5-1-2001

Martin Luther for the twenty-first century: the presence of the other

Barry G. Rasmussen

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus

Recommended Citation

Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol27/iss1/4

This Articles is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Consensus by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
On the occasion of his retirement from teaching, a Festschrift was organized to celebrate the scholarly work of Brian Gerrish. In his response, Gerrish confesses: “The theologian in me has always been convinced that there cannot be a theology without a secure concept of revelation, while the historian in me whispers back that revelation is in serious trouble and has been since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” Behind this insecurity surrounding Christian revelation is the hermeneutical question of whether God can be present to an individual or humanity while remaining Other. Martin Luther, living before the period of time referred by Gerrish, is a theologian who has stressed that God is present in human life. At the same time, Luther has purposely complicated the relationship between the sign and meaning so that God always remains Other in communication with humanity. In fact, this part of Luther’s hermeneutic has led many to inquire whether Luther’s writings had an active role in the creation of the present western secularized culture. This question, outside the focus of this paper, is one that has occupied recent Luther-scholarship and leads in several conflicting directions. At the same time, in opposition to the assumptions of modern western culture, it is of central importance to Luther whether one lives in the presence of God or not. This combination, where Luther prevents revelation from becoming an expression of the “same” and insists that human beings live in the presence of God, makes Luther a theologian who is most helpful for western Christianity at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

This article will show that Luther’s theology and concept of revela-
tion, centred on the *proclamation* of the "Gospel," is one that is able to talk about the presence of God in a believer's life while keeping God wholly Other. The relevance of this for the Christian mission at the beginning of the twenty-first century will become evident by noting some parallels between Luther's hermeneutic and some of the concerns raised in recent critiques of the western metaphysics of presence. A representative example is provided by Jacques Derrida, who also wants to complicate the relationship between sign and meaning for the sake of the otherness of the other. John D. Caputo affirms that for Derrida: "This delimitation of reference is motivated not by subjectivism or scepticism but by a kind of hypersensitivity to otherness, by a profound vigilance about the other of language and of the possibility of something different, something 'impossible.'"

Luther's "hermeneutic of suspicion" was directed against any expression of transcendence used to give ultimate meaning to human accomplishments, works, and morality in the face of the darkness and threat of the future, human guilt, and the limits of the will. Luther makes it clear that, when faced with the God of the *proclamation* of the "Gospel," there is no secure place from where the interpreter can interpret the signs of God's presence and activity. Luther disallows the use of reason, moral projects, being, the human will, and even holiness as categories by which human beings might construct a hermeneutic to unify human experience. In the "Gospel," the various attempts to create identity, righteousness, and "eternity" are replaced with the "Other," Jesus Christ.

Robert W. Jenson claims that western civilization has heard the "Gospel's" attack on idolatry without believing in Christ's gifts and so now faces nothingness. In the aftermath of this intellectual and moral attack on transcendence, theology has changed so that it often becomes an expression of anthropology. Faith has no object but rather is urged because it is variously valued to be good for healthy, moral, or confident living. David S. Yeago writes: "This has, moreover, been true for 'liberal' and 'conservative' Protestants alike. Protestants have tended to assume that the real object of faith is *the fact of our being forgiven and accepted*, rather than Jesus Christ himself, apprehended as true God and true human being." In this nihilistic vacuum, there has arisen a fascination with language as a possible replacement of the gods of the West. The ground for interpretive security is sought in humanity's ability to communicate with the other. However, since the holocaust, there
has been a loss in confidence that the great narratives of the last two centuries might be able to provide a moral basis for society. An awareness has arisen that instead of revealing, language is a tool for hiding. Elie Wiesel eloquently captures this loss of confidence:

Today it’s different....Like the Shekinah, Divine Presence, language has followed Israel into exile. What does exiled language mean? It refers to the distance between words and what they mask....In every modern country one witnesses this verbal inflation, and a resulting devaluation of words. Political parties “war” with each other, industrial enterprises launch “offensives,”...On another plane, Stalin built the Gulag to “re-educate” his citizens and Lavrenty Beria (Soviet Intelligence chief during Stalin’s regime) annihilated hundreds of thousands of people for the “salvation” of humanity; as for Hitler, he invented the terms “concentration camp” and “final solution,” and all for the “well-being” of the human race.

According to Jean-François Lyotard, this postmodern rebellion against language has also occurred at other times in western civilization. Luther is also one who had practiced such a rebellion in his context and because of that, Luther’s hermeneutic is one that can prove helpful to Christian theology today.

God’s Speaking

In the cross and resurrection of Christ, God actively and effectively speaks to create believers. God’s Word in Christ Jesus is a performative Word that effects what it says. Thus, as God’s speaking created the heavens and the earth, God’s Word of Absolution effects absolution. Luther insists:

In Holy Scripture, however, there are real blessings. They state facts and are effective. They actually bestow and bring what the words say. We also have blessings of this kind in the New Testament through Christ’s priesthood, which is our blessing when I say: “Receive the absolution of your sins.”...All these things have the power to grant you forgiveness immediately and truly if you believe, for they are not our works; they are God’s works through our ministry. Accordingly, they are not blessings that express wishes; they are blessings that have the power to bestow. When I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, it is just as if I were saying: “I am snatching you from the hands of the devil and bringing you to God, and I am doing this truly and in fact.”
Luther talks about the proclamation of the cross of Christ in a way that is a critique of reason, human experience, and all “what’s in it for me” calculating philosophies. Luther claims that all attempts at finding God by interpreting the *signs* through reason and experience will actually result in an increase in sin. For Luther, these interpretive strategies will be governed by the desires and wishes of a self-centred interpreter who now identifies these desires with God. Luther was convinced that such self-created *gods* will eventually violently turn on the interpreter by creating a despair manifested as hypocrisy, self-righteousness, or self-hatred. This violence will be also manifested outwardly in one’s relationships with others. God’s speaking gives blessings and are not a reflection of human wishes.

At the end of the twentieth century, there has been a different kind of revolt going on against some of these same assumptions. For instance, Emmanuel Lévinas distinguishes between what he calls the “Said” and the “Saying” so that the *active* address of and to the Other can never be made into a function of the Same. The Said, which turns everything into part of the Same, is what can be said about the Other or can be the discourse which defines the Other by giving the parameters of what is reasonable or consistent with experience. Similarly, Jacques Derrida has recognized the inherent violence of a hermeneutic which either defines oneself by the other or the other by oneself. John D. Caputo claims that there is a positive relationship between Lévinas’ distinction between the Said and the Saying and Derrida’s negative theology. For Derrida, there is a world of difference between speaking to someone and speaking about someone. This becomes clear in his analysis of Nietzsche’s statement:

> “Friends, there are no friends!” cried the dying sage;  
> “Enemies, there is no enemy” shouts the living fool that I am.

This pithy quotation, reveals the difference between talking to friends and enemies and talking about them. When talking about them, they are no longer there: “One speaks *of them* only in their absence, and *concerning* their absence.” This is true even when such friends and enemies are physically present.

For Luther, what can be *said* about God in theology must never be confused with what God actively and creatively *says* to us in the proclamation of the “Gospel.” Otherwise, theology becomes a new “Law.” Violence is done to God and others as one’s own agendas for salvation
are projected onto God. God and one's neighbour are ordered into a scheme for establishing one's own righteousness, identity, and salvation. Talking about God does not effect salvation and righteousness. Theology is a second-order discourse and should not be confused with the encounter with God in the proclamation of the crucified and risen Christ. Luther safeguards against the expressions of such a tradition of immanence by talking about Christ as the Word spoken by God outside us (extra nos). The righteousness that Christ gives is always an “alien” righteousness (iustitia Christi aliena). Luther insists that a believer is simultaneously righteous and sinful (simul iustus et peccator) precisely because Christians encounter a Christ who is “alien” to them. When one is drawn to trust in the Other who is Christ, such a believer is completely holy, righteous, and blessed because of Christ. At the same time, when the same person is examined for signs of righteousness according to a list of categories designed to measure attributes or behaviour, one will either find nothing “good” or find a righteousness, which by definition, is a self-righteousness. The presence of the “alien” Christ cannot be understood in such a way that Christ becomes “possessed” by the believer. Christ remains other even while making the believer blessed by his presence. Luther's hermeneutic, by insisting that Christ's righteousness remains “alien” and that the Word is spoken extra nos, is a radical critique of such a philosophy of immanence.

Alterity

Luther, after introducing a distinction between a general and particular knowledge of God, shows why these two should not be confused. He is convinced that just about everybody has a general knowledge of God which includes the affirmations that God exists, that God created the world, and that God is good. Luther, however, is also persuaded that such general knowledge of God has limited or no value. The reason for this lies in the awareness that an intricate knowledge of God and the world does not reveal anything about God's intentions for us: “For it is written (Romans 3:11): 'No one understands God'; and elsewhere (John 1:18): 'No one has ever seen God,' that is, no one knows what the will of God is. Now what good does it do you to know that God exists if you do not know what His will is toward you?” God is not available or “at hand” for the “grasping” of human knowledge. It is God who ensures that no towers of Babel can be built to reach heaven gloriously. In fact, Luther
makes "the startling claim that the trinitarian God is 'hidden' precisely in his revelation, that God's hiddenness is a wilful act within the economy of salvation." 29 As part of the revelation itself, God actively hides from humanity so that God can communicate a particular knowledge of God in Christ Jesus. Luther identifies this particular knowledge as one that is passive: "As a matter of fact, our knowing is more passive than active; that is, it is more a matter of being known than of knowing." 30 Luther continues by explaining that being known by God means: "You have been visited by the Word; you have been granted faith and the Holy Spirit, by whom you have been renewed." 31

Luther's hermeneutic describes what takes place in the encounter with Christ in the proclamation of the "Gospel." This encounter creates faith and the fear of the Lord which is the beginning of knowledge and wisdom. Oswald Bayer has shown that there is an inherent connection between Luther's description of the vita passiva and his understanding of godly knowledge as that which is gained from sapientia experimentalis rather than scientia. 32 Being known by God in Christ Jesus is not the same as gaining knowledge of things "at hand." Nor can it be equated with knowledge of the self where consciousness or the mind becomes an object of inquiry. According to Luther, this passive and particular knowledge of Christ implies that: "you must hear Him and not master Him or prescribe method, goal, or measure to Him." 33

This knowledge of Christ is one that is directed to us particularly. It is a passive knowledge that, nevertheless, delivers us from the terrors of the Law:

"...Thus day by day I can become stronger and surer against the terrors of the Law, till I finally become master of the Law and sin through full confidence in Thy mercy." This is the teaching of this psalm and our perpetual school, from which we never graduate as perfect masters, neither we nor the Apostles nor the Prophets. We all remain students here, as long as we live, we all ask to be washed thoroughly. 34

That God is the active One in this proclamation of the "Gospel" is the death knell to a human reason which examines and judges experience in order to find salvation:

Human reason is easily offended by the ugly shape of the cross. It regards as insane those who try to comfort, help, and care for others, or who boast about their great riches, righteousness, power, and victory over sin, death, and every evil, and about their happiness, salvation, and
Martin Luther for the Twenty-first Century

eternal life – when meanwhile these same people are needy, weak, sorrowful, and despised, and are mistreated and killed as enemies of the state and of religion....

The passivity of Luther’s “particular” knowledge of God prevents the cross and the “Gospel” from becoming principles for building theories concerning knowledge and reality. Even a godly focus on the womb of Mary and the death of Jesus on the cross can become subverted into new “theologies of glory” when turned into the building blocks for constructing models for mastering history and reality. For example, Hegel’s attempt to make the Christian proclamation of God’s powerlessness on the cross into a principle of reality turns Luther’s “theology of the cross” into a “theology of glory.” Such a project changes the proclamation of the cross and resurrection of Christ from being an announcement concerning God’s gifts to a scheme by which one can order life’s moral undertakings. Luther’s identification of the “particular knowledge” of God in Christ Jesus as God knowing us prevents the use of his theology for such expressions of immanence.

Luther is aware that in the face of life’s trials, temptations, and sufferings it is not enough to align our thoughts with some divine attribute or principle. As David S. Yeago points out, for Luther, Christian comfort is not a thought:

Thus Luther can make the odd-sounding remark that when tribulation comes, “a comfort is necessary, not a thought.” “Comfort” theologically considered is therefore not at all the same thing as “a subjectively consoling thought.” On the contrary, the “comfort” of the believer is Christ himself.

Christ must reveal by his actual speaking to and for us and cannot be found by human seeking. In Luther’s hermeneutic, Christ must reveal and is not immanently located in some aspect of human life.

Emmanuel Lévinas is one postmodern thinker who has judged western thought’s “long adventure with immanence” to be “violent.” A symptom of this violence is that it undercuts the possibility of a God who actively reveals from the outside. This concern resonates with Luther’s hermeneutic. Adriaan Peperzak summarizes Lévinas’ revolt against western use of immanence:

In any case, the project of Western philosophy has excluded the possibility of ego’s transcending itself toward a God who would be absolutely other and irreducible to any element or to the whole of the universe. Under the name of God, the philosophers, as did the
theologians, built many *idols* [italics mine], as for example Logos, *Esse ipsum*, Substance, Nature, or Spirit, but a God neither known or preknown, nor concealed in the unconscious or preconscious memory of conscience, a God who must *reveal* in order to be accepted – such a God is impossible within the traditional framework.\(^{40}\)

Lévinas describes the encounter with the Other as an encounter with an infinity that cannot be reduced to an “ideal of reason,” thereby becoming a projection of a beyond which completes the incomplete.\(^{41}\) To describe this encounter, Lévinas has purposely chosen the *face* of the other as that which confronts us. Unlike a text or other work of culture the face resists being made into a phenomenon, symbol, or mask.\(^{42}\) It resists the narcissistic efforts of the self to get behind the sign and, according to Lévinas, the face claims responsibility from the one it confronts. As Lévinas states, the implication of this transcendence calling us to responsibility is that we are in a passive position concerning Goodness: “This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would signify the Goodness of the Good: the necessity that the Good chose me before I can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice.”\(^{43}\)

Lévinas chose the *face* to talk about the encounter with the other and that he did so because it best resists attempts at *representation*. In doing this, Lévinas carefully avoids a hermeneutic which becomes an archeology to get past the face-to-face encounter. The *face* gives the transcendent a recognizable content, thereby saving human beings from an unlimited desire for transcendence. Such a desire would only consume the one desiring.\(^{44}\) Luther expressed a similar concern by using the distinction between the “*hidden*” and the “*revealed*” God. God *hides* so that the revelation of God will always be “dressed and clothed in His Word and promises.”\(^{45}\) The encounter with God will be through Christ, the *mask* of God:

> The Gentiles speak with God outside His Word and promises, according to the thoughts of their own hearts; but the Prophets speak with God as He is clothed and revealed in His promises and Word. This God, clothed in such a kind appearance and, so to speak, in such a pleasant mask, that is to say, dressed in His promises – this God we can grasp and look at with joy and trust.\(^{46}\)

The attempt to go past this *mask* is the attempt to view God “absolutely” and rise to heaven through one’s own speculations.\(^{47}\) According to Luther, this “naked God” eventually turns on us and crushes us with our own despair.\(^{48}\) At the same time, such a “naked God” causes trouble for
others: "All misfortune begins in the name of God." 49

The concern for the alterity of the other expressed throughout the writings of major postmodern thinkers is one that is also a priority with Luther. The difference is that Luther's hermeneutic is shaped by trinitarian and christological considerations. Luther’s hermeneutic constantly directs attention away from the self toward the God who speaks in Christ Jesus:

I refuse to look at anything except this Christ. He should be such a treasure to me that in comparison with Him everything else is filthy. He should be such a light to me that when I have taken hold of Him by faith, I do not know whether there is such a thing as Law, sin, or unrighteousness in the world. 50

It is in this light that one can understand Luther's criticism of the scholastic assertion that faith does not justify the sinner unless it is "formed by love." 51 Luther calls faith, itself, a gift from God which precludes it from being immanently formed by human love for others. A faith "formed by love" asks: "What have I done? Where have I sinned? What have I deserved?" 52 Instead, faith created by God looks away from the self toward Jesus, asks what Jesus has done, and so draws the self out of itself. Created by the proclamation of the "Gospel" which announces redemption from sin, eternal death, and the devil in Christ, faith has its gaze directed outside itself to Christ. 53

The Gift of God

Being drawn out of oneself is experienced as a violence against one's autonomy. Luther was not only convinced that God's speaking in the proclamation of Christ Jesus goes against what can be learned from experience but also goes against what human beings want or will for themselves. Thus, the creation of faith will necessarily entail experiences of Anfechtungen. These intense experiences of temptation and trial arise from the saving encounter with this Other called Jesus. Jesus interrupts the sinful self's attempts at establishing itself over against others. The encounter with Jesus Christ in the proclamation of the "Gospel" undermines all projects for self-creation and self-redemption while giving redemption in Christ. Luther’s hermeneutic undermines modern confidence in the human will.

The sinful self, curved in on itself, believes that it can make choices
which, in its very choosing, has power redemptively to transcend itself. Modernity has taken the power of choice and has made it the locus of infinity and freedom. Friedrich Schiller philosophically examines the moment before a decision is made and the limitless possibilities become a particular reality. He defines this moment as an infinite space where there is human freedom and a free will which is not empty but is filled with the content of an aesthetic freedom. In opposition, Robert Jenson once again claims that this metaphysic of pure possibility is a result of the western world hearing the promises of the Gospel while emptying those promises of Christ. Jenson writes:

If the gospel, which asserts this God, is true, then this futurity is really there, and we must expect that when the gospel calls our attention to it, it will be noticed also by those of us who do not come to obey the gospel. To such notice, unbounded futurity must present itself as the child’s nightmare of eternity, in which at every moment there is always yet another moment, so that no journey can have a goal, no pain a termination, no joy a resting place, into which the meaning of every temporal act and sequence evaporates. If infinity is not the infinity of God, it must be the infinity of the world, that is, nothingness....Insofar as the call of infinity has been an actual historical phenomenon in the West...radical faith and nihilism have repeatedly and with increasing urgency posited themselves as our only choices.

Luther, many years before Schiller, also examined the moment of decision and came to radically different conclusions from those assumed by dominant western society. Luther is convinced that “the will cannot change itself and turn in a different direction.” One cannot get behind one’s own will in order to change what one wants. Therefore, Luther describes the human will as either being raptured by God or enslaved by the devil. In Luther’s own day, Erasmus of Rotterdam posited a neutral place from which the will could either move toward evil or the good. Luther identifies the inherent nihilism of such a theory by calling such a “will to nothing” a dialectical fiction. He traces this speculation back to Origen’s theory of the soul as a neutral place between Spirit and flesh: “I, too, am familiar with Origen’s fable about the threefold disposition of flesh, soul, and spirit standing in the middle and being capable of turning either way, toward the flesh or toward the spirit....Paul here calls everything flesh that is without the Spirit....” For Luther, this theoretical proposition of an abstract will is an attempt to storm the very gates of heaven. It attempts to be like God who creates ex nihilo: “For the power of apply-
ing itself to salvation cannot be a merely abstract willing, unless salvation itself is to be called nothing. Nor again can desire and endeavour be a merely abstract willing, since desire must strive and endeavour in some direction....”

Luther insists that it is the God who speaks in Christ Jesus who is the active one in salvation and that this Word is always spoken *pro me* or *pro nobis*. Referring to Galatians 3:13, where St. Paul says that Christ became a curse *for us* (*huper həmon*), Luther confesses: “...but He is a divine and human Person who took sin, the condemnation of the Law, and death upon Himself, not for Himself but for us. Therefore the whole emphasis is on the phrase *huper həmon*.” The “Word” is spoken to particular people at particular times. The “Word” is not passively available for insightful human searching or willing. That the “Word” is spoken *pro nobis* theologically ensures that God is the active party in salvation and gives the Christian message an existential focus and prevents it from becoming a theological abstraction.

Luther’s existential focus, therefore, is different from the popular existentialism of the twentieth century. For those who face an indifferent universe, existing in time which ends in death, there can be no meaning to one’s decisions and actions apart from the meaning one gives to oneself or receives from others. Such an existential expression follows Luther’s critique of the various attempts at making God abstract. However, at the same time, it does not hear the active voice of God which proclaims love. Identity and meaning are created by the self which “leaps” into this emptiness and, in so doing, creates its own meaning. In opposition to this, Luther insists that meaning, identity, and salvation are given by God in the Word, Jesus Christ.

Nevertheless, the faith created by this “Word” is also a “leap” because, for Luther, God remains hidden within this proclamation. The “particular knowledge” of God is proclaimed under the cross. The love, mercy, promise, and faithfulness of God are proclaimed under its opposite, namely, the crucified Son of God. This prevents love, mercy, promise, and faithfulness from becoming abstractions that become appropriated by aligning one’s life to these values. The “Word” spoken under the cross is not a divine lecture about righteousness but is God’s active rescue mission of humanity. The “hiddenness” of God in the cross is not based on a division between Spirit and flesh which identifies flesh with material things. For Luther, God’s “hiddenness” is not a statement about
humanity's dependence on the senses and reason. Against this possibility, Luther contends: "Actually the opposite is true. The Spirit cannot be with us except in material and physical things such as the Word, water, and Christ's body and in his saints on earth." God actively "hides" so that God can be active in the *proclamation* of Jesus Christ.

In Luther's theology, the "hiddenness" of God is not a function of humanity's finitude, but is a result of God's active mission that curtails human attempts at reaching God. God, who alone is righteous, will not be reached by human attempts at establishing their own goodness or "goods." For Luther, all pretenses of righteousness are undermined by the "Law" that is never fulfilled or satisfied. This use of the "Law" prevents the neighbour from being used as a path to God. Luther's understanding of the positive use of God's "Law" places us firmly in the presence of the "other" who is our neighbour and the "Other" who is God. Such an understanding undermines the seeking of righteousness, freedom, and salvation through the realization of personal autonomy.

In this sense, Luther's *theological use* of the "Law" mirrors the concerns of the postmodern Emmanuel Lévinas. Adriaan Peperzaks argues that Lévinas' delineation of the alterity of the Other calls into question a freedom defined as autonomy:

In turning to the alterity of the Other, I discover that my freedom is called into question; the Other's appearance reveals the injustice of my monopoly. If, by the shock of this encounter, the I seeking domination discovers itself to be unjust, this discovery is not a quality added to the preliminary existence of an innocent and neutral freedom but rather the beginning of a new way of existing and being conscious of myself and the world. The original state is not that of an ego enjoying its isolation before it would meet others; from the beginning, and without escape, the Same sees itself related and linked to the Other from which it separated, and it is unable to escape from this relationship.

The Other lays claim to one's life. In fact, western culture's "long adventure with immanence" is an attempt to protect itself from such claims. We have experienced and still fear the tyranny of the Other, whether it takes the form of the tyranny of the One or the Many.

For Luther, the fear of the Other, whether experienced as the threat of God or the threat of the neighbour, will lead to a nihilistic despair apart from the resurrection or promise of the "Gospel." With the proclamation of the "Gospel" both neighbour and God become gifts given to the
believer. The “Gospel” proclaims the righteousness of Christ and thus gives believers freedom to love the neighbour and God:

To become circumcised, therefore, is a characteristic of slavery. But to love one’s neighbour is a characteristic of freedom, because the former is done under the threat of the Law by those who are unwilling, while the latter is done by those who are willing out of love that flows freely and gladly.68

Luther’s positive use of the “Law” is grounded on the “otherness” or alterity of Christ, God’s “Word”:

Therefore Moses, together with Paul, necessarily drives us to Christ, through whom we become doers of the Law and are accounted guilty of no transgression. How? First, through the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of righteousness, on account of faith in Christ; secondly, through the gift and the Holy Spirit, who creates a new life and new impulses in us, so that we may keep the Law also in a formal sense. Whatever is not kept is forgiven for the sake of Christ.69

Oswald Bayer claims that it is the hermeneutical function of the aliena iustitia of Christ which places Luther’s theology in sharp contrast with modern thought. Bayer continues by saying that the relationship of the “same” to the “other” is decisive and that, in this regard, Luther’s hermeneutic mirrors Emmanuel Lévinas’ recent critique of modern assumptions. Bayer writes:

Damit ist der entscheidende Streitpunkt im Konflikt reformatorischer Theologie mit neuzeitlichem Denken bezeichnet. Indem ihn die Theologie ins Auge faßt, muß sie auf ihre Weise das Verhältnis von ison und heteron bestimmen, das in der philosophischen Tradition seit Platon im Sinne der monarchischen Vernunft gefaßt wurde und nun von Emmanuel Levinas, der gegen diese Tradition die „Anderheit“ (altérité) scharf betont, neu bearbeitet wird.70

Luther’s hermeneutic, which directs theology to talk about the presence of God in the proclamation of the Crucified One, is very different from the metaphysics of presence of Greek philosophy. God, in the proclamation of the cross and resurrection of Christ, speaks to and for the ungodly. There is no perspective from which the “godly” might judge that God is here or there. An analogy is provided by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in physics. The theory suggests that there is no place by which one can judge the position and velocity of particles. Similarly, there is no neutral place from which one can view and determine God’s pres-
ence either. It does not help to affirm that God is everywhere because, according to Luther, that is simultaneously to say that God is also nowhere: "...you will run back and forth throughout all creation, groping here and groping there yet never finding, even though it is actually there; for it is not there for you." According to Luther: "There is a difference between [God's] being present and your touching." Instead, God speaks a saving Word to the ungodly. Theological statements that say "there it is" return to Aristotelian logic. Instead, for Luther, theology functions to "drive" the church back into the wilderness where the "Gospel" is proclaimed with tears, passion, and suffering. In that "Gospel" God speaks to and for us, giving us salvation in Christ Jesus.

Notes


2 David C. Steinmetz, "Hermeneutic and Old Testament Interpretation in Staupitz and the Young Martin Luther," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 70 (1979) 24-58. David C. Steinmetz comments that since the 1928 publication of Karl Bauer's *Die Wittenberger Universitätstheologie und die Anfänge der Deutschen Reformation*, the thesis has been widely accepted that it was the discovery of a new hermeneutic that caused Luther to move from being a monk to being a reformer.


4 Luther was convinced that the meaning of categories such as sin, faith, freedom, and experience fundamentally changed depending on whether one was talking about them coram Deo or coram hominibus. Søren Kierkegaard used Luther's emphasis on being "before God" as a way to carry his own polemic against those "speculative" philosophies which got rid of the
question of living “before God” by universalizing the human being. The unbelonging Christianity which attempted to call sin “sin” without the determinant “before God,” is one which “discovered a higher wisdom – which, however, strangely enough, was neither more nor less than what the higher wisdom no doubt generally is...the old paganism.” Søren Kierkegaard (Anti-Climacus), The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and Awakening (Copenhagen, 1849) in Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death, tr. by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954) 214.

Gospel has a particular meaning for Luther: “For gospel (evaggelion) is a Greek word and means in Greek a good message, good tidings, a good report, which one sings and tells with gladness.” In this news, Christ has strove against sin, death, and the devil thereby giving to all believers his righteousness, salvation, and life. [Preface to the New Testament (1546)] Martin Luther, Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, ed. by Timothy F. Lull (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989) 113.

For a more in-depth analysis, see Barry G. Rasmussen, Martin Luther’s Hermeneutic as the Proclamation of the Gospel: Pre-modern Luther for Post-modern Times (Winnipeg: Ph.D. Dissertation at The University of Manitoba, 1999).

Oswald Bayer notes that by distinguishing between “holiness” as an attribute and “blessedness” as the result of God’s activity, Luther is criticizing the assumptions of Greek philosophy and modern views of a “good” life. See Oswald Bayer, Theologie (Gütersloher: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994) 115-117.

Robert W. Jenson, “Proclamation without Metaphysics,” Dialog 1 (1962) 22-29; 26. According to Jenson, it has been the preaching of the “Gospel” which has killed the gods of the West, breaking the West’s metaphysical words even as the “Gospel” employed them.


Ibid.

This fascination with language is not new. Umberto Eco has outlined how
other times have had a strong interest in speculating about the human language of Adam and Eve, the language spoken before the fiasco at the tower of Babel. There was a confidence that such a language would have great power. See Umberto Eco, *The Search for the Perfect Language*, tr. by James Fentress (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).


14 See, for example, Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, tr. by Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 14ff.


17 George A. Lindbeck, “Atonement and the Hermeneutics of Social Embodiment,” *Pro Ecclesia* 5/2 (1996) 144-160; 160. George A. Lindbeck, after outlining the strengths of a premodern hermeneutic of social or ecclesial embodiment, concludes: “The future of Christian community may well depend, humanly speaking, on the retrieval of premodern hermeneutics in a form suitable to our postcritical age....”

18 WA 43,525,3ff.; LW 5, 140-141: “In scriptura sancta autem sunt reales benedictiones, non imprecativae tantum, sed indicativae et constitutivae, quae hoc ipsum, quod sonat re ipsa largiuntur et adferunt. Cuiusmodi etiam nos in novo Testamento habemus per sacerdotium Christi, quod est nostra benedictio, cum dico: accipe absolutionem peccatorum tuorum....Ista omnia sunt potestatis praesenter et vere tibi donantis, si credis, quia non sunt opera nostra, sed Dei per ministerium nostrum. Non igitur benedictiones imprecativae sunt, sed collatavae. Quando baptiso te in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti, perinde est, ac si dicerem: rapio te ex manibus Diaboli, et offero te Deo, idque vere et realiter.”

19 See Alister E. McGrath, *Spirituality in an Age of Change: Rediscovering the Spirit of the Reformers* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994) 75ff. McGrath reflects on Luther’s claim that the *crux sola est nostra theologia*. In a personalized account, McGrath notes that Luther’s stress on the cross of Christ is of a mere historical interest to theologies dominated by the insights of the Enlightenment. McGrath goes on to confess that his own Enlightenment theology foundered on Luther’s “theology of the cross” and that this centrality of the cross not only challenged Luther’s contemporaries but also challenges modernity to its roots.

20 See Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l’extériorité* (The Hague:


24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., 173.

26 WA 40, 1,368,26-27: “Sic homo Christianus simul iustus et peccator, Sanctus, Prophanus, inimicus et filius Dei est.”

27 See Emmanuel Lévinas, “The Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture,” *Entre Nous*, tr. by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshaw (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 179-187. Lévinas shows how the appropriation of the strange and hostile forces of nature by culture is an attempt to turn these forces into presence through knowledge. Lévinas’ analysis is one that claims that such a project is inherently violent in its search for safety by control.


29 Scott S. Ickert, “Luther on the Timelessness of God,” *Lutheran Quarterly* 7 (1993) 45-66; 53. See also Reiner Jansen, *Studien zu Luthers Trinitättslehre* (Frankfurt/M.: Herbert Lang Bern Peter Lang, 1976) 59ff. For Luther, the “hiddenness” of God is always also a reference to the cross of Christ. Luther’s use of this concept, then, becomes a short-hand way of calling to mind God’s condemnation of all “theologies of glory” and at the same time forces the church’s hermeneutic toward the proclamation of the “Gospel-promises” inherent in the death and resurrection of Christ Jesus.

30 WA 40, 1,610,15-17; LW 26,401: “Et revera nostrum cognoscere est magis passivum, quam activum, Hoc est: est potius cognosci, quam cognoscere.”

31 WA 40, 1, 610; LW 26,401: “...visitati estis per verbum, donati estis fide et
Spiritusancto, quo renovati estis etc."

32 See Oswald Bayer, *Theologie: Handbuch systematischer Theologie*, Band 1, herausgegeben von Carl Heinz Ratschow (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994) 42-55; esp. 49, n.65. Luther’s priority of wisdom over science can be seen in the following references gathered by Bayer: “WA 9,98,21 (Randbemerkungen zu Taulers Predigten, um 1516). Für die Spätzeit s. Die Auslegung von Ps 51,2 (1532): »Cognitio dei et hominis est sapientia divina et proprie theologica« (Enarratio Psalmi Ll. »Miserere mei Deus«...; WA 40 II,327,11) und These 20 der Disputatio de homine, 1536: »Theologia vero de plenitudine sapientiae suae...« (WA 39, I,176,5).”

33 WA 33,364,11-13; LW 23,230: “in sot ir hören und nicht meistern, im nicht weise, ziel oder mass geben.”

34 WA 40, II,357,29-34; LW 12,331: “... ut de die in diem fiam fortior et certior contra terrores legis, donec fiam dominus legis et peccati, per plerophoriam tuae misericordiae etc. Haec est doctrina huius Psalmi et perpetua nostra schola, in qua nunquam perfecti Magistri evademus, Non nos, non Apostoli, non Prophetae. Omnes enim hic manemus discipuli et omnes petimus, dum vivimus, amplius.”

35 WA 40, I,14-19; LW 26,42: “Humana enim ratio facile offenditur illis vilibus formis crucis et pro insanis habet eos, qui alios volunt consolari, iuvare et curare, Item qui lactant magnas opes, iustitiam, fortitudinem, victoriam peccati, mortis et omnium malorum, laetitiam, salutem et vitam aeternam, Et illi ipse interim egent, infirmi, tristes, despecti sunt, indignissime tractantur et occiduntur ut nocentissimae pestes rerum publicarum et religionis....”

36 See Oswald Bayer, *Theologie: Handbuch systematischer Theologie*, Band 1, herausgegeben von Carl Heinz Ratschow (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994) 48. Bayer writes: “Aus dieser tiefsten Einsicht des christlichen Glaubens, daß von Gottes Macht nicht anders als zusammen mit seiner Ohnmacht am Kreuz zu reden ist, hat die Philosophie Hegels ein Prinzip gemacht, so daß es zu einer theologia crucis naturalis gekommen ist. Wandte sich Luther damals gegen die theologia gloriae, so ist es heute vordringlicher, gegen die Prinzipialisierung und Methodisierung des Kreuzes zu einem Erkenntnisprinzip und Wirklichkeitsprinzip – gegen die Theoretisierung des Evangeliums – zu kämpfen. Luther hat in aller Schärfe gesehen, daß die, denen das Evangelium Theorie, ein »menschlich Gedicht und Gedanke« [reference: WA DB 7,10,3], ist, notwendig for dern müssen, daß es nun auch in der Praxis zu verwirklichen sei.” My translation: “Out of this deep insight of the Christian faith, that the power of God cannot be spoken of without also speaking of his powerlessness on the cross, Hegel’s philosophy has established as a principle, that has rendered the theology of the cross something natural. In his day Luther opposed the theology of
glory, but in our day it is urgent to fight against making the cross into a principle and a method in order to arrive at a principle of understanding and reality — namely, making the Gospel into a theory. Luther saw in all clarity that those to whom the Gospel was a theory — namely, a human story and thought — are those who must press on and actualize it in practice."

See Colin Gunton, *The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 148. Gunton writes: "...by interpreting culture, and especially modern culture, as the immediate product of the Spirit’s operation, Hegel, as is often enough pointed out, tended to give modernity the status of the kingdom of heaven, of the finality that has been its undoing. [Reference to Robert W. Jenson, *The Knowledge of Things Hoped For*, p.233: ‘Hegel’s only real fault was that he confused himself with the last judge; but that is quite a fault’.] In sum, it can be said that Hegel presents a defective transcendentality: the Spirit displaces the Father and the Son, so that we have, at the root of a finally demonic immanentism, the inability truly to find room for plurality."


Adriaan Peperzak, *To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1993) 51.

Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity*, tr. by A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) 196. Here Lévinas is criticizing Kant’s definition of religious transcendence.

Adriaan Peperzak, *To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, 164.


See Jeffrey Bloechl, "Lévinas, Daniel Webster, and Us: Radical Responsibility and the Problem of Evil," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 38 (1998) 259-273; 269. Bloechl writes: "Free of every limit, a desire for the transcendent is contradictory; it destroys both itself and what it aims at. But since we are evidently saved from it, there must already be limits in place. Where do we find such limits if not in the human faces which, as Lévinas himself admits, calls us ceaselessly to particular acts which concretize that desire? The face, then, does not call me to an unlimited responsibility so
much as it saves me from what might otherwise consume me.”


WA 40, II,329,32-330,17; LW 12,312: “Gentes enim loquuntur cum Deo extra verbum et promissiones, secundum cogitationes cordis sui, Prophetae autem loquuntur cum Deo induto et revelato promissionibus et verbo suo. Hic Deus tam clementi specie et, ut sic dicam, tam iucunda larva indutus, nempe promissionibus suis, potest apprehendi et cum gaudio ac fiducia a nobis conspici.”

LW 12,312: “The people of Israel did not have a God who was viewed ‘absolutely,’ to use the expression, the way the inexperienced monks rise into heaven with their speculations and think about God as He is in Himself.”

LW 12,312: “From this absolute God everyone should flee who does not want to perish....We must take hold of this God, not naked but clothed and revealed in His Word; otherwise certain despair will crush us.”

WA 40, I,109,31-32; LW 26,50. Luther quotes a German proverb: “Ihr Gottes namen hebt sich als ungluck an.”

WA 40, I,304,9-13; LW 26,182: “Ego plane nihil videre volo prae illo Christo. Is tantus mihi thesaurus esse deebet, ut reliqua omnia prae ipso mihi sordeant. Is denique tanta lux mihi esse debet, ut eo apprehenso fide nesciam, an sit lex, peccatum vel ulla injustitia in mundo.”

See LW 26,273: “You should constantly say that these terms, ‘faith formed,’ ‘unformed,’ ‘acquired,’ etc., are monstrosities of the devil, produced to destroy Christian doctrine and faith, to blaspheme Christ and tread Him underfoot, and to establish the righteousness of works.”

WA 40, I,164,24-25; LW 26,88: “Quid feci? Quid peccavi? Quid merui?”


WA 18,634,30f.; LW 33,64: “...quod voluntas sese mutare et vertere alio non possit....”

WA 18,774,39ff.; LW 33,275: “Nota est et mihi fabula Origenis de triplici affectu, quorum unus caro, alius spiritus illi dicitur, Anima vero medius ille, in utram partem vel carnis vel spiritus vertibilis....Paulus his carnem vocat, quicquid sine spiritu est....” Luther’s criticisms of Origen’s theories concerning the soul resonate with Julia Kristeva’s description of the soul in
post-modern culture. Kristeva notes that the soul has ceased to be a place from which language can have an effect on the person. Instead it has become a place where endless language games can be played as an escape from facing the others in one’s life responsibly. See Julia Kristeva, *New Maladies of the Soul*, tr. by Ross Guberman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).


WA 18,669,29ff.; LW 33,114f.: “Neque enim vis ea applicandi ad salutem potest esse prum velle, nisi salus ipsa nihil esse dicatur. Deinde studium et conatus quoque purum velle esse non potest....”

WA 40 1,448,14-16; LW 26,287: “...sed persona divina et humana quae suscepit peccatum, damnationem legis et mortem, non pro se, sed pro nobis. Igitur tota Emphasis est in particula: 'huper hāmon.'”

See Robert W. Jenson, “Proclamation without Metaphysics,” *Dialog: A Journal of Theology* 1 (Autumn 1962) 22-29; 24. Jenson quotes Camus’ *Stranger* where a character is condemned for murder: “I’d passed my life in a certain way, and I might have passed it in a different way, if I’d felt like it. I’d acted thus, and I hadn’t acted otherwise....And what did that mean?... Nothing, nothing, had the least importance, and I knew quite well why....All alike would be condemned to die one day....It was as if that great rush of anger had washed me clean, emptied me of hope, and gazing up at the dark sky spangled with its signs and stars, for the first time, the first, I laid my heart open to the benign indifference of the universe.”

Gerhard O. Forde writes: “We can, of course; become fascinated with the emptiness, the nothingness, thinking perhaps that it in itself provides some avenue of escape from the burden of God.” Gerhard O. Forde, *Theology is for Proclamation* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990) 16-17.

The essence of the following statement concerning Jacques Derrida could be made about Luther’s *theology of the cross*: “For it is important to see that Derrida’s religion is more prophetic than apophatic, more in touch with Jewish prophets than with Christian Neoplatonists, more messianic and more eschatological than mystical. His writing is more inscribed by the promise, by circumcision, and by the mark of father Abraham than by mystical transports, more like Amos and Isaiah than Pseudo-Dionysius, moved more by prophetico-ethico-political aspiration than by aspiring to be one with the One. The non-knowing, the ‘without knowing’...of deconstruction has more to do with bearing an ethico-political witness to justice than with the *docta ignorantia.*” John D. Caputo, *The Prayers and

WA 23,193,31-33; LW 37,95: “So das widderspiel warhaftig ist, Das der geist bei uns nicht sein kan anders denn inn leiblichen dingen als im wort, wasser und Christus leib und inn seinen heiligen auff erden.”

This is called the theological use of the Law. Gerhard Ebeling garners evidence that the usus theologicus is the “absolute centre” of Luther’s understanding concerning the Law. In his Galaterbriefvorlesung (1535), the usus theologicus is referred as: “verus usus (WA 40,1,511,11;530,22;532,7); usus necessarius (WA 40,1,535,8); verum officium legis et proprius usus (WA 40,1,481,4); legis usus proprius et absolutus (WA 40,1,482,3); optimus et perfectissimus usus (WA 40,1,490,5); legitimus usus (WA 40,1,509,1).” Gerhard Ebeling, “On the Doctrine of the triplex usus legis in the Theology of the Reformation,” Word and Faith, tr. by James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963) 71, n.2.

Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 53.


WA 40,1,408,27-409,12; LW 26,260: “Quare Moses una cum Paulo necessario nos cogit ad Christum per quem firmus factores Legis et nullius transgressionis rei. Quo modo? Primum per remissionem peccatorum et imputationem iustitiae propter fidem in Christum; Deinde per donum et Spiritum sanctum qui parit novam vitam, novos motus etc. in nobis, ut etiam Legem formaliter faciamus. Quod autem non fit, ignoscitur propter Christum. Deinde quidquid peccati reliquum est, non imputatur nobis.”

Oswald Bayer, “Luthers Verständnis des Seins Jesu Christi im Glaubens,” Luther und Ontologie: Das Sein Christi im Glauben als strukturierendes Prinzip der Theologie Luthers, herausgegeben von Anja Ghiselli, Kari Kopperi, und Rainer Vinke (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 1993) 111. My translation: “With this, the decisive battle-line in the conflict is drawn between reformation theology and modern thought. What strikes theology graphically, that one must determine the relationship between the same and
the other, which in the philosophical tradition since Plato was composed in the sense of monarchial reason. Now, this issue is becoming reworked from Emmanuel Levinas, who against this tradition, sharply emphasized 'otherness.'" Bayer continues: "Die Theologie Luthers zeichnet sich durch einen klaren Verzicht auf jeden theoretischen Monismus aus, ohne manichäisch zu werden. Die Betonung des Kampfes zwischen Gott und Teufel sowie zwischen Evangelium und Gesetz, der Spannung zwischen dem im Wort offbaren Gott und seiner schrecklichen Verborgenheit sowie zwischen Glauben und Schauen führt ebensowenig in einen theoretischen Dualismus wie die Betonung des Bruches zwischen dem alten Menschen und dem neuen Menschen, der sich gleichwohl, bis zum Tod, zum alten zu verhalten hat." Ibid., 112. My translation: "The theology of Luther shows itself through a clear avoidance of every theoretical monism without becoming Manichean. The emphasis of the battle between God and the devil, Gospel and Law, the tension between the God revealed in the Word and his terrible hiddenness as well as between faith and seeing leads as little to a theoretical dualism as it does to an emphasis on the break between the old creature and the new. Till death, one has to remain with the old."

This analogy is made in another context and for other purposes in Ulrich Asendorf, Die Theologie Martin Luthers nach seinen Predigten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988) 420.

See WA 23,150,17ff.

WA 23,150,22-24; LW 37,69: "...sonst solt wol alle Creatur, durch und durch laffen, hie tappen und da tappen und dennoch nymmer mehr nicht finden, ob sie gleich da ist warhafftig, Denn sie ist dir nicht da." In Luther's exposition of Jonah, he notes that reason cannot find God either. Reason plays "blindman bluff" with God and: "consistently gropes in the dark and misses the mark. It calls that God which is not God and fails to call Him God who really is God." LW 19,55 (WA 19,207,3-6).

WA 23,150,3; LW 37,68: "Es ist ein unterscheid unter seiner gegenwertikeit und deinem greiffen."

The language chosen here reflects the Gospel of Mark which tells of the Spirit "driving" Jesus into the wilderness. The word chosen, ekballei, is a particularly strong word which communicates that this was against Jesus' will.