The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory Training Team Tanzania
1965–1970

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At the beginning of the 1960s Canada embarked on an increasingly interventionist policy in Southern Africa that included a significant number of peacekeeping, military, and technical assistance programmes. In addition to peacekeeping efforts in the Congo (1960-64), Canada provided military assistance to Ghana (1961-68), Zambia (1965), Tanzania (1965-70) and Nigeria (1963/1968-70). While the Zambia and Nigeria missions were essentially responses to emergencies, the Ghana and Tanzania missions were more calculated affairs. To help foster democratic governments Canada agreed to assist in the establishment and training of professional armies and air forces which, when combined with governmental assistance and other infrastructure building, would firmly support a pro-Western rather than communist regime in the two countries. While the mission for Ghana began in 1961, the Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania (CAFATTT) was officially authorized on December 8th, 1964, after Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson made the announcement in the House of Commons. Over the next five years the Canadian contingent built the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) from the ground up, creating everything from Tanzania's National Defence Act to the instructional pamphlets used for teaching weapons classes. Throughout the CAFATTT mission both Russian and Chinese advisory teams who were also competing for Tanzania continuously challenged the Canadians, initiating a game of Cold War chess with all of Southern Africa as the prize. In the end, the Canadians were unable to sway Tanzania towards the west and were forced to leave only five years after they had first arrived.

The Formation of Tanzania 1946-1964

Following the end of the Second World War Great Britain reluctantly agreed to place a number of its African protectorates under United Nations (UN) trusteeship. In Tanganyika the British government began a slow transition by encouraging Africans to enter the civil service while higher educated Africans were positioned to eventually take over various aspects of the administration. The move was designed to retain a substantial voice for white Europeans and Asians in colonial politics while Tanganyikan Africans were confined to the development of local infrastructure. The British government continued to control Tanganyikan markets and in particular its sisal production over which Britain had exclusive buying rights. Britain was also the sole purchaser of Tanganyikan coffee at a fixed price though this agreement ended in 1952. Overall, while publicly Britain had agreed to encourage self-rule it had in fact taken very few steps in that direction.

In July 1954 the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was created under the leadership of a well-educated political activist named Julius K. Nyerere. TANU immediately notified the Colonial Office and the British authorities that its ultimate aim was independence for Tanganyika. The governor, Sir Edward Twining, tried to restrict its activities and prohibit the
printing and publishing of material or any assembly that was likely to raise discontent amongst the inhabitants of the country. Despite these efforts, by 1956 the party had registered over 100,000 members. The following year the government banned TANU in ten districts, but its membership still continued to grow. By 1960, TANU was firmly rooted in Tanganyika and had gained enough influence to create the political momentum needed to move towards an African-led independence. The Tanganyika election of August 30th, 1960, was a resounding success for TANU. Running unopposed in 58 of Tanganyika's 71 seats, the party lost only one of the remaining thirteen ballots. Following the election Governor Turnbull appointed Julius Nyerere as Chief Minister of the Council of Ministers, the first African to ever hold the position.

In March 1961 a series of talks between Nyerere and the British Colonial Secretary, lain MacLeod, led to the announcement that full internal self-government in Tanganyika would begin on 15 May 1961. Though Nyerere was appointed Prime Minister of Tanganyika on this date, the British Governor retained control of foreign affairs and the military until Tanganyika's full independence on 9 December 1961.

While Tanganyika marched towards its independence so did its offshore neighbours, Zanzibar and Pemba. Socioeconomic and ethnic divisions on the two islands had led to an increase in violence beginning in the 1950s. Arabs, Indians, Africans, and white Europeans all struggled for control in an endless series of bloody clashes. In 1954, a number of political groups emerged including the Arab Association, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP), and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP). Each party had a similar platform differing only in terms of who would actually rule the islands.

In a general election held in January 1961, the ZNP and ZPPP won equal victories and formed a coalition government that included a small number of members from the ASP. Wanting to ensure its own survival the ZNP sent party members out of the countryside to take over rural administrations while the mainlander police force, Zanzibar's most experienced and competent authority, was dismissed and replaced with ZNP constables. Finally, the government announced the prohibition of all other political parties, giving itself dictatorial rule over the islands.

Like Tanganyika, Zanzibar was also released from Colonial rule and became an independent state on 10 December 1963. The ZNP/ZPPP continued to hold power with a majority of the seats, however the ASP had in fact received the majority (54.3%) of the popular vote in the last election. Within a few weeks the newly independent state fell into chaos, and a bloody revolution in January 1964 did away with the coalition government and the Sultanate. Immediately following the revolt the Umma Party, a radical element of the ZNP led by Abdul Rahman Mohammed-Babu, and the more radical elements of the ASP took political control and steered the island towards a union with Tanganyika. Zanzibar and Pemba joined Tanganyika on 26 April 1964, and the three territories formed the United Republic of Tanzania.

**Canada and Military Assistance to Tanzania**

After the end of the Second World War military assistance emerged as an important instrument of international diplomacy employed by both the East and the West. Canadian participation in military assistance programs began in the late 1950s as officials in the Department of External Affairs (DEA) realized the increasing value of such aid in contributing to towards the pro-democratic evolution of the developing world. While not overly anxious to divert scarce resources away from Europe, the decolonization and expansion of the New British Commonwealth provided yet another opportunity for Canada to participate in post-war international affairs.

The rapid disintegration of European rule in Central and Southern Africa instantly created a power vacuum that neither the Soviet Union or the United States was prepared to accept. For Canadian officials who naively hoped that Africa might not become another East-West battleground there was an argument made towards cabinet that military assistance would bring both internal and international stability to the region. More realistically, it was well accepted by both Washington and Ottawa that if the West refused to help new African nations, they might feel it necessary to turn toward the Communist bloc for assistance.

In June 1961 Cabinet approved the conditions under which the Department of National Defence (DND) would accept as part of its commitments the flexibility to train as required military personnel of Commonwealth countries. Almost immediately DND responded to requests for assistance from Nigeria and Ghana, and had sent a full training team to the latter country by the end of the year.

Unlike Nigeria and Ghana, the first request made by Tanganyika (later Tanzania) for Canadian military assistance met with little success. Forwarded to DND in April 1963, the inquiry was quickly turned down by the newly appointed Minister of National Defence (MND), Paul Hellyer. The MND had just initiated a complete reorganization of DND and refused to undertake any further commitments until the job was done. Hellyer's stubbornness proved particularly frustrating for the Department of External Affairs as Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson had verbally committed Canada to assisting Tanganyika during President Julius Nyerere's visit to Ottawa in July 1963. Heated debate between DEA, DND, Finance, and the Department of Defence Production (DDP) eventually led to a feasible solution whereby all parties participated in an interdepartmental Military Assistance Committee (MAC) that would share control over budgets and programs. The MAC determined how requests for aid would be fulfilled and then forwarded proposals and budget costs to the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs and Defence (CCEAD) for approval. With a satisfactory mechanism in place DEA was able to renew their efforts to procure military assistance for Tanzania.

In August 1964 a request for a military survey team to Tanzania was approved by the CCEAD and upon receipt of the team's report after their return in December, a general program for Canadian military assistance was
Tanzanian soldiers are taught how to use a generator tester by RCEME Sergeant John Rogers, 11 March 1967.

The Deployment of CAPFATT

With the decision finalized, DND tasked the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) to provide the advisory group and a training group for CAPFATT. The advisory group assignment was a two-year accompanied posting at the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF) headquarters in Dar es Salaam, while the training group assignment was a one-year unaccompanied posting at Colito Barracks just outside of the Tanzanian capital (see map). CFHQ selected Colonel H.E.C. Price, Canadian Guards, to lead the first thirty man team to Tanzania, with Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Gardner of the Fort Garry Horse as his senior training advisor.11 An advance party consisting of Colonel Price, Major A.M. Potis, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), and Sergeant P.L. Magalos, Headquarters (HQ) Western Command, arrived in Dar es Salaam in January 1965 to establish contact with the TPDF and prepare for the arrival of the rest of the team.

At first the task must have appeared impossible. The TPDF was in a decrepit state, disorganized, scattered, and rife with corruption especially within its officer corps. The order of battle boasted only two under strength infantry battalions and a small headquarters at Dar es Salaam, a total of 53 officers and 2,000 men, of whom a thousand were recruits. In 1964, the army had mutinied over issues of service and pay, and the Tanzanian government embarrassingly required the aid of British forces to put down the revolt and restore order. In the end the TPDF were grant aid of many of their demands and the force was reorganized, though this allowed only some veteran soldiers to benefit while the majority of the army was left to ruin.

The advisory group worked with Brigadier General M.S. H. Sarasikya, the Tanzanian Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) to establish the foundations of what would become a new military, while the training group prepared Colito Barracks to serve as the temporary military academy until the permanent academy was completed at Arusha. Colonel Price quickly discovered that there was much work to be done. The TPDF had no National Defence Act (NDA), no military legal or logistics system, and no administrative capability. There were no service records for soldiers nor any system to regulate and verify pay. Not a single qualified or experienced staff officer could be found in the Defence Force Headquarters (DFHQ), and there was not even a clerical staff to handle typing and filing. Everything had to be built up from scratch.

The training group experienced similar challenges. The TPDF had no recognized training standards or system, and there were no training aids or instructional pamphlets for any of the trades. The TPDF employed a variety of weapons and equipment from half a dozen western and eastern bloc countries, though the majority of material was of Chinese origin. Without any existing personnel administrative system at DFHQ, it was impossible to determine who had been trained to what level.

The Tanzania Military Academy was initially organized into five wings with a staff of 250 personnel, including 18 Canadians. Each wing - administrative, basic training, officer training, battalion training, and technical training - was overseen by two Canadian members assisted by a small number of recently trained Tanzanian officers and soldiers. The objective was to provide direction while TPDF instructors were trained after which the Canadian positions could gradually be eliminated. From May to December 1965, 21 courses were conducted in five professional advancement fields and six trades, resulting in 232 graduates by the end of the first year of operation. Triple the numbers of students was expected the following year.12

Because of the tropical climate the TMA began operations daily at 0730 hours, breaking for lunch at 1200 hours and ending classes at 1500 hours. During the cooler seasons this left a few hours for physical training before supper, but during the Tanzania summer few ventured outdoors for physical activity before 1630 hours. After hours the students and staff found recreation in squash, golf, sailing, and deep-sea fishing, as well as messes for both the officers and men at Colito Barracks.13 The CAPFATT personnel were garrisoned either at the officer’s mess or in furnished housing in Dar es Salaam until more permanent quarters were constructed.

Add the Air Force

A number of countries had responded to Tanzania’s request for military and technical assistance, including West Germany, which had taken on the task of developing the country’s air force.14 In 1964, the West German government protested Julius Nyerere’s decision to allow an East German consulate in Dar es Salaam and threatened to terminate their military and technical aid. Declaring that no country would decide Tanzania’s friends and enemies, Nyerere directed the West Germans to remove all of their advisors from the country and cancel not only their military and technical assistance but also their economic aid as well. While politically impressive the decision was not particularly astute, and the sudden cessation of West German assistance left Tanzania’s air force in a precarious state. As Canada had just recently committed itself to training the Tanzanian army, Nyerere explored the possibility of Ottawa assisting with the development of its air force as well. On 6 April 1965, Ottawa announced that it had agreed in principle to meet a further Tanzanian request for military support, this time in the establishment of a military air wing.

Canada dispatched an air survey team consisting of two officers, Group Captain (G/C) H. Currie, and Group Captain P.L. Magalos, to Dar es Salaam to begin their training. Upon his return to Ottawa, G/C Currie reported that Tanzania required considerable equipment and training assistance to achieve a modest air-transport and liaison capability within the next five years. From the field report the MAC formulated a detailed assistance proposal that was readily accepted by Ottawa. Ottawa publicly announced on 3 September 1965, that Canada would donate up to four Caribou and eight Oter aircraft and assist with the training of up to 400 Tanzanian aircrew, ground crew, and support personnel. Half of these would be trained in Canada while the other half would be trained in Tanzania.15

Like the army, the Tanzanian air wing had to be built up from nothing. The study conducted by the CAPFATT air wing in October 1965
confirmed that Tanzania lacked any sort of air control system, ground control facilities, supply system, or stock control. Pilots needed conversion training on both the Caribou and Otter aircraft, and technicians had to be taught how to service them. Based on this situation G/C Currie and his advisory staff produced a notional air wing establishment for Tanzania, a five-year development plan, and a budget. The CAFATTT air wing also recruited more Tanzanian personnel to come to Canada to join the five Tanzanian officers who had already reported for flying and technical instruction in June 1965.18

In January 1966 the first sixteen RCAF personnel arrived at Dar es Salaam under the command of S/L K. MacKenzie to establish air operations and training facilities. The first priorities were the initiation of conversion training for pilots and ground crew and the building of the facilities required for a self-supporting air wing. The construction at the airfield proceeded slowly until the Britoria oil lift to Zambia ceased operations at the end of May 1966, thus eliminating the congestion in the air wing operations area. The first two donated Caribou aircraft sporting Tanzanian markings arrived from Nairobi on May 19th, 1966, flown in on the last leg by newly trained Tanzanian pilots. After a perfect landing the two aircraft were handed over in a well-publicized ceremony to officially mark the creation of Tanzania’s airforce.17

The Naval Dilemma

With the development of Tanzania’s air and ground forces well under way, Julius Nyerere next turned his attention towards building a navy. Not wanting to give the Communists any chance to exploit a newly opened door, the United States quietly but quickly requested that Canada instruct CAFATTT to deter the Tanzanians from building a naval force at all. Colonel Price had already made this recommendation to Brigadier Sarakikya, arguing that manning a navy would drain scarce human resources from the army and air wing. However when the Tanzanian President persisted in advancing the issue, Brigadier Sarakikya was left with little choice but to address the matter seriously. The naval dilemma that followed became the first of a series of Cold War chess matches played out by CAFATTT during its tenure in Southern Africa.

An initial suggestion that the British train the Tanzanian navy was promptly refused by President Julius Nyerere, who was at the time officially opposing British economic sanctions against the recently self-independent Rhodesia that had in turn begun to cripple other South African economies as well.19 However, a British naval officer had already been tasked to complete an assessment for Tanzania’s naval requirements in early 1966, and his report became the basis for subsequent offers of western assistance.20 The officer had estimated that the initial requirement for a coastal maritime patrol force was 240 officers and men manning three patrol craft. With the necessary shore installations the cost was estimated at £3,150,000 plus £289,200 annually for operations and maintenance. Realizing that given the political situation surrounding Rhodesia it seemed unlikely that Britain would spearhead the effort, other western European nations were canvassed for support. Of the few who agreed to consider the idea, only the Netherlands gave the proposal any serious consideration, but they soon declined as well.21

A confidential message to Ottawa on 14 June 1966, informed External Affairs that within twenty-four hours of the Dutch refusal the Chinese ambassador in the Hague had called on the Tanzanian ambassador, Mr. Ngaiza, and informed him that China would be pleased to train the Tanzanians and meet all costs including the supplement of naval vessels.22

The door had suddenly swung wide open for Chinese competition. Within four days the State Department of the United States responded by attempting to persuade the Dutch government to reverse its decision, and had sent a secret message to Ottawa asking for Canadian support in their efforts. The Americans were clearly concerned about increased Chinese activity in the western Indian Ocean, especially so near the U.S. meteorological and research installation at Aldabra. Additionally, Chinese naval assistance to Tanzania could have led to the justification for the establishment of shore facilities and communications installations, and the sudden increased presence of two hundred plus Chinese military advisors would almost certainly have jeopardized the western position in the Indian Ocean area.23

Despite further efforts by Washington to encourage the Dutch to change their position, by September 1966 the issue was closed. The decision left the American State Department with only Canada as an immediate influence against Tanzania seeking aid from a Communist country: there was good reason to suspect that the Soviets had done the same. Tanzania had been improving its relationship with China since its independence and clearly Washington perceived this as a strategic threat. President Nyerere eventually decided to postpone acting on the Chinese naval offer, and Colonel Price suspected that perhaps he was waiting to see if the Soviet Union would step forward with a better offer still.24 There was no doubt in his mind that the outcome would be of great interest to Washington.

Developing Command and Control of the TPDF

Despite reform in the TPDF there continued a serious deficiency in command and control of the army. Few, if any, of the TPDF senior leadership had any real command
experience, and staff abilities were entirely absent from both the headquarters and the army. Indeed, as Zanzibar to be the lynchpin in the development of the army, Colonel Price with the support of Brigadier Sarakikya initiated the TPDF senior officers study group that became an annual event. Attended by senior officers from the three TPDF infantry battalions plus a few representing the headquarters and the air wing, the first week long work shop in 1966 was designed to brief the senior leadership on the progress of the TPDF development, to discuss future plans for organization, training, and operations, and to study the principles of tactical employment in preparation for the annual collective training period at Monduli in the autumn. Well attended, the only disappointment was that the two officers invited from Zanzibar failed to arrive at the workshop, and no explanation for their absence was provided. However it became increasingly obvious to the Canadians that a gap was forming between the mainland force and those stationed on Zanzibar, where Communist advisors had taken the lead.24

The short training session highlighted the obvious weaknesses in the TPDF command. Map reading and battle procedure skills amongst the TPDF officers were very poor, and they demonstrated considerable difficulties in solving tactical problems above the platoon level.25 This was understandable to Col. Price and his advisors, as many of the older poorly qualified officers were commissioned after the 1964 mutiny and the newer Canadian trained TPDF officers had never deployed more than a handful of soldiers in any operation. Meanwhile, those that had been sent for officer training in Eastern Bloc or Asian countries had demonstrated no skills. The problem lay in the obvious differences in training that each group had received. While those Tanzanians sent to Canada for officer training were simply incorporated into existing regular officer candidate training courses, those sent to Russia, the United Arab Republic (UAR), and Indonesia had received special courses designed for foreign nationals. Upon returning from Russia and the UAR the TPDF officers turned in course reports showing that they had qualified as battalion commanders, while those returning from Indonesia were graciously qualified as ‘generals’. The CAPATT officer commander suggested running all returning officers through a junior officer refresher course in July 1966 before deployment to Monduli, and Brigadier Sarakikya agreed. Of those attending, almost all of the Eastern Bloc trained officers failed and had to be re-taught over the summer by CAPATT instructors.46

Field Training at Monduli

In the autumn of 1966 three battalions of the TPDF infantry traveled to Monduli for their first full-scale field exercise. Up to this point none of the units had ever operated a field command post, and very few of the troops had ever fired their weapons or lived in the field for a protracted period. The aim of the exercise was to evaluate the individual training that the TPDF had received to date, and to see whether they could operate up to the battalion level. Under the watchful eye of their Canadian advisors, Tanzanian soldiers were evaluated on the conduct of a battalion headquarters, on the conduct of offensive, defensive, and internal security operations, and on the use of support weapons in support of battalion sub-units.27

Beginning with the 3rd Battalion TPDF on September 3rd, 1966, each unit was evaluated by Lieutenant Colonel S. F. Andrunyk, the CAPATT senior training advisor.47 During the first week each battalion conducted basic routine and individual skills training to get prepared for more complex operations. During the second week LCpl. Andrunyk conducted a Tactical Exercise(s) Without Troops (TEWT) with the officers, while Major K. L. Mollison and Major J. W. Cummings supervised a controlled company level exercise (EX TANARIISHA).48 LCpl. Andrunyk also tested the TPDF officers on their battle procedure and fire planning, while Majors Mollison and Cummings ran the TPDF companies through a series of defensive positions and ambush drills. Additionally, the soldiers practiced firing their 82mm mortars with a high degree of skill and success. During the final week of training the CAPATT officers conducted EX NGUVU MOJA, a three-day battalion sized cordon and sweep of a guerrilla infested area. While conducting the operation the TPDF battalion was “attacked” and had to mount an effective counter-attack against the CAPATT enemy force.

The field exercise highlighted a number of areas where further training was still needed. Overall, the command and control of the battalion was weak as none of the officers had any experience in operating a tactical HQ. The headquarters was seriously lacking in support staff and few of the officers had staff training of any sort. The battalion intelligence sections were not trained at all prior to their arrival at Monduli, and the Intelligence Officers (IO) were more concerned with security matters in their home stations than with operational intelligence. This was understandable considering that in the past home station security had been their primary function. The CAPATT advisor recommended that in the future the battalion should create a field security section for operations and leave the remaining intelligence staff at home.49

Personal shortcomings and frustrations with command were further aggravated by the criticisms of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Mafude, second in command of TPDF forces in Zanzibar, who had accompanied several Zanzibar officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to observe the field training at Monduli. Lieutenant Colonel Mafude had received his military and political training at the hands of Soviet and Chinese advisors, who had obviously encouraged him to speak out against any system or tactics that the Canadians had introduced to the TPDF. The presence of Mafude and his encouragement had become so annoying during the first week of training that the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion TPDF, Lieutenant Colonel Musuguri, made a formal request to Lieutenant Colonel Andrunyk that they be removed from the camp, and by force if necessary. Andrunyk immediately contacted the Chief of the Defence Staff on the matter, and within a few hours Brigadier Sarakikya had arrived and collected the group. Mafude and his fellow officers were immediately returned to Zanzibar town on Sarakikya’s return flight, leaving the CAPATT team to carry on with training uninterrupted.50

The field training at Monduli in 1966 revealed that all ranks of the TPDF suffered a number of difficulties. There was in general a poor knowledge of support weapons and the
TPDF soldiers had not been taught indirect fire methods. This came as something of a surprise to the CAPATTI instructors as the Chinese advisors had supposedly trained the TPDF on all support weapons that their country had provided. Noting that there were no teaching aids for the Chinese weapons, a couple of the Canadian NCOs taught themselves how to employ both the 82mm mortar and the 7.62 Medium Machine Gun effectively, and then wrote training guides that were later used to teach TPDF soldiers. Another surprising weakness was driving skills, in particular cross-country driving. Again the Canadian soldiers learned to master the Chinese vehicles before passing a number of TPDF soldiers through a make-shift driver's course.

In general TPDF battle skills were also weak. Protection on the battlefield was poor and units were reluctant to employ reconnaissance forces and fighting patrols. In some cases, Canadian advisors noted that TPDF standing patrols were positioned too close to the main defensive position yet without communications to warn of an impending attack.\(^\text{32}\) It was realized that these units were typical of a force used to dealing more with internal security and not sovereignty defence. However, the TPDF troops performed well during the corded and sweep exercise, a maneuver they had had more experience in executing. Overall, Lieutenant Colonel Andruyk was satisfied that these lessons had been learned at Monduli and that the capability of the TPDF army was slowly improving.

**Enter the Dragon**

In mid-1966 the Chinese began to augment their physical presence in Tanzania and openly challenged Canadian dominance in the country’s military and technical assistance programs. In July Colonel Price reported to Ottawa that coincident with the preparation of the 1966-67 Tanzania defence budget was the recommendation that the TPDF acquire both tanks and artillery. It was argued by the Tanzanian Second Vice-President that both were required for suppressing potential riots or other possible trouble in the capital of Dar es Salaam, and that the Chinese had graciously offered to supply tanks, artillery, and training for Tanzanian crews. It was difficult for Colonel Price to justify the tabling of the issue for the time being, but he managed to do so. On August 15th, DND received another confidential memorandum from Department of External Affairs via Washington stating that 12 large truck tankers and a quantity of unidentified heavy equipment had been delivered to Zanzibar by the Chinese navy. Furthermore, the message noted that four Cubans had also arrived on the island via the Chinese navy, and these issues the point was being made. China had delivered in excess of 82 million in assets including material for home station development at both Nachingwea and Zanzibar. Chinese advisors were deploying with the materials to oversee the work and continue their efforts in promoting an anti-western government and defence force. By contrast, western interests had delivered limited assistance and more often than not had tried to dissuade Tanzania from acquiring advanced weapon systems. This diplomatic approach had had an adverse effect on western influence in the region.\(^\text{33}\)

In December 1966 Colonel Price was informed by Brigadier Sarakikya that despite his own arguments to the Tanzanian government the decision had been made by the Second Vice-President to dispatch ten officers and sixty men to China for training on the tanks that the Communists intended to supply.\(^\text{34}\) Soon after the Chinese deployed a team of approximately eight persons to Songea to train reserve soldiers, and possibly a second group to train others at Musoma. Songea had been chosen as the home station of the planned 6th Battalion TPDF, with the 7th Battalion TPDF based at Musoma. The latter station was located not far from the Kisabakori Gold Mine, then considered one of the country’s strategic assets.\(^\text{35}\)

CAPATTI officers found TPDF defence planning increasingly difficult as Chinese influence expanded throughout Tanzania. Despite regular meetings with Brigadier Sarakikya and Mr. Kyesi, the Principle Assistant Secretary for the TPDF Ministry of Defence, there seemed to be no way to achieve a realistic defence plan or budget. Worse, there was no coordination between the Tanzanian Ministry of Defence and its Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning. The existing defence plan had called for $7-10 million a year while the Treasury had allotted only $3-5 million. The sudden desire to include the formation of a navy and an armoured unit further degraded the viability of the defence plan, and the Canadians argued that there was little hope of establishing a credible force if the Tanzanian government continued.\(^\text{36}\) Colonel Price put forth that priority for a capability had to be based on need, availability of outside assistance, and capability to recruit, train, equip, house, maintain that capability. He also argued that neither the international situation nor the national security situation at that time warranted any sort of accelerated build up of force. Finally, the CAPATTI chief engineer warned that the tarmac simply did not favour tanks, as most roads in Tanzania were metalled and the bridges were not designed to carry anything over twenty-two tonnes.\(^\text{37}\) In end despite all of the advice CAPATTI offered, there seemed to be no way to deter the government from accepting certain Chinese plans over their own.

**The Enemies Within**

The continuously evolving security situation in Tanzania had serious effects on the ability of CAPATTI to continue with its planned operations throughout the next two years. A
number of issues arose both in the international arena as well as at home regarding the nature of the training the Canadians were providing and the extent to which they had become involved in the internal and external security matters of Tanzania. Far from simply fostering good international relations and contributing to peace and stability, CAFATTT found itself embroiled in the complicated game of Cold War chess being played out in Tanzania between themselves and the communists.

In December 1966 CAFATTT assisted in the coordination of a number of internal security operations throughout Tanzania's southern districts. In one instance the members of CAFATTT supervised an airift of twenty field force policemen from Moshi to Lake Manyara to intercept a raid being carried out by the Wamang'ati tribe against the Masai tribe in retaliation for cattle theft.42 Later the same month, CAFATTT assisted in the deployment of TPDF units to villages along the Tanzania-Mozambique border in response to the discovery of recently laid mines in the Mtwara district that had killed and wounded several civilians.43 Additionally, CAFATTT recommended the immediate building up to strength of the 3rd Bn TPDF at Nachingwea because of its proximity to the Mozambique border and the possibility that there might be further incidents. The CDF agreed and further augmented the 3rd Bn TPDF with a company from the 4th Bn TPDF then stationed on Pemba.44

New evidence suggesting that soldiers were being trained in Tanzania for fighting in Mozambique and Rhodesia was one explanation for the increased attacks occurring along its southern border. CAFATTT had suspected that the Chinese advisors were training both civilians and TPDF soldiers for guerrilla warfare, though there was no clear evidence to suggest that TPDF regulars were being used for raids on Mozambique. Questions were raised in Ottawa by the Standing Committee on External Affairs (SCEA) in July 1967 regarding this matter, however the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs reassured the committee that CAFATTT had played no role in training raiders or freedom fighters. This point was reinforced during Second Vice-President Rashid Kawawa's visit to Ottawa on July 19th, 1967, when he categorically denied that freedom fighters were being trained by the TPDF or by CAFATTT.45

Despite such reassurances there was clearly evidence to suggest that soldiers belonging to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) were being trained at DFDHQ suggesting that these units may have assisted FRELIMO in sinking two small Portuguese gunboats off Cobwe, over a hundred kilometers south of Momba Bay and in the Mozambique channel. However, it was clear that Tanzania's government intended to pursue the matter further, and once again the CAFATTT found itself in the middle of a game of Cold War chess.

The MIG issue

In response to the growing concern of retaliatory air and ground attacks against Tanzania by its neighbouring countries, President Nyerere dispatched a team of senior officials to Moscow in May 1968 to explore the possibility of acquiring MIG aircraft, radar fire guns, and air defense systems.46 Washington immediately responded to this action with a series of political and diplomatic manoeuvres, including the dispatch of Rear Admiral Cobue, over 100 miles southwest of the TPDF air force command. CAFATTT was thus able to take control of the situation, and offer the Tanzanians assistance on the maintenance of the aircraft. In addition, the CDF immediately responded to this action with a more offensive air capability beyond the turbo-prop transport aircraft that Canada had supplied.47

Incident along the southern border. A month later a report arrived on the CAFATTT commander's desk at DFDHQ suggesting that these units may have assisted FRELIMO in sinking two small Portuguese gunboats off Cobwe, over a hundred kilometers south of Momba Bay and in the Mozambique channel. However, it was clear that Tanzania's government intended to pursue the matter further, and once again the CAFATTT found itself in the middle of a game of Cold War chess.

The MIG issue remained complicated for all parties. There were a number of factors that weighed against the possibility of Tanzania acquiring MIG aircraft including the fact that Tanzanian-Soviet relations were generally poor. The Russians had had little success in the past in convincing Julius Nyerere to accept Soviet equipment and advisors, and the Soviet MIG fighter support to Nigeria in their war against the Biafrans had greatly disturbed Tanzania, which favoured the latter group in the conflict. As well, due to British influence in both the Zambian and Kenyan military, they tended to advise Tanzania against pursuing Soviet assistance. Finally the small cost of maintaining sophisticated aircraft was simply beyond the current Tanzanian defence budget.48

By the end of May 1968 it appeared that the government had decided to pursue the possibility of acquiring both MIG fighters and an air defence system though no clear indication was given of how the Tanzanians planned to proceed. The CAFATTT dispatched valuable messages on the progress of their MIG fighter acquisition to Ottawa daily, allowing the decision makers in Ottawa to keep Washington well informed of the situation on the ground while assessing Canada's own next moves. When it was realized that the TPDF was having serious difficulties in establishing a fighter air wing, Colonel Sheffield left Ottawa once again stepped forward to offer Canadian assistance on the matter. Every opportunity to retain influence over the TPDF was seized, and in this case Canada had the additional advantage of already having significant influence over Tanzania's air power development. Still, it was unknown if Canada could succeed in shifting the Russian offer as it had lost considerable influence with the TPDF over the last year while the Chinese had gained much political ground. By 1968
Chinese influence had certainly become a factor in every major defence decision now being taken by the Tanzanian government.

**Ending the Program**

By March 1968 the Department of National Defence had expended almost 87.5 million in military assistance to Tanzania, spending well beyond its original proposed budget of 84.54 million for the entire five-year program. Like all programs without a precedent the original budget was grossly underestimated, and did not account for unexpected equipment costs and the need for extra supplies and staff. The addition of the Air Wing in 1965 greatly added to the immediate costs of the mission, although approximately 810.5 million had been set aside for its establishment and maintenance. A review of the costs for the program identified that there was little possibility of reducing current expenditures without significantly depleting the Canadian presence in the country, and that remained several tasks that had yet to be accomplished. As a particular point of contention with the Tanzanian government was the failure thus far on the part of Canada to complete the construction of the military academy. Although the site survey was completed in 1967 the building had yet to be constructed.

In May 1969 a number of Chinese advisors returned to Canada in January 1970. The air wing team followed soon after. The message came as both a surprise and a relief. Ottawa was delighted to learn that Tanzania had chosen not to pursue the MIG option, however they were prepared for their return to Canada. Meanwhile the Chinese focused on turning the Mutual revolutionary army to fight the European presence in Southern Africa and there was little Canada could do to stop it. By December 1969 CAFATTT had ceased operations and the last army advisors returned to Canada in January 1970. The air wing team followed soon after.

**Conclusion**

Overall the Canadian mission to Tanzania had been a success. In a little more than five years the Canadian Armed Forces had turned a mutinying rabble into something resembling a professional army, had linked the mainland with its islands by air, and had formed the nucleus of a modern air force. The construction of the TMA had been a failure, yet CAFATTT had established a self-sustaining training program without any facilities and very limited support. Other than the TMA all objectives had been met. For DND the CAFATTT marked yet another remarkable achievement that defined the professionalism of the Canadian Armed Forces even while in the throes of reorganisation at home.

Last, although the Communists had clearly prevailed in the Cold War battle for influence, Canadian-Tanzanian relations were not harmed by the termination of CAFATTT. In fact, some in DEA observed the ending as a blessing in disguise. Both Department of External Affairs and DND realised that Canada’s presence in Tanzania attracted suspicion from the east that saw them as spies for Washington. This accusations were taken as a sign that Canada was not cooperating with western interests on a number of strategic issues, and it would have been difficult to pursue a foreign policy of moderate middle power under such circumstances. As well, given the very likely possibility that Tanzania was going to continue its active though indirect support of liberation forces, CAFATTT’s role as advisor to the TPDF may have created possible future political difficulties for Ottawa and maybe even serious embarrassment.
Canada was, after all, a member of both NATO and the Commonwealth. Finally, CAFATT serves an interesting reminder of what was once easily within the capabilities of DND. The operational atrophy that followed the unification of the forces in 1967 depleted any possibility of carrying out similarly independent missions for two decades. In 1996 Canada made an attempt to independently deploy a force to central southern Africa only to fail for a miserable lack of strategic intelligence, lift, and combat service support. The force that actually arrived in theatre was a mere shadow of the presence that DND had in Africa three decades before, and Canada has yet to revive DND to the point where it could undertake such missions without serious difficulty. For the present, Canada remains on the periphery of capably supplying assistance to the developing world in Africa.

Notes
3. N. A. Robertson, “Memorandum for the Minister” dated 23 May 1962, and attached “Memorandum to the Cabinet.”
4. Andrew B. Godefroy is currently a Department of National Defence Security and Defence Policy Research Scholar in the War Studies Programme, Royal Military College of Canada. His research focuses on Canadian international relations in the Twentieth Century, in particular issues related to science and technology, missile defence, and space programs. Andrew has previously published on topics such as Canada and the First World War, Canadian doctrine and tactics, and Canadian defence policy. Since the summer of 2004, he has served on the editorial board of the Canadian Military Journal.