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**THE HOLOCAUST:  
A CATALYST FOR THEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION  
AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE WRITINGS OF  
DR. JOHN T. PAWLIKOWSKI, O.S.M.**

**By**

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**THESIS**

**Submitted to the Department of Religion and Culture  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Master of Arts degree  
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DEDICATED TO:

JOSEF DOVID RECHTER

WHO DIED IN AUSCHWITZ,

JYTE BEILE KIPEL

WHO SURVIVED TO RAISE HER THREE CHILDREN,

MADAME ELIZABETH HOOLMAN

THE RIGHTEOUS GENTILE WHO HID MY GRANDMOTHER, MOTHER AND UNCLES.

תהיינה נשמותיהם צרות בצרור החיים.

## ABSTRACT

Beginning with James Parkes and Jules Isaac, and continuing even until this day, extensive effort has been focused on the issue of Christian-Jewish relations. The Holocaust is a topic central to those reflections. This is due to the general acceptance of the thesis that, in some fashion, Christianity can be described as having contributed to the Holocaust. To appreciate that thesis one need only consider Hitler's own remarks, made at the 1933 Concordat Conference, "I am only continuing the work of the Catholic Church: to isolate the Jews and fight their influence."

One outcome of the effort has been courageous writings by select Christian thinkers. This paper will review the writings of one individual who can today be described as a veteran of the Dialogue, Dr. John T. Pawlikowski, O.S.M. We will focus particularly on evidence that the Holocaust itself serves as the catalyst for the innovative theological content in Pawlikowski's writings.

Prior to reviewing his writings this paper will summarize the "Holocaust question" as it is put to Christianity. We will continue by considering some attempts to answer that question. Finally, we will explore some of the suggested solutions to the problems unveiled by the answers and react to some of the discussion surrounding those solutions.

Following our discussion of Pawlikowski, the paper will conclude with some personal reactions and reflections.

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### **The Question:**

In essence, the question compelling Holocaust theologians is an accusation. Rather than simply asking how could the Holocaust have taken place, they ask how could the Holocaust have taken place in the heart of Christian Europe? Rather than simply suggesting that human nature should have made the Holocaust impossible they suggest that the Christian persona in Christian Europe should have made the Holocaust impossible. Not how could people commit those crimes but how could Christians perpetrate the crimes committed during the Holocaust? Can centuries of Christian teachings about the Jews be seen as an indispensable prerequisite to the Holocaust? Does the Holocaust, therefore, reveal any weakness in the fabric of Christianity?

These questions, variously worded, sometimes with cool academic precision, sometimes with the passion of the prophet, have been repeated for nearly half a century. Fundamentally they ask this: is the Holocaust a significant event to Christianity and if so, in what way?

The earliest remarks recognizing a connection between Christianity and the Holocaust, were issued at Darmstadt on April 8, 1948 by the Brüderrat of the Evangelical Church of Germany:

. . . anti-Semitism rose and flourished not only among the people (who still seemed to be a Christian nation), not only among the intelligentsia, and in governmental and military circles, but also among Christian leaders. And when finally this radical anti-Semitism, based on racial hatred, destroyed our nation and our churches from within, and released all its brutal force from without, there existed no power to resist it - because the churches had forgotten what Israel really is, and no longer loved the Jews. Christian circles washed their hands of all responsibility, justifying themselves by saying that there was a curse on the Jewish people. Christians no longer believed that the promise concerning the Jews still held good, they no longer preached it, nor showed it in their attitude to the Jews. In this way we Christians helped to bring about all the injustice and suffering inflicted upon the Jews in our country. (Brockway 1988:127)

That same year James Parkes, a British Anglican and a patriarch of the Christian-Jewish Dialogue movement, published the following:

If the thesis which has been unfolded in the preceding chapters of this book is, in its major lines, correct, then the problem which is posed to any sincere Christian is both inescapable and agonizing. In our own day and within our own civilization, more than six million deliberate murders are the consequence

of teaching about Jews for which the Christian Church is ultimately responsible, and of an attitude to Judaism which is not only maintained by all the Christian Churches, but has its ultimate resting place in the teaching of the New Testament itself (Parkes, 1948 167)

Sixteen years later, in her introduction to Jules Isaac's *The Teaching of Contempt*, Claire Huchet Bishop asks simply:<sup>1</sup>

How could Hitler's Germany have been possible, a country which had been Christian for fifteen hundred years? (1964:5)

Eleven years later, in *The Crucifixion of the Jews*, Franklin Littell remarks that:

The murder of six million Jews by baptized Christians, from whom membership in good standing was not (and has not yet been) withdrawn, raises the most insistent question about the credibility of Christianity. (1975:2)

Fifteen years later Harry James Cargas, in the introduction to his *Shadows of Auschwitz*, challenges:

The Holocaust is, in my judgement, the greatest tragedy for Christians since the crucifixion. In the first instance, Jesus died, in the latter, Christianity may be said to have died. In the case of Christ, the Christian believes in a resurrection. Will there be, can there be, a resurrection for Christianity? (1990:1)

Of late, Haynes has summarized the question:

Christian Holocaust Theologians assume that Christian anti-Judaism and Christian complicity in the Holocaust unequivocally reveal the failure of the church to remain faithful to its divine calling. (1994:555)<sup>2</sup>

As simple to understand as the question is, the answer is elusive. Whether to a larger degree or a smaller degree, the Holocaust was possible in Christian Europe because of a weakness in the fabric of Christianity. The debate over the identity of that weakness, and the degree to which the weakness is or is not fundamental to Christianity, is extensive.

---

<sup>1</sup>Huchet Bishop (1899-1993) was a French born Catholic who edited three of Isaac's books, published her own How Catholics Look at Jews, and served as President of the International Council of Christians and Jews from 1975-1977.

<sup>2</sup>Haynes' footnote #31 has a selection of biting formulations of the question.

## The Answers:

James Parkes is the Christian patriarch of this post-Auschwitz school of thought. His writings are the earliest studies of the problem and even predate the Holocaust.<sup>3</sup> In *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue* he focuses upon the supersessionist claims that are implied by even as common a term as "New" Testament:

. . . the issue had gone much deeper, and the entirety of the religious conceptions of Judaism as proclaimed in the Old Testament was rejected as superseded by the Church . . . It is in this conflict and its issue that modern anti-Semitism finds its roots. For the Gentile Church the Old Testament became the record of two communities, the pre-Incarnation Church symbolized by the 'Hebrews', and the temporary and rejected people of the Jews. Out of this artificial separation of history into two parts, on the simple principle that what was good belonged to one group and what was bad to the other, grew the caricature of the Jew with which patristic literature is filled (1934:373-374)

. . . the main responsibility must rest upon the theological picture created in patristic literature of the Jew as a being perpetually betraying God and ultimately abandoned by Him. (375)

In his *Judaism and Christianity*, published fourteen years later, Parkes adds a second primary cause and refines the supersessionist argument. In essence, he traces the ill lot of the Jews back to the Christian idea that "legislation should be brought into the field of personal belief."

One of the most pernicious innovations of the Christian Emperors was the belief that only in a State with conformity on matters of faith could there be civil peace. It is not possible to defend this development in the Christian tradition by the argument that such ideas were universally held at this period of human development. They were not . . . It is a Christian development, a short-cut solution to the problem created by the recognition of the extreme importance of right belief, and has been, and still is, wholly damnable in its effects, and without a single argument in its favour. (1948:120)

---

<sup>3</sup>*The Jew and His Neighbor* was published in 1930. His first major work, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue* was published in 1934. Additional works appeared before, during, and after the Holocaust. It comes as no surprise that Parkes was "on the death list of Nazi agents working in England." (Pawlikowski 1969:576)

Thus, "with the disappearance of Roman Law, whittled down though it had been by the influence of the Church over legislation, the Jew had no political status of his own whatsoever " (124)

According to Parkes, the consequence of the lack of political stature was absolute vulnerability There simply existed no avenue of appeal.

The rightlessness in which Jewry was abandoned when the traditions of Roman law finally gave way before Christian and feudal substitutes deprived the Jews of any possible appeal, save the limited and humiliating power of bribery, against injustice, expulsion or even death. (135)

Parkes adds that:

Even in such countries as contemporary England, Jews have become conscious that their political rights are dependent, as those of non-Jews are not, on the absence of a political regime of a Nazi or Fascist type. (125)

Political vulnerability was exacerbated by the fact that "as a result of nearly a thousand years of Christian preaching, the public was coming to believe any story, however absurd, about the conduct or beliefs of its Jewish contemporaries." (124) Those stories, whether explicitly or implicitly, were granted an official seal of approval.

But the Papacy was naturally the authority primarily responsible for enforcing on the Jews a status which the Church Fathers had deduced, as appropriate to a deicide nation, from their interpretation of the New Testament. The Jewish badge, segregation and the ghetto, the conversional sermon, the destruction of Jewish books, all owe their origin to or were confirmed by Papal policy . . . the local clergy shared the views of the populace, and often created their superstitions and directed their violence. (135)

Other early attempts to address the issue include works by Paul Demann (1953) and Karl Thieme (1960). Both are referred to in Gregory Baum's introduction to *Faith and Fratricide*. Baum summarizes their views:

. . . the coming of Jesus produced a tragic schism in God's people, a schism between Church and Synagogue, leaving both communities slightly damaged . . . as long as the Jewish tradition remains apart from the Church, it is not as one, holy, catholic, and apostolic as it was meant to be. The absence of the older sister, the Synagogue, has left the church estranged from the Jewish environment of its foundation . . . and weakens the fidelity of the Christian

community to the original message. While according to these authors, Jewish religion remains incomplete without Jesus, the Christian religion remains incomplete without the Jewish tradition. (1974:9)

As Parkes is the Christian patriarch of this school of thought, Jules Isaac must be recognized as the Jewish patriarch of the movement challenging post-Auschwitz Christianity.<sup>4</sup> In 1947 Isaac had published a massive treatise entitled *Jesus et Israel*. That work "brought out, as no study had done before, how closely the contempt for the Jewish people and the vilification of Jewish religion were linked to Christian preaching from the New Testament on." (Ruether 1974:2) His book, *The Teaching of Contempt: Christian Roots of Anti-Semitism*, was first published in France in 1962. He was eighty-five years old at the time of its publication.<sup>5</sup>

*The Teaching of Contempt* was the first of Isaac's books to be translated into English. To the question of Christianity being an accomplice to the Holocaust he says

Yes, even after Auschwitz, Maidanek, Dubno, and Treblinka, Christian anti-Semitism is still alive. It does not perceive, it does not wish to perceive the hidden bond linking it with Nazi anti-Semitism, whose anti-Christian racism has committed such unspeakable ravages. (1964:25)

Isaac identified three weaknesses in Christian teachings which he claimed accounted for Christian anti-Semitism. First of those was the claim that the dispersion of the Jews was "providential punishment for the crucifixion."

Almost all the Church Fathers of the fourth century speak with the same voice, from Saint Ephrem to Saint Jerome, from Saint John Chrysostom to Saint Augustine. In the great Augustinian treatise *The City of God* we read, "But the Jews who rejected him, and slew him . . . after that were miserably spoiled by the Romans . . . and dispersed over the face of the whole earth." Before such a pronouncement, from such distinguished pens, how could the Church hesitate? She believed it with all her heart, and upheld it with all her authority. . . century after century the theme is taken up in varying tones, above all, alas, the tone of contempt. (1964:45)

---

<sup>4</sup>So too, John T. Pawlikowski. See page 21.

<sup>5</sup>Isaac had begun his writing on this topic in 1942. In 1943 most of his family was taken by the Nazis. His wife managed to send one final message to her husband. It read, "Save yourself for your work, the world is waiting for it." Isaac devoted the final twenty years of his life to this study. Moreover, he worked tirelessly on behalf of emerging Christian-Jewish relations. He was a central figure in the process that would lead up to the Vatican II pronouncement *Nostra Aetate*. Isaac died in 1963.

According to Isaac, the second contributing factor was the "theological contention, invented, reinforced, and propagated for hundreds of years, that at the time of Jesus the religion of Israel was mere legalism without a soul." (74)

During the fourth century . . . the Church Fathers return constantly to this theme . . . Saint John Chrysostom . . . rails bitterly against the "carnal" Jews (those "unclean and savage beasts"), against the synagogue ("the house of the devil"), and against the Jewish religion, which is by now no more than "a mockery, a parody, and a disgrace." (75)

Finally, Isaac attributed Christian anti-Semitism, and subsequently the Holocaust, to the question of "the pernicious view of [Jews] as the deicide people."

From this background emerged the recurring theme of murder - of Israel as Cain, as Judas, as a murderous people, a "deicide" people - an epithet at once indelible and absurd, singled out to be an abomination to the Christian world. By one flourish of the magic wand of theology, old Israel is transformed from a crucified into a crucifying people. (110)

But it is the theme of accusation - an accusation of the most shameful kind - which takes root in impressionable minds, is incorporated into the liturgy, perpetuated century after century down to the present, and takes a striking form in the mystery plays that flourished from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries.

And if we skip from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries we find the same theme - the murderous Jews, the Jews as "deicides" (112)

1964 also saw the publication of Father Edward H. Flannery's *The Anguish of the Jews: Twenty Three Centuries of Anti-Semitism*. *The Anguish of the Jews* was welcomed as "a ground-breaking book that did much to expose the fact of historical anti-Semitism in the United States and around the world." Its significance was enhanced by the fact that, unlike Isaac, a Jew, Flannery was a Roman Catholic Priest.

Flannery devotes one of fifteen chapters to the Holocaust. In that chapter he deftly avoids the common conclusions of Holocaust theologians. Nowhere does he describe Christian anti-Semitism as the basis for Nazi anti-Semitism. Nowhere does he describe Nazi anti-Semitism as the culmination of Christian anti-Semitism. His presentation of the Catholic Church and of the silence of Pope Pius XII is politically correct in a Catholic sense. In his final chapter he openly disagrees with Isaac. Flannery says:

Mr. Isaac unfortunately appears at times to take as essential teaching of the Church, that which at most was a secondary, if widely held, theological tradition, and at times an anti-tradition, but of which he says: "Twenty centuries of teaching *ex cathedra* has more or less unconsciously impregnated the Christian mentality. (1964:273)

Mr. Isaac has, moreover, exaggerated the historical bond between Christian anti-Semitism and the Hitlerian model. How much more historically plausible it is to see Hitlerian or racist anti-Semitism as the creature of modern laicism, the modern revolt against God, rather than a fruit of Christian teaching. (275)

These comments, and Gregory Baum's work *The Jews and the Gospel* (1961), constitute the only two attempts to parry Isaac's work. Both Flannery and Baum recant in later writings. In his 1974 introduction to Ruether's *Faith and Fratricide* Baum declares that:

the book I wrote in the late fifties and published in 1961 no longer represents my position on the relationship between Church and Synagogue. (4)

Flannery, though still attempting to remain politically correct, rewrites the entire last chapter of his book. In his 1985 edition he leaves out his criticism of Isaac. In its place one finds an affirmation of the charges against Christianity.

Modern racist anti-Semitism, as exemplified in its purest culture by the Nazi regime, would not have been possible without centuries of anti-Judaic and anti-Semitic precedents. From the beginning of his program, Hitler had his target, the Jews, already set up, defenseless, and discredited . . . Modern racist anti-Semitism, historically, is doubly rooted. The longer but thinner root, Christian anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, supplied a necessary historical preparation. (1985:290)

On the historical level one of the foremost problems of anti-Semitism is that of bringing Christians to a full recognition of the enormity of the anti-Semitic development and the preponderant role played in it by Christians and the Christian churches. There can be no quarter conceded to pious dissimulation or defensive minimizing of the magnitude of the crime committed against the Jews in the Christian era and later in the modern era. The authentic Christian can only deplore that the Church and his/her co-believers were actively - or passively - involved in this tragic story, especially in its latest and most gruesome manifestation, the Holocaust. And he/she can only rue the fact that Christian anti-Semitism, while milder today, continues to stain the souls of many Christians. (1985:294)

In sharp contrast to Parkes, Isaac, and Flannery, Norman Cohn's *Warrant for Genocide* offered a very different response to the puzzle of the Holocaust.<sup>6</sup> His response focused on *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as a

... modernized, secularized version of the popular medieval view of Jews as a league of sorcerers employed by Satan for the spiritual and physical ruination of Christendom. (1966:16)

Cohn's answer serves to release the official Church from responsibility without releasing Christendom. The Holocaust was possible because of "popular", perhaps intended in its most disparaging sense, opinions of Jews. Thus, the most serious charges to be brought against the Church would be its failure to inoculate its masses against the scourge of superstition.

Several works by less known scholars offer evidence that the struggle to discover an answer had entered the popular arena. In his introduction to Hannah Vogt's *The Jews: A Chronicle for Christian Conscience* Rev. Robert Roberts argues that Christianity is indeed an accomplice to the Holocaust:

The ghetto and the yellow star were implements of the Christian persecution of the Jews long before the Nazi reign of terror. Christianity has played a sinful role in the development of that diabolical force which in our time sent six million Jews to the furnaces of Auschwitz and Treblinka. The "final solution" to the "Jewish problem" was arrived at in a classical Christian country, a country steeped in Christian tradition. On Sunday mornings in those horror-filled days of the late 1930's and early 1940's many of the seven thousand persons employed at Auschwitz took their wives and children to Protestant or Catholic churches and prayed, "... Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." (1967:12)

A second less scholarly, less balanced book also echoes the same vituperativeness. In *The War Against the Jew*, Dr. Dagobert D. Runes states:<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Cohn's formulation of the question is powerful: "The Jews were marked out for extermination. They were not simply killed or worked to death - they were humiliated, hunted and tortured with an intensity of hatred which was reserved for them alone; while the killed amounted to well over half, probably to more than two-thirds of all European Jews. Moreover, all this happened to a people who did not constitute a belligerent nation or indeed a nation at all but lived scattered across Europe from the English Channel to the Volga, with very little in common to them all save their descent from adherents of the Jewish religion. how can this extraordinary phenomenon be explained?"



However, need I remind anyone that the supreme holocaust took place only a few decades ago under the very eyes of Christian Europe; that the bishops of Austria and Germany blessed the arms of the killers, and the Vicar of Christ looked out of his window in Rome while Jewish children and women were dragged to extermination camps?

But the churches are not only guilty of ignoring the doom of a million Jewish children, choked to death along with their parents and grandparents.

The churches are guilty of directly inciting this massacre by their persistent religious teaching based on this thesis: The Jews killed God, therefore all Jews are damned. (1968:xi - xii)

These then constitute the earliest voices to struggle with the question. Their answers are simple when compared with later writings. There are specific and identifiable weaknesses which can be blamed for having created an image of the Jew and of Judaism that left the Jews vulnerable. More important, in the minds of Christians these weaknesses justified crimes against Jews. Supersessionism, legislation of personal belief, Christian teachings regarding the diaspora, Jewish legalism, and the deicide charge, and superstitions concerning the Jew as devil are all weaknesses that are indicted.

Except for the issue of supersessionism, the above are not fundamental to Christianity. Indeed, those weaknesses can be corrected through simple historical accuracy. Yet, the existence of those weaknesses in the minds of Christians allowed the Holocaust to occur. In other words, in the opinions of the writers up until the late 1960's, Christianity is fundamentally sound. Auschwitz teaches that Christians need to return to the true and authentic teachings of Christianity, and to purge from her all the superstitious and non-orthodox teachings that have accrued to her over the ages.

A lull followed. The question festered and fermented until, in the middle of the 1970's, it reemerged with greater focus and fury. No longer are answers to be found in the mere history of Christian anti-Semitism. Instead, the answer is now to be found in the innately anti-Semitic nature of Christianity. From Christology to ecclesiology, from Calvary to the classroom, everything and anything associated with Christianity was subject to criticism.

Baum's introduction restores the struggle to center stage, where it has remained ever since.

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<sup>7</sup>Runes (1902-1982) was a Rumanian born, Jewish, freelance author and lecturer. He was the founder and editor-in-chief of Philosophical Library Inc., New York City. He was apparently married to a non-Jew.

Under the impact of the Holocaust that destroyed six million Jews, some Christian theologians have been ready to submit Christianity to a radical ideological critique. They have been willing to face the possibility that the anti-Jewish trends in Christianity are not simply peripheral and accidental, but woven into the core of the message. As long as the Christian Church regards itself as the successor of Israel . . . no theological validity is left for the Jewish religion. (Ruether 1974:5)

If the Church wants to clear itself of the anti-Jewish trends built into its teaching . . . It must examine the very center of its proclamation and reinterpret the meaning of the gospel for our times. Is such a reinterpretation possible? It was not until the Holocaust of six million Jewish victims that some Christian theologians have been willing to face this question in a radical way . . . What the encounter of Auschwitz demands of Christian theologians, therefore, is that they submit Christian teaching to a radical ideological critique. (7)

If the Christian Church wants to purify its message and its life from the anti-Jewish virus, it will have to remove this left hand of Christology . . . But is such a rethinking of Christology possible? Is not Jesus the fulfillment of all the promises made in the Scriptures? Is he not the one mediator between God and man? It is possible for the Church to relativize Jesus as the Christ? (14)

1974 also saw the first symposium on the Holocaust. This International Symposium on the Holocaust was held at Saint John the Divine Church, in New York City, from June 3 to 6. The presentations were collected and published in 1977. The same overarching tones are to be found in Fleischner's introduction to the volume.

For Christians, the Holocaust necessitates a confrontation with certain fundamental aspects of Christian tradition and teaching that lead some speakers to raise the question, Can one still be a Christian after Auschwitz . . . Is Christian theology itself at stake? Is anti-Judaism endemic to the very nature of Christianity? (Fleischner 1977:x-xi)

Franklin H. Littell, one year after the symposium, in *The Crucifixion of the Jews*, states:

For a professing Christian, the red thread that ties a Justin Martyr or a Chrysostom to Auschwitz and Treblinka raises issues far more serious than can be dealt with by conscious avoidance of vulgar anti-Jewish slurs in speech or discrimination in practice . . . (1975:1)

The cornerstone of Christian Anti-Semitism is the superseding or displacement myth, which already rings with the genocidal note. (2)

But the crucial long-range question is how the Christians are to reestablish their credibility vis-a-vis humanity, signalized in the concrete historical situation by the way they rework their relationship to the Jewish people. The Holocaust was the consummation of centuries of false teaching and practice, and until the churches come clean on this "model" situation, very little they have to say about the plight of other victimized and helpless persons or groups will carry authority. (65)

It appears, therefore, that the period from 1974 - 1977 saw the evolution of Christian Holocaust theology until its presence was irreversible. These few authors, and others, are to be credited with having succeeded in having one of the world's most difficult question placed on the agenda: Is there life after Auschwitz for Christianity?

There are two early attempts to summarize the answers. The first of those is John T Pawlikowski's *The Challenge of the Holocaust for Christian Theology*, a 1978 thirty seven page essay likely based upon a 1974 paper presented at the American Academy of Religion. That paper will be discussed later along with Pawlikowski's other writings.

The second summary focuses on the third stage in the evolution of Christian Holocaust theology. In his 1977 work entitled *Christology after Auschwitz* Michael B. McGarry turns his attention, not to the question "what are the weaknesses that allowed it to happen," nor to the identification of a list of weaknesses, but to the effort to find solutions to the identified weaknesses. In the process, however, he also offers further insight into the possible identification of weaknesses.

After surveying official statements made by various Church bodies McGarry addresses the question of Christology. He divides scholarly theological opinion into three categories. The first he entitles "Christologies of Discontinuity." The second, divided into two subcategories, he entitles "Christologies of Continuity" - two-covenant theologians and single-covenant theologians.<sup>8</sup> McGarry summarizes the differences between the Discontinuity and the Continuity schools of thought:

The theology of discontinuity, applied to Christology, stresses the uniqueness and finality of Christ; the universality of Christ as the sole mediator of salvation; Christ as the fulfillment of Jewish hopes and prophecies; Christ as the leader and embodiment of the New Israel, successor to Judaism; Christ as Messiah; and the necessity of preaching Christ to the Jewish people. The theology of continuity, applied to Christology, stresses Christianity as the

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<sup>8</sup>The schema of theologies of discontinuity versus continuity was originally used by A. Roy Eckardt, *Elder Brother, Younger Brother* (1967), p. 50f.

continuation of Israel's covenant which Christ does not abrogate, but which he opens up to the Gentile world. This Christology speaks of the abiding validity of the covenant with Israel; the positive witness of the Jewish "no" to Jesus; the positive Jewish witness to the unredeemed character of the world; Christ as *partial* fulfillment of Jewish messianic prophecies; and the eschatological unification of all God's peoples. (1977:62-63)

McGarry is interested only with "how the theologians interested in the Jewish-Christian encounter have expressed their understanding of Christ." (62) Earlier, McGarry suggests that all aspects of the solution "find a common point of departure in the one central issue, Christology."<sup>9</sup> (9) However, McGarry does note that

... some see other issues to be the lynchpin for understanding the Jewish-Christian relationship. Variousy stated, the claim is made that the cornerstone of Jewish-Christian relations involves a proper understanding of revelation, covenant, election, Trinity, Messiahship, or the nature of religious language. (62) <sup>10</sup>

Both Pawlikowski's 1982 and 1989 books contain reviews of current single-covenant and double-covenant thinkers, along with ideas of multi-covenantal viewpoints. He offers the following general comments:

It has become customary to classify the theologians working within the framework of the Christian-Jewish dialogue as holding either a single covenant or a double covenant perspective. The former conceives of Jews and Christians as basically part of an ongoing, integrated covenantal tradition appropriated by each in somewhat different ways. The Christ event in this view facilitated the entry of non-Jews into a covenantal relationship Jews never lost. The double covenant position, on the other hand, emphasizes the distinctiveness of each covenantal tradition but insists that both are ultimately crucial for the complete emergence of the divine reign. (1989:11-12)

The dilemma is that the single covenantal tradition runs the risk of a new kind of absorption of Judaism, more benign but still absorption, while the double

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<sup>9</sup>McGarry's footnote demonstrates the extent of attention given to the topic. Those who focus upon Christology include Gregory Baum, Jean Danielou, W.D. Davies, A. Roy Eckardt, Eva Fleischner, Monika Hellwig, John T. Pawlikowski, Rosemary Ruether, J. Coert Rylaardsdam, Eugene Borowitz, and Hans Joachim Schoeps.

<sup>10</sup>Again, MrGarry's footnote illustrates the extent of attention given to the topic. Those focusing upon revelation include Peter Chirico and J. Coert Rylaardsdam; upon election Frank M. Cross, Jr. and Alan T. Davies; on the Trinity, James Parkes; in the notion of messiahship Rosemary Ruether and Frederick C. Grant; in the nature of religious language, Gregory Baum and Monika Hellwig.

covenant framework can easily fall prey to the temptation of underplaying Christianity's Jewish roots. (1989:12)

One example of each will illustrate the differences. J. Coos Schoneveld provides the most blatant case of a single covenant thinker.

When the Jew says 'Torah' the Christian says 'Christ,' and basically they say the same thing, although they express it very differently. Both Jews and Christians are called to walk in the path of Torah, the teaching of the God of Israel which is the Way, the Truth and the Life. The Jews walk this path incorporated in the people of Israel and participating in the Covenant of Sinai by observing the *mitzvot* . . . The Christians walk this path incorporated in the body of Christ, the faithful Jew who was himself the embodiment of Torah and participating in his life, cross and resurrection through the sacraments and the life of faith. (Pawlikowski 1989:29)

Parkes provides the simplest formula of a double covenant theory. For Parkes, the events of Sinai and Calvary are both covenant making events. Sinai is basically communal in orientation whereas Calvary focuses more on the individual:

That highest purpose of God which Sinai reveals to men as community, Calvary reveals to man as an end in himself. The difference between the two events, both of which from the metaphysical standpoint are identical as expressions of the infinite in the finite, of the eternal in the world of space and time, lies in the fact that the first could not be fulfilled by a brief demonstration of a divine community in action; but the second could not be fulfilled except by a life lived under human conditions from birth to death. (Parkes 1948:30)

Without an exhaustive survey of writing since McGarry's and Pawlikowski's books were published, it is safe to suspect that there is still no consensus as to whether or not there is a single lynchpin upon which theologies of continuity teeter. Several very recent articles illustrate the ongoing debate.

Michael E. Lodahl argues, like McGarry, that Christology is the lynchpin.

Rosemary Radford Ruether in 1974 laid down the gauntlet for Christian theology with her claim in *Faith and Fratricide* that anti-Jewishness historically has been the inevitable backside of Christology. Certainly that claim continues to be debated even to the present day, and, while several notable efforts to reformulate Christology with an intentionally post-Holocaust commitment have appeared on the theological horizon, there is no question that Christology remains the greatest challenge facing Christian

theologians whose concern is to cleanse their religious tradition of its traditional anti-Jewish bias. (1993:213)

Lodahl offers his own solution. His article aims

to ask whether and how Christology may now be done in such a way as both to be (1) responsive to the apostolic witness, even if to fragments of that witness often overlooked; and (2) ethically sensitized to rightful claims to dignity, respect, and divine care for the Jewish people - and then by implication for all persons and peoples. In short, our aim will be to provide a biblical foundation for a Christo-praxis: a way of affirming Jesus as the Christ, which, in the very affirmation, will be profoundly and intentionally ethical in nature. (215)

Paul H. Jones suggests that it is the crucifixion, and the central image of the cross, that is the lynchpin. He says:

This attitude of Christian triumphalism astounds me because it contradicts the heart of the gospel - the crucifixion of Jesus . . . In the cross of Christ, Christians locate the true nature of discipleship as well as the pathway to credibility - suffering love.<sup>11</sup> (1992:16)

The focus upon suffering recurs in an article by Beverly Asbury. After lengthy reflections he concludes by quoting from Robert Nozick. Asbury summarizes Nozick and offers his suggestion for a solution:

Nozick suggests that suffering in this way offers Christians a way to mend their relations with Judaism and the Jewish people. It would acknowledge agreement that whatever was accomplished in human history by Jesus, it has not produced a redeemed world. If humanity can be redeemed at all, it will have to be by everyone taking on the suffering of others. (1993:62)

The October 1990 Religious Studies Review contains a review by Peter Haas entitled *Toward a Post-Holocaust Christian View of Judaism*. In that article Haas reviews seven books each of which offers solutions to the problem. Authors reviewed include Paul M. van-Buren, Alice and Roy Eckardt, and John Pawlikowski. Haas' disappointment with the books is two-fold. First:

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<sup>11</sup>Jurgen Moltmann's *The Crucified God* is the most thorough treatment of this thesis linking Auschwitz to the Cross. Pawlikowski call this "Cross Christology" and has mixed feelings about it.

. . . the recasting of Judaism to fit the discursive needs of Christian theology must invariably so distort the Judaism lived by Jews that the validity of the whole enterprise falls into immediate question. (1990:317)

The second<sup>4</sup> addresses the recurring theme of supersessionism:

All the authors reviewed here are adamant in their rejection of supersessionist theologies . . . [yet] none has finally succeeded. The problem is that the very nature of Christianity makes the avoidance of supersessionism (on a theological level) impossible. (317)

Haas' criticisms of van Buren and Pawlikowski are complex and, in the opinion of this author, of questionable value. It must be born in mind that the masses are not Haases! If the authors adamantly teach the rejection of supersessionism then it can well be assumed that the students and the lay-readers will learn to reject supersessionism. Ultimately, that, and not a formulation of Christian theology that satisfies a Peter Haas, is the objective.

The latest word on the topic is Stephen Haynes (1994). In a disturbing sense, Haynes' article is a return to the original question, and so subtitled "A Critical Reassessment", even to James Parkes, and an attempt to cast a shadow of doubt over the very legitimacy of that question. The ramifications of a successful attempt on his part are frightening.<sup>12</sup> We address first Haynes' six pages on the rhetoric of "continuity and discontinuity".<sup>13</sup>

First in the list of criticisms is that Haynes levels the playing field by using the same term, rhetoric, to describe aspects of both the discontinuity and continuity schools of thought.

It is troubling that many Christians employ a *rhetoric of discontinuity* to erect protective barriers between Christian faith and the worst forms of anti-Semitism . . . Holocaust Theologians often rely on a *rhetoric of continuity* that weds Christian and Nazi brands of anti-Semitism in formulations that are emotionally powerful, but historically dubious. (570-571)

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<sup>12</sup>Additionally, Haynes' article categorizes aspects of Christian Holocaust theology which, though central to the topic, this paper will not address, particularly the phenomena of Christian Zionism.

<sup>13</sup>Unlike McGarry, Haynes does not credit Eckardt for these useful terms, most likely because he uses them for an entirely different purpose. Rather than describing Christianity's relationship to Judaism, Haynes uses the terms to describe the relationship between Christian anti-Semitism and Nazi anti-Semitism. The discontinuity school argues that there is no real connection whereas the continuity school argues that there is.

The term rhetoric, in and of itself, is laced with meanings, few if any of which are complementary. To employ the term in a description of the continuity school is to run the risk of breaching a structure that, even thirty two years after Isaac's *The Teaching of Contempt*, Haynes himself admits has yet to gain any popular strength.

The further impression is created that both schools are deserving of equal treatment, that both are fair and honest attempts to grapple with the problem of the Holocaust. To equate the discontinuity school, whose teachings are at best little more than denial and escapism with the continuity school, whose teachings at worst may be described as exaggerated remorse, has the overall effect of undermining the continuity school.

Haynes refers to, but does not powerfully underscore, the challenge the Holocaust poses to contemporary Christianity. He states, for example, that "Convincing the church that the Holocaust is a Christian problem is an endeavor of undoubted importance . . . ." (573) However, referring to Yosef Yerushalmi, Jeremy Cohen and Marc Saperstein he then emphasizes that Nazi anti-Semitism was distinctly different from Christian anti-Semitism. The risk involved is apparent even to Haynes.

Unfortunately, it is probably not possible to identify these difficulties with the rhetoric of continuity without at the same time giving aid and comfort to those who emphasize discontinuity between Christianity and Nazism in order to shelter Christian orthodoxy from the vicissitudes of contemporary history. (574)

Nevertheless, Haynes advocates on behalf of Holocaust theologians providing that aid and comfort. Combined with the use of the term rhetoric Haynes' article levels the playing field in what this author feels is only a destructive and negative move.

Inexcusable, as well, is the poor logic and assumptions replete in these six pages. For example, Haynes states that:

A common assumption underlying these statements is that from the beginnings of Christianity, genocide has been inherent in its understanding of the Jewish people. (572)

That assumption is nowhere explicitly stated. Nor can it be convincingly argued that it is implicitly stated. Indeed, as early as 1964 Isaac explicitly states the opposite:

It should be said in defense of the Roman Catholic Church that at least it has never gone as far as "genocide," that it has always recognized the right of the Jews to exist as "living testimony," and that on occasion it has endeavored to



curb the hatred of the people - after its own teachings had helped to unleash it  
(116)

And as late as 1993 William Nicholls reiterates the point:

Although many Jewish converts to Christianity perished through the Inquisition, the Church was still able to guard against the last consequence of anti-Semitic hatred, genocide itself. The traditional doctrine that the Jews must be preserved until the Second Coming of Christ still saved the Jews from corporate extinction. (226)

Furthermore, in that we can assume that it is soothing to a Christian to listen to a list of discrepancies between Christian anti-Semitism and Nazi anti-Semitism and that, on the other-hand, it is painful to Christian ears to listen to any description of continuity between the two the objective of the Holocaust theologian must clearly be, not to provide a "balanced view", but to open eyes to the reality of some continuity. For Haynes to recommend that Holocaust theologians undermine their own impact by mapping out the intellectual escape route of Tal, Yerushalmi, Cohen or Saperstien, is absurd.

Haynes states that:

First, official policy toward Jews was never one of genocide during the centuries the church might have had the power and influence to carry out such a policy. (574)

There are two problems with this statement. First, Haynes is toying with the theoretical "might have had." In fact, it is doubtful that at any time in history the Church had the influence to carry out genocide.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, at no time in its history did the Church possess the technology necessary to carry out genocide. The point being not that the Church would have if it could have, a point previously made by Isaac, but that Haynes' toying with the theoretical leads nowhere and is of no value.

Second, Haynes appeal to official church policy misses the most important thrust of Holocaust Theology. Holocaust Theology is less interested in official church policy and more interested in how that policy is incorporated into the daily lives of average Christians, what Isaac would describe as having taken root in impressionable minds. If the limbs don't follow the instructions of the brains than there is something wrong with the body. The problem might be in the brain; it might be in the nervous system, it might be in

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<sup>14</sup>That being an impression gleaned from WLS 620B - History of the Medieval Church. Would the nobility have given the Church a free hand to commit genocide? Unlikely.

the muscles. If the official church policy fails to motivate the average Christian then there is something wrong with the body. Perhaps the official policy is out of synch with official sentiments. Perhaps official policy is internally self-contradicting. Perhaps official policy is not even communicated to the average Christian. Holocaust Theology is not interested in official church opinions but rather in the entire system known as Christianity. Holocaust Theology wrestles with its conclusion that there is a problem within Christianity, notwithstanding the fact that the problem might not be in "official policy."

No better example exists, perhaps, than the recounting of *Sicut Judaeis*.<sup>15</sup> Notwithstanding the oft issued official *Sicut Judaeis*, grass-roots Christians led by front-line clergy marched down the Rhine slaughtering Jews wherever the nobility allowed; accusations of ritual murder were common and mistreatment of Jews was widespread. Official church policy is meaningless if it is not embraced by the laity.

Haynes states that:

Second, although the anti-Jewish tradition in Christianity desensitized many Germans to Nazi anti-Semitism, Nazism's amalgamation of Fascist and racist notions was compelling largely because it comprised a response to the dual crisis of modernity and a lost war. Neither of these considerations diminishes Christianity's role as a necessary condition of the Holocaust; but they explain why it was not a sufficient condition. (574)

The concern of the Holocaust theologian is not what was or was not a sufficient condition. At one time rumors of poisoning the wells were sufficient conditions; at another time the blood libel was a sufficient condition; at other times economic stress was a sufficient condition; during the Holocaust the "crisis of modernity and a lost war" were sufficient conditions. Their question is why, when these conditions exist, does it always result in Christians murdering Jews?

In other words, their concern is not the issue of "sufficient conditions" but rather the issue of contributory negligence versus proximate cause. Consider the example of a city that fails to properly salt a street; a driver driving too fast slides through a red light hitting another driver who is then taken to a hospital. There the hospital offers a misdiagnosis

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<sup>15</sup>According to the Encyclopedia Judaica: *Sicut Judaeis* first issued by Calixtus II around 1120, was a general Bull of Protection for the Jews, who had suffered at the hands of participants in the First Crusade and were being maltreated by their Christian neighbors. It forbade killing them, using force to convert them, and otherwise molesting them, their synagogues, and cemeteries. The bull was modeled on a letter, which began with the same phrase, sent to the bishop of Palermo by Pope Gregory I in 598, objecting to the use of force as a conversionary method. Calixtus' formulation was repeated by most of the popes from the 12th to the 15th century. They often added references to problems current in their day. Several of them condemned the accusation of ritual murder. (4:1495)

and the person dies. The proximate cause of death was the hospital's misdiagnosis. Granted, the driver would never have wound up in the hospital if the city and the other driver were not both negligent. But the hospital is responsible for the death.

That is to say, it is possible for fascism and racism, and for that matter for any other kind of "ism", to exist without either having resulted in genocide. Throughout the history of Christian-Jewish relations, any excuse at all was good enough to justify a Christian massacre of Jews. Without Christianity's assistance, Hitler would have come and gone without there being a Holocaust. Thus, it was the teaching and practice of contempt that was the proximate cause of the Holocaust. That Haynes would disregard that troubles me.

Parkes makes a similar point in 1934. He describes the claims that early anti-Semitism is to be attributed either to Jewish monotheism in a polytheistic world or to the politics of Jewish revolt against Rome. He continues:

What trouble there was came from one of these two causes, monotheism or the harshness of the Roman domination. The significant fact for subsequent history is that when these two causes were removed, the problem remained. When Christianity became the religion of the state, monotheism was no longer abnormal. With the scattering of the Jews from Palestine in the second century, Jewish rebellions came to an end. But the Jewish problem remained. (372)

Perhaps the fundamental point missed by Haynes is the reality of Eastern Europe for the Jew during the Holocaust. There are, and we shall see them in Pawlikowski as well, grounds for constructing a case which argues that Nazi anti-Semitism was a new phenomenon and not simply an outgrowth of the teaching of contempt. But for that argument to be relevant to the Jewish reality of Eastern Europe during the Holocaust one would also have to argue that all of Christianity abandoned Christian thought and embraced Nazi anti-Christian thought. The facts would have to be that crucifixes were taken off the walls and swastikas hung in their place and that Bibles were tossed in the garbage and copies of Mein Kampf placed on the end-tables. That did not happen; there was no mass conversion.

The Jewish realities are summarized by Elie Weisel:

In Christian Poland, so hostile was the countryside that those who escaped from the ghettos often returned to them; they feared the Poles as much as the Germans. In Lithuania too. In the Ukraine. In Hungary. And yet in all of these occupied countries, there were resistance movements that had their

heroes and martyrs. Only the Jews were victims of the Nazi invaders and of their victims as well. (Cargas 1990:x)

The point cannot be distorted or watered down. The hundreds of thousands of Christians who assisted the Nazis in the destruction of European Jewry did so as an expression of their Christian faith, not as an expression of Nazi ideology. Without the Christian locals pointing out to the Nazis who the Jews were and where they were hiding, the Holocaust would not have happened. The Christians were not necessarily Nazis, indeed, they may have been enemies of Nazism. Yet they welcomed the opportunity presented to them by the Nazis to engage in the "sacred" Christian act of destroying Jews.

Politics makes strange bed-fellows, and religious politics makes the strangest of all. In so far as the destruction of European Jewry was concerned, Christians were all too happy to climb into bed with Nazis. Nazis killed Jews for their reasons; Christians killed Jews for their reasons. If Christians had not linked up with Nazis there would not have been a Holocaust. As Weisel said, "Only the Jews were victims of the Nazi invaders and of their victims as well."

Haynes notes that "the gap between professional theology and 'real life' has become a tired lament in the church." (576) If anything, Haynes article is a contribution to the professional; Holocaust theology is an appeal to the 'real life' of Christian-Jewish relations. There are, and will always be, ways to deflect blame, to deny responsibility, to minimize allegations, and to rationalize conduct. Escapism, especially intellectual escapism, is alive and well. Real life, at times, demands assigning fault, identifying shortcomings, and plotting a path: to improvement.

George Santayana, in The Life of Reason, says:

Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

Haynes' approach to Holocaust Theology puts us squarely upon a regressive path condemned to the repetition of history; the Holocaust Theologians in the history reviewed, attempt to remember the past and to learn from it, and thereby they advocate on behalf of human progress.

### **John T. Pawlikowski: Biographical Background:**

Father John T Pawlikowski, (born November 2, 1940) a priest of the Order of Servants of Mary, is a professor of social ethics at the Catholic Theological Union in Chicago, where he has taught since 1968; he served as the Acting President in 1975-1976. An ordained Servite priest, he holds an A.B. from Loyola University of Chicago and a Ph.D. in theology (1970) from the University of Chicago. In addition to his writings he was appointed to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council in 1980 by President Carter and then reappointed by President Reagan. He is a member of the Advisory Committee of the Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations of the National conference of Catholic Bishops and of the National Council of Churches' Commission on Christian-Jewish Relations. A consultant to the International Council of Christians and Jews and to the Israel Interfaith Association, he has visited the Middle East frequently and has lectured at the Ecumenical Institute for Advanced Theological Research in Jerusalem. He is an Associate Editor for the *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* and also serves on the editorial boards of the *Journal of Holocaust and Genocide Studies* and *New Theology Review*. He has been involved in East/West Christian/Jewish dialogues in Hungary and East Germany and in Christian/Jewish/Muslim dialogues in Spain and the U.S.A., as well as being a member of the National Polish-Jewish Dialogue.

Pawlikowski dedicated his *Christ in the Light of the Christian-Jewish Dialogue* to "James Parkes, J. Coert Rylaarsdam, and Jules Isaac, who first led me to rethink the Christian-Jewish relationship." (1982:0) Pawlikowski gave earlier testimony to the influence of Jules Isaac in his paper at the 1974 International Symposium on the Holocaust. Pawlikowski stated that:

It may be said that no one person was more influential in preparing the way for the Declaration on the Church and the Jewish People adopted at the Second Vatican Council. (Fleischner:155)

Likewise, the influence of Parkes upon Pawlikowski is obvious. In 1969 Pawlikowski published an article entitled *The Church and Judaism: The Thought of James Parkes*, a twenty-four page review of the topic. He says:

In my view Parkes was saying as far back as the thirties what Paul Tillich proposed in his final public lecture . . . And Parkes went beyond Tillich in trying to work out a detailed model for at least one phase of this encounter. Thus, though Harnack, Baur, Döllinger and Möhler may get more of the

headlines, James Parkes has given a more radical and more valid answer to the problem of the church and history with which all of these thinkers have struggled. His model and vision needs expansion and refinement. But in his writings we have witnessed a terribly important breakthrough. (1969:596-597)

It will become apparent in this paper that references to Parkes occur repeatedly throughout Pawlikowski's writings. Indeed, Pawlikowski's second book is entitled Sinai and Calvary: A Meeting of Two Peoples, a title clearly inspired by Parkes' focus upon Sinai and Calvary. For the moment, though, suffice to say that Pawlikowski has spent a good portion of his career expanding and refining the thought of James Parkes.

### **John T. Pawlikowski: Evidence of the Influence of the Holocaust:**

The Holocaust reverberates in all of Pawlikowski's writings. At times it is obvious, as in the title and opening sentences of *The Challenge of the Holocaust for Christian Theology*:

The reflections that follow are those of a Catholic trying to grasp the implications of the Nazi conflagration. They come as a response to the challenge posed by the church historian Franklin Littell . . . in whose view the Holocaust "remains the major event in recent church history - signaling . . . the rebellion of the baptized against the Lord of History . . . Christianity itself has been put to the question." (1978:3)

The Holocaust as inquisitor is apparent elsewhere:

It is not easy to grapple with the many dimensions of the Holocaust experience. It is especially difficult for sensitive Christians, considering that classic Christian anti-Judaism provided the seedbed for the ideology of the Nazis. (1980:295)

Turning now to the Holocaust's significance for Christian theological reflection one reality seems clear. Given the centrality of Christology in Christian faith expression the Holocaust must have implications for this dimension of Christian faith or it can hardly be termed an 'orienting event.' (1984:43)

This presentation is a modest attempt to confront some overarching ethical issues emerging from the Holocaust and from contemporary Jewry's reflection on that 'orienting experience' . . . . (1988:649)

An in-depth examination of the Nazi Holocaust raises challenging questions relative to the relationship between church and society. As a nation whose people endured in a special way the horrors of Nazi ideology, contemporary Poland needs to ponder the significance of this cataclysmic event far more than it has. (1993:1)

At other times the Holocaust's presence can only be assumed. His earliest published book Catechetics and Prejudice (1973) contains almost no references to the Holocaust, certainly none which would reflect the kind of influence that is evident in later writings. The book is a review of the criticism of religious instructional material and the progress

made in improving that material. Pawlikowski's interest in the topic stems from the following:

Among Jewish and Christian scholars alike, the conviction was widespread and deeply implanted that a certain tradition of Christian teaching, uncritically handed down for generations, was the prime source of anti-Semitism. (1973:7)

Pawlikowski then quotes Flannery and Baum. Each of the quoted remarks, though not mentioning the Holocaust per se, is a veiled reference to the Holocaust as the culmination of centuries of anti-Semitism to which Christian teaching had been the greatest, perhaps only, contributor. Thus, this author is of the opinion that, even in 1973, the issue of the Holocaust was festering in the mind of Pawlikowski.<sup>16</sup>

There is a tension of ambiguity in Pawlikowski's opinions regarding the Holocaust. On the one hand the Holocaust is an "orienting event," an expression Pawlikowski borrows from Irving Greenberg. (1982:5) The implications of the expression "orienting event" are variously articulated:

The ethical philosopher Hans Jonas has written of the post-Holocaust period as a time in which "we shiver in the nakedness of a nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greater capacity with knowing least what for." Can post-Holocaust theological ethics overcome this impasse, this spirit of nihilism? Can it express an understanding of God and religion that will prevent the creative powers of the human person from being transformed into the forces of destruction that were horridly made visible in the Auschwitz era? That is the moral challenge facing the Christian churches today. (1980:297)

Auschwitz has emerged in my mind as the beginning of a significantly new era, one in which the extermination of human life in a guiltless fashion becomes thinkable and technologically feasible. (1981:143; 1988:443)

The Holocaust has unquestionably shattered many conventional Christological claims. It has rendered any Christological approach that rejects Jews and Judaism as religious relics a moral obscenity. (1982:147)

Auschwitz truly opened up a new era in human possibility. (1984:317; 1984:44)

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<sup>16</sup>It is the opinion of this student that the absence of direct reference to the Holocaust in Catechetics & Prejudice, is the first manifestation of a certain ambiguity that haunts Pawlikowski vis-a-vis the Holocaust. We shall return to this thought.



The contention of the essay throughout is that the experience of the Holocaust has profoundly altered the very basis for morality in our time. (1988:649)

However, Pawlikowski dedicates considerable effort to the thesis that the Holocaust was not just an orienting event for Christianity but that it was, as well, an orienting event for Western Enlightenment thought. This is demonstrated by another of Pawlikowski's favorite quotations, again from Irving Greenberg:

The Holocaust has shattered not only Christianity's moral basis, but that of Western liberal society as well, a point Irving Greenberg has so correctly insisted upon in his writings on the significance of Auschwitz: "One of the most striking things about the *Einsatzgruppen* leadership makeup is the prevalence of educated people, professional, especially lawyers, Ph.D.'s, and yes, even a clergyman. How naive the nineteenth-century polemic with religion appears to be in retrospect; how simple Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and many others. The entire structure of autonomous logic and sovereign human reason now takes on a sinister character . . . For Germany was one of the most advanced Western countries - at the heart of the academic, scientific, and technological enterprise. All the talk in the world about 'atavism' cannot obscure the way in which such behavior is the outgrowth of democratic and modern values, as well as the pagan gods . . . This responsibility must be shared not only by Christianity, but by the Enlightenment and democratic cultures as well. Their apathy and encouragement strengthened the will and capacity of the murderers to carry out the genocide . . . . (1980:295; 1981:144; 1984:322; 1988:450)

Pawlikowski once even suggests that Hitler's "Final Solution" was not, as is commonly thought, a reference to the "Final Solution to the Jewish Problem:" but rather that the aim of the final solution was a:

. . . total transformation of values. It wished to free humankind from the shackles of a God concept and its attendant notions of moral responsibility, redemption, sin and revelation.<sup>17</sup> (1978:4)

He bases his opinion upon the writings of Uriel Tal. Tal writes:

God became man, but not in the theological New Testament sense of the incarnation of the word . . . In the new conception, God becomes man in a

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<sup>17</sup>This redefinition of the word does not appear in any of his later writings. It is possible that his opinion on this point changed. However, his overall opinion of Hitler's objectives remains consistent.

political sense as a member of the Aryan race whose highest representative on earth is the Führer. Communication with the Führer became communion. This transfiguration took place through public mass meetings which were staged and celebrated as sacred cults as well as by means of education, indoctrination and inculcation of discipline. As a result, a personal identification with the Father was made possible in terms of the Father of the State, the Son of the race and the Spirit of the *Volk*.<sup>18</sup> (Tal:69-70)

The conclusion Pawlikowski draws from Greenberg's comment and Tal's thesis is one which addresses the issue of responsibility. This point is first made in *The Challenge of the Holocaust for Christian Theology*:

At least indirectly, Western liberal thought was responsible for the Holocaust. By breaking the tight hold the God-concept had on previous generations, it paved the way for greater human freedom and self-sufficiency without realistically assessing the potential of the destructive forces within mankind to pervert this freedom into the cruelty revealed by the Nazi experiment. (1978:11)

In 1981, just before referring to Tal, Pawlikowski writes that:

Nazism was as much opposed to Christianity in the final analysis as to Judaism; it was as much a product, perhaps even more so, of fundamental trends in Western society as it was of traditional Christian anti-Semitism. (1981:144-145)

Following his reference to Tal in *Christ in the Light of the Christian-Jewish Dialogue* his statement of responsibility is far more emphatic and absolute:

. . . the Holocaust was in the last analysis the product of secular, profoundly anti-Christian forces and not simply the final chapter in the long history of Christian anti-Semitism . . . . (1982:137)

His 1982 remark is consistent with his 1984 remark:

I have been persuaded by scholars such as the Israeli historian Uriel Tal that the Holocaust represents something more than the final, most gruesome sequel in the long and tragic history of Christian anti-Semitism. (1984:316)

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<sup>18</sup>It is significant to note that reference to Tal's opinion appears in 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, twice in 1984, twice in 1988, and in 1993. Often the very same quote is repeated.

One would be hard-pressed to prove if Pawlikowski sees either Christianity or Western liberal thought as being the more challenged by the Holocaust. Likewise, one would be hard-pressed to determine if Pawlikowski is attempting to deflect criticism away from Christianity by increasing the pool of sinners - a "don't blame it all on me" attitude - or if he is, instead, making no excuses for Christianity while expanding the absoluteness of the condemnation to include Western liberal thought. This is a significant point which deserves consideration.

From Pawlikowski's words one might conclude that he is not attempting to deflect criticism. He states, for example, that his acceptance of Tal's thesis "in no way intends to undercut the blame Christian churches share for Hitler's Final Solution." (1978:23) Again:

At this point I must make it clear that the above description of the primary moral challenge stemming from the Holocaust is in no way intended to exonerate the complicity of the Christian churches in the event. (1980:300)

After both of those passages Pawlikowski quotes the same remark of Flannery:

. . . in the final analysis, some degree of the charge (against the church) must be validated. Great or small, the apathy or silence was excessive. The fact remains that in the twentieth century of Christian civilization a genocide of six million innocent people was perpetrated in countries with many centuries of Christian traditions and by hands that were in many cases Christian. This fact in itself stands, however vaguely, as an indictment of the Christian conscience. (Flannery 1969:174-175)

In *Worship After the Holocaust* he says:

I have been persuaded by scholars such as the Israeli historian Uriel Tal that the Holocaust represents something more than the final, most gruesome sequel in the long and tragic history of Christian anti-Semitism. This is in no way meant to minimize the central role played by the classical anti-semitic tradition in public cooperation with the Nazi "Final Solution." There is little question that Christian anti-Semitism provided an indispensable seedbed for Nazism. (1984:316)

In *The Shoah: Its Challenges for Religious and Secular Ethics* he says:

It certainly would constitute an unconscionable evasion of moral responsibility for Christians to ignore the active collaboration of many believing members of

the church in the *Shoah* as well as the indirect, but real, participation of so many other baptized faithful as bystanders. But in the end we must see the *Shoah* as caused by something more than Christian failure . . . But Tal nonetheless underscores the pivotal contribution of the Christian tradition to the genesis of the 'Final Solution.' (1988a:444)

Much the same appears in *Christian Ethics and the Holocaust*. (1988b:650) In *The Holocaust: Its Implications for Contemporary Church-State Relations in Poland* he says:

Those of us who are generally sympathetic to the Western liberal tradition (and I count myself among them) must honestly face up to the failures of this tradition during the Hitler period. But we must avoid giving the impression, as some in the churches tend to do, that liberalism/modernism had a far greater hand in the success of the Nazi effort than the religious traditions. Confronting the failures of the liberal tradition during the Holocaust in no way removes the serious obligation incumbent upon the churches to examine the pervasive role played by many Christian teachings in the event. (1993:5)

It is the opinion of this student that Pawlikowski is anxious and willing to admit to Christianity's guilt. However, there remains significant question as to what, in Pawlikowski's opinion, Christianity is confessing to. To what is he referring when he says "the complicity of the Christian churches in the event" or "the pivotal contribution of the Christian tradition" or "the pervasive role played by many Christian teachings"? The quotation from Flannery uses the terms "some degree," "great or small," and "however vaguely." Those are weak terms which serve to virtually exonerate Christianity; Pawlikowski is responsible for having selected that quotation. At the same time, Pawlikowski is anxious to indict Western liberal thought.

It appears that Pawlikowski is, in fact, trying to minimize the accountability by deflecting the blame. Having said that, one must likewise admit that Pawlikowski is responsible for the occasional damning quotation which appear in his writings and which create the impression that Christianity, though not solely responsible, is much the accomplice to a sin of enormous proportion. Quotations such as:

Was not the Holocaust a terrible test - which the church failed? ... It may be ... that the question whether Christianity is to remember the Holocaust or dismiss it is a question of the ability and the right of Christianity to survive in a form in any way conformable to the Scriptures. (1978:25)

Professor Alice Eckardt . . . writes . . . 'nothing normal should prevail after the most fearful abnormality in human history. It further assumes that the

Holocaust is primarily a Jewish problem - whereas in fact it is, in far deeper respects, a Christian problem.' (1983:410)

In the end Christianity cannot escape the question a fellow inmate posed to Alexander Donat, author of *The Holocaust Kingdom*: 'How can Christianity survive the discovery that after a thousand years of its being Europe's official religion, Europe remains pagan at heart.' (1988a:444)

Perhaps all that can be concluded is that, in the opinion of Pawlikowski, the balance of accountability, an accountability that Christianity shares with Western liberal thought, is another mystery of the *Shoah*. Rather than accept more, as some have, Pawlikowski has decided to assign less accountability to Christianity. That having been said, the very fact that Christianity is an accomplice to the greatest sin since the murder of Cain leaves Christianity bearing a mark far heavier than any cross.<sup>19</sup>

My reading of Pawlikowski makes sense if one reflects upon the opposing forces pulling at the loyalties of a person of Pawlikowski's depth and sensitivity. Utter defensiveness ought to be the first reaction of any devout Christian to accusations that Christianity is fully responsible for the death of six million Jews, nearly a third of whom were children. Loyalty to the Church and to Christianity allows for no other initial reaction. I would describe Pawlikowski as defensive, at times overly so, and as reluctant to itemize the extent to which Christianity shoulders responsibility for Auschwitz. Yet, even as I accuse him of defensiveness I understand the source of the reaction.

As one becomes consumed by the realities and the history of the Holocaust, as one begins to know Auschwitz, a second reaction occurs. The question "How can Christianity survive the discovery that after a thousand years of its being Europe's official religion, Europe remains pagan at heart?" is a haunting question. It festers in the mind surfacing at every moment of faith. How many Nazis sang Silent Night while still wearing the blood of Jewish children on their uniforms? Is there life after Auschwitz for Christianity?

The facts, the history, and the descriptions from actual survivors are so graphic that the devout cannot help but become angry and disappointed. A Christian must become angry at his/her own faith for its complicity with Auschwitz, however one describes that complicity. A sense of profound disappointment ought to overwhelm devout Christians as they reflect upon the failures of their own religious traditions. I would describe Pawlikowski as a disappointed Christian. However, I would also describe him as a

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<sup>19</sup>For the Jewish participant in the dialogue the above discussion is critically important. Though I have no reservations about expanding the criticism to include Western liberal thought, I am absolutely opposed to any attempt to mitigate Christianity's ultimate role as proximate cause to the death of the six million. I will return to this thought in my own conclusion.

Christian who has quickly learned how to channel his disappointment into a constructive process of reconstruction of Christian theology.

Christianity was an accomplice, and it was so in a big-way, to the great sin of Auschwitz. It is my opinion that a tension of ambiguity, defensiveness and disappointment, coupled with constructive theological reflection, is the fullest response the truly devout Christian can have in the face of Auschwitz. Pawlikowski has achieved that. We now turn our attention to Pawlikowski's response to Auschwitz.

## **The Holocaust as a Catalyst for Theological Evolution: The Theology of John T. Pawlikowski:**

At the conclusion of the chapter entitled "Christian Education and the Jewish People" Pawlikowski writes that

The obligation of the Christian teacher is to make clear to the student the continuing validity of Judaism as a religion and its important contributions to mankind, to show him that the old stereotypes about the total absorption of Judaism by Christianity are wholly unwarranted. At the same time the teacher must frankly admit to the student that it may take Christian theologians quite some time to work out a new positive statement on the interrelationship of the two faith-communities, since Christianity has for so long a time defined itself in terms of the culmination of Judaism. (1973:114)

Twenty-five years later it is clear that not enough time has passed and that a new Christian theology of Judaism has not emerged. Still, progress has occurred and to a large extent that progress is reflected in Pawlikowski's own writings.

In the final two chapters of *Catechetics & Prejudice* Pawlikowski lists three topics that are "major problem areas in Christian-Jewish relations that were revealed in the textbook analysis" (100) and four areas that

are seldom touched upon in elementary or high school textbooks but which nevertheless have affected the historical relationship between the two faiths and still influence Catholic attitudes toward Jews and Judaism. (117).

The former include:

1. attitudes towards the Pharisees,
2. attitudes towards the crucifixion and death of Jesus, and
3. and attitudes towards the two covenants.

The latter include four areas:

1. Paul and Judaism,
2. The apparent anti-Semitism of the New Testament,
3. The recovery of some of the heritage of Judaism, which includes:
  - a. the importance of history,
  - b. man's responsibility for Creation,
  - c. salvation in community,
  - d. the idea that man is not basically evil, and

#### 4. attitudes towards Israel.

Each of these receive attention in one or more of Pawlikowski's later writings.

Regarding attitudes towards the two covenants, in *Catechetics and Prejudice* Pawlikowski asks:

What about the overriding impression in the *New Testament* that Christianity has totally superseded Judaism? It is the *New Israel*; it has a *New Covenant* and a *New Moses*. What then remains the role of Judaism in the *New Age*? Is it nothing more than an old wine sack? Has the Sinaitic covenant been replaced? (109)

In answer, Pawlikowski discusses the opinions of three scholars. First amongst those is the opinion of James Parkes, upon whose works Pawlikowski had published four years earlier.

. . . James Parkes who argues that both covenants are necessary because each speaks to man in a different aspect of his being: Calvary to man as individual, ignoring natural boundaries, Sinai to man as social being, existing in a natural community. (109)

Additionally, Pawlikowski refers to the work of Gregory Baum and the Catholic theologian Dr. Monika Hellwig.

In *Christ in the Light of the Christian-Jewish Dialogue*, particularly in chapter five, Pawlikowski begins to develop his own answer to the question of the two covenants. We preface our discussion of chapter five with a brief review of the preceding four chapters.

*Christ in the Light of the Christian-Jewish Dialogue* opens as follows:

But for me there remains little doubt about the need for a profound re-examination of the Christological question if the Church is to construct a solid, positive theology of Judaism in our time.

This theology will have to abandon some of the classic Christian formulations that Christ has fulfilled the messianic prophecies of the Hebrew Scriptures and inaugurated the expected messianic age. On the other hand, neither will it be satisfactory to simply reduce the experience of Christ to one among many experiences of messianic hope, as Ruether appears to do, nor merely to understand Christianity as Judaism for the Gentiles, a thesis being developed of late by Paul van Buren and others. Unless Christianity is able to articulate some unique features in the revelation of Christ, then it should fold up as a major world religion . . . the Christ event however interpreted by



different churches and scholars, stands at the very heart of Christian faith expression. (1982:3)

In chapter two he reviews the opinions of single-covenant perspectives and double-covenant perspectives. He draws two sets of conclusions First:

The only areas in which there is general agreement are: (1) that the Christ event did not invalidate the Jewish faith perspective, (2) that Christianity is not superior to Judaism, nor is it the fulfillment of Judaism, as previously maintained, and (3) that Christianity needs to reincorporate dimensions from its original Jewish context, in particular the sense of rootedness in history (34)

Second:

The respective positions advocated by dialogue scholars that (1) Christianity is essentially Judaism for the Gentiles, or (2) that the Christ event is one among several valid messianic experiences, or (3) that Christianity and Judaism are distinctive religions, each with a unique faith perspective despite their historic links, have each drawn support from several scholars (34)

In Chapter three he reviews European Protestant and Catholic writings, as well as Latin American liberationist writings. Overall he reflects disappointment with their progress. In particular he complains that their "Christology continues to suffer from a deep anti-Judaic malady" and that "the Continental and liberation theologians . . . seriously lack a proper understanding of the Second Temple period in Judaism." (74)

In Chapter four he turns his attention to the Second Temple period and in particular to the Pharisaic movement. Following a lengthy discussion of the salient aspects of the Pharisaic movement Pawlikowski concludes that Jesus can be considered a son of the Pharisaic movement "even though on several key issues which we shall examine shortly he was without doubt his 'own man'." (102) For Pawlikowski those key issues are not just differences but constitute the *raison d'etre* of Christianity. In Pawlikowski's words, those seven key issues are:

(1) In the first place is the degree of intimacy involved in Jesus' Abba experience. No Pharisee of his day would have been willing to grant the possibility of so close a link between humanity and divinity. The consciousness of a profound tie was certainly present in Pharisaism, but notions of separation, of distance, remained firm and unbending in the mind of even the most liberal members of the movement. (103)

(2) The second difference has to do with Jesus' attempt to carry the Pharisaic notion of the basic dignity of each human person to its ultimate conclusion . . . while the Pharisees pushed the concept of each individual's worth a tremendous distance, Jesus stretched it to its final limits. (104)

(3) Another possible distinction between Jesus and the Pharisees concerns their respective attitudes toward the *am ha aretz*. . . Jesus . . . was more ready to welcome the *am ha aretz* into the company of his disciples . . . . (105)

(4) A fourth distinction . . . For both the rabbis and Jesus, the first master was God. They differed, however, on the primary source of opposition to divine discipleship. The Pharisaic rabbis insisted that it was "evil inclination" which probably had a sexual base. Jesus changed this, perhaps under Essene influence, to wealth. (105)

(5) . . . another unique quality of Jesus' message [is] his attitude toward one's enemy. Following through on his stress on the fundamental dignity inherent in each person, Jesus urged upon his followers a positive attitude of respect for even those who had wronged them. (106)

(6) Notice must also be taken of Clemens' Thoma's assertion that Jesus preached the actual presence of the Kingdom of God in his activities and person in a way that alienated him from Pharisaism. (106)

(7) The final point of contrast . . . relates to the question of the forgiveness of sin . . . the Pharisees continued to hold tenaciously to the traditional view that God alone had the power to forgive sins. Jesus claimed this power for himself [and] transfers this same power to his disciples. (106)

Chapter five is among the most important of Pawlikowski's writings. Pawlikowski attributes the existence of chapter five to:

The enrichment and insight I have received from living contact with Jews and Judaism has given me new religious meaning and in many ways enhanced and deepened my understanding of the Incarnation. But it has also forced upon me a profound re-evaluation of traditional claims of Christian superiority and universality. I am not the same Christian person I was before my involvement in the dialogue. Hence the need to restate Christological meanings in the light of this experience which I know has also been shared by other Christian men and women involved in the dialogue. (1982:7)

However, it must be noted that the Christology he proposes matches the criterion stated later in the book:

To begin with, there is need to affirm without the slightest qualification that Auschwitz has made it immoral for Christians to maintain any Christology that is overly triumphalistic or that finds the significance of the Christ event in the elimination of the Jewish covenant. (1982:143)

The Holocaust has unquestionably shattered many conventional Christological claims. It has rendered any Christological approach that rejects Jews and Judaism as religious relics a moral obscenity. (1982:147)

Thus, explicitly Pawlikowski sees the impetus for chapter five to be Christian-Jewish dialogue. He implies, however, that the impetus is the Holocaust and indeed, he tailors his theology to account for criticism growing out of reflections upon the Holocaust.<sup>20</sup> It is this author's opinion that the Holocaust is the catalyst for Pawlikowski's Christology. We shall return to this thought after a review of chapter five.

Drawing to some degree upon the writings of Ellis Rivkin, Pawlikowski begins by asserting a Pharisaic interest in moving salvation out of the history of community and into the individual realm. Unlike Rivkin, Pawlikowski believes that the Pharisees did not totally reject history as an author of salvation. Rather, they introduced the concept of individual salvation and struggled to define a balance between history of community and individual. Pawlikowski call this the "internalization process in Pharisaism" and agrees that "the Pharisaic revolution can be said to have 'seeded' the Christian revolution" (1982:111)

Internalization extended to its ultimate limits is the internalization of God, otherwise referred to as the notion of the Incarnation. Belief in Incarnation is intended to instill a "sense of the intimacy between humanity and divinity" and can be summarized as a "proclamation of the indwelling presence of God in humanity, in a measure that was hinted at in Pharisaic theology but which still did not come out in all its power and glory." (109)

Pawlikowski seems to suggest that Incarnation reveals a symbiotic relationship between God and humanity. Once, he refers to "the humanity of God." (119) He says.

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<sup>20</sup>An argument can also be made that the Dialogue's existence is a consequence of the Holocaust. Were it not for that 'orienting event' Christian-Jewish relations might very well have remained as they were at the beginning of the century. If that is so, attributing his innovative theology to the Dialogue becomes little more than a means of underplaying the Holocaust.

Put somewhat simply, what ultimately came to be recognized with clarity for the first time through the ministry and person of Jesus was how profoundly integral humanity was to the self-definition of God. This in turn implied that each human person is somehow divine, that he or she somehow shares in the constitutive nature of God . . . humanity existed in the Godhead from the very beginning. Thus in a very real sense one can say that God did not become man in Jesus. God always was man; humanity was an integral part of the Godhead from the beginning. The Christ event was crucial, however, for the manifestation of this reality to the world. (115)

Pawlikowski qualifies his theory of internalization in two ways. First, a gulf still remains between God the Creator and humanity the created. Second, there was a uniqueness "about the manner in which humanity and divinity were united in Jesus. . . . [O]ur humanity will never share the same intimacy with the divine nature that existed in the person of Jesus." (115)

Pawlikowski suggests that the Christ event was crucial for a second reason. The co-existence of humanity and God is the reality of Creation. Since the moment of creation the human component of humanity has been struggling to define its "self-identity, especially insofar as that identity related to the Creator God." (115) The Christ event resolved that struggle:

It revealed the incomparable greatness of the human person as well as his or her limits. It made these limits tolerable, if not meaningful, because in the suffering of the Son of God it likewise revealed the vulnerability of God. (115)

Several additional points in Pawlikowski's Incarnational Christology are worthy of review. First, Pawlikowski emphasizes the fact that Incarnational Christology is uniquely Christian, a point we shall return to. Second, he reflects upon an outgrowth of Incarnational Christology. If, as he suggests, God is present in every human then human dignity, and the obligation to treat others with dignity, is a function of that presence of God. Insult hurled at an individual is insult hurled at God. Forgiving an individual is forgiving God. Rejection and hatred of individuals is rejection and hatred of God. Therefore:

Incarnational Christology insofar as it has implications for anthropology is inherently communal. (118)

Thus, a tangible outcome of Incarnational Christology is reconciliation - a process which in history remains incomplete. The incompleteness of reconciliation is, as well, Pawlikowski's defense against charges of exaggerated individualism. Cooperation within humanity is necessary for salvific reconciliation. Individuals cannot withdraw from community lest reconciliation become bogged down.<sup>21</sup> Pawlikowski says:

The Incarnational Christology that I advocate must ultimately be understood as the revelation to the human family that its humanity can be made whole because of the ability of people to be touched in the deepest realms of their consciousness by the humanity of God and its saving power. This gives history a vital new significance. (119)

After admitting that his Christological vision "does imply a degree of universalism" Pawlikowski offers four reasons why "it is necessary to assert that Judaism continues to play a unique and distinctive role in the process of human salvation." (121) His assertion is based upon the belief that:

Judaism and Christianity are essentially distinct religions, each emphasizing different but complementary aspects of human religiosity . . . Whatever might have been ideally, the fact is that Judaism and Christianity went their separate ways. In the course of history they have each developed a unique ethos. (122)

The four unique features of Judaism are the same as those listed in the category "the recovery of some of the heritage of Judaism" in *Catechetics and Prejudice*. They are:

1. Judaism's sense of peoplehood,
2. Judaism's sense of the human person as co-creator, as responsible for history and for the world God created,
3. Judaism's vision of God as a person active in history, and
4. Judaism's sense of the goodness of creation. (122-124)

The final point made by Pawlikowski in chapter five is his definition of the expression "Christ the Savior." Pawlikowski asserts that "salvation" in its root meaning means wholeness, and that wholeness can only be achieved through "total reconciliation both with God and with humankind." (133)

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<sup>21</sup>Does this not return us, albeit in a slightly altered fashion, to the Pharisees effort to balance history of community and individual?

This process of reconciliation began at the level of community with the revelation of God in the Sinai covenant. It was developed at the individual level starting with the Pharisaic revolution and achieved a significant new phase in the Christ event. (133)

Considering the above, and in answer to the question is Christ the Savior, Pawlikowski concludes:

In this sense it is quite legitimate to assert that the understanding and experience of the Christ event brings to the human community the promise and partial fulfillment of salvation. (133)

Chapter five concludes with a reaffirmation of the "tentativeness" of his Christology since

The articulation of a new definition of Christianity's role vis-a-vis Judaism will involve many years of theological reflection, for it touches upon the very self-identity of the Church. (134)

Two final points before we close this discussion of Pawlikowski's Incarnational Christology. First, Pawlikowski refers to his chapter five only once in his later writings, that being in 1984 in the article appearing in *The Holocaust as Interruption*. Second, a footnote in his 1989 article "Toward a Theology for Religious Diversity" appears inexplicable. Pawlikowski states, "My writings on the Holocaust include . . . ." but he fails to list this chapter five, or for that matter, the entire book. It is possible that Pawlikowski believes his Incarnational Christology is not an outgrowth of the Holocaust and that it is, furthermore, not a response to the Holocaust. That is unlikely, however, in that in the same 1984 article he says:

The ultimate significance of this Christology lies in its revelation of the grandeur of humanity, a necessary corrective to the demeaning paternalism that often characterized the divine-human relationship in the past. In my view the fear and paternalism associated in the past with the statement of the divine-human relationship were at least partially responsible for the attempt by Nazism to produce a total reversal of human meaning, to go back to Uriel Tal's analysis, and finally overpower the Creator God. Incarnational Christology can help the human person realize that he or she shares in the very life and existence of God. (1984:47)

In summary, Pawlikowski is compelled to compose a theology that contains no elements of supersessionism. His composition brings Jesus close to Pharisaic thought. He highlights unique aspects of Incarnational Christology while preserving the unique aspects of Judaism. The uniqueness of each is so fundamental that syncretism is impossible; they are mutually exclusive world views. Nevertheless, ultimate reconciliation, that is salvation, requires a sharing of views, a flavoring of Christianity in Judaism and Judaism in Christianity, so to speak. Both religions, though mutually exclusive, must share and cooperate if humanity is to advance. Pawlikowski summarizes himself as follows.

(1) any Christology that simply presents the meaning of Jesus' ministry as the fulfillment of Jewish Messianic prophecies is invalid; (2) the basic link between Jesus and Judaism must be sought in his sharing of the revolutionary vision of Pharisaic Judaism; (3) the difference between Christianity and Judaism theologically - and the difference should not be papered over - is to be found in Christianity's acceptance of Incarnational Christology and its attendant notions; this Christology, however, involves a firm retention of Judaism's commitment to justice within history; (4) Judaism's principal contribution to Christological thought will come from understanding the Exodus covenantal tradition and the sense of salvation within history that this covenant entails as well as the sense of peoplehood. . . . (134-135)

Among the questions to be asked are whether or not most of the unique aspects of Christianity and Judaism identified by Pawlikowski are indeed mutually exclusive, that is, not subsumable by the other. Why can't Christianity recapture a sense of co-creatorship? And if Christianity can what remains of the differences? Why can't Judaism posit the ultimate dignity of the individual, even to the extreme of individual well-being above communal well-being? If Judaism can of what value is Incarnational Christology to Judaism? If Parkes' Sinai/Calvary :: Community/Individual theory is overstated, the only remaining question is that of Incarnation. Are the rest only matters of emphasis with both sets of values existing in both religions? If so, if neither religion needs the other, if the only real point of disagreement is the nuance of Incarnation, have we succeeded in addressing supersessionism? Or does the lack of private turf doom Christianity and Judaism to a future of "I'm right, you're wrong" battles?

Pawlikowski considers this point in his *Jesus and the Theology of Israel*.<sup>22</sup> He says.

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<sup>22</sup>*Jesus and the Theology of Israel*, notwithstanding the fact that it was written seven years later, is essentially a rewriting of *Christ in the Light of the Christian-Jewish Dialogue*. The ideas are organized in a slightly different order, with only a few new thoughts added.

In presenting my interpretation of the Incarnation/Resurrection doctrine there is indeed a sense in which I have "disallowed" what [Eckardt] and most Jews consider Judaism's traditional position about the absolute impossibility of divine-human interpenetration. In this sense I am professing my belief that *on this point* Christianity has moved beyond the pale of Judaism and done this correctly as a result of studied reflection on the basic meaning of Jesus' ministry culminating in the Easter events. Saying this does not fundamentally invalidate the Jewish covenant nor reduce Judaism to total inferiority vis-a-vis Christianity. It is only, but importantly, to say that I remain convinced that Christianity has the more developed understanding in this regard, an understanding I deem vital for resolving important aspects of the human condition, and that is why I choose to remain a believing Christian rather than converting to Judaism. We must be clear about one point in the new Jewish-Christian encounter: the new theological model of its relationship to the Jewish People that the church is now slowly constructing will never be identical with the religious self-definition of a Jew. As close as they might come in many respects, the two theological definitions will inevitably separate on some crucial points. (1989:83-84)

The "crucial points" remain undefined. Other than the point of divine-human interpenetration I am left wondering if we are, in fact, only dealing with differences in priorities and emphases.

Though it is my opinion that Pawlikowski's Incarnational Christology is an outgrowth of reflection upon implications of the Holocaust, Pawlikowski himself addresses implications of the Holocaust for Christianity under separate headings. Chapter six in *Christ in the Light of the Christian-Jewish Dialogue* is his second addressing of the issue. It is relatively weak in comparison to other articles. We shall review Pawlikowski's writings from 1978 - 1993 on each of those topics and offer comments sequentially.

Foremost among the challenges Pawlikowski identifies as growing out of the Holocaust is that of human freedom.

Western liberal thought . . . paved the way for greater human freedom and self-sufficiency without realistically assessing the potential of the destructive forces within mankind to pervert this freedom into the cruelty revealed by the Nazi experiment. (1978:11)

Thus, the basic moral question that emerges from a study of the Holocaust is how we today grapple with a new sense of freedom and power within humankind in a context of a highly sophisticated technological capability with the capacity for massive destruction. (1981:144)



As I see it, human autonomy is the principal theological issue to arise out of reflection on the Auschwitz experience. (1984:45)

The primal issue for ethics posed by the Holocaust is how we are to respond to the sense of human liberation that was central to the Nazi world-view (1988a:445)

The first question to be asked is whether this "new sense of freedom" is truly a new issue? Pawlikowski points to Western liberal thought as having weakened the classic sense of God. The evidence of the weakening and accompanying new sense of freedom, however, is the Holocaust itself. The Holocaust is evidence because it is a new benchmark in human destructiveness. Thus, the assumption Pawlikowski makes is that, conceptually, humanity's exercising the epitome of its latest and greatest destructive ability is a new phenomenon reflecting a new sense of freedom.

There are difficulties with Pawlikowski's position, however. One can argue that the Holocaust was novel only in a technological sense and in scale; it is often claimed that every weapon ever invented by humanity has been used. Technology and scale do not necessarily translate into concept. Conceptually the Holocaust introduces no new precedent in terms of segments of humanity's history striving to achieve ultimate destructive prowess. In that case, one finds nothing radically new in the Nazi event's exploitation of human freedom, a subject otherwise referred to as 'free will'. In this case, it is the same sense of freedom, only different technology.

Tal's comments then become nothing more than an explanation of how the Nazis rationalized what conquerors at other points in human history have found other ways of rationalizing, the exploitation of free will. The Exodus event, frequently addressed by Pawlikowski, begins with Pharaoh's rationalizing of the enslavement of the descendants of Jacob leading up to the casting of the males into the Nile. If Pharaoh had had Zyklon B he would have used it. If he had the technological sophistication of the Dominican Inquisitors he would have used it. Technology and scale ought to be separated from fundamental concepts of free will.

Furthermore, if there is nothing conceptually new in the Nazi event, then contemporary religion, though it ought to continue reflecting upon the problem of human freedom, ought not ascribe to itself a superior stature vis-a-vis past religious reflections upon the topic of freedom and evil. Pawlikowski, it seems to me, implies that post-Holocaust religion has better insight into the problem of free will and evil. One cannot help but wonder how Job would respond to Pawlikowski.

For Pawlikowski, technology and scale do create a conceptual difference. The difference rests in the issue of responsibility. He says:

The Shoah is not merely the most gruesome and troubling example of the classical theological problem of evil. To stop there in probing the Holocaust is, in my judgement, to endanger our humanity. For we will fail to appreciate fully enough the degree of power and consequent responsibility that has come into our hands. (1988b:655)

Does technology and scale, the degree of power and consequent responsibility, introduce a new concept into the issue of free will? Does the fact that the stakes have been raised to an all new level translate into a need for a major reappraisal of free will? In my opinion, Pawlikowski's arguments are tempting but not compelling.

Second, I wonder if Pawlikowski's generalizing of the implications of the Holocaust as fodder for all religions to reflect upon is not another manifestation of Pawlikowski's tension of ambiguity. In this case it serves to refocus the criticism away from the Church and onto religion in general. Though he entitles his article *The Challenge of the Holocaust for Christian Theology*, in fact, many of the challenges are not specifically for Christian theology but for theology in general. Ten years later, in his introduction to *The Shoah: Its Challenges for Religious and Secular Ethics*, Pawlikowski recognizes this tension:

The focus on more generic ethical issues in this essay in no way implies therefore that questions directly involved with the Christian response to the *Shoah* are of secondary importance. They remain absolutely critical. It would be presumptuous for any Christian to delve into the overarching moral issues without first having grappled with Christian culpability during the *Shoah* itself. Having tried to be faithful to this responsibility in other writings, I would like to concentrate in this presentation on the more generalized and pervasive moral issues. (1988a:444)

Put simply, my response to the question of free will and power as Pawlikowski has asked it would be that, in that the victims had no power, free will arises as an issue for the perpetrators but not for the victims. Christianity, and Christianity alone, has to deal with the issue of Christian power and free will in that Christians were the perpetrators. In that Jews were the victims, Judaism does not have to deal with that issue. Rather, Judaism would have to deal with the issue of armed and spiritual resistance as expressions of free will.

Having established that human freedom is the primary issue arising from reflections upon the Holocaust, it becomes the challenge for Christianity and, generalizing again, contemporary religion to address the problem by finding:

. . . a way to articulate a notion of transcendence which can counter-balance the potential for destructiveness found in the contemporary human condition while guiding human freedom towards the creation of societies in which the dignity and the diversity of individual persons is affirmed and maintained within the context of a deep commitment to communal responsibility on a national and international plane. (1978:12)

In light of the Holocaust and related examples of the brutalization of human power it is incumbent upon contemporary Christianity to discover ways to affirm the new sense of freedom that is continuing to dawn within humankind while channeling it into constructive outlets. (1984a:318)

The task for Christian theology after the Holocaust, as for Jewish theology, will be to discover a way whereby the new sense of human freedom that is continuing to dawn might be affirmed but channeled into constructive rather than humanly destructive purposes. (1988b:653)

. . . the basic point must be made that post-Holocaust humanity needs to rediscover a permanent relationship with a God who remains a direct source of strength and influence in the conduct of human affairs. (1989b:146)

As a Jew I struggle again to discover what is broken. Judaism's old sense of transcendence seems to be working just fine. The Jew's relationship with God is as permanent as it ever was and remains a direct source of strength and influence. Perhaps this is a consequence of the Israel experience. Unique to the Holocaust's victims is the fact that they can point to an historical event which testifies to God's enduring love and immediate proximity.

It is common to blame religion for the failures and shortcomings of secular governments. Though I question the motives of those who engage in that kind of rhetoric, what goes around comes around. The achievements of Israel's secular government can likewise be attributed to religion. Contemporary Judaism's overwhelming rejection of Rabbi Meir Kahane's political platform - the expulsion of the Arab population from Israel - and the condemnation by all Jews of acts of fringe fanatics, such as the Hebron massacre, is testimony to the strength of God's influence upon the Jewish community. Kahane's ideas could have become a generally accepted justification for abuse of Arabs on a scale not unlike Christian abuse of Jews. Israel could have abused its power in manners

perfectly in keeping with Middle East precedent. God's influence upon the Jewish community of Israel tempered Israel's abuse of power. Though abuses of power occurred, and many would argue occurred frequently, Jews never attempted to commit acts that engaged the extremes of destructiveness that are known and are available. Christians did that during the Holocaust, as they have at several points in their historical relationship with Jews. Simply put, God's influence upon the Jewish community has resulted in restraint. God's lack of influence upon the Christian community has resulted in unbridled destruction. The Christian community needs to reconsider its relationship with God. Leave Judaism out of the discussion.

Having addressed the single problem of human autonomy and its counter-balance, the sense of the divine, Pawlikowski turns his attention to the second challenge posed by the Holocaust, its impact upon concepts related to God, such as providence, omniscience, and omnipotence. He says:

The post-Auschwitz God-human relationship will have to be one in which we clearly acknowledge God's utter and inescapable dependence upon man as a partner in bringing about the ultimate salvation of the world. (1978:16)

The first [major area of theological impact on the part of the Shoah] is the return of the God-problem to its proper centrality. Too often Christian theology has focused unduly on Christological questions while ignoring this more fundamental problem. (1989c:69)

I have become convinced of the utter centrality of the God question for any theology of religious diversity, because, to the degree that we acknowledge that the covenantal approach to God, whether rooted in Sinai or in the Christ-event, has been modified as a consequence of the experience of such events as the Holocaust, to that same degree we lessen superiority - and/or finality - claims regarding religions other than our own. (1989b:139)

It may indeed be the case that, because of the freedom God has accorded humanity, a freedom the Holocaust has brought to the surface in quite dramatic fashion, such intervention is now beyond the scope of divine activity . . . since the Holocaust salvation has become much more a shared ideal in which both God and humanity must assume a role. (1989b:142)

. . . many dimensions of the covenantal concept of God found in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures continue intact after the Holocaust. God remains Creator, remains the Judge to some degree, and remains a loving Parent. Stated another way, humankind's perception of its relationship with God after the Holocaust will require fundamental revisions but not total reconstruction ..

. The revisions will need to come in our understanding of the depth of human freedom and the extent of the power God has graciously shared with humankind. (1989b:142)

Again, one notices immediately that Pawlikowski has equated Christianity's and Judaism's need to address God's relationship with humanity. The challenge to the perpetrator and to the victim is again presented as if it were identical.

There are many questions which can be asked. Can Judaism and Christianity be in the same predicament if Judaism has never been distracted away from the God question, not by discussions of Christology nor by any other distraction? Can they be in the same predicament if there are pre-Holocaust Jewish writings describing God's utter and inescapable dependence upon man as a partner in bringing about the ultimate salvation of the world? Given the vast library of Jewish philosophical writings on the topics of omniscience, omnipotence, and providence is Judaism really in a situation that it needs "fundamental revisions" in its perceptions of humankind's relationship with God? Is it not more accurate to suggest that the Holocaust demonstrates that some of those authors were wrong whereas other opinions remain viable?

Lest one be overly critical of Pawlikowski it must be remembered that he bases his reflections about Judaism on the writings of Jewish thinkers, particularly those of Irving Greenberg. In both *Christian Ethics and the Holocaust* and *Toward A Theology for Religious Diversity* Pawlikowski quotes the same passage from Greenberg:

In light of the Holocaust it is obvious that this role opened the Jews to a murderous fury from which there was no escape. Yet the divine could not or would not save them from this fate. Therefore, morally speaking, God must repent of the covenant, i.e., do *teshuvah* for having given his chosen people a task that was unbearably cruel and dangerous without having provided for their protection. Morally speaking, then, God can have no claims on the Jews by dint of the covenant. (1988b:658 & 1989b:143)

Pawlikowski states that he is "convinced that Greenberg remains fundamentally on the right track." (1988b:659) Therefore, building upon Greenberg, as well as upon Fackenheim and Cohen, Pawlikowski declares that

The Holocaust has shattered all simplistic notions of a "commanding" God . . . a commanding God can no longer be the touchstone of ethical behavior, but the Holocaust has also revealed humanity's desperate need to restore a relationship with a "compelling" God, *compelling* because we have experienced through symbolic encounter with this God a healing, a

strengthening, an affirming that buries any need to assert our humanity through the destructive, even deadly, use of human power . . . "Compelling" can perhaps be criticized as too strong a substitute for "commanding." An alternative would be to speak about a "God to whom we are drawn." (1989b:145-146)

The difficulty associated with claiming the end of a notion of a commanding God is monumental; Greenberg reminds me of Eckardt's claim that Christianity can no longer speak of the Resurrection. When Pawlikowski is ready to accept Eckardt I'll accept Greenberg. In the meantime contemporary Jewish history testifies to the fact that, even in this post-Auschwitz era, the notion of a commanding God is alive and well. Simply put, Fackenheim. Cohen and Greenberg notwithstanding, the concept of a commanding God is not open for negotiation, nor for that matter, for significant revision.

That should not be surprising. Greenberg's thesis does not hang together. Even accepting the notion that God would not or could not save Eastern European Jewry, a notion that need not be accepted, why would that translate into an imperative for God to "repent of the covenant"? And even if the covenant were cancelled would that negate commands originating from the earliest moments of the covenant? If a kindergarten teacher is convicted of a crime does that mean her students should no longer share? The lessons taught remain true regardless of subsequent failures of the teacher. Likewise, transcendent truths, *mitzvot*, remain inviolable notwithstanding a Divine screw-up.

Pawlikowski clearly favours the particular school of Jewish post-Auschwitz thought represented by writers such as Rubenstein, Greenberg, Fackenheim, and Cohen. Pawlikowski rejects Hartman, Wyschogrod, Berkovitz, and Borowitz, claiming that they underestimate "the extent to which the Holocaust experience demands some significant readjustments in the understanding and statement of the covenantal relationship." (1989b:140) It is this student's opinion that that preference weakens Pawlikowski's case. Those whom he rejects have already won the day; removing *mitzvah* from Judaism is as impossible as removing Resurrection from Christianity.

Again, my question is why Pawlikowski favours the peripheral Jewish thinkers? Again, my answer is the tension of ambiguity. Christology is central to Christianity as *mitzvah* is central to Judaism. If the Holocaust prompts a redefinition of Christology than a redefinition of *mitzvah* is required lest the impression be made that in some way Judaism is superior to Christianity. Again, Pawlikowski's error might be in assuming that the perpetrator and the victim must deal with the same questions.

Growing out of the first and second, the third challenge addresses the nature of humanity. Pawlikowski asks:

The real challenge of the Holocaust is whether we can say anything positive and constructive about the dignity of man after the exposure of the evil forces within humanity during this period of history. (1978:16)

Thus the Holocaust not only poses a God-problem; it also raises the question of whether it is any longer possible to construct a hopeful image of the human person. For it was humanity in one of its most developed forms that perpetrated the Holocaust. (1980:296)

Is there any basis for building an ethics upon a hopeful image of the human person after the Holocaust? (1980:303)

There are two points worthy of note in Pawlikowski's discussion of this challenge. First, like the previous issues, this question is also posed to religion in general. Again, the dilemma for victims and for perpetrators is equated. Why? Is this the tension of ambiguity that haunts Pawlikowski? Christology, ecclesiology, and Christian Scripture are all challenged by the Holocaust. Does Pawlikowski have to fantasize about similar failings in the Jewish tradition? And, considering the ever-growing body of testimony to Jewish resistance during the Holocaust, resistance both of the spirit and of the sword, why should a Jew have a problem constructing a hopeful image of Jews? We may have a problem constructing a hopeful image of Christianity, or a hopeful image of those who embrace Western liberal thought, but Jewish resistance is inspiring testimony to the ever-hopeful nature of Judaism.

Second, the reader may have noticed that this issue does not appear in his later writings? What changed?

The answer to the second point might be found in Pawlikowski's discussion of the Catholic philosopher Friedrich Heer (appearing in 1980:305, 1981:150 and 1988a:451-452). Heer reflects upon the "Augustinian principle" that

views the world under the aspect of sin and ultimately leads to a sense of fatalism and despair about the world . . . The only cure for this centuries-long pattern in Christianity, according to Heer, is to abandon the "Augustinian principle" and replace it with a return to the Hebrew Bible's roots of Christ's own piety and to even older roots . . . (1981:151)

This return to roots Pawlikowski identifies as one of the six areas

. . . in which the uniqueness of the Jewish covenantal experience can have a constructive impact on Christian faith is that of its basic outlook on the nature of the human person . . . [Judaism views the sinful drive] as secondary in power to the "good inclination" in human beings . . . there has been an exaggerated stress on the sinfulness of the human person in Christianity that can be modified through contact with the Jewish revelatory experience. (1989a:93-94)

Pawlikowski may have found his own answer to the question of the image of the individual in his discussion of the re-Judaization of Christianity. By substituting a Pharisaic attitude of humanity in place of the Augustinian attitude one can recreate a hopeful image of the human person. Pawlikowski never suggests this as an explanation, but the connection is possible.

The fourth implication addressed is that of ecumenical and interreligious dialogue. Pawlikowski says:

The new understanding of the God-human relationship impelled by the Holocaust must force recommitment to ecumenical and interreligious dialogue . . . The Holocaust experience revealed how totally intertwined Jews and Christians are with each other and with all humanity. (1978:20)

The Holocaust has elevated interreligious cooperation to the level of a moral imperative for both Christians and Jews. (1980:307)

Like the third, this fourth challenge is also absent in Pawlikowski's later writings. In its place we find reflections upon the topic of religious diversity. He says:

A fully honed and widely accepted theology of religious pluralism remains a challenge still inadequately met by any of the world religions, including Christianity and Judaism. Until each of these religious communities goes beyond merely providing religious warrants for toleration or for individual religious liberty and begins to generate a comprehensive statement about the positive values inherent in religious pluralism, we will not be able to close the books once and for all on the history of interreligious strife. (1989b:147)

The extent to which we as Christians can create positive theological space for the Jewish People against whom we originally forged Christian identity, to that same extent shall we moderate, even implicitly, all absolutist claims for the Christian faith relative to any other religious tradition. (1989a:46)



The evolution from Christian-Jewish interreligious cooperation to a theology of religious pluralism is natural. That the Holocaust is the stimulus for Pawlikowski's Christian "theology of cooperation amongst the world's religions" is evident. Once again, however, we must wonder about his call to Judaism. If the formative elements of Jewish history are significantly different than the formative elements of Christian history, and if the resulting faiths are in their truest sense, different, ideas which Pawlikowski readily subscribes to, than why must Judaism answer the same questions that challenge Christianity?

As previously mentioned, there are questions that are directed solely at Christianity. The question of Christology was one such question. Pawlikowski's fifth and sixth challenges are two more. The fifth implication addresses ecclesiology:

The Holocaust has eliminated any possibility of retaining an ecclesiology which depicts the church as a wholly complete and perfect institution, existing essentially apart from this world though in contact with it. The only model of the church that can claim any authenticity and credibility after Auschwitz is one that envisions it as a group of men and women immersed in the flow of history who have experienced through Christ the love and healing of the transcendent God and are struggling as a result of this experience to exercise their co-creatorship in concert with non-Christians towards the attainment of that peace and that justice which are central to the ultimate salvation of mankind. (1978:26)

In short, what is demanded by the Auschwitz experience is the creation of an ecclesiological vision in which the church is clearly seen as immersed in history despite its transcendental dimensions, recognizing as well that it is only within the flow of history that its still incomplete nature can be perfected. (1981:152)

Another result of the reflections on the Shoah experience is the enhanced appreciation for the significance of history. (1988a:450)

The vision of the church that must direct post-Holocaust Christian thinking is one that sees the survival of non-Catholics as integral to the authentic survival of the church itself. There is no way for Christianity to survive meaningfully if it allows the death of other peoples to become a by-product of its efforts at self-preservation. (1993:6)

The concept of a church immersed in history correlates well with Pawlikowski's appreciation of the Jewish concept of co-creatorship. He says this explicitly in his early writings:

Part of the process of sinking the church anew into the realm of the historical will involve the recovery of the Jewish sense of the human person as God's co-creator, as co-responsible for the salvation of the earth. (1978:32)

Later this theme of co-creatorship appears as one of the unique aspects of Judaism:

Second, the Church's Christological tradition lost sight of the sense of the human person as co-creator, as responsible for history and for the world God created. (1982:123)

Another critical dimension of the Jewish covenantal tradition that can have a positive impact on Christian faith is the sense of the human person as co-creator, as co-responsible for history and for the world God created. (1989a:92)

It is important to note that an ecclesiology of the Church immersed in history, and one which embraces a sense of co-creatorship, demands an understanding of history and of creation that justifies the Church's involvement therein. That understanding of history stands in contrast to other ecclesiological claims that grew out of a sense that history had arrived at completion with the Christ event. According to Pawlikowski, the Christ event did not fulfill the expectations of the Hebrew prophets; ultimate salvation still is a matter of the future and its attainment requires involvement in history and responsibility for creation. Pawlikowski continues:

Critical for the reappropriation of this Jewish co-creatorship notion within the churches is the recognition that the salvation of humankind is primarily a task yet to be accomplished, the Christ Event did not complete, but only advance, the process. The premature claims of Christianity for so long a time that the messianic kingdom had arrived fully in Jesus seriously eroded any feeling of responsibility for the destiny of the world. Now that the theological discussions among Christian scholars associated with the dialogue have resulted in the discarding of simplistic assertions about total fulfillment in Christ . . . . (1989a:93)

Associated with this call for a new ecclesiology is an understanding of the actions of Pope Pius XII. Pius XII has been soundly criticized for his inactivity during the Holocaust. The facts of the matter seem to be still somewhat unknown and evaluations of his personal moral qualities seem to divide themselves along party lines. Pawlikowski moves beyond both the facts and the personality to a consideration of the "theological

framework that conditioned his mentality and guided his decision making . . . " (1980:302) He says:

One aspect of Pius XII's papacy that needs further probing by ethicists is his ecclesiology, which largely defined the church in its essence as the institution through which the vital ingredients of human salvation - the Mass and the sacraments - became available to the human community. Since the continued existence of the Church was of the very highest priority, the goal had to be to keep the church alive, no matter what the costs in non-Catholic lives . . . when hardnosed decisions had to be made regarding the very survival of the institution, the destruction of non-Catholics could become an unfortunate by-product because non-Catholics had no central role in the definition of ecclesiology within Catholicism. (1980:302)

The sixth and final implication focuses upon a challenge posed by Rosemary Ruether's *Faith and Fratricide*. Ruether "sees the Holocaust as ultimately rooted in the anti-Semitism that emerged from the New Testament itself . . . ." (1978:27) After some discussion Pawlikowski concludes that:

. . . the Christian confrontation with the New Testament on the question of anti-Semitism must now move beyond mere background information and improved exegesis to a genuine soul-searching as to whether we can continue to proclaim parts of the gospel of John as authentic teaching for our time. (1978:29)

The Holocaust also forces the Christian community to examine more thoroughly the possible roots of anti-Semitism in the New Testament . . . it is being increasingly admitted by Christian scholars that the architects of Nazism found their targets well-primed for the formulation of their racist theories because of centuries of anti-semitism in the churches going back to New Testament times. (1983:414)

There are additional issues that Pawlikowski sees as emerging out of the Holocaust. These include questions as to the use of depersonalized public language, vitality and liturgy, society's symbols, church-state separation, and the use of power. However, his discussion of these issues is along the lines of public policy as opposed to theology and as such will not be addressed in this paper.

### **Applied post-Auschwitz Pawlikowskian Christianity:**

The above discussion of Pawlikowski's reflections upon the Holocaust's challenge to Christianity would be of little value if those reflections did not find expression in actual human conduct. Pawlikowski has lobbied for the application and inculcation of the post-Auschwitz values he espouses, and has, as well, contributed to the translation of the theoretical into practical.

His earliest venture in the realm of the practical was his 1984 *Worship After the Holocaust: An Ethician's Reflections*. In it he addresses the human freedom counterbalanced by a fresh sense of transcendent dilemma by urging liturgical reforms that would highlight that concern. He says:

Unless you begin to create liturgical experiences that will lead to a genuine experience of a compelling God together with a consciousness of such realities as sin, freedom, dependence, solidarity, vulnerability and oppression, we have little chance to influence human decision-making . . . In other words, moral sensitivity remains an indispensable prelude to moral reasoning . . . Mere appeals to reason, authority and/or natural law will prove ineffective by themselves. Such sensitivity will reemerge only through a new awareness of God's intimate link with humankind through symbolic experience. (321)

His second effort appears in *Economic Justice: CTU's Pastoral Commentary on the Bishop's Letter on the Economy*. The pastoral message is entitled "Economic Justice for All" and opens by declaring that

Our faith calls us to measure [the U.S. economy] not only by what it produces, but also by how it touches human life and whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the human person. (xi)

In considering the history of Catholic responses to economic issues Pawlikowski makes reference to the theme of co-creational responsibility:

. . . several themes which have become a prominent part of Pope John Paul II's approach to economic issues . . . and which are crucial to the theological foundations of the present U.S. pastoral. One of these is the Incarnation. Another is the profound relationship between labor and human dignity. A third, related to the second, is the notion of human co-creational responsibility for the world. Human labor, the bishops said, enables people "to share in the creative work of God" (#30). The 1986 pastoral says much the same: "Men and women are also to share in the creative activity of God . . . They can justly

consider that by their labor they are unfolding the Creator's work." (#32)  
(45-46)

His third effort appears in *The Holocaust: Its Implications for Contemporary Church-State Relations in Poland*. The topics addressed are all familiar. Pawlikowski restates his thesis:

Thus the basic moral question that emerges from a study of the Holocaust is how we today grapple with a new sense of freedom and power within humankind in a context of a highly sophisticated technological capability with the capacity for massive destruction. (1993:3)

He first applies the implications drawn from his discussion of ecclesiology

. . . the overriding lesson for religious bodies coming from the Holocaust is that they can ill afford to become so enmeshed with a particular socio-political experiment that they lose their potential for constructive dissent and disobedience . . . Final salvation may remain a central dimension of Christian belief. But, in light of the Holocaust, it can no longer be the controlling force in defining the church's relationship to society. Preservation of human life must have an equal, and at times more immediate role. (1993:4)

Second appear his condemnations of Western liberal thought.

In capsule form the failures of the Enlightenment perspective are to be found in its excessive individualism, its general consigning of religion to the 'private realm,' and its excessive rationalism which made it no match for the highly emotional public rallies organized by the Nazis. (1993:3)

The third and fourth again touch upon issues of ecclesiology:

The vision of the church that must direct post-Holocaust Christian thinking is one that sees the survival of non-Catholics as integral to the authentic survival of the church itself. There is no way for Christianity to survive meaningfully if it allows the death of other peoples to become a by-product of its efforts at self-preservation.

A fourth significant implication of the Holocaust for church-world understanding today is the danger of a fundamentally pessimistic outlook on the world . . . the principal problem lies in the church's traditional withdrawal from history which nurtures a deep-seated pessimism towards the world . . . The only cure for this centuries-long moral cancer in Christianity, according to

Heer, is for the church to liberate itself from the dominance of the "Augustinian principle" and return to the Jewish roots of Jesus' own piety, to the original vision of the Hebrew Scriptures in which the human person felt the call to be both Gods creature and a responsible moral partner with God in the world. (1993:6)

The fifth returns to the themes appearing in his address on liturgy.

In light of the Holocaust it has become apparent that no full response to the church-state question is possible without a major focus on value formation in the realm of popular culture. (1993:7)

Without entering into a review of the Polish church-state debate, we can summarize Pawlikowski's recommendations:

First of all . . . it would be to the advantage of the Polish Church to maintain its distinctiveness (and freedom) from the state. [Second] . . . it will also prove necessary to question the validity of [the liberal Enlightenment] church-state model . . . a rationalistic perspective on church-state questions is inadequate by itself . . . in our day the critical aspect of the church-state problematic may no longer be the legal one so much as the cultural one. (1993:11-12)

Pawlikowski's third recommendation is that "the wholesale rejection of the Western liberal tradition" is not justified in that the Western liberal tradition has been "far more open to the basic protection of minority rights, including religious rights." Finally, he warns against a Polish version of pessimism whose "real social dangers" the Polish fail to acknowledge.

Pawlikowski's final and, in my opinion, most telling, application of the lessons learned from the Holocaust appear in a volume he co-edited entitled *The Ecological Challenge: Ethical, Liturgical, and Spiritual Responses*. In his article entitled "Theological Dimensions of an Ecological Ethic" he lists three aspects of God that the Church will have to retrieve in order to respond to ecological concerns. Those three points are:

- 1) The notion that God is definitely to be found within the natural world,
- 2) the land tradition, that being the notion that God is pictured not only as a God of history but also as "fructifier of the land", and
- 3) the notion of the human community as sharing in the responsibility for the governance of creation. (1994:42-43)

In one wonderful paragraph he weaves together the notions of God's changing relationship with humanity, human freedom, the need for a fresh sense of transcendence, and the co-creator theme as well as referring to the impact of the Holocaust:

It should be emphasized, if it is not already clear, that the understanding of this commission must reach far beyond the parameters of the biblical vision. We have an altered sense of God's relationship to humanity, made evident through such epochal events as the Nazi Holocaust. We now recognize that we must go to great lengths to recover a sense of the healing and directive power of the divine presence, while at the same time spurning any temptation to imagine that God controls the fate of creation in an immediate and direct fashion. The latter responsibility has clearly been left to humankind, a responsibility whose full dimensions are only beginning to unfold in our time (1994:45-46)

Having completed his consideration of God, Pawlikowski moves on to Incarnational Christology. He makes four points relevant to the ecological debate:

- 1) The earlier revelation of divine presence in all of nature found in the Hebrew Scriptures was not invalidated by the subsequent revelation of divine-human union in Christ.
- 2) Incarnational Christology gives an added significance to the original Genesis proclamation of human co-creatorship.
- 3) Incarnational Christology gives the believing community the authority to reshape its social environment.
- 4) Incarnational Christology established reconciliation as the ultimate model for the divine-human-relationship and by extension, this reconciliation must embrace humanity's stance towards the world. (1994:46-47)

Pawlikowski offers his own summary:

. . . a sound ecological ethic will emerge only within a theological context where God is understood as sharing with humankind responsibility for the maintenance and development of creation, to a degree never before conceivable, and where high priority is assigned to the reconciliation of humanity with the rest of creation. Additionally, such an ecological ethic must be guided by three fundamental convictions: (1) all of creation is integral to the ongoing process of salvation, leading to the emergence of the final reign of God; (2) humankind must act in a manner that insures the preservation of creation for future generations, because the passage to the final divine reign is one of transition, not destruction; and (3) through the gift of co-creatorship

men and women share with God in the process of bringing the divine reign into realization. (1994:49-50)

There are few issues as contemporary as the environment. Pawlikowski's entry into this discussion is as important as it is insightful.



## **Reflections of one Jew upon the Writings of John Pawlikowski:**

Before reacting to Pawlikowski's post-Auschwitz theology a comment needs to be made as to his reliance on Uriel Tal and the associated sharing of guilt with Western liberal thought. As in the case of Haynes, discussed at the end of chapter two, a distinction has to be made between Nazism and the Holocaust. Tal, as well as the others who comment on Nazi ideology, may well be entirely accurate in their portrayal of Nazism as being equally anti-Christian as it was anti-Jewish. Such may have been the world view of the ideologues of the movement.

However, the principal thinkers, and those who can be described as having actually converted from the religion of their birth to Nazism, those who actually took down the crucifix and threw out the Bible, numbered perhaps in the hundreds. Though they may have masterminded the Holocaust, they could not, by themselves, have perpetrated the Holocaust. Rather, the Holocaust was perpetrated by hundreds of thousands who continued to embrace the religion of their birth, Christianity, while associating themselves with a movement they viewed as political and not in conflict with Christianity. Therein lies the dilemma for historical Christianity.

In *Christian Anti-semitism: A History of Hate*, William Nicholls makes this very point

The Final Solution required for its execution the obedient or even willing cooperation of hundreds of thousands of Germans and East Europeans. Perhaps only a small minority of these held in full strength the Nazi view of the Jews as a pestilence to be exterminated. But in their cultural environment, anti-semitism in a less extreme form had long been something taken for granted, and it weakened the resistance of Germans and others to the radical aims of the Nazis. (1993:347)

Pawlikowski, like Haynes, cannot escape the fact that hundreds of thousands of child-murderers, camp employees, and cooperative neighbors were comfortable going to Church on Sunday mornings. The rank and file of the Nazi movement were professing Christians. Notwithstanding the insightful comments of Tal and others, Nazism and the Holocaust are not entirely synonymous. Whereas Nazism was anti-Christian, in the minds of the rank and file the Holocaust was consistent with the lessons they had learned regarding Jews and Judaism from their Church.

In regards to theological concerns, my reaction to Pawlikowski has two elements. First there is the cathartic sense that as a consequence of the Shoah new visions of

Christianity have emerged. Second is the troubling realization that Pawlikowski insists on dragging Judaism into slime-pits that are strictly Christian domain.

Michael Wyschogrod suggests that Christian-Jewish dialogue would have advanced significantly even had the Holocaust not occurred. He says:

In the last forty or so years, several dozen Christian bodies have adopted statements about Jewish-Christian relations. It is widely conceded that this concentration of attention on the Jewish issue by Christian bodies is largely the result of the Holocaust. It is possible that even without the Holocaust, Christian interest in Judaism would have escalated in the closing decades of the twentieth century. The maturation of the historical method made it more and more difficult to overlook the deeply Jewish character of early Christianity. So, even without the Holocaust, it is not unlikely that Christian scholarship would have been forced to deal more seriously with the Jewish roots of Christianity. (Klenicki:104)

Although I agree, I also suspect that the content of the dialogue, particularly on the Christian side, would have been radically different. As we have seen, the Holocaust interjected a painful measure of guilt into the dialogue. Without the guilt, understandings of Jesus within his context would have evolved as more information about the first century emerged. However, there is no reason to assume that that information would have inspired the composing of successionist-free theologies. The attempt to purge Christianity of its successionist teachings, its teaching of contempt, is an outgrowth of the guilt associated with the Holocaust.

Pawlikowski's reflections on the Covenant or Covenants question, free will balanced by a sense of the transcendent, the nature of God, Incarnational Christology, ecclesiology, and Christian Scriptures are all a response to the challenge of the Holocaust to Christian theology. Had the Holocaust not occurred would Pawlikowski have asked the same questions?

My response to Pawlikowski begins with the critical question of single or dual covenants. As we've seen, Pawlikowski clearly subscribes to the dual-covenant concept. For Christianity to have any right to exist there must be something unique about it. It cannot be simply Judaism for the Gentiles.

My initial reaction would be a question. It appears difficult to identify within Christian Scripture a consistent attitude to the concept of covenant. For example, Hebrews 8:6-7 "But as it is, Christ has obtained a ministry which is much more excellent than the old as the covenant he mediates is better, since it is enacted on better promises. For if the first covenant had been faultless, there would have been no occasion for a second" cannot

easily be reconciled with Romans 9:4, "They are Israelites, and to them belong the sonship, the glory, the covenants, the giving of the law, the worship, and the promises " Furthermore, accepting Pawlikowski's point regarding the depths to which Christianity and Judaism differ, even if references to covenant were consistent the contemporary practice of the two faiths would indicate that each faith defines the word in a significantly different fashion. Therefore, why the preoccupation with the English term "covenant?" Use of the term, whether it be to speak of a single covenant or a double covenant, seems problematic. Better altogether might be to speak of a Divine-Jewish relationship based upon the Hebrew concept of *brit* as opposed to a Divine-Christian relationship based upon the Greek concept of *diatheke*. Though both words might be related, and are translatable as covenant, practically they have resulted in radically different faith practices That reality should be allowed to affect the Dialogue.

Assuming, though, that we must choose between single and double covenant theories, an Orthodox Jewish perspective would, in my opinion, have to subscribe to the single-covenant theory. From that perspective Pawlikowski's comment, simply Judaism for the Gentiles, is nothing less than offensive. There is nothing within Jewish thought suggesting that a Gentile cannot have as intimate a relationship with God as a Jew can. There is, however, a belief that Torah is complete and perfect: *Torat Hashem temimah*, the Torah of the Lord is perfect. (Psalms 19:8) There is nothing missing. To suggest that Torah lacks a flavouring of Christianity contradicts a basic tenet of Orthodox Jewish thought.

It is possible, and desirable, to expand exposure to that perfect emanation of the Creator God throughout differing segments of humanity. It might even be possible to suggest that the vehicles for propagating a notion of a concerned Creator God could be varied; the notion need not be carried only in a scroll containing words and wound around two wooden posts. Yet, the notion as contained in those words is complete as it would be complete in other vehicles. If there is, so to speak, the presence of God in the message of the words of the Torah, is it not also possible for there to be the presence of God in the message of the words of Jesus? In both cases the message is complete and identical, only the vehicle changes.

More correctly, along with the change in vehicle there is a change in emphasis. All the same content exists but the relevant passages change depending on the setting. Indeed, if one believes in a God who remains concerned about His creation, and who involves Himself with His creation, how can one not accept that a religious movement with a two thousand year history is anything less than God reaching out? Further, if God is reaching out to His children, is He going to play favorites by giving one more and the other less?

But even more to the point, is there tangibly really anything missing? Of the points that Pawlikowski mentioned the most illustrative of the question is his discussion of Incarnational Christology. Incarnational Christology serves to force the issue of the dignity of the individual to its absolute limit, paraphrasing Pawlikowski, even to the extent that Jesus is prepared to endanger the community for the sake of the individual, an assertion the Pharisees were not prepared to make. (1982:104)

It might be argued that the Pharisees were prepared to do the same, that they did embrace the concept of the value of the individual at the cost of the community, but that the political circumstances that existed afforded other means of defusing the conflict. In other words, the Pharisees recognized the opportunity to salvage both individual and community whereas Jesus was of the opinion that one or the other had to be sacrificed.

In fact Pharisaic literature discusses this concept. The Tosephta of Terumot (7:23) states:

A company of men is confronted by non-Jews. They say, "Give us one of your number whom we will kill. If you do not, we will kill all of you!" Even though all of them will be killed, let them not deliver a single Jewish soul into their hands. However, if they specified a single individual, as for example in the case of Sheva ben Bikhri (2 Sam. 20) then they may deliver him up and not themselves be killed. Rabbi Simeon ben Lakish said, "This is so only when that person is guilty of a capital offense, as was Sheva ben Bikhri." Rabbi Yohanan, however, said "He may be delivered up, even though his is not guilty of a capital offense." (Rosenbaum:28)

Maimonides, and later Jewish legal opinion following Maimonides' lead, determine that the authoritative opinion is that of Rabbi Simeon ben Lakish; "they may deliver up only such a specified person as was guilty of a capital offense and even then we do not *ab initio* recommend this action." (Yesodei ha-Torah 5:5) The dignity of the individual precludes the possibility of compromising that dignity on behalf of the community.

Responsa literature from the Holocaust draws upon this passage. On September 15, 1941, the Nazis delivered 5,000 "white cards" to the Judenrat of the Kovno ghetto. The cards were to be distributed amongst the 10,000 workers of the Kovno ghetto. Those with white cards would live, those without would die. Reflecting upon the actions of the Judenrat, Rabbi Oshry concluded that their decision to distribute the white cards was

wrong in that some were being allowed to live at the expense of others. The passage from Terumot is central to Rabbi Oshry's decision.<sup>23</sup> (Rosenbaum:24-31)

A second situation involved a group of Jews in hiding. With them was a baby which could not be quieted. Realizing that the Nazis had entered the bunker and that if the baby continued to cry they would all be discovered and killed one individual placed a pillow over the baby's mouth. The baby suffocated. Rabbi Elfrati was asked whether or not the man's actions were permissible. Rabbi Elfrati based his opinion on the continuation of the same Tosephta:

Rabbi Judah says, "When does this apply [that they may not deliver up a specified victim]? If the murderers are outside the city, and the victims inside. But if the murderers and the threatened group are both inside the city [and, therefore, there is no possibility that any of them will escape] since both the named individual and the entire group will certainly be killed, they may give him up." (Rosenbaum:32)

Since, if discovered there would be no possibility of any of them escaping, Rabbi Elfrati concludes that the man's actions were permissible. (Rosenbaum:31-34)

The two cases are sufficiently different as to generate two different responses. Of great significance is the fact that, in the first case, respect for the dignity of the individual was accomplished without a theology of divine/human interpenetration, that is incarnation. Of equally great significance is the fact that there is no oversimplification of the realities. Different situations warrant different responses. Pawlikowski recognizes this value. He says:

Maintaining the proper balance in the ongoing community/individual tension is a task [Jesus] left for us. Too often, however, the Christian churches have overemphasized the individual dimension at the expense of the communal (1982:104)

It appears that the Pharisees may have succeeded where the Church did not.

In place of the doctrine of incarnation is the doctrine of the Divine Creation. The individual is a creation of God. As such it deserves the ultimate respect, we are surrounded by Divine creations that, in that they are Divine Creations, deserve absolute

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<sup>23</sup>Rabbi Oshry's writings also include the following lament: Did our enemies, the Germans - many of them churchgoing sons of churchgoing mothers and fathers - ask their priests and ministers how to care for the Jewish dead? Were they concerned to learn whether one may use clothes stolen from a dead Jew, or a curtain ripped from the ark where the Torah scrolls are kept? Did they receive dispensation to bayonet pregnant mothers? (1983:xi)

respect. God need not be present in the human, He needs only to be the Creator of the human, in order for Judaism to accord the human the same ultimate dignity that Pawlikowski sees growing out of the concept of Incarnation. This is illustrated by one of the most beautiful of all the passages I have ever discovered:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: An entourage of angels always walks in front of people with messengers calling out. And what do they say? "Make way for the image of the Holy One. (Deut. Rabba, Re'eh 4)

The Sifra on Kedoshim (Lev. 19:18) records the following exchange:

"Love your neighbor as yourself." Rabbi Akiva says, 'This is the all-encompassing Torah principle.' Ben Azzai says, "This is the story of humanity: "When God created the first human being He created that person in the likeness of God" (Gen. 5:1) is an even greater principle.'

Does Torah need to be flavoured by the concept of Incarnational Christology in order to be complete? Pragmatically speaking, it seems not. Theologically speaking, I'd prefer not. Judaism has always wrestled with the question of whether the doctrine of incarnation is or is not idolatry. Notwithstanding a tendency to conclude that it is not, there still remain significant difficulties with the doctrine of incarnation.

Incarnational Christology also seems to serve Pawlikowski's need for a new sense of the proximity of the Transcendent. Though the Divine/Human nexus found in Jesus was unique, to a far lesser degree it exists in every individual. All that is required is for liturgy to create experience that brings the recognition of that reality to the focus of the worshipper.

First, I cannot help but sense some irony in this claim. The popular conception within the Jewish grass-roots, one whose accuracy I would never defend, seems to be that God, the Father, can only be approached through the intermediary of God, the Son. One has to pray to Jesus, not to God. Making matters even worse are the appeals to Mary whose feminine beneficence can be pitted against the stern masculine judgement of Jesus and God. If that is an accurate portrayal then I fail to see how incarnation has advanced the cause of Divine proximity.

Second, the proximity of the Transcendent is a deeply entrenched element of Jewish liturgy, and liturgy of the most user friendly nature. On a daily basis, at any of hundreds of different opportunities, the observant Jew recites a *bracha*, a brief formula often translated as a "blessing." One theme of that formula is the proximity of the Transcendent.

The blessing formula begins with the words "Blessed are You Lord, Our God, King of the Universe." The pronoun "you" is an informal pronoun, one that would be used in the context of friends speaking one to another, that is, a sense of immediacy, proximity, and friendship. In contradistinction, the expression King of the Universe suggests transcendence. The two are juxtaposed deliberately to reinforce the lesson that though God is transcendent, He is also immediate.

Thus, the blessing formula succeeds at instilling a sense of Divine proximity. Without incarnation Judaism can successfully instill within the heart of a Jew a sense of the loving proximity of the transcendent Divine. What then is the need for a flavouring of Christianity?

Finally, I would comment on the topic of free will and the nature of God's involvement with humanity. It seems to me that Pawlikowski has not overstated the question, but misstated it. The philosophical dilemmas related to providence have certainly been radically clarified. We can no longer entertain the possibility that "no man bruises his finger on earth unless it is decreed in heaven." (Talmud Hullin, 7b) God cannot be the author of the death of two million children. However, Akiva's dictum "All is foreseen, but freedom of choice is given" (Avot, 3:15) focuses responsibility back onto humanity and is as viable post-Auschwitz as it was pre-Auschwitz. Extreme teachings about Divine providence can no longer be considered but the omniscience versus free will dilemma hasn't changed.

That having been said, we are still left with the problem of omnipotence. A beneficent, omnipotent God should have intervened to prevent the death of two million children. Do we have to reconsider our concept of an omnipotent God? Perhaps we must now conclude, as does Pawlikowski, that human autonomy has grown beyond God's ability to control. The issues of human freedom, human power, and consequent human responsibility are now beyond the omnipotence of the Divine.

I hesitate to enter into the discussion to any depth. One thought on the topic, however, I will commit to writing. I begin with the recognition that, unlike natural disasters considering which the same questions of divine omnipotence are asked, regarding the Holocaust humanity was involved. Humans built the camps, humans built the ovens, humans drove the trains, humans performed the medical experiments, humans officiated at selections, humans tattooed arms, humans shaved the heads and pulled the teeth, humans turned other humans into non-humans. To the question "where was God?" one often hears the answer "where was humanity?"

The answer, however, often continues. God was there. Many a survivor is haunted by the question "why did God cause me to live? Why couldn't I have died along with all of

my relatives?" Many of the stories told by survivors seem to be testimony to the presence of God even in Auschwitz. Likewise, testimonies regarding the Righteous Amongst the Nations also indicates that humanity, though seemingly on its deathbed, was still present.

So the question can not simply be "where was God?" God was in Auschwitz and God was active in Auschwitz. The question instead is "why couldn't God do more than He did?" For some, the answer might be to speak of the curtailed omnipotence of God. God didn't do more because God couldn't do more. Human power had increased to such an extent that all God could do was salvage a few survivors.

Yet, the same facts of Auschwitz can generate a different question that leaves open a whole realm of possibilities about God. Instead of "why couldn't God do more" the question might be "Why did God choose to limit His activity to the preservation of a handful of survivors?" "Why didn't God choose to save two million children?" "Why didn't God choose to reveal Himself in Auschwitz with the same outstretched arm that he revealed in Egypt?" The difference in thrust is obvious; no longer are we discussing the question of Divine omnipotence. Instead we are now discussing what is, in my opinion, a far more interesting aspect of the Divinity, the question of the Divine nature, if you will, the psychology of God.

But before continuing, another question begs at least recognition. Topics associated with death seem to deal with the reality only from the point of view of the survivors. If death is viewed as a challenge to the survivors, a perspective that's often offered at a funeral, then the Holocaust's challenge is only to the survivors. But if death is viewed from the perspective of the dead, does the discussion change? If, for the dead, death has served only as the transition from the soul's existence confined in a body to the soul's existence without body, does that change our perspective on God or our expectations of God? I dare not go beyond indicating that the question is relevant.

It is possible, though again not for this paper, to explore the question as to whether the Pharisees perceived of a Divine psychology. Leaving that question open, I would still draw upon the metaphor of the King and his child, a parable often used in midrashic literature. The following is one arbitrarily chosen example of such a parable:

"Lonely sits the city" (Lam. 1:1)

R. Berechiah said in the name of R. Abudimi of Haifa:

A mashal. It is like a king who had a son. Whenever he obeyed the will of his father, the king clothed him in garments of fine wool; and whenever the king was angry at him, he clothed him in an olive-presser's garments.

Similarly, all the time Israel obeys the will of the Lord, He clothes them in garments of fine wool, as it is written, "I clothed you with embroidered



garments" (Ezek. 16:10) . . . But once they angered him He clothed them in an olive-presser's garments. (Eikh. Rabbah 1:1B)

Bearing in mind the fact that, unlike natural disasters, humanity plays the lead role in the Holocaust, our question "why did God choose to limit His activity?" might in fact be answered by considering the evolving relationship between God and humanity. Maimonides, in his Guide to the Perplexed, hints at exactly this kind of relationship when he suggests that the sacrifice of animals is an immature form of worship of the Divine.

. . . it is therefore according to the nature of man impossible for him suddenly to discontinue everything to which he has been accustomed . . . the custom which was in those days general among all men, and the general mode of worship in which the Israelites were brought up, consisted in sacrificing animals . . . It was in accordance with the wisdom and plan of God, as displayed in the whole Creation, that He did not command us to give up and to discontinue all these manners of service . . . (Friedlander: 1904:322-323)

By extension, the tragedy of the destruction of the Temple, an historical event that evokes the same types of questions as the Holocaust evokes, was positive in that it reflected a maturing of the changing Divine/Human relationship. Jews no longer needed animal sacrifice; we had, so to speak, outgrown that mode of worship. This concept of the maturation of the Divine/Human relationship is largely rejected by contemporary Orthodox Judaism. Nevertheless, the Maimonidian precedent exists.

In a sense, we can suggest that it is humanity's desire to preserve the Divine/Human relationship as that of a young child who, when he angers God, receives immediate punishment. Humanity enjoys the reassurance of knowing that its parameters are clearly defined. Thus, "*shivti bvait Hashem kol yimei chayi*, I will dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life" (Psalms 27:4) is actually a petition.

God the parent, particularly as portrayed in the king *mashal*, has the potential to do far more than he does. In effect, by restraining Himself he rejects the petition. Two thousand years later God again has the potential to do more than He does. But He again chooses to limit his activity lest he create a dependent child, a child who still lives at home even though he's thirty-five years old. Humanity, God's child, must learn to fend for itself. Humanity must be expelled from the womb.

In fact, if we pursue the metaphor, we do recognize an evolving limitation to God's omnipotence. As the child grows more independent the parent can control less and less of the child's life. That is desirable. There is still much that the parent can do, and indeed, at

times parents in fact choose to do less than they can. But that is all part of the maturation of the relationship between parent and child.

So too, with God and humanity. Why did God choose to limit His activity in Auschwitz? Is it because it was the only responsible choice He had? Had God interceded in human affairs to the extent of saving European Jewry would Christianity have served as the seedbed to a Holocaust in Farakhan's United States? We must learn the consequences of our own evolving freedom. We must learn the consequences of our own power. We must learn to exercise responsibility in regards to the creation and humanity. God's omnipotence remains intact as humanity moves on to the next level of its existence.

Of course, the metaphor does have its limits. In the mashal the child could become the king. Humanity, however, can never become God. We will always be the created, God the Creator. Nevertheless, the maturation of humanity ought to have implications for the Divine/Human relationship.

If Pawlikowski were representative of humanity, I would conclude that God's exercise in fostering independence was indeed successful.

### **A Concluding Thought:**

Different scholars suggest a variety of comparisons between Judaism and Christianity in so far as the Holocaust is concerned. I would concur with those who compare the Holocaust to the Roman destruction of the Second Temple. To first century Judaism, the destruction of the Temple was an orienting event. It signalled the dramatic end, not simply of the sacrificial system, but more important, it signalled the beginning of the end of much of the protracted division that had existed within the Jewish community.

A prominent characteristic of first century Judaism was that division. For our purposes, the exact nature of that division is less important than the later appreciation of that division. Despite the fact that its destruction furthered the Pharisaic revolution, the destruction of the Temple was not ignored by the emerging Pharisaic dominion. Nor, despite their opposition to Temple abuses, did the Pharisees rejoice at the Temple's destruction. Indeed, the opposite is closer to the truth, the Temple is mourned even to this day. Rather, destruction became an orienting event.

In their reflections the Rabbi's attribute the destruction of the Temple to *smat chinam*, baseless hatred. The Talmud (Yoma 9b) states:

Why was the Second Temple destroyed . . . ? Because therein prevailed hatred without cause. This teaches you that groundless hatred is considered as of even gravity with the three sins of idolatry, immorality, and bloodshed together.

The Talmud's story of Kamza and Bar Kamza is the most famous example of baseless hatred. The story tells of a master who instructs his servant to invite his friend, one Kamza to his party. Instead, the servant mistakenly invites the enemy Bar Kamza. Bar Kamza is asked to leave. To avoid the embarrassment of having been thrown out, he offers increasingly larger sums of money to be allowed to stay. The host is adamant and Bar Kamza is forced to leave. Bar Kamza is furious, particularly at those Rabbis at the party whom he felt should have voiced objection. Subsequently, he arranges a ruse that results in the Roman destruction of the Temple. (Gittin 55b-56a)

That the story is or is not historical fact is irrelevant. That the Temple's destruction may or may not be attributed to a host of contributing factors, the least or greatest of which might be internecine strife, is a matter of historical interest relegated to those whose bread and butter is the thrust and parry of academia. That other opinions in the Talmud attribute the destruction of the Temple to transgressions toward God is inconsequential. What is of ultimate importance is that every child in kindergarten, and repeatedly

throughout their education, every adult in at least one sermon and likely repeatedly, will hear it all simplified to the statement that the Second Temple was destroyed because of *sinat chinam*. That equation has become part of the psyche of the literate, grass-roots Jewish community.

In regards to Pharisaic thought and the destruction of the Second Temple the term "orienting event" is given very defined parameters. The destruction was an orienting event, but the significance of that statement is very immediate and profoundly simple. Where baseless hatred is allowed free reign sacred society cannot exist.

I note that Pawlikowski adopts Greenberg's expression "orienting event." I also note that his definition of orienting event embraces a broad spectrum of Christian theological and scriptural concerns. I applaud that. Yet, I am tempted to admit that I'd exchange it all for the simple declaration that "the Holocaust occurred because of *sinat chinam*." Put otherwise, I'd exchange it all for this declaration:

\* the answer to Alexander Donat's question, "how can Christianity survive the discovery that after a thousand years of its being Europe's official religion, Europe remains pagan at heart?" is:

\* Christianity can survive only by admitting the extent to which it has harboured and promoted hatred, and by recognizing that the reason Europe remained pagan at heart was that sacred society cannot exist where baseless hatred is allowed free reign.

Cargas says it the best:

Am I a fool to be an active member of a church that proclaims love as its motivating energy when historically . . . ?

I let the question hang. I'm not even sure how to ask it. (1992:2)

In concluding Cargas offers an actual list of sixteen recommendation growing out of the Holocaust that the Church ought to implement. They are deserving of full quotation:

1. The Catholic church should excommunicate Adolf Hitler.
2. The Christian liturgical calendar(s) should include an annual memorial service for Jewish victims of the Holocaust.
3. We Christians must publicly and officially admit the errors of our teachers where they were wrong concerning Jews.

4. The Christian churches must insist on the essential Jewishness of Christianity.
5. Jesus should be recognized as a link between Jews and Christians.
6. The churches' teaching on the subject of evil needs to be reevaluated.
7. Traditional Christian theologies of history must be reexamined.
8. The Vatican historical archives for the twentieth century need to be opened to historians.
9. Chairs of Judaic studies ought to be established at more Christian colleges and universities.
10. Christian schools should adopt Holocaust curricula as integral segments of their overall instructional plans.
11. Christian seminaries should teach future ministers the history and theological implications of anti-Judaism in general and of the Holocaust specifically.
12. We might look to see if a redefinition of the notion of inspiration in Christian Scripture is appropriate.
13. Christians must find new terminology for what we now designate as the Old Testament and the New Testament.
14. Catholics must demand an encyclical letter that deals specifically with the sins of anti-Judaism and with the sins of Christians in their actions toward Jews.
15. The heavy Christian emphasis on missionizing should be redirected toward perfecting individual lives.
16. We Christians need to get on our knees and repent our sins against the Jewish people. (1992:162-163)

Granted theologians would still need to theologize, and scriptural experts would still need to exegete, and historians would still debate, but the world would be better off if simply, the Holocaust would do for Christianity what the destruction of the Second Temple did for Judaism: place a compelling equation in the hands of the grass-roots. I'd exchange the entirety of Cargas' list for a protracted campaign to inoculate the Christian psyche with the words "along with six million martyred Jews Christianity nearly died, all because of *sinat chinam*." That's all.

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