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Spirited Imperialism

The Formation and Command of the First Canadian Expeditionary Force in South Africa

Daniel P. Gosselin

Canada's experiences with transferring the command of its military forces to another nation originate with the South African War, when the Canadian contingent was assigned to, and integrated with, British forces. While command of the Canadian forces during the war was characterized by near total subordination to the British field commanders, the decision to send an official contingent for Canada's first major overseas deployment and the formation and organization of this military expeditionary force were greatly influenced by the actions of three staunch British imperialists in London and in Ottawa.

Joseph Chamberlain had been the secretary of state for the colonies for over four years, and sought greater colonial participation in the defence of the Empire. The Boer (or South African) War gave him the opportunity. The Fourth Earl of Minto had been named governor-general of Canada in the summer of 1898, and a few months later Major-General Edward T.H. Hutton had arrived in Ottawa as the general officer commanding (GOC) the Canadian militia. Both resolutely believed in Chamberlain's imperial vision. As war in South Africa grew nearer in the fall of 1899 the three agents of the British government had, for different reasons, a strong interest in the formation of a uniquely Canadian contingent and in the selection and rank of its first national commander.

The circumstances that surrounded the decision to offer and deploy a Canadian

contingent to South Africa in October 1899 have received considerable study.¹ These studies have tended to focus on the political intrigues among Chamberlain, Minto and Hutton, on their "clandestine attempt" to force Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier's hand for Canadian military participation,² and on the reactions of Canadian politicians to imperial demands for participation in the war in response to divided opinion in Canada. Unfortunately, because of the enduring allegations of an imperial conspiracy to pressure the Canadian government to participate in the war, and later charges that the British imperialists encouraged the break up of the contingent,³ the contribution they made in bringing about the formation of a distinct Canadian contingent commanded by a Canadian militia officer has been largely marginalized in past historical studies.

This article explores the role played by Chamberlain, Minto and Hutton in shaping the organizational and command structure of the Canadian expeditionary force that deployed to South Africa. In 1899, the war raised not only the vital question about the kind of imperial war Canada ought to participate in, but also the form of that participation. As this article demonstrates, the British politician, the colonial administrator and the general saw the war as an opportunity to advance their specific agenda, strongly fuelled by imperialist sentiments. In doing so, the ideas that shaped their actions between July and October 1899 provided the base for a succession of seemingly unrelated decisions that had a



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At the 1897 Colonial Conference in London, Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary (seated) attempted to convince the colonial premiers (among them Canada's prime minister, Wilfrid Laurier, standing front row, second from left) to expand their military establishments. He failed to get a formal arrangement, but planted the seeds for the colonial contribution to the South African War two years later.

substantial influence on Canada's contribution and on the command arrangements in South Africa. The Canadian soldiers who sailed to South Africa were, for the first time, grouped in a national military formation commanded by a Canadian officer, setting a precedent for the country's participation in future conflicts.

The Boer War, Joseph Chamberlain and Wilfrid Laurier

The Boer War had its origins in more than two centuries of hostility and conflict between the British and the descendants of the region's first Dutch settlers, known as the Boers. The war took place between 1899 and 1902, and saw British and colonial forces pitted against the Afrikaner Republic of South Africa (also known as Transvaal) and the Orange Free State, the two most northerly independent republics where the

Boers had settled. The Boers declared war on 11 October 1899, and the British public expected peace by Christmas.⁴ At the time, Queen Victoria ruled over a large empire, Britain was at the height of its power, and the British people were proud of their military capabilities and confident of their place at the centre of the world. Instead, the war proved to be the longest, costliest, bloodiest, and the most humiliating conflict for Britain between 1815 and 1914, requiring the commitment of nearly 450,000 imperial and colonial soldiers.⁵ Canada sent more than 7,300 soldiers to South Africa, and approximately 270 perished there.⁶

In the decades following Confederation, Canadian defence policy was insular, with the militia focused on the defence of Canada from a possible invasion by the United States. In practice, the main role of the army was internal security, settling minor riots and suppressing

rebellions, such as the campaign that took place to put down the North-West Rebellion of 1885.⁷ The defence establishment was highly politicized, and patronage and favouritism were rampant.⁸ While the Militia Act of 1868 provided for a large volunteer militia, the permanent military establishment was small, limited to less than 1,000 personnel enlisted for continuous service and employed almost exclusively in an instructional role. In 1899, the Permanent Force officer corps consisted of four British and 63 Canadian officers.⁹

Deteriorating world events in the mid-1890s led the new British secretary of state for the colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, to champion improved defences of the empire. With his appointment in 1895, Chamberlain had “brought new vigor to the Colonial Office.”¹⁰ While the position of colonial secretary was not customarily an influential cabinet appointment in the British government, with tension rising in the world, the state of the empire became a key concern of the government, giving more importance to colonial matters, especially defence and trade.

At the Colonial Conference of 1897, Chamberlain exerted considerable pressure on the colonies to augment their land and naval forces.¹¹ He failed to gain formal military commitments, but managed to receive acceptance of the principle of uniformity in organization, training and equipment, and agreement for an occasional interchange of military units.¹² As he told the colonial representatives present, including Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, he saw the possibility of regiments of the colonies fulfilling an expeditionary role with other military forces of the empire, to “share in the dangers and the glories of the British army and take their part in expeditions in which the British army may be engaged....”¹³ Two years later, the Boer War would provide the colonial secretary with the opportunity to put his imperial vision to the test.

In the late 1890s Canada was the largest and most prosperous self-governing colony of the empire, and the colonial secretary firmly believed that Canada ought to demonstrate leadership and increase its imperial defence contribution.¹⁴ Despite Canada’s strong ties to the empire and the demands of the Anglophone

community that Canada fulfil her obligations to the mother country, the decision to participate in this foreign war was a difficult one for Laurier and his government. However, Chamberlain saw the South African crisis as the occasion for a marked demonstration to the world of imperial military unity. He wanted colonial participation in South Africa “to demonstrate to...European enemies that, in the event of a major crisis, the self-governing colonies would not stand aside.”¹⁵

Despite Chamberlain’s ardent desire for colonial military participation, the Boer threat was not a menace to the security of the empire and many Canadian politicians – especially Laurier – seriously questioned the wisdom of participating in this imperial small war.¹⁶ The prime minister knew that a debate over Canada’s participation in this war would highlight the rift between French and English Canadians over the Dominion’s involvement in overseas conflicts of the empire.¹⁷ Strong French-Canadian opposition to the war, and concerns that the despatch of Canadian soldiers would set a precedent for future imperial adventures, created deep divisions inside the cabinet and contributed to Laurier’s indecision.

There was a possible compromise. If Britain recruited volunteers to integrate in the British Army, as had been done before, the Canadian government would avoid taking a difficult decision that might split the country between the imperial enthusiasts and those who wanted no part in Britain’s wars. Even if the government did not raise an official contingent, Canadians volunteers, feeling a surge of imperial sentiment, would likely participate in the war.¹⁸ Offers of service by private individuals to raise units started to surface in the fall 1899 as the possibility of conflict grew.¹⁹

The prime minister’s more immediate concern in 1899 was the economic growth and prosperity of the new Dominion, and he was convinced that the colonies should not “assume the burden of military expenditures, except...in the case of pressing danger.”²⁰ His objections to raising and sending a Canadian contingent were centred more on the open-ended nature of military financial commitments than on the principle of participation in a foreign imperial war, but he realized that Canadian participation



Joseph Chamberlain, secretary of state for the colonies, 1895-1903 (left); Sir Gilbert John Murray Kynynmound Elliot, 4th Earl of Minto, governor-general of Canada, 1898-1904 (centre); Major-General Edward T.H. Hutton, general officer commanding the Canadian militia, 1898-1900 (right). Though not Canadian, these three men played a major role in Canada's decision to send troops to support Britain during the South African War, a precedent which would shape all future Canadian overseas military deployments.

in the war would promote a closer relationship within the empire and might sway Britain to compromise on the issue of the preferential tariff for Canadian goods exported within the empire.²¹ If Britain were willing to recruit Canadians and pay for their participation in the war, Laurier would not object. Major-General Hutton, however, had other ideas, consistent with his desire for a more robust Canadian army and for greater Canadian participation in imperial military affairs.

Major-General Hutton and Dreams of a Canadian National Army

A combination of good fortune and forethought by Chamberlain saw the arrival in 1898 of a new governor-general, Lord Minto, and a new general officer to command the Canadian militia, Major-General Hutton, two "outstanding and vigorous" imperialists.²² Chamberlain believed that Minto, a former soldier, would be of great help in convincing the Canadian government of the necessity of improving the military. Hutton, who Chamberlain had interviewed for nearly two hours prior to his departure for Canada, knew he had the support of both the colonial secretary and the governor-general as he embarked upon

a series of reforms soon after taking command of the militia.²³

Hutton "was aggressive, imaginative, and energetic, with nearly limitless self-confidence," and he approached his new responsibilities with an uncommon fervour. Shortly after his arrival in Canada, he visited many militia districts, made an inspection tour of the units, and delivered public speeches at every occasion to educate and win over the Canadian public and to persuade influential newspapers of the need for a Canadian national army. By the summer of 1899, when the possibility of war in South Africa appeared more serious, Hutton knew better than the Canadian government what the militia could do and the positive reaction to his speeches made him optimistic about what the public would accept for its military.²⁴

In his 1898 end-of-year report to Parliament, Hutton characterized the existing condition of the military forces of the Dominion as "unsatisfactory in the extreme," and had found a receptive ear for reforms in Dr. Frederick W. Borden, the minister of militia and defence.²⁵ The Canadian militia, which consisted of numerous small units of cavalry, artillery, and infantry of varying strength, was of dubious quality in discipline

and efficiency.²⁶ Hutton dreamed of creating a “national army” that could rapidly mobilize and make Canadians proud, one with a trained general staff and departmental corps, such as an army service corps and a medical corps.²⁷

Wanting to create a capable, field-ready army for the Dominion, he saw little value in pursuing proposals to integrate the tiny Canadian permanent force into the British regular army, a suggestion Chamberlain had made at the Colonial Conference of 1897.²⁸ Instead, his desire was for Canada to be able to contribute to imperial wars, and he believed that the Canadian army, in addition to the defence of Canadian soil, should have the “power to participate in the defence of the British Empire....”²⁹ In early 1899, however, despite Hutton’s dreams, any suggestion of fielding an autonomous army formation, such as a brigade, was out of the question. The Canadian militia lacked all the essential components necessary for an army to conduct independent overseas operations. It also had no trained staff, and its units did not exercise together. In addition to these systemic organizational deficiencies, Canadian army officers and soldiers had no experience in expeditionary wars. In short, as Hutton concluded in his annual report, the militia force of Canada of 1899 was not “under the existing system, an army, in its true sense....”³⁰ The conflict in South Africa provided Hutton with an ideal opportunity to advance his own interests in reforming the Canadian militia.³¹

The Formation of a Distinct Canadian National Contingent

In July 1899, when relations between the British and the Boers in the Transvaal became more strained, and the likelihood of a conflict increased, Chamberlain had written Minto about a possible Canadian military force serving with British troops in South Africa.³² At Minto’s request, Hutton immediately developed a plan to form a Canadian brigade of 1,209 personnel and 314 horses, comprised of infantry, mounted infantry, and artillery.³³ To give his proposal the best odds at being accepted by the War Office, Hutton ensured that the organization of his proposed Canadian brigade was consistent with the latest British war establishment.

The experienced British officer also wanted a contingent that would be capable of operating independently in the field within a British army division, and he reasoned that a small headquarters staff was required to support the contingent commander. Even though the proposed force did not exist in the tiny Permanent Force in Canada, Hutton firmly believed that he could raise it from the militia and deploy it to South Africa in 14 days, provided the militia department could contract a ship in time. Within days of learning of Hutton’s proposal, Minto had relayed it with his full support to Chamberlain.³⁴

Hutton informed Borden in early September of his proposal, including the names of officers recommended for employment. Borden seemed confident that, in the event of hostilities, Canada would offer a contingent.³⁵ Canadian military autonomy was one of the principles of action that highlighted Borden’s 15-year tenure as minister, as he firmly believed that “autonomy and imperialism were complementary, not contradictory.”³⁶ During the October cabinet crisis surrounding the decision to participate in the war, Borden led the faction pressing for a full contingent (with infantry, artillery and mounted troops), equipped, transported and paid by the Canadian government.³⁷

With diplomatic events unfolding rapidly in September, the discussions between London and Ottawa intensified, especially after Chamberlain’s circular cable of 3 October 1899, which outlined strict terms for colonial military participation:

Firstly, units should consist of about 125 men; secondly, may be infantry, mounted infantry or cavalry; in view of numbers already available infantry most, Cavalry least, serviceable...fifthly, not more than one Captain and three Subalterns each unit. Where more than one unit from single Colony, force may be commanded by officer not higher than major. In considering numbers which can be employed Secretary of State for War guided by nature of offers, by desire that each Colony should be fairly represented, and limits necessary if force is to be fully utilized by available staff as integral portion of Imperial forces; would gladly accept four units....³⁸

This cable is important as it reveals much about the priorities of the War Office for a potential colonial contribution, and set out key conditions affecting the organization and the command

structure of a possible Canadian contingent. The War Office was certainly aware of Hutton's small brigade proposal, and that many Canadians were anxious to volunteer, but preferred small infantry units that could be easily integrated into army battalions commanded by British officers, unlike cavalry units that required more training, tended to operate more independently, and were more difficult to control.³⁹

Lord Lansdowne, the secretary of state for war, confirmed after the war during his testimony to the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa that "[t]he reason infantry were asked for was that it was proposed that we should attach small bodies of Colonial soldiers to the units of Imperial soldiers already at the Cape."⁴⁰ Since the total colonial contribution sought was very small in relation to the British army force, the British field commanders wanted the greatest flexibility for their employment of the colonial troops.⁴¹ To begin with, the military authorities believed that they had a large enough force in South Africa for their purpose. Moreover, British officers were aware that most colonial soldiers were volunteers, not part of formed and trained units, and thought they would be difficult to manage and more a burden than anything else.⁴²

The War Office had a prejudice against irregular troops, a distrust of the colonial fighting ability, and it was convinced that the inexperience of the colonials would jeopardize the regulars.⁴³ General Redvers Buller, the designated commander-in-chief in South Africa, had advised the War Office against the participation of independent colonial units. A larger colonial force, such as the small brigade of arms contemplated by Hutton, was a more complex war organization and one that would present more integration challenges to the British commanders in the field. It would also deploy with a larger complement of senior colonial officers, a proposition not attractive to the British field commanders. In the end, it was only under strong pressure from the War Office that Buller consented to accept small detachments, a compromise that led to the wording of the 3 October cable.⁴⁴

The telegram from the Colonial Office was a request for an official Canadian contingent, and the government definitely understood it as

such.⁴⁵ The terms and conditions imposed by the War Office dissatisfied Borden, but did not deter military men like Hutton and Minto, who clearly saw this first cable as the opening round of negotiations for the Canadian contribution.⁴⁶ For one, Minto remained very concerned that the conditions outlined in the telegram for colonial contributions kept the door open for the possibility that Canadian participation might end up being privately-raised regiments.⁴⁷ The governor-general believed that the issue was important enough to write to the prime minister to comment on the cable from the Colonial Office:

I am strongly of the option that it would be much better that they [troops] should be offered by the Govt: – the organization being undertaken by the Govt: – selection of officers etc. Up to the present this has not been thought advisable ... but it may be time to reconsider the question – rather than to allow an irresponsible call for volunteers. I can not think it advisable that Col. Hughes should be allowed to raise an expedition of his own responsibility – representing Canada....⁴⁸

It was clear to Minto that the government must be seen as the driving force behind the Canadian contribution, and not individuals such as Conservative M.P. Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Hughes. Acceptance of individual volunteer offers by the War Office would have enabled the Laurier government to avoid making an official offer, an alternative Minto dreaded. By then, there were many private offers for service in South Africa putting even more pressure on the Canadian government to act.⁴⁹

Minto also advised Laurier on the composition and the command of the contingent, even though the prime minister had yet to express any interest in offering a government-organized force:

You will see from the [3 October] Cable that it is evidently intended that the Canadian troops on arriving in S. Africa should be *attached* to the different units which they represent & that they *should not* remain constituted as a Canadian contingent. I think it would be better if troops are to be offered at all that they should be offered as a Canadian contingent to act as such - & possibly this offer might still be made, & would appear more dignified, & also could find a much better officer to command it than if we accept the suggestion of small units – and an officer of the rank of Major to command which would cut out some of the best Canadian officers.⁵⁰

LAC C-007993



Soldiers from the Canadian Mounted Rifles, part of the second contingent sent to South Africa, on their way to embark for their voyage overseas.

On 9 October, the Boer ultimatum to Britain expired, and war was declared. Two days later, Boer troops moved into British territory. On 13 October, Minto, at the conclusion of a lengthy cabinet meeting, telegraphed Chamberlain advising him that the Canadian government had agreed to offer 1,000 infantry based on the terms proposed in the Colonial Office telegram. Now that the government had agreed to despatch a respectable Canadian contribution, Minto and Hutton devoted all their efforts to influence the organization and command of the contingent.

Minto stressed to Chamberlain that the troops offered should be kept together as a Canadian national contingent, realizing nevertheless that this aspect “must be left to discretion of War Office and [the] Commander-in-Chief.” He also reiterated the idea of a small brigade comprised of two small battalions and one artillery battery.⁵¹ Hutton, for his part, knew that the governor-general was in regular contact with the colonial secretary, and told Minto that he was “extremely sorry” that, according to the 3 October cable, the

Canadian troops would not “go as a distinct unit.” Having visited many units and spoken to many district commanders and commanding officers, Hutton understood the harmful consequences of parcelling small Canadian infantry units into the British Army, and warned that “[t]he Canadian Militia esprit-de-Corps cannot fail to be injured and much unfavourable comment will arise.”⁵² During his travel across the country, he had become acutely aware that Canadians wanted to serve together, under their own officers.⁵³

On 16 October Hutton wrote to Colonel Hubert Foster, his chief of staff, in Ottawa:

Please inform Minister [Borden] as follows: I very deeply regret proposed Colonial Office organization and distribution of companies, by which identity [of] Canadian troops will be lost. I recommend that at any rate the eight companies be despatched from Canada as a regimental unit and upon arrival in South Africa that intimation be made to the Imperial Govt that it be placed at disposal of General Buller for service as required. I would urge that representation be



further made that the retention of Canadians in one single infantry unit would, if circumstances admit, be more consistent with the wishes of Canadian Troops.⁵⁴

Borden was of the same mind on this issue. While Borden publicly told the press that the militia department would continue “to organize the South Africa contingent on the basis of eight companies,” he privately confided to Minto that the units would be assembled into two battalions as soon as the men were on board the ship.⁵⁵

But it was not just the War Office that wanted small colonial infantry units. Quebec cabinet members were, in the opinion of the governor-general, “trying to render the contingent as little representative as possible,” so as not to set a precedent for future Canadian participation.⁵⁶

The resulting 14 October order-in-council authorizing the force was therefore a compromise document, which intentionally lacked specific direction and did not make any reference to a Canadian contingent or brigade. It only confirmed that the government had agreed to equip and transport to South Africa up to 1,000 volunteers, without any mention about how these volunteers were to be organized or commanded.⁵⁷

In spite of the cabinet's decision, the governor-general continued to promote to both Borden and Chamberlain the concept of a Canadian brigade. Minto's persistence on this issue greatly irritated the prime minister, even though Laurier admitted that he did not understand the distinction between contributing a contingent and a small brigade of all arms.⁵⁸ Minto saw

the brigade organization proposed by Hutton as only an improvement on the government's intent, while those members of the cabinet opposing formal Canadian participation clearly perceived anything beyond a basic regiment of infantry as broadening of the scope of the contribution that had been agreed in cabinet after a prolonged and bitter debate.⁵⁹ Although the word "contingent" had been intentionally omitted in the text of the order-in-council, specifically to appease Quebec politicians, Laurier had by then implicitly accepted the concept of a distinct Canadian contingent in South Africa, a very important achievement for Minto, Hutton and Canadian soldiers.


The debate on the matter of sending a contingent, a regiment of infantry or a small brigade is important, as it reveals the motivations of the politicians and the military officers who shaped the Canadian contribution to the South African War. Minto, Hutton and the militia department had the expertise to appreciate fully the military consequences of sending an independently capable army formation as opposed to eight small infantry companies that could be attached to different British units. Laurier, on the other hand, did not appreciate those nuances and was quite satisfied with Canada contributing a *dignified* representative force, as it preserved cabinet solidarity while not incurring extra expenditures for the young Dominion.⁶⁰ Some members of the cabinet believed that fielding an independent brigade of artillery and mounted infantry as well as dismounted infantry would have given too much profile and visibility to the Canadian contribution, and created an important precedent. They reasoned that a Canadian contingent of dismounted infantry was a sufficient undertaking for the Dominion. As for other matters that affected military effectiveness, such as organization, equipment and command, it was up to Borden, Minto and Hutton to address with the War Office, and to the designated Canadian national commander (Lieutenant-Colonel William D. Otter) to sort out the details with the British army staff once in South Africa.

Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian prime minister, was content with Canada's contribution to the Boer War being a dignified representative force. Minto and Hutton had more grandiose plans for the contingent.


It was the military authorities in South Africa and not the Colonial Office nor the War Office that needed to be convinced of the merit of keeping the Canadian soldiers together as a unit. Under British army doctrine of the time, the field commander in South Africa had complete autonomy to conduct the war as he saw fit. The War Office saw its wartime role as largely administrative, and its primary function and chief operational concern was the mobilization of the army at the beginning of a war.⁶¹ In 1899, control of the army field formations for the conduct of operations remained firmly in the hands of the commanders-in-chief dispersed around the globe. Decisions about the type of military units required, their role, field organization, and employment in the theatre of war were the sole responsibility of the commander-in-chief in South Africa, General Buller.⁶²

The under secretary at the Colonial Office highlighted for Chamberlain the predicament facing the War Office with the Canadian offer:

The War Office anticipate difficulties with the Military authorities [in South Africa] as to the Canadian offer which varies from the suggestions made to them, both as regards the number of units and the organization. On the latter question I do not think it would be possible or advisable to question the military view, but.... I think an effort should be made to meet their wishes if possible.... If we are to get the political result



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Hutton (third from right) believed that he was the best-qualified officer to command the Canadian contingent in South Africa, but it was a Canadian, Lieutenant-Colonel William Otter (third from left), an experienced and respected regular force officer who was a veteran of the 1885 Northwest Rebellion, who would get the opportunity.

anticipated from having Colonial detachments, we must endeavour to do what we can to avoid anything likely to cause embarrassment to the Govt. of the Colonies. Perhaps you [Chamberlain] should let Lord Wolseley [commander-in-chief in London] have a line as to your views.⁶³

Chamberlain could certainly appreciate the political benefit of the Canadian offer, and he stressed to the secretary of state for war, Lord Lansdowne, that Canada had offered twice the number of troops requested. He warned Lansdowne that he would not accept a decision for fewer than the 1,000 soldiers offered, as it would “be a fatal policy – and it is policy and not military necessity which has governed our decision....To refuse their offer would grievously offend and discourage them....”⁶⁴ Lansdowne sent the Canadian proposal to the commander-in-chief in London for his review, and replied to Chamberlain that he “was inclined to allow the political considerations to outweigh the military....” a statement indicative of the political importance of having the self-governing colonies participate in the war with Britain with official contingents.⁶⁵

The War Office eventually accepted the Canadian offer of 1,000 soldiers,⁶⁶ but could not guarantee that the contingent would always be kept together during operations, stressing that the commander-in-chief in South Africa must retain a “free hand to deal with the Brigade as he likes.”⁶⁷ As Chamberlain reminded Minto, the senior British general in South Africa “must have the power to dispose of contingent to best advantage.”⁶⁸ Even Minto, the former soldier, could not really take exception to this condition, aimed at achieving the greatest operational effectiveness in the field. The eight companies formed were subsequently organized into one large infantry battalion (instead of two, as originally envisaged), and became the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry (2 RCR).

The Command of the Canadian Contingent

Both Minto and Hutton took a personal interest in the selection of the 41 officers for the regiment. Hutton knew many of the available militia officers, and wanted, above all,

to prevent political influence and interference in the selection for appointments in the contingent. As well, Minto was interested in ensuring that the best Canadian officers filled the key positions. His correspondence with Laurier and Chamberlain gave particular attention to the choice of the commander for the Canadian contingent.

The Canadians, as events showed, were very well served by Minto. As one biographer of Laurier stated, Minto was “very much the soldier, very much Chamberlain’s man, but a great deal more sympathetic and alert to Canadian attitudes than he at first seemed.”⁶⁹ He possessed a wide knowledge of Canadian military conditions gained in 1883-85 when he had been military secretary to the governor-general of Canada, then Lord Lansdowne, and he had seen military action in many countries, including Afghanistan, South Africa, and Egypt. As chief of staff to the general officer commanding the North-West field force during the Rebellion of 1885, he was able to appreciate that Canadian troops fought most effectively when grouped in a unit to which they felt a close association, and under their own commanders.⁷⁰ A former commanding officer himself, Minto understood the importance of unit cohesion and *esprit de corps*. He thus had a heightened sensitivity to the importance of command in the field, and, to his credit, he recognized that officers employed with the contingent should be Canadians.⁷¹ Minto, as his several letters to Laurier and Chamberlain in the summer and fall 1899 demonstrate, devoted considerable efforts to influence the prime minister and the colonial secretary not only on the organization of the contingent, but also on its leadership.

Hutton also wanted as many Canadian officers as possible to command the troops, so that they could gain experience to help him with the re-organization of the militia.⁷² But, as to the overall commander of the force, Hutton was of two minds: if a Canadian had to command the force, then Lieutenant-Colonel Otter, a respected and experienced permanent force officer, was his recommendation to Borden; otherwise, Hutton believed that *he* was the best-qualified officer to command the Canadians and other colonials in South Africa.⁷³

British officers in the militia department were well aware that British regular army officers

regarded colonial officers very poorly. To justify his command of the Canadians, Hutton had even emphasized to Minto the unique challenges of commanding colonial troops,⁷⁴ believing that only a qualified, trained and experienced officer could hope to gain some degree of respect with the British field commanders and be in a better position to protect – and advance – Canadian interests in South Africa.⁷⁵ He was convinced that without a strong and capable commanding officer, the Canadian troops would risk “being either ignored altogether or left on the lines of communications,” limited to the protection of supply routes, and garrison duty, far removed from front-line combat where battle honours were earned.⁷⁶ Hutton was likely not wrong in his assessment of what the Canadian contingent needed to be successful in South Africa, but blinded by his desire to command in war he was overlooking the emerging nationalist sentiment that was gripping the country, an important element that Minto recognized. The governor-general had been unequivocal in his advice to the colonial secretary that a Canadian officer should command the Canadian soldiers, and Hutton was therefore ordered to remain in Canada as GOC to continue the reform of the militia.⁷⁷

The rank of the Canadian officer commanding the contingent was significant to Hutton and Minto. The higher the rank of the Canadian officer in the field, the easier it would be for this officer to get access to senior British commanders to ensure Canadian interests were protected, and the less likely Canadian troops would be misemployed or broken down into small units and dispersed. British commanders preferred to attach small numbers of colonial troops to regular British units, and limit the rank of the senior colonial officer to curtail the independence of colonial contingents, minimize colonial influence, and to guarantee a greater number of higher command positions for the British regulars.⁷⁸

In his earlier correspondence with the colonial secretary, the governor-general had frequently emphasized the need for a senior Canadian officer, always suggesting Otter as the best candidate, even if he were “to sink rank to Major.”⁷⁹ While Canadian politicians and military officers accepted that, once deployed to South Africa, the senior Canadian officer would receive his orders from the commander-in-chief of the imperial force in South Africa, Minto and Hutton

fully appreciated the national significance of a Canadian commanding the unified contingent. Although they never expressed it in these terms in their correspondence, they clearly saw Otter as a national commander, and not solely as a tactical field officer.⁸⁰ They knew that only an officer of Otter's experience (he was 56 years old), wearing the appropriate rank, could earn some respect from the British chain of command.

Hutton was also experienced enough not to be deterred by the War Office condition stipulating that the highest rank to be held by any of the Canadian officers be that of major, and he continuously pressed for a lieutenant-colonel, and even a colonel.⁸¹ As well, Hutton never gave up his hope of a Canadian brigade. When, in December 1899, the Canadian government decided to despatch a second contingent, a regiment of two battalions of mounted infantry and three artillery batteries, he continued to urge that the two deployed contingents be joined to create one larger Canadian formation: "You as senior Canadian will have a fine command if you are ever brought together,"⁸² he wrote to Otter. In the end, no attempt was made to form the Canadian brigade with the two official contingents, and all the Canadian units operated independently of each other for the duration of their tours of duty. Minto and Hutton's concerns in the fall of 1899 regarding the possible break up of the Canadian contingent into smaller elements for dispersion and integration within British units did not materialize, however, and the British senior commander in South Africa never seriously considered splitting the infantry regiment into smaller elements. Except for very short periods, and only because a force smaller than a battalion was often all that was necessary for a particular mission, 2 RCR stayed united for the duration of the war. Otter deployed to South Africa as a lieutenant-colonel (he was even promoted to colonel toward the end of his tour) commanding the first contingent. Once the precedent had been set, other Canadian commanding officers also served as lieutenant-colonels.

Conclusion: The Seeds of National Command

With the sailing from Quebec City of 1,019 officers and soldiers on the SS *Sardinian* on 30 October 1899, Canada, for the first time in

its history, sent a formed contingent commanded by a senior Canadian officer to participate in an overseas war. The 14 October order-in-council clearly stated that expenditures associated with the equipping and transporting of Canadian volunteers "cannot be...construed as a precedent for future action."⁸³ In spite of this stipulation, the rejection by Minto and Hutton of the War Office's initial proposal of small Canadian units scattered through the British army in favour of a unified Canadian contingent was, as historian C.P. Stacey noted, "a small but nevertheless striking precedent."⁸⁴

Raising and sending official contingents meant that the government implicitly accepted additional responsibility for the expeditionary military force, certainly more than Laurier and the cabinet envisioned at the time, and the consequences of this new military policy would be important. For one, the formation of a single large regiment meant the creation of a regimental administrative structure and headquarters, and justified the addition of auxiliary staff (chaplains, medical officers, nurses, historical officer), all of which eventually enhanced the contingent's prestige and provided for a degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency. The naming of the unit as the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry, was important to retain an association with a permanent Canadian militia regiment.⁸⁵ Further, because this first contingent was despatched as an official Canadian contribution, which all Canadians clearly came to recognize as such, the decision allowed for the appointment of additional officers, including some that joined the imperial staff. Otter, the senior Canadian officer in South Africa, deployed with the authority and influence of a national commander, and even Field Marshal F.S. Roberts, the British corps commander in South Africa, treated him with deference, recognizing his national obligations.

The initial contribution of a contingent was certainly worthy of Britain's senior dominion. More remarkable in this episode were the efforts of three ardent British imperialists. They played an important role in convincing Laurier, the Canadian government, and the War Office of the merit of maintaining the unity of the national contribution. In London, Chamberlain, more interested with satisfying the wishes of the self-governing colonies in

Lieutenant-Colonel Otter commanded the first Canadian overseas contingent. Major-General Marc Lessard, commanding Regional Command South in Afghanistan from February to October 2008 is the most recent example of this tradition.



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order to promote his imperial vision, argued convincingly with the secretary of state for war for a large Canadian contribution to the war. In Ottawa, Minto, the proud governor-general and a former commanding officer, sought a dignified representation from the largest dominion, and kept insisting to Laurier and Chamberlain that the Canadians serve together under their own national commander. Lord Wolseley, the commander-in-chief in London, acknowledged Minto's leading role in this episode: "I know how much we have to thank you for the Canadian Contingent. It is not because it adds to our strength so much as because it serves to draw the Dominion & the Mother Country together that I value the move. You have the satisfaction in this way of knowing how much you have achieved *for England* at this."⁸⁶ Minto had also achieved much *for Canada*, and there is no doubt that his personal engagement and resolve in the fall of 1899 were quite influential in the outcome. John Buchan, Minto's biographer, goes as far as giving him the credit for the contingent not "being split up among British regiments," a fair assessment.⁸⁷ Finally, at the militia department, the aggressive and energetic Hutton, bent upon reforming the militia to create a Canadian national army, devised a bold plan for the creation of a large contingent that could be deployed overseas on short notice, and convinced Borden of its feasibility.

Hutton's brief command of the Canadian militia was marred with disagreements, controversy and accusations, and he was eventually fired by the Canadian government in February 1900, after only 16 months in office. While he nevertheless

had an important and lasting impact on the Canadian military, he remained branded as a co-conspirator along with Chamberlain and Minto in forcing the hand of the Canadian government to send an expeditionary force overseas. Minto, Hutton, and more particularly Chamberlain, never received proper acknowledgment for their actions, which in the end brought great credit to Canada and made all Canadians proud of their contingent.

As events showed, the Canadians soldiers, under command of a Canadian militia officer, performed very well in South Africa, and the creation of the first contingent of 1899 established the pattern for the 1st Canadian Division of 1914. At the end of the 19th century three spirited British imperialists planted the seeds of Canada's national command, and these grew over the two subsequent world wars. In 2005, it would be an energetic and self-confident Canadian chief of the defence staff, General Rick Hillier, who would urge the Canadian government to contribute a larger and more capable Canadian Forces contingent to the campaign in Afghanistan. Canada thus gained several important national advantages, including the opportunity to have its own area of operations in Kandahar province, to have a more robust command structure including a senior national commander on the ground, to access higher-level command and staff positions within the coalition chain of command, and to have a stronger voice at the coalition decision-making bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) council.⁸⁸ Canada's current military contribution to the NATO International Security Assistance Force,

Task Force Afghanistan, with a battlegroup of nearly 2,500 men and women commanded by a Canadian brigadier-general, and Canada's command of over 12,000 coalition soldiers from 11 other nations (including British forces) in Regional Command South in Afghanistan,⁸⁹ represent the harvest of those fundamental ideas of the fall of 1899.

Notes

- The interested reader should consult the following sources, each offering different perspectives on the issue. Sanford W. Evans, *The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism* (London: F.T. Unwin, 1901), pp.38-68; Carman Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War 1899-1902* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), pp.31-53, and also in *The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto: The Education of a Viceroy* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980), pp.80-118; Norman Penlington, *Canada and Imperialism 1896-1899* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp.226-61; Desmond Morton, *Ministers and Generals* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp.133-62; C. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict, 1867-1921* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp.57-74.
- Laurier used this expression in his 12 October 1899 letter to Minto, Library and Archives Canada (thereafter LAC), Minto Papers (thereafter MP), microfilm (mf) C-3113, vol. 7, p.102.
- Montreal Gazette, 31 October 1899.
- Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (New York: Random House, 1979), pp.3-115; or L.S. Amery, *The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902* (London, Sampson, Low, Marston, and Company, 1900-09), vol. 1.
- Pakenham, *Boer War*, p. xix and p. 607, and Great Britain, Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, *Report of His Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Military Preparations and Other Matters Connected with the War in South Africa* (hereafter *Report of His Majesty's Commissioners*) (London: His Majesty Stationary Office (HMSO), 1903), pp.35-6. In South Africa, enemy action and accident killed 5,774, and 16,168 died of wounds or disease.
- The sessional papers of 1903 list 224 deaths and 252 wounded; the book of remembrance at the Canadian War Museum lists 267 names, while Miller, *Painting the Map Red*, p.429, states that "at least 270 soldiers" died in South Africa. Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, *Further Supplementary Report: Organization, Equipment Despatch and Service of the Canadian Contingents during the War in South Africa*, Sessional Paper (SP) 35a (1903), pp.94-95. After peace was proclaimed in 1902, 2,036 Canadians men arrived in South Africa, too late to participate in the combat.
- Richard A. Preston, *Canada and Imperial Defense: A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense organization, 1867-1919* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967) and *Canadian Defence Policy and the Development of the Canadian Nation 1867-1917* (Ottawa: The Canadian Historical Association Booklet, No. 25, 1970).
- Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); and Desmond Morton, *Minister and Generals: Politics and Canadian Militia, 1868-1904* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
- The "Non-Permanent Active Militia" was the name of Canada's part-time volunteer military force. The full-time component was called the "Permanent Active Militia" or also the "Permanent Force." In 1898, the establishment of the Permanent Force totalled 832. Canada, *Report of the Department of Militia and Defence: Year ended 31st December, 1898*, SP 35a (1899), pp.36-37, and Morton, *Ministers and Generals*, table 4, p.202.
- Preston, *Canada and Imperial Defense*, p.233. Also Richard Hay, *Joseph Chamberlain: A Political Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp.211-213. On world situation at the end of the 19th century, J.A.S Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century* (London: Athlone, 1964).
- For results of the 1897 Colonial Conference, see "Proceedings of a Conference between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Premiers of the Self-Governing Colonies," in Ollivier, Maurice, ed., *The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1939* (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1954), pp.129-145.
- Norman Penlington, "General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada, 1898-1900," *Canadian Historical Review* 24, 2 (June 1943), p.46; and Gordon A. Dewey, *The Dominions and Diplomacy: The Canadian Contribution* (London: Longmans, 1929), pp.226-228.
- Joseph Chamberlain, opening remarks to the Colonial Conference of 1897, in Ollivier, p.35. Also Penlington, *Canada and Imperialism*, pp.183-188.
- Penlington, *Canada and Imperialism*, pp.70-78. Also notes from interview between Chamberlain and Hutton, 8 August 1898, LAC, E.T.H. Hutton Papers (thereafter HP), mf C-1219, pp.959-961.
- Preston, *Canadian Defence Policy*, pp.14-15.
- Minto to Seymour, 22 November 1898, in Paul Stevens and John T. Saywell, eds., *Lord Minto's Canadian Papers (LMCP)*, Volume 1, (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1981), p.16, and Minto's personal note on letter Hutton to Minto, 19 March 1899, MP, mf C-3114, vol. 15, p.14.
- Hay, p. 211; and Dewey, *Dominions and Diplomacy*, pp.1-22, especially for the discussion on colonialism, imperialism and nationalism.
- Morton, "Hutton: Imperial Agent," pp.151-152. Canadian "voyageurs" had voluntarily participated in the Nile Expedition of 1884-85 in Egypt and Sudan, but without any Canadian government responsibility. The Canadians volunteers made their contracts directly with the Imperial authorities. C. Stacey, "Canada and the Nile Expedition of 1884-85," *The Canadian Historical Review* 33 (December 1952), pp.319-340.
- Offers were made notably by Sam Hughes, an Opposition M.P., who communicated his proposals separately to Laurier, Hutton and Chamberlain. Hughes to Hutton, HP, mf C-1219, pp.1148-1164; and Hughes to Chamberlain, 24 July 1899, LMCP, p.113.
- Laurier to Minto, 30 July 1899, MP, mf C-3113, vol. 7, p.100. Laurier had also stated this position in a speech to the Imperial Institute in June 1897. See Evans, p.35,

- and John Buchan, *Lord Minto: A Memoir* (London: Nelson, 1924), p.136 n.
21. Laurier to John Cameron, *London Advertiser*, 14 October 1899. The late nineties marked the first years of real economic prosperity Canada had experienced since Confederation, and, as Laurier had said at the Imperial Conference of 1897, Canada needed to spend great sums on public works, especially railways. Laurier's concern with engaging in military expenditures surfaces several times in various correspondences, especially with Minto. See, Laurier to Minto, 12 October 1899, MP mf C-3113, vol. 7, pp.101-102. Also, Robert J.D. Page, "Canada and the Imperial Idea in the Boer War Years," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 5, no.1 (February 1970), pp.42-47; and, "Report of a Conference between the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain and the Premiers of the Self-Governing of the Empire," UK Public Records Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 885, Confidential Print, Miscellaneous No. 111, September 1897, LAC, mf B-2392, pp.61-62.
 22. Penlington, "General Hutton and ...," p.46, and Morton, "Hutton: Imperial Agent," *Ministers and Generals*, p.135. Hutton was a Colonel in the British Army, but given a temporary rank of Major-General for his appointment in Canada.
 23. Interview Hutton / Chamberlain, *ibid*.
 24. Morton, "Hutton: Imperial Agent," p.134, and Evans, p.50.
 25. Edward T.H. Hutton, "Part III - General Report and Recommendations Dealing with the Military Situation in Canada," *Report of the Year Ending 31 December 1898*, SP 19 (1899), p.38.
 26. Morton, *Ministers and Generals*, table 3, 202. For the state of the militia in 1896, see Carman Miller, "Sir Frederick Borden and Military Reforms in Canada, 1896-1911," *Canadian Historical Review* 50 (September 1969), pp.271-272.
 27. On the national army, see speech quoted in the *Globe*, 4 March 1899. Also Morton, "Hutton: Imperial Agent," p.138. Hutton to Minto, 20 November 1898, MP mf C-3114, vol. 15, p.8. On what the Canadian army should look like, see interview Chamberlain / Hutton, *ibid*, and Hutton, "Part III - General Report and Recommendations....," SP 19 (1899), pp.38-39.
 28. He told Chamberlain as much during his initial interview. Interview Hutton / Chamberlain, *ibid*.
 29. Hutton, "General Report and Recommendations....," SP 19 (1899), p.40.
 30. *Ibid*, p.38.
 31. Preston, *Defence of the Undefended Border*, p.147, and Evans, pp. 49-50.
 32. Chamberlain to Minto, 3 July 1899, MP mf C-3114, vol. 4, pp.40-43.
 33. Hutton to Minto, 17 July 1899, MP mf C-3114, vol. 15, pp.99-104; also, letter Hutton to Chamberlain, 28 July 1899, HP mf C-1219, p.973.
 34. Minto to Chamberlain, 25 July 1899, *LMCP*, pp.106-107.
 35. Hutton to Minto, 3 and 5 September 1899, MP mf C-3114, vol. 15, pp.107-111, and Minto to Laurier, 12 October 1899, MP mf C-3113, vol. 7, p.102.
 36. Miller, "Sir Frederick Borden and Military Reforms," pp.277-280.
 37. Carman Miller, "The Public Life of Sir Frederick Borden," MA thesis (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1964), p.69; Minto to Laurier, 12 October 1899, *LMCP*, p.145.
 38. Chamberlain to Minto, 3 October 1899. Canada, *Correspondence Relating to the Despatch of Colonial Military Contingents to South Africa*, SP 20 (1900), pp.16-7. Also letter from Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for War, to Minto, 26 July 1899, MP, mf C-3114, vol. 12, pp.11-12.
 39. See the reference to the testimony of General Sir Redvers Buller, Commander-in-Chief in the early stages of the war in South Africa, in the main report of *Report of His Majesty's Commissioners*, p.78.
 40. *Ibid*, pp.77-78; and Lord Lansdowne's testimony, *Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa* (hereafter *Minutes of Evidence*), vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1903), q. 21138, p.506.
 41. In relative terms, the Canadian total contribution, with just over 5,000 troops of almost half a million Empire troops in total, was quite small.
 42. Amery, *Times History*, vol. 2, p.116, and John Stirling, *The Colonials in South Africa 1899-1902* (London: Blackwood, 1907), p.298.
 43. Jay Stone and Erwin A. Schmidl, *The Boer War and Military Reforms* (New York: University Press of America, 1988), p.21.
 44. Penlington, *Canada and Imperialism*, p.252; testimony of Lord Lansdowne, in *Minutes of Evidence*, vol. 2, qq. 21138-40, p.506; testimony of Lord Wolesley, *ibid*, vol. 1, q. 8850, p.372. For General Buller's discussion on the use of colonials, *ibid*, vol. 2, qq. 15276-7, pp.199-200. About pressure from the War Office, Amery, *Times History*, vol. 2, p.116.
 45. Evans, p.57.
 46. Miller, "The Public Life of Sir Frederick Borden," p.69.
 47. Minto to Laurier, 6 October 1899, *LMCP*, p.137.
 48. *Ibid*.
 49. Evans, pp.41-42.
 50. Minto to Laurier, 6 October 1899, *LMCP*, p.137. Italics in original letter.
 51. Minto to Chamberlain, 13 October, PRO CO 42/869, LAC, mf B-785, p.382, and Minto to Chamberlain, 17 October 1899, *LMCP*, p.159.
 52. Hutton to Minto, 15 and 16 October 1899, MP, mf C-3114, vol. 15, pp.119-120.
 53. C.P. Stacey, "Canada and the South African War: II: How Canada Got into the War," *Canadian Army Journal* 4 (Summer 1950), p.45.
 54. Hutton to Foster, 16 October 1899, HP, mf C-1218, p.209. Emphasis added.
 55. Borden, quoted in *Halifax Herald*, 19 October 1899, and Miller, "The Public Life of Dr Frederick Borden," p.69.
 56. Minto to Chamberlain, 18 October 1899, PRO CO 42/869, LAC, mf B-785, p.411. For more discussion on the 11-12 October cabinet meetings, see Miller, *Painting the Map Red*, pp.46-8.
 57. Canada, Order in Council C. 1618K, approved on 14 October 1899, in *Copies of Orders in Council, General Orders ...*, SP 49 (1900), pp.1-2.
 58. Laurier to Secretary of State R.W. Scott, 17 October 1899, note 1, in *Lord's Minto Canadian Papers*, p.157.
 59. On Minto's views, see his journal, 16 October 1899, and exchange of letters between Minto and Borden, 16 October 1899, *ibid*, pp.157-8.
 60. See Minto's comments in this regard in his Journal, 16 October 1899, *ibid*.
 61. Testimony of Lieutenant-General Sir W.G. Nicholson to the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, in *Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence*, Royal

- Commission on the War in South Africa (London: HMSO, 1903), pp.13-15, and John Gooch, *Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c1900-1916* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp.20-21.
62. See testimony of Wolesley, *Minutes of Evidence*, qq. 8830-9, p.376; qq. 9084-5, pp.383-384. General Redvers Buller had been designated to command the imperial force in South Africa, but had not yet deployed to Cape Town. Nevertheless, he was being consulted on the force to be assembled, including the colonial forces.
63. Minute from Under-Secretary John Anderson appended on Minto to Chamberlain letter, 14 October 1899, PRO CO 42/869, LAC, mf B-785, pp.392-393.
64. Note from Chamberlain, 15 October 1899, PRO CO 42/869, LAC, mf B-785, p.395. Note from Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 14 October 1899, *LMCP*, note 1, p.150.
65. Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 15 October, *ibid*.
66. Telegram Chamberlain to Minto, 23 October 1899, *Supplementary Correspondence...*, SP 20a (1900), p.45.
67. Note from Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 15 October 1899, PRO CO 42/869, LAC, mf B-785, p.396. Also telegram Chamberlain to Minto, 16 October 1899, *LMCP*, p.156. Interestingly, the word "brigade" appears in the original War Office text of the telegram of 15 October; it was struck out and replaced (likely by the Colonial Office staff) by the word "contingent" in the final released version. *Ibid*, p.397. In addition, see note from Knox (Under Secretary of State for the War Office) to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 17 October 1899, PRO CO 42/873, LAC, mf B-789, p.427.
68. Chamberlain to Minto, 16 October, *ibid*.
69. Joseph Schull, *Laurier: The First Canadian* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), p.377.
70. Penlington, "General Hutton and ...," p.47. On Minto, see Miller, *Minto*, pp.26-34, and Buchan, *Lord Minto*, pp.84-114.
71. Minto to Lady Minto, 18 July 1899, *LMCP*, pp.101-102.
72. Hutton to Lieutenant-Colonel Lessard, 29 December 1899, HP mf C-1218, p.619.
73. In addition to Otter, Hutton had recommended to Borden officers for key positions within the contingent. Hutton to Minto, Schedule "C", 17 July 1899, MP mf C-3114, vol. 15, pp.103-104; and, for reference to Borden, Hutton to Minto, 5 September 1899, *ibid*, pp.109-111, and Penlington, *Canada and Imperialism*, p.230.
74. Hutton to Minto, 3 September 1899, *ibid*, pp.107-108.
75. Testimony of Major-General Sir George A. French to the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, *Report of His Majesty's Commissioners*, p.81. Also, Preston, *Canada and Imperial Defense*, pp.266-8. See "Colonial Contingents," *Report of His Majesty's Commissioners*, pp.76-81. Also, see Miller, *Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto*, p.34, for comments on Canadian soldiers.
76. Hutton to Minto, 11 August 1899, MP mf C-3114, vol. 15, p.78. The lines of communications are the routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations (usually at the rear of the theatre of operations), along which supplies and reinforcement move (almost exclusively land routes in the case of the Boer War). It is also a generic expression to designate all rear-area logistical and support functions. See also Hutton's letter to Lieutenant-General Forestier-Walker (who commanded the lines of communications in South Africa for nearly two years), 27 October 1899, pleading for the general to do his utmost to employ the Canadians in battle. HP mf C-1219, p.1672.
77. Lord Methuen to Hutton, 9 November 1899, HP mf C-1218, pp.597-599.
78. Testimony of Lord Lansdowne to the Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence*, vol. 2, q. 21139, p.506. Stone and Schmidl, p.21.
79. Minto to Chamberlain, 23 September, 9, 14 and 18 October, *LMCP*, p.127, p. 139, pp.150 & 159. On Otter's experience, Morton, *The Canadian General*, p. 156. On rank, 14 October 1899, *ibid*, pp.149-150.
80. Hutton to Otter, 28 December 1899, HP mf C-1218, 594. Minto to Chamberlain, 13 October 1899, PRO CO 42/869, LAC, B-785, 382, and Minto to Chamberlain, 14 October 1899, *ibid*.
81. Hutton to Foster, 14 October 1899, MP mf C-3114, vol. 15, 82. The rank condition had been set in the October 3rd telegram from Chamberlain, in *Correspondence Relating...*, SP 20 (1900), pp.16-17.
82. Hutton to Otter, 28 December 1899, HP mf C-1218, p.594.
83. Order in Council, 1618K, reproduced in *Copies of Orders in Council...*, SP 49 (1900), p.2.
84. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict, 1867-1921*, p.70.
85. Miller, *Painting the Map Red*, p.50-51.
86. Lord Wolseley to Minto, 1 December 1899, MP mf C-3114, vol. 14, p.78; also 2 March 1900, *ibid*, pp.80-81. Underline in original letter. Emphasis added.
87. Buchan, *Lord Minto*, p.143.
88. Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), pp.178-196.
89. From February to October 2008, Canadian Major-General Marc Lessard commanded Regional Command (South) of ISAF.

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