

2008

Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts, 1885–1905

Andrew B. Godefroy
Canadian Armed Forces

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh>



Part of the [Military History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Godefroy, Andrew B. "Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts, 1885–1905." *Canadian Military History* 17, 1 (2008)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in *Canadian Military History* by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Canadian Soldiers in West African Conflicts, 1885-1905

Andrew B. Godefroy

"The Scouts were under Lieutenant [A.H.] Macdonnell, DSO, an excellent officer of the permanent forces of Canada."

Lieutenant-Colonel William Heneker's narrative of the
Ibeku-Olokoro Expedition, Southern Nigeria, 1902¹

The history of the Canadian army at the beginning of the 20th century is most often defined by its operational participation in the South African War. Between 1899 and 1902 Canada dispatched a few thousand soldiers to fight for British interests against Boer settlers, a commitment that had a considerable impact on both the evolution of Canada's fledgling army as well as Canadian politics in general. The sheer magnitude of this event overshadowed just about every other British and Canadian army activity at the time, but it was by no means the only conflict in which Canadian soldiers were then engaged. In addition to helping secure the veldt of the Transvaal for Great Britain, Canada's soldiers were also active participants in a number of other campaigns across equatorial Africa. Though there were fewer troops who served as part of a general frontier force instead of being organized into specific Canadian units, their presence was influential and at times critical for operational success in these other theatres of conflict.


This article examines the role played by Canadians at the turn of the century in West Africa.² Though not intended to draw sweeping conclusions about the influence of such operations on the Canadian army as a whole – such analysis must follow at a later time when more contextual evidence is available – it does rediscover a largely forgotten chapter in the origins and evolution of the army, as well as raise a number of questions that obviously deserve greater attention. Most important, perhaps, this article demonstrates

that a new approach to the analysis of the pre-1914 Canadian army is required, one that focuses as much on the influence of those who left Canada for military service as those who remained within the ranks of the institution at home.

There is little question that the development of a better understanding of the pre-Great War Canadian Army is long overdue. Existing literature too often focuses solely on how the British army controlled and influenced a nascent Canadian militia.³ As this article reveals, not only are such analyses incomplete but they do not reverse the lens and examine how Canada and Canadians influenced the British army and its operations abroad during the same period.⁴ A more complete picture of Canadian army evolution can only exist through such an examination, and this article touches on but one topic that brings new evidence for that reassessment.

The British Empire in West Africa⁵

During the late Victorian and Edwardian eras, the relationship of Europe and Africa was in the midst of a great transition. For centuries Africa had been the "Dark Continent," a vast and impenetrable unknown to the European adventurer, often perceived as a place of witch doctors, juju cults, cannibalism, and savagery into which one dare not venture. Since the late 15th century, the valuable trading commodities of West Africa were brought from the interior by



native groups for exchange with the Europeans, few of whom ever ventured inland from the trading forts they built along the coast. As British historian R.B. Magor later noted, "The main products traded were slaves, palm oil, and gold, in that order of importance."⁶

From the beginning of the 19th century, however, the British renounced their participation in the slave trade, and set themselves to blocking everyone else engaged in the activity. Both the Europeans and Arabs who shipped the slaves and the native kings who sold them were soundly reprov'd by British sailors and soldiers who imposed their anti-slavery views justified by a mixture of religion and reformism backed up by artillery, Maxim machine guns and rifles. By extension, the British were developing an interest in the internal governance of West Africa by the

mid-19th century. Having begun that century without ambitions beyond holding their collection of trading enterprises along the coast, they closed it by endeavouring to extend their involvement to full-fledged imperial rule as deep inland as possible.

The British, however, were not the only Europeans with designs on ruling the region. The Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish had all been there, but were no longer serious contenders against the rising British military and commercial power. Instead it was the French and Germans who challenged the British. While the British were seizing the hinterlands of the Gold Coast [now Ghana] and the Niger coast, the Germans seized Togoland and Cameroon on the east side of these British claims. There was some friction and disputes among traders and officials on the

scene, but agreements were soon reached in a more or less gentlemanly fashion. The manner in which Europeans resolved their African boundaries is neatly described in the comments of Britain's Foreign Minister Salisbury upon a subsequent boundary treaty with the French: "We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot has ever trod...We have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were."⁷

Contrary to popular conception, the delegates at the Berlin Conference of 1885 did not lay out all the borders of modern Africa.⁸ While they did resolve a few disputes about jurisdiction on certain rivers and a few boundary disputes in the Congo basin, the main achievement of the conference was the establishment of some rules for mitigating disputes among themselves in the years to come as they laid their claims to the rest. Over the next three decades, seven European nations extended their dominions inland from the coast, and as they ran up against each other's claims, they resolved their boundary disputes in a series of bilateral treaties.

While the British had stayed on good terms with the Germans as they worked out their disputes, they nearly went to war with the French over territorial claims in West Africa. The French were energetically advancing their territories in the region, while Britain vacillated about whether to expend the effort to move inland. Under Salisbury, British policy was to secure east Africa, flanking as it does the vital corridor to India, and let the French have most of West Africa without much contest.⁹ But when Joseph Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary in 1895, he launched a vigorous drive to prevent any more inland and western territory from falling into French hands by default. As things stood when Chamberlain took office, the French already had much more territory and troops in West Africa than the British. If Britain were to stake out and defend anything significant, the forces on hand would have to be strengthened.

In July 1897, as contentions grew sharp between British and French rivals over the regions north of Lagos, Chamberlain instigated the amalgamation of the miscellaneous British

military units then in West Africa into a unified regional army, known as the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). Frederick Dealtry Lugard was gazetted to be its first commandant on 26 August 1897.¹⁰ Though only listed as a captain in his regiment, within the army he was a brevet-major, and in his new assignment as commanding officer of the WAFF he was granted the local rank of colonel.

As an organization the WAFF evolved over several years between 1897 and 1901. Initially comprised of two battalions of the Northern Nigeria Regiment, by 1902 it also included one battalion of the Southern Nigeria Regiment, the Lagos Battalion, the Sierra Leone Battalion, a battalion and a half of the Gold Coast Regiment, and the Gambia Company.¹¹ The ranks of these infantry units were comprised of African natives, while the officer corps was made up of white men from Britain and its colonies. As they had long been doing in India, the British developed strong prejudices in favour of recruiting certain races for their purported martial qualities. In West Africa, the Hausa was the most favoured tribe, and in English usage "Hausas" was sometimes used as a generic term for African soldiers. A detailed treatment of the tribal constituents of the WAFF can be found in Haywood and Clarke's, *History of the Royal West African Frontier Force*, which shows that the British, even when local recruiting sources were scarce, strove to create as professional and capable a force as possible, even if only a small one. Securing officers to lead these units was another matter, as only "proper white gentlemen" would suffice for such a role. Without such resources readily available locally, the War Office had to look elsewhere for the solution.

While the WAFF was still taking shape in late 1897 and early 1898, it did its best to show the flag and thereby validate British claims in the disputed areas (Borgu, Bussa, Say, Sokoto, Katsina) north of Lagos, in the midst of numerically superior French forces who were there doing the same. Thus before the WAFF was fully born it was being used by Colonial Secretary Chamberlain as a sabre to rattle at the French. Had there been a war, the WAFF's prospects against the vastly larger French forces in the area would have been uncertain no matter what its quality, although British naval preponderance held the promise of eventual success if Britain could commit large

resources to reverse possible initial defeats. In the end, no war came, and France and England reached a diplomatic agreement on many West African boundaries in a convention signed on 14 June 1898. With the main threat removed for the moment, the British turned their attention to securing the local population's governance for the eventual introduction of British commerce and trade. Several Canadians would ultimately take part in shaping these events.

British Recruiting Policy and Practices in Canada

As the British Empire continued to expand its influence across the African continent, its forces and, in particular, its officer corps was seriously overstretched. Constantly increasing demands for new subalterns since the end of the Second Afghan War (1870-1880), especially technically trained ones such as artillery officers and engineers, pushed the War Office in London to begin scouting for new officers among its colonies to fill the widening gap. Canada offered a tempting and easy source. With a nascent army of its own and a recently created Royal Military College that showed great promise in its focus on technical education and training, the country soon became a preferred recruiting ground for British operational needs overseas.

Despite the fact that the British North American colonies had entered into a confederation in 1867, the new dominion remained very much a loyal subject of the British Empire and English Canadian families continued to encourage their sons to join the ranks of the British army just as much as Canada's military. There were plenty of reasons for making such a choice ranging from the romantic to the practical, but it is perhaps most important to note that at the time service in one army was not perceived as making a sleight towards the other.

From a practical perspective, in the latter half of the 19th century those desiring the military life as a professional soldier in Canada were often left wanting if they stayed at home. Just prior to the departure of the British army from Canada in 1871, the War Office in London offered to transfer to Canada the Royal Canadian Rifles, a British regular army battalion that had been

raised in Canada primarily from British veterans. Ottawa politely rejected the offer, suggesting that the government was not yet ready to finance a permanent standing force of regular soldiers. The government did authorize the formation of two regular force artillery batteries to man the critical fortresses at Quebec City and Kingston once the British left. This was done just in case the United States saw the British withdrawal as an opportunity for another invasion of Canada. These two batteries formed the entirety of the regular Canadian army in 1871. The remainder of the confederation's military was composed of part-time, partially trained militia. Expansion of the permanent force with infantry and cavalry schools in 1883 raised the entire strength of regular army to barely a thousand personnel. There were few options in Canada for one seeking a career in the military.¹²

Canada's army had not yet embarked on its future development as an expeditionary force, with the first governments often unable or unwilling to fill requests from London for the dispatch of troops in support of British operations overseas while it was still struggling to create law, order, good government and security at home.¹³ Still, with the exception of the 1885 Northwest Rebellion and the endless requests for aid from the various civilian authorities to restore public order, officers could expect little excitement beyond garrison life, social events, and daily drill.¹⁴ There was little opportunity for real soldiering of the kind witnessed in British army actions across the frontiers of the empire, and British officers posted to Canada during this period often described their assignment as safe, healthy, expensive, and dull.¹⁵ Thus for those Canadians who saw the military as a calling or an escape, the British army presented the best opportunities to bring honour to self and family in the latter half of the 19th century.¹⁶

Though Canada's permanent force remained relatively small, the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) at Kingston, Ontario, was opened in 1876 to educate and train young gentleman for service as officers in the militia, but also to train them as engineers and managers for the civil service and private industry to stimulate the economic development of the young country. The curriculum was based upon the American West Point model, with mathematics forming

the base of all degrees and certificates.¹⁷ The first cadets graduated in 1880. Most emerged with qualifications as artillery or engineering officers.¹⁸

The War Office in London sent notice to Ottawa offering immediate commissions in the British army for the top four gentleman cadets graduating out of the first RMC class of 18 officers.¹⁹ Major-General Edward Selby Smyth, a British officer engaged by the Canadian government to command the militia, commented in his annual report in 1878 that taking up this offer would be “another link in the chain that binds us altogether.”²⁰ It was hoped by some that such British employment of Canadian soldiers would change government attitudes about eventually deploying Canadian troops overseas, and act as a preliminary move towards the establishment of Canadian permanent force units that could be easily interchanged with British units.²¹

The first Canadians commissioned into the British army from RMC showed tremendous ability and promise, and increasing numbers of Canadian officer graduates were recruited throughout the 1880s in an effort to fill gaps in the British army’s officer corps. In some instances successful recruitment even seemed critical to survival. A Russian victory over Afghan forces at Penjdeh in Transcaspia in March 1885 caused great concern in the War Office in London about the state of operational readiness of the British army. It was felt that if Britain had to engage the Russians the army would be at a disadvantage because of large shortages of qualified officers.

In April 1885 the War Office offered to Canada an additional 26 commissions in the British army over and above the four commissions normally offered every year. In particular it sought six artillery officers, ten engineer officers, and ten officers of either infantry or cavalry.²² Furthermore if RMC and its recent graduates could not fill the positions, London was prepared to offer the commissions to officers of the Canadian permanent force and even the active militia if suitable candidates might be found. Britain eventually received 28 officers from RMC alone in that year.²³

In 1888 the War Office offered, in addition to the usual four commissions, six commissions in

the Royal Engineers and two in the Royal Artillery. The Canadian gentlemen cadets soon filled them all.²⁴ Such offers were indicative of Britain’s confidence in Canada’s ability to produce professionally competent officers for service in either colonial or British forces. Some might argue that London simply had no choice but to engage Canadian soldiers, but it did. There was a plethora of British militia officers to choose from not counting its own engineer and artillery officer graduates. However, those Canadian officers who had entered into British service performed admirably, and the War Office could see no reason not to continue its exploitation of Canada’s RMC and permanent force. By 1889, Britain had taken 75 RMC cadets into the British army, over a quarter of all cadets that had graduated from Kingston thus far.²⁵

In addition to recruiting directly from RMC, the War Office regularly accepted applications for both imperial commissions as well as secondments from the Canadian permanent force and militia. This policy allowed other Canadians such as Lieutenant A.H. Macdonnell of the permanent force or Lieutenant Henry Read of the Canadian militia to offer their services and obtain local commissions in the WAFF.²⁶

Canadian Officers in West Africa

Canadians who left the relatively benign environment of Canada for service on the dangerous and deadly West African coast were well aware of the challenges that awaited them. Since the mid-1860s, both British and American newspapers carried regular dispatches from “the dark continent,” written explorers and missionaries.²⁷ They presented sometimes hair-raising yet alluring characterizations of life and service in Africa, and the fame and fortune often accorded to such intrepid travelers certainly seemed worth the potential risks involved.

An examination of the existing evidence indicates that Canadian officers in British and Canadian service were present in operations in Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Northern and Southern Nigeria, all of the theatres of conflict in western Africa except the Gambia, which will nevertheless be discussed in the interests of completeness.

The Gambia

Of all the West African theatres during the period, the Gambia saw the least amount of conflict. A series of punitive expeditions were carried out against the local ruler, Chief Fodeh Cabbah, who was resisting incursions by the Anglo-French Boundary Commission through his country during 1891 and 1892. The following year another expedition was launched, this time against Chief Fodeh Silah, a cunning slave raider and skillful tactician who for some time was launching forays against the district west of Cape St. Mary and generally threatening the fledgling British colony of Gambia.²⁸ British attempts to capture Silah and put an end to his activities met with considerable difficulties, and only after a couple of failed attempts were the British finally able to launch a successful expedition and force Silah to flee in March 1894. No other serious conflicts occurred in the region, save for a single punitive expedition in early 1900 to chase down a band of men who had murdered two British traveling commissioners and their escort.

The nature of the inland water operations in the Gambia precluded the large-scale involvement of land forces, with the majority of forces being made up of Royal Navy sailors, Royal Marines, or members of the West India Regiment.²⁹

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone was witness to a number of local conflicts between 1887 and 1905. Comprising a region of approximately 77,700 square kilometers and a population of approximately two million, the borders of Sierra Leone stretched from the Great Scaries River in the north to the Great Bum River in the south and as far inland as the Niger River tributary. Very little of the region stood far above sea level, consisting mostly of swampy mangrove bush and thick rain forest that became grasslands and orchard bush only some 160 kilometers inland from the coast. In this area two Canadians distinguished themselves in combat.

Born in Kingston, Ontario in March 1858, Captain Huntley Brodie Mackay graduated from RMC with a commission in the Royal Engineers and first served in Africa as a Special Service Officer under Sir Charles Warren in

the Bechuanaland Expedition in 1884-85.³⁰ He was appointed Commanding Royal Engineers (CRE) in West Africa in 1887, and later served in Sierra Leone where he assisted Colonel Sir Francis Walker de Winton in the 1887-88 punitive expeditions against the Yonnie tribe. It was an arduous and dangerous campaign against a skillful adversary, and Captain Mackay came close to being killed on a number of occasions as the expedition was repeatedly ambushed on its way to destroy the Yonnie stronghold at Robari. For his consistently outstanding efforts and personal courage Mackay was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.³¹ While serving as acting administrator to the Imperial British East Africa Company he contracted fever and died at Mombassa on 10 April 1891. It was an all-too typical end for a man serving in West Africa at that time.

Perhaps the most notable Canadian to serve in Sierra Leone was William Henry Robinson. Born in Saint John, New Brunswick in July 1863 he entered the Royal Military College at Kingston in 1879. Upon graduation he accepted a commission in the Royal Engineers, completing his training at Woolwich, England. Soon after he received orders for service in West Africa.

In 1889 Captain Robinson replaced Captain Mackay as the CRE in West Africa. He was serving in Sierra Leone in 1891 when a local warrior leader named Karimu attacked a patrol of the Sierra Leone Frontier Police. Karimu had already made a name for himself in the region leading bands of fighters belonging to Chief Bari Bureh against local tribes under British protection near the Limba Susu border. Karimu operated out of a stockade stronghold at Tambi on the River Scaries, and the Sierra Leone Frontier Police mounted an operation to kill or capture him. In March 1892 Captain Robinson was assigned the task of leading a small force to Tambi to get Karimu and kill or disperse his men. When Robinson and his party of Sierra Leone Frontier Police attacked the stockade on 14 March, however, Karimu was ready and repulsed the initial assault. The momentum lost, Captain Robinson tried to rally the attack by personally setting explosive charges at the gates to blow them open and allow his men to rush through. Despite heavy fire he succeeded but was shot dead during the assault. Their leader killed, the frontier police were repulsed and soon abandoned the

fight. Captain William H. Robinson was the first graduate of RMC to be killed in action.³²

The untimely death of Captain Robinson caused a tremendous outrage in London. New officers were immediately sent out from England to organize a response, and soon assembled 550

Born in Kingston and a graduate of RMC, Captain Huntley Brodie Mackay served in Bechuanaland in 1884-85 and then after in Sierra Leone as the Commanding Royal Engineer for West Africa. Awarded the DSO, he died on active service in 1891.

Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) photo archives

men of the West India Regiment, 125 Sierra Leone Frontier Police, 400 local African militia, as well as a naval landing party of 175 men equipped with 7-pounder artillery pieces, rockets, and Maxim machine guns. Within a month, the Tambi fort was breached and destroyed, with the remnants of Karimu's force fleeing to another stronghold named Toniataba. The British-led expedition assaulted it on 28 April, effectively putting an end to Karimu and his allies for good.

In December 1899 an editorial in a Canadian newspaper suggested that Robinson would have been awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions at Tambi had he not been killed in action. At the time of his death, the standing policy was that VCs were not awarded posthumously. This changed in 1902 to allow such awards, but a clause making it retroactive for previous actions was not added until 1907. By that time, unfortunately, Robinson's valiant actions against an unknown warlord in an obscure part of West Africa 15 years earlier were all but forgotten.

Active service in Sierra Leone was often deadly and Canadian officers knew it. Gentleman Cadet Bertie Harold Oliver Armstrong was lucky to survive his own experience. He graduated from RMC in 1893 and received a commission into the Royal Engineers and was also assigned to West Africa. Captain Armstrong served as an intelligence officer in Sierra Leone in 1898-99 during the uprising later known as the "Hut Tax War," where he was largely responsible for assessing enemy strengths and fortifications and assisting with the development of operational plans to defeat the insurgency. Following the end of the conflict in March 1899, Armstrong was appointed CRE for West Africa, making him the fourth Canadian to hold this post since 1887.



The Gold Coast

The Asante (or Ashanti) Empire, with whom the British fought a series of wars between 1820 and 1900, occupied a large region of the Gold Coast between the River Komoe and the Volta Rivers. The Ashanti were perhaps the most difficult adversaries ever faced in West Africa and their eventual subjugation was difficult, lengthy, and very costly in lives on both sides.³³

Early British attempts to colonize the area along the Gold Coast foreshadowed the difficulties to come. When the Ashanti began raiding British settlements in the 1820s, the colony's governor, Sir Charles MacCarthy, organized the Royal African Colonial Corps (RACC) of Light Infantry to protect his citizens. In 1824 the Ashanti king annihilated the RACC at Isamankow where the governor was also killed. Triumphant, the Ashanti King Osei Bonsu added MacCarthy's skull to his royal regalia as a drinking cup.

British footholds along the Gold Coast were not solidified until after the Ashanti War of 1873-74. Canadians began entering this theatre sometime after, with many seeing action against the Ashanti at one point or another. RMC's Gentleman Cadet No.79 John Irvine Lang-Hyde was commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1883, and a decade later he was assigned to West Africa to conduct an extensive survey of the Gold



Northern and Southern Nigeria

Of all the areas of conflict on the West African coast, Nigeria presented perhaps the largest challenge for British forces. A vast theatre divided into a northern and southern region, the WAFF was embroiled in continuous conflict in Nigeria between 1892 and the end of the First World War.

The Nigerian operations demanded huge expeditions and many white officers to lead them. Canadians were present, often in large numbers. Existing evidence suggests that the

Captain William Henry Robinson was the first RMC graduate killed in action in West Africa. He was recommended for the VC and his death caused outrage both in London and Ottawa. (RMCC Photo)

Coast while serving as the second-in-command of the Attabalu Expeditionary Force. He went on to be employed in the Anglo-French boundary commission in Nigeria during 1900-1, completing a survey of both the railway as well as the most western boundary of the Gold Coast colony. He was later made a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George (CMG) for his efforts, and eventually served with the Royal Engineers during the First World War.

Captain Casimir VanStraubanzee, another RMC graduate who obtained a commission with the Royal Artillery, served in the 1895-96 Ashanti War as a special service officer. Yet another, Captain D.S. MacInnes, also served in the Gold Coast in 1897-98.³⁴ During this time a vast number of expeditions were launched from Accra in all directions as the British attempted to occupy some of the hinterland that was then being rapidly parceled out among French and German expeditions. As a Royal Engineer officer supporting these expeditions, MacInnes was responsible for communications and logistics, as well as a number of engineering duties such as route maintenance, geographical survey, bridges, and general construction. Both VanStraubanzee and MacInnes survived their tours of duty in West Africa and had lengthy military careers.

largest concentration of Canadians in West Africa was here, including many RMC graduates, one of whom often served as expedition commander. As well, a number of the Canadians serving were not in the British Army, but rather remained officers in the Canadian permanent force or militia seconded for duty in the WAFF. This is particularly interesting, as it is not well known that Canadian officers served as members of the Canadian Forces in combat operations abroad during this period.

Kenneth J.R. Campbell was one of the first Canadians to serve in this theatre. Having graduated from RMC in 1881 he was unable to secure a commission in either the British or Canadian forces and ended up enlisting as private soldier in the Gloucester Regiment. It was not long before his superiors became aware of his RMC qualification and provided a commission in the 6th Dragoon Guards. He soon transferred to the Suffolk Regiment as he sought an infantry command. In 1894, he served in operations in the Niger Coast Protectorate against Chief Nanna on the Benin River. Captain Campbell fought at the capture of Brohemie with distinction and was mentioned-in-dispatches and awarded the Distinguished Service Order.³⁵ At the time of this action, Campbell was already serving as deputy consul-general and acting commissioner of the Oil River Protectorate, eventually becoming the consul-general.³⁶ Campbell later commanded the Naval Brigade at the Relief of Peking during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. He also served in the navy and the army during the First World War.

Other Canadians followed. Captain H.C. Carey served with the Royal Engineers in the Niger Coast Protectorate between 1895 and 1896. Captain Robert Cockburn, a militia officer serving in the 3rd Canadian Dragoons, transferred first to the Suffolk Regiment and then later to the West African Field Force. Records show that he served in theatre between 1899 and 1902.³⁷

Captain L.C.A. de B. Doucet was one of the few francophone Canadians to serve in West Africa. After graduating from the Royal Military College with a commission in the Royal Engineers, he was assigned to West Africa in 1903. Doucet was an expert geographer, having shown considerable skill in his early career. In theatre, he was tasked to a special duty under the Colonial Office in connection with the Yola-Chad Boundary Commission, a difficult mission that he performed admirably.

The Anglo-Aro War in Southern Nigeria

Canadian participation in the pacification of West Africa appeared to climax in late 1901 when the British launched a substantial civil-military operation against the group of the Ibo tribe whose influence extended between the Niger and Cross rivers. The total area of the operation was 193 kilometres east to west and 144 kilometres north to south, and operations lasted over four months.³⁸ The British had a number of objectives that required a series of expeditions

RMC graduate John Irving Lang-Hyde served with the Royal Engineers and was second-in-command of the Attabalu Expeditionary Force in West Africa in 1893. He was awarded the CMG for his role in the Nigerian Anglo-French Boundary Commission in 1901. (RMCC Photo)

against various factions of the Aro tribe. First and foremost, they wanted to open the Ibo country to peaceful trading and British-directed commerce and prevent further massacres and subjugations of the local populations by slave hunters and raiders. Second, they were keen to suppress the native Long Juju practices once and for all.³⁹

Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Montanaro, then commanding the West African Field Force, deployed just over 2,000 soldiers and 2,300

carriers for this massive operation. The white European officer ranks included at least a dozen Canadian officers at all levels and functions across the force. Major William Heneker was perhaps the most senior Canadian present in this campaign, being second in authority only to Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro, the force commander. Heneker was born and raised in Sherbrooke, Quebec, and attended Bishop's College before completing his education at RMC. After graduation in 1888 he accepted a commission in the Cannaught Rangers, and was seconded for duty in West Africa in June 1897. He would eventually become one of the most successful and noted commanders in the entire theatre.

In November 1901 Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro dispatched four converging columns towards Aro-Chuku [modern spelling Arochuku], the capital of the Aro families. It was also considered to be the centre for Juju worship and was therefore Montanaro's primary target. Major Heneker commanded No.4 Column of this expedition, his force consisting of 19 European officers as well as one local officer, 479 local rank and file, one Maxim gun and crew, 13 gun carriers, and 225 general carriers.⁴⁰ Concentrated at Itu, his orders were to make a feint advance



towards Aro-Chuku to fix the Aro forces at or near their capital. This allowed the remaining columns to conduct other operations across the country and move towards the Aro capital without being frequently ambushed along the way.

Major Heneker conducted a series of reconnaissances-in-force along the Enyong River until he reached the village of Esu-Itu on 29 November. There he made a fortified camp and then continued on 8 December with a smaller force in the direction of Aro-Chuku. His force was joined by No.2 Column under the command of Major A.M.N. Mackenzie on 20 December, which was incorporated into Heneker's own column. A sizeable enemy force attacked him on the night of 24 December, and British force spent Christmas day and most of the next day in constant contact with their adversary.

Under Heneker's command during the fighting was a young Canadian named James Wayling. Commissioned as a major in the 12th Battalion, Canadian Militia (now the Royal York Rangers), Wayling had volunteered for West Africa and was subsequently seconded to the Southern Nigeria Regiment in 1901. Though he still retained his major's rank in the Canadian militia, locally he was gazetted as a lieutenant. Wayling survived the Christmas battle and several subsequent engagements, including the capture and destruction of the Long Juju at Aro-Chuku.⁴¹ His luck nearly ran out, however, a few weeks later in an ambush at Ikotobo on 26 January 1902 while defending a water party.⁴² Wayling was saved from certain death at the last minute by the timely arrival of three fellow officers who were able to force the ambushers to retire. Lieutenant



Wayling survived the Aro expedition, being mentioned-in-dispatches three times for his service.⁴³


The lion of West Africa. Born in Sherbrooke, Quebec, and a graduate of RMC, William Heneker would fight in over a dozen campaigns along the Gold Coast and end his career as a full general in the British Army.

(RMCC Photo)

Sporadic fighting continued across the region well into the spring of 1902. A large engagement was fought at Edimma on 18 January, where a small force led by Captain J.C. Graham of the Highland Light Infantry was attacked by a much larger enemy contingent. During the fight, "Lieutenant A.E. Rastrick, Canadian Militia...who was in command of the Maxim, used it with great effect, and so good was the fire control and discipline that the enemy was forced to retreat...."⁴⁴ The young Canadian officer not only brought the Aro attack to a dead stop, he forced them back into a rout that resulted in the subsequent capture of Edimma. For his actions, Rastrick was mentioned-in-dispatches.⁴⁵

The Aro expedition came to a climax when the British columns converged at Bende on 2 March 1902 to face the last concentrated resistance. Major Heneker led the assault against the town, capturing it, and two senior Aro chiefs, within a day. Though the pacification and subjugation of the entire region was far from complete, the capture of Aro-Chuku and Bende meant that for the time being the main adversary was defeated. Lieutenant-Colonel Montanaro's main force returned to the coast where he prepared his official dispatches for London.

Despite this massive operation small local conflicts persisted, and British punitive and



An operational planning map for the 1899 Benin Expedition showing key locations, travel distances, and timings hand drawn by William Heneker. The map is remarkably accurate and he often credited his RMC education and training for being able to produce such documents.

pacification expeditions in Southern Nigeria continued until 1910. Archibald Hayes Macdonell, born in Toronto, served first as a scout, and then later as a platoon and company level commander in several of these operations.⁴⁶ He had joined the Canadian militia in February 1886 and was a company commander with the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry during the South African War. Macdonell was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his actions at the Battle of Paardeberg. In 1901 Macdonell was seconded to the WAFF, and first saw action when he was attacked outside the town of Onor during the Ibeku-Olokoro expedition in Southern Nigeria in late 1902. His commander, Major Heneker, later wrote of the engagement,

Half a mile out of the friendly town of Onor the road ran along a narrow causeway about 100 yards in length, and with a deep swamp on either side; there was a small stream at the enemy's end of it which had to be waded. Fire was opened on [Macdonell's] scouts...the scouts kept the enemy employed while the 75-millimetre and maxim were got into position. A heavy fire was then poured in....⁴⁷

Such actions were a regular occurrence in Southern Nigeria, and Lieutenant Macdonell quickly became one of Major Heneker's best reconnaissance officers and combat leaders.

Lieutenant Macdonell went on to serve in seven separate expeditions between 1901 and 1904.⁴⁸ By the time of his return to the Canadian militia he was one of its most experienced small wars veterans. Reverting to his rank of major, Macdonell later passed the Army's staff college and was subsequently appointed to command The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR). Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonell took that unit overseas in 1914, led it in action on the western front, subsequently commanding the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade in 1916 upon his promotion to brigadier-general.

Still, Major William Heneker remains the most intriguing Canadian who served in this theatre. Between 1897 and 1906 he fought in no less than a dozen separate campaigns ranging from peacetime military engagements to major combat operations, earning the DSO for his efforts. More important perhaps, in 1907 he published *Bush*



Warfare,⁴⁹ a 196-page book which is an astute, articulate, and detailed study of small wars that was perhaps intended to advance if not supercede the ideas initiated by Charles Callwell's well-known 1896 publication, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*.⁵⁰ Almost completely forgotten by both British and Canadian military historians today, this book served as one of the trilogy⁵¹ of small war "bibles" for the British army until well after the First World War. In 1934 the War Office institutionalized the lessons of men like Callwell and Heneker, when it finally released its own internally-produced manual titled, *Notes on Imperial Policing*.⁵²

Heneker went on to serve in India and the northwest frontier before returning to Europe as a brigade commander and later division commander on the western front during the First World War. In 1920 he was appointed the first commander of the British Army on the Rhine, and then served as commander of the Inter-Allied Commission of Management in Upper Silesia, stabilizing the tenuous borders between Germany and Poland. He retired in 1932 at the rank of full general after serving as commander-in-chief of Southern Command, India. Yet Heneker is completely unknown in Canada, and like many of his colleagues, has yet to be recognized by Canadian military historians either

for his innovative approach to operations in complex terrain that influenced later British and Canadian doctrines, or even his writings on the relationships between conflict and diplomacy.⁵³

In addition to those men detailed here there

Already a decorated veteran of the South African War, Major A.H. Macdonell served in West Africa between 1901-1904 and fought in seven major expeditions. He went on to command the RCR and later the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the First World War.

(Library and Archives Canada PA-007525)

was several other serving Canadian militia officers who were seconded for duty in Nigeria. Lieutenant J.L.R. Parry, Canadian Militia, was mentioned-in-dispatches for his services during the Aro Expedition along with James Wayling.⁵⁴ Two brothers, Captain B.M. Read and Lieutenant Henry Read, as well as Second Lieutenant F. Homer-Dixon, all Canadian militia officers, served in this theatre beginning in 1902.⁵⁵ Wayling would eventually be promoted to major and mentioned-in-dispatches several further times. It is very likely that there were many others who served in this theatre as well but whose names have slipped through the cracks of history. Further investigation of the subject is certainly needed.

Conclusion

There are many points one could draw from the experience of Canadian officers in West Africa. Perhaps most important is the obvious fact that a significant aspect of the history of Canada's Victorian and Edwardian army remains untold and little understood. With the main focus of published works on politics⁵⁶ or operations in Saskatchewan and South Africa, little attention has been paid to other minor operations or the army's intellectual and institutional evolution. A more thorough examination of subjects like the service of Canadian officers with British forces overseas will undoubtedly revise existing views and conclusions about what the Canadian army was and was not as well as how it evolved.

This article reaffirms the fact that Canadian army biography is underdeveloped, and that many important personalities such as Lieutenant-Colonel William Heneker and the young Lieutenant Archibald H. Macdonell remain forgotten. This is especially true regarding those officers and

men who served abroad prior to 1939, many of whom are lost in the folds of national ambiguity between Canadian and British military service. Yet regardless of the uniform they wore at the time, their knowledge

The African General Service Medal with bar for the Aro Campaign.

(Andrew Godefroy collection)

and experiences was often shared between the two forces, and one cannot consider and assess the pre-Great War evolution of the Canadian army at home without giving some consideration to those Canadians who served overseas. As well, it is important to appreciate that on many occasions Canadians influenced the British army just as much as the British influenced the Canadian army. That three successive Canadians held the post of Commanding Royal Engineers for all of West Africa between 1887 and 1894 with a fourth Canadian following soon after, for example, is a point of leadership that must be recognized.⁵⁷

The evidence in this article suggests that the Canadian officer corps was more engaged in international affairs, military operations, and strategic studies than has previously been credited. As well, there is a poor understanding of how these external relationships affected the evolution of the Canadian army at home and how or why these influences did or did not do more to create a certain type of field force. Current debates concerning Canadian army conceptual and doctrinal design, for example, regularly criticize its networked approach to force development as paying too little consideration to Canadian culture and military traditions. Yet as more of the army's history is examined, it becomes clearer that its evolution has always been one of blending influences and best practices from a wide range of experiences. Canadians serving in West Africa between 1885 and 1905 very likely cared much less whether or not they were uniquely identified as "British" or "Canadian" than the historians who examine them today. Though always proud of their origins, the transparency of their national allegiance and service was beneficial to both the Canadian and British armies, who defended the interests of the same empire.



This study also reinforces the argument that the Canadian army was shaped by individual as well as collective experiences prior to 1914. Many of the officers studied in this article returned to Canada at some point after their deployments to provide briefings, lectures, articles, and papers on what would be identified today as "lessons learned." Narratives and analyses of their experiences appeared in professional Canadian military journals and magazines, and transcripts of their presentations were often reprinted in media such as *The Proceedings of the Royal Military College Club of Canada* or magazines published by the Royal Canadian Military Institute in Toronto or the Montreal Hunt Club. As well, in keeping with British army traditions of the day, professional development and operational corporate knowledge

in Canada's army was often passed along verbally or through the publication of private analyses such as Lieutenant-Colonel Heneker's *Bush Warfare*, rather than via official doctrine manuals.⁵⁸ Heneker notes this informal approach to sharing knowledge and teaching lessons in the introduction to his book: "Should any officer... happen to peruse these notes, and should he, perchance, come across anything which may be of use to him, the following pages will have served the purpose for which they were written."⁵⁹

Finally, it is very likely that better knowledge of the experiences of Canadian officers with British forces prior to the Great War will force a reassessment of the nature of relationships in the Canadian Expeditionary Force as well as the nature of its British influences, particularly within the 1st Canadian Division. Many active service field grade officers (majors and above) in the Canadian army in 1914 had spent the majority of their careers up to that point seconded to the British army and fighting small wars and counterinsurgencies in places like Africa, northwestern India, and southeast Asia. This previous experience obviously influenced their early ideas about what combat would be like on the western front. It also revealed their potential limitations as commanders. Campaigning in West Africa seldom involved more than a brigade of troops, and though the logistics were complicated

the staff work was not. The massive expansion of forces and the corps and army level scale of operations proved a tremendous challenge for officers who spent the majority of their careers fighting small wars and counterinsurgencies.

In the past too much has been made of the fact that a large portion of the early volunteers for the first Canadian contingent were British expatriates. As ongoing research is demonstrating, Canadians made substantial commitments to imperial defence not just during the flashpoint that was the South African War, but rather constantly during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.⁶⁰ Between 1885 and 1905 British law and order in West Africa was ending the large-scale enslavement of Africans and bringing them into the British sphere of influence. Canadians serving in both the Canadian and British armies played a substantial role in this process. It mattered little to them whether one was born in London or Ottawa.

Notes

1. Lieutenant-Colonel WCG Heneker, DSO, *Bush Warfare* (London: Hugh Rees Limited, 1907), p.19.
2. Canadian involvement in Central and East African conflicts during this period will be the subject of a separate article.
3. For example see Desmond Morton, *Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).
4. A notable exception is Norman Penlington *Canada and Imperialism, 1896-1899* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). See also Guy R. MacLean, "The Canadian Offer of Troops for Hong Kong, 1894," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol.38:4 (December 1957), pp.275-283.
5. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Lawren Guldmond in researching and writing an earlier draft of this section for a separate publication.
6. R.B. Magor, *African General Service Medals* (London: The Naval & Military Press, 1993), p.25.
7. Sam C. Ukpabi, *The Origins of the Nigerian Army: A History of the West African Frontier Force 1897-1914* (Zaria, Nigeria: Gaskiya Corporation Ltd, 1987), p.8.
8. J.D. Hargreaves, "The Work of the Berlin Conference," in Robert O. Collins, ed., *The Partition of Africa: Illusion or Necessity* (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969), p.106.
9. Ukpabi, p.8.
10. Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard, GCMG, CB, DSO, PC (22 January 1858–11 April 1945) was a British soldier, explorer of Africa, and colonial administrator. He served in the Second Afghan War (1878-1880), the Sudan (1884-1885) and Burma (1886-1887). He was severely wounded in Nyasaland in May 1888 while leading a British expedition against Arab slave traders near Lake Nyasa. He raised the WAFF in 1897 and served as its first commander until 1899. Lugard was later Governor of Hong Kong (1907–1912) and Governor-General of Nigeria (1914–1919).
11. Ukpabi, p.85. The strength of the force at the end of 1901 is given as (not including officers) 6,208 other ranks.
12. E.K. Senior, *Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District 1846-1870* (Montreal, The Society of the Montreal Military and Maritime Museum 1981), p.14. See also G.W.L. Nicholson, *The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, Vol.1*. (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1967).
13. Such a political stance was not entirely unreasonable. During the mid-19th century Canada was repeatedly invaded by special interest groups from the United States, and the large territory to the west of Kingston and Ottawa had yet to be brought under the government's influence and control.
14. Between 1867 and 1890 the military was called out on no less than 37 occasions to restore public order. These events included electoral rioting, religious disputes, railway strikes, Crown land disputes, and the guarding of public hangings. See Andrew B. Godefroy, "Accustomed to Relying on Soldiers: Aid to the Civil Power and the Canadian Militia, 1867-1890", unpublished paper presented at Concordia University history symposium, May 1995.
15. S.J. Harris, "The Permanent Force and Real Soldiering, 1883-1914," in Marc Milner, ed., *Canadian Military History: Selected Readings*. (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998), pp.35-54. Both Harris and British historian Richard Holmes comment on how British officers preferred postings to Africa or India over Canada where the cost of living was less expensive and there was more opportunity to gain both fame and fortune. See also Richard Holmes, *Sahib: The British Soldier in India* (London: Harper Perennial, 2005) for comments on cost of living in this theatre.
16. The large number of RMC officer candidates seeking imperial commissions instead of a place in Canada's permanent force between 1880s and early 1900s is but one example of this trend. For statistics on the numbers of RMC graduates serving abroad at the beginning of the 20th century see RMC, *The Proceedings of the Royal Military College Club of Canada*, 1901 No.18. (Montreal: Chronicle Printing Co., 1902), p.26. Each of the *Proceedings* for years 1894 through 1913 offers detailed statistics and biographical notes on college graduates serving in other forces including the British and Indian armies.
17. Government of Canada, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1870, XXV, pp.635-637, Colonel P. MacDougall, *Account of the System of Education at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Precis in Militia Report 1873*, Appendix No.9, 221-223.
18. Richard Preston, *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College* (Toronto, 1969), pp.74-76.

19. *Ibid.*, pp.66-68.
20. *Ibid.*, pp.65-66.
21. *Ibid.*, p.66.
22. United Kingdom [UK], Public Records Office [PRO], Colonial Office [CO] 42/783, 69-75. See also Richard Preston, *Canada and "Imperial Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defence Organization, 1867-1919* (North Carolina: Duke University Commonwealth Studies Centre, 1967), pp.162-163.
23. C.P. Stacey, "John A. Macdonald on Raising Troops in Canada for Imperial Service, 1885," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol.38:1 (March 1957), pp.37-40.
24. UK PRO CO papers. *Ibid.*, CO 42/783, pp.69-75.
25. By 1889 a total of 302 cadets had been allotted numbers at the college of which 292 entered for studies.
26. See below in this article for details of their African service.
27. For more on the exploits of H.M. Stanley, one of the most famous explorers, see Tim Jeal, *Stanley: The Impossible Life of Africa's Greatest Explorer* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 2007). RMC cadet No.52 Lieutenant William Grant Stairs served under Stanley during the infamous Emin Pasha relief expedition 1887-90, and is commemorated on the college's memorial arch. Stair's own exploits are analyzed in Roy MacLaren, *African Exploits: The Diaries of William Stairs, 1887-1892* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998).
28. Magor, *African General Service Medals*, p.38.
29. UK PRO War Office [WO] 100/76 and 100/91 Gambia Service; see also UK PRO ADM 171/45, 171/46, and 171/356 Gambia service entitlements. An examination of the RMC graduate list service also did not reveal any participants in the campaign in British service.
30. RMC Archives. (No.39) Gentleman Cadet H.B. Mackay. Mackay was the first RMC graduate to be awarded the DSO. A memorial plaque with brief biographical data on Mackay was presented to RMC by the Corps of Royal Engineers and currently hangs in the front entrance of the Mackenzie Building at the college. See also RMC Club of Canada, *Directory of Ex-Cadets of the Royal Military College of Canada* (Kingston, RMC Club, December 1935), n.d.
31. *London Gazette* [LG]. Citation for being made a companion of the Distinguished Service Order, 12 April 1889. "Huntly Brodie Mackay, Lieutenant, Royal Engineers, having local rank of Captain while commanding Royal Engineers on the West Coast of Africa. For services during the operations in the Suly-mah District."
32. See reprint from the *Yukon Sun* and *Klondike Pioneer*, 19 December 1899 in RMC, *Proceedings of the Royal Military College Club of Canada* (Quebec: The Chronicle Printing Company, 1899), p.86.
33. Primary studies of the Britain-Asante Wars remain Alan Lloyd, *The Drums of Kumasi: The Story of the Ashanti Wars* (London: Longmans Green and Co. Ltd. 1964), and Robert B. Edgerton, *The Fall of the Asante Empire: The Hundred-Year War for Africa's Gold Coast* (New York: Free Press, 1995).
34. Gentleman Cadet D.S. MacInnes graduated from RMC in 1891, and obtained a commission in the Royal Engineers. He was mentioned in dispatches for his services in the Gold Coast between 1897-98.
35. Mention-in-dispatches recorded in the *London Gazette*, 21 December 1894. Created a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, announced in the *London Gazette* 10 April 1896 - "Kenneth Jeffrey Rankin Campbell, Capt, The Suffolk Regiment. In recognition of services during the recent operations on the Benin River." Campbell was the first RMC graduate to be mentioned-in-dispatches. He was later also awarded Royal Humane Society bronze medal for rescuing a local African man from crocodile-infested river.
36. For his personal account of the battle see Lieutenant J.R. Campbell. "The Capture of Brohemie, Niger Coast Protectorate, West Africa," paper read before the Royal Military College Club of Canada, 1 March 1895, reprinted in the *Royal Military College Club of Canada Review*, 1896. Kingston: ...
37. LG 18 June 1901. P.4098. Captain Cockburn served in the 3rd Canadian Dragoons. He was transferred/ Seconded to the Suffolk Regiment and subsequently to the WAFF effective 30 December 1899.
38. Histories of the details of this conflict are few in number. Notable works include J.U.J. Asiegbu, *Nigeria and Its Invaders, 1851-1920* (Lagos: Nok Publishers International, 1984), and R.B. Magor, *African General Service Medals* (London: Bourn Press Limited, 1993). The best British histories remain the contemporary writings of the commanders. See Colonel A.F. Montanaro, *Hints for a Bush Campaign* (London: Sands Publishers, 1901); and Heneker, *Bush Warfare*.
39. *Ibid.*, p.77.
40. Campaigning in West Africa during the late 19th century was a logistical nightmare. The broken ground, marshes, rivers, deep forest and jungle, as well as the ever present tsetse fly ensured that no pack animal would survive for more than a few days. As a result, almost everything needed for operations from ammunition to food had to be carried by hand. Locals were contracted and paid to act as porters for these operations.
41. After the capture of Aro-Chuku the British forces claimed they had destroyed the temple of the "Long Juju" as part of their information operations campaign against the Aro and their slave trading partners. Recent archaeological research, however, has contested this claim and suggests that the British destroyed a decoy site and not the actual "Long Juju" temple or oracle, which remained hidden from Montanaro's force. See Johnston A.K. Njoku's Nigerian Slave Routes Project (Western Kentucky University) accessed in August 2007 at URL <http://www.wku.edu/~johnston.njoku/intro/aro-chukwu/>
42. LG 12 September 1902, p.5882. *Dispatches from Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Montanaro, Commanding Aro Field Force*, dated 5 April 1902.
43. MiD LG 12 September 1902; see also MiD LG 23 February 1906, p.1338 for services at Obukpa. Source LG 23 February 1906; and again in LG 18 September 1906 p.6312 for services in minor operations. Captain Wayling also has the distinction of being the figure who brought this entire subject to the author's attention. In 2005 I was made aware of this officer's medals in a private collection, which included an African General Service Medal. Victorian campaign medals named to Canadians, other than the Queen's South Africa Medal (1899-1902), are rare. It also led to the

- obvious question, "What was the Canadian Militia doing fighting in West Africa?"
44. LG 12 September 1902, p.5885. *Disptach from Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Montanaro, Commanding Aro Field Force*, dated 5 April 1902.
 45. LG 12 September 1902 p.5885. MiD for actions at Edimma, 18 January 1902.
 46. LG 21 January 1902 p.455. Lieutenant in Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry (Major Canadian Militia), granted local rank lieutenant in army whilst employed with WAFF, dated 28 December 1901.
 47. Heneker, *Bush Warfare*, p.19.
 48. These expeditions, their dates, plus the campaign clasps to his Africa General Service Medal he received for them is listed in his entry in the *Distinguished Service Order Encyclopedia*, p.226.
 49. Heneker, *Bush Warfare*.
 50. Charles Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*.
 51. Heneker's commander, interestingly, wrote the third book. See Colonel A.F. Montanaro, *Hints for a Bush Campaign* (London: Sands Publishers, 1901).
 52. *Notes on Imperial Policing* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1934).
 53. The author is currently editing *Bush Warfare* along with a biography of Heneker for publication in 2007.
 54. LG 12 September 1902. p.5886.
 55. LG 3 April 1903 p.2233, Captain B.M. Read granted local rank of captain in army whilst employed with WAFF, dated 31 January 1903. LG 5 May 1903 p.2843, Lieutenant H. Read Canadian Militia, granted local rank of lieutenant in the army whilst employed with WAFF, dated 4 April 1903. LG 20 February 1903 p.1133. Second Lieutenant F. Homer-Dixon, Canadian Militia, granted local rank lieutenant in army whilst employed with WAFF, dated 31 January 1903.
 56. The most notable work remains Desmond Morton, *Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
 57. For more on the subject of Canadian influence on the evolution of the pre-1914 British army see Andrew B. Godefroy, "For Queen, King, and Empire: Canadians Recruited into the British Army, 1858-1944," *Journal of the Society for British Army Historical Research*. (accepted for publication 2008).
 58. See Thomas R. Mockaitis, "The Origins of British Counter-Insurgency," in *Small Wars and Counter-Insurgencies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1990), p.223. Mockaitis noted that the traditional custom of the British army of the period was to rely on its senior officers and NCOs to pass along their knowledge to newcomers, an approach that, "worked reasonably well so long as there was an unbroken string of similar conflicts, for in each ensuing campaign there would always be a core of soldiers who could remember how things used to be done."
 59. Heneker, *Bush Warfare*, preface.
 60. *Ibid*, Andrew B. Godefroy, "For Queen, King, and Empire: Canadians Recruited into the British Army, 1858-1944," *Journal of the Society for British Army Historical Research*.

Andrew B. Godefroy is an historian and strategic analyst with the Canadian Army as well as the editor of the *Canadian Army Journal*. He holds a Ph.D. in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada and has authored over a dozen studies on the Canadian Expeditionary Force. He is currently editing the memoirs of Brigadier-General George S. Tuxford as well as researching a definitive biography of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie.

CMH Mailbox

(continued from page 4)

Der Weltkreis is an invaluable contemporary source, and that it must be considered in the analysis of the history and historiography of the First World War. However, using this quote out of context to overstate the factual correctness of these volumes is folly. *Reichsarchiv* files made available since the end of the Cold War undeniably confirm the value of the official work, but these new sources have also demonstrated where there are significant weaknesses in the official histories, especially when addressing issues regarding grand strategy and the roles played by senior command. Among others, historian Robert Foley made this very clear in his recent study of Erich von Falkenhayn, which demonstrates considerable differences between newly available primary sources and the "official" German account published after the war.

Historians are right to be wary of these and other official postwar German publications, and their caution does not stem simply from a lack of understanding of the language or its form. As well, as Strachan correctly points out, neither would serious scholars attribute this caution to the possible influences of Nazism. As recently discussed by historian Alan Kramer in his examination of culture and mass killing in the First World War, it has become common knowledge that in the 1920s Germany launched a mammoth historical research project in which the foreign ministry secretly paid both German and foreign scholars, notably in France and the USA, to support written accounts that stated Prussia was not to blame for the war. Therefore it is hardly surprising to find western contemporary quotes, such as that from Alexander Johnson (CMH vol.16/3 p.58), which portrays *Der Weltkreis* in a positive light. In any brief survey of other American historical

journals during this period, one will find similar superfluous compliments. This activity, along with other officially published German apologia and protection of military reputations, is the backdrop against which *Der Weltkreis* must be examined and understood.

At the end of the day, Canadian military historians will benefit from the translation of *Der Weltkreis*, as it will allow at least more balanced general narratives of CEF operations to be written in the future. For more detailed historical analyses, however, historians must remain vigilant in their scrutiny of the accuracy of these accounts in the corroboration of facts concerning German operations on the western front. For it is corroboration and context, not compliments, which will determine the value of *Der Weltkreis* as evidence.

Andrew Godefroy,
Kingston, ON