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Forging and Severing Connections Between Historical Injustices
and Current Experience

by

Gregory Roy Gunn

BA, University of Waterloo, 2004

THESIS

Submitted to the Department of Psychology
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
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Abstract

Past research on temporal self-appraisal theory has revealed that individuals are able to maintain a positive sense of self by subjectively moving favourable past events forward and unfavourable past events backward in time. The current study extends past work by examining whether individuals alter subjective distance from historical injustices to protect their collective identity. Men, as members of a perpetrator group, may perceive past injustices against women as a threat to their collective identity. As such, men may be motivated to subjectively move past injustices backward in time. On the other hand, women, as members of a victim group, may perceive past injustices against women as a crucial aspect of their collective identity. As such, women may be motivated to subjectively move past injustices forward in time. Study 1 examined subjective distance from past injustices and its relation to collective guilt and support for compensation. When the threat posed by past injustices had not been mitigated by the “advances made in women’s rights”, men distanced past injustices more than women. Furthermore, men who distanced injustices furthest in the past reported less collective guilt and less support for compensation; whereas women who perceived injustices to be closer to the present reported greater support for compensation. Study 2 examined the causal role of subjective distance in determining collective guilt and support for compensation. Further support was provided for the role of subjective distance in men’s acceptance of collective guilt and willingness to compensate women. However, results suggest that subjective distance may not have played as large a role for women’s assignment of collective blame. We discuss the powerful role of time perception in forging, or severing, connections between history and current experience.

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Forging and Severing Connections Between Historical Injustices and Current Experience

Think about a social in-group with which you strongly identify (e.g., gender, race, religion, etc.). Try to recall any injustices that members of your own in-group have committed in the past against members of another group. For example, if you are a man, think back to the beginning of the 20th century when women, not yet considered ‘people’ under the law, were not allowed to vote or own property, and scarcely permitted to work. Do you feel guilty over the past actions of your in-group? If so, do you think you would feel less guilt if these past injustices seemed relatively distant compared to recent in the past? In contrast, try to recall any injustices that members of another social group have committed in the past against your own in-group. For example, if you are a woman, think of the Montreal Massacre of December 6, 1989, in which 14 female students were targeted and systematically killed by a lone gunman because of their gender. Do you hold only the specific individuals accountable, or do you assign guilt to the entire out-group? If so, would you assign more guilt if the past injustices committed against your in-group seemed relatively recent compared to distant in the past?

Recent research has demonstrated that people do experience collective guilt over past injustices committed by their in-group (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). For example, Branscombe and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that, even when not personally accountable, White Americans often feel guilt over the past transgressions of Whites against minority groups. Similarly, Branscombe and colleagues demonstrated that people do assign collective guilt to members of a perpetrating group when their own in-group has been unjustly acted upon. In other words, people tend to feel accountable for the actions committed by

members of their own in-groups, and they tend to hold others accountable for the actions of those individuals' in-groups. What role do these group-based emotions have in intergroup relations? To alleviate collective guilt, will members of a perpetrator group make amends to the victimized group; or instead will they trivialize the harm caused by their in-group? On the other side, will members of a victimized group forgive the perpetrator group; or instead will they demand that the wrongs be corrected?

Collective Guilt

Guilt refers to the dysphoric feeling that is experienced when the self is perceived as responsible for some wrongdoing (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1995). Moreover, Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) argued that guilt is the tension that people experience in response to the harm they have inflicted on others. Just as people experience personal guilt, they also experience guilt in response to the harm that members of their in-group have inflicted on another group. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), aside from a private sense of self (i.e., derived from experiences as unique individuals), people also possess a collective sense of self (i.e., derived from memberships in different groups). Specifically, when membership in a specific group is salient, that group will function as a part of the self. Expanding upon social identity theory, Smith (1993; 1999) theorized that people are capable of experiencing "social emotions" on behalf of a salient in-group. To the extent that an in-group becomes an integral part of the self, appraisals of that in-group's behaviours or circumstances can trigger a diversity of emotions, ranging from resentment to envy towards an out-group, or disappointment to pride toward their in-group. A classic example of this is Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, and Sloan (1976) findings

that, by sharing in their team's victories, football fans are able to experience enhanced feelings of personal self-worth even though they played no direct role in their team's success. Therefore, just as self-conscious emotions stem from judgements of the personal self, group-conscious emotions should stem from judgements of the collective self.

In this manner, people can feel guilty, or can be perceived by others to be guilty, for injustices they did not personally commit because their in-groups are linked to their collective identity. Indeed, Branscombe and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that, when group membership is salient, people tend to accept collective guilt when they belong to a group that has historically been high in status, but tend to assign collective guilt when they belong to a group that has historically been low in status. American participants first indicated their racial heritage, and then completed the acceptance and assignment subscales of the Collective Guilt Scale. The acceptance subscale assesses guilt in response to an in-group's transgressions against another group (e.g., "I can easily feel guilty for the bad outcomes brought about by members of my group"). The assignment subscale assesses perceived culpability of other groups for transgressions against an in-group (e.g., "Other groups have benefited at the expense of my group for generations"). Compared to minority groups, White Americans reported greater acceptance of collective guilt for their ancestors' treatment of other groups. Compared to White Americans, minority groups reported greater assignment of collective guilt to other groups for harm inflicted against their ancestors. Therefore, acceptance of collective guilt seems to depend on membership in a perpetrator group, whereas assignment of collective guilt seems to depend on membership in a victim group.

In recent years, a growing body of research has provided much insight into collective guilt (Doosje et al., 1998; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005; Wohl & Branscombe, 2004). For example, Powell and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that framing historical or current inequality in terms of out-group disadvantage or in-group privilege plays a large role in collective guilt acceptance. When racial inequality was framed in terms of Black disadvantage, Whites were able to ignore their in-group's role in establishing and maintaining the inequality, resulting in less collective guilt. However, when racial inequality was framed in terms of White privilege, Whites were forced to acknowledge the in-group's unearned status and resources, resulting in greater collective guilt. In addition, Doosje and colleagues (1998) reported that, in some instances, acceptance of collective guilt is moderated by collective identity. Specifically, when the Dutch colonization of Indonesia was depicted ambiguously (i.e., "although exploited, Indonesia did experience some benefits"), highly identified Dutch participants were able to alleviate collective guilt by emphasizing the positive impact and justifying the negative impact of their in-group's past actions.

From the victims' perspectives, Wohl and Branscombe (2004) reported that assignment of collective guilt is moderated by how members of a victim group categorize the perpetrator group. Specifically, Jews assigned greater collective guilt and were less forgiving when they perceived Germans as an antagonistic out-group (i.e., "Nazis"). However, Jews assigned less collective guilt and were more forgiving when they perceived Germans as part of a shared, superordinate in-group (i.e., "Humans"). With each study, collective guilt is coming to be understood as a widespread phenomena experienced by many populations and in response to a varied inter-group transgressions.

Compensation

What are the behavioural consequences of guilt when experienced at the collective level? Strongly linked with a concern for the effect that one has on others, guilt is believed to engender pro-social behaviours (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1995). At the individual level, guilt motivates people to confess and apologize to those they have harmed, and to reverse the damage they have caused (Baumeister et al., 1994). Likewise, at the group level, guilt has been demonstrated to motivate people to apologize and make amends to those whom members of their in-group have harmed (Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Swim & Miller, 1999). From the victim's perspective, people are more likely to forgive and move on when the individuals they blame accept responsibility and apologize for their actions (Nadler & Liviatan, 2004). Therefore, the assignment and acceptance of collective guilt seem to play a crucial role in the reconciliation process between two groups when one has unjustly acted against the other.

Harvey and Oswald (2000) demonstrated the pro-social benefits of collective guilt by assessing White participants' willingness to support Black programs after viewing material designed to elicit various levels of guilt and personal distress. Some participants viewed a video of Black teenagers being attacked by the police during a civil rights protest, whereas other participants viewed a video of a White person suffering from Alzheimer's. As a control, the remaining participants viewed a video on how to make movies. After watching the videos, all participants completed measures of guilt. At this point, a confederate acting as a research assistant for another study "accidentally" entered the room. After apologizing, the confederate asked if participants would fill out an unrelated survey by indicating the degree to which various campus programs, including

three Black programs, were worthy of financial support from the university. Participants who watched the civil rights video reported significantly more guilt than participants who watched either the movie-making video or the Alzheimer's video. Moreover, guilt was significantly related to the degree that Black programs received support, but only for participants who viewed the civil rights video.

Collective Identity

Despite its pro-social benefits, personal guilt stems from a negative evaluation of one's own actions (Tangney, 1995). As such, guilt might be experienced as a negative emotion that people are motivated to avoid. Indeed, Baumeister and colleagues (1994) identified several strategies with which people are able to deflect feelings of guilt, such as derogating the victim, minimizing the perceived harm inflicted on others, or rationalizing their transgressions. Just as one's own wrongdoings reflect poorly on the personal self, an in-group's wrongdoings should reflect poorly on the collective self. In line with this, Tajfel and Turner (1986) theorized that in the same manner that people are motivated to protect and enhance their personal identity, they are also motivated to protect and enhance their collective identity. This is often accomplished through social comparisons in which out-group members are denigrated so that in-group members look relatively favourable. However, Taylor and Jaggi (1974) demonstrated that another way in which people protect their collective identity is by making dispositional attributions for an in-group's desirable behaviours, but situational attributions for an in-group's objectionable behaviours. Therefore, people should be able to deflect feelings of collective guilt through biased interpretations of their in-group's transgressions.

Can people also interpret historical transgressions committed by an in-group in a biased manner? Doosje and Branscombe (2003) demonstrated that, even for historical events, people do make dispositional attributions for an in-group's positive behaviours and situational attributions for an in-group's negative behaviours. Moreover, Baumeister and Hastings (1997) argued that people possess a variety of strategies with which they distort the memory of their in-group's history in ways that enhances their collective identity. They even briefly speculate that members of a group can detach their current identity from a past perpetrator, or link their current identity to a past victim, by altering their perceptions of time from a prior inter-group conflict.

One way in which a group's recent transgressions might be distinct from more distant historical ones is that the enduring consequences of the latter may be less tangible. For instance, as the Holocaust occurred decades before the escalation of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, it may be more difficult for some people to conceive how the Jewish community continues to suffer due to the Holocaust than to conceive how the Jewish community continues to be affected by the suicide bombing attacks of Palestinian terrorists. However, actual calendar time is not the only determinant of how recent or distant an event feels. To protect their collective identity, current members of a perpetrator group might be motivated to put their in-group's transgressions behind them by viewing them as "ancient history" and "over and done". Therefore, one way to sever the connection between their in-group's past transgressions and their current collective identity may be by perceiving such transgressions as very distant from the present.

On the other hand, events that are quite distant in chronological time can sometimes feel "like yesterday", allowing victims to see historical injustices as vivid,

recent, and connected to their present experience. For instance, Jews may have very little difficulty in conceiving how the Jewish community still suffers due to the Holocaust. Indeed, Nazi camp survivors do report feeling close to their Holocaust experience, sometimes even expressing that the Holocaust never ended (Lomranz, Shmotkin, Zechovoy, & Rosenberg, 1985). Therefore, the very tangible consequences of past transgressions may be central to a victim group's sense of who they currently are.

Indeed, Eyerman (2004) theorized that the collective identities of victimized groups are often grounded in the loss and trauma that they have experienced at the hands of another group. In the wake of severe cultural trauma, a group often experiences a loss of identity and meaning. However, the source of the cultural trauma is often used to provide meaning and interpretation to a new identity. For example, in discussing the emergence of an "African American" identity, Eyerman stated that "slavery, not so much as an experience, but as a form of memory, was a focal point of reference in this process" (p. 166). In other words, through reflection and re-interpretation of slavery, succeeding generations of African Americans have been able to establish a new sense of identity. As such, members of a victimized group may be motivated to perceive past injustices as very recent in order to preserve the relevance of such injustices to their current identity. In light of this distinction between victims and perpetrators' subjective distancing of past injustices, the current study investigated whether people are able to protect or maintain their group's identity by shifting perceptions of temporal distance from past transgressions committed by or against their in-group.

Temporal Appraisal

According to the temporal self-appraisal theory (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2001; Wilson & Ross, 2003), people adjust how distant or recent certain past events feel in order to make their current selves seem more favourable. As recent events have stronger implications for the current self, people are motivated to perceive past events that portray them positively as subjectively recent. Similarly, as distant events generally have fewer implications for the current self, people are motivated perceive past events that portray them negatively as subjectively distant. In this way, people are able to bask in the glory of a subjectively recent success by associating it to the current self. However, people are able to free the current self from blame by associating a subjectively distant failure to a former self.

Along a similar vein, Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990) reported that people are motivated to perceive their transgressions against others as distant and over with, whereas they are motivated to perceive transgressions committed against themselves as recent and ongoing. When participants were asked to write a narrative of a past incident in which they angered someone else (i.e., they acted as a perpetrator), they tended to report their transgressions as isolated incidents that were over and done with and had no lasting negative consequences. When participants were asked to write a narrative of a past incident in which they were angered by someone else (i.e., they were treated as a victim), they tended to report the transgressions as connected to ongoing events and having lasting negative consequences. Baumeister and colleagues concluded that, in order to minimize feelings of guilt, perpetrators tend to reconstruct transgressions

as having little bearing on the present. On the other hand, in order to elicit sympathy or reparation, victims tend to reconstruct transgressions within an ongoing context.

If people subjectively distance themselves from their past transgressions to protect their personal identity, then they may also subjectively distance themselves from past transgressions committed by their in-group to protect their collective identity. Therefore, current members of a perpetrator group should be able to minimize the perceived negative consequences that a past injustice currently has on an out-group, and consequently alleviate feelings of collective guilt, by distancing the injustice from the present. On the other hand, current members of a victim group may tend to emphasize past injustices committed against their in-group, or in some cases, may actually still experience negative repercussions resulting from past injustices. In either case, current members of a victimized group should regard past injustices as more relevant to their group's current identity, and consequently assign more guilt to current members of the perpetrator group, by perceiving the injustice as subjectively recent rather than distant.

Overview of Present Research

In the current research, we attempted to extend past research on temporal self-appraisal by investigating feelings of subjective temporal distance from an in-group's past. Subjective temporal distance is defined as how psychologically distant or recent a past event feels, regardless of how long ago it actually occurred. Although Ross and Wilson (2002) have demonstrated that altering perceptions of subjective distance might allow people to detach their current sense of self from past unfavourable events, or to link their current sense of self to past favourable events, the effect of subjective distancing has yet to be empirically investigated at the collective level, specifically within the context of

inter-group transgression. Therefore, our goal was to determine the role of subjective distance in forging or severing connections between historical injustices and current experience for members of perpetrator and victim groups. One of the most pervasive forms of injustice throughout history has been gender inequality, with women having less power, resources, and status than men. Therefore, we investigated the role of subjective distance within the context of past injustices committed by men against women. In Study 1, we examined subjective distance from past injustices and its relation to collective guilt and support for compensation. In Study 2, we examined the causal role of subjective distance in determining collective guilt and support for compensation.

Study 1

The purpose of the current study was to investigate whether past events that reflect negatively on an in-group would tend to feel subjectively distant, and if subjective distance would be related to the perceived relevance of such events for current members of that group. At the level of the individual, Ross and Wilson (2002) have reported a relation between subjective distance and past personal events. University students were instructed to write about an incident that had occurred since the end of high school that made them feel either “quite proud” or “quite embarrassed”. Afterwards, participants indicated on a time line ranging from “*feels very near*” to “*feels very far away*” how subjectively distant the incident felt. Participants reported feeling further from embarrassing events than from proud events, even when actual calendar time was controlled. Ross and Wilson concluded that one way in which people are able to maintain a positive sense of self is by subjectively moving favourable past events forward and unfavourable past events backward in time.

In a similar manner, the current study sought to examine the extent to which participants subjectively distanced past injustices against women, and if subjective distance would be related to the intensity of their collective guilt and support for compensation. According to temporal self-appraisal theory, subjective distancing functions to protect the sense of self. As such, our expectations for subjective distance should only hold true when the self, the collective identity in this case, is threatened. Therefore, we manipulated threat before providing participants an opportunity to subjectively distance past injustices. Specifically, we induced threat in some participants by presenting specific injustices against women as the focus. However, we mitigated this threat for other participants by also presenting the advances made in women's rights, in which many of those specific injustices had been corrected, as the focus.

Hypotheses

Perpetrator group. Past injustices against women should be perceived as less reflective of men today when those wrongdoings feel distant versus recent. As such, men should be motivated to perceive past injustices against women as subjectively distant. However, men should no longer be motivated to subjectively distance past injustices when the threat posed by those injustices has already been mitigated. Therefore, we hypothesized that men who had been presented only with past injustices against women would subjectively distance past injustices to a greater extent than men who had also been presented with the advances made in women's rights (Hypothesis 1a).

The introduction of the threat manipulation gave rise to two potential outcomes concerning collective guilt. On one hand, we expected that men who had been presented only with past injustices against women might accept more collective guilt than men who

had also been presented with the advances made in women's rights. Whereas the "injustice" information should compel men to feel guilty, the "women's rights" information should provide men a sense of "absolution" for historical transgressions against women. On the other hand, we expected that there might be no difference between conditions, such that men who had been presented only with past injustices would not accept more collective guilt than men who had also been presented with the advances made in women's rights. Past research has demonstrated that people possess many different strategies to regulate their sense of self, such that when one strategy is unavailable, people can turn to others to defend themselves against threat (Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & Beach, 2000). Therefore, when not presented with the mitigating "women's rights" information, men might still be able to alleviate the threat to their collective identity by subjectively distancing the past injustices.

Moreover, as collective guilt leads to an increased willingness to make amends (Harvey & Oswald, 2000), we expected that men who had not been presented with the mitigating "women's rights" information would accept less collective guilt, and consequently be less supportive of compensation, to the extent that they subjectively distance past injustices. Specifically, for men who had been presented only with past injustices against women, we hypothesized that the relation between subjective distance and support for compensation should be mediated by collective guilt (Hypothesis 1b).

Victim group. This study also investigated the role of subjective distance for groups that have been historically victimized. Eyerman (2004) theorized that, when searching for a new cultural identity, groups often attempt to "turn tragedy into triumph" (p. 161). One way to do this is through collective action (i.e., behaviours intended to

improve the in-group's status or condition). When people hold another group responsible for their in-group's suffering, one appropriate form of collective action may be to seek compensation, or at least acknowledgement, from current members of the perpetrator group. In order to strengthen their case for compensation, members of a victim group may be motivated to accentuate the relevance of past injustices to their present state. Even when aware that some improvement in their condition has been made, members of a victim group may still be just as motivated to emphasize past injustices in order to maintain their belief that the perpetrator group needs to do much more in order to fully atone for the harm they have inflicted. One way that members of a victim group may be able to maintain a connection between past and current experience is by perceiving those injustices as subjectively recent.

Therefore, we hypothesized that both women who had been presented only with past injustices and women who had also been presented with the advances made in women's rights would perceive past injustices as relatively recent (Hypothesis 2a). Furthermore, perceiving past injustices to be close to the present should motivate women to right the wrongs committed against their in-group. Therefore, we hypothesized that women's subjective distance from past injustices would be related to their support for compensation. Specifically, women should be more supportive of compensation to the extent that past injustices feel relatively recent (Hypothesis 2b).

Method

Participants

A total of 343 undergrad students at Wilfrid Laurier University participated in this study. Participation involved completing several measures during a mass testing session

to earn half a research credit for their PS100 requirements. As this study assessed collective guilt in response to injustices relevant to Canadians, only participants who indicated Canada as their country of birth were included.¹ Of the remaining 302 participants, 200 were females and 102 were males. The mean age of participants was 18.76 and the age range was 17-51. Although the majority of participants were of European descent, 16 percent were of diverse ethnic origins.²

Materials & Procedure

For this study, participants completed a series of measures and surveys as part of an in-class mass-testing questionnaire package. A flowchart illustrating the order in which participants received the measures is presented in figure 1. At the beginning of the mass-testing package, participants first indicated their gender, age, country of birth, and ethnicity on a background survey. Afterwards, participants completed several scales, in the following fixed order, assessing individual differences in just world belief, collective self-esteem, sexism, and feminism.³

Threat manipulation. In order to manipulate threat, we varied the content of the material that was first presented to participants. In the threat condition, participants first read a paragraph depicting specific injustices that women endured at the turn of the century (e.g. “In 1900, women were not considered ‘people’ under the law. They were not allowed to vote, to run for office, or to own property”; see Appendix A). The severity and unfairness of this “injustice” information should have acted as a threat to men’s collective identity. In the mitigated-threat condition, participants first read a paragraph depicting the past advances made in women’s rights, in which many injustices against women had been corrected (e.g., “Between 1916 and 1928, women received the right to

vote, to run for office, and to own property”; see Appendix B). This “women’s rights” information should have mitigated any threat, as men should have become quite willing to believe that the negative effects of any historical injustices against women had been eliminated. At a later point in the study, participants were also presented with the information concerning women’s past that they had not already read about (see figure 1). Specifically, participants in the threat condition were presented with the “women’s rights” information, whereas participants in the mitigated-threat condition were presented with the “injustice” information.

Subjective distance. The primary dependent variable in both conditions was subjective distance from past injustices. However, participants from the two conditions completed the subjective distance measure at different stages in the study. In the threat condition, participants first read the “injustice” information and then completed the subjective distance measure. Specifically, they indicated on a time line how far the injustices felt from the present. The time line consisted of a 16 cm scale ranging from the present (*feels very close to the present*) to the distant past (*feels very distant from the present*). To calculate subjective distance, we measured the length in centimetres from the end point of the time line (*feels very close to the present*) to the point that participants marked to indicate how long ago the past injustices felt. A score of zero indicated that past injustices against women felt very close to the present, whereas a score of 16 indicated that the past injustices felt very distant from the present. In addition, participants indicated how knowledgeable they were of the past injustices, how accountable they perceived men to be for the past injustices, and how accountable they

perceived women to be for the past injustices. Participants indicated their agreement with each of these items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*fully*).

In contrast, in the mitigated-threat condition, participants first read the “women’s rights” information and then completed a series of questions corresponding to those asked in the threat condition (i.e., subjective distance from, awareness of, and perceived responsibility for past advances made in women’s rights). These items were included to provide symmetry in the questionnaires across the two conditions and are not relevant to the hypotheses of the current study. Only after reading the “women’s rights” information did participants in the mitigated-threat condition receive the “injustice” information and complete the subjective distance measure and other items relevant to past injustices against women. Specifically, they now indicated on the timeline how far the past injustices felt from the present, how knowledgeable they were of the past injustices, how responsible they perceived men to be for the past injustices, and how responsible they perceived women to be for the past injustices.

Collective guilt. Before being presented with the second set of information concerning women’s past (see figure 1), all participants read a brief statement about the injustices that women have generally experienced throughout history (e.g., “Gender inequality, with men having more power, resources, and status than women, has been the most prevalent form of group-based inequality through history”), and then completed a modified version of the Collective Guilt Scale (Branscombe et al., 2004; see Appendix C) in response to how they personally felt about gender inequality. This scale consists of five items (Cronbach’s alpha = .83) that assess how guilty one feels due to the injustices against women in the past (i.e., “I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received

by women in the past”). Participants indicated their agreement with each statement on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*).

Compensation. Two additional items were included at the end of the Collective Guilt Scale. Participants indicated their agreement to both of these items on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The first item assessed support for compensation towards women (i.e., “women should be compensated by men because of the injustices committed by men against women”).

Gender inequality no longer exists. The second item assessed the belief that women continue to face gender inequality or not (i.e., “the injustices faced by women in the past no longer exist in today’s society”).

Synopsis of design. To manipulate threat, participants in the threat condition were first presented with the “injustice” information, whereas those in the mitigated-threat condition were first presented with the “women’s rights” information. Participants then completed a questionnaire regarding the information they had just received. It is at this point (i.e., after having only received the “injustice” information) that participants in the threat condition indicated how subjectively distant the past injustices felt. All participants then completed the collective guilt and compensation measures. We wanted participants in the threat condition to complete these dependent variables before they had read the “women’s rights” information as we expected that the focus on the advancement of women’s rights would mitigate the threat produced by past injustices. Afterwards, participants were presented with the information concerning women’s past that they had not initially read. Specifically, participants in the threat condition were now presented with the “women’s rights” information, whereas those in the mitigated-threat condition

were now presented with the “injustice” information. Participants then completed a questionnaire in response to this new information. It is at this point (i.e., after having received both the “women’s rights” and then the “injustice” information) that participants in the mitigated-threat condition indicated how subjectively distant the past injustices felt.

Results

This study employed a 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (condition: threat vs. mitigated-threat) experimental design. The independent variable was the type of event that was presented first, either past injustices against women (i.e., threat condition) or past rights attained by women (i.e., mitigated-threat condition). The main dependent variables were subjective distance, collective guilt, and support for compensation. Mean scores and standard deviations for these dependent variables are presented across gender and conditions in Table 1. Correlations between the dependent variables are presented for men in the threat condition in Table 2, for men in the mitigated-threat condition in Table 3, for women in the threat condition in Table 4, and for women in the mitigated-threat condition in Table 5.

Men and women are likely to have different motives when dealing with past injustices. Generally, men may attempt to minimize past injustices committed by their in-group in order to reject collective guilt. Indeed, we had hypothesized that men in the threat condition would subjectively distance past injustices against women to a greater extent than men in the mitigated-threat condition (Hypothesis 1a). Moreover, for men in the threat condition, the more they subjectively distanced past injustices, the less collective guilt they would accept, and consequently the less supportive of compensation they would be (Hypothesis 1b). In contrast, women may attempt to emphasize past

injustices committed against their in-group in order to motivate themselves into collective action (i.e., in this case, requesting compensation). As such, we hypothesized that women in both the threat and the mitigated-threat condition would perceive past injustices as relatively recent (Hypothesis 2a). Moreover, the closer women perceived past injustices to be, the more supportive of compensation they would be (Hypothesis 2b). To better appreciate the strategies that men and women may use to fulfill these distinct motives, men and women were not only investigated together, but when appropriate were also examined separately, even in the absence of a statistically significant interaction. Specifically, each dependent variable was examined separately for men and women across the threat and mitigated-threat conditions, and also examined as it related to the main variable of interest, that being subjective distance.

Subjective Distance

A 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (condition: threat vs. mitigated-threat) factorial ANOVA with subjective distance from past injustices as the dependent variable revealed a marginal effect for gender. Men ($M = 10.84$, $SD = 3.18$) subjectively distanced past injustices against women somewhat more than women ($M = 10.13$, $SD = 3.06$), $F(1, 258) = 3.07$, $p = .08$. There was no main effect for condition, $F(1, 258) = 1.56$, $p = .21$; but the gender X condition interaction was marginally significant, $F(1, 258) = 3.06$, $p = .08$. This interaction is presented in figure 2. To test the simple effects, independent samples *t*-tests were conducted for men and women comparing the threat condition to the mitigated-threat condition with respect to average subjective distance. The results for men and women and their implications are separately presented below.

Perpetrator group. In support of Hypothesis 1a, men in the threat condition ($M = 11.45$, $SD = 2.72$) felt marginally greater subjective distance from past injustices than did men in the mitigated-threat condition ($M = 10.23$, $SD = 3.54$), $t(85) = -1.81$, $p = .07$. Therefore, when only past injustices against women had been presented, men subjectively distanced those injustices, possibly in order to protect their collective identity. However, men no longer distanced the past injustices when the advances in women's rights had also been presented, possibly because the "women's rights" information had already mitigated the threat to their collective identity.

Victim group. Similar analyses revealed that women in the threat condition ($M = 10.02$, $SD = 3.00$) did not differ significantly from women in the mitigated-threat condition ($M = 10.23$, $SD = 3.13$) in how recent they reported past injustices to feel, $t(173) = .44$, $p = .66$. Therefore, consistent with hypothesis 2a, women who had received only the "injustice" information perceived past injustices to be just as recent as women who had also received the "women's rights" information. However, given that the means fell above the midpoint, where zero indicates that past injustices felt recent and 16 indicates that past injustices felt distant, it is not accurate to say that women perceived past injustices to be more recent than distant. At best, these results suggest that women perceived past injustices to be recent relative to men in the threat condition.

Collective Guilt

Although we were only interested in collective guilt acceptance as it pertains to members of the perpetrator group, past research suggests that members of perpetrator groups tend to accept greater collective guilt than members of victimized groups (Branscombe et al., 2004). However, a 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (condition: threat

vs. mitigated-threat) factorial ANOVA revealed no main effects for gender or condition, nor an interaction, $F_s < .44, p > .51$. This null effect could be due to the strategies men used to reduce collective guilt, or could simply reflect that the scale means something different for women. Further analyses concerning collective guilt in this study were performed exclusively on male respondents.

Perpetrator group. An independent groups *t*-test comparing men in the threat and mitigated-threat conditions with respect to average levels of collective guilt acceptance revealed that men in the threat condition ($M = 4.36, SD = 1.76$) did not differ significantly from men in the mitigated-threat condition ($M = 4.40, SD = 1.72$) in the amount of collective guilt they accepted, $t(99) = -.12, p = .91$. At first glance, these results suggest that the type of information that was first presented to men (i.e., “injustice” vs. “women’s rights”) had no effect on their collective guilt. However, there may have been no difference between conditions because men in the threat condition might have alleviated collective guilt by subjectively distancing past injustices against women. Specifically, when presented only with past injustices, men who did not subjectively distance past injustices may have accepted collective guilt, but men who did subjectively distance past injustices may not have accepted collective guilt.

To test whether men in the threat condition were able to reject collective guilt by distancing past injustices against women, we conducted a multiple regression analysis with collective guilt as the criterion variable, and condition and subjective distance as the predictor variables.⁴ As presented in figure 3, there was a significant condition X subjective distance interaction, $b = .37, t(83) = 2.23, p < .03$. To examine this interaction, we conducted separate regression analyses for the threat and mitigated-threat conditions.

Men accepted less collective guilt when they subjectively distanced past injustices against women in the threat condition, $b = -.34$, $t(44) = -2.39$, $p = .02$; but not in the mitigated-threat condition, $b = .11$, $t(39) = .66$, $p = .51$. Therefore, men who had only been presented with past injustices against women may have alleviated collective guilt by subjectively distancing those injustices. However, men who had already been presented with the advances made in women's rights may not have needed to subjectively distance past injustices in order to alleviate collective guilt. It makes sense that men would accept the most collective guilt in the threat condition. Indeed, men in this condition who did not distance the past injustices experienced the most guilt. However, men in this condition who did distance the past injustices did not experience the expected guilt, and even reported less guilt than men in the mitigated-threat condition.

Compensation

A 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (condition: threat vs. mitigated-threat) factorial ANOVA with support for compensation as the dependent variable revealed a main effect for gender. Overall, compensation received more support from women ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 1.89$) than men ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.83$), $F(1, 293) = 7.23$, $p < .01$. There was no main effect for condition or a gender X condition interaction, $F_s < .33$, $p > .56$. As there may be distinct motivations concerning compensation for men and women, further analyses concerning support for compensation were conducted separately for each gender.

Perpetrator group. One might expect that men who had only been presented with past injustices against women would be more supportive of compensation than men who had also been presented with the past advances made in women's rights. However, independent samples t -tests revealed this was not the case. Men in the threat condition (M

= 2.98, $SD = 1.84$) did not differ significantly from men in the mitigated-threat condition ($M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.88$) in their support for compensation, $t(99) = -.58$, $p = .57$.

Similar to how men in the threat condition were able to alleviate collective guilt, it is possible that subjective distance may have allowed men to be less sympathetic to women's request for compensation. As such, we conducted a multiple regression analysis with support for compensation as the criterion variable, and condition and subjective distance as the predictor variables. As presented in figure 4, there was a marginal condition X subjective distance interaction, $b = 1.71$, $t(83) = 2.23$, $p = .09$. Further analyses revealed that, in the threat condition, men who subjectively distanced past injustices were less supportive of compensation than men who did not subjectively distance past injustices, $b = -.33$, $t(44) = -2.34$, $p = .02$; but this was not the case for men in the mitigated-threat condition, $b = -.01$, $t(39) = -.08$, $p = .94$.

Victim group. We speculated that women might demand compensation regardless of condition. Indeed, women in the threat condition ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 1.85$) did not differ significantly from women in the mitigated-threat condition ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 1.94$) in their belief that women should be compensated, $t(194) = -.18$, $p = .86$. Therefore, it seems that the "women's right" information did little to satisfy women's desire for atonement. However, given that both means fell below the midpoint of a 9-point scale, it would be misleading to conclude that women in either condition strongly believed that men should compensate their in-group.

One determinant of women's belief that men should compensate women may be the subjective recency of past injustices committed against their in-group. To test this, we conducted a multiple regression analysis with support for compensation as the criterion

variable, and condition and subjective distance as the predictor variables. The regression revealed a main effect for subjective distance. Overall, women who felt close to past injustices were more in favour of compensation, $b = -.34$, $t(171) = -3.18$, $p < .01$. There was not a main effect for condition, $b = -.15$, $t(171) = -.57$, $p = .57$; nor a condition X subjective distance interaction, $b = .21$, $t(171) = .80$, $p = .43$. These results suggest that, consistent with Hypothesis 2b, women were more likely to request compensation when they subjectively placed past injustices endured by women close to the present.

Mediation Analysis

We have demonstrated that, for men in the threat condition, subjective distance predicts both collective guilt and support for compensation. To further explore the relation between these variables, we conducted a mediation analysis to determine whether acceptance of collective guilt mediated the relation between subjective distance and support for compensation. As we expected this mediation to occur only in the threat condition, we used a product term (i.e., condition X subjective distance) in our analyses. The main effects of condition and subjective distance were entered as control variables in the first step of the analysis. The results are presented in figure 5.

Following the procedure outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), we first determined that the condition X subjective distance interaction significantly predicted collective guilt, $b = .37$, $t(83) = 2.23$, $p < .03$. Next, we found that the condition X subjective distance interaction marginally predicted support for compensation, $b = .29$, $t(83) = 1.71$, $p = .09$. Finally, we tested whether our potential mediator predicted support for compensation and whether the condition X subjective distance interaction accounted for support for compensation when controlling for the mediator. This analysis revealed

that the more men accepted collective guilt, the more they supported compensation, $b = .55$, $t(82) = 5.89$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, when collective guilt acceptance was included in the equation, the condition X subjective distance interaction on support for compensation was reduced to non-significance, $b = .08$, $t(82) = .57$, $p = .57$. A Sobel test confirmed that collective guilt did mediate the effect of the condition X subjective distance interaction on support for compensation, $z = 2.08$, $p < .04$. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 1b, for men in the threat condition, subjective distance predicted collective guilt, which in turn predicted support for compensation.

Gender Inequality No Longer Exists

To better make sense of our findings, we turned to some exploratory analyses. A 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (condition: threat vs. mitigated-threat) factorial ANOVA with the belief that gender inequality no longer exists as the dependent variable revealed a main effect for gender. Overall, men ($M = 5.51$, $SD = 1.93$) were more likely than women ($M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.93$) to believe that gender inequality no longer exists, $F(1, 293) = 30.41$, $p < .001$. There was no main effect for condition, and only a trending gender X condition interaction, $F's < 2.19$, $p > .13$.

Perpetrator group. Our findings have suggested that men who have been presented with the advances in women's rights are able to reject collective guilt without subjectively distancing past injustices. In other words, reminding men of the rights women have attained might have convinced them that women no longer suffered as a result of past injustices, thereby freeing men today from blame. Consistent with this speculation, men in the mitigated-threat condition ($M = 5.83$, $SD = 1.88$) were marginally

more likely to believe that gender inequality no longer exists than men in the threat condition ($M = 5.19$, $SD = 1.94$), $t(99) = -1.69$, $p = .09$.

Exploratory analyses revealed that the belief that gender inequality no longer exists might have been crucial in alleviating collective guilt for men in both conditions. A multiple regression analysis was conducted with collective guilt as the criterion variable and condition and belief that gender inequality no longer exists as the predictor variables. The regression revealed a significant main effect for belief that gender inequality no longer exists. In general, men accepted less collective guilt when they believed that gender inequality no longer exists, $b = -.27$, $t(97) = -2.04$, $p < .05$. There was no main effect for condition, $b = .08$, $t(97) = .72$, $p = .47$; nor an interaction, $b = -.05$, $t(97) = -.35$, $p = .73$. A second analysis revealed that, overall, men who believed that gender inequality no longer exists were significantly less supportive of compensation for women, $b = -.35$, $t(194) = -3.70$, $p < .001$.

Although men in both conditions were less likely to accept collective guilt when they believed that gender inequality no longer exists, we speculated that men in the threat and the mitigated-threat conditions might arrive differently at the belief that gender inequality no longer exists. Specifically, men who have only been presented with past injustices against women may need to subjectively distance the injustices far into the past before they can believe that women no longer suffer as a result of past injustices. However, as reported earlier, men who have already been presented with the advances made in women's rights may be able to simply focus on these advances to support their belief that gender inequality no longer exists. To investigate this, we conducted regression analyses in the threat and mitigated-threat conditions with belief that

inequality no longer exists as the criterion variable, and subjective distance as the predictor variable. These regressions are presented in figure 6. Men were more likely to believe that gender inequality no longer existed after subjectively distancing past injustices from the present in the threat condition $b = .31, t(44) = 2.18, p = .03$; but not in the mitigated-threat condition $b = .06, t(39) = .35, p = .73$.

Victim group. Earlier we reported a main effect for gender on belief that gender inequality no longer exists, such that women were less likely than men to believe that women no longer face gender inequality in today's society. Further analyses revealed that women in the mitigated-threat condition ($M = 4.18, SD = 1.98$) did not differ significantly from women in the threat condition ($M = 4.23, SD = 1.89$) in their belief that gender inequality no longer exists, $t(194) = .19, p = .85$. Therefore, women tended to disagree with the notion that gender inequality no longer exists, even when aware of the improvements in their condition that have been made.

We speculated that women would be particularly likely to believe that gender inequality is still a problem when past injustices felt recent. Indeed, a regression analysis with belief that gender inequality no longer exists as the criterion variable and subjective distance as the predictor variable revealed that women who felt close to past injustices were less likely to believe that gender inequality no longer exists, $b = .34, t(173) = 4.71, p < .01$. Further analyses revealed that women who rejected the notion that gender inequality no longer exists were marginally more likely to support compensation, $b = -.13, t(194) = -1.82, p = .07$. These findings, obtained from both women and men, stress the importance of the belief of ongoing inequality in intergroup conflicts.

Discussion

In Study 1, we investigated the role of subjective temporal distance in men and women's ability to forge or sever connections between past injustices and their current experiences. We found that men, as members of the perpetrator group, did tend to subjectively distance past injustices against women when the threat posed by those injustices had not been mitigated by other factors. Furthermore, the further in the past that the injustices felt, the less collective guilt men accepted and the less supportive they were of compensating women. These findings suggest that men may protect their collective identity by subjectively moving past events that reflect negatively on their group backward in time. However, we also found that men in the mitigated-threat condition did not distance past injustices against women. Therefore, when reminded of the advances women have made, men may feel less need to subjectively distance past injustices against women because of the belief that women no longer suffer due to those past injustices.

In both conditions, men seemed to have protected their collective identity by convincing themselves that gender inequality no longer exists. What is interesting is that men in the two conditions seemed to have taken different routes to come to the belief that gender inequality no longer exists. Specifically, men in the threat condition tended to subjectively distance past injustices. On the other hand, men in the mitigated-threat condition may have simply focused on the "women's rights" information. Such findings are consistent with the recent evidence for the substitutability of different self-esteem maintenance mechanisms (Tesser et al., 2000). These findings suggest that people can protect their sense of self in a variety of ways, but the route they chose depends on which ones are available to them. In the mitigated-threat condition, the "women's rights"

information that allowed men to absolve their guilt was readily available. However, in the threat condition, even though the mitigating information was not available, an alternate route to protect the self still presented itself. Specifically, when not given a chance beforehand to reflect upon the “women’s rights” information, some men may have reduced the threat to their collective identity by increasing perceptions of subjective distance from the injustices.

We also found that women, as members of the victim group, perceived past injustices as being more recent relative to men in the threat condition. Moreover, the closer to the present that the injustices felt, the more women believed that they should be compensated. Therefore, even when aware of the improvements in their condition, subjective recency of past injustices might motivate women to seek compensation. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that subjective distance may be serving a rather different function for women than it did for men. For some women, it might simply be a reflection of their belief that, in a world where inequality still exists, past injustices against their in-group are still relevant, consequential, and psychologically recent. However, rather than being invoked as a defensive strategy, some women may alter subjective distance to emphasize the aspect of their collective identity rooted in the unjust hardships they have endured in the past.

There are some limitations to this interpretation. First, men in the mitigated-threat condition perceived past injustices to be just as recent as women. Therefore, instead of altering subjective distance to feel close to past injustices, it seems that women simply did not show the same tendency to subjectively distance past injustices when those injustices were perceived to have negative implications for the present. Second, even

though women did perceive past injustices as more recent than men in the threat condition, they still perceived those injustices to be more distant than recent (i.e., closer to the “distant” endpoint of the scale). This may be because attempts to alter subjective distance are limited by actual chronological time. With these potential issues in mind, future research should address whether women, as members of a victim group, are truly motivated to feel close to past injustices committed against their in-group.

There are a few potential confounds in this study concerning the order in which participants completed the measures. First, the experimental design may appear unsound because, even before participants received the manipulation, the sexism and feminism measures would have made participants in both conditions aware of past injustices against women. Both of these measures contain items that likely would have reminded participants of gender inequality. For example, participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with statements such as “Women in Canada are treated as second-class citizens” and “It is easy to understand the anger of women’s groups in Canada”. However, the study was in fact designed to make participants aware of injustice prior to the dependent measures in both conditions. Participants in both conditions were reminded of injustice generally in the sexism and feminism scales, then again in the introduction to the Collective Guilt scale. In the threat condition, historical injustice was the sole focus, as participants were provided with detailed information about injustices against women around 1915. In contrast, in the mitigated-threat condition, the focus was shifted from historical injustice to the advances made in women’s rights since 1915. We were interested in whether this focus on the advancement of women’s rights would mitigate

the threat produced by past injustices, and consequently eliminate the related distancing effects that we predicted would occur when collective identity was threatened.

A second potential confound concerns when participants completed the “subjective distance from past injustices” item. Men in the threat condition indicated subjective distance from past injustices before they completed the collective guilt measure, whereas men in the mitigated-threat condition indicated subjective distance from past injustices afterwards. Therefore, the lack of a relation between subjective distance and collective guilt for men in the mitigated-threat condition may merely be an artifact of the order in which the measures of subjective distance and collective guilt were completed. For instance, the relation between subjective distance and collective guilt may not have persisted for men in the mitigated-threat condition because, as they read about specific injustices only after completing the collective guilt measure, these men may have had different injustices in mind when completing the collective guilt and subjective distance measures. As such, in order to validate the finding that men no longer need to subjectively distance past injustices in order to alleviate collective guilt when they have already been presented with “mitigating” information, future research should attempt to replicate these findings but with the “subjective distance from past injustices” item before the collective guilt measure for both the threat and the mitigated-threat conditions.

Finally, although we did demonstrate that collective guilt was related to subjective distance, we only considered collective guilt from the perspective of the perpetrator group. Even though members of both the perpetrator group (i.e., men) and the victim group (i.e., women) participated in this study, they all complete a measure of collective guilt acceptance. Some women may have accepted collective guilt for the past injustices

committed against women, but it is difficult to interpret whether their responses to this scale reflect guilt, shame, or even a more general regret. As such, instead of assessing acceptance of collective guilt for both men and women, future research should include a measure of collective guilt assignment. Including assignment of collective guilt should provide a better understanding of when members of a victimized group are likely to assign guilt and seek compensation, and when they are likely to forgive and move on.

Study 2

The purpose of the current study was to test for a causal relation between subjective distance and collective guilt. At the level of the individual, Wilson and Ross (2003) reported that manipulating subjective distance from past outcomes influences how people perceive themselves. In their study, half the participants received a time line that spanned back from “today” to the distant past (e.g., “birth”), whereas the remaining participants received a time line that spanned back from “today” to the recent past (e.g., “age 16”). On these time lines, they were instructed to mark a point representing the occurrence of either a positive or a negative personal event (e.g., a good or bad outcome in high school). The time lines were designed such that participants with the time line spanning back to the distant past would mark a point much closer to the present than participants with the time line spanning back to the recent past. A manipulation check confirmed that participants did report feeling subjectively closer to the events that they marked closer to the present. Moreover, participants who perceived past failures to be subjectively recent evaluated themselves less favourably than participants who were led to perceive past failures as subjectively distant. In contrast, participants who felt close to past successes evaluated themselves more favourably than participants who were led to

feel distant from past successes. Wilson and Ross concluded that subjective distance from past personal events affects how people evaluate their current selves.

As a preliminary study, the results from Study 1 did shed some light onto how subjective distance may enable men and women to forge or sever connections between past injustices against women and current experiences. However, these interpretations stem mostly from correlations. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether perceiving past injustices committed by an in-group as subjectively distant truly resulted in the alleviation of collective guilt. To address this issue, in this second study we attempted to manipulate subjective distance as an independent variable to test for a causal relation between subjective distance and collective guilt. Specifically, we examined the extent to which women assigned and men accepted collective guilt when past injustices were induced to feel distant versus recent.

Aside from how distant or recent they feel, past injustices should be perceived to be more relevant for individuals who strongly identify with one of the group's involved in the injustices. However, people might have greater reason (i.e., stronger motivation) to protect their collective identity when they do perceive the perpetrator or the victim group to be their own in-group. As such, in this study, we also manipulated the personal relevance of past injustices by depicting the perpetrators and victims to be men and women from either Canada or the Southern United States. Specifically, past injustices were depicted either as a part of Canadian or American history.

Hypotheses

Results from Study 1 suggest that the relevance of past injustices for current members of both a perpetrator group and a victim group depend on how far the injustices

feel from the present. Therefore, we expected men, as members of the perpetrator group, to accept more collective guilt and be more willing to engage in compensatory behaviours when past injustices against women were made to feel recent versus distant (Hypothesis 1a). Similarly, we expected women, as members of the victimized group, to assign more collective guilt to men and be more in favour of compensation when past injustices committed by men are made to feel recent versus distant (Hypothesis 1b).

Past injustices should be most relevant for those who identify their in-group as either the perpetrators or the victims. Therefore, the effect of the distance manipulation might be greater when past injustices are depicted as part of Canadian history. For example, when reflecting upon past injustices in which the perpetrators were men from the Southern United States, Canadian men might perceive American men and not themselves to be accountable. However, they should be less able to dissociate themselves from blame when reflecting upon past injustices in which the perpetrators were men from Canada. Therefore, we hypothesized that male participants would accept greater collective guilt and be more willing to engage in compensatory activities when past injustices were made to feel recent versus distant, but only when the injustices are presented as part of Canadian versus Southern United States history (Hypothesis 2a).

On the other hand, when reflecting upon past injustices in which women from the Southern United States were the victims, Canadian women may feel to some extent that they have also been wronged. However, being Canadians, they should be more likely to perceive themselves as having been wronged when reflecting upon past injustices in which women from Canada were the victims. Therefore, we hypothesized that women would assign greater collective guilt and be more in favour of compensation when past

injustices were made to feel recent versus distant, but only when the injustices are presented as a part of Canadian versus Southern United States history (Hypothesis 2b).

Method

Participants

A total of 189 undergrad students at Wilfrid Laurier University participated in this study; however, 35 did not complete the subjective distance manipulation so were excluded from analysis. Participation involved completing several online measures to earn either a research credit for their PS100 Distance Education requirements or \$8 as compensation. As this study assessed the acceptance or assignment of collective guilt in response to injustices relevant to Canadians, only participants who indicated they have lived in Canada for more than five years were included.⁵ Of the remaining 143 participants, 81 were females and 63 were males. The mean age of participants was 22.27 and the age range was 18-45. Although the majority of participants were of European descent, 30 percent were of diverse ethnic origins.

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed a series of measures and surveys as part of an on-line experiment. A flowchart illustrating the order in which participants received the measures is presented in figure 7. At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their gender, age, country of birth, how long they have lived in Canada, and ethnicity. They also indicated on 10-point scales ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*very much*) how much they identified with their gender, with their ethnic group, and with Canadian culture in particular. Afterwards, participants completed a survey containing items, in a mixed

order, from several scales assessing individual differences in belief in a just world, collective identity, common fate, sexism and feminism.⁶ To mask the purpose of this study (i.e., the focus on gender groups), several items assessing attitudes toward the self and various minority groups were also included. Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

History manipulation. At this point, participants read a paragraph depicting the unjust treatment of women in 1915 (e.g., “*in 1915, spousal rape was not considered a crime and domestic battery was not a chargeable offence*”; see Appendix D). To manipulate the relevance of past injustices to their collective identity, participants were randomly assigned to either the Canadian or the American condition. In the Canadian condition, the paragraph was described as a “snapshot of Canadian history” in order to highlight participant’s connection to the perpetrator and victim groups (i.e., Canadian men and women). In the American condition, the paragraph was described as a “snapshot of Southern United States history” in order to provide participants an opportunity to distinguish their in-group (i.e., Canadians) from the perpetrator group (i.e., Americans).

Subjective distance manipulation. To manipulate subjective distance from the past mistreatment of women, participants were randomly assigned to either the distant or the recent conditions. In the distant condition, past injustices were described as a “fairly distant” point in history. In the recent condition, past injustices were described as a “fairly recent” point in history. In addition, participants in the distant condition were presented with a time line that spans back from “today” to 1900 AD, whereas participants in the recent condition were presented with a time line that spans back from “today” all the way to 0 AD (see Appendix D). Participants were instructed to mark a point on the

time line that represents when the past injustices occurred. These timelines were designed so that participants with the time line spanning back to 1900 AD would mark a point spatially much further from “today” than participants with the time line spanning back to 0 AD, creating a subjective sense of temporal distance.

Collective guilt acceptance. Participants then completed the acceptance subscale of the Collective Guilt Scale (Branscombe et al., 2004; see Appendix E). For male participants, the acceptance subscale consisted of five items (Cronbach’s alpha = .89) that measure how guilty one feels for past actions committed by men against women (e.g., “I feel guilty about the negative things that men have done to women”). For female participants, the five items from the acceptance subscale (Cronbach’s alpha = .90) were modified so that they assessed how guilty they believed men should feel for past injustices committed against women (e.g., “Men should feel guilty about the negative things that men have done to women”). Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Collective guilt assignment. Participants also completed the assignment subscale of the Collective Guilt Scale (see Appendix F). For both genders, the assignment subscale consists of five items (Cronbach’s alpha = .75) that measure how responsible men are perceived to be for past injustices against women (i.e., “Men have benefited at the expense of women for generations”). Participants responded by indicating their agreement with each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Conceptually, this assignment subscale seems very similar to blame. Therefore, so as to avoid confusion when discussing the assignment and acceptance of

collective guilt, we henceforth use the term “collective blame” when referring to collective guilt assignment.

Additional attitudes toward past injustices. Following the collective guilt subscales, participants received a series of items assessing various attitudes toward the past treatment of women (see Appendix G). To verify the effectiveness of the subjective distance manipulation, participants first indicated how far 1915 felt from the present on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*very far*) to 7 (*very near*). Participants then indicated their awareness of the past treatment of women; how unjust the past treatment of women was, how accountable men were initially and still are currently, how accountable women were initially, to what degree women continue to face gender discrimination, whether men have done enough to make amends, how much women’s rights have improved, and how much they expected women’s rights to continue to improve, and to what degree was gender an important part of their identity. These items were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Finally, participants indicated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*) the extent to which women from the opposing country faced injustices similar to the ones they had read about (e.g., “Earlier, you read of the inequalities that women faced in Canada at 1915. To what extent do you think women in the United States were facing the same injustices at that time?”). Specifically, participants who had read about “Canadian” injustices were asked whether women in the United States faced similar injustices, and participants who had read about “American” injustices were asked whether women in Canada faced similar injustices.

Compensation. To assess support for compensation, participants indicated which forms of compensation (i.e., nothing, formal apology, community support, education

about gender issues, and/or monetary compensation) they wanted the government to offer women (see Appendix G). To assess willingness to engage in compensatory behaviours, participants indicated which activities (i.e., nothing, stay informed, discuss with others, sign a petition, write a letter, take part in a protest, volunteer, and/or donate money) they would personally engage in to eliminate gender inequality (see Appendix G).

Results

This study employed a 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) factorial design. The independent variables were whether past injustices were made to feel recent (i.e., recent condition) or distant in the past (i.e., distant condition), and whether past injustices were depicted as being committed by an in-group (i.e., Canada condition) or by a potential out-group (i.e., American condition). The main dependent variables were collective guilt and collective blame. Other dependent variables include support for compensation and belief that gender inequality continues to exist. Mean scores and standard deviations for these dependent variables are presented across conditions for men in Table 6, and for women in Table 7. Correlations between dependent variables are presented for men in Table 8, and for women in Table 9. As in Study 1, men and women were not only investigated together, but also examined separately, even in the absence of a significant interaction.

Manipulation Checks

Subjective distance manipulation. To verify the effectiveness of the subjective distance manipulation, a 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA was conducted with how far 1915

felt from the present as the dependent variable. There was a main effect for subjective distance, such that participants in the recent condition ($M = 4.53, SD = 1.86$) did indeed perceive 1915 to be closer to the present than participants in the distant condition ($M = 5.66, SD = 1.45$), $F(1, 134) = 15.77, p < .001$. There was also a main effect for history, such that participants perceived 1915 to be closer to the present when it reflected a “snapshot of American history” ($M = 4.81, SD = 1.81$) rather than a “snapshot of Canadian history” ($M = 5.37, SD = 1.62$), $F(1, 134) = 3.79, p = .05$. This difference may have occurred because it might be easier to bring to mind past injustices committed by other groups than past injustices committed by an in-group. The effect of gender and all interactions were non-significant, $F_s < 1.24, p > .26$.

Overall the subjective distance manipulation was effective. However, with the relatively low sample size in this study, power to detect some differences between specific cells may have been limited. Therefore, we wondered whether the subjective distance manipulation was equally effective in all conditions. Manipulating past injustices to feel “recent” was meant to increase the association between past injustices and current collective identity. Therefore, as members of the perpetrator group, men might have felt quite threatened when past injustices were manipulated to feel recent, especially in the “Canadian” condition. Due to the threat posed by acknowledging the subjective recency of injustices, we reasoned that men might have shown some resistance to the influence of the “recent” manipulation.

An examination of the means did indeed reveal that the manipulation of distance might have been somewhat less effective for men in the Canadian history condition. For this group only, the difference between the recent ($M = 5.13, SD = 1.54$) and distant ($M =$

5.72, $SD = 1.45$) conditions was not statistically significant, $t(32) = 1.16, p = .25$. The difference between recent and distant conditions were significant, at least marginally, for each of the other groups (Men-American history, $t(26) = 1.72, p < .10$; Women-Canadian history, $t(37) = 3.06, p < .01$; Women-American history, $t(39) = 2.26, p < .03$).

Examination of the means suggest that we were just as successful at making men feel distant from past injustices in the Canadian condition ($M = 5.72$) as we were in the other groups (means for the “distant” conditions ranged from 5.33 to 6.09), but we were not as successful at inducing subjective recency among men in the Canadian group ($M = 5.13$) as we were in the other groups (all other means ranged from 4.00 to 4.53). Therefore, despite the distance manipulation, men seemed somewhat reluctant to perceive past injustices against women to be recent when those injustices occurred in Canada. These exploratory analyses must be interpreted cautiously, especially since the overall interactions did not attain significance. However, because of our theoretical interest in how groups might protect their collective identity, the observation that the most-threatened group (men in the Canadian condition) showed the weakest effect of the distance manipulation is worth keeping in mind when considering subsequent results.

History manipulation. To explore the effect of the history manipulation, we asked participants whether women from the opposing country faced injustices similar to the ones they had earlier read about. This is not a true manipulation check, as it does not assess whether participants (i.e., perpetrators or victims) in each condition identified with the targeted in-group. However, it does assess the manipulation’s effectiveness indirectly by comparing participants’ tendency to enhance or downplay similarities between their in-group (i.e., Canadians) and a related but separate group (i.e., Americans).

A 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed a main effect for history, such that participants in the American condition (i.e., perpetrators and victims belong to an out-group) were less likely to say that Canadian women faced similar injustices ($M = 5.74$, $SD = 1.15$) than participants in the Canadian condition (i.e., perpetrators and victims belong to an in-group) were to say that women in the Southern United States faced similar injustices ($M = 6.31$, $SD = .96$), $F(1, 134) = 9.73$, $p < .01$. The effects for gender and subjective distance, as well as all interactions, were non-significant, F 's < 2.49 , $p > .12$. Therefore, when presented with past injustices committed in Canada, participants seemed quite willing to infer that similar injustices occurred in the Southern United States. However, when presented with past injustices committed in the Southern United States, participants did not necessarily infer that similar injustices occurred in Canada. Such findings imply that participants, regardless of gender, were more eager to share the tarnish on Canadian history with their American counterparts than they were to look for similarities between Americans' past wrongdoings and Canada's own actions.

ANOVAs conducted separately for men and women revealed the main effect of history was stronger for men than women. Women in the American condition were only marginally less likely to report that Canadian women faced similar injustices ($M = 5.97$, $SD = 1.01$) than women in the Canadian condition were to report that women in the Southern United States faced similar injustices ($M = 6.37$, $SD = .90$), $F(1, 76) = 3.43$, $p < .07$. The effect of subjective distance and the interaction were non-significant, F 's < 1.57 , $p > .21$. In contrast, men in the American condition were much less likely to report that Canadian women faced similar injustices ($M = 5.51$, $SD = 1.29$) than men in the

Canadian condition were to report that women in the Southern United States faced similar injustices ($M = 6.25$, $SD = 1.02$), $F(1, 58) = 5.79$, $p < .02$. The effect of subjective distance and the interaction were non-significant, F 's $< .70$, $p > .42$. Therefore, when past injustices were depicted as having occurred in the Southern United States, male participants were particularly unlikely to bring to mind acts committed by their own in-group. It should be noted that, although participants often inferred that similar injustices occurred in the Southern United States when presented with past injustice committed in Canada, the focus was still on "Canadian injustices". Therefore, men in the Canadian condition may have been able to share the blame, but they would not have been in a position to deny it entirely.

Collective Guilt

The items assessing collective guilt acceptance were modified such that they did not have the same meaning for men and women. For men, these items assessed the extent to which they personally felt guilty for past injustices committed against women. In contrast, for women, these items assessed the extent to which they believed men in general should feel guilty for past injustices committed against women. As such, it did not seem appropriate to explore collective guilt acceptance across genders. Instead, we focused on men and women separately.⁷

Perpetrator group. A 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA with men's collective guilt as the dependent variable revealed that there was no effect for subjective distance. Therefore, contrary to Hypothesis 1a, men did not accept greater collective guilt when past injustices were made to feel recent ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.61$) versus distant ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 1.50$), $F(1, 58) = 1.77$,

$p = .18$. There was also no effect for history, such that men did not accept greater collective guilt when past injustices were presented as a part of Canadian ($M = 4.25$, $SD = 1.61$) versus Southern United States history ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 1.46$), $F(1, 58) = 1.91$, $p = .17$. Moreover, the subjective distance X history interaction was non-significant, $F(1, 58) = .41$, $p = .52$. Therefore, contrary to hypothesis 2a, the history manipulation did not seem to moderate the effect of subjective distance on men's collective guilt.

One possible explanation for why no main effect of subjective distance was found might be because of men's reluctance to feel close to past injustices in the recent condition. To explore this possibility, we conducted a 2 (distance from 1915: recent X distant) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA with collective guilt as the dependent variable. In this analysis, instead of using the condition that participants had been assigned to, subjective distance was determined by a median split on men's responses to the "*how far does 1915 feel from the present*" item.⁸ Using this median split, there was a main effect of subjective distance; such that men accepted more collective guilt when 1915 felt recent ($M = 4.59$, $SD = 1.49$) than when 1915 felt distant, ($M = 3.54$, $SD = 1.49$), $F(1, 58) = 7.59$, $p < .01$.⁹ Although there was a trending effect for history, such that men accepted more collective guilt in the Canadian condition ($M = 4.36$, $SD = 1.61$) than in the American condition ($M = 3.77$, $SD = 1.46$), $F(1, 58) = 2.48$, $p = .12$; there was no interaction, $F(1, 58) = .08$, $p = .77$. Therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 1a, the negative emotional consequences of past injustices seem stronger when current members of the perpetrator group are unable to subjectively distance those injustices. However, contradictory to Hypothesis 2a, the history manipulation still failed to moderate the effect of subjective distance.

To further investigate the role of subjective distance in accepting collective guilt, we conducted regression analyses in the Canadian and American conditions with both the subjective distance manipulation and “*how far does 1915 feel from the present*” as the predictor variables.¹⁰ These exploratory analyses were meant to assess the relation between collective guilt and individual differences in subjective distance after accounting for the variance caused by the distance manipulation. For the Canadian condition, there was a marginal condition X distance from 1915 interaction, $b = -.93$, $t(30) = -1.74$, $p = .09$. Follow-up analyses revealed that distance from 1915 predicted collective guilt for men in the recent-Canadian condition, $b = -.54$, $t(14) = -2.40$, $p = .03$; but not for men in the distant-Canadian condition, $b = .03$, $t(16) = .13$, $p = .90$. Conceptually, the recent-Canadian condition poses a double threat, as past injustices are depicted as having been committed by fellow Canadians and as being subjectively recent. It is in this condition that the extra variability in subjective distance not accounted for by the distance manipulation predicts collective guilt. This suggests that, even though past injustices in Canada had been manipulated to feel recent, some men might have been rejecting the subjective recency of the injustices in order to alleviate collective guilt. In the American condition, there was a main effect for the subjective distance manipulation, such that men accepted less guilt when injustices in the Southern United States were made to feel distant, $b = -.38$, $t(24) = -1.97$, $p = .06$; but there was no interaction, $b = .86$, $t(24) = .56$, $p = .58$. Therefore, the relation between collective guilt and men’s reluctance to feel close to past injustices did not seem to persist when injustices were depicted as having occurred in the Southern United States.

Victim group. Even though we had not made any hypotheses, we did conduct a 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA with women's belief that men should accept collective guilt as the dependent variable. The results revealed no main effects or interaction, F 's < 1.61 , $p > .20$. Regression analyses with "how far does 1915 feel from the present" as the predictor variable supported these non-significant findings. Women's belief that men should accept collective guilt was not predicted by distance from 1915 in any of the subjective distance (recent vs. distant) X group history (Canadian vs. American) conditions.

Collective Blame

A 2 (gender: men vs. women) X 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA with collective blame as the dependent variable revealed no main effects or interaction, F 's < 1.37 , $p > .24$. To further explore collective blame, we turned to separate analyses for men and for women.

Perpetrator group. Consistent with the previous analyses, a 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed no main effects or interaction, F 's < 1.28 , $p > .26$. Therefore, men did not blame their in-group more when past injustices felt recent rather than distant, nor when past injustices were depicted as having occurred in Canada rather than the Southern United States. This failure to find an effect for subjective distance may again be due to some men's reluctance to feel close to past injustices in the recent condition. A second ANOVA using the median split on men's responses to "how far does 1915 feel from the present" revealed a trending effect for subjective distance from 1915, such that men blamed their in-group more when 1915 felt recent ($M = 4.42$, $SD = 1.15$) than when 1915 felt distant,

($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.05$), $F(1, 58) = 2.56$, $p = .12$.¹¹ Moreover, although there was no effect for history, $F(1, 58) = 1.15$, $p = .29$; there was a significant history X distance from 1915 interaction, $F(1, 58) = 5.21$, $p < .03$. As presented in figure 8, men in the Canadian condition blamed their in-group more when 1915 felt recent ($M = 4.88$, $SD = .76$) versus distant ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 1.18$), $t(32) = 2.97$, $p = .01$. However, there was no difference in the American condition between when 1915 felt recent ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 1.28$) and when it felt distant ($M = 4.15$, $SD = .79$), $t(26) = -.45$, $p = .66$.

To further explore the role of subjective distance in collective blame, we conducted a series of regression analyses across the subjective distance and history conditions with “*how far does 1915 feel from the present*” as the predictor variable. Subjective distance from 1915 predicted collective blame for men in the recent-Canadian condition, $b = -.52$, $t(14) = -2.29$, $p < .04$; but not for men in the distant-Canadian condition, $b = -.31$, $t(16) = -1.30$, $p = .21$. Therefore, in the recent-Canadian condition (i.e., presumably the most threatening condition for men), the extent to which men blamed their in-group was predicted by the degree to which they accepted or rejected the subjective recency we attempted to induce. Specifically, men who were reluctant to feel close to injustices that occurred in Canada’s recent history seemed less willing to blame their in-group. In addition, subjective distance from 1915 did not predict collective blame for men in the recent-American condition, $b = -.32$, $t(7) = -.90$, $p = .40$; but did for men in the distant-American condition, $b = -.48$, $t(17) = -2.24$, $p = .04$. These results replicate earlier findings concerning men’s acceptance of collective guilt.

Victim group. A 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed no main effects or interaction, F ’s < 1.42 , $p > .70$.

Therefore, contrary to Hypothesis 1b, women were not most likely to blame men when past injustices were made to feel recent. Furthermore, contrary to hypothesis 2b, the history manipulation did not seem to moderate the effect of subjective distance on women's collective blame. Although women did not show the same reluctance to feel close to past injustices as men did, a second ANOVA using the median split on women's responses to "*how far does 1915 feel from the present*" revealed a trending effect for subjective distance. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, women blamed men slightly more when 1915 felt recent ($M = 4.55, SD = 1.13$) versus distant ($M = 4.15, SD = 1.04$), $F(1, 76) = 2.44, p = .12$. Moreover, although there was no effect for history, $F(1, 76) = .69, p < .41$; there was a marginal history X distance from 1915 interaction, $F(1, 76) = 2.95, p < .09$.¹² As presented in figure 9, women in the Canadian condition blamed men more when 1915 felt recent ($M = 4.85, SD = 1.13$) versus distant ($M = 4.04, SD = 1.18$), $t(37) = 2.09, p = .04$. However, there was no difference in the American condition between when 1915 felt recent ($M = 4.23, SD = 1.08$) or distant ($M = 4.26, SD = 0.85$), $t(39) = -.12, p = .90$. Therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the history manipulation seemed to moderate the effect of subjective distance on women's collective blame.

To further explore the role of subjective distance on collective blame, we conducted a series of regression analyses across the subjective distance and history conditions with "*how far does 1915 feel from the present*" as the predictor variable. Unexpectedly, the extent to which women blamed men was predicted by distance from 1915 in the recent-Canadian condition, $b = -.53, t(15) = -2.42, p < .03$; but not in any of the other conditions. Therefore, even when past injustices occurring in Canada are

manipulated to feel recent, some women might have blamed men only when those injustices felt particularly recent.

Compensation

A 2 (gender: men vs. women) X 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA with compensation that participants would like to see offered to women as the dependent variable revealed no main effects or interactions, F 's $< .77$, $p > .38$. Similarly, a second ANOVA with compensatory activities that participants would be willing to partake in revealed no main effects or interactions, F 's < 1.03 , $p > .31$.

Perpetrator group. Results from Study 1 revealed that, as members of the perpetrator group, men's acceptance of collective guilt leads to greater support for compensation towards women. However, as collective guilt reflects how guilty one personally feels for their in-group's transgressions, we were more interested in what men would personally be willing to do to compensate women than how much they supported the general idea of compensation.¹³ To assess what men would personally be willing to do, we had asked them what type of compensatory activities they would personally be willing to engage in to eliminate gender inequality. A 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed no main effects or interaction, F 's $< .75$, $p > .39$. Therefore, contrary to Hypothesis 1a, men were not more willing to engage in various compensatory activities when the past injustices against women were made to feel recent versus distant. Furthermore, contrary to hypothesis 2a, the history manipulation did not moderate the effect of subjective distance on men's willingness to engage in compensatory activities.

Before concluding that subjective distance plays no role in men's willingness to engage in compensatory behaviours, we conducted regression analysis in the Canadian and American conditions with both the subjective distance manipulation and "*how far does 1915 feels from the present*" as the predictor variables. In the Canadian condition, the results revealed a significant condition X distance from 1915 interaction, $b = -1.42$, $t(30) = -2.79$, $p < .01$. Follow-up analyses revealed that distance from 1915 predicted willingness to engage in compensatory behaviours for men in the recent-Canadian condition, $b = -.62$, $t(14) = -2.93$, $p = .01$; but not for men in the distant-Canadian condition, $b = .32$, $t(16) = 1.33$, $p = .20$. Therefore, in the recent-Canadian condition, men's willingness to engage in compensatory behaviours was predicted by the degree to which they accepted or rejected the subjective recency we attempted to induce. Specifically, even though past injustices in Canada were made to feel recent, men who persisted in subjectively distancing 1915 from the present were less willing to engage in compensatory behaviours. In the American condition, there were no main effects or interaction, $b < -1.03$, $p > .56$. These results suggest that subjectively distancing 1915 from the present had no effect on men's willingness to engage in compensatory behaviours when past injustices were depicted as a part of Southern United States history.

Victim group. As members of a victimized group, the extent to which women blame men should not be reflected in what they would personally be willing to do to eliminate gender inequality. Instead, we were interested in the extent to which women wanted compensation for past injustices against women.¹⁴ To assess the extent to which women wanted compensation, we had asked them to indicate which forms of compensation they would like the government to offer women. A 2 (subjective distance:

distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed no main effects or interaction, F 's $< .11$, $p > .74$. Therefore, contrary to Hypothesis 1b, women did not report wanting more types of compensation when past injustices were made to feel recent versus distant. Consistent with the non-significant findings, regression analyses with “*how far does 1915 feels from the present*” as the predictor variable revealed that subjective distance from 1915 did not predict the extent to which women wanted compensation in any of the conditions.

Gender Inequality Continues to Exist

A 2 (gender: men vs. women) X 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA with belief that women continue to face gender discrimination as the dependent variable revealed a main effect for gender. Women ($M = 4.14$, $SD = .14$) reported a stronger belief that woman continue to face discrimination than men ($M = 3.70$, $SD = .16$), $F(1, 132) = 4.17$, $p < .05$. There were no main effects for subjective distance or history, nor any interactions, F 's < 1.70 , $p > .19$.

Perpetrator group. We speculated that men might be more likely to acknowledge that gender inequality still exists when past injustices are induced to feel recent. However, a 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed no main effects or interaction, F 's $< .96$, $p > .33$. Furthermore, a series of regression analyses with “*how far does 1915 feel from the present*” as the predictor variable confirmed that subjective distance from 1915 did not predict men’s belief that gender inequality continues to exist in any of the conditions.

Victim group. We also speculated that women might be more likely to acknowledge current gender inequality when a past injustice is induced to feel recent. A 2

(subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed no main effects or interaction, F 's < 1.34 , $p > .25$. However, regression analyses with “*how far 1915 feels from the present*” as the predictor variable revealed that distance from 1915 predicted the belief that inequality continues to exist for women in the recent-Canada condition, $b = -.62$, $t(13) = -2.84$, $p = .01$. Therefore, when past injustices were depicted as having occurred in recent Canadian history, women seemed more likely to believe that gender inequality still exists when they felt particularly close to 1915.

Additional Analyses: Alternative Defensive Strategies

Disidentification. Could it be possible that, when past injustices were made to feel recent, men were able to alleviate collective guilt by dissociating themselves from their in-group? Past research has demonstrated that people are able to distance themselves from their group's failures by decreasing their identification with that group (Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford 1986). In this manner, members of a perpetrator group may be able to distance themselves from that group's transgressions by decreasing their identification with the perpetrator group. Indeed, when reminded of their in-group's “privileged status” relative to other groups, some White Americans tend to lower their identification with being White (Powell et al., 2005). To measure group disidentification, participants indicated the extent to which gender was an important part of their identity before (i.e., demographic survey) and after (i.e., opinion survey following Collective Guilt Scale) reading about the past injustices against women. For men, we conducted a 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANCOVA with their pre-manipulation gender identity as a covariate and with their post-manipulation gender identity as the dependent variable. Results revealed a significant subjective distance X

group history interaction, $F(1, 55) = 10.11, p < .01$. As depicted in figure 10, after reading about past injustices that occurred in Canada, being male was reported as less important to men's identity when those injustices were made to feel recent ($M = 4.67, SD = 1.50$) versus distant ($M = 5.65, SD = 1.19$), $t(39) = 2.35, p = .02$. However, after reading about past injustices that occurred in the Southern United States, being male was actually reported to be more important when past injustices were made to feel recent ($M = 6.00, SD = 1.08$) versus distant ($M = 4.92, SD = 1.41$), $t(35) = -2.41, p = .02$.¹⁵

Distance as improvement. Another defensive strategy that men may have used to alleviate collective guilt was by perceiving the current treatment of women to be much improved over their past treatment of women. Expanding upon the temporal self-appraisal theory, Wilson and Ross (2001) reported that, in order to see their current selves in a better light, people often derogate former selves belonging to the distant past, but do not derogate past selves belonging to the recent past. Wilson and Ross concluded that people are motivated to perceive their negative traits or behaviours as belonging to a remote self that is different and inferior to the current self. Therefore, by evaluating past selves less favourably than their present or even their recent selves, people tend to believe that they have improved over time, even though no actual improvement may have occurred. Even within the context of interpersonal relationships, past research has demonstrated that perpetrators tend to see improvements in how they currently treat victims, even when no real improvement occurred (Cameron, Ross, & Holmes, 2002).

In attempting to extend these findings to the context of intergroup conflict, we speculated that members of a perpetrator group would be motivated to see improvement in how their group treats members of a victim group (i.e., "it may not be totally fair now,

but look how much it has improved since then!”). First, we conducted a 2 (distance from 1915: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA with perceptions of how unjust the treatment of women in 1915 was as the dependent variable. Results revealed a marginal effect for distance from 1915, such that men did perceived their in-group’s past treatment of women as much more unjust when it felt like it took place in the distant past ($M = 6.58, SD = .76$) rather than the more recent past ($M = 6.04, SD = 1.54$), $F(1, 58) = 3.01, p < .09$. We conducted a second ANOVA with perceived improvement of women’s rights as the dependent variable. Again, the results revealed a main effect for distance from 1915, such that men in the distant condition ($M = 6.64, SD = .60$) perceived more improvement than men in the recent condition ($M = 5.95, SD = 1.13$), $F(1, 56) = 9.26, p < .01$. There was also a main effect for group history, such that men saw more improvement for women’s rights in Canada ($M = 6.52, SD = .67$) than in the Southern United States ($M = 6.07, SD = 1.16$), $F(1, 56) = 3.79, p < .06$. There was no interaction, $F(1, 56) = 2.06, p < .16$.¹⁶

Discussion

In Study 2, we investigated the causal relation between subjective distance and collective guilt for men and between subjective distance and collective blame for women. We expected that men, as members of the perpetrator group, would accept less collective guilt, and be less inclined to undo the harm their in-group has caused, when past injustices against women were made to feel distant versus recent. However, the subjective distance manipulation did not seem to have an effect on men’s collective guilt or on their willingness to engage in different compensatory behaviours.

One possible explanation for why a main effect of subjective distance was not found might be because of men's reluctance to feel close to past injustices. Specifically, using distance from 1915 as a predictor variable, we found that men's collective guilt and willingness to engage in compensatory activities in the recent-Canadian condition were predicted by the extra variability in subjective distance not accounted for by the distance manipulation. Specifically, even though past injustices in Canada had been manipulated to feel recent, some men seemed to have rejected the subjective recency of the injustices. Furthermore, those men who did resist the subjective distance manipulation accepted less collective guilt, and were less willing to engage in compensatory activities.

We also expected that, even when unable to subjectively distance, past injustices would only pose a threat when they were strongly associated to men's in-group. Specifically, when past injustices were depicted as a part of American history, we expected male participants to perceive American and not Canadian men to be accountable, consequently eliminating the effect of feeling close to past injustices. However, men in the Canadian condition did not accept greater collective guilt nor were they more willing to engage in compensatory activities than men in the American condition. Therefore, at first glance, the history manipulation appeared to have no effect. This may have been because participants did not make enough of a distinction between American and Canadian men, or maybe because injustices that occurred in the United States brought to mind similar injustices that occurred in Canada.

Although having no direct effect on collective guilt or willingness to engage in compensatory activities, the history manipulation did seem to have an effect on men's reluctance to perceive past injustices as subjectively recent. Conceptually, the recent-

Canadian condition should have posed a double threat for men, as past injustices were depicted as having been committed by their in-group and as being subjectively recent. However, when past injustices had been manipulated to feel recent, men showed a greater tendency to reject the subjective recency of these injustices when they had been also been depicted as a part of Canadian versus United States history. These findings suggest that men may have persisted to subjectively distance recent injustices that occurred in Canada to reduce threat. However, men may not have needed to distance recent injustices that occurred in the United States because the threat might have already been reduced by dissociating their in-group (i.e., Canadian men) from those they perceived to be responsible (i.e., American men).

Consistent with the first study, we found further evidence that, when faced with belonging to a perpetrator group, men seemed to use whatever mechanisms are available to protect their collective identity. Specifically, our findings revealed two additional strategies that men may have used to defend against threat. Instead of distinguishing their in-group from the perpetrator group, some men may have personally disidentified from the perpetrator group. Specifically, when the injustices were depicted as a part of Canadian history, we found that men in the recent condition reported their gender as less important to their identity than men in the distant condition. The second defensive strategy draws upon temporal self-appraisals. Wilson and Ross (2001) reported that, by evaluating their distant past selves less favourably than their present or recent selves, people are able to convince themselves that they have improved, even though no actual improvement may have occurred. In a similar manner, we found that men in the distant condition reported the past mistreatment of women as being much more unjust, and

followed by much greater improvement in women's rights, than men in the recent condition. Therefore, instead of simply perceiving past injustices against women as very distant, men may be able to defend against threat by perceiving the past mistreatment of women to be much worse than how women are currently treated.

We expected that women, as members of the victim group, would blame men to a greater extent and be more in favour of compensation when past injustices were made to feel recent versus distant. However, the subjective distance manipulation did not seem to have an effect on women's collective blame or on their support for various types of compensation. These findings suggest that subjective distance may not have played as large a role for women's assignment of collective blame as it seemed to have for men's acceptance of collective guilt. It is conceivable that, similar to how men may resort to alternative strategies to alleviate collective guilt when unable to subjectively distance past injustices, women may resort to alternative strategies to emphasize men's culpability when unable to feel close to past injustices. For instance, women may no longer need to subjectively push forward past injustices if they can readily bring to mind an injustice that really did occur much closer to the present. However, such conclusions are beyond the scope of this study and would require future research to determine if that is the case.

In this study, we employed the acceptance and assignment subscales of the Collective Guilt Scale (Branscombe et al., 2004). The acceptance and assignment subscales have been designed to measure the same construct (i.e., collective guilt) but from the perspective of either the perpetrator or the victim group. As such, these two subscales seem to reflect different aspects of collective guilt. However, we reasoned that either subscale could be relevant to current members of both the perpetrator and the

victim group. In the past, the acceptance subscale has been used to assess the affective experience of guilt that current members of a perpetrator group may experience.

However, we modified the acceptance subscale so that it assessed the extent to which women, as members of the victim group, believed that men should feel guilty for past injustices against women. Conceptually, this modified acceptance scale seems to reflect the assignment of guilt as an affective state more than the actual assignment subscale. On the other hand, the assignment subscale has been used in the past to assess perceptions of out-group culpability that current members of a victim group may hold. However, we used the assignment subscale to assess the extent to which men, as members of the perpetrator group, held their own in-group accountable for past injustices against women. Although we did conduct some exploratory analyses, future research is needed to investigate what role, if any, that these new concepts (i.e., belief that current members of a perpetrator group should feel guilty, and perceptions of in-group culpability) may play in the acceptance and assignment of collective guilt.

A limitation of this study might be a potential confound contained within the subjective distance manipulation. Although the purpose of the time line was to alter the spatial distance from “today”, the time lines contained additional information that could have influenced our results, possibly even working against the predicted effects. In the distant condition, participants indicated when past injustices against women occurred on a time line spanning from “today” to “1900 AD”. In contrast, in the recent condition, participants indicated when past injustices against women occurred on a timeline spanning from “today” all the way to “0 AD”. We expected that participants with the time line spanning back to “1900 AD” would mark a point spatially much further from

“today” than participants with the time line spanning back to “0 AD”, thus creating a greater sense of subjective temporal distance. However, the end points “1900 AD” and “0 AD” may have affected perceptions of subjective distance in the opposite direction than expected. For example, the “0 AD” condition was intended to make 1915 seem recent, but at the same time it primes a much more distant point in time (i.e., 0 AD) than the distant condition which uses the endpoint “1900 AD”. It is conceivable that the endpoints acted as an anchor or prime, eliciting a more “distant” or “recent” frame of mind that ran counter to the spatial focus of the manipulation. Specifically, injustices in the recent condition may have felt quite distant, whereas injustices in the distant condition may have felt relatively recent.

This potential anchoring effect has implications for our finding that on the manipulation check, some individuals, particularly men in the recent-Canadian condition, were able to resist the effects of the subjective distance manipulation. We interpreted this as evidence of men’s reluctance to perceive past injustices committed by their in-group as subjectively recent. However, this resistance to the manipulation may simply have been caused by an anchoring effect produced by the endpoints of the timelines. This alternative interpretation does not seem likely though, as variants of the subjective distance manipulation have been successfully used in the past (Wilson & Ross, 2003). Despite the fact that, overall, the manipulation seemed to be effective, this anchoring effect may have had a less obvious impact on some of the other dependent variables. If the anchoring effect had countered the effect of the subjective distance manipulation, this would account for why no differences between the recent and distant conditions were found for any of the dependent variables.

General Discussion

Gender inequality, with women being disadvantaged compared to men, may be the most prevalent form of group-based inequality through history. We speculated that women and men might have different motives when making sense of the mistreatment of women throughout history. Generally, men may try to minimize the relevance that the past mistreatment of women has for their current collective identity. On the other hand, women may try to emphasize the relevance that the past mistreatment of women has for their current collective identity. Although, women and men likely have many distinct strategies to carry out their motives, we believed that altering subjective distance might be one strategy that both groups share. Specifically, men may be able to minimize the relevance of past injustices committed by their in-group by perceiving those injustices as “ancient history” and “over and done with”. In contrast, women may be able to emphasize the relevance of past injustices committed against their in-group by perceiving those injustices as “close to the present” or even as “having never ended”.

In two experiments, we examined the potential use of subjective distance by men and women as a means to forge or sever connections between past injustices and their current experiences. In Study 1, we found that men tended to subjectively distance past injustices when they had been presented only with those injustices. Furthermore, the further in the past that the injustices felt, the less collective guilt men accepted, and the less supportive they were of compensation. On the other hand, we found that women tended to perceive past injustices as relatively recent, at least compared to men in the threat condition. Furthermore, the closer to the present that the injustices felt, the more women believed that they should be compensated. In Study 2, we sought to determine the

causal role of subjective distance in collective guilt and blame. We were not successful in this attempt; perhaps because some men appeared to have resisted our attempts to make past injustices against women feel recent. Furthermore, men in the recent-Canadian condition who did resist the subjective distance manipulation (i.e., felt further from past injustices) accepted less collective guilt and were less willing to engage in compensatory behaviours. On the other hand, we found that subjective distance may not have played as important of a role for women's collective blame and desire to be compensated.

Altogether, the findings from these two studies suggest that men might use subjective temporal distance to protect or maintain their collective identity. Specifically, some men may alter subjective distance to defend their collective identity from the threat posed by their in-groups' past misdeeds. On the other hand, the findings were inconsistent concerning the role of subjective distance for women. In Study 1, women were more in favour of compensation to the extent that the injustices felt recent. However, Study 2 yielded no evidence for an effect of subjective distance on the extent to which women blamed men or on their support for compensation.

Protecting collective identity. Past research has demonstrated that people possess a variety of strategies to protect the self from threat, such that when one strategy is unavailable, people can turn to another one (Tesser et al., 2000). Consistent with this finding, we found that men were able to rely on a variety of strategies in order to protect their collective identity. Furthermore, the successful use of any one strategy to eliminate threat might have precluded the need to engage in other defensive strategies. In Study 1, we found that men no longer subjectively distanced past injustices when they had been reminded of the advances women have made. Presumably, men may have been able to

convince themselves that gender inequality no longer exists when given a chance to mull over the advances in women's rights that have been made since the past mistreatment of women. As such, men seemed to have no longer needed to subjectively distance past injustices. In Study 2, we found that men seemed reluctant to feel close to past injustices, but only when those injustices were relevant to their identity as Canadian men.

Presumably, when injustices were depicted as a part of American history, male participants may have felt less threat to their collective identity by dissociating their in-group (i.e., Canadian men) from those responsible for the past mistreatment of women (i.e., American men), consequently precluding the need to subjectively distance those injustices. Men may also have eliminated threat by dissociating themselves personally from their in-group, and by perceiving men's current treatment of women as having greatly improved since men's past mistreatment of women.

Perceived illegitimacy. Belonging to a disadvantaged group can be a negative experience. However, people's responses to belonging to that disadvantaged group are largely dependent on the extent to which they perceive their group's low status as legitimate (Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). Specifically, people who perceive their group's low status to be illegitimate may likely feel resentment and be motivated to improve their group's status through collective action. However, people who perceive their group's low status to be legitimate may likely perceive collective action as futile and instead rely on more creative strategies to reaffirm, at least in their own eyes, their group's status.

What role does perceived illegitimacy have for women's response to past instances of gender inequality? Women may only feel a sense of outrage and a desire to

improve their in-group's status when they perceive men's past mistreatment of women as having lasting consequences. As such, consistent with our earlier hypotheses, some women may be motivated to feel close to past instances of gender inequality to bolster their perceptions of the unjustness and illegitimacy of women's current status, and consequently to encourage collective action as an appropriate response. On the other hand, some women may perceive men's past mistreatment of women to be fair and legitimate, that women at the time did not deserve any better. Such a negative perception of their in-group could act as a threat to women's collective identity. In such instances, women may actually be motivated to subjectively distance past instances of gender inequality. By delegating their in-group's victim status to women in the distant past, women today may be able to convince themselves that they deserve better and are treated as such, consequently eliminating the threat of legitimate gender inequality.

Historical injustices versus ongoing inequality. In this study, we assessed women and men's responses to specific historical injustices. However, gender inequality is not limited to the past. On the contrary, women today still face many forms of gender discrimination across many realms of life. With this in mind, we cannot be sure that, by having participants read about past injustices against women, we are not simply reminding them of the gender inequality that exists even today in our society. Given our focus on subjective distance, it may be that the perception of past injustices as being pertinent to the present is integral to the experience of collective guilt. Indeed, past research indicates that Whites experience collective guilt over the slavery of Blacks, not because of perceived responsibility for slavery, but because they have personally done nothing to eliminate the ongoing effects of racism against Blacks (Lickel, Schmader, &

Barquissau, 2004). In a similar manner, Swim and Miller (1999) reported that Whites experience collective guilt when they acknowledge the advantages that they personally receive for belonging to a “privileged” group.

Guilt over both historical injustices and ongoing inequality require the acknowledgement that an in-group is responsible for injustices against another group. However, one distinction between these two types of guilt may be that guilt over specific historical injustices seems to represent a threat to a collective identity that encompasses not only the present group but even a temporally extended in-group, whereas guilt over general, ongoing inequality may be more likely to represent a threat to the personal identity. For example, some Germans today still express guilt for the Holocaust, even though they may not have even been born at the time. As such, instead of stemming from personal accountability, people seem to be experiencing guilt because of their association with those responsible for the past transgressions. On the other hand, some Whites express guilt, not over the past slavery of Blacks, but because of their personal inaction against the ongoing consequences of racism (Lickel et al., 2004).

If guilt stemming from a focus on specific historic injustices represents a different type of threat than guilt stemming from a focus on pervasive ongoing inequality (i.e., collective identity vs. personal identity), then people may respond differently to reduce these threats. As we have demonstrated, people possess a variety of strategies with which they can protect collective identity from the threat posed by an in-group’s past transgressions. However, many of these strategies should be ineffective in protecting personal identity from the threat posed by contemporary injustice. For example, if people regard current inequality as pervasive and ongoing, they should not be able to distance

such inequality. In addition, if people hold themselves accountable for not acting against such inequality, then dissociation of their selves or of their in-groups from those directly accountable should not alleviate their guilt. Complicating matters, some people may experience guilt in response to both past and current inequality. Even if these people could minimize the threat posed by specific historic injustices, they would still be motivated to escape their guilt over ongoing pervasive inequality.

Future research is needed to further disentangle the defensive strategies and behavioural consequences that are associated with guilt over specific historical injustices and with guilt over pervasive ongoing inequality. One way to go about this may be by first distinguishing between past injustices that are firmly in the past and do not reflect the current relation between current members of both the perpetrator and the victim group, and past injustices that are ongoing or are reflective of the pervasive inequality that still exists between current members of both the perpetrator group and the victim group. However, this may be easier said than done. Historical and contemporary injustices may not always be easily separated; focus on past injustice might bring to mind present inequality, whereas a focus on current unfairness might bring to mind historical acts that brought about current conditions. Furthermore, the lasting consequences of a past injustice may be less recognizable to a researcher looking in from the outside than to an actual member of one of the groups involved. For example, current members of a victim group might strongly dispute an outsider's claim that a past injustice is "over and done with". On the other hand, the victim perspective may not necessarily be the most accurate one. For example, current members of a perpetrator group might feel wrongly accused by an outsider deeming a past injustice as having "ongoing consequences". As

such, one needs to be careful when relying on the accounts of past injustices provided by members of either the victim or perpetrator group when attempting to determine the relevance of those injustices to the present.

Gender inequality as a unique case. In this study, we examined past injustices committed by men against women. However, gender inequality might be distinct from other group-based (i.e., race, religion, class, etc.) inequalities. Specifically, there seems to be more contact and affiliation between men and women than there are between other groups who have historically been at odds with one another (i.e., Blacks and Whites, Jews and Germans, etc.). Such interdependence between groups may influence their perceptions of and responses to a past injustice. When the groups are segregated, as usually seems the case for ethnic groups, it may be easier for each group to interpret past injustices in an unashamedly group-serving manner in order to protect their collective identity. For instance, members of a perpetrator group may justify their in-group's actions by derogating or blaming the victim group (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). In such cases, members of the perpetrator group may not need to subjectively distance the injustices in order to protect their collective identity. On the other hand, members of a victim group may protect their in-group's identity by interpreting the injustices strictly in terms of out-group hostility. It is possible that it would be more important for members of the perpetrator group to perceive injustices as recent and relevant to the present in such cases.

Such negative perceptions of the other group may be less advantageous, or even frowned upon, when the victim and perpetrator group are more strongly affiliated with one another, as is the case with women and men. Indeed, when men have a strong affiliation with women, they may be more likely to acknowledge the injustices committed

against women. However, men may still rely on more subtle strategies to protect their identity, such as by subjectively distancing the injustices or by disidentifying with men as their in-group. On the other hand, when women have a strong affiliation to men, they may be more likely to forgive, or at least less likely to blame men as a whole. No longer holding men accountable, these women might possibly feel less of a need to perceive past injustices as being subjectively recent. Future research is needed to determine the effect, if any, of the degree of interdependency between the perpetrator and victim group on subjective distance from historical injustices. One way to determine interdependency may be by simply asking for the degree of contact and the type of relations that individuals have with members of an opposing group. However, it may also be worthy to consider societal issues such as the current status difference and degree of segregation between the victim and perpetrator groups as a measure of interdependency.

Conclusion

As society becomes more diverse, social groups who have historically been at odds with each other will begin to interact with each other on a more regular basis. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly imperative to find ways to alleviate the tensions that exist between different groups of people. Recent research suggests that individuals who feel guilty for the actions of their in-group often feel a need to make reparations to members of the mistreated group (Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Swim & Miller, 1999). On the other hand, current members of a victim group are more likely to forgive and move on when the perpetrator group accepts responsibility and, at the least, apologizes for their past actions (Nadler & Liviatan, 2004). Therefore, understanding when people will accept or assign collective guilt could be used to facilitate the process of forgiveness and

reconciliation. To this end, we believe that our research has shed some light onto the role of subjective distance in the acceptance and assignment of collective guilt.

However, it is not clear whether and when it would be more beneficial for either the victimized or the perpetrator group to perceive past injustices as subjectively recent or distant. In promoting reconciliation between groups, will it always be favourable for current members of the perpetrator group to feel close to past injustices, such that they would be more likely to acknowledge their transgressions and to compensate? Or are there some instances in which it would be more advantageous, for themselves and for the victim group, to perceive past injustices as distant? For example, if the victim group has already forgiven and moved on, making past injustices feel recent would needlessly compel current members of the perpetrator group to feel guilty. Furthermore, the behavioural responses to such guilt (i.e., apology or compensation) may only function to bring back painful memories for the victim group. On the other hand, will it always be favourable for current members of a victim group to perceive past injustices to be distant, such that they are more likely to forgive and forget? Or are there some instances in which this shift in subjective distance would undermine more effective ways for coping with past transgressions against an in-group? For instance, by feeling that past injustices are “ancient history”, current members of the victim group may be less willing to address the negative consequences that past injustices against their in-group continue to have. Therefore, further research is required to better understand how and when subjective distance may be used to facilitate or inhibit the reconciliation process between different groups who have historically been at odds with each other.

Table 1

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables across Gender and Conditions in Study 1

Variable	Women Threat		Women Mitigated-Threat		Men Threat		Men Mitigated-Threat	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Subjective distance	10.02	3.00	10.23	3.13	11.45	2.72	10.23	3.54
Men responsible for injustices	3.73	0.83	3.54	0.95	3.72	0.94	3.62	1.01
Women responsible for injustices	2.48	0.86	2.17	0.90	2.19	0.73	2.26	0.97
Men responsible for rights	2.79	0.91	2.59	0.87	3.22	0.90	2.76	0.90
Women responsible for rights	3.80	1.04	4.17	0.75	3.30	1.09	3.83	0.80
Collective guilt	4.48	1.67	4.55	1.61	4.36	1.76	4.40	1.72
Compensation	3.68	1.85	3.73	1.94	2.98	1.84	3.19	1.83
Inequality no longer exists	4.23	1.89	4.18	1.98	5.19	1.94	5.83	1.88

Ratings were made on a 5-point scale with exception of collective guilt, compensation, and inequality no longer exists (9-point scales); and subjective distance (15 cm line)

Table 2

Bivariate Correlations Between Dependent Variables for Men in the Threat Condition in Study 1

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Subjective distance	.19	-.03	.27†	.19	-.34*	-.33*	.31*
2. Men responsible for injustices		-.36**	.34*	.01	-.03	-.07	.22
3. Women responsible for injustices			-.01	.31*	-.13	-.15	-.11
4. Men responsible for rights attained				-.32*	-.12	-.12	.18
5. Women responsible for rights attained					.02	.06	-.16
6. Collective guilt						.56**	-.27*
7. Compensation							-.44**
8. Inequality no longer exists							

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$

Table 3

*Bivariate Correlations Between Dependent Variables for Men in the Mitigated-threat**Condition in Study 1*

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Subjective distance	.27†	-.38*	.04	.34*	.11	-.01	.06
2. Men responsible for injustices		-.21	.11	.43**	.30*	.34*	-.02
3. Women responsible for injustices			.30*	-.08	-.09	-.02	-.30*
4. Men responsible for rights attained				-.25†	.06	-.14	-.09
5. Women responsible for rights attained					.26†	.15	.11
6. Collective guilt						.64**	-.33*
7. Compensation							-.28†
8. Inequality no longer exists							

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$

Table 4

Bivariate Correlations Between Dependent Variables for Women in the Threat Condition in Study 1

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Subjective distance	-.28**	.02	-.18†	.05	-.14	-.33**	.50**
2. Men responsible for injustices		-.24*	.07	.27**	.33**	.27*	-.06
3. Women responsible for injustices			.16	.04	.01	-.10	.03
4. Men responsible for rights attained				-.40**	.07	.19†	.03
5. Women responsible for rights attained					.09	-.12	.06
6. Collective guilt						.24*	-.12
7. Compensation							-.12
8. Inequality no longer exists							

** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10

Table 5

Bivariate Correlations Between Dependent Variables for Women in the Mitigated-threat Condition in Study 1

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Subjective distance	.02	.01	-.08	.11	-.15	-.22*	.18†
2. Men responsible for injustices		-.25*	-.03	.08	.04	.27**	-.15
3. Women responsible for injustices			.23*	-.18†	-.12	.03	.16
4. Men responsible for rights attained				-.40**	.02	.12	.02
5. Women responsible for rights attained					.01	-.10	-.08
6. Collective guilt						.18†	-.06
7. Compensation							-.14
8. Inequality no longer exists							

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$

Table 6

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables for Men in Study 2

Variable	Distant Canadian		Distant American		Recent Canadian		Recent American	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Subjective distance from 1915	5.72	1.45	5.47	1.61	5.13	1.54	4.44	1.13
Similar injustices in U.S./Canada?	6.44	0.62	5.58	1.39	6.06	1.34	5.44	1.13
Collective guilt	4.39	1.54	4.09	1.48	4.11	1.71	3.28	1.32
Collective blame	4.26	1.01	4.25	0.89	4.25	1.31	3.60	1.37
Compensation willing to do	2.61	1.94	2.58	1.95	2.00	1.75	2.89	2.62
Compensation would like to see	1.39	0.85	1.59	1.12	1.38	1.09	1.56	1.42
Inequality still exists	3.44	1.20	3.95	1.40	3.63	1.26	3.78	1.09
Importance of gender to identity	5.65	1.03	4.94	1.55	4.50	1.46	6.22	0.97
Past treatment of women was unjust	6.33	1.46	6.47	0.77	6.31	0.87	5.89	1.97
Improvement since past injustices	6.78	0.43	5.95	1.27	6.29	0.83	6.11	0.93

Ratings were made on a 7-point scale with exception of compensation that one would like to see (checklist of 4 items); and compensation one would be willing to do (checklist of 8 items)

Table 7

Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables for Women in Study 2

Variable	Distant Canadian		Distant American		Recent Canadian		Recent American	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Subjective distance from 1915	6.09	1.02	5.33	1.65	4.53	2.10	4.00	2.10
Similar injustices in U.S./Canada?	6.27	0.94	6.14	1.01	6.47	0.87	5.80	1.01
Collective guilt	3.41	1.42	3.80	1.17	3.39	1.74	3.82	1.50
Collective blame	4.35	1.09	4.19	1.02	4.36	1.40	4.37	0.98
Compensation willing to do	2.91	1.95	2.71	2.05	2.47	1.70	2.71	1.76
Compensation would like to see	1.60	0.82	1.62	1.12	1.65	1.54	1.75	1.25
Inequality still exists	3.91	1.23	4.05	1.28	4.13	1.30	4.45	0.89
Importance of gender to identity	5.68	1.04	5.71	1.35	6.33	1.05	5.55	1.28
Past treatment of women was unjust	6.36	1.05	6.38	0.97	6.65	0.49	6.45	0.89
Improvement since past injustices	6.27	0.77	5.95	1.24	6.13	1.15	5.95	1.05

Ratings were made on a 7-point scale with exception of compensation that one would like to see (checklist of 4 items); and compensation one would be willing to do (checklist of 8 items)

Table 8

Bivariate Correlations Between Dependent Variables for Men in Study 2

		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	Subjective distance from 1915	-.28*	-.34**	-.13	-.27*	-.06	.12	.08	.36**
2.	Collective guilt		.51**	.49**	.42**	.33**	-.07	.36**	-.11
3.	Collective blame			.50**	.55**	.34**	-.25†	.33**	-.20
4.	Compensation willing to do				.70**	.35**	.09	.26*	-.23†
5.	Compensation would like to see					.25†	.00	.24†	-.25†
6.	Inequality still exists						-.03	.32*	-.35**
7.	Importance of gender to identity							-.29	.11
8.	Past treatment of women was unjust								.12
9.	Improvement since past injustices								

** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10

Table 9

Bivariate Correlations Between Dependent Variables for Women in Study 2

		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	Subjective distance from 1915	-.07	-.14	-.07	-.07	-.28*	.11	.07	.27*
2.	Collective guilt		.73**	.15	.23*	.05	-.10	-.02	-.23*
3.	Collective blame			.38**	.40**	.24*	.25*	.23*	-.26*
4.	Compensation willing to do				.55**	.46**	.05	.30*	-.03
5.	Compensation would like to see					.21†	-.10	.34**	-.09
6.	Inequality still exists						-.02	.07	-.24*
7.	Importance of gender to identity							.35**	.09
8.	Past treatment of women was unjust								.14
9.	Improvement since past injustices								

** p < .01; * p < .05; † < .10

Figure 1. Flowchart illustrating experimental design of Study 1.




Figure 2. Gender (men vs. women) X condition (threat vs. mitigated-threat) interaction on subjective distance.




Figure 3. Regression for men with collective guilt as the criterion variable, and condition (threat vs. mitigated-threat) and subjective distance as the predictor variables.




Figure 4. Regression for men with support for compensation as the criterion variable, and condition (threat vs. mitigated-threat) and subjective distance as the predictor variables.




Figure 5. Pathway analyses testing the relations between the condition X subjective distance interaction, support for compensation, and collective guilt for men.




Figure 6. Regressions for men with belief that gender inequality no longer exists as the criterion variable and subjective distance as the predictor variable.




Figure 7. Flowchart illustrating experimental design of Study 2




Figure 8. History (Canadian vs. American) X distance from 1915 (distant vs. recent)

interaction on men's collective blame toward their in-group.




Figure 9. History (Canadian vs. American) X distance from 1915 (distant vs. recent) interaction on women's collective blame toward men.





Figure 10. Subjective distance (distant vs. recent) X history (Canadian vs. American)
interaction on men's gender identity



Footnotes

¹ We only included Canadian-born participants to ensure that male participants identified themselves as a member of the perpetrator group (i.e., Canadian men) and could not dissociate themselves from the past injustices depicted in this study by bringing to mind some other nationality they belong to that was not responsible for the injustices. However, the same patterns of findings do persist, albeit not as strongly, when both Canadian and non-Canadian born participants are included in the analyses.

² It seems possible that participants of diverse ethnic origins may perceive historic injustices that occurred in Canada as irrelevant to their selves. However, this does not seem to be the case. Participants of diverse ethnic origins ($M = 8.47$, $SD = 1.57$) reported themselves to be as strongly identified with Canadian culture as did participants of European descent ($M = 8.65$, $SD = 1.41$), $t(299) = .77$, $p = .44$. Moreover, the same patterns of findings persist, albeit not as strongly, when participants of diverse ethnic origins are excluded from the analyses.

³ We included measures of just world belief, collective self-esteem, sexism and feminism for exploratory purposes. However, none of these variables yielded any notable results, so were not discussed further.

⁴ All regressions were run according to the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991). Specifically, all predictor variables were centered (i.e., the mean for any predictor variable was subtracted from each individual score to yield a total mean of zero). In addition, the condition variable was always dummy coded (0 = injustice, 1 = equality) when included in a regression analysis. Finally, we only reported standardized betas (b).

⁵ We included participants who had lived for 6 or more years in Canada to ensure that they identified themselves as members of the perpetrator group (i.e., Canadian men) or members of the victim group (i.e., Canadian women). Six years was chosen as the selection criterion because results from our background survey indicate that it is at this time that immigrants appear to begin identifying with Canadian culture. Canadian identity was significantly lower for immigrants who have been here for 5 or less years ($M = 5.18, SD = 2.32$) than for immigrants who have been here at least 6 years ($M = 7.86, SD = 1.71$), $t(30) = 3.72, p = .001$. In addition, there was no significant difference between the Canadian identity of immigrants who had been here for at least 6 years and Canadian-born citizens, ($M = 8.04, SD = 1.70$), $t(141) = .46, p = .65$.

⁶ We included measures of just world belief, collective identity, common fate, sexism, and feminism for exploratory purposes. However, as in the first study, none of these variables yielded any notable results, so were not discussed further.

⁷ For exploratory purposes, we did conduct a 2 (gender: female vs. male) X 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA with collective guilt as a dependent variable. The results yielded a marginal gender X distance interaction, $F(1, 135) = 3.41, p < .07$. Men accepted more guilt ($M = 4.24, SD = 1.50$) than women believed they should ($M = 3.40, SD = 1.29$) in the distant condition, but accepted roughly the same amount of guilt ($M = 3.70, SD = 1.61$) as women believed they should ($M = 3.81, SD = 1.59$) in the recent condition. There were no main effects and none of the other interactions were significant, F 's $< 2.00, p > 0.16$.

⁸ The median score for responses to "how far does 1915 feel from the present" was 6.00. Participants who scored equal or above the median were assigned to the distant

group, whereas participants who scored below the median were assigned to the recent group.

⁹ A regression analysis with men's collective guilt as the criterion variable and with the history manipulation and "*how far does 1915 feel from the present*" as the predictor variables revealed the same pattern. Men accepted more collective guilt to the extent that 1915 felt recent, $b = -.29$, $t(59) = -2.36$, $p = .02$.

¹⁰ The condition variables, subjective distance (0 = distant, 1 = recent) and history (0 = Canadian, 1 = American), were dummy coded when included in regression analyses.

¹¹ A regression analyses with men's collective blame as the criterion variable and with the history manipulation and "*how far does 1915 feel from the present*" as the predictor variables revealed the same pattern. Men blamed their in-group more to the extent that 1915 felt recent, $b = -.35$, $t(59) = -2.88$, $p < .01$.

¹² These results should be interpreted with caution, as regression analyses did not replicate the effect of distance from 1915, $b = -.16$, $t(77) = -1.38$, $p = .17$, nor the history X distance from 1915 interaction, $b = -.35$, $t(76) = 1.09$, $p = .28$.

¹³ It is conceivable that, regardless of what they personally be willing to do, men who accept collective guilt may be more likely to support various forms of compensation (e.g. government apology) than men who do not experience collective guilt. Therefore, we speculated that men would support more forms of compensation when past injustices against women were manipulated to feel recent versus distant. However, a 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed no main effects or interaction, $F's < .43$, $p > .51$. Taking into consideration men's reluctance to feel close to past Canadian injustices in the recent condition, we decided to conduct

separate regression analyses across the subjective distance X history conditions with “*how far does 1915 feels from the present*” as the predictor variable. However, supporting the non-significant findings, distance from 1915 did not predict men’s support for various forms of compensation in any of the conditions except in the distant-American condition, $b = -.54$, $t(15) = -2.48$, $p < .03$.

¹⁴ To correct the past wrongs committed against their in-group, some women may take matter into their own hands. Therefore, we speculated that women may be willing to engage in more types of activities aiming at eliminating gender inequality when past injustices against women were manipulated to feel recent versus distant. However, a 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs. American) ANOVA revealed no main effects or interaction, F ’s $< .28$, $p > .60$. However, regression analyses with “*how far does 1915 feels from the present*” as the predictor variable revealed that subjective distance from 1915 did not predict women’s willingness to engage in various collective action behaviours across any of the conditions except in the recent-Canadian condition, $b = -.71$, $t(17) = -3.86$, $p < .01$. Therefore, even though injustices in Canadian history had already been manipulated to feel distant, some women may have been more likely to take collective action when they perceived the injustices as particularly recent.

¹⁵ We conducted a similar analysis for women. According to the Rejection-Identification Model (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999) when coping with prejudice, one way for members of a disadvantaged group maintain collective well-being is by identifying themselves more strongly with their in-group and dissociating from the majority group. In this way, the majority group’s actions are given less importance. However, a 2 (subjective distance: distant vs. recent) X 2 (history: Canadian vs.

American) ANCOVA with pre-manipulation gender identity as a covariate and with post-manipulation gender identity as the dependent variable did not reveal any main effects or interactions, $F^3s < 1.38, p > .24$. Therefore, women did not seem to identify more strongly with being female after reading about past injustices against women.

¹⁶For women, a similar ANOVA with perceptions of how unjust the treatment of women in 1915 as the dependent variable revealed a history X distance from 1915 interaction, $F(1, 76) = 2.94, p = .09$. Women reported injustices in Canada to be similarly unjust, regardless of whether they felt distant ($M = 6.42, SD = .88$) or more recent ($M = 6.60, SD = .83$). However, women reported injustices in the Southern United States to be more unjust when they felt distant ($M = 6.68, SD = .48$) compared to when they felt more recent ($M = 6.18, SD = 1.14$). A second ANOVA with perceived improvement of women's rights as the dependent variable revealed a main effect for distance from 1915, such that women who felt distant from past injustices ($M = 6.42, SD = .86$) perceived more improvement than women who felt close to past injustices ($M = 5.76, SD = 1.13$), $F(1, 75) = 8.58, p < .01$. There was also a history X distance from 1915 interaction, such that women saw little improvement from American injustices, but only for ones that occurred in the recent past, $F(1, 75) = 3.48, p < .07$. Therefore, unlike men, women did not necessarily perceive the past treatment of women to be more unjust when it felt further in the past. However, like men, they did tend to see more improvement when the past treatment of women felt distant rather than more recent.

Appendix B Rights Questionnaire

After the turn of the 20th century, women began to receive the same rights and privileges that only men had previously been entitled to. From 1916 to 1928, women received the right to vote, to run for office, and to own property. Indeed, by 1928, it had been established that both men and women were recognized as ‘persons’ and therefore equal under the law.

Past events may sometimes *feel* quite recent or distant, regardless of how long ago they actually occurred. Please think about the rights attained by women by 1928 as described above. Place a mark through the lines below at the points that best indicate how far away the attainment of rights *feels* from the present.

feels very distant from present	feels very close to present
------------------------------------	--------------------------------

feels very far away	feels very near
---------------------	-----------------

Before reading this questionnaire, how aware were you of the rights attained by women by 1928?

1 -----	2 -----	3 -----	4 -----	5
not at all aware		moderately aware		fully aware

To what degree do you feel that men are responsible for the rights attained by women by 1928?

1 -----	2 -----	3 -----	4 -----	5
not at all responsible		moderately responsible		fully responsible

To what degree do you feel that women are responsible for the rights attained by women by 1928?

1 -----	2 -----	3 -----	4 -----	5
not at all responsible		moderately responsible		fully responsible

Appendix C Collective Guilt

Gender inequality, with men having more power, resources, and status than women, has been the most prevalent form of group-based inequality through history. Women have often been at a disadvantage; being underrepresented in the labour force, and being the primary victims of domestic abuse and sexual assault. We would like you to consider past injustices against women, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you personally feel about gender inequality. There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully and respond by using the following scale:

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 ----- 8 ----- 9
strongly moderately neutral moderately strongly
disagree disagree agree agree

1. ____ I feel guilty about the negative things that have been done to women
2. ____ I feel regret for harmful past actions toward women
3. ____ I feel regret about things that have been done to women in the past
4. ____ I believe that I should repair the damage caused to women
5. ____ I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by women in the
past
6. ____ I believe that women should be compensated by men because of the
injustices committed by men against women
7. ____ I believed that the injustices faced by women in the past no longer exist in
today's society

*Appendix D Distance & History Manipulations****A “Snapshot” of Canadian history: The Year 1915***

In 1915, a fairly recent point in Canadian history, women in Canada had few rights as they were not considered ‘people’ under the law. Women were not allowed to vote or to own property. Furthermore, job discrimination on the basis of marital status forced women to be financially dependent on their husbands, as they were not allowed to work after marriage. In 1915, male violence against women was not only common, but was socially and legally accepted in Canada. For example, spousal rape was not considered a crime and domestic battery was not a chargeable offence, so men could sexually or physically assault their wives without fear of consequence. In cases of such violence, women had few options for escape. Although men could use adultery as grounds for divorce, women were not permitted to divorce their husbands on the grounds of infidelity. Even if abandoned by an unfaithful husband, women were not entitled to financial support for herself and their children.

The following few questionnaires will ask you to provide your attitudes and emotions in response to this “snapshot of Canadian history”. To help you visually place the year 1915 into historical context, please place a mark through the line below and label it “1915” to indicate when the year 1915 occurred.

0 AD

Present

A “Snapshot” of Southern U.S history: The Year 1915

In 1915, a fairly recent point in U.S. history, women in the southern United States had few rights as they were not considered ‘people’ under the law. Women were not allowed to vote or to own property. Furthermore, job discrimination on the basis of marital status forced women to be financially dependent on their husbands, as they were not allowed to work after marriage. In 1915, male violence against women was not only common, but was socially and legally accepted in the southern United States. For example, spousal rape was not considered a crime and domestic battery was not a chargeable offence, so men could sexually or physically assault their wives without fear of consequence. In cases of such violence, women had few options for escape. Although men could use adultery as grounds for divorce, women were not permitted to divorce their husbands on the grounds of infidelity. Even if abandoned by an unfaithful husband, women were not entitled to financial support for herself and their children.

The following few questionnaires will ask you to provide your attitudes and emotions in response to this “snapshot of U.S. history”. To help you visually place the year 1915 into historical context, please place a mark through the line below and label it “1915” to indicate when the year 1915 occurred.

0 AD

Present

A “Snapshot” of Canadian history: The Year 1915

In 1915, a fairly distant point in Canadian history, women in Canada had few rights as they were not considered ‘people’ under the law. Women were not allowed to vote or to own property. Furthermore, job discrimination on the basis of marital status forced women to be financially dependent on their husbands, as they were not allowed to work after marriage. In 1915, male violence against women was not only common, but was socially and legally accepted in Canada. For example, spousal rape was not considered a crime and domestic battery was not a chargeable offence, so men could sexually or physically assault their wives without fear of consequence. In cases of such violence, women had few options for escape. Although men could use adultery as grounds for divorce, women were not permitted to divorce their husbands on the grounds of infidelity. Even if abandoned by an unfaithful husband, women were not entitled to financial support for herself and their children.

The following few questionnaires will ask you to provide your attitudes and emotions in response to this “snapshot of Canadian history”. To help you visually place the year 1915 into historical context, please place a mark through the line below and label it “1915” to indicate when the year 1915 occurred.

1900 AD

Present

A “Snapshot” of Southern U.S history: The Year 1915

In 1915, a fairly distant point in U.S. history, women in the southern United States had few rights as they were not considered ‘people’ under the law. Women were not allowed to vote or to own property. Furthermore, job discrimination on the basis of marital status forced women to be financially dependent on their husbands, as they were not allowed to work after marriage. In 1915, male violence against women was not only common, but was socially and legally accepted in the southern United States. For example, spousal rape was not considered a crime and domestic battery was not a chargeable offence, so men could sexually or physically assault their wives without fear of consequence. In cases of such violence, women had few options for escape. Although men could use adultery as grounds for divorce, women were not permitted to divorce their husbands on the grounds of infidelity. Even if abandoned by an unfaithful husband, women were not entitled to financial support for herself and their children.

The following few questionnaires will ask you to provide your attitudes and emotions in response to this “snapshot of U.S. history”. To help you visually place the year 1915 into historical context, please place a mark through the line below and label it “1915” to indicate when the year 1915 occurred.

1900 AD

Present

Appendix E Collective Guilt Acceptance

We would like you to consider the treatment of women in Canada at 1915, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you currently feel about each statement. There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully and respond by using the following scale:

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
strongly slightly slightly strongly
disagree disagree agree agree

Men

1. ____ I feel guilty about the negative things that men have done to women
1. ____ I feel regret about things that men have done to women in the past
2. ____ I feel regret for the harmful past actions of men toward women
3. ____ I believe that I should repair the damage caused by men against women
4. ____ I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by women in the past

Women

1. ____ Men should guilty about the negative things that men have done to women
2. ____ Men should feel regret about things that men have done to women in the past
3. ____ Men should feel regret for the harmful past actions of men toward women
4. ____ I believe that men should repair the damage caused by men against women
5. ____ Men should easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by women in the past

Appendix F Collective Guilt Assignment

We would like you to consider the treatment of women in Canada at 1915, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you currently personally feel about each statement. There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully and respond by using the following scale:

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
strongly slightly slightly strongly
disagree disagree disagree agree

1. ____ After benefiting at the expense of the female gender, men now owe back to women
2. ____ Men have benefited at the expense of women for generations
3. ____ Women are entitled to concessions for past wrongs that men have done to women
4. ____ It makes me upset that women have been used to benefit men throughout history
5. ____ It distresses me that women suffer today because of the wrongdoings of past generations of men

Appendix G Attitudes Toward Past Injustices

Please respond to the following questions by indicating your personal opinion or belief:

1. The past may sometimes *feel* quite recent or distant, regardless of how long ago it actually occurred. How far does 1915 feel from the present?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
Very far Very near

2. Before reading this questionnaire, how aware were you of the treatment of women in 1915?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
not at all fully
aware aware

3. To what degree were men initially accountable for the treatment of women in 1915?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
not at all fully
accountable accountable

4. To what degree can men still be held accountable for the past treatment of women?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
not at all fully
accountable accountable

5. To what degree were women initially accountable for the treatment of women in 1915?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
not at all fully
accountable accountable

6. To what degree do women *today* still experience negative consequences resulting from the treatment of women in 1915?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
No current **Severe current**
 consequences consequences

6. Have men done enough to make amends to women for the treatment of women in 1915?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
 Have not done Have done more
 nearly enough than enough

8. To what extent do women continue to face gender inequality in today's society?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
 Gender discrimination Gender discrimination
 no longer exists still very much exists

9. Which forms of compensation would you like to see offered to women in response to the treatment of women in 1915? (check all that apply)

Nothing **ف** formal apology **ف** community support **ف** monetary **ف**
 compensation **ف**

10. What kind of activities would you personally be willing to do to promote gender equality? (check all that apply)

- Nothing
- Collect information and keep informed on gender issues
- Discuss gender issues amongst friends and family, stressing the need to act on these issues
- Sign a petition
- Stay aware of the views of my members of parliament regarding gender issues
- Write a letter to a politician
- Take part in a protest
- Volunteer for groups aimed at reducing gender inequality
- Donate money to an organization aimed at reducing gender inequality

11. Earlier, you read of the inequalities that women faced in Canada at 1915. To what extent do you think women in the U.S. were facing the same injustices at that time?

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7
not at all very much

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