became politicized, and the up-and-coming youth, as well educated as their superiors, were victims of a phenomenon labelled the intergenerational gap.³⁰

Realistically, the only two states on the threshold of societal development in the study area are the Ivory Coast and Ghana. Zolberg has called this "incipient modernity".³¹ It is not the result of a morbid outlook on political development that the fate of such states as the C.A.R. and Upper Volta appears extremely bleak. While on a global level the advanced industrial nations of the world are widening the gap with the have-nots both relatively and absolutely, on

a more specific plane, as remarked by Karl von Vorys, one of the more interesting results of economic development programs is an increased skewness of the income pattern.³²

CHAPTER THREE

A QUESTION OF UTILITY: MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The twin topics of modernization and political development must rank equally in the competition for fruitless returns. If a justification for the use of either one of these were to be arrived at, it would be for potential utility. As with structural-functionalism, deriving an appropriate definition is a matter of sifting through the multiplicity of the irrelevant.

About the only form of consensus that exists on the subject of modernization is that it is no panacea for those in government. Basically, modernization is not a process, it is a group of processes not even approaching parallelism. Klinghoffer is probably on the right track when he makes a determined effort to define it universally.¹ However, for the sake of operationability, something a little simpler is desirable. One of the more obvious truths about modernization and political development is that the one does not necessarily or even willingly accompany the other. Modernization concerns the individual, the group and the state and is a "process which implies an increasingly complex socio-economic and political environment and presents man with a great range of alternative choices of action".² Although

modernization is a general tendency it is not deterministic and the rates at which its different forms progress do not necessarily co-vary. Klinghoffer has identified several types. These include: psychological, which is associated with the growth of rationality; social, associated with increasing geographical and social mobility; economic, involving the move to a monetary economy and increasing wage-labour specialization, greater use of inanimate energy and greater investment capital; and political modernization, associated with increasing politicization of society, an increase in political communications, proliferation of interest groups and new associational organizations, and a greater demand for participation.³ The general trend is to secular and centralized governmental power (this is a growing phenomenon even in the Maghreb) and increased functional specialization and differentiation.

African modernization has assumed several peculiar forms. In Northern Nigeria centralized, codified and territorial law has been fused with local, customary, and ethnic tradition rather than supplanting it. Party formation and political participation in many states, rather than being the fulfillment of a demand are often a manifestation of manipulation by elites. While both of these cases represent only dubious examples of true "modernization" other modernizing processes, such as burgeoning urbanization come under little governmental constraint.

In order to define modernization in the most operationally useful form, Morrison and Stevenson, like most others, have defined modernization "as changes in the structure of nations that produce institutional arrangements like those found in advanced industrial societies".⁴ While this definition implies a degree of requisite political development, their specific concern is with the processes of social mobilization and economic development. As such it is a reasonable approximation of an otherwise difficult universal.

The concept of political development, and one which is abundantly used in African studies, is surrounded by a great deal of unnecessary confusion. Apparently this lack of clarity has sprung from a general tendency to attempt to include more under this umbrella concept than is conceptually feasible. As with modernization, political development as a theoretical concept has only limited time and place relevance. In this light then, political development in the African context of the near future must meet three pressing demands: institutionalization, differentiation, and capacity. While satisfaction of these three political systems needs might not be pertinent for the distant future, at the present time they are crucial.

Many distinguished writers have stipulated various combinations of political and social developmental forms as being "political development". Two of the most popular terms to be incorporated are equality and integration, and while

equality may be discounted for the time being in the African context as being of secondary importance, integration is a definite and primary need. In order to make the matter more difficult this same integration in all of its forms insists on being necessary for institutionalization, achieved through effective differentiation (resolution of conflict and adequate socialization) and simultaneously one of the building-blocks and one of the objects of the effective operation of capacity.

Huntington has made an umbrella concept of institutionalization and forced differentiation, capacity and integration under it.⁵ From Einstadt there is a call for capacity, particularly in the earliest stages of modernization or industrialization,⁶ and a recognition of forms of stagnation and breakdown precipitated by acute failures of co-ordination and control.⁷

Pennock, in a take-off from a quote by K. Deutsch, makes a bid for the degree of political development of a polity to be measured by the quality of the normative consequences flowing from selection among choices.⁸ Deutsch, though, for his part, asserted that political development should include a system's capacity "to absorb and utilize more information taken from its environment, to respond to this information, to change its environment more effectively to satisfy its needs, and to enhance the range and diversity of the goals that can be satisfied".⁹

Several visual models have been drawn up at one time

or another for use in defining political development and giving it empirical applicability. Riggs has balanced capacity against equality in one such configuration as being dependent on stages of differentiation. He contends that an increase in both capacity and equality together depends on an absolute rise in structural differentiation. This rise is itself only possible through the balancing of the two forces: a swing too far one way robs capacity, too far the other way detracts from legitimacy dangerously.¹⁰ (See Figure #5.)

Karl von Vorys has attempted a similar scheme and has stipulated that in order for a political system to be viable the rise in demands must not accelerate over and above the level of capacity over a generational period. Also, he feels that political development must include the concept of endogenous structural change.¹¹ (See Figure #6.)

While modernization processes occur relatively spontaneously, political development on the other hand concerns the "needs" of the political system to cope with the effects of modernization, or change generally, in such a way as to satisfy demands arising out of change, maintain capacity, and allow for further adaptation to take place. As the satisfaction of demands must be accomplished through structural and functional differentiation, this is one of the primary needs of most states undergoing either rapid modernization or radical change of other and related types. While a number of





Figure # 5: A Paradigm for Political Development
 taken from: Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Political Development", p. 341.

Figure # 6: A Graph for the measurement of the viability of political systems based on control, demand, and capacity.

Taken from: Karl von Vorys, "Use and Misuse of Development Theory", p. 356.



writers have demanded that "equality", "participation", and representation be included as a part of political development, they may be seen to be a better fit as part of the modernization process. Demands for participation, or equality, take care of themselves by their very nature. If certain political demands could not either be successfully met or resolved then both institutionalization and differentiation could be seen to suffer. In the final analysis even regime legitimacy would decrease.

Klinghoffer has introduced the concept of capacity as a measure of comparative success. Political development is quite logically thought of as having as its counterpart political reversion or political regression.¹² If political capacity is furthered more rapidly than modernization then there is political development. Political development, therefore, is based on the ability of the state to cope with increasing modernization. Conversely, where there is little modernization, there is also a low level of capacity and a state of political reversion exists.¹³

This conception of capacity is useful in that it permits an examination of political development and modernization in their dynamic aspects. Further, as stated by Klinghoffer, state identity, penetration and integration are significant factors in determining capacity. In African states problems arise regarding all three.¹⁴

The three-fold classification of differentiation, in-

stitutionalization, and capacity assume analytical utility when they are grouped in sets. Consider the following: institutionalization cannot exist under modernizing circumstances without a requisite measure of differentiation; differentiation can exist without capacity; and capacity while in a final analysis dependent on a sufficient base of each is a relative term and must be considered in conjunction with modernization. This makes possible a functional if somewhat simplistic taxonomy.

Low Rate of Modernization

- a) High Level of Instit.
High Level of Different.
Low Level of Capacity
(stable)
- b) Low Level of Instit.
Low Level of Different.
Low Level of Capacity
(Stagnant and potentially precarious)
- c) High Level of Instit.
Low Level of Different.
Low Level of Capacity
(Potentially unstable)

High Rate of Modernization

- d) High Level of Instit.
Low Level of Different.
Low Level of Capacity
(Egypt under Nasser)
(Potentially unstable)
- e) Low Level of Different.
Low Level of Instit.
Low Level of Capacity
(Precarious)
- f) High Level of Different.
Low Level of Instit.
High Level of Capacity
(If the circumstances in the political system are conducive)
- g) High Level of Instit.
High Level of Different.
High Level of Capacity
(Stable)

Most African states at the present time are at 'e' and wish to progress to 'f' and then to 'g'. Ghana and the Ivory Coast are possibly the only states presently at 'f'.

This form of capacity then is markedly different from

the concept of capability proposed by Almond. Klinghoffer's capacity, on the other hand, is relative both to the rate of modernization and to existing social conditions specific to the system. This could be highly useful in that it makes possible a consideration of the particular state of potential stability or instability present at any given time. By considering modernization and capacity together it is possible to measure the dynamism of the political system and of the specific government.

The addition of the two terms 'institutionalization' and 'differentiation' makes it further possible to compare nations and classify them according to their status by considering four items: the rate of modernization, problems arising with regard to legitimacy and/or the institutionalized base of the political system, problems due to deficiencies in the structural or organizational configuration of the political system, and the actual adaptive capability and regulative efficiency of the governmental system.

A breakdown of the differentiation criteria can be achieved through considering both arms of traditional "input" and "output" functions as governmental responsibilities as in fact they are in most African states. On the "input" side there is a necessity for "artificial" arms performing "political functions" such as political socialization, interest aggregation, and political communication. It is this necessity which has promoted the development of the "party state" and

has arisen out of a basic lack of institutionalization of governmental structures. On the "output" side there must be arms for the distribution of goods, coercion, and the binding of sanctions, etc. The two together, along with prevailing societal imbalances, have caused in many states a burgeoning and stagnating bureaucracy. Primary lines of emphasis regarding the direction and strength of action by governmental agencies are also easily demarcated according to whether the social group in question is more oriented to political socialization or favourable allocative activity (see Figure #7).




Figure # 7: Pinpointing Sources of Failure of the Governmental System Leading to Political Instability

CHAPTER FOUR

THE COLONIAL LEGACY

The patchwork heritage of the colonial era has received far less attention regarding its continuing effect on political integration than its import-merits. Most of what has been attempted is far from conclusive, indeed only preliminary. Although it is often expressed that the differences of administration found under French, British, or Belgian rule are over-emphasized and even distorted, comparative analysis is very complex.¹ Michael Crowder feels that appreciation of the very different approaches of assimilation, indirect rule, and paternalism as experienced by the colonies are the key to understanding the diverse courses their political development has taken.² However, it must be realized that there was considerable variation to be found even in the same colonial territory both in the precolonial social and political structures and in the colonial administration itself.³

Colonial administration as it affected post-independence integration and stability requires scrutiny in several of its aspects. Initially, imperialist tendencies were to bring the colonial territories onto the periphery of the world capitalist system. Generally, there were three broad patterns


of economic penetration.⁴ The earliest of these was often the trading company which established the first link with the metropolitan power and set up an initial dependence on the mother country for capital, technology, and management. Its requirements were met by imports and its exports were sold on the world markets.⁵ The second pattern was that through emigration from the metropolitan country to the colonies. This involved the appropriation of land and followed the establishment of colonial rule, most often borne and consummated in the spilling of indigenous blood. The greater inherent economic sophistication demanded the importing of large numbers of workers and traders from other parts of the colonial world whose roles lay in small-scale trading and unskilled plantation labour as an indispensable appendage of the modern capitalist sector. This extension of the colonialist era produced conflicts and tensions which were to erupt in the independence period.⁶ The third pattern was through the transformation of subsistence peasants into cash-crop farmers producing and selling on the world capitalist market. Ghai claims this was the forerunner of indigenous enterprises in construction, transportation, manufacturing, and services. However, it has been argued by Crowder that Africa contained the seeds of its own modernization in that the subsistence farmers in many areas took on the production of cash-cropping before the coming of the colonialist era to the region. In most African countries at the time of

independence the growth of indigenous modern capitalist enterprises (particularly in those which contained significant numbers of immigrant settlers) was in little more than an embryonic state.⁷ Regarding these three patterns of capitalist economic penetration it must be noted that the degree of penetration in most territories was in no way complete at the time of independence, and all of the new states were to share some varying degree of dependence on the metropolitan and advanced industrial nations.⁸ Coupled with the desire to banish the spectre of capitalism there was in the independence spirit a resultant conviction that in order to achieve economic growth a complete control of the economy was of primary importance.⁹

The period of colonial rule was for the most part exceedingly short, averaging less than seventy years for the countries in the study area. (See Figure #8 for independence dates.) Despite a tendency on the part of the citizenry of the imperial powers to consider colonial tutelage of unquestionable benefit to Africans in general, colonialism in essence was a period of foreign domination often bitterly opposed by the indigenous peoples, for example, by peoples of Dahomey, the Tokolor Empire, and the Ashanti.¹⁰

Despite the establishment of protectorates late in the nineteenth century there was a certain time lag before changes filtered down to the grass-roots. It was especially prominent in areas of West Africa, particularly Eastern

Figure # 8: Dates of Independence



Nigeria, Yorubaland, Senegal, and the Gambia, that the peasant took on the real revolution of the production of export cash-crops prior to colonial administration. The building of roads and highways and the introduction of taxes and health services came at a somewhat later date.¹¹ Crowder argues that the administrative system of government actually retarded rather than speeded up the integration of West Africa (and, by inference, the rest of Africa as well) into the modern world. It was only in the period following World War II that African agitation effected substantial efforts by the colonial powers directed at modernization.¹² Similarly, it was in this later period that education, health services and road and rail systems were expanded over and above that which was necessary for the colonial export trade. It was also in this period in which there were the first signs of the growth of industry: industry which in Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast has multiplied a hundred times since 1955.¹³ Indeed, much of the credit for educational services of any kind must go to missionary schools which were training new African elites before the coming of the colonial administration in the Gold Coast, Western Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. This elite was subsequently relieved of its administrative role in British Protectorate areas and subordinated. This was less true of French-speaking areas, but there also no early effort was made toward encouraging the development of an African elite which would be capable of indigenous

and autonomous integration within the modern world.¹⁴

Precisely how colonial policy affected "elite formation" and the vertical integration between elites and masses is very complicated. However, as put forward in Black Africa,¹⁵ it would appear as if the "more direct" forms of colonial administration widened the gap between the masses and the elites and hence that mass-elite tensions were more likely to be pronounced. However, the differences in colonial policy among imperial powers seems to be less important than the general similarity in colonial interference with the traditional patterns of elite recruitment.¹⁶ The colonial economy and the impact of western education together worked toward changing the position of traditional elites and setting up new ones.¹⁷

The impact of education was complicated by the tendency in French territories for there to be greater restriction to families of traditional elites than in English colonial territories. The changes in elite formation that resulted had a corresponding effect on post-independence centralization of authority as well as on mass-elite relationships. The French policy of training African politicians in legislative institutions both at home and abroad and recruiting them to centralized colonial hierarchies can be contrasted with the more recent legislative experiences of politicians under British tutelage and the over-all British pattern toward greater decentralization of administration.¹⁸

Fred R. von der Mehden lists three key changes which were brought about by the introduction of colonial administration. These included: the establishment and maintenance of order, the provision of at least a minimum of national unity through the maintenance of stable institutions, education, and communications, and the introduction of institutions and processes new to the area.¹⁹ The effect of these changes on post-independence political stability and integration has proven to be problematic, indeed a mixed bag. For other non-colonial states than Japan, the fruits of independence do not appear to manifest themselves in any material advantage, as may be seen to be true of Ethiopia and Liberia. Colonies and ex-colonies also fare "better demographically than otherwise independent states".²⁰

Regarding variations in educational achievements among imperial powers as experienced within the colonies, the literacy rates vary from the one to five per cent as found in French colonial areas, to the thirty-five to forty per cent claimed among Belgian colonies.²¹ There is no doubt that the accuracy of these figures is suspect. However, despite the inaccuracies, the total showing is extremely poor compared with other areas of the world, particularly Latin America which boasts a mean of over fifty per cent literacy.²² Post primary education varies between 0.08 per cent within Portuguese colonies and 0.24 per cent in British territories.²³

The short period of colonial administration would

have produced problems in training modern administrative personnel, creating national unity and a strong party system, and expanding communications in preparation for self-government adequately even if there had been the will. As it was, nativization received strong opposition from most colonialists. British nativization programs began late in Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda, and even later in Somalia, Lesotho, Tanzania, and Malawi.²⁴

Nativization at the lower levels was almost total in French Equatorial Africa by the mid-50's, but dropped to twenty-five to thirty-three per cent in the middle levels. The British and French alike entrusted top policy-making positions to only a select few, while the Belgians entrusted no policy decisions to Africans until almost immediately before independence.²⁵ The effect of this too-little too-late training was the occurrence of severe administrative problems and shortages on the eve of independence and the added complication of charges of collusion with the colonialists against those who were properly trained, particularly in French areas. Other problems arising at the time of independence included the precarious position of many of the states in the primary market economy, the disproportionate use of minority groups in governmental posts and the lack of a truly common language in areas which had been under indirect rule, and in areas which had experienced direct rule, the loss of support for bureaucrats who could no longer command tradi-

tional respect and authority.²⁶

Colonial policy could also be seen to foster obstacles to national unity in the area of boundary delimiting. In many areas there were indistinct or non-existent ethnic and geographic divisions upon which national boundaries were based. Good examples of such anomalies are the Gambia whose boundaries have no rationale other than convenience, and the division of the Somali peoples among Southern Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern Kenya producing severe sources of internal conflict as the result of irredentist claims²⁷ and potential international conflict such as now is the case between Ethiopia and Somalia. Belgian and Portuguese colonies particularly suffered from adverse colonial policy in the decision of the imperial powers not to encourage political parties, facilitate the educations of Africans in administration and state-craft, or encourage training of natives in the language either of the colonial power or any major indigenous tongue, thereby preventing political communication and the formation of political culture and myths.²⁸

E. W. Nafziger outrightly accuses the colonial legacy of interfering with the internal development of Nigeria, itself only an example of a broader phenomenon, and affecting the shape of the class structure and power relations in the independence era, eventually contributing to instability.²⁹ Much of the blame for the civil war and coup of the 1966 to 1970 period falls on the division of Nigeria into North and

South Protectorates which were kept separate even after their amalgamation in 1914. The South was ruled directly, whereas the North was under "indirect policy" and Emirship.³⁰ As a result of support by the British, the traditional ruling Northern aristocracy achieved a solid hegemony through the elimination of important sources of internal resistance.³¹ After 1948 in the South, however, there was the gradual replacement of British civil servants and British expatriots in government agencies by educated and aspiring Nigerians who enjoyed many of the privileges of class and status and interest protection of the British administrators they replaced. By granting regional self-government in 1954, six years before the coming of central government, the British government granted an unintentional acquiescence to the demands of nationalist leaders seeking a power base in each of the three regions, reducing the eventual strength of the centre.³² After 1951 then, elites consisted of the Hausa-Fulani ruling oligarchy in the North and high-ranking politicians and civil servants in the South, with each of the three major political parties achieving security and hegemony in one region only, enjoying a majority in one regional parliament and being supported by a regionally-based bank. Conflicts after 1957 arose both as the result of contradictory policies directed at enhancing the regional security of one group over another and as the result of attempted interference by one elite in the affairs of another (the first early example of the latter

being the opposition of the South to the maintenance of the Northern aristocracy extending from 1949 to 1953).³³

At the grass-roots level the colonial administration and the tribal authority as found in many British colonies tended to be mutually complementary. Both sets of rulers had a stake in preserving the status quo, which caused the traditional colonial systems to ossify African society at the Iron Age.³⁴ The colonial system though, was simultaneously the trigger mechanism involved in sending a mounting migration of Africans to towns. Resting comfortably on the institution of tribal rule there was an inability and unwillingness within the colonial administration either to make an effort to re-integrate the growing body of persons or to accede to a demand for participation. The type of rule imposed by the British has been likened by Feit to a non-integrative grid of colonial administration backed by a sufficient level of force or threat of force to keep it together. At the time of independence the upcoming politicians were unable to keep the grid from breaking down. This disintegration was accompanied by a corresponding loss of power, and in Ghana and Nigeria, the immobilization and loss of security experienced by members of the administration as the result of rapid changeover to a subordinate position under inexperienced politicians.³⁵ With the breakdown of the grid, the political machines were unable to replace British administration at the head of the administrative-traditional system even when

in combination with a tribal core, or to offer anything better.³⁶

The impact of colonial policy on pluralism in the colonies was as much a function of pre-colonial development as of differences in European patterns.³⁷ Where the territory was already heterogeneous the effect was to enhance that heterogeneity. This was in large part a function of the addition of the colonialist's language and religion to the linguistic and religious patterns of the area. Because of the separation between church and state in French territories the intrusion of religion was probably a little less.³⁸

Impact on colonial territories working in the direction of integration derives mainly from the more centralized character of French colonial administration. British indirect policy had the effect of reinforcing existing language patterns and ethnic groups whereas the French system of direct rule cut across traditional ethnic boundaries and reduced traditional rulers to French appointed functionaries. This policy had the effect of reducing ethnic pluralism in ex-French colonies and exacerbating it in those inherited from British rule.³⁹

Colonial policy as reflected in the development of communications is simultaneously of both a positive and a negative character. The exploitive nature of railroads out of hinterlands was such that most were built prior to the end of World War I. The road building that occurred post-1920

was normally as an extension of existing railroads and did not produce economically productive linkages for the indigenous population in the fashion of traditional central place theory. In this sense then, the integration of states that did occur was a function of the geographic dispersion of products exported to Europe. Concerning this practice most colonial powers varied very little.⁴⁰

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MILITARY

The issue of the military in politics is extremely complex, unsettled, and by no means exclusive to either developing states or African states. The focus of this chapter, however, must be specific, and as such deals with only two questions, those of the how and why of military intervention, and in particular, the phenomenon of the coup d'état.

Samuel Decalo has attacked studies of "military regimes" as lacking definition. Is there a justification for including the civil-military coalitions in Upper Volta, the civilianized Togolese regime, and the largely personalized cliques of Idi Amin in Uganda and Bokassa in the C.A.R., as inseparable parts of the same phenomenon? If so, then why has the growing influence of the military on the governments of Gabon and Guinea been largely ignored?¹ While all of these types of intervention are part of the larger phenomenon, it is the coup d'état which has stimulated the greatest interest and controversy and has brought into sharp relief two highly pertinent questions dealing with how direct military intervention in politics affects not only the stability of governments but also of regimes, and also why military inter-

vention occurs, both in its personal and societal elements.

Finer has outlined general systemic characteristics which appear to be prevalent in states where the military is able to take direct control of the reins of government,² or is able to achieve a form of displacement of one set of civilians in government for another. These may be organized to form the parameters within which levels of military intervention may occur. Countries in which either displacement or supplantment may occur lack appropriate strength in one or all of legitimacy of civil authorities, public recognition of who constitutes the authorities, and a high level of association¹ mobilization.³

The growth of the military in Africa as a major political force is only indirectly the changeling child of nineteenth century imperialism and twentieth century power struggles. During the world wars both France and Britain recruited African troops heavily, but the French more heavily. French African soldiers also fought in wars in Southeast Asia and Algeria. Apart from their more extensive service, armies in French territories had Africanized officers corps sooner than was the case in British colonies and territories. Morrison et al., maintain that this experience plus the relatively undramatic movement to independence in French colonial Africa as compared to the more violent transition in British territories might be construed as leading to greater army professionalism in former French-controlled areas.⁴ In all

areas, however, both the army and police were forced to make the difficult conversion at the time of independence from reactionary agents against nationalist forces to supporting bodies of governments drawn of those same forces. In this sense the French colonial experience may have been conducive to greater relative stability in that French African troops were not necessarily stationed at home, and French metropolitan troops and officers were stationed in Africa in quite large numbers after independence in order to bolster their "colleagues"⁵ in African armies of states which remained members of the French Community. After 1964 though, the numbers of French troops in Africa were drastically cut to 16,000 from their previous level of 35,000.

Within British African armies Africanization took place at a very slow rate due to a low level of secondary schooling and over-staffing by ex-World War II British officers. Admissions to Sandhurst did not take place to any extent until after 1960. As the result of this late transfer of responsibility of the armed forces and the slow pace of Africanization there was a predominant apathy and ignorance at the time of independence about the armed forces among the emerging African elites.⁶ There was continued inattention to the military prior to June 1965 when the first direct military intervention took place (aimed at the replacement of a civilian government) largely because of the minor role the military had played in nationalist movements and because the

attainment of self-government was, for the most part, through constitutional arrangements and negotiations almost entirely dissociated from the military.⁷

Viewed in retrospect, there can be discerned three stages of military intervention: relative passivity in the immediate post-independence period while still under substantial expatriate influence particularly within the French Community; mutiny as a reaction against European officers and African political leaders designed to force a policy change; and the coup d'état in which some arm or sector of the military wished to remove and replace the holders of government office.⁸

Slow Africanization occurred within the military simultaneously with rapid indigenization of civil and governmental bodies both as the result of a short supply of trained and qualified manpower and as a politically-expedient post-independence policy designed to ensure continuity and prevent disorientation and military breakdown. This was desirable even to Nkrumah of Ghana and Patrice Lumumba of Zaire.⁹ Along with this disproportion went a corresponding squeeze on the military budget which remained in effect until such time that the colonial power refused to intervene in the instance of an insurrection. In this sense, national armies were neither national or nationalistic but were remnants of the colonial administration. It was also not surprising that this first step of military involvement in politics was

in many cases over issues relating to promotion and pay scales.¹⁰

The issue concerning the reasons behind military take-overs is presently the centre of a raging controversy. However, finding some balance of factors sufficient to facilitate, prompt, and even trigger military intervention is simple when juxtaposed against the even thornier problem concerning the role of the military as a modernizing agent, a governmental body capable of fostering political development, or even as a relatively stable form of administrator.

Very briefly, variables generally attributed responsibility for bringing about military take-overs fall into three groups: genetic; social, political, and economic, or systemic or ecological of the type which are non-inhibitive; and trigger-action variables including personal and corporate interests, internal military crises, or conflicts arising out of military-governmental clashes. None of these is in itself conclusive or deterministic. However, the second type constitutes a set of necessary conditions both by force of empirical evidence and definition; and the first and last may always be found if one wishes to look hard enough at the interplay of circumstances and events.

Many arguments have been put forward pinpointing systemic variables as the culprit. However, examination of real cases has not provided a set of variables which may unequivocally be said to create good and sufficient circum-

stances under which a military take-over might take place. In this sense, Finer's a priori approach to setting up parameters still stands. While military intervention is basically a political phenomenon and hence associated with the political sphere, it is also inextricably tied to economic and social factors. African states without exception suffer from deficiencies in all three of Finer's general systemic characteristics and as such are prone to political breakdown and intervention. Stated otherwise, military intervention is one of the forms in which political institutional weakness and lack of capacity manifest themselves. Specific factors which may be labelled systemic variables include: declining prestige of the major political party, weakening of the nationalist movement, lessened likelihood of external intervention, contagion from other countries (that is, the inter-territorial demonstration effect), domestic social antagonisms, economic malaise leading to "austerity programs" affecting the articulate portions of the urban population, corruption and inefficiency among government officials,¹¹ the elite class character of the military,¹² a syndrome of developmental strains and stresses that provoke the military to seize power,¹³ institutional weakness,¹⁴ precipitous decline in popularity and effectiveness of government officials among politically relevant strata,¹⁵ a low degree of social cohesion, existence of fratricidal classes, social polarity and a non-consolidated middle class, low levels of recruitment and mobilization of


resources, political centre-periphery conflict,¹⁶ and uneven patterns of modernization.

Perhaps one of the most interesting of these is the inter-territorial demonstration effect which is traceable from state to state and coup to coup. Claude Welch feels that this type of contagion must be considered on two levels: the personal link among African officers as among Bokassa of the C.A.R., Soglo of Dahomey, Eyadema of Togo, and Lamizana of Upper Volta; and the increasing extent of inter-state ties and communication.¹⁷ Contacts have increased as the result of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) and subordinate unit conferences which has led to the "multiplication of reciprocal influences".¹⁸ Zolberg tends to view the continent as an interacting system with a process of positive feedback.¹⁹ There was a distinct wave of civilian and military coups in former French West Africa from late 1962 to January of 1964 in Mali, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Dahomey, Congo-Brazzaville, Niger, and Gabon.²⁰ A similar wave occurred in East Africa beginning in Zanzibar and progressing to Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya.²¹ For each of the commanding officers involved in military coups, others who had been successful constituted a form of reference group. And although there is no direct proof of the African domino theory, the ease with which a small group could topple a government became increasingly clear.²² (For a list of coups and country of origin, see Figure #9 . Morrison and Stevenson define coups a little

Figure # 9: African Political Instability: Coups and Attempted Coups

The Interterritorial Demonstration Effect, Independence to January, 1974.

Taken from: Morrison et al.,
Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook



differently than does Zolberg.) Zolberg has pointed out that the coup in Africa has become an institutionalized form of politics.²³ In recent years it has become the modal form of governmental and regime change. The coup d'état is the normal result of the culmination of a conflict between a government and its opposition where the force at the disposal of the government is extremely limited.²⁴ In this sense any body which may draw upon sufficient reserves of force may unseat the government. This is true of trade unions and other civilian elites as well as the armed forces or some branch thereof. While trade unions are often involved, the support of the army, or at least a good portion of it, is requisite. The size of the army also is of little relevance, as a very small body can stage a successful coup. The Togolese army of 250 men did so in 1963, as did the army of the C.A.R. in 1966 with about 600. The tendency of coups to engender other coups is of particular interest as even the existence of military government does not lessen this effect. The character of military organization and authority in many states is of such a nature that their control over subordinates and the society at large is little improvement over that of the governments which they replaced.²⁵

Variables which tend to act as trigger mechanisms are normally associated with the military itself. These may be of a variety of types but invariably are related to the nature of the military organization. Some of these include: the

awareness within the military of its own relative strength or monopoly on force, the desire to pursue personal ambitions,²⁶ the existence within the army of fratricidal tendencies born out of conflicting corporate interests,²⁷ competing civilian and military cliques, the internal state of the officers corps,²⁸ efforts on the part of civilian politicians to enhance military subordination (as in the Congolese mutiny), the refusal of Africanization and proportionate power,²⁹ interference with matters usually resolved by the army itself, commanding the army to take on militarily inconceivable acts, and the undercutting of professional autonomy by favoring or instituting countervailing institutions.³⁰

Zolberg, in his article "Military Intervention in the New States of Tropical Africa: Elements of Comparative Analysis,"³¹ explores an interesting line of thought connected with the progression in the forms of military interventions as a function of military awareness of its own indispensability.³² This awareness came, paradoxically, as the result of governmental dependence on the military for suppression of demonstrations and as a function of the tendency of governments to rely on force as a political instrument. Initially in the post-independence period, intervention took the form of strikes, demonstrations, and mutiny purely for the sake of military interests and policy changes. These then proceeded to referee actions against specific civilian regimes and

usually led to the establishment of a government of "national unity"³³ or a civilian government with military backing. In 1965, referee actions started to merge with direct take-overs with the immediate intention of establishing military rule. Until 1966, Ghana displayed the only example of such an intention.³⁴

All of these types of intervention are, if successful, injurious to political stability. If unsuccessful they may have a variety of effects: they may strengthen government institutions by increasing capacity as the result of the successful handling of crises; they may have a weakening effect on a government already besieged with problems; or may conceivably have no effect at all if the attempt were aborted through military weakness, division, or error.

However, it is necessary to consider the potential of a military junta once in power. Optimism regarding the stabilizing or integrative effects of military governments is presently at a very low ebb. Even more pessimistic is the outlook for strong military-led advances in political development.

Edward Feit has neatly isolated one of the reasons why military rule presents bleak and few possibilities. The organization of the colonial administration in Ghana and Nigeria was such that when the military came to power in each it was forced to take over the control of the administrative grid. Feit (writing in 1969) claims this to have been successful in Ghana, but a dismal failure in Nigeria. He explains that the

reason why similar structures keep emerging is the absence of change in the institutions that underlie the structures.³⁵ The arrangements made in the colonial era, were, it now seems, the most appropriate for Africa given its stage of development. It is Feit's prediction that it is most likely that African governments in the future will be an adaptation of the administrative-traditional rule with legislative and executive councils providing the forum for a largely empty political activity.³⁶ While the situation may not be so barren, it is unlikely that non-aggregative political machines based on force will be able to replace colonial government at the head of the existing institutional (tribal-based) structure.

Samuel Decalo has pointed out serious deficiencies in the organization and make-up of the military establishment itself. Most African armies are neither "complex structures", national, western, nor modern. In most cases the hierarchical structure only obscures ever-present lines of division based on age, class, education, rank, and ethnic origin.³⁷ The military is not often "the most efficient type of organization for combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control".³⁸ To the original cleavages has been added erosion of organizational unity both as the result of rapid Africanization before intervention and politicization of cleavages once in power. Where the military has maintained internal strength and unity it has usually been

due to basic ethnic cohesiveness, the resolution of competing ambitions as in Togo and Upper Volta, and purges as in Zaire and the C.A.R. The other extreme is the praetorian army as found in the Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Uganda.³⁹

Military regimes also are neither conducive to the development of political institutionalization or a stable political order. In this sense they are dysfunctional to political development. When civil-military channels of communication are opened it is more often an effort to strengthen military rule than to create significant institutions.⁴⁰ Decalo argues that meaningful systemic change has only occurred in Rwanda, Zanzibar, and possibly the Congo-Brazzaville subsequent to their revolutions.⁴¹ Ruth First, while cynical, has written that military intervention brings neither economic development nor social change, for the interests of the officers corps lie in preserving the already inflated standard of the African elite, retaining and increasing the army's share of the budget, and preventing and steadying systemic stresses.⁴² In support of this statement Zolberg denies that military elites innovate in either the structural or ideological sense.⁴³ Where there is a reasonable facsimile of integration it has been achieved through political fiat: through force of arms. Examples of this are the cutting of regional autonomy as in Nigeria and the Congo in order to enhance central control.⁴⁴ In many states economic bargaining has been

prohibited or discouraged (Dahomey, Upper Volta, the C.A.R.), as have political parties. Some changes in economic policy have been found in Ghana, and the greatest changes in constitutional arrangements have been made in Nigeria and the Congo. Despite this, however, he writes that "there is little or no innovation in the group as a whole".⁴⁵ Huntington, also, finds little progress among military governments in the field of institution-building. The approach of rational officers to societal problems often causes them to "modernize par excellence" (in the sense of land reform).⁴⁶ At the same time, though, individual civilian politicians are excluded from politics simultaneously with an unwillingness to set up alternative legitimizing institutions.⁴⁷

C. E. Welch takes a dim view of the capacity of military governments to achieve either legitimate organizational strength or sufficient resources to carry out the requisite tasks for political development.⁴⁸ He feels three possible courses include: gaining or creating social and political bases of support, avoiding excessive recourse to force, and building effectiveness over an extended period. However, given the present characteristics of most military establishments, none of these is likely to build legitimacy as there is uncertainty of economic development, a strong tendency to resort to force, and a general failure to cultivate support through coalition-building. While military

governments have the option of creating new political parties there are problems involved with widespread apathy and the huge necessary expenditure of effort without short-run impact.⁴⁹ Both Nasser and Ataturk failed in this connection.

Dismal as this picture may be, there is a definite integrative role for the military out of political office. Most African leaders have expressed the desire to employ their armies in the social and economic development of the country. This is highly foreign to troops trained under the British military ethic and even in the ideologically-committed Ghana armed forces have been used only sporadically for this purpose. In former French Africa, however, military tradition has provided for a primary role for the army in economic development.⁵⁰ This may also be attributed to the effect of Israeli military influence which has provided training aid. Soldiers in the French Community are dedicated to the defence of the economic independence of the state, which is achieved either through the use of professional skills in economic development (as through the use of army engineers), or through compulsory military service as a means of unifying the young.⁵¹ This has been called the "service civique" or "promotion sociale" and provides for technical and military training. The idea has spread to anglophone Africa and especially to Tanzania.⁵²

The Zanzibar-inspired revolution of 1964 was handled very effectively by the Kenya and Tanzania governments. The

Kenyan government purged the army officers responsible and set about to create a thoroughly professional army with a high degree of military esprit.⁵³ The Tanzanian government handled the situation differently by seeking to integrate the army with society and the governing party organization. The leaders were removed and then efforts were made to demilitarize the army as an adjunct to the Tanzania African National Union (T.A.N.U.). Political education was given a high priority as a means of officer and soldier socialization, and recruitment was channelled through the T.A.N.U. youth league.⁵⁴

CHAPTER SIX

THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

While there has been a great deal of theorizing and guesswork about the effects of various social, economic, and political factors on political instability, there has also been some very solid empirical research. In this chapter the search for Morrison et al., for "converging evidence" will be explored.

Morrison, Mitchell, Paden, and Stevenson have very methodically set out to isolate factors contributing to political instability, or truer to behavioral methodology, positively or negatively correlated with political instability. Out of their work has arisen a strong recommendation for well-directed theoretically-oriented behavioral research. Even given the rigor of the three studies examined here, though, it must be conceded that wise operationalization and interpretation greatly affect the validity and knowledge-enhancing qualities of any positive results. This is the basis of the need for "converging evidence".

Morrison and Stevenson, the co-authors of the three major articles under discussion have isolated factors which are of paramount importance when applied to constructive policy-making for African developing states. The three studies

deal with dimensions of conflict behavior within states, the empirical relationships between patterns of integration and stability, and the effects of cultural-pluralism and modernization on conflict dimensions.¹

The approach of the A.N.I.P. study group was to define political instability in terms of "violence between political actors in conflict over the values governing the distribution of rewards in a society".² This definition requires "an investigation of the authority relationships between specific actors in the political system" which may be broken down into a typology of the elite, communal and mass type as opposed to the less useful conceptualizations of dimensions of political instability as lying in the degree of organization of the participants³ or in the scale of violence involved.⁴

Perhaps the greatest single credit of the A.N.I.P. study is its strict definition and operationalization. Types of political conflict activity have been defined and broken into these three groups: elite instability is comprised of the coup d'état, attempted coups, and plots; communal instability takes the form of rebellions, civil wars, irredentism, and interethnic violence of other kinds; and mass violence falls into the revolt or revolutionary category. Other types of political instability include riots, strikes, demonstrations, assassinations, mutinies, and isolated terrorism, but given their distribution in quantitative studies are usually classed as turmoil.⁵ Also, they present difficulties for

classification as their relatively ephemeral character defines breakdown as to type of organization.

It is important to note that the nature of elite instability is characterized by a low intensity of violence, low degree of involvement, and relatively little change in the character of authority relationships; communal instability is marked by high intensity of violence aimed at radically restructuring the authority relationships between communal groups or with the national government; and mass instability involves associational commitment, radical change in the structure of the political system by breaking down the distinction between mass and elites, intensive violence, and may be reactionary or fascist in character.⁶

When submitted to factor analysis the A.N.I.P. data produced five factors with high eigenvalue loadings for four time periods: year of independence to 1969, 1960-1964, 1965-1969, and the first six years of independence. The computer program used was the MESA1 using a principal-component factor analysis with 1.00 as the communality estimates.

The factor analysis produced some rather interesting results. Elite instability, according to the readings, is hardly unidimensional. However, there is evidence that it is independent of other forms of political instability.⁷ Similarly, communal instability events are also not unidimensional. They are, however, relatively independent of factors loading high on turmoil and elite instability.

Mutiny events load high with levels of communal violence suggesting that "communal conflicts are perceptible at all levels of the social structure",⁸ or stated otherwise, that communal conflict is one of the principal components of army mutinies. The revolt variable is ubiquitous and as such does not reveal an independence of mass instability from communal violence. In fact, this is probably a true reflection of the case.

The study also was used for longitudinal runs in order to try to distinguish temporal relationships between types of political instability. The results indicate that: turmoil is a localized response to the failure to achieve significant redistribution of rewards in political systems which have undergone elite or communal instability; and communal instability in Africa is a response to elite instability which either fails to bring about a reapportionment of ethnic representation in government or does so too radically.⁹

The significant fact^{that} emerges with these results is the logical conclusion that elite instability tends to increase the likelihood of the occurrence of communal instability in subsequent time, and that both elite and communal instability have the general tendency to precede the outbreak of turmoil activities.¹⁰

The author of this present paper reran the data from the study as aggregated from the date of independence to

January 1973. The computer subprograms used were the SPSS type PA2 OBLIQUE, QUARTIMAX, AND VARIMAX options. As this type of subprogram was not tailored to the needs of the study specifically and as the aggregated data covered a longer period than in the original study, the computed loadings were slightly different. However, as can be seen in Figures 10 and 11, there is little significant change in factor composition. While these runs are neither proof of validity or of replicability they do have the effect of substantiating the continuing nature of the dimensionality of the three types.

Factor 1, as found in Figure 11, presents high loadings on six turmoil variables and a surprisingly high loading on coups. While this may appear a contradiction of the independence of the three types it is perhaps a strong indication that coups, or change in government, are often followed by a high incidence of turmoil events.

Factor 2 loads attempted coups and plots highly along with mutinies and revolts. It is not possible to account for the indecisive character of the loadings for the revolt variable. However, mutinies also loaded high with the elite variables in the 1965-1969 aggregation. For the most part 3 of the other 4 factors load highly only on communal instability variables.

In their article on integration and instability, Morrison and Stevenson wish to test the basic proposition that increasing integration decreases the likelihood of

Orthogonally Rotated Factor Matrices of Instability Measures
for 32 African Nations

Figure # 10: taken from Morrison and Stevenson, "Political Instability in Independent Black Africa", p. 362.

	Independence to 1969				
	Turmoil	Elite	Communal	Ethnic	Rebellion
<u>Turmoil:</u>					
Riots	.88 *	.24	.30	-.06	-.06
Demonstrations	.32	.25	.62 *	.30	.06
Strikes	.06	.55 *	.08	.00	-.01
Terrorism	-.21	.14	-.03	-.01	-.68 *
Declarations	.43	.44	.42	.45	-.08
Turmoil	.62 *	.47	.40	.11	-.24
<u>Elite Instability</u>					
Plots	-.09	.80 *	.15	.25	-.10
Attempts	-.15	.39	.69 *	-.28	.06
Coups d'etat	.23	.82 *	.16	.05	.12
Elite Instability	.09	.89 *	.34	.04	.06
<u>Communal Instability</u>					
Mutiny	-.01	.23	.46	.66 *	.29
Civil War	.28	.07	.92 *	-.00	.10
Rebellion	.31	.06	.11	.10	-.68 *
Irredentism	-.10	-.31	.41	.16	-.43 *
Ethnic Violence	.13	.05	.01	.80 *	.23
Communal Instability	.31	.01	.89 *	.14	-.21
Revolt	-.16	.08	.41	.53 *	.46
Number Killed	.97 *	-.01	.10	.00	.03
# Killed @ Million	.96 *	-.01	.14	.03	.05
# Killed @ M (log.)	.53 *	.05	.46	.33	-.21
Arrests	.96 *	.04	.16	.06	.01
Arrests @ Million	.70 *	.38	-.03	.34	.02
Arrests @ M (log.)	.29	.45	-.01	.41	-.13
Number of Events	.16	.28	.90 *	.22	-.06
Weighted Instability	.25	.46	.82 *	.15	-.08
Percent of Total Variance	22.6	15.7	21.6	9.3	6.8

Figure # 11: Computer Run of ANIP Study Data: Factor Analysis,
Type PA2, Orthogonal

	Independence to January, 1973:					
	Turmoil	Elite	Communal	Elite	Ethnic	Communal
Riots	.80 *	.45	.10	.08	.04	.05
Demonstrations	.77 *	.15	.10	.19	.06	.28
Strikes	.41 *	.03	.15	.30	.21	.10
Number of Killed	.69 *	.63	.17	.05	.10	.07
Number of Impris.	.77 *	.50	.15	.00	.07	.11
Terrorism	.19 *	.03	.13	.04	.05	.19 *
Emergencies	.88 *	.08	.17	.03	.18	.11
Civil War	.52 *	.00	.14	.49	.16	.18
Rebellion	.36	.12	.74 *	.13	.09	.50
Irredentism	.12	.01	.19	.46	.55 *	.32
Ethnic Violence	.38	.27	.06	.15	.67 *	.32
Revolts	.30	.55 *	.46	.31	.10	.33
Plots	.39	.46 *	.14	.27	.24	.00
Attempted Coups	.26	.43 *	.43	.09	.29	.28
Coups d'etat	.54	.27	.04	.61 *	.04	.12
Mutiny Events	.54	.56 *	.29	.20	.10	.16
Percent of Variance	42.1	18.3	11.3	11.0	9.4	7.9

instability.¹¹ Integration is the degree of cohesion that binds members of society together and is usually thought of in terms of values, institutions, and increased communications facilitating contact and co-operation.¹² Working on the vertical, horizontal, value, and centralization distinctions the authors derive "the components of a model of national integration and stability" as shown in Figure 12 and a path analysis diagram relating to integration and political stability as shown in Figure 13. Their conclusions are discouraging. The basic assumption of a strong negative relationship between national integration and political stability "needs considerable quantification" for black African nations.¹³ There is substantial support for the assumption that higher levels of ethnic pluralism, religious diversity, and linguistic heterogeneity, all indicators of a very low level of value congruence, are related to higher probabilities for both communal and elite instability events.¹⁴ While this is indicative it is not deterministic as it is not possible on the grounds of such evidence to say to what extent the processes of value integration tend to inhibit the incidence of political instability. Further, there are the unexplored intervening variables of forms of "political organizations, ideological mobilization, rates of change in education, and religious conversion" as they might affect the relationship between pluralism and instability.¹⁵

There is, however, partial support for the theoretical

assumption that increasing horizontal and vertical integration tend to decrease the likelihood of political instability. "Increased urbanization decreases the likelihood of both elite and communal instability" in African states.¹⁶ Also, increased access to secondary education and decreasing the ethnic imbalance of the ruling elite tend to decrease elite instability.¹⁷ On the other hand, increasing mass communications potential increases the probability of communal instability and higher levels of secondary school enrollment increase the likelihood of elite instability. These results suggest that:

Unless the process of integration is dynamically persistent higher levels of integration provide for greater communication between disparate social groups and increase the likelihood that their mutual conflicts, which have been inhibited by a past history of increasing contact and co-operation will increase in intensity.¹⁸

The results of their study on cultural pluralism and modernization are very similar.¹⁹ There is converging evidence for the following statements: cultural pluralism increases the likelihood of conflict between members of communal groups and increases the probability of both communal and elite instability; greater degrees of variation in the ethnic backgrounds of elites further increase the likelihood of elite instability; modernization decreases the likelihood of political instability in these nations, but there is no evidence to indicate that the destabilizing influence of cultural pluralism is aggravated by modernization.²⁰ However, modernization can be seen to inhibit political instability

"only if it is a consistent feature of national development over time".²¹ While these conclusions may seem innocuous enough, statistical analysis is particularly difficult when it is applied to questions dealing with integration or modernization. As explained by Morrison and Stevenson, and also by van den Berghe, the process of integration, especially in its earlier stages, while it may work toward stability also is self-generative of opposing forces.²² Further, integration must also be viewed in the light of a consequence of, or rather an unattainable goal prior to, the resolution of a lengthy process of political development involving the challenge of modernity, leadership consolidation, and economic and social transformation.²³ Before this integration becomes a driving force then, the different processes of integration may have important and ambiguous effects on the stability of African states.²⁴

CHAPTER SEVEN

THREE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD CHANGE

The purpose of this last investigatory chapter is to examine three approaches to the study of African political instability. All three are very different. A. R. Luckham studies the problem of political instability from a specific variable-relationship standpoint. Apter considers political forms as they relate to the modernization process, and Huntington sets out a "componential" approach to political change. Simultaneously, however, all three approach the question of instability from an analytical and taxonomical viewpoint. Apter is specifically interested in plotting those forms of governmental structures most appropriate to different levels of modernization, while Huntington and Luckham express more interest in potentially unstable situations. What is significant, however, is how all three diverse approaches can be mutually complementary and reinforcing. Although this is not a surprising phenomenon, it is still encouraging in the light of the fact that political insight is still one of the greatest factors involved in meaningful "middle-range" theory development.

Luckham approaches the problem of military interventions with a review of the rationalizations behind specific

cases and rejects them all. In a more logical fashion he sets up a typology based on the intrinsic characteristics of civilian institutions, the military establishment, and the nature of the boundary between the latter and the socio-political environment.¹ Although this typology is based on ideal types mixed with the empirical it has the advantage of drawing attention to all the possible combinations.²

While Luckham has criticized Finer on the lack of operationability of his parameters, he himself commits much the same fault in drawing up his summary variables. In his analysis of civilian institutions he stresses two key elements. The first is the aggregative nature of public support accruing to political institutions, which depends on the amount and scope of the allocative activity that they control, and the degree of political mobilization, the extent of political communications, and the general awareness of government and the political issues surrounding it.³ Often mobilization occurs well outside the scope of the means of controlling it. The second important referent for the strength of political institutions is their internal coherence or structural effectiveness without which centralized institutions would have little power in relation to the periphery of a nation.⁴ These two criteria may then be labelled as legitimacy and structural strength for the institutionalization of that legitimacy, maintaining channels of political

participation, satisfying demands, and applying effective and limited coercion where needed. It is axiomatic that legitimacy derives its durability from a solid, centralized, institutional base.⁵

Luckham argues that there is no reason to believe that mobilization at the periphery and institutionalization of central institutions ought necessarily to be contradictory, as is held by Huntington and Shils. While this is the case in contemporary Africa the relationship between the two may be positive as it is in the U.A.R., Tunisia, Tanzania, Cuba, or China.⁶

Naturally, deficiencies in either legitimacy or structural strength and cohesion may provide opportunity for military intervention in politics.

Military establishments are examined in the same way. Luckham has broken down military power into three types: coercive and strategic, organizational, and political. The military's political resources are crucial and include: coercive and organizational power, the extent to which this can be converted into a political resource, the degree of integration of the military with civilian power structures, and the amount of diffuse political support it can generate, or its social legitimacy.⁷ Based on this distinction, Luckham has derived three different kinds of boundaries. (See Figure #14.) Most developing states fall into the third group because they must keep their organizational format,

Civil Power	Military Power	Boundaries		
		Integral	Fragmented	Permeated
High	High	1) Objective Control	3) Apparat Control	5) Subjective Control
	Medium	2) Constabulary Control	4)a Nation-in-Arms	
	Low		4)b Revolutionary Nation-in-arms	
Not High	High	6) Garrison State	8) Praetorian State	
	Medium	7)a Guardian State		
	Low	7)b Post-Colonial Guardian State		
	Low	9) Political Vacuum		

Figure # 14: Comparative Military Roles in Politics
 taken from: A.R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of
 Civil Military Relations", p. 22.

while being caught up by political and social forces beyond their control. The second permits a fusion with other social groups regarding both goals and organization.

Luckham's typology based on the three original summary variables may be used to set out different sets of parameters within which the military's role may be defined. While it bears some resemblance to Finer's approach, it is more complex and definitive.

Apter, in his quest for the most appropriate type of political system for states undergoing modernization immediately deals with the question of "democracy". He contends that while highly industrialized societies by virtue of a need for multiple information sources have a "systemic tendency" toward democracy, the modernizing process creates such problems of co-ordination and control that a high control system is necessary.⁸ Apter also discovers a problem: Is there an inverse relationship between coercion and information?

Apter wishes to use structural models for an analysis of differentiation and complexity due to modernization.⁹ He holds that during the modernization process a government's ability to effect development itself generally reaches an effective ceiling very rapidly. At the time when this point is reached then the system of government as opposed to the individual occupants of office requires a change. This need is stimulated by the management problems of modernization.¹⁰

Apter has stipulated that both modernization and in-

dustrialization proceed at the expense of traditionalism. This slightly peculiar outlook gains logic when it is explained that modernization represents the spreading of roles originating in societies with an industrial infrastructure serving definite functional purposes in the industrial process to systems lacking industrial infrastructures. This leads to a double problem: a lack of "fit" and a political management problem to accommodate the change.¹¹

Therefore, the closer a political system comes to the stage of industrialization, then the greater is the need for control. After the achievement of that phase, there is a changeover to an emphasis on generation, dissemination, and application of new knowledge, expressed as a need for greater decentralization of high control systems. The infrastructure carries with it certain organizing properties which reduce the need for direct governmental control. In this way the government can assume a mediating and co-ordinating role.

The significance of modernization is its capacity to widen human choice presenting the theorist with three problems: a normative one regarding how choice may be best widened; a structural one regarding ways in which the system of roles can be held together under various conditions of choice; and a "behavioral" one dealing with that which constitutes the permissible levels of action as seen from the viewpoint of the interacting individual.¹²

According to this scheme, a solution, and the only one in a modernizing situation, is a high degree of political expertise under conditions of low legitimacy and a low ceiling on political options. In this sense, development and choice are the parameters within which a political system must operate.¹³ The political response to an increasing proliferation of contradictory norms arising as the result of the modernization process is an effort to control the normative and structural aspects of choice in the hope that these in turn will act as a control on behavior.

Apter, using value types and authority types as defining variables has set up a typology of political system types which he feels are a reflection of the empirical. Types of values include: consummatory or ideological; and instrumental, or empirical. Similarly, hierarchical command systems are checked by very little accountability to the public, whereas the pyramidal structure demands high accountability, and semi-autonomous decision-making powers, such as those of the several states of a federal system.

As modernization proceeds there is the need for stronger and stronger hierarchical authority structures. One characteristic response to this need is the hierarchical government with consummatory values reinforced by instrumental acts. Such systems are useful in the transition from high rates of modernization into the industrial stage as in the U.S.S.R. of 1917. However, Apter states that they are of limited value in the

transformation from traditionalism to early stage modernization, as in Guinea, Ghana, or Mali.¹⁴

Another alternative is the reconciliation system which is common during periods of rapid modernization. There are several inherent problems, however, which must be recognized. The allocation of rewards goes to the biggest interest groups in the social structure and there is very little actual commitment to the system as such. This system type can work only if it has developed out of "A" or if there is a very high rate of growth and "payoff". Therefore this type is most useful for periods of thriving industrialization.¹⁵

There are two other possible movements which might occur during the modernization process: from A to B to C; and from B to D. The first two shifts occurred in Ghana and Nigeria prior to 1968 and the second was being attempted in Chile at about the same time.

Apter predicts that the long-term probability in systems undergoing modernization is a bureaucratic-reconciliation type recurrent swing in which there is the stalemate of oligarchical systems to military leaders, and then back again. The mobilizing and reconciliation systems, though, share a "process which is the key to their functioning", that is, driving organization and system direction and the mediation of interests. In that they may be seen to interlock, they share a "political coherence".¹⁶

Apter believes that there may be optimum types for each stage of political development. Mobilization systems are optimal for late stage modernizing societies in the transition to industrialization, whereas bureaucratic systems are optimal for mid-point or intermediate stages of modernization. Both mobilization and reconciliation systems are useful for primary stages of modernization in that they create a framework for society. However, the transition from traditionalism to early stage modernization produces extreme difficulties for both. Theocratic systems are not useful for any of the modernizing stages but they have historical significance.¹⁷

Apter also, in the same work, expresses a paradigm for political analysis. (See Figure #15.) He feels that there have traditionally been two emphases on government: that of authority (a normative question) which may be tackled either from the angle of morality or as the best power balance to be achieved; and political order (a structural focus) dealing with accountability or how power is derived.¹⁸ Of course, the third element in the paradigm is that of behavior. While the consideration of authority falls within all of the normative, structural, and behavioral foci, it is the matter of choice which determines the dimensions of the paradigm. (See Figure #16.) The analysis of choice has three necessary dimensions: the normative (or that which is ethical), the structural (that which is possible), and the behavioral (that

		Authority Types	
		Hierarchical	Pyramidal
Value Type	Consummatory	A Mobilization Types	D Theocratic Types
	Instrumental	C Bureaucratic Types	B Reconciliation Types

Figure # 15: Political Systems Types
 taken from D.E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, p. 338

		Degree of Generalization		
		Method of Observation	Method of Generalization	Theory
Level of Analysis	Normative	A1) Participant Observation	A2) Dialectical Generalizations	A3) Values Embodied in Belief Systems
	Structural	B1) External Observation	B2) Functional Generalizations	B3) Role Sets in Systems
	Behavioral	C1) Experimental Observation	C2) Replicating and Testing	C3) Learning, Adaptation, and Motivation

Figure # 16: Dimensions of Choice: taken from D.E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, p. 367.

which is actually selected).¹⁹ In the study of the developing states it is the structural and behavioral dimensions which do not "fit". It is also between these dimensions that Apter feels the greatest utility of focus will fall in the future.

S. P. Huntington, in his article, "The Change to Change" attacks the problem of modernization from a classificatory standpoint.²⁰ While it was Almond and Powell who first dealt with political development as it related to the modernization process their approach was more suited for comparative, that is, spacial, studies than for temporal analysis.²¹ Further, until quite recently, the argument dealing with political development either considered it as a teleological entity whereby it was given a flavor slightly undesirable for analytical purposes, or defined it in such a way as to rob it of the utility of either an umbrella or a distinguishing concept.

However, different approaches to the study of political development have emerged, each with a significant contribution to make to the study as a whole.

The first of these approaches is labelled "System-Function", and is primarily a conceptual framework. It lends itself neither to middle-level generalizations, specific functional relationships, or empirical data research. In itself, it does not deal with the problem of change. In the functionalist tradition Apter was probably the most successful in this regard in his consideration of the rate, sources,

and forms of change.²²

The "Social" Process approach emphasizes the processes of modernization, and encourages empirical data collection. Process correlation may proceed to causation studies employing causal or path analysis. Forerunners in this area were Lerner and Deutsch. This is also the approach used by Morrison and Stevenson in their article on integration and instability. The social process analyst has the advantage of being able to focus on relationships between variables, and particularly on changes between one set of variables and changes in others. In this way it is possible to focus directly on change. The more common outlook, though, is oriented toward levels of change rather than rates of change.²³ However, this outlook has trouble dealing with national macro-level studies and in relating social and political variables in causal analysis as the result of the mediation of macro-changes by micro-changes in attitudes, values, and behavior by individuals. Further, one of the great problems associated with the approach is to assign independent roles to cultural, institutional, and leadership factors.²⁴

The "Comparative History" approach is more diverse and eclectic. It compares and categorizes political development either according to general stages or phases through which societies must pass. This type of analysis may include both vertical and horizontal types. Examples of these include Rustow's requirements to political modernization:

authority, identity, and modernity. Differences among societies arise from their treatment of these as either sequential or simultaneous.²⁵ This approach deals with the "historically discrete" phenomenon of modernization, but is weak in theory.

New theories of political change, the product of the 1960's, could be used for the study of societies at any level of development, were indirectly related to the processes of modernization, focused essentially on variables of a political nature, and were both flexible and complex.

Huntington himself has introduced an approach which connects elements of the social and political structure to the problem of instability. The fundamental source of the growth of political participation may be found in those socio-economic processes identified with modernization. If these participatory tendencies exceed the level of institutionalization then a situation of potential instability results.

$$\frac{\text{Political participation}}{\text{Political Institutionalization}} = \text{Political Instability}$$

While much of the work dealing with political development has been concerned with the directions of change, Huntington advocates an approach dealing with the change to be found among the components of a political system, or "componential change."²⁶ Such a focus would include delineating the major components of the social system, determining the

rate, scope, and direction of change in these components, and analysing the relationships between changes among components. Huntington defines the political system as being composed of the following components: culture, structure, groups, leadership, and policies or patterns of governmental activities.²⁷ Types of changes relevant to the study of political change would include those affecting power. Also, intercomponential change and comparison could be used to study patterns of stability and instability. Likewise, intra-componential change might be related to the change or absence of change in other components.²⁸

CHAPTER EIGHT

A THEORETICAL ORIENTATION TOWARD PROBLEM SOLUTION

While the entire orientation of this paper has been exploratory rather than of a synthetical nature, it has also followed three main directives: to examine the complementarity of enlightened functionalism, social process, and behavioral studies; to trace the themes of modernization and political development as theoretical underpinnings of the study of political instability; and to expose empirical "problems" to be incorporated into the framework dealing with African political instability. Of these three, it is the latter which is currently of great import regarding both meaningful theory development and policy decisions.

From the perspective of theory development, discovering purely theoretical problems is no problem at all. On an empirical level, however, the old adage reminding us that recognition of a problem is ninety per cent of the solution has ironic value. Most potentially critical grass-roots level problems do not lend themselves to a priori theorizing, and as such may best be explored in their fullest measure through empirical application.

While the problem orientation from the viewpoint of the theorist is understandably incomplete, true problems

affecting policy formulation, such as the enigmatic and apparently capricious integration process, present more than sufficient challenge to the middle-range theorist and the analytical empiricist alike. Further, resolution of specific problems involving relationships among processes and variables, rates, directions, and amplitude of change--the substance of middle-range theory development--is crucial to the development of political theory proper of a quality deserving its subject matter.

It is the connection with governance, however, which endows problem solution with its highest utility. This orientation assumes a double-edged character, benefitting both theory development and government, when it is realized that most African states, particularly regarding international economic standing, do not possess either the time nor the legitimacy capital to learn by trial and error. Important as the integration process, and the effects of modernization, cultural or ethnic pluralism, or the nature of the "syncretic" society might be in determining government and regime stability, the issue does not end there. Notwithstanding the immediate interest to be found in particular stances assumed by African political leaders regarding these elements (for example, encouraging certain tribal tendencies toward communalism in the pursuit of African "socialism")¹ the efficient allocation of resources in the entire governmental sphere is dependent upon a working knowledge of the probable repercus-

sions of policy decisions. One of the major objectives of developing countries is felt to be economic independence,² and whether economic dependence is held to be found in foreign aid and private capital flows, the high share of wages and the Gross Domestic Product earned by foreigners, or those structural characteristics of trade and production³ considered anathema by political leaders, measures to alleviate these concentrations can be effective only insofar as demands and imperatives arising out of the societal milieu are satisfactorily resolved.

These same societal characteristics of African states preventing formalized institutionalization of collective goal formulation which prompted Riggs to declare a greater affinity of comparative politics in the region with international relations than with the traditional input-output model,⁴ have also presented a multitude of problems to the African politician interested in economic growth. While African socialism has not been a highly successful ideological movement on the continent, it was evolved to tackle three basic themes of the post-independence era: "the problem of continental identity, the crisis of economic development, and dilemmas of control and class formation".⁵ The Pan-African doctrine emerged among nationalist leaders as a replacement for the unifying force of anti-colonialism.⁶ Exigencies of economic development, however, have gone far toward demonstrating its economic impracticality. Techniques for gaining

a level of relative economic independence concentrate mainly in two areas: substitution of national for foreign personnel and enterprises, and the socialization of foreign enterprises often accompanied by the localization of capitalism.⁷ Accordingly, economic development strategies, especially in socialist states, concentrate largely in the public sector,⁸ and emphasize the role of the government in this development and in the accumulation of capital. It is the heavy dependence of the developing states on the export of primary products which spearheads a dilemma. Even though industrialization and reduction of dependency on advanced states is a definite commitment, the continuing dependence on earnings from primary products accompanies a vested interest in increasing these exports.⁹ In addition, there is competition for inter-territorial markets for the manufactured goods produced within developing states. A fear of growing dependence of the least developed of these on the strongest exists even in established common markets such as the East African Common Services Organization (E.A.C.S.O.).¹⁰ These two mutually reinforcing factors have the tendency to encourage independent strategies for growth.

Problems of control and class formation have centred on the necessity of creating support and mass co-operation for policies designed to aid the accumulation of capital without creating new disparities in the distribution of national income.¹¹ Elements antagonistic to these policies include new

interest groups, the beginnings of social classes, and inter-group competition and conflict.¹² While African society, as stated by Zolberg, has no centre and as such defies inversion¹³--thereby displaying a relative immunity to true revolutionary overtures--increasing divisive tendencies place great pressures on African political leaders to maintain either an effective ideology or high levels of coercive power. Groups possessing the potential for revolutionary action, according to Franz Fanon, include the youthful sub-proletariat, the alienated intellectuals, and the unmobilized and neglected rural masses.¹⁴ The only real examples of what African revolutions might involve are found in the aftermath of the Congo-Brazzaville coup of 1963 and the Zairese rebellion that began in 1964; both involved widespread mobilization and massive force.¹⁵

Policy formulation designed to encourage economic development and pacify divisive elements found in the economic and social sectors must also provide for sufficient, though not exorbitant, levels of military strength. Louis Terrell, in a study of per capita defence budget and manpower allocations, in highly unstable states discovered a strong correlation with low manpower recruitment. This has been assumed to represent an inability to extract human resources or a hesitancy to do so.¹⁶ Political instability in particularly weak states involves potential loss of control to almost any powerful social group or combination of groups unwilling to support governmen-

tal policy.

The issue of problem resolution as applied to policy formulation is particularly vital in those areas of greatest governmental activity, potential societal stresses and conflicts arising out of the modernization processes, and the interaction between the two. Consequently it may be concluded that Huntington's approach to componential change is a necessary first step in the search for truly functional theory.

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Appendix: Reference Data: Thirty-Seven African Nations

Name	Area	Population (U.N. est. '72)	Colonial Power Independence Date	Number of Years un- der Colon- ial Power	Date became Protectorate/ or incorporation into Fr. W. Africa	Colonial Status	System Type
Ethiopia	457,000	26,000,000	-	-	-	-	Constitutional- Parliamentary Emperor
Liberia	43,000	1,650,000	U.S. sponsored 1822, 1847 (rep.)	-	-	-	Constitutional Presidential
Sudan	967,500	16,490,000	Anglo-Egyptian 1956	57	1899--joint sovereignty	-	Civilian Military
Ghana	91,843	9,090,000	English 1957	83	Northern Terri- tories delimited/ in 1897 /ies delimit- ed in 1901	1847-	Military
Guinea	94,925	4,110,000	French 1958	67	1891	-	Constitutional Presidential
Cameroon	183,581	6,000,000	French and British originally German 1960	76	-	1884-Ger. Fr. mandate 1919 (4/5) Brit. (1/5)	Assembly
Togo	21,850	2,090,000	French, originally German, 1960	76	German pro- tectorate 1884	Fr. mandate 1922	Taken 1914 Military

Zaire	905,328	22,860,000	Belgium 1960	52	Belgium 1885 / Belgium 1908 / Military- mainly exploitative	1908 / Military- Presidential
Somalia	246,201	2,940,000	Eng. and It. 1960	55	British 1887 / Br. Italy 1905 1936	Military- Civilian
Dahomey	43,483	2,830,000	French 1960	69	1889 1891	- Military- Presidential
Nigeria	356,669	58,020,000	British 1960	60	Brit. 1900	1914 Military- Presidential
Upper Volta	105,869	5,610,000	1960 France	64	France 1919 France 1896	Fr. 1904 Constitutional Prime Minister
Ivory Coast	127,520	4,530,000	1960 France	67	1904	1893 Constitutional Member of W. Af. Ec. Commun- ity with Dahomey, Mali, Mau- ritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta.
Chad	495,753	3,790,000	France 1960	50	1910	1910 Elected President and National Assembl.
C.A.R.	236,293	3,000,000	France 1960	50	1910	1910 Military President
Congo (Brazzaville)	132,046	980,000	France 1960	50	1910	1910 Military President
Gabon	102,089	500,000	France 1960	50	1910	1910 Elected President and National Assembl.
Senegal	75,750	4,120,000	France 1960	40	about 1900	1920 Elected President and National Assembl.
Mali	464,000	5,260,000	France 1960	56	1920	1904 Military President

Niger	489,189	4,210,000	France 1960	60	Territory in 1900	-	Presidential Assembly
Mauritania	419,231	1,230,000	1960 France	57	1903	1920	Civilian President
Sierra Leone	27,699	2,630,000	1961 British	65	Hinterland 1896	1787	Civilian Pres. Military-Backed
Tanzania	363,708	14,000,000	Germany 1885-/ 1918, Brit. 1918-/ 1961, 1961	61	Germany about/ 1900, British mandate 1920	-	Civilian President
Burundi	10,747	3,400,000	Germany 1880's- 1918, Belg. 1918-/ 1962, 1962/	-	Germany 1880's/ Mandate to Belg. post-WWI	-	Military President
Rwanda	10,166	3,900,000	Germany 1880's- 1918, Belg. 1918-/ 1962, 1962	77	Germany 1880's/ Mandate to Belg. post WWI	-	President and National Assembly
Uganda	91,134	10,460,000	Brittan 1962	69	1893	-	Military President
Kenya	224,960	12,070,000	Brittain 1963	68	1895	1920	Civilian President
Malawi	45,747	4,670,000	Brittain 1964	73	1891	-	Republic
Zambia	290,586	4,420,000	Brittain 1964	40	1924	-	Civilian President National Assembly
Gambia	4,005	380,000	Brittain 1965	77	-	1888	President and Elected legislature
Botswana	219,815	690,000	Brittain 1966	81	1885	-	President and National Assembly

123	Lesotho	11,716	1,200,000	Britain 1966	98	1868	-	King, Assembly, Senate, Prime Minister Cabinet
	Swaziland	6,704	430,000	Britain 1968	74	1894	put under administration of the Union of South Africa	King, Assembly, Senate, Prime Minister
	Equatorial Guinea	10,852	300,000	Britain 1827-1844, Spain 1968. 1968	141	1844	Spanish West African Territory in 1904, British administration from 1827, Spanish province from 1844.	As of 1972, president for life with complete power
	Morocco	172,834	15,830,000	Fr. and Spain 1956	45	1911	French	Autocratic monarchy, Chamber of Deputies, elected.
	Tunisia	63,378	5,380,000	France 1955-56	75	1881	-	Constitution, P.M., President, National Assembly
	Algeria	919,591	15,270,000	France 1962	115	1830	serious uprisings to 1847	Military President

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AFTERWORD

The eight chapters of this paper were designed to illuminate eight specific areas of study regarding the question of political instability as found in contemporary African states. Although these sections do not cover the entire area of current attention to the topic, they do reflect one line of development each built along the same common denominator, and are mutually complementary, indeed essential.

Basically, the general purpose of the entire work is exploratory, rather than aimed at specific or unconditional explanation. As a result, it was possible to exercise a fair amount of discretion in the selection of reference work and subject material. The end result is an apparent structural looseness which requires an explicit effort toward demonstrating sectional indispensability.

My main over-all concern when researching this paper was in either discovering or developing a conceptual approach or outlook which was sufficiently flexible to simultaneously incorporate, organize, and supply explanatory and comprehensive directives for any and all "national" political instability phenomena as manifested in independent African states. It is hoped that the paper provides a structural framework for such an approach. Its justification, while the only one possible, is not easy.

As pointed out in the first sections of the paper, African states on the whole are not systems; often they are not states; occasionally, they even lack governments in the 'control' sense of the word. Nevertheless, because of the legal and effective organization of the African continent, it is necessary to think of African states as operational units. Thanks to this conveniently misleading delimiter, the national or unit boundary, it becomes necessary to consider political instability as a national phenomenon, not so much because of its genetics (or even generics) as because of the fact that

the theatre in which political instability phenomena are acted out is the state, or in some instances, some micro-unit found within the state. Further, in order for the term political instability to retain any sense value or meaning, it is necessary to view political instability acts against the background of the political arena, again, the state or regional government.

Juxtaposed against this de facto, semantic, and even conceptual necessity is the comprehension of African states, political instability acts, governments, and societies as they actually exist in context. A full appreciation of the discrepancy between the usual theoretical import of the terminology and the actual existent circumstances exposes the need for a conceptual framework so flexible as to be able to incorporate the divergent and highly complex phenomena of the African continent, while at the same time providing a springboard, so to speak, for meaningful and productive lines of research and cognition.

The complexity, and, in fact, often extreme polarity of African political "systemic" characteristics demands some type of structural organization along which thought and research may be directed. It was in acquiescence to this demand that the paper was sectioned into eight, admittedly arbitrary, chapters. Apart from their conceptual convenience, the subject matters of the sections were found to be easiest to research in their present forms, particularly as my one driving aim was to keep the sections sufficiently separate to allow for the maximum inter-play of variables, ideas, or typologies to be considered and discussed, thereby hopefully reflecting a true picture of the state of this particular corner of the discipline, and at the same time attempting to avoid rigidity of conceptualization and possible exclusion of that which it was not possible to fully consider.

The first chapter of the paper, that concerning theoretical approaches most commonly applied to African states, was designed more as a guideline to that which is inapplicable for reasons of distortion or insufficient relevance than as an effort toward setting up an approach specifically for the purpose of African states. Despite the apparent arrogance of the effort, the results and consequent realization were very humble; I cannot imagine, far less construct a handy all-round meaningful approach for the use of African nations.

The second chapter, dealing with definitions, is the first step in an effort to find relevant and explanatory concepts. The most commonly used in contemporary literature are the four dealt with here: integration, political instability, modernization, and political development. Of these, only political instability is concrete in the sense that it is susceptible to empirical research in a direct fashion. The other terms, like those of regime and institutionalization refer to theoretical, social, psychological, or political variables and processes most difficult to test empirically and which form the conceptual superstructure of the study of political systems. While these terms and concepts are often problematic, they are essential to any basic organization of data into an understandable form possessing qualities of explanation, much less of prediction.

Chapter three deals with modernization and political development specifically as conceptual tools with an end to organizing divergent types of systems into some form of classificatory system. While the effort is purely token, it represents a necessary first step in coming to a recognition of those characteristics of African states most likely to demonstrate political instability and in trying to account for them in an orderly fashion.

Chapters four and five deal specifically with the colonial heritage and the military as two of several possible foci

including ethnic groups, urbanization, or perhaps economic factors representing important, even crucial variables which need consideration in any study of the forms which African political systems may take. Colonial heritage may be termed a genetic factor, and the military a societal component--nevertheless, their study contributes to a realistic understanding of at least two important and determining factors.

Chapter six, entitled "The Behavioral Approach", outlines one highly empirical method of tackling the problem of instability. All of the data employed in the four basic studies are, of course, national; the definitions are arbitrary, and often do not correspond in all points to the desirable by way of theory formulation. However, the results of the studies must be saluted as they represent real progress along the road to setting up specific variable relationships as they are reflected in the real world. Chapters one and six, placed side by side could be considered as opposite poles of an axis, theory on one side and fact on the other, neither perfect and both striving toward some point in the middle most capable of incorporating building-concepts as in chapters two and three, and systemic variables as in chapters four and five.

Chapters seven and eight represent a desire to examine useful and explanatory typologies on one hand, and place the study of political instability into its real-life context on the other. While chapter seven ought logically to follow chapter three, I considered it more useful that it follow the discussion of situational variables in order that typology-formation might be juxtaposed profitably against those things of which, in order for it to be meaningful, it must take as full account as possible.

Chapter eight, quite simply, merely speaks for the necessity for the understanding and explanation of political instability in African states as an aid in policy formation. It is designed

only to put the need for meaningful and valid studies into perspective.

Therefore, in summation, the eight sections of the paper deal with theory, concepts, typologies, genetics, and components, if not all the necessary elements of an exploratory study, then most of them. Further, while it is not possible to outline a specific "approach" dealing with measures of political instability, then perhaps at the least there has been developed an outlook, a structural framework, one sufficiently broadminded not to be drawn into dogmatism, and simultaneously helping to restore a little order to that to which order must be imputed for the sake of conceptual clarity.
