

2015

"And All Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final Battles in the North, 1814 (Book Review)" by Donald Graves

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Recommended Citation

Rich Roy "And All Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final Battles in the North, 1814 (Book Review)" by Donald Graves." Canadian Military History 24, 2 (2015)

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is the report of forensic psychologist expert Michael Welner. The Welner report showed that Khadr was mature beyond his years and responsible for his actions. Ultimately, Omar was considered a valuable prisoner because of his intellect and the fact that he had been “too close” to Bin Laden on a personal basis. Nevertheless, the real embarrassment was Canada’s slow response to his incarceration, unlike Australia and Great Britain, where the arrest of its citizens involved with Al-Qaeda were quickly dealt with. What is required of CSIS, according to the authors, is reform in watchdog organizations and greater public accountability in the interest of human rights (p. 519).

In spite of its problems of exclusion in the research into more recent history, *Secret Service* provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of Canada’s capabilities and objectives in political policing. The information is presented in a refreshingly jargon-free manner, in contrast to a number of works which discuss the overall idea that the state assumed that white middle class values were under siege in the twentieth century. Readers vaguely familiar with the course of Canadian history in this period will find the book easy to follow, since it is presented chronologically rather than thematically and, for the most part, sticks to a rigid formula of history of events: including the Fenian raids, the Winnipeg General Strike, The October Crisis, the ongoing War on Terror.

CURTIS B. ROBINSON, *INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER*

And All Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final Battles in the North, 1814. Donald Graves. Montreal: Robin Brass Studios, 2013. Pp. 400.

Donald Graves has again contributed to the historiography of the War of 1812 with *And All Their Glory Past: Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final Battles in the North, 1814*. Part of a trilogy that includes *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 1814* (1997), and *Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm* (1999), the author’s purpose in *And All Their Glory Past* is to describe the concluding campaigns of the war –those on the Niagara peninsula, the Plattsburg campaign, the British amphibious operations on the American seaboard, and McArthur’s Raid in what was then western Canada. Graves covers both land and naval aspects of the campaign

and demonstrates, in the carefully organized five parts of this book, a superlative narrative style and an ability to correct long-standing myths.

In the first two parts of the book, Graves provides a detailed and well-balanced account of the lead up to and then the night assault on Fort Erie. The American troops had the better of this encounter with the British being plagued by difficulties. The British commander, Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond, did not assault the works when he first closed up to them and when they were most vulnerable. Subsequent bad fortune included Lieutenant-Colonel John Tucker's failure at Conjocto Creek on the 2 August, the nine days lost in the preparation of the position of No. 1 artillery battery, and its poor placement—it was too far from the fort walls to effectively create a breach. The explosion of a small magazine in the American position late on the 14 August, after barely twenty-two hours of bombardment, led Drummond to order the assault for that night. The timing seems to confirm Graves' opinion of the British army's lack of siege warfare expertise, as the fort's walls had not been breached nor the bombardment long enough to wear down the American defenders significantly. Drummond directed a major portion of his forces against the left side of the American lines, which had been unmolested by shelling. It failed disastrously, as Drummond had ordered the assaulting De Watteville Regiment to remove their flints from their rifles to preserve secrecy in their approach march. In their subsequent confused milling before the walls of the fort, they were easily shot down by the alert and waiting Americans. The attack on the right side of the fort nearly succeeded, but when an unexpected explosion in the captured demi-bastion caused massive British casualties the assault was spent. That evening cost Drummond 905 officers and men, the second highest loss the British army experienced in a single engagement in the war.

After this failed assault, there was a vigorous application of the spade on both sides of the front. The Americans further reinforced Fort Erie while Drummond extended his siege lines by adding outposts and two additional batteries, No. 2 and No. 3. The opponents skirmished continually, trading gun and shell fire on a daily basis. Due to the limited amount of artillery ammunition available, the weight of the daily British bombardment was weak but sufficiently galling to provoke the Americans in late August to plan a sally in order to capture the British guns. When Drummond moved his forces further

back from the gun lines to a better encampment, Major-General Jacob Brown, the American commander, saw his opportunity. He launched the attack late on the 17 September, intending to capture battery No. 3 and then roll up the other two. The Americans obtained initial success, but then the British re-organized and counterattacked. There was much confused and desperate fighting across the line with outposts and battery positions frequently changing hands. Once the British recaptured most of the positions, Brown broke off the fighting and withdrew to the fort. As the last shots echoed over the battlefield, the British started a much lengthier withdrawal back up the Niagara peninsula to their winter positions at Burlington Heights. By 21 September, the British position had been completely abandoned. This brief encounter had been costly to both sides: Brown lost 511 men—79 killed, 216 wounded, and 216 missing; and Drummond lost 579 men—115 killed, 148 wounded, and 316 missing.

By 1814 both sides had realized the importance of naval control of the major waterways to the successful prosecution of the overall campaign. Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, the British commander-in-chief, had been reinforced by over 13,000 troops from post-hostilities Europe during the summer, but their late arrival precluded all but an attempt to seize control of Lake Champlain. Prevost ordered his three brigades south from Montreal on the 30 August. As Prevost's forces pushed south the Americans, now under Brigadier-General Alexander Macomb, fought a delaying action. By the evening of the 6 September Prevost's forces had closed up to the Saranac River and occupied the northern half of Plattsburg. When pressed to cross the river and conduct an immediate assault, Major-General Frederick Robinson, the commander of the 1st Brigade, refused as Prevost's staff had not obtained the necessary intelligence on fording points or on the strength of the enemy positions. This un-readiness would characterize Prevost's preparations: there was order—counter-order—order; there was inadequate reconnaissance for the final land assault; there was haphazard preparation of the artillery positions; and there was the constant prodding of the British naval commander, Captain George Downie, to hasten along his fleet without the development of a combined plan. The Americans forces were led by more vigorous and energetic commanders—Macomb by land and Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough by sea. Fought on the 11 September, the Battle of Plattsburg was largely a desperate and punishing naval encounter which the British quickly lost. On

seeing the British ships striking their colours, Prevost recalled his assault columns just as they were closing up to the American positions. Later that evening Prevost's forces began their rain-soaked retreat back to Canada. For the Americans, the defence of Plattsburg was an overwhelming success. Though Prevost had preserved his forces to fight another day, one of his strategic aims throughout the war, his handling of campaign over these two weeks would tarnish his reputation and soon lead to his recall.

There are a number of minor issues with this book. First, it has become the habit for authors writing on the War of 1812 to include side-portraits of the key participants but the same ones so frequently appear that they have become overused. Further, in this book several of the entries suffer from merely repeating what is described close by in the text and in some instances the side-portrait, like that of Commander Alexander Dobbs, is at odds with the text. Second, this trilogy appears to have been written for a large audience with widely different tastes and whereas some of the modern photographs may aid battlefield tourists they contribute little to the narrative. Finally, Graves likes to describe the "after the battle" lives of the main actors, which presupposes an emotional attachment that I would suggest is not as strong for most readers as for an author who has spent hours, days and years exploring the detail of their lives.

Of more substantial nature, though Graves has provided a strong and well balanced narrative of events, those seeking in-depth analysis will have to seek it elsewhere. Graves proves good at puncturing some of the myths that have evolved around select events of the war. For instance, he rehabilitates the reputation of Lieutenant-Colonel William Drummond from his utterance of "no quarter" during the assault of Fort Erie and the logistic necessity of Drummond's withdrawal after the sortie. There are a few points where more detailed analysis would have been useful. For instance, why were both Drummond's and Prevost's siege operations similarly inept and why did Downie give up the advantage of his long guns to close, at his hazard, with the American fleet on the morning of the 11th. More importantly, Prevost's actual plan demands more explanation. Combined land and sea operations were well practiced having occurred at Sackets Harbour, Oswego and even during the Burlington Races. Why was Prevost's plan at Plattsburg not a combined one? A final comment bears on Graves' treatment of key British leaders: Drummond is treated charitably even given the butcher's bill at Fort Erie; Prevost is

rehabilitated along the lines of John Grodzinski's *Defender of Canada* (2013) despite his shortcomings as an operational commander; and Commodore James Yeo, the commander of British naval forces, is treated as an impediment to operations, yet he did make significant contributions as ably described in Robert Malcomson's *Lords of the Lake* (1998).

Despite these criticisms, *And All Their Glory Past* is a fine concluding volume to this trilogy and covers the closing period of the War of 1812 in an entertaining and lucid fashion. Its breadth and scope make it useful to both historians and students alike.

RICH ROY, PHD, *INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER*

Caen Controversy: The Battle for Sword Beach 1944. Andrew Stewart. Solihul: Helion & Company, 2014. Pp. 164.

Caen Controversy is a narrative account of the activities and performance of the 3 (British) Infantry Division that fought in the Sword sector on the eastern flank of the D-Day landings in Normandy. In order to contextualise the Division's progress inland the book also describes the preparations for the landings, the supporting activities of the 6 Airborne Division, which protected the left flank of the Allied forces, and it assesses the capabilities and challenges facing the German defenders. The book's aim is to analyse the performance of the assaulting officers and soldiers, in the context of the objectives set for them, to examine their relative success. Stewart's narrative closes on the evening of 6 June 1944 when, although a solid lodgement had been secured away from the beaches, the objective of Caen had not been taken.

The controversy described in the book stems from an enduring perception that 3 Br Inf Div was excessively cautious in advancing towards Caen and was affected by an offensive malaise which permeated staff and soldiers alike. The French, of course, might consider any controversy relating to Caen in terms of the deaths of over a thousand French civilians killed by the Allied Air Forces bombing of the city in June and July 1944, something that still