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**Cognitive Assimilation-Contrast Effects
Among Partisan Identifiers:
An Analysis of the 1993 Canadian National Election**

by

Jordan Colby

Honours Bachelor of Arts, Carleton University, 1995

Thesis
Submitted to the Department of Political Science
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Master of Arts degree
Wilfrid Laurier University
1997

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Abstract

The electoral debut of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois allows for an examination of the character and role of party identification in political cognition in a manner not previously available to researchers. Campbell and colleagues (1960) *American Voter* presented a psychological basis for understanding individual-level voting behaviour, where party identification affects the vote choice directly and acts as a perceptual screen where the screening function distorts perceptions of political objects that are inconsistent with the citizen's existing political attitudes.

The findings of this study are largely consistent with the notion that, among those who acknowledge an association with a major political party, partisan identification appears to be an important structure around which political cognition is organized. Data from the 1993 Canadian election show that the stronger one's positive ratings of one's own leader, party and local candidate the stronger the negative ratings of rival objects. In addition, this tendency to contrast one's own objects relative to the opposition intensifies as partisan identity intensifies.

Acknowledgments

On this page I am given the opportunity to acknowledge the immeasurable contributions made by others to this work. While I cannot hope to adequately thank all of those who have contributed to the production of this thesis, there are several people who deserve particular mention. Thanks must go to Dr. David Docherty, Dr. Barry Kay and to Dr. Seven Brown whose skill as an advisor is only surpassed by his patience. Without their many insightful and useful suggestions this enterprise would have been vastly more difficult.

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Introduction

Introduction

Does party identification fulfill the same role in the voting decision for Reform and Bloc identifiers as it does for Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and NDP identifiers? In the context of this study, variations among these partisan groups present an opportunity to examine whether party identification is central to political judgment as is the classical assertion or, whether party identification is shaped by issue, candidate and retrospective performance evaluations, as is the revisionist assertion.

In the traditional model developed in Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes' (1960) *American Voter*, party identification acts as a perceptual screen through which political objects on the current landscape are endowed with meaning. An individual's identification is an affective, psychological force which serves to direct and maintain the consistency of one's evaluations of political objects.

Fiorina (1981), following the rational choice school of thought, proposed voters' thought processes to be rational, on-going evaluations of political objects subject to change when current circumstances warrant. He rejected the traditional model's psychological explanation in arguing that an exogenous screening function is not the dominant force operating within voters. Party identification is simply a cumulative tally of rational evaluations which cannot be separated from and tends to travel with the vote.

The Canadian literature tends to acknowledge both models in identifying the existence of stable and flexible partisans in the Canadian electorate.¹ Partisan screening is the strongest empirical implication and the strongest evidence supporting the psychological model. The 1993 Canadian National Election Study² data provide a unique opportunity in which to examine the character of party identification and its role in the voting decisions of the electorate.

The electoral debut of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois allows for an examination of the character and role of party identification in voting behaviour in a manner not previously available to researchers. From the perspective of the classical assertion, we should see less evidence of an active partisan screening among non-traditional party identifiers for they have not been subjected to long-term social reinforcement nor have they had an opportunity to form long-term psychological associations with one of these new parties. Hence, one expects to find greater partisan assimilation and contrast tendencies among identifiers of the traditional Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic Parties than among identifiers of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois. Moreover, one expects to demonstrate that this assimilation-contrast effect is more pronounced among strong traditional party identifiers than among strong non-traditional party identifiers.

¹For example see Harold D. Clarke, J. Jenson, L. LeDuc, and J. Pammett. Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections, 2nd ed. Toronto: Gage, 1991a ; and Lawrence LeDuc, H.D. Clarke, J. Jenson, and J.H. Pammett. "Partisan Instability in Canada: Evidence from a New Panel Study" in J. Wearing, Ed. The Ballot and Its Message: Voting in Canada. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991.

²Data from the 1993 Canadian Election Study were provided by the Institute for Social Research, York University. The survey was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada (SSHRC), grant numbers 411-92-0019 and 421-92-0026, and was completed for the 1992/93 Canadian Election Team of Richard Johnston (University of British Columbia), Andre Blais (University de Montreal), Henry Brady (University of California at Berkeley), Elisabeth Gidengil (McGill University), and Neil Nevitte (University of Calgary). Neither the Institute for Social Research, the SSHRC, nor the Canadian Election Team are responsible for the analysis and interpretations presented here.

Campbell and colleagues' (1960) *American Voter* presented a psychological basis for understanding individual-level voting behaviour, where it was argued that citizens maintain a durable, long-term psychological identification with one political party. Individuals are thought to derive such an association from a combination of family influence and social group membership. Parties are the major group objects in the political environment and, once imbued with meaning by the individual, serve as mechanisms for organizing political cognitions.³ "In a complicated and remote political world, this identification allowed individuals to make more sense of politics than would be possible without the partisan clue."⁴ It was this affective relationship in which the *American Voter* authors were most interested.

Party identification affects the vote directly and acts as a perceptual screen where the screening function distorts perceptions of political objects that are inconsistent with the citizen's existing political attitudes - their partisan identification. This process of perceptual distortion produces a consistency of attitude where less central political objects are revised around the central identification.⁵ Evidence of this distortion is manifest as a partisan assimilation-contrast effect where attitudes toward one's own party objects are assimilated into existing positive attitudes while rival objects are contrasted with these, producing negative attitudes toward rival party objects. In the *American Voter*, partisanship constitutes a continuum of direction and

³Franklin, Charles H. and J.E. Jackson. "The Dynamics of Party Identification." in American Political Science Review Vol. 77 (1983). p.957. also Whiteley, Paul F. "The Causal Relationships Between Issues, Candidate Evaluations, Party Identification, and Vote Choice - The View From 'Rolling Thunder'." Journal of Politics Vol.50 (1988).

⁴Franklin, Charles H. "Issue Preferences, Socialization, and the Evolution of Party Identification." American Journal of Political Science Vol.28 (1984). p.460.

⁵Franklin, 1984. p. 459; Richardson, Bradley M. "European Party Loyalties Revisited." in American Political Science Review Vol. 85 (1991). p.767.

strength - the stronger the social environmental reinforcement, the stronger the perceptual screening function.

Fiorina's (1981) *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* elevated the debate surrounding the role of party identification in the voter's decision making processes. Following the work of Downs (1957) and the revisionist, issues-based voting models of the early 1970s, Fiorina rejected the social-psychological explanation proposed by the *American Voter* team, choosing rather to expand a rational choice conceptualization of the role of partisan identification.

Identification functions as an on-going, short-hand device permitting voters to make sense of the political environment and adjust their attitudes toward the party objects which they encounter.⁶ Fiorina's model depicts voters as forming an identification with the party they rank highest and this association and the evaluative criteria upon which it is based are subject to periodic evaluation.⁷ "By this account, partisanship is not at all stable and responds to changing political events and voter perceptions of those events."⁸ "Thus, rather than serving as an antecedent to the perception and evaluation of issues and candidates, party identification has been viewed by the revisionists as a result of these forces."⁹

The Canadian literature acknowledges both the classical and revisionist models in identifying the existence of stable and flexible partisans in the electorate.

⁶Niemi, Richard G., and H. F. Weisberg. Eds. Controversies in Voting Behavior, Third ed. Washington: CQ Press, 1993.

⁷Miller, Arthur H. "Partisan Cognitions in Transition" in R. R. Lau and D.O. Sears. Eds. Political Cognition: The 19th Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cognition. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986. p.229.

⁸Whiteley. 1988. p. 962.

⁹Bassili, John N. "On the Psychological Reality of Party Identification: Evidence from the Accessibility of Voting Intentions and of Partisan Feelings" in Political Behavior Vol.17:4 (1995). p.342.

Clarke et al have identified two types of partisans in the Canadian electorate with, presumably, the 'durables' being *American Voter*-type partisans and the 'flexibles' being *Retrospective*-type partisans. Several studies have presented evidence which suggests party identification is not the screening structure antecedent to other political attitudes as proposed by Campbell et al. At the same time, these studies generally acknowledge the continuing presence of large numbers of partisan voters for whom partisanship presumably remains a meaningful way of organizing the political world.

Party identification has been a topic of discussion in Canada for many years as several authors have sought to apply the traditional model's understanding of voting behaviour to the Canadian electorate. While some questioning has focused on different absolute rates of long-term attachments to parties in the two countries, as has occurred in other settings where the traditional model has been applied, the concepts presented by the *American Voter* authors are transferable across national boundaries. "[T]he party identification reported by a respondent has the same general character in both the United States and Canada. Although the exact percentages may vary somewhat by country and by time, this *difference in incidence* does not mask the *identity of patterns* in the two nations."¹⁰

Findings of several studies have been mixed, with some researchers reporting the traditional model's expectations borne out while others - far more - report revisionist approaches to be more accurate representations of the electorate's thought processes. Sniderman, Forbes and Melzer (1974) argued that party identification

¹⁰Elkins, David J. "Party Identification: A Conceptual Analysis" in Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.11:2 (1978). p.427. Italics in original.

fulfills a stabilizing role in voters' decision processes.¹¹ Elkins (1978) states: "Despite disagreements with one's own party and the attractiveness of other parties or candidates, persons strongly identified with a party nevertheless remain loyal to it nearly all the time. Such a pattern of the coherence of the vote with strong identification can persist in spite of massive defections since the highest rate of defections occurs among voters with weak identification."¹² More recently, Bassili (1995) reports the findings of a survey conducted during the 1993 Canadian federal election campaign:

What the present results demonstrate is that identification with a party is not a secondary product of candidate and issue evaluations. Instead, party identification is psychologically primary and "real" in that it acts as an anchor against which discordant evaluations strain.¹³

Yes, partisan feeling can change with time, as has been argued by the revisionists, but these changes require the resolution of potentially intense conflicts. The very fact of these conflicts makes the case for the classical position.¹⁴

Such findings, supportive of the traditional conceptualization of party identification, are challenged by a significant body of Canadian literature which suggests that the revisionist model of party identification is a more accurate representation of the electorate in emphasizing the highly mutable, endogenous nature of party identification in the majority of voters.

In Canada, "...the process of partisan change is an ongoing one, with individual-level variations in party identification frequently being associated with

¹¹Sniderman, Paul M., H.D. Forbes and I. Melzer. "Party Loyalty and Electoral Volatility: A Study of the Canadian Party System" in Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol.7 (1974).

¹²Elkins. 1978. p. 429.

¹³Bassili. 1995. p. 354.

¹⁴Bassili. 1995. p. 355.

reactions to such mundane occurrences as the varying salience of issues, changing party leader images, and the conduct of election campaigns."¹⁵ Happy (1989) reports a linkage between economic performance and incumbency voting consistent with Fiorina's retrospective model.¹⁶

Short-term forces, manipulated by competing political parties, affect voting to a greater degree than do long-term ideologically driven forces based in class or group identity.¹⁷ Images of issues, leaders, and campaigns are susceptible to variations in political context in response to new concerns or changes in platforms or leadership characters.¹⁸ The linkages among party and issue preferences and partisan change illustrate the importance of issues and leaders.¹⁹ For the majority of Canadians, "[p]roximate reactions to both issues and party policies as well as feelings about currently salient political figures, events and conditions seem to play important roles in prompting movement in party identification."²⁰

Many of these revisionist studies have concluded, explicitly or implicitly, that the concept of party identification and its role in the voting decisions of citizens as formulated by the *American Voter* team is not an accurate representation in the Canadian setting. Jenson (1978) questions the traditional theoretical construct in

¹⁵LeDuc, Lawrence, H.D. Clarke, J. Jenson, and J.H. Pammet. "Partisan Instability in Canada:Evidence from a New Panel Study" in Wearing, Joseph. Ed. The Ballot and its Message:Voting in Canada. Toronto:Copp Clark Pitman, 1991.

¹⁶Happy, J.R. "Economic Performance and Retrospective Voting in Canadian Federal Elections" in Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.22:2 (1989). p.386.

¹⁷Stevenson, H. Michael. "Ideology and Unstable Party Identification in Canada:Limited Rationality in a brokerage Party System" in Wearing, Joseph. Ed. The Ballot and its Message:Voting in Canada. Toronto:Copp Clark Pitman, 1991. p. 54.

¹⁸LeDuc et al. 1991.; LeDuc, Lawrence. "The Flexible Canadian Electorate" in Penniman, Howard. Ed. Canada at the Polls, 1984:A Study of the Federal General Elections. Durham, N.C.:Duke University Press, 1988.

¹⁹Clarke, Harold D., and M.C. Stewart. "Short-Term Forces and Partisan Change in Canada:1974-1980" in Wearing, Joseph. Ed. The Ballot and its Message:Voting in Canada. Toronto:Copp Clark Pitman, 1991b. p. 43.

²⁰Clarke and Stewart. 1991. p.37.

terms of the long-term stability of partisan attitude resolving: "One way to understand the observations is to conceive of party identification as primarily a cognitive link rather than an affective one."²¹ Reports of widespread partisan instability over-time and the apparent salience of issues and leader images have presented some compelling evidence to support this claim. Reviewing public attitudes toward political parties between 1965 and 1991, Clarke and Kornberg (1993) found "...an over-time erosion in the strength of federal party identification."²² This paper is concerned with one aspect of that thesis - the character of party identification in the 1993 election.

Among many revisionist studies however, there is an acknowledgment that partisanship appears to be a highly influential force in the decision-making processes of large numbers of Canadians. It is important to recognize that there exists a substantial minority of voters who are durable partisans who apparently maintain durable party allegiances resistant to deterioration.²³ "Clearly, Canadians do have links to political parties which survive across several elections and which do not immediately change with infidelity of voting choices."²⁴ Kay et al. (1991), report these "...so-called 'hard-core' partisans constitute a large, albeit a minority, proportion of the electorate."²⁵

²¹Jenson, Jane. "Comment: The Filling of Wine Bottles Is Not Easy" in Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.11:2 (1978). p.443.

²²Clarke, Harold D. and A. Kornberg. "Evaluations and Evolution: Public Attitudes Toward Canada's Federal Political Parties, 1965-91." in Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol.26:2 (1993). p.302.

²³LeDuc et al. 1991.

²⁴Jenson. 1978. p.446.

²⁵Kay, Barry J., S.D. Brown, J.E. Curtis, R.D. Lambert and J.M. Wilson. "The Character of Electoral Change: A Preliminary Report from the 1984 National Election Study" in J. Wearing The Ballot and Its Message. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman. 1991. p.309.

In the chapter that follows, the theoretical basis of party identification from the perspectives of both the social-psychological and rational-revisionist models are reviewed. In Chapter Three the data source, hypotheses, and variables upon which this investigation is undertaken are discussed and examined. Findings from this research are reported and discussed in Chapter Four. This thesis concludes with Chapter Five which draws the research together by providing a summary of findings and offers some conclusions.

Theoretical Review

Theoretical Review

Debate over the role of party identification in the voting decision continues some four decades after the introduction of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes' *American Voter*. The exogenous character of party identification put forth in the traditional approach remains contentious in that while shortcomings have been detected over the years, the model remains an elegant representation of large numbers of voters. The linkage between psychological attachment to party, perceptual adjustment, and consistency of attitude remains a powerful and compelling thesis for examining voting behaviour. Conceptualizing voters as developing and maintaining a system of thinking about politics in a psychologically convenient and consistent manner has both intuitive and empirical appeal. Revisionist theses based in a rational choice framework have shown a similar durability. Fiorina's (1981) *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* presents party identification as an endogenous, cumulative tally of rational evaluations. This represents a compelling alternative to the traditional approach.

The American Voter Model

The *American Voter* team developed a model of the psychological processes underlying voting behaviour which they present as the result of attitudinal forces acting within the individual voter. From a very young age citizens learn and subsequently maintain a durable, long-term psychological attachment to one political party which structures thinking about political objects, events and information. Campbell and his colleagues proposed that partisan identification affects the vote

choice directly and acts as a perceptual screen which provides a framework in which voters' perceptions of political objects are evaluated.¹

The partisan screening function that occurs in individual voters distorts perceptions of political objects that are inconsistent with the citizen's existing partisan identification. This process of perceptual distortion produces a consistency of attitude in which perceptions of less central political objects are revised. "Most Americans have this sense of attachment with one party or the other. And for the individual who does, the strength and direction of party identification are facts of central importance in accounting for attitude and behavior."² Converse would later refine the exogenous role of partisanship - the effect of party identification is the central structure around which the political belief systems of the mass public are organized.³

Within the *American Voter*, partisanship was viewed as an exogenous factor where identification remained a stable, highly influential filter; however, under rare circumstances, contrary attitudes may penetrate this perceptual screen to strain the individual's identification. If contrary attitudes penetrate the filter, the motivating influence may supersede the central function of party identification in directing the vote choice.

Through the *American Voter* model, the authors sought "...to reshape the materials on perceptions of politics to measure the psychological forces acting on the

¹Lau, Richard R., and D.O. Sears. Eds. Political Cognition: The 19th Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cognition. Hillsdale, N.J.:Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986.

²Campbell, Angus. P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller, and D.E. Stokes. The American Voter. New York:Wiley, 1960. p. 121.

³Converse, Phillip E. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in D. Apter. Ed. Ideology and Discontent. New York:Free Press, 1964.

individual."⁴ In doing so, Campbell and colleagues measured six dimensions of partisan feeling. The personal attributes of each of the two presidential candidates, social group affects, domestic and foreign policy issues, and the comparative performance of each of the political parties as assessed by the respondent. The measures indicated both the direction and strength of partisan attitude toward each of the dimensions of partisan feeling.⁵

The *American Voter* authors define party identification as an enduring disposition thus enabling them to characterize the importance of more short-lived electoral factors including topical issues, governmental performance, and the attributes of candidates in specific elections.⁶ "Party identification, in other words, was conceptualized as an inertia component that determined voting choices *unless* the short-term forces of issue orientations and especially candidate evaluations were acting sufficiently strongly in the opposite direction to deflect the vote temporarily."⁷

It is important to note that the individual voter's political attitudes are not envisioned by the authors to be free-floating, unconnected creations, but, rather, fundamentally tied to the perceived stimuli. The qualities attributed to perceived political objects are posited by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes to evoke strong evaluative feelings within the individual elector. The perceptions and evaluations that form an individual's image of political objects are not neutral, and as such, the positive and negative feelings toward political stimuli take on great motivational importance.⁸ These feelings derive from the individual's need for

⁴ibid. p.67.

⁵ibid. p.67.

⁶Keith, Bruce, D.B. Magleby, C.J. Nelson, E. Orr, M.C. Westlye, and R.E. Wolfinger. The Myth of the Independent Voter. Berkley, Calif.:University of California Press. 1992.

⁷Gidengil, Elisabeth. "Canada Votes:A Quarter Century of Canadian National Election Studies" in Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol.25:2 (June, 1992). P.231.

⁸Converse. 1964. p.40.

cognitive consistency, the consequence of which is that encountered political information is brought into harmony with pre-existing views. "[F]or most people the tie between party identification and voting behavior involves subtle processes of perceptual adjustment by which the individual assembles an image of current politics consistent with his partisan allegiance."⁹

The classical approach to partisan identification and the screening process borrows upon the large and diverse theoretical background of consistency theory. Heider's (1946; 1958) balance theory, Osgood and Tannenbaum's (1955) congruity theory, and Festinger's (1957) dissonance theory all share the view that attitudinal inconsistencies are unpleasant thus motivating the individual to resolve these cognitive conflicts.¹⁰ One is considered to be consistent when one's various attitude elements are clustered at some point on the political spectrum.¹¹ The psychological tension resulting from a state of cognitive inconsistency is relieved only through changes among the perceived relations of objects toward a more balanced cognitive state. The driving motivation for attitude change is psychological conflict.¹²

The central proposition of the family of cognitive consistency theories is what Smith (1989) calls the 'association condition' where an individual must perceive or formulate some association or linkage among various attitude elements. In other words, Converse's (1964) characterization of a belief system as a "...configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."¹³

⁹Stokes, Donald E. "Party Loyalty and the Likelihood of Deviating Elections" in A. Campbell et al. Elections and the Political Order. New York:Wiley, 1966. p.127.

¹⁰Judd and Krosnick. 1989. p.101.

¹¹Smith, Eric R.A.N. The Unchanging American Voter. Berkley, Calif.:University of California Press, 1989.

¹²Smith. 1989.

¹³Converse. 1964. P.207.

Elements for which there is no perceived association produce no sense of tension and thus no motivation to alter one's attitude(s). "When an individual does bring conflicting ideas into association with one another, perhaps simply by thinking about them together, tension will be produced, and attitude change may result."¹⁴ The social psychological model proposes that partisanship exists, to varying degrees, as the dynamic association condition among citizens who encounter and interpret political objects.

Converse described belief systems as consisting of three elements: (1) the expanse of an individual's opinions; (2) the degree of attitude consistency among those opinions; and (3) the extent to which the individual utilizes abstract concepts to organize political cognitions.¹⁵ This paper is concerned with the attitudinal consistency component of belief systems.

Converse refined his notion of attitudinal constraint to include three basic elements: "... (1) logical (in the sense of formal, symbolic logic), (2) 'psychological' (in the sense of the rationality of a coherent, persuasive argument), and (3) social (in the sense of social pressures to accept certain ways of thinking about things regardless of their logical or psychological relationships)."¹⁶ Converse argued that social constraints are more common in that people most often confront the task of bringing sets of both opinions and judgments of people into balance.¹⁷

Granberg (1993) argues that Heider's balance theory gave no specific indication as to which elements of the unbalanced set would remain intact and which

¹⁴Smith. 1989. P.149.

¹⁵Smith. 1989. P.4.

¹⁶Smith. 1989. p.107.

¹⁷Smith. 1989. p.151.

would change. Campbell et al (1960) adopted the position that perceptual elements or linkages between political objects would be the most likely elements altered through a psychological process of distortion. Lau and Sears (1986) suggest the easiest path to changing belief elements is most often taken; Shaffer (1981), Rosenberg and Abelson (1960), and Burnstein (1967) find people seek to revise the fewest number of relations and linkages; and Shaffer (1981), Sherrod (1972), Kirkpatrick (1970) concur with the classical position that it is the perceptual relation that is likely to be altered.

Within this conception of the dynamic processes of perceptual adjustment and distortion there is an immensely "...important distinction between the assumption that people are motivated to be accurate (i.e. 'to get it right') and the alternative assumption that people are motivated to maintain cognitive balance."¹⁸ This distinction is at the very centre of debate among the competing assumptions of human cognition put forth by the classical and revisionist theories.

While Campbell et al. (1960) sharpened the application of consistency theory to political behaviour, they did not intend to demonstrate a general tendency within individual voters toward the consistency of policy attitudes. "Rather, they claimed, some people derive their attitudes toward policies from ideologies, and others from each attitude on the basis of considerations specifically relevant to it."¹⁹ It was in this framework that the classical concept of a dynamic system of attitudes responsive to and dependent upon partisan identification was developed. The *American Voter* authors report: "Apparently, party has a profound influence across the full range of political objects to which the individual voter responds. The strength of relationship

¹⁸Granberg, Donald. "Political Perception" in S. Iyengar and W. McGuire, Eds. Explorations in Political Psychology. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993. p.75.

¹⁹Judd and Krosnick. 1989. p.102.

between party identification and the dimensions of partisan attitude suggest that responses to each element of national politics are deeply affected by the individual's enduring party attachments."²⁰ Such attachments involve a psycho-social feeling of closeness similar to the feelings of identification that people associate with their ethnic or religious group.²¹

"The attitude consistency theory underlying the *American Voter* model suggested that party identification acted as a prior perceptual screen and that the human need for consistency would result in attitudes toward less central political objects, such as candidates, being brought into affective harmony with party identification."²² As new information is encountered and dealt with by the voter in a manner consistent with his or her partisan disposition, the evaluations and stored information further strengthen the perceptual influence of partisanship on the individual voter's cognitive processes. The subordination of candidates and issues to the consistency demands of the voter's own self-image leads, over time, to a strengthened and durable partisan identification which assists individuals in encountering, perceiving and interpreting the barrage of political information to which they are subjected.²³

McGrath and McGrath (1962) conceptualize a 'perceiver-determined' process in which existing preferences exert a great degree of influence on the individual's perceptions of political candidates. In such a perceiver-determined environment, the actions and remarks of the candidates satisfy and reinforce the existing preferences of

²⁰Campbell et al., 1960. p.128.

²¹Gidengil, 1992. P.231.

²²Miller, Arthur H. "Critique:Where's the Schema?" American Political Science Review. (1991) 85:1369-77. p.1371.

²³Harrop and Miller, 1987. p.131.

the individual voter.²⁴ This principle of perceptual balance is expected to be particularly strong within partisan individuals when judging political objects with partisan relevance;²⁵ "...even if it is unrelated to objective reality."²⁶ Such expectations are consistent with the findings of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes who found that strength of party bond exaggerated the process of perceptual distortion within the individual.²⁷ This fits well with Heider's (1946,1958) formulation that the psychological pressure on an individual to attain cognitive balance is greatest when an individual and a political object share a 'unit relationship' - in this case, a shared partisan context.²⁸

"We should not fail to recognize that people can live with a certain amount of dissonance or cognitive imbalance (Aronson, Turner and Carlsmith, 1963). This is especially true if the issue under consideration is not highly salient or does not highly involve the individual's ego."²⁹ However, to the strongly partisan the political environment is likely to be highly salient and involve the ego.

Stokes (1966) explains the voter's motivation for maintaining a partisan disposition:

In view of the fact that very few Americans have any deep interest in politics, it is a mild paradox that party loyalties should be so widespread. A partial key to this puzzle is that these identifications perform for the citizen an exceedingly useful evaluative function. To the average person the affairs of govern-

²⁴McGrath, Joseph E., and M.F. McGrath. "Effects of Partisanship on Perceptions of Political Figures" in Public Opinion Quarterly. 26 (1962). 236-248.

²⁵McGrath and McGrath. p.237.

²⁶Sigel, Roberta S. "Effect of Partisanship on the Perception of Political Candidates" in Public Opinion Quarterly. 28 (1964). 484.

²⁷Campbell et al., 1960.

²⁸Granberg. 1993.

²⁹Granberg. 1993. p.89.

ment are remote and complex, and yet the average citizen is asked periodically to formulate opinions about those affairs. At the very least, he has to decide how he will vote, what choice he will make between candidates offering different programs and very different versions of contemporary political events. In this dilemma, having a party symbol stamped on certain candidates, certain issue positions, certain interpretations of political reality is of great psychological convenience.³⁰

Campbell and his colleagues acknowledge: "The psychological function of party identification undoubtedly varies among individuals. Our interest here centers primarily on the role of party as a supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics."³¹

One of the intriguing implications that arises from the *American Voter* is the association between age and strength of identification. Campbell and his colleagues found such an implication to further support their understanding of the social-psychological basis for political thinking. The age-partisanship association "fits very well a more general thesis that group identification is a function of the proportion of a person's life he has been associated with the group."³² As such, age is thought to act as a surrogate for the compounding intensity of the partisan effect as one travels through a lifetime of social and psychological reinforcement.³³ "The repeated use of party labels to interpret and understand the political world through the years reinforces and strengthens one's partisan ties."³⁴ Young people are thought to possess weaker partisan anchors and thus demonstrate less constraint in their reactions to topical political forces.³⁵

³⁰Stokes in Campbell et al., 1966. p.126-7.

³¹Campbell et al. 1960. p.128.

³²Campbell et al. 1960. P.163.

³³Keith et al. 1992. P.114.

³⁴Markus, Gregory B. "Dynamic Modelling of Cohort Change: The Case of Political Partisanship" in American Journal of Political Science. Vol.27 (1983). P.721.

³⁵Keith et al. 1992. P.113.

For *The American Voter* authors, political parties provide an important feature linking variance in cognitive attributes and the electoral decision. Campbell and Valen (1966) explain: "To a voter who has not learned to interpret political events in terms of an ideology of social class, the party is likely to be the most important source of political direction available."³⁶ Parties serve to direct the electorate's thinking about politics in that an antecedent partisan identification acts as the perceptual screen where information is evaluated according to pre-existing attitudes, possibly distorted, and added to the individual's existing store of political attitudes. This psychological function is manifested through judgmental consistency - consistency favourable to maintaining the person's partisan orientation. Importantly, Campbell et al. envisioned this function to be at work across large segments of the electorate.

As influential as its direct effect on the vote and its indirect psychological function, party identification does not wholly govern a changing political world. "Some elements of political reality not agreeing with these loyalties will get through the perceptual screen raised in the partisan voter. A war, sharp recession, a rash of scandal will leave their mark on all shades of partisans, though the mark will not be deep enough to change the votes of more than some."³⁷ Indeed, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes recognize that as party allegiance alters inconsistent attitudes, one must presume there to be at least some reciprocal effect. "If this pressure is intense enough, a stable partisan identification may actually be changed."³⁸

³⁶Campbell, Angus and H. Valen "Party Identification in Norway and the United States" in Campbell et al. Elections and the Political Order. New York: Wiley, 1966. p.268.

³⁷Stokes in Campbell et al., 1966. p.127.

³⁸Campbell et al., 1960. p.134-5.

"In the predominant view presented in the *American Voter*...attitudes toward the candidates were seen primarily as projections of partisan bias, although individual candidates could interject dynamism into presidential contests that prompted short-term deviations from normal partisan voting patters."³⁹ In the two elections that Campbell and his colleagues examined, Eisenhower's personal popularity among voters contributed greatly toward his electoral victories. DeSart (1995) reports:"Candidates have become the focus of election campaigns, but this has not necessarily come at the expense of party irrelevance for the electorate. This study shows that, increasingly between 1972 and 1988, a key piece of information for the electorate in shaping attitudes about a candidate is his or her party label."⁴⁰

The *American Voter* authors' focus on the psychological function of partisan identification in the voting decisions of individual citizens provides a compelling frame in which to view voting behaviour. That citizens maintain a durable, long-term psychological attachment to a particular party which structures thinking about politics remains a contentious thesis. Indeed, others have challenged the traditional conceptualization of identification and its role in the vote decision. Revisionist models have followed, Fiorina's in particular, which present quite a different understanding of partisan identification.

A Revisionist Model

In response to *The American Voter* and its partisan-centred progeny, rational choice re-emerged from its 1960s hiatus. Rational choice approaches, in their

³⁹Rahn, Wendy et al. "A Social Cognitive Model of Candidate Appraisal" in R. Niemi and H.F. Weisberg. Eds. Controversies in Voting Behavior, Third ed Washington:CQ Press. 1993. p.187.

⁴⁰DeSart, Jay A. "Information Processing and Partisan Neutrality:A Reexamination of the Party Decline Thesis" in Journal of Politics Vol.57 (1995). p.792.

broadest forms, may be traced through the work of Anthony Downs. Like *The American Voter*, which appeared three years later, Downs' (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy* stimulated widespread and lasting debate.

Downs popularized the notion of proximate causes of the vote where individual voters were seen to purposefully "...choose the candidate who minimizes the issue distance from the respondent."⁴¹ Downs and others who have adopted the rational choice approach "...view voters' reactions to campaign stimuli as products of a deliberative process governed by calculations of self-interest."⁴² "The emphasis on the thoughtful, calculating nature of the vote decision is quite consistent with psychological theories of people as rational problem solvers."⁴³ "According to this view, people consider information in a rational, scientific manner and attribute causality to that entity with which an outcome covaries."⁴⁴ Deliberate calculations minimizing issue distances reflect the voter's rational goal of having public policy reflect their judgments and opinions.⁴⁵

Downs (1957) theorized party preference to be a function of the proximate distance between an individual voter's issue positions and those of the political parties. Franklin and Jackson (1983) summarize:

In this structure, party identification was a summary of policy preferences which was totally responsive to changes in those preferences and played no role in organizing other political perceptions or behaviors, quite unlike

⁴¹Shanks, J. Merrill and W.E. Miller. "Policy Direction and Performance Evaluation: Complementary Explanations of the Reagan Elections." British Journal of Political Science. (1990) 20:143-235. p.232.

⁴²Brown, S.D., R.D. Lambert, B.J. Kay, and J.E. Curtis. "In the Eye of the Beholder: Leadership Images in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol. 21 (1988). p. 730.

⁴³Lau and Sears. 1986. p. 5.

⁴⁴Ibid. p. 5.

⁴⁵Jackson, John E. "Issues, Party Choices, and Presidential Votes." American Journal of Political Science (1975) 29(2):161-185.

the *American Voter* model.⁴⁶

The cost of information might lead voters to adopt methods of evaluating party positions which could lag behind actual party policies, and this could produce apparent loyalty to a party. However, once provided with more current information, voters would immediately reevaluate their party preferences. Thus there was no party loyalty per se in the Downsian Framework. Stability of party preferences would result only from stable policy preferences and party platforms.⁴⁷

Rational choice subscribers argue that most voters cannot or will not voluntarily maintain the type of partisan identification proposed in *The American Voter*. Proponents of the party identification model viewed attitudes toward issues as meaningful pieces of the voting puzzle but in a manner different from that proposed by Downs. It was not until the early 1970s with the work of Boyd (1969, 1972), Repass (1971), Brody and Page (1972), Kessel (1972) and Miller et al. (1973) that issue-based voting models returned to challenge the supremacy of *The American Voter* conclusions.

Over the years, issues have been shown to be among the central determinants of the vote. Boyd (1972) argues: "If an issue is salient enough that people become familiar with the parties' stands, then the issue position probably influences their voting choices rather than vice versa."⁴⁸ Instead of the idiosyncratic factors that may affect short-term partisan deviation, as *The American Voter* suggested, many scholars sought to portray issues in a different light. "The central argument [of the early 1970s research] was that issues, instead of being short-term disruptions of otherwise stable partisan choices, could be seen as systematic determinants of voters'

⁴⁶Franklin and Jackson. 1983. p.958.

⁴⁷Ibid. p.958.

⁴⁸Boyd, Richard W. "Rejoinder to 'Comments' by Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page and John H. Kessel." American Political Science Review Vol.66 (1972). p.469.

decisions."⁴⁹ By the late 1970s, policy issues remained an important component of the vote within much of the literature.⁵⁰

Shanks and Miller (1990, 1991) provide a broad but useful characterization of the logic supporting the role of issues.

Evaluations of national conditions, presidential performance and candidate traits seem to be crucial in determining the vote, but they are themselves partially determined (or structured) by the voter's general preferences on goals, directions or priorities for government policy.⁵¹

In our view, beyond the conflict between rival groups of politicians for office, democratic elections are primarily about conflicting preferences concerning government policy and assessments of current conditions that can be affected by the government.⁵²

The primary criteria for assessing current conditions and governmental performance is often the economy. Downs (1957), Key (1966) and Fiorina (1981) all viewed economic conditions to be important evaluative criteria for the voter. Fiorina's work contributed greatly to the notions of a retrospective evaluation of past economic performance with responsibility (deserved or not) accorded to the governing leaders and party. In simplest terms, incumbents are judged in terms of the voter's assessment of economic prosperity and rewarded or punished at the polling station accordingly. Kinder et al. (1989), find "...the voter's performance calculus is dominated by economic concerns centered upon the nation, reflects in a modest and

⁴⁹Rahn et al., 1993. p. 187.

⁵⁰see for example: Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Markus and Converse, 1979; Page and Jones, 1979.

⁵¹Shanks and Miller, 1990. p. 232.

⁵²Shanks, J. Merrill, and W. E. Miller. "Partisanship, Policy and Performance: The Reagan Legacy in the 1988 Election." British Journal of Political Science (1991) 21:129-197. p.194.

indirect way economic concerns centered upon the group, and draws scarcely at all from economic concerns centered upon the family."⁵³

"The debate over issue voting has been a contentious affair with emotionally charged exchanges between, on one side, those who doubt voters' 'competence' to make informed policy choices and, on the other side, those who find voters 'surprisingly sophisticated'."⁵⁴

Data from the 1960s fueled debate as many findings portrayed a much different picture of the American electorate than that captured during the Eisenhower era of the 1950s. The 1960s data were interpreted by Field and Anderson (1969), Pierce (1970), Pomper (1972), and Nie and Anderson (1974) to show a relatively informed, ideological, and issue consistent electorate.⁵⁵ These findings are conspicuously at odds with those presented just a decade earlier. Reflecting on the rational choice developments of the 1970s, Petrocik (1980) notes: "...our image of the voter as a stable creature with a limited repertoire of responses to political events has been undermined. The original emphasis on inherent psychological characteristics in modeling the voter produced a caricature. The inherent psychological properties, while real enough, were overemphasized."⁵⁶

During the debate, however, the contributions of *The American Voter* model have generally been acknowledged. Kessel (1972) reported that the model gave a

⁵³Kinder, Donald R. et al. "Economics and Politics in the 1984 American Presidential Election." American Journal of Political Science. (1989) 33:491-515. p.512.

⁵⁴Rivers, Douglas. "Heterogeneity in Models of Electoral Choice." American Journal of Political Science (1988) 32:737-57. p. 746.

⁵⁵Petrocik, John R. "Contextual Sources of Voting Behavior: The Changable American Voter." in Pierce, John C., and J.L. Sullivan. Eds. The Electorate Reconsidered. Beverly Hills: Sage. 1980.

⁵⁶ibid. p.276.

mixed verdict on issues and "...needs to be updated with respect to issue voting."⁵⁷ Kelley and Mirer (1974) offered a conciliatory acknowledgment of the party identification model's value. "[P]erhaps the authors of *The American Voter* have identified the ingredients that go into voting decisions but not the recipe for mixing the ingredients."⁵⁸ One of the original *American Voter* authors, Stokes (1966) explains: "...the moral of my piece is that [the issues and leaders] relationship introduces more dynamism into contests for the Presidency than the stability of party identification or the social bases of party preference might lead us to expect."⁵⁹

In spite of its initial promise, partisanship is argued to have a declining role in shaping the vote (Nie et al., 1979; Petrocik, 1978, 1980). Partisanship remains an essential component of the voting equation, however, its causal properties remain in question for subscribers of rational choice. Rather than forging attitudinal consistency around a partisan centre (which would involve the irrational distortion of reality), voters instead may be expected to use cognitive short-cuts to evaluate the political environment. These short-cuts assist the voter in thinking about politics for Downs (1957) acknowledged that constantly formulating prospective evaluations places extensive cognitive demands on the voter.

Fiorina (1981) built upon Downs' recognition of the cost-saving function of retrospective voting - "Knowledge of past performance is cheaper to acquire (it is acquired automatically in effect) than knowledge of future plans."⁶⁰ Much of the

⁵⁷Kessel, John H. "The Issues in Issues Voting." American Political Science Review Vol.66 (1972). p.460.

⁵⁸Kelley, Stanley, Jr., and T.W. Mirer. "The Simple Act of Voting." American Political Science Review Vol. 68 (1974). p.573.

⁵⁹Stokes, Donald E. "Some Dynamic Elements in Contests for the Presidency." American Political Science Review Vol. 60 (1966). p.19.

⁶⁰Fiorina, Morris. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981. p. 12.

early 1970s rational choice work could be criticized for demanding more issues-rationality of individual voters than might be expected. Fiorina differs in that he "...indicated that partisanship is not merely a restatement of current policy preferences, as the Downsian model predicts."⁶¹ Fiorina modified the issues-based models by placing greater motivational emphasis on the individual's retrospective evaluations of political performance. Fiorina contests the assumptions inherent in *The American Voter*; the underlying motivational basis for partisan identification is rational-maximizing, cost-saving not attitudinal consistency.

Fiorina advanced the concept of cumulative updating where citizens use a running tally (encapsulated as a partisan orientation) as a cognitive method for making sense of the political objects they encounter.⁶² "...[W]e have proposed a model of the individual voting decision that depends on the notion that citizens monitor party promises and performances over time, encapsulate their observations in a summary judgment termed 'party identification', and rely on this core of previous experience when they assign responsibility for current societal conditions and evaluate ambiguous platforms designed to deal with uncertain futures."⁶³ Party identification is one of the functional short-cuts available to voters as tools for making sense of political affairs.

Partisanship is viewed not as *The American Voter's* 'unmoved mover', but rather as an important endogenous variable both acting on and being acted upon by electoral forces including the evaluations of candidates, issues and retrospective judgments. "Citizen's continually evaluate their political environments and adjust their

⁶¹Franklin and Jackson, 1983. p.958.

⁶²Niemi and Weisberg, 1993. p.289.

⁶³Fiorina, 1981. p.83.

views of the political parties accordingly. They alter their own partisan attachments as their comparative judgments of the parties' merits change over time."⁶⁴

Campbell and his colleagues acknowledged that in some circumstances voters may take temporary leave of their partisan attachments. An enormously popular candidate, such as Eisenhower was in the 1950s, could be expected to attract some voters from their opponent's partisan ranks. Such an effect, however, was argued to be temporary. The individual's identification did not change but rather some electoral force superseded its principle influence for a short time. They concluded the greater the partisan attachment, the less likely such a deviation will occur.

Reaching a similar conclusion to that of Campbell and his colleagues, Fiorina finds: "...the more partisan an individual, the less responsive his or her reported partisanship will be to retrospective evaluations, although, as the latter cumulate over time, even strong identifiers may eventually cross the threshold of their category."⁶⁵ Such apparent agreement, however, belies very different ideas about the role of party identification in the voter's mind. Partisan defection in the traditional model is rare in most cases as the stability provided by having a consistent view of the world is psychologically convenient for voters. Fiorina's conception of a stable identification is radically different - "...stability only reflects the empirical consistency of political experiences with previous identification, not the resistance of the latter to change. The underlying theoretical dependence of current party identification on political events and conditions remains."⁶⁶

⁶⁴Niemi and Weisberg. 1993. p.289.

⁶⁵ibid. p.96.

⁶⁶ibid. p.97.

Fiorina states:

The traditional conception of party identification suggests that the change in identification is a step function of political evaluations: up to a certain severity they have no impact on party identification, while beyond that they shake an individual loose from an existing identification. Clearly the model we are using allows party identification to vary continuously. As new evaluations form, an individual's identification may wax and wane."⁶⁷

Stability for Fiorina, like Downs, lacks a perceptual basis; rather observed stability is merely a phenomenon which reflects the consistency of the individual's rational, summary evaluation (in the form of a partisan identification) with the actual behaviour of the political objects themselves. This view is directly contrary to *The American Voter's* where the voter's internal psychological process of perceptual distortion forges consistency and stability of attitude. The rational choice explanation differs from the *American Voter's* in that the psychological process is not perceptual screening and attitudinal consistency but rather, a rational calculation where the strong experiential identification is not threatened by the existence of a conflicting attitude. However, if this attitude is of sufficient influence, then it is rational for the summary evaluation to change. Partisan identification, as the summary of rational evaluations, has little or no role in the constraint of political attitudes. "...[T]here is an inertial element to voting behavior that cannot be ignored, but that inertial element has an experiential basis; it is not something learned at mommy's knee and never questioned thereafter."⁶⁸

Fiorina recognizes that "...not all voters should be equally prone to use retrospective evaluations in making a voting decision."⁶⁹ The voter's level of

⁶⁷Fiorina, 1981. p.90.

⁶⁸ibid. p.102.

⁶⁹ibid. p.44.

sophistication should have some bearing on their propensity toward retrospective voting. He states an expectation that retrospective voting diminishes as one approaches the rational, "civic man". The data were unconvincing except where it ran counter to the anticipated relationship. Examining education, interest, media usage, and so on produced no clear patterns to support the hypotheses and in some cases suggested the basic retrospective relationship to be unexpectedly stronger at the upper ends of the scales.

Fiorina returned to his retrospective voting thesis to explain these results.

Campaign rhetoric is so notoriously unreliable, and the future so inherently uncertain, that nearly all voters prefer to interpret the future in light of the past, a la Downs, or to engage in 'Referenda voting' a la Key. The simple retrospective evaluations we have been examining may look more credible than promises about future policies, even to the highly educated, interested and informed.⁷⁰

The *American Voter* and Fiorina's rational choice model each present compelling arguments as to the nature and function of partisan identification. On several points they share similar expectations, however, partisan screening is not one of these points. The perceptual screening function, manifested through judgmental consistency, is the central operational variable for the traditional model. Its existence is the conceptual basis upon which the *American Voter* and its progeny rest. Fiorina's characterization could not be more different. His thesis has no requirement for attitudinal screening. In fact, the appearance of judgmental consistency presents him with a problem. As he hypothesized the character of partisan identification, there is no need for attitudinal consistency as citizens process political information through rational evaluations. Inconsistent information is not purged by a process of perceptual distortion, but rather it is accounted for by the individual as part of the

⁷⁰ibid. p 56.

rational evaluative process. Evidence of judgmental consistency resulting from a process of partisan perceptual adjustment would represent a significant complication to Fiorina's revisionist hypothesis.

Hypotheses and Methodology

Hypotheses and Methodology

Hypotheses

The primary aim of this thesis is to determine if partisan identification is a central attitudinal structure around which partisan citizens construct and maintain attitudes toward political objects. Past research in the United States and in Canada has sought to examine the relationships among partisan feelings and the long- and short-term forces that exist in the political environment. The social-psychological research of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) depicts party identification as a perceptual screen through which political objects on the current landscape are evaluated and imbued with meaning by the individual. An individual's identification is an active, psychological force serving to direct and maintain the cognitive consistency of political object evaluations. Fiorina (1981) rejected this notion of a dominant exogenous screening function instead formulating party identification to be a cumulative tally of one's rational evaluations of contemporary political objects. For Fiorina and his fellow revisionist scholars, the rational nature of political evaluations places no requirement for a consistency of partisan attitudes upon the citizen.

The Canadian literature tends to acknowledge both the classical, social-psychological and the revisionist, rational-choice models in identifying the existence of stable and flexible partisans within the electorate. Several studies have presented evidence to suggest that party identification is not the perceptual screening structure antecedent to other political evaluations as the classical model suggests. At the same time, however, many of these studies acknowledge the continuing presence of large numbers of partisan voters for whom partisanship presumably remains a meaningful way of viewing the political world.

The 1993 Canadian National Election Study presents a unique opportunity in which to examine the character of party identification across partisan groupings. During the 1993 election, a unique partisan environment was present in that two new major political parties competed for the first time alongside the three traditional parties. The growth of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois allows for a unique examination of the role and character of party identification in a Canadian setting.

Partisan screening, manifested through judgmental consistency, is a unique implication of the classical model. Evidence of judgmental consistency would represent a significant complication to the understanding of partisanship put forth by Fiorina. The traditional conceptualization of the partisan screening function requires a gestation or maturation period for the screening function to manifest itself. Among Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois partisans one should not expect to find evidence of the active screening function that one does expect to find among partisans of the long-established Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic Parties; therefore,

Comparing party identifiers, traditional party identifiers ought to exhibit greater evidence of judgmental consistency than non-traditional identifiers.

Within the classical model, judgmental consistency is expected to be greater among partisans when evaluating political objects with partisan relevance. As such, one may expect to find evidence of an antecedent screening function that varies according to the strength of one's partisan disposition; therefore,

Among traditional identifiers, The stronger an individual's partisan identification, the greater the judgmental consistency in viewing political objects.

Sources of Data

The data employed throughout this study were collected as part of the 1993 Canadian National Election Study incorporating the 1992 Referendum Survey on the Charlottetown Accord. In a manner similar to the 1988 Canadian National Election Study, the sample was drawn using random digit dialing (RDD) to select households. Within households, the adult (eighteen years of age or older) Canadian citizen having the next birthday was selected. "The probability of an adult member of the household being selected for an interview varies inversely with the number of people [adults] living in that household."¹

The sample is divided among five regions: East (Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick); Quebec; Ontario; Midwest (Manitoba and Saskatchewan); and, West (Alberta and British Columbia) with each province having not less than 400 completed interviews. The sample was distributed equally among provinces when regions consisted of more than one province. Since the distribution is not proportional to the population of the provinces the data are weighted to reflect the relative proportion of each province. The random digit dialing, household selection, respondent selection, regional and provincial weighting methodology was designed to represent the adult population of Canada speaking at least one of the official languages and residing within one of the ten provinces.²

The 1993 survey data consist of two components - a "panel" component and a "RDD" component.³ Some respondents to the survey were part of the panel study component of the 1993 Canadian Election Study. These respondents had previously

¹"The 1993 Canadian National Election Study - Technical Documentation" Institute for Social Research, York University. 1994. p.9

²Technical Documentation. 1994.

³Technical documentation. 1994. p.3

participated in the referendum surveys conducted during 1992. The second component (RDD) of the survey consisted of respondents interviewed for the first time during 1993. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 depict the response rates for the various waves within the panel and RDD components of the survey respectively. Variables from the Panel Post-Referendum and Mail-Back Survey and variables from the RDD Mail-Back Survey are not utilized in this thesis.

Table 3.1 Number of Interviews Completed and Response Rates for Panel Component.

Wave	Interviews Completed	Re-Interview Rate
Pre-Referendum	2530	---
Post-Referendum	2232	88%
Campaign Period	1434	65%
Post-Election	1312	91%
Mail-Back Survey	887	68%

Table 3.2 Number of Interviews Completed and Response Rates for RDD Component.

Wave	Interviews Completed	Re-Interview Rate
Campaign Period	2341	---
Post-Election	2028	87%
Mail-Back Survey	1322	65%

Measures

Party Identification. In the context of this study, partisan identification is a function of the positive or negative direction and degree of feeling toward competing political parties. The measures employed here rest upon two standard items applied during the campaign-period wave of the Canadian Election Study. The first item,

seeking self-identification, asks respondents if they usually think of themselves as being a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P., Reform / Bloc Quebecois, or none of these.⁴ Only respondents acknowledging that they think of themselves as being a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P., or Reform / Bloc Quebecois are included in this study. The second item asks respondents to specify the strength of their identification.⁵ The combination of these two measures produces a three point scale of party identification for each of the five political parties.

Respondents who did not think of themselves as belonging to any of these groups are not represented on any of the scales. Each scale constitutes a continuum of partisan identification where strong-, moderate-, and weak-partisans are represented. In total, there are five party identification scales employed; one for each of the major political parties.

Table 3.3 presents the numbers of identifiers for each partisan group, broken down by strength of identification. Moderates in each of the five partisan groups account for the largest number of cases. It appears that among Liberal, Conservative, New Democrat, and Reform partisans, approximately half of the cases fall within the moderate strength categories while, among Bloc Quebecois partisans, approximately sixty percent of Bloc partisans identify themselves as being moderates.

⁴"Thinking of federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P. (Reform/Bloc Quebecois), or none of these?"

Respondents within Quebec were not asked about the Reform party, and respondents outside of Quebec were not asked about the Bloc Quebecois.

⁵"How strongly _____ do you feel, very strongly, fairly strongly, or not very strongly?"

Table 3.3 Identification Frequencies Broken Down by Partisan Group and Strength of Identification.

Identification	Strength	Frequency	Relative Frequency
Progressive Conservative	Strong	89	12.1
	Moderate	383	52.1
	Weak	263	35.8
Liberal	Strong	185	18.9
	Moderate	522	53.3
	Weak	271	27.8
New Democrat	Strong	52	19.7
	Moderate	132	50.0
	Weak	80	30.3
Reform	Strong	64	33.2
	Moderate	103	53.3
	Weak	26	13.5
Bloc Quebecois	Strong	65	24.6
	Moderate	156	59.1
	Weak	43	16.3

Among the identifiers of the three traditional parties, fewer individuals report themselves being strongly partisan in relation to their weak and moderate counterparts. This relationship is opposite to that apparent among the identifiers of the two non-traditional parties where strongly partisan individuals out-number their weak counterparts. This tendency of the non-traditional partisan groups to exhibit a greater ratio of strong partisans than the traditional groups runs counter to the distribution one may expect to find given the classical position on partisan development.

Long Term Party Identification. The long term party identification scales are constructed in the same manner as the campaign period identification measure except that a longer-term component is added by using pre-referendum panel data. During the pre-referendum survey, respondents were asked if they usually think of themselves as being a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P., Reform / Bloc Quebecois, or none of these when thinking of federal politics.⁶ Again, only respondents acknowledging that they think of themselves as being a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P., or Reform / Bloc Quebecois are included in this study. Unfortunately, no measure for strength of partisan feeling was included in the pre-referendum survey.

Long-term identification for the purpose of this study reflects a stability of identification during the period between the pre-referendum survey in September-October, 1992, and the campaign period wave in September-October 1993. Although a one year period is considerably less than may be commonly thought of as comprising a long term identification in the context of the social-psychological

⁶The campaign period self-identification used the same question wording - "Thinking of federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P. (Reform/Bloc Quebecois), or none of these?"

Respondents within Quebec were not asked about the Reform party, and respondents outside of Quebec were not asked about the Bloc Quebecois.

model, the scope of investigation is limited to the present panel design and data. Thus one must acknowledge the limitations of the data at hand in attempting to make the best use of the information.

Given typical cross-sectional data, one is confronted with a common problem in establishing the causal sequence in a relationship. In the context of this thesis, it may be just as plausible that people who interpret political objects as evaluatively contrasted (or similar) may then describe themselves as strong identifiers. Indeed, this alternative explanation is at the heart of Fiorina's revisionist model.

Given the panel design of the 1993 Canadian National Election Study, the closest we may get to rebutting this alternative explanation is to make every attempt to examine the data from a classically sequenced structure. As such, we posit that partisanship is an antecedent force directing the evaluations of partisan relevant objects. Thus we examine the relationship of partisanship on object evaluations using a sequenced design - campaign period and post-election data, respectively. In an effort to further justify the partisanship shapes evaluation thesis, we examine this relationship in relation to additional (pre-referendum) data within the limitations of the 1993 CNES design. Hence, we expect those respondents whose long term identification can be established, manifest the same (or perhaps greater) evidence of the assimilation-contrast effect in evaluation. Table 3.4 provides summary statistics for each of the five long term party identification scales.

Table 3.4 Long-Term Identification Frequencies, Broken Down by Partisan Group and Strength of Identification.

Identification	Strength	Frequency	Relative Frequency
Progressive Conservative	Strong	24	13.3
	Moderate	103	57.2
	Weak	53	29.5
Liberal	Strong	47	18.7
	Moderate	132	52.3
	Weak	73	29.0
New Democrat	Strong	11	13.8
	Moderate	47	58.8
	Weak	22	27.4
Reform	Strong	12	46.1
	Moderate	14	53.9
	Weak	0	0.0
Bloc Quebecois	Strong	27	33.8
	Moderate	41	51.2
	Weak	12	15.0

Table 3.4 depicts the number of long-term identifiers for each partisan group, broken down by strength of identification. These partisans have been established to have held a stable partisan identification during the period between the pre-referendum and campaign period surveys. Similar to the results from those partisans identified using only the campaign period measure, moderates within each of the five partisan groups account for the largest number of cases; approximately half to sixty percent of partisan respondents identified themselves as having moderately strong partisan feelings.

Findings from the established long-term partisans' data suggest that the pattern of weak partisans out-numbering traditional identifiers, and strong partisans out-numbering weak ratios among non-traditional identifiers continues. Again, this tendency runs counter to the distribution one may expect to find given the classical position on partisan development.

Leader Evaluation. As part of the post-election survey, respondents were asked to provide an evaluation of each the major party leaders on a thermometer-type scale running from 0 to 100, with ratings between 0 and 50 being unfavourable and ratings between 50 and 100 being favourable.⁷ Prior to providing their evaluations of the party leaders, respondents were asked how informed they felt about each of the party leaders. Those who indicated that they were *not at all* informed about a particular leader, or responded *don't know* or who *refused* to answer, were not asked to provide an evaluation for that party leader.

⁷"Now I'll ask you to rate each leader on a scale that runs from 0 to 100. Ratings between 0 and 50 mean you rate that person UNFAVOURABLY. Ratings between 50 and 100 mean that you rate that person FAVOURABLY. You may use any number from 0 to 100. How would you rate _____?" (emphasis in questionnaire text.) Order of delivery for individual leader items was random.

A common problem which may arise with the use of raw thermometer data is thermometer scale artifact. Some people have a tendency to be more positive (and some more negative) toward the whole genre of political objects thus creating the possibility of an artifactually high positive association when multiple variables are examined. In order to avoid the potential influence of artifactual distortions, each of the five leader evaluations employed as dependent variables were constructed as a difference measure by subtracting individual thermometer responses from the respondent's average rating of objects. This average thermometer score was calculated for each respondent by computing the mean of twenty-eight thermometer evaluations of partisan objects contained in the campaign period and post-election waves of the 1993 CNES.⁸

For illustrative purposes, Table 3.5 displays mean difference scores of the major political leaders for each partisan group. It is apparent from the table that the pattern of difference scores, which can vary between -100 degrees and +100 degrees, are not as one might expect. Evidence which suggests that partisans tend to rate their own leader higher than their average rating of all objects, and tend to rate the other leaders lower than their average rating of all objects is not clear among the party leader difference scores presented in Table 3.5.

⁸Campaign Period ratings of: Campbell; Chretien; McLaughlin; Manning; Bouchard; Conservative Party; Liberal Party; New Democratic Party; Reform Party; and Bloc Quebecois. Post-Election ratings of: Campbell; Chretien; McLaughlin; Manning; Bouchard; Conservative Party; Liberal Party; New Democratic Party; Reform Party; Bloc Quebecois; Conservative Candidate; Liberal Candidate; New Democratic Candidate; Reform Candidate; Bloc Quebecois Candidate; respondent's provincial Premier: Pierre Trudeau; and Jean Charest. The mean rating across these 28 thermometer variables is 47.7, based upon 3731 valid cases.

Table 3.5 Mean Difference Scores for the Five Party Leaders, Broken Down by Partisan Groups.

		Respondent's Identification				
		PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ
Party Leader	Campbell	2.80 (642)	-7.72 (783)	-7.70 (231)	-11.11 (166)	-12.32 (222)
	Chretien	11.05 (643)	23.08 (827)	16.21 (235)	10.19 (173)	0.59 (228)
	McLaughlin	-8.44 (564)	-3.54 (692)	9.82 (232)	-10.38 (162)	-6.4 (146)
	Manning	6.46 (563)	-3.47 (639)	-5.03 (213)	26.34 (174)	---
	Bouchard	-5.05 (467)	-7.21 (618)	-6.69 (167)	---	28.98 (234)

Among Conservative identifiers, the average score for Campbell ratings are less than those for Chretien and Manning while only the ratings for McLaughlin and Bouchard are negative. New Democrats appear to rate Liberal leader Chretien higher in relation to all other political objects than they rate their own leader McLaughlin, yet, their tendency to rate the remaining leaders lower than McLaughlin in relation to their average is consistent with expectations. Both Reform and Bloc Quebecois identifiers exhibit substantially higher relative ratings of their own leaders than those leaders of the opposing parties although both groups manifest the tendency to rate Chretien higher than their average across all objects. The non-traditional identifiers' ratings of Conservative leader Campbell and New Democrat leader McLaughlin do not appear to be as generous. Reviewing Table 3.5, it appears that only Liberal partisans consistently rate their leader higher than their average rating for all objects and rate opposing leaders lower than their average rating.

Table 3.6 Mean Difference Scores for the Five Party Leaders, Broken Down by Long-Term Partisan Groups.

		Long-Term Identification				
		PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ
Party Leader	Campbell	4.65 (163)	-8.8 (216)	-9.36 (73)	-11.40 (22)	-13.73 (72)
	Chretien	10.31 (164)	23.94 (225)	17.79 (73)	7.85 (25)	-1.71 (72)
	McLaughlin	-7.83 (146)	-2.21 (194)	12.19 (71)	-15.93 (23)	-8.49 (49)
	Manning	5.94 (149)	-6.63 (183)	-8.62 (65)	30.73 (25)	---
	Bouchard	-4.79 (127)	-6.72 (182)	-7.92 (51)	---	32.95 (76)

Table 3.6 depicts the mean difference scores for the major party leaders for each of the established long-term partisan groups. With a few exceptions, it appears that the pattern of difference scores are as one might expect. The evidence contained within Table 3.6 generally supports the view that partisans rate their own leader higher and opposing leaders lower relative to an average across political objects. Reviewing the leader evaluations undertaken by long-term Conservative partisans, it appears that the ratings of Campbell are lower than the evaluations of Manning and Chretien, yet, higher, relative to the average object rating, than McLaughlin and Bouchard. This pattern is the same as found among Conservative partisans identified in the campaign period data. The rating of Campbell is higher over the longer-term data (4.65) than found among the campaign period only data (2.80).

Respondents established to be New Democrat identifiers over the longer period of time exhibit a more favourable rating of McLaughlin (12.19) than found among New Democrats established during the campaign period (9.82), reported

higher evaluations for Chretien, and lower evaluations of Campbell, Manning and Bouchard.

Long-term Liberal, Reform, and Bloc partisans apparently rate their own leaders substantially above average. Among all three of these groups, the pattern of rating one's own leader higher and one's opponents lower than average is well established. With the exception of Reform identifiers' positive rating of Chretien (7.85), each of the groups' opposing leaders are held less favourably than average. The strength of ratings of one's own leader among Bloc (32.95), Reform (30.73), and Liberal (23.94) are substantially higher than New Democrats' rating of their leader (12.19) and far more favourable than the ratings of Campbell (4.65) by Conservative identifiers.

Party Evaluation. Following their rankings of each of the party leaders, respondents to the post-election survey were asked to rate each of the four major political parties on a scale that ran from 0 to 100 with ratings between 0 and 50 meaning an unfavourable rating and between 50 and 100 meaning a favourable rating.⁹

Similar to the raw leader evaluations, thermometer-based party evaluations may suffer artifactual distortion. To avoid such an effect, the raw party data is computed as a difference measure in the same manner as leader evaluations using the respondent's average rating of partisan objects. Table 3.7 displays mean difference scores for each of the major political parties broken down by partisan group.

⁹"Now, I'll ask you to rate each political party on the same scale that runs from 0 to 100. You may use any number from 0 to 100. (How would you rate) The FEDERAL _____ PARTY?" (emphasis in questionnaire text). Order of delivery for individual leader items was random. Respondents within Quebec were not asked to rate the Reform party, and respondents outside of Quebec were not asked to rate the Bloc Quebecois.

Table 3.7 Mean Difference Scores for the Five Parties, Broken Down by Partisan Groups.

		Respondent's Identification				
		PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ
Party	PC	0.69 (657)	-13.74 (835)	-16.16 (243)	-15.21 (175)	-18.35 (234)
	Liberal	9.15 (657)	23.25 (840)	11.72 (243)	6.42 (176)	0.21 (235)
	NDP	-16.06 (644)	-10.55 (813)	9.15 (240)	-18.58 (173)	-12.75 (217)
	Reform	1.13 (637)	-9.67 (784)	-10.55 (238)	25.77 (176)	---
	BQ	-18.02 (630)	-17.03 (791)	-18.86 (226)	---	27.10 (235)

Among Conservative identifiers, the average scores for Conservative Party ratings are less than those for the Liberal and Reform Parties while the ratings for the New Democratic Party and Bloc Quebecois are negative. New Democrat identifiers appear to rate the Liberal Party higher in relation to all other political objects than they rate their own party, yet, their tendency to rate the remaining parties lower than the New Democratic Party in relation to their average is consistent with expectations.

Both Reform and Bloc Quebecois identifiers exhibit substantially higher relative ratings of their own parties than opposing parties although both groups manifest the tendency to rate the Liberal Party higher than average across all objects. The non-traditional identifiers' ratings of the Conservative and New Democratic Parties are clearly rated below the average. It appears that only the Liberal partisans uniformly rate their own party higher than the average rating for all objects and opposing parties below their average object rating. The character of the relationships found among the party data is the same as found among the leaders data.

Table 3.8 Mean Difference Scores for the Five Parties, Broken Down by Long-Term Partisan Groups.

		Long-Term Identification				
		PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ
Party	PC	3.04 (164)	-13.94 (226)	-18.95 (74)	-17.70 (25)	-17.53 (76)
	Liberal	8.83 (165)	24.10 (228)	12.94 (74)	1.93 (25)	-0.33 (77)
	NDP	-17.24 (164)	-10.18 (219)	12.52 (73)	-22.22 (25)	-12.55 (70)
	Reform	1.88 (162)	-12.23 (207)	-12.23 (73)	31.45 (25)	---
	BQ	-17.54 (159)	-17.14 (220)	-19.20 (69)	---	30.56 (76)

Table 3.8 presents the mean difference scores for the major political parties broken down by long-term partisan group. It is apparent from the evidence depicted in Table 3.8 that Liberal, Reform, and Bloc Quebecois partisans tend to rate their own party above their average rating of all objects and rate opposing parties lower than that average rating. Across these three partisan groups, a similar pattern emerges to that found among the evaluations of each of the parties by Liberal, Reform, and Bloc partisans identified during the campaign period. Among these three long-term groups, only Reform evaluations of the Liberal party do not fit the expected pattern, yet, even these evaluations of the Liberal Party (1.93) are substantially lower than Reform partisans' ratings of their own party (31.45).

Long-term Conservative (3.04) and New Democrat (12.52) partisans both exhibit stronger favourable ratings of their own party than found among their campaign period co-partisans and, like those co-partisans, both long-term groups report higher evaluations of the Liberal Party than for their own parties. Conservatives also exhibit the tendency to rate the Reform Party above the average

rating for all objects, but, the Conservatives, established as such over a longer-period of time, tend to rate the Conservative Party higher than Reform.

Local Candidate Evaluation. Respondents were asked to rate the local candidate representing each of the four major parties on a 0 to 100 thermometer scale.¹⁰ The local candidate evaluation measure was presented in the post-election questionnaire. Prior to the local candidate rating questions, respondents were asked how informed they felt about each of the parties' local candidates. Those who were *not at all* informed about a particular candidate, responded *don't know*, *refused* to answer, or if the party had no local candidate in that riding, were not asked to rate the local candidate of that party.

Again, as with leader and party evaluations, the raw scores from the local candidate thermometer rankings were subtracted from the respondent's average thermometer rating of partisan objects yielding a measure adjusted for a respondent's idiosyncratic positive or negative response tendencies.

For illustrative purposes, Table 3.9 displays mean difference scores for the evaluations of each party's local candidate broken down by partisan group. It is apparent from the table that the pattern of difference scores, which can vary between -100 degrees and +100 degrees, is not as one might expect. Evidence which suggests that partisans tend to rate their own party's local candidate higher than their average rating of all objects, and tend to rate the opposing parties' local candidates lower than

¹⁰"Please rate each candidate in your riding on the same scale that runs from 0 to 100. You may use any number from 0 to 100. (How would you rate) The _____ CANDIDATE?" (emphasis in questionnaire text).

Order of delivery for individual leader items was random.

Respondents within Quebec were not asked about a Reform Candidate, and respondents outside of Quebec were not asked about a Bloc Quebecois candidate.

their average rating of all objects is not clear among the candidate difference scores presented in Table 3.9.

Table 3.9 Mean Difference Scores for the Five Parties' Local Candidates, Broken Down by Partisan Groups.

		Respondent's Identification				
		PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ
Local Candidate	PC	6.90 (510)	-5.40 (556)	-7.82 (154)	-7.91 (120)	-5.11 (138)
	Liberal	6.32 (481)	18.74 (702)	7.26 (195)	2.98 (130)	-3.61 (147)
	NDP	-11.65 (317)	-7.68 (435)	11.76 (194)	-11.92 (103)	-15.29 (63)
	Reform	5.20 (343)	-4.21 (331)	-7.36 (146)	23.30 (156)	---
	BQ	4.76 (70)	-5.02 (104)	9.51 (5)	---	21.77 (188)

Conservative partisans exhibit the highest rating for the local Conservative Party candidate relative to their average thermometer evaluations calculated across twenty-eight political objects. The data suggest that these same Conservative partisans rate the Liberal, Reform and Bloc Quebecois local candidate above their established average rating as well. Only the New Democratic candidate tends to be evaluated with less than average favourability by this group. New Democratic partisans exhibit a similar mix of evaluations toward opposing parties local candidates. Their own party's candidate is rated more favourably than any of the opposing candidates, yet, Liberal Party and Bloc Quebecois candidates appear to be evaluated above the average rating for political objects. Reform and Conservative candidates tend to be held in less favourable regard relative to the average rating.

Liberal, Reform and Bloc identifiers exhibit evaluations consistent with expectations. Each of these partisan's own local candidate scores well above the

average established across objects and, with the exception of a positive rating toward Liberal candidates by Reform identifiers, opposing candidates are less favourably evaluated.

Table 3.10 Mean Difference Scores for the Five Parties' Local Candidates, Broken Down by Long-Term Partisan Groups.

		Long-Term Identification				
		PC	Liberal	NDP	Reform	BQ
Local Candidate	PC	10.64 (134)	-4.13 (156)	-8.70 (41)	-15.94 (20)	-5.92 (39)
	Liberal	5.50 (118)	18.42 (187)	8.94 (53)	-2.53 (21)	-3.79 (45)
	NDP	-13.25 (82)	-8.00 (113)	13.67 (51)	-12.91 (14)	-14.72 (19)
	Reform	5.30 (86)	-7.24 (78)	-8.32 (36)	25.63 (22)	---
	BQ	4.34 (17)	-9.07 (35)	---	---	24.01 (61)

Table 3.10 presents the mean difference scores for the evaluations of each party's local candidate broken down by partisan groups established over the longer-period of time. Respondents established to have held a stable partisan identification over the period between the pre-referendum and campaign period surveys apparently maintain similar evaluations toward partisan relevant political objects as those respondents identified using only campaign period measures of identification. The longer-term data suggest that the pattern of rating one's own party's local candidate above their average rating of all objects and rating one's opponent's local candidates as below their average rating of objects is at least as strongly manifest by those respondents established to be long-term identifiers.

Long-term New Democratic, Reform and Bloc identifiers appear to evaluate their own local candidates slightly more favourably than their respective partisan cohorts recorded during the campaign period only while the long-term partisans' evaluations of opponents are more negative in relation to their average evaluation across all objects. Most notable, is the more pronounced negativity toward the local Conservative candidate by long-term Reform partisans which drops from -7.91 to -15.94.

Liberal partisans exhibit a similar pattern over the long-term data where their evaluations of the local Liberal candidate is very similar to that found among the shorter-term data, evaluations of local New Democrat, Reform, and Bloc candidates are slightly less favourable but evaluations of local Conservative candidates are slightly more favourable than recorded among Liberal partisans identified using only campaign period measures.

Conservative partisans manifest the same pattern of local candidate evaluations over the long-term. Only New democratic candidates tend to be evaluated below the average while again Liberal, Reform and Bloc candidates are evaluated favourably in relation to the average across objects. Ratings of Conservative candidates tend to be more favourable among those established to be Conservative over a longer-period of time where the scores for Conservative candidates rise from 6.90 to 10.64.

Overview

This chapter began with a discussion of the two hypotheses which will be tested in Chapter Four. The first hypothesis is that when comparing party identifiers, traditional party identifiers ought to exhibit greater evidence of judgmental

consistency than non-traditional party identifiers. The second hypothesis is that the stronger an individual's partisan identification, the greater the judgmental consistency in viewing political objects with partisan relevance. Thus one expects the data to be consistent with the broad expectation that long-term, strong, traditional partisans will exhibit assimilation and contrast tendencies in evaluation of partisan objects more so than moderate or weak traditional partisans and more so than long-term, strong, non-traditional partisans. These hypotheses will be tested using data from the 1993 Canadian National Election Study incorporating the 1992 Referendum Survey on the Charlottown Accord.

Analysis

Analysis

The American Voter developed a model of the psychological processes underlying voting behaviour in which partisan identification affects the vote choice and functions as an affective force directing and maintaining consistency among political evaluations through the distortion of perceptions of political reality. The affective process of evaluation and distortion came to be recognized by the authors as a partisan screening function and is an implication unique to social-psychological models of voting behaviour.

According to the classical view, partisan identification is thought to require a gestation period in which social and psychological forces combine over time, enabling an individual to develop and manifest the partisan screening and perceptual adjustment function. Early in life people learn, and subsequently maintain, a psychological attachment to one political party which comes to serve as the central mechanism for organizing political cognitions.

The 1993 Canadian election presents a unique opportunity in which to examine the character of party identification across partisan groupings. The electoral debut of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois allows for an examination of the character and role of party identification in voting behaviour. From the perspective of the classical assertion, we should not see evidence of an active partisan screening function among the non-traditional party identifiers for they have not been subjected to long-term social reinforcement nor have they had an opportunity to form a long-term psychological association with one of these new parties. Hence, we expect to find greater partisan assimilation and contrast tendencies among the partisans of the

traditional Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic parties than among the partisans of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois.

This chapter begins with an examination of leader, party, and local candidate evaluations as separate objects. These data are supplemented with a discussion of the extent to which these findings conform to inferences made regarding the internal consistency of each of these objects reported by identifiers of each party. Although the *American Voter* made no explicit provisions for partisans to manifest consistent assimilation-contrast tendencies toward leaders, parties, and local candidates as isolated objects, we provide such an examination as a precursor to the remainder of the chapter where hypotheses are tested in relation to the whole constellation of these objects.

According to inferences drawn from a social-psychological understanding of the role of party identification, one may expect to see evidence of contrasting in the evaluations of one's own party leader and those evaluations of rival party leaders. That is, the stronger an individual's positive ratings of their own leader, the stronger the negative ratings of rival leaders. In addition, this tendency to contrast one's own leader with rival leaders intensifies as partisan identity intensifies. Table 4.0 displays the pattern of these zero-order relationships for each partisan grouping.

Conservative partisans appear to manifest contrasting evaluations of Conservative and non-Conservative Party leaders in that negative correlations are evident among one's own leader evaluation and evaluations of rival leaders in nine of twelve pairings. Ratings of Jean Chretien, Preston Manning and Lucien Bouchard are each negatively correlated with Progressive Conservative identifiers' ratings of Kim

Campbell. The evaluations of New Democratic Party leader Audrey McLaughlin reported by Conservative partisans, however, does not appear to fit this pattern for ratings of McLaughlin convey a positive relationship to ratings of Campbell where both Campbell and McLaughlin appear to be evaluated above Conservative respondents' average rating of political objects.

**Table 4.0 Correlation of Own Leader Ratings with Rival Leader Ratings:
Broken down by Strength of Pre-Election Identification.**

Identification		Campbell	Own Chretien	Leader McLaughlin	With Manning	Rival Bouchard	Row Avg.
P.C.	Strong		-.15 (73)	.04 (62)	-.60* (63)	-.44* (53)	-.28
	Moderate		-.18* (332)	.15* (300)	-.15* (301)	-.23* (250)	-.10
	Weak		-.25* (225)	.06* (198)	-.07 (194)	-.10 (155)	-.09
Liberal	Strong	-.41* (142)		-.03 (129)	-.09 (115)	-.07 (115)	-.15
	Moderate	-.23* (420)		-.05 (370)	-.10* (345)	-.12* (329)	-.13
	Weak	-.26* (219)		.10 (193)	-.09 (179)	-.27* (171)	-.13
N.D.P.	Strong	.00 (45)	.19 (46)		-.17 (39)	-.05 (45)	.00
	Moderate	-.06 (111)	.19* (113)		-.32* (107)	-.03 (79)	-.06
	Weak	.02 (67)	.18 (68)		-.42* (60)	.04 (49)	-.05
Reform	Strong	-.11 (52)	-.20 (57)	.08 (53)		---	-.08
	Moderate	-.02 (93)	-.19* (95)	-.24* (88)		---	-.15
	Weak	-.38* (20)	.35 (35)	-.36 (20)		---	-.13
B.Q.	Strong	-.23* (55)	-.39* (56)	-.30* (41)	---		-.30
	Moderate	-.10* (129)	-.18* (135)	.12 (84)	---		-.05
	Weak	-.40* (37)	-.18* (36)	-.23 (21)	---		-.27

* p < 0.05

Conservative identifiers of varying intensity appear to manifest this contrasting tendency to different degrees. Contrasting, manifest as negative evaluations, is most pronounced in the evaluations of Manning and Bouchard reported by strong Conservative partisans and decreases in intensity as respondents' identification weakens. Evaluations of Liberal leader Chretien (-.25*) run in the opposite direction, however, in that weaker Conservative partisans appear to contrast Campbell and Chretien to the greatest degree, followed in diminishing intensity by moderate and strong Conservative partisans. Neither pattern of symmetrical increasing or diminishing contrast intensity as identification increases is apparent among the evaluations of McLaughlin and Campbell reported by Conservative partisans. Moderate Conservatives (.15*) exhibit a more positive rating of McLaughlin in relation to Campbell than either strong or weak Conservative identifiers.

Among respondents identified as Liberal partisans, there is substantial evidence of contrasting evaluations of Chretien and the other party leaders. Eleven of twelve pairings indicate a negative relationship in rating rival leaders in comparison to one's own. With the exception of McLaughlin ratings among weak Liberals (.10), opposing party leaders are consistently evaluated less favourably than one's own. The greater one's rating of their own leader, the lesser the rating of opposing party leaders. The degree of negativity varies among Liberals, where in some instances, the contrast is quite strongly manifested (-.41) and in others the contrast effect is much less (-.03) pronounced. The average contrast ratings reported by Liberal partisans do not appear to vary greatly according to respondents' strength of partisan disposition in that there is little difference in average evaluations of opposing leaders.

Under the assumptions of the classical model, we ought to find support for the existence of a partisan contrast effect among New Democrats when viewing their leader and those leaders of the other political parties. Examining the leader ratings provided by New Democratic identifiers in Table 4.0, evidence of a partisan contrasting effect is mixed. In only half of the table cells are evaluations of other leaders negatively correlated with evaluations of McLaughlin. New Democrat partisans exhibit mixed evaluations toward opposing leaders for there appear to be wide discrepancies in the generally positive associations of Chretien and Campbell with McLaughlin and the generally negative associations of Manning and Bouchard with McLaughlin. Such results do not fit the pattern of results established among Conservative and Liberal identifiers. New Democratic partisans of varying intensity exhibit similar, weak positive associations with Liberal leader Chretien and, with the exception of moderate New Democrats, weak positive associations with Conservative leader Campbell. The ratings of the Reform and Bloc leaders are reflective of the expected pattern of partisan evaluations. The ratings of Manning and Bouchard conform to the expectation of contrasting one's own leader with opposing leaders in that five of six leader evaluation pairings are negatively correlated. New Democrat identifiers exhibit a substantial tendency to contrast evaluations of their leader with those of Reform leader Preston Manning.

Based upon our understanding of the social-psychological model, we may not find as great a contrasting tendency among Reform partisans as we might find among the partisans of the traditional Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic parties. The leader evaluations reported by Reform partisans in Table 4.0 suggest that this expectation is not satisfied. Seven of nine leader pairings reveal that the

stronger one's positive evaluations of one's own leader, the stronger the negative ratings of rival leaders.

Such a tendency, however, does not appear to be evenly dispersed among Reform partisans of differing intensity. Contrasting is more pronounced among stronger identifiers when evaluating Chretien, but, less pronounced among stronger identifiers when evaluating McLaughlin. There is evidence of a pronounced contrast effect among strong Reform partisans' judgments of Chretien (-.20); among moderate Reform partisans' judgments of Chretien (-.20*) and McLaughlin (-.24*); and, among weak Reform partisans when judging Campbell (-.38*) and McLaughlin (-.36). At the same time, however, weak Reform partisans appear to exhibit a moderate positive association (.35*) between their evaluations of Manning and those of Chretien. Findings of relatively strong tendencies among Reform partisans in seven of nine table compartments suggest our expectation of finding less evidence of leader contrasting tendencies among Reform identifiers than among traditional party identifiers is not satisfied.

Similar to our expectations for Reform partisans, one may not expect partisan contrasting tendencies to be evident among Bloc Quebecois partisans to the same degree as those partisans of the long-established traditional parties when evaluating other leaders. Bloc partisans' evaluations of Bouchard and rival leaders exhibit evidence of the existence of partisan contrasting. Bloc identifiers appear to separate their evaluations of the leaders along party lines. With the exception of moderate Bloc partisan evaluations of McLaughlin (.12), the data appear to confirm that Bloc partisans consistently evaluate opposing party leaders less favourably as their evaluations of Bouchard increase in favourability.

Table 4.1 Correlation of Own Party Ratings with Rival Party Ratings: Broken down by Strength of Pre-Election Identification.

Identification		P.C.	Own Liberal	Party N.D.P.	With Reform	Rival B.Q.	Row Avg.
P.C.	Strong		-.35*	-.09	-.18	-.45*	-.27
			(80)	(78)	(78)	(75)	
	Moderate		-.27*	.09	-.18*	-.29*	-.16
			(344)	(339)	(335)	(333)	
	Weak		-.25*	.01	-.12*	-.16*	-.13
			(232)	(228)	(224)	(221)	
Liberal	Strong	-.32*		-.20*	-.23*	-.16*	-.23
		(159)		(156)	(142)	(146)	
	Moderate	-.21*		-.05*	-.12*	-.21*	-.15
		(445)		(369)	(426)	(420)	
N.D.P.	Strong	-.14*		-.04*	-.11	-.17*	-.12
		(230)		(224)	(215)	(224)	
	Moderate	.23	.19		-.28*	-.23	-.02
		(48)	(48)		(47)	(45)	
Reform	Strong	-.24*	.09		-.41*	.04	-.13
		(119)	(119)		(117)	(114)	
	Moderate	-.28*	.25*		-.38*	-.20	-.15
		(73)	(73)		(72)	(66)	
	Weak	-.04	-.25*	-.07		---	-.12
		(58)	(58)	(56)			
B.Q.	Strong	-.17	-.16*	-.08		---	-.14
		(96)	(96)	(96)			
	Moderate	.02	.31	.03		---	-.09
		(21)	(22)	(21)			
	Weak	-.11	-.52*	-.22	---		-.28
		(58)	(59)	(57)			
B.Q.	Strong	-.23*	-.18*	-.07	---		-.13
		(138)	(138)	(126)			
	Moderate	-.15	.17	.00	---		.01
		(37)	(37)	(34)			

* $p < 0.05$

Based upon inferences drawn from the social-psychological model, one may expect to find some evidence of a contrast effect among partisan's evaluations of their own party and their evaluations of competing parties. Table 4.1 presents the pattern of these zero-order party relationships among partisan groups.

In ten of twelve comparisons we find evidence supporting the expectation that Conservative partisans exhibit evidence of contrasting evaluations toward rival political parties. With the exception of moderate and weak Conservative's evaluations of the New Democratic Party, Conservative partisans appear to contrast evaluations of rivals with those of the Conservative Party. Such a pattern demonstrates the general expectation that the stronger one's positive feelings about one's own party, the stronger the negative feelings about other parties.

The tendency to contrast along partisan lines appears to become more pronounced as the strength of partisan identification increases among Conservative identifiers. Evaluations of each of the four rival parties are more strongly contrasted among the most strongly partisan and, with the exception of evaluations of the New Democratic Party, moderate Conservatives tend to exhibit greater contrasting of rivals than their weaker Conservative cohorts.

Among the data reported by Liberal partisans in Table 4.5, one expects to find similar evidence of contrasting among the evaluations of the Liberal Party and each of the other parties. There appears to be strong support for such an expectation in that Liberal partisans appear consistently to evaluate other parties less favourably as their evaluations of the Liberal Party increase in favourability. Each of the twelve Liberal-rival party pairings is negatively correlated indicating that Liberals are making judgments of competing parties in contrast to their feelings toward the

Liberal Party. Among Liberals, the most strongly partisan appear to manifest this party-based contrasting tendency to a greater degree than their moderate or weak cohorts.

Examining the data for New Democrats evaluating their own and competing parties, there is mixed evidence of an operative partisan contrast effect. Only seven of twelve pairings feature the negative correlations which we might expect partisans to manifest when evaluating other parties. New Democrat identifiers manifest positive associations with the Liberal Party to varying degrees and exhibit relatively strong contrast tendencies in their evaluations of the Reform Party. Unlike their Liberal and Conservative counterparts, New Democrat partisans exhibit less of a tendency to rate competing parties more negatively as ratings of their own party become stronger.

There is no clear pattern of contrasting party ratings among New Democrats of varying intensity. With the exception of strong New Democrats' ratings of the Bloc Quebecois, strong partisans exhibit less contrasting negativity than exhibited among moderate and weak New Democrat identifiers. Expectations that the tendency to contrast one's own party to the opposition intensifies as identification intensifies are not substantiated by the data reported by New Democratic Party identifiers.

Resting on the expectations of the classical model, Reform identifiers may not exhibit as great a contrasting effect among their evaluations of the Reform Party and those evaluations of each of the three competing parties as one may expect to find among traditional party identifiers. Reform partisans appear to exhibit contrasting evaluations of their own and rival parties in that negative correlations are evident

among six of nine pairings. The exceptions fall in weak Reform partisans' evaluations of competing parties in which the data suggest the absence of a contrasting effect. Based upon expectations, these exceptions are consistent with the notion of less partisan influence among the least strongly partisan identifiers. Moderate and strong Reform partisans tend to rate each of the three rival parties more negatively as their ratings for the Reform Party are more positive.

Similar to expectations for Reform partisans, Bloc Quebecois partisans may not manifest as strong a partisan contrast tendency as do identifiers of the three traditional parties. The party rating figures reported by Bloc identifiers in Table 4.2 depict a different pattern of evaluations than one may expect based upon a classical perspective. Bloc partisans exhibit evidence of contrasting evaluations of the Bloc Quebecois and the other political parties. Seven of nine pairings indicate a negative relationship in rating rival political parties in comparison to one's own party. The greater the rating of one's own party, the lesser the rating of one's rival parties. The average contrast ratings across rival parties appear to vary according to the strength of partisan intensity where strong Bloc identifiers tend to evaluate rival parties (-.28) more negatively on average than their moderate or weak Bloc cohorts.

Table 4.2 Correlation of Own Local Candidate Ratings with Rival Local Candidate Ratings: Broken down by Strength of Pre-Election Identification.

Identification		Own	Local	Candidate	With	Rival	Row Avg.
P.C.		P.C.	Liberal	N.D.P.	Reform	B.Q.	
P.C.	Strong		-.28*	-.05	.12	-.73	-.24
			(51)	(37)	(35)	(5)	
	Moderate		-.02	-.03	-.15*	.22	.01
			(225)	(151)	(170)	(27)	
	Weak		-.01	-.09	-.07	-.63*	-.20
			(151)	(108)	(108)	(32)	
Liberal	Strong	-.39*		-.17	-.07	-.43	-.27
		(99)		(83)	(60)	(15)	
	Moderate	-.10*		-.09	-.01	-.28*	-.12
		(289)		(235)	(178)	(51)	
	Weak	.06		-.04	-.30*	-.33*	-.15
		(141)		(107)	(81)	(30)	
N.D.P.	Strong	-.01	.32*		-.11*	---	.07
		(32)	(35)		(28)	(0)	
	Moderate	.16	-.05		-.56*	---	-.15
		(70)	(89)		(71)	(0)	
	Weak	-.09	.34*		.31*	.50	.27
		(39)	(47)		(34)	(3)	
Reform	Strong	.08	-.42*	-.37*		---	-.24
		(38)	(42)	(30)			
	Moderate	-.20	-.17	-.09		---	-.16
		(64)	(70)	(56)			
	Weak	.03	-.05	-.43		---	-.15
		(14)	(14)	(15)			
B.Q.	Strong	-.53*	-.17	.34	---		-.12
		(34)	(36)	(16)			
	Moderate	-.16	-.03	.04	---		-.05
		(77)	(83)	(39)			
	Weak	-.26	.02	-.23	---		-.17
		(19)	(20)	(7)			

* $p < 0.05$

According to inferences drawn from our understanding of the social-psychological model, one may expect to find evidence of a partisan contrast effect among partisans' evaluations of their own party's local candidate and those of rival local candidates running in the constituency. Table 4.2 displays the pattern of zero-order relationships for each partisan group.

Under the assumptions of the classical model, we ought to find support for the existence of a partisan contrasting effect among Conservative partisans when evaluating other parties' local candidates in relation to the local Conservative candidate. Conservative partisans appear to exhibit this contrast tendency in that ten of twelve own-rival candidate evaluation pairings correlate negatively. Thus, the more strongly positive one's feeling for one's own party's local candidate, the more strongly negative one's feelings for the local candidates representing opposing parties.

The contrast effect ranges in intensity among weak (-.01) and moderate (-.02) Conservatives' evaluations of Liberal candidates to weak (-.63*) and strong (-.73) Conservatives' evaluations of Bloc Quebecois candidates, yet, the contrast effect does not appear to consistently increase in intensity as Conservatives' intensity of identification increases.

Liberal partisans exhibit evidence of an operative partisan contrast effect. With the exception of weak Liberals' evaluations of local Conservative candidates, eleven of twelve pairings suggest that the more positive Liberal partisans' ratings of local Liberal candidates, the more negative the ratings of non-Liberal candidates.

One finds that opposing candidates are consistently evaluated more negatively as the less favourably than the local Liberal candidate. Generally, contrasting appears to be most pronounced among strongly partisan Liberals, less pronounced among weaker partisans. Yet, both moderate and weak Liberals exhibit substantial negativity toward the Bloc Quebecois candidate in relation to their ratings of other rival candidates and certainly in relation to their own party's local candidate. In the same sense, weak Liberals appear to exhibit substantially more pronounced contrast tendencies toward local Reform Party candidates than their more intensely Liberal cohorts.

The association among one's evaluation of opposing candidates and one's own candidate appears to vary substantially among New Democratic partisans. We find evidence of a similarity in NDP candidate-Liberal candidate evaluations among strong (.32) and weak (.34) partisans, yet, these evaluations are very different from those reported by their moderate fellow New Democrats. This asymmetry is exhibited within local Conservative candidate evaluations where the moderate partisans do not appear to overtly manifest contrasting. A contrast tendency appears most evident in relation to evaluations of Reform candidates by strong (-.11) and moderate (-.56) partisans, yet, weak partisans appear to manifest a moderate assimilation tendency toward the local Reform candidate. The strong (.50) positive association among New Democratic-Bloc candidate evaluations among weak partisans is highly suspect in that it is based upon only three reported cases and not significant.

Upon inferences drawn from our understanding of the classical model, one may not expect to find as great a contrast effect manifested among Reform partisans as among partisans of the traditional parties. Local candidate evaluations reported by

Reform partisans suggest that such an explanation is not substantiated for seven of nine pairings of evaluations of rival candidates and Reform candidates reported by Reform partisans suggest that partisan contrasting is at work. The data suggest that, regarding Liberal and New Democratic Party candidates, the more positive Reform partisans' ratings of local Reform candidates, the more negative the ratings of Liberal and New Democratic Party candidates. Such a pattern continues only among moderate Reform identifiers' evaluations of local Conservative Party candidates while strong and weak Reform identifiers report positive associations toward Conservative candidates. It is only in relation to the Liberal Party candidates that a pattern of growing intensity of contrasting occurs among the most intense Reform partisans.

Bloc Quebecois partisans may not manifest as strong a partisan contrast tendency as do identifiers of the three traditional parties. Local candidate ratings reported by Bloc identifiers present a different pattern of evaluations than one may expect based upon a classical perspective. Bloc partisans exhibit evidence of contrasting evaluations of Bloc Quebecois candidates and candidates representing rival political parties. Six of nine pairings indicate that, among Bloc identifiers, the greater the positive rating of one's local Bloc candidate, the greater the negative rating of rival non-Bloc candidates. It appears that Bloc partisans of moderate intensity manifest this tendency, on average, less strongly (-.05) than their strong or weak Bloc cohorts.

Judgmental consistency is a unique implication of the classical model. The traditional conceptualization of the partisan screening function requires a gestation or maturation period for screening to manifest itself. The inclusion of the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois on the political landscape allows for a unique opportunity to examine this partisan gestation hypothesis. According to the classical model, one

should expect to find evidence of judgmental consistency, manifest as a partisan assimilation-contrast effect, among the evaluations of partisan-related objects reported by partisans of the three traditional parties. Non-Traditional partisans ought not to manifest the assimilation-contrast effect to the same extent as their traditional identifier cohorts since they lack the long-term social and psychological reinforcement of identification. Table 4.3 presents combined zero-order relationships for leader, party and local candidate evaluations.

Table 4.3 Average Inter-Correlation of Own Partisan Object Ratings with Themselves and Rival Partisan Object Ratings: All Partisans, Broken Down by Pre-Election Party Identification.

Identification	Own Objects	Rival Objects
Progressive Conservative	.43* (549)	-.19* (502)
Liberal	.51* (738)	-.17* (615)
New Democrat	.38 (201)	-.09 (194)
Reform	.60 (165)	-.13 (159)
Bloc Quebecois	.58* (201)	-.16 (180)

* meets general threshold for significance; $p < .05$.

The pattern of data depicted in Table 4.3 contradict our hypothesis. Reform and Bloc partisans manifest greater attitudinal consistency in evaluating their own partisan objects than do Liberal, Conservative or New Democratic partisans. The existence of such a strong assimilation effect towards one's own partisan objects, and the strength of this assimilation effect relative to traditional party identifiers, appears to contradict the gestation hypothesis. The assimilation effect is least pronounced among New Democratic (.38) and Conservative (.43) identifiers suggesting that identification is less central to thinking about partisan-relevant objects among these

individuals. At the same time, we recognize that identification appears to play an unexpectedly central role in the assimilation tendencies of Reform and Bloc Quebecois partisans.

As encountered in Tables 4.0 through 4.2, there is considerable evidence of contrasting tendencies among partisans. When the leader, party and local candidate data are combined to form an average inter-correlation of objects, a similar picture emerges. The contrast tendency appears to be well represented among each of the five partisan groups in Table 4.3. This again, however, contradicts our hypothesis. There appear to be few differences in the contrasting tendencies of non-traditional partisans and traditional partisans. Unexpectedly we find that Reform (-.13) and Bloc (-.16) partisans manifest similar partisan contrast tendencies as Liberal (-.17) and Conservative (-.19) identifiers. New Democratic partisans appear to manifest the contrast effect to a slightly lesser degree.

As stated in Chapter Three of this thesis, one must strive to properly represent the causal sequence of the identification-consistency relationship. It may be just as plausible that people who interpret partisan-relevant objects as evaluatively contrasted (or similar) may then describe themselves as identifying with the party having the best overall evaluation.

Cross-sectional data relating to partisan-relevant objects provides evidence of partisan assimilation and contrast effects among identifiers of each of the parties. This tends to fit with the expectations derived from the classical model that partisanship is an influential factor in partisans' perceptions of political objects. Findings of substantial evaluative differences among partisans' perceptions of their own objects and those objects of rival parties suggests a general confirmation of this

model. However, the hypothesis that non-traditional identifiers ought to manifest the assimilation and contrast effect less than traditional identifiers appears to incorrectly represent the central role of partisanship among non-traditional identifiers.

The influence of partisanship should not be as prevalent among these non-traditional partisans for they have not undergone the long-term social and psychological reinforcement upon which the classical notion of partisan identification rests. Evidence that Reform and Bloc identifiers exhibit substantial partisan assimilation-contrast tendencies and that these tendencies are of similar intensity to those identifiers of the traditional parties raises doubt as to the gestation requirement inherent to the classical model.

Further justification of the "partisanship shapes evaluation" thesis may be found by demonstrating that the assimilation-contrast tendencies identified in the cross-sectional data may be replicated with longer-term data. One expects those respondents, for whom a longer-term identification can be established, will manifest the same (or greater) evidence of the assimilation-contrast effect as found among those partisans identified during the pre-election period. Table 4.4 presents the average inter-correlation coefficients of partisan-relevant object evaluations among long-term identifiers for each of the parties.

Table 4.4 Average Inter-Correlation of Own Partisan Object Ratings with Themselves and Rival Partisan Object Ratings: All Partisans, Broken Down by Long-Term Party Identification.

Long-Term Identification	Own Objects	Rival Objects
Progressive Conservative	.40* (141)	-.17 (129)
Liberal	.57* (263)	-.17 (169)
New Democrat	.54* (58)	-.08 (57)
Reform	.47 (23)	-.28 (23)
Bloc Quebecois	.57* (66)	-.20 (57)

* meets general threshold for significance; $p < .05$.

In general, the inter-correlation data from established long-term partisans mirror that reported for partisans identified in the pre-election period. According to our understanding of the causal sequence of the partisan-evaluations thesis, the data derived from the partisan-relevant object evaluations of these identified long-term partisans ought to evidence similar, or perhaps even stronger, assimilation-contrast effects. Comparing the results depicted in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, long-term Liberal, Conservative, and Bloc Quebecois identifiers appear to manifest very similar assimilation-contrast tendencies to their respective pre-election cohorts.

Long-term Liberals exhibit slightly more assimilation (.57) with their own partisan objects than do pre-election Liberals (.51) and manifest the same contrast tendency in evaluating out-partisan objects (-.17). The assimilation-contrast effect is slightly less pronounced among long-term Conservative partisans (.40; -.17) than among those identified Conservative partisans in the pre-election period, yet, these two groups remain remarkably similar. Bloc partisans, as well, manifest similar assimilation-contrast tendencies.

Some assimilation-contrast variation exists between pre-election and established long-term New Democratic and Reform Party identifiers. Long-term New Democratic partisans exhibit substantially greater assimilation tendencies when evaluating New Democratic objects (.54) than do their pre-election counterparts (.38), yet, exhibit the same contrast tendency (-.08 and -.09). Long-term Reform partisans manifest less assimilative consistency toward their own objects (.47) than pre-election Reform identifiers (.60) and manifest less favourable evaluations of the other parties (-.28) than pre-election Reform partisans(-.13).

Such findings buttress the assumption that partisanship is a temporally prior force by demonstrating that the same pattern of partisan assimilation-contrast effect obtains when we replicate using established longer-term identifiers. Among Liberal, Conservative, and Bloc identifiers the correlations are quite similar. With the exception of long-term Reform identifier's reduced assimilative tendencies, longer-term New Democrat and Reform identifiers to support expectations in that they manifest partisan-centred evaluation to a greater degree than their pre-election cohorts.

Comparing party identifiers, non-traditional partisans do exhibit fairly similar assimilation-contrast tendencies as those partisans of the long established Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic Parties. The initial treatment of leader, party and local candidate evaluations as isolated objects provided an indication that, in some cases, the contrast effects toward competing leaders, parties and local candidates reported by partisan identifiers appear to vary in intensity according to the strength of an individual's identification. Such findings among isolated objects are consistent with classical expectations for partisan-relevant objects as a whole where

judgmental consistency is expected to be greater among more strongly partisan individuals when evaluating partisan-relevant objects. This expectation leads to the second hypothesis: the greater the intensity of one's partisan identification, the greater the intensity of the assimilation-contrast effect when evaluating partisan-relevant objects. Table 4.5 presents the judgmental consistency figures among partisan groups broken down by strength of identification.

Table 4.5 Average Inter-Correlation of Object Ratings Among Themselves and with Rival Object Ratings, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Party Identification.

Identification		Own Objects	Rival Objects
Conservative	Strong	.62* (66)	-.28 (60)
	Moderate	.32* (292)	-.14 (264)
	Weak	.33 (91)	-.15 (178)
Liberal	Strong	.58* (145)	-.21 (114)
	Moderate	.53* (402)	-.17 (331)
	Weak	.44* (191)	-.12 (170)
New Democrat	Strong	.46 (44)	-.06 (40)
	Moderate	.41* (102)	-.12 (96)
	Weak	.28 (55)	-.08 (58)
Reform	Strong	.69* (53)	-.17 (50)
	Moderate	.61* (93)	-.16 (90)
	Weak	.51 (19)	-.05 (19)
Bloc Quebecois	Strong	.67* (53)	-.23 (46)
	Moderate	.62* (118)	-.16 (106)
	Weak	.48 (30)	-.10 (28)

* meets general threshold for significance; $p < .05$.

Among Liberal identifiers we expect to find evidence of the assimilation-contrast tendency manifest to the greatest degree among strong partisan individuals. The data presented in Table 4.5 support such an expectation. We find strong Liberals to manifest greater assimilation (.58) toward their own objects and greater contrast (-.21) toward others than do their moderate (.53 and -.17) and weak (.44 and -.12) counterparts.

Similar to Liberal partisans, one expects Conservative identifiers to manifest the assimilation-contrast effect in a manner consistent with our second hypothesis. Conservative partisans follow this pattern. Strong Conservatives exhibit greater assimilation and greater contrast tendencies than their weaker Conservative counterparts. Unlike the pattern we find among Liberals, however, moderate and weak Conservative partisans exhibit very similar assimilation-contrast tendencies when evaluating partisan-relevant objects. In addition we note that both assimilation and contrast are much less pronounced among weak and moderate partisans than among the strong.

Among New Democratic identifiers one would expect the more strongly partisan to manifest the most pronounced assimilation-contrast tendency. The correlation patterns among New Democrat partisans is mixed. In terms of assimilation effect, strong New Democrat partisans manifest greater consistency toward NDP objects (.46) than do their moderate (.41) or weak (.28) fellow New Democrats. The distribution of assimilation tendencies across these three groups fits well with the partisan-evaluation relationship as we have hypothesized.

Contrast tendencies on the part of New Democratic partisans appear to be less conclusive. The moderately partisan (-.12) exhibit the most pronounced tendency

to contrast competing partisan-relevant objects with those of their own party while the weak (-.08) and strong (-.06) manifest this effect to a lesser degree.

Defining expectations regarding the assimilation-contrast tendency among strong, moderate and weak Reform and Bloc partisans is a more difficult task than for partisans of the traditional parties. According to inferences based upon the classical model, non-traditional partisans ought to manifest less assimilation-contrast effect toward evaluations of partisan-relevant objects. In testing the first hypothesis, however, it was noted that there appeared to be few differences in the partisan assimilation-contrast tendencies exhibited among traditional and non-traditional party identifiers.

Examining the second hypothesis, a general relationship emerges in which it appears that as one's strength of partisan disposition intensifies so too does the assimilation-contrast effect. However, among non-traditional partisans one must infer from the classical model that not only will traditional party strong partisans manifest assimilation-contrasting more than moderate and weak partisans but also that they do so more than strong non-traditional identifiers.

The data for Reform partisans appear to fit the pattern of the traditional parties. Strong partisans manifest both greater assimilation toward their own objects and greater contrast with those objects identified with other parties. The strength of these assimilation-contrast associations appears to diminish as the intensity of partisan identification lessens. Such findings on the surface would appear to confirm the applicability of our second hypothesis. Yet, because of the special circumstances of the 1993 Canadian election, these results may actually serve to take away from the classical notion of party identification.

Looking at the assimilation effect among Reform partisans, evidence of judgmental consistency toward one's own leader, party and local candidate is greater than that expressed by any of their comparative Liberal, Conservative, or New Democratic counterparts. In short, the pattern exhibited by Reform identifiers suggests that not only do they as a group exhibit substantial assimilation tendencies but also that they exhibit these tendencies more than traditional party identifiers.

Bloc Quebecois partisans appear to follow the pattern established by the other parties. One may expect to find less consistency of attitude expressed in evaluations of leaders, parties and local candidates among Bloc partisans, yet, this is not the case. Bloc partisans at each level of intensity exhibit greater assimilation tendencies than their traditional party counterparts and exhibit assimilation effects quite similar to those recorded among Reform partisans. As well, Bloc partisans appear to manifest partisan contrasting tendencies to a similar extent as traditional Liberal and Conservative partisans.

Table 4.6 Average Inter-Correlation of Object Ratings Among Themselves and with Rival Object Ratings, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Party Identification.

Identification		Own Objects	Rival Objects
Conservative	Strong	.50 (20)	-.29 (17)
	Moderate	.35 (84)	-.15 (77)
	Weak	.34 (37)	-.08 (35)
Liberal	Strong	.75* (39)	-.21 (32)
	Moderate	.49* (112)	-.16 (91)
	Weak	.47* (112)	-.15 (46)
New Democrat	Strong	.73 (10)	.05 (7)
	Moderate	.41 (34)	-.14 (35)
	Weak	.50 (14)	-.16 (15)
Reform	Strong	.44 (11)	-.36 (11)
	Moderate	.50 (12)	-.21 (12)
	Weak	--- (0)	--- (0)
Bloc Quebecois	Strong	.69 (24)	-.37 (20)
	Moderate	.45 (33)	-.18 (29)
	Weak	.58 (9)	-.06 (8)

* meets general threshold for significance; $p < .05$.

It is useful to demonstrate that the pattern of assimilation-contrast tendencies identified in the cross-sectional data may be replicated with longer-term data. Respondents, for whom a longer-term identification can be established, should manifest the same (or greater) evidence of the assimilation-contrast effect as found among those partisans of varying intensity identified during the pre-election period. Accordingly, strong, moderate, and weak longer-term partisans established as such over the year preceding the election should exhibit less partisan assimilation-contrast effect than those persons identified during the period of time immediately before the election.

Long-term, strong Conservative partisans manifest a less pronounced assimilation tendency (.50) than that found among their pre-election cohorts (.62). While this pattern runs against expectations, the consistency of contrasting evaluations among these long-term identifiers (-.29) appears very similar to that found within the pre-election group (-.28). It appears that strong Conservatives, establish as such during the pre-referendum and pre-election periods, manifest less assimilative consistency (.50) toward the Conservative leader, party, and local candidate than those Conservatives identified only in the pre-election period. Yet, both groups clearly present a pattern where the stronger one's positive feelings about one's own partisan objects, the stronger one's negative feelings about one's rivals.

Moderate Conservatives exhibit slightly more assimilation toward Conservative objects (.35) than found among pre-election identified moderates (.32). The data show that the contrasting tendencies of the long-term and pre-election groups are as expected. Among long-term weak Conservative identifiers, assimilation effects appear to be consistent with those found among their pre-election cohorts.

The contrast tendency toward non-Conservative objects is less pronounced among long-term weak identifiers (-.08) than expressed within the pre-election group(-.15).

Among long-term Liberal identifiers we expect to find evidence of an assimilation-contrast effect most pronounced among the strongest partisans. Indeed, the data confirm such an expectation. The strongly Liberal manifest very strong (.75) assimilation tendencies toward the Liberal leader, party, and local candidate. The strength of this effect is more pronounced than among the strong Liberal, pre-election identifiers (.58). Strong long-term Liberals manifest a clear contrast tendency in their evaluations of non-Liberal objects (-.21) mirroring the relationship found among strong Liberals in the cross-sectional data (-.21).

Moderate long-term Liberals exhibit slightly less consistency toward their own objects (.49) than found among moderate Liberals based upon pre-election identifications only. The gap between strong and moderate Liberals is much more defined among the long-term partisan group. The data again show the contrast tendency among moderate Liberals to vary little among moderate Liberals established during the pre-election period (-.17) as opposed to those whom we can verify as being moderate Liberals over a longer period of time.

Weak Liberal identifiers manifest greater assimilation-contrast tendencies than do their pre-election counterparts. While the differences are slight, long-term Liberals are a little more disposed toward their own objects and away from non-Liberal objects. Such findings fit within expectations for Liberal identifiers, yet, one must also note that long-term moderate (.49 and -.16) and weak (.47 and -.15) Liberal partisans do not appear to differ widely in the degree of assimilation-contrast expressed toward partisan-relevant objects as may be expected.

We should expect to find a similar, if not stronger pattern of assimilation-contrast among long-term New Democratic identifiers. The data generally confirm this expectation. The strongly New Democratic manifest very strong (.73) assimilation tendencies toward NDP objects. This effect is much more pronounced than the assimilation effect found among the pre-election strong partisan group (.46). The contrast tendencies of the long-term strong partisans toward rival leaders, parties and local candidates are inconsistent with the expected pattern. Unlike any of the other partisans, regardless of group or intensity, these strong, long-term New Democrats appear to manifest assimilation tendencies toward non-NDP objects. At the same time, one must note the substantial degree of consistency toward New Democrat objects (.73) held by these strong New Democrats. Clearly they differentiate between New Democratic Party and rival party objects, yet, they do not exhibit the same pattern of negativity toward rivals as do moderate and weak New Democrats or any of the other party identifiers.

Longer-term moderate New Democrats exhibit the same assimilation-contrast effect as seen among the pre-election moderates. Assimilative tendencies toward New Democrat objects are identical for the two groups (.41) and the contrast effect appears to manifest itself only slightly more (-.14) among the long-term moderate partisans. Weak New Democrat identifiers manifest greater assimilation-contrast tendencies than do their moderate cohorts. This relationship is unlike that found in the pre-election identification data where the assimilation-contrast effects for moderate and weak New Democrats are consistent with the classical expectations that the effects become less pronounced the lesser one's strength of identification.

Among Reform partisans identified during the pre-election period, the data fit a classical pattern and thus appear to confirm the strength-consistency hypothesis. For not only did we conclude on the basis of pre-election identifications that Reform partisans exhibit substantial levels of consistency but also that they exhibit them to a greater degree than do traditional identifiers. Over the longer-period of time, the assimilation tendencies of strong Reform partisans are substantially less pronounced than those found among the pre-election group, yet, the contrast tendencies are much more pronounced evidencing strong negative associations with non-Reform leaders, parties, and local candidates.

Unlike the classical distribution found among the established pre-election groups, long-term moderate identifiers manifest greater assimilation effects than their strongly Reform counterparts. This greater manifestation does not hold true for contrast effects, however, as moderate Reform identifiers appear to exhibit less negativity. We can account for no weak Reform partisans over both the pre-referendum and pre-election periods.

With the exception of moderate partisan's assimilation tendencies, we find long-term Bloc partisans exhibit a classical pattern of consistency across strong, moderate, and weak identifiers. The strongly partisan manifest the greatest assimilation-contrast effect toward partisan-relevant objects. Moderates exhibit less assimilative consistency toward Bloc objects than their weak Bloc identifier counterparts but more contrast towards opposing leaders, parties and local candidates.

Overview

We began this chapter with an examination of the relative evaluations of leaders, parties, and local candidates reported by partisans in the 1993 Canadian National Election Study. These data were supplemented with a discussion of the extent to which these findings conform to inferences made regarding the internal consistency of each of leader, party, and local candidate evaluations among partisans of each of the five major political parties.

The first hypothesis stated that traditional party identifiers ought to exhibit greater evidence of a partisan assimilation-contrast effect than non-traditional party identifiers. This hypothesis was not supported with evidence drawn from the 1993 Canadian National Elections Study. Non-traditional identifiers were found to manifest greater assimilation tendencies toward their own partisan-relevant objects than do traditional identifiers toward their own objects. Combining separate leader, party, and local candidate data, non-traditional identifiers exhibited few differences from their traditional counterparts in the contrast effect toward objects associated with competing parties.

These findings were replicated with data covering a longer period of time. Among partisans for whom a longer-term identification could be established, these data mirrored findings reported by partisans identified during the pre-election period only. Again, non-traditional identifiers were found to exhibit similar partisan assimilation-contrast tendencies as those evidenced among identifiers of the traditional parties.

The second hypothesis stated the stronger an individual's partisan identification, the greater the assimilation-contrast effect on evaluations of partisan-relevant objects. Taking into consideration our first hypothesis, however, the expectation was to find strong, moderate, and weak non-traditional identifiers to manifest less assimilation-contrast effect than their comparative traditional partisan cohorts. The data generally supported this view for among all five groups of partisans, the partisan assimilation-contrast effect appears to be most pronounced among the most intensely partisan individuals. Similar to the data which contradicted the gestation hypothesis, strong, moderate and weak non-traditional partisans were found to generally exhibit assimilation-contrast tendencies equal to or, in some cases, greater than those exhibited by traditional partisans.

Again, an attempt was made to replicate the strength-consistency hypothesis using established longer-term party identifiers. With the exception of strong Reform partisans, the most strongly partisan manifest the greatest assimilation tendencies toward their own objects. Moderate Reform partisans appear to exhibit greater assimilative tendencies over the long-term. In terms of contrast effects, again the most intensely partisan groups exhibited the most pronounced assimilation-contrast effects with the exception of longer-term New Democratic partisans who surprisingly exhibited some assimilation toward rival leaders, parties and local candidates, yet, maintained a clear distinction between their own and rival parties' objects. In this sense there is general support for the strength-consistency hypothesis.

Each of the five longer-term partisan identifier groups exhibited some difference from their pre-election cohorts. Liberal and Bloc identifiers exhibited similar or slightly more pronounced assimilation-contrast effects than those found among Liberal and Bloc partisans identified during the pre-election period only.

Long-term Conservatives exhibit less pronounced assimilation effects, yet, similar contrasting tendencies over the longer-term. New Democrats, with the exception of strong partisan's contrast tendencies, exhibited stronger assimilation-contrast effects over time while Reform partisans appear to manifest less assimilative effect but a greater partisan contrasting tendency over the year-long period prior to the election. While the long-term data are less conclusive, one cannot overlook the unexpectedly partisan-consistent behaviour of Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois identifiers.

Summary and Conclusions

Summary and Conclusions

This final chapter provides a summary of findings and seeks to place them within the wider context of Canadian voting research. This thesis began by asking the question: Does party identification fulfill the same role in political cognition for Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois identifiers as it does for Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic Party identifiers. It was suggested that answers to this question would have far-reaching implications for our understanding of the way in which people think about political objects. This chapter proceeds by summarizing the study and presenting discussion of the implications of the partisan assimilation-contrast data.

The linkage between psychological attachment to party, perceptual adjustment, and consistency of attitude is a compelling and powerful thesis for examining voting behaviour. The classical model developed by Campbell and his colleagues envisions party identification to be an affective, psychological force which serves to direct and maintain the consistency of one's evaluations of political objects. The *American Voter* team concluded that party identification has a profound influence on the perceptions of political objects and that responses to elements of national politics are acutely influenced by the individual's enduring partisan ties. The affective process of evaluation and distortion came to be recognized by the authors as a partisan screen and is an implication unique to social-psychological models of voting behaviour. Indeed, the influence of identification appeared so strong that Converse (1964) would conclude that party identification is the central structure around which the political belief systems of the mass public are organized.

Some researchers have presented alternative explanations of the role and function of party identification in the voting process. Fiorina (1981) presented a revised approach to party identification. He rejected the classical notion of party identification as an antecedent psychological force dominating voters' perceptions of political objects. For Fiorina, party identification is simply a cumulative tally of rational evaluations which functions as an on-going, short-hand device permitting voters to make sense of the political environment and adjust their attitudes toward party objects they encounter accordingly.

Canadian research tends to recognize both the classical and revisionist models in acknowledging the existence of stable and flexible partisans in the electorate. The 1993 election data provided us with a unique opportunity to examine the classical model in that two new political parties competed for the first time alongside the three traditional parties. We sought to examine the relationship between identification and object-evaluations reported by partisans identifying with one of the three traditional or two non-traditional parties in order to answer our original question. Comparing the two models, we found the partisan screening function, manifested through judgmental consistency, to be a unique implication of the classical model. Hence, findings of partisan-relevant consistency would tend to discount the alternative explanation offered by the revisionist model in that evidence of consistency would represent a significant complication to Fiorina's characterization of identification.

The specific aim of this thesis was to examine two hypotheses related to the screening effect manifest among partisan individuals. The first hypothesis was that when comparing party identifiers, traditional identifiers ought to exhibit greater evidence of judgmental consistency in their evaluations of partisan-relevant political objects than do non-traditional identifiers. Therefore, the expectation was for the

data to be consistent with the notion that traditional party identifiers would exhibit greater partisan assimilation-contrast tendencies toward objects than would non-traditional party identifiers. A second hypothesis followed that the stronger an individual's partisan identification, the greater the judgmental consistency in viewing political objects. The assumption was that not only would strong traditional partisans manifest greater assimilation-contrast tendencies than their weaker cohorts, but also that they would manifest greater assimilation-contrast tendencies than strongly partisan non-traditional party identifiers.

Prior to testing the hypotheses, leader, party, and local candidate evaluations reported by partisans for each of the five parties were examined as isolated objects.. The data were supplemented by a discussion of the extent to which these findings conform to inferences made regarding the internal consistency of each of these objects reported by identifiers of each party. Although the *American Voter* made no explicit provision for partisans to manifest contrasting tendencies toward rival leaders, parties, and local candidates as isolated objects, evidence of the partisan-contrast effect was found among partisans' evaluations of each of the objects.

As reported, the first hypothesis stated that traditional party identifiers ought to exhibit greater evidence of judgmental consistency than non-traditional identifiers. This hypothesis was not supported in that Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois identifiers exhibited few differences from their Liberal, Progressive Conservative, and New Democratic Party counterparts in the assimilation-contrast effects manifest toward partisan-relevant objects. Measures of attitudinal consistency indicated the existence of a partisan screening function across large segments of the sample. Attempting to validate the causal model, these findings were replicated among partisans for whom a longer-term, durable identification could be established. Object

ratings reported by these longer-term partisans exhibit the same pattern as found among the ratings reported by pre-election identifiers.

The second hypothesis stated the stronger an individual's partisan identification, the greater the judgmental consistency in viewing political objects. The data generally support this hypothesis for among each of the five partisan groups, those individuals with the strongest disposition manifest the greatest assimilation-contrast effects when evaluating partisan-relevant objects. The evidence suggests more intensely partisan individuals possess the ability, habit or motivation to view political stimuli in a more balanced cognitive framework than less intensely partisan individuals. These findings were replicated when only longer-term partisans were included. A general conclusion was that the greater one's strength of identification, the more pronounced the partisan assimilation-contrast effect tends to be.

A corollary to the second hypothesis, however, was related to our first. From our understanding of the classical model, it was hypothesized that non-traditional partisans should not exhibit as high a degree of evaluative consistency toward partisan-relevant objects. From this hypothesis, one could expect to find comparatively less consistency among strong, moderate, and weak non-traditional partisans than among their traditional party counterparts. Consistent with the data which contradicted the first hypothesis, little substantive difference was found between traditional and non-traditional partisans when separated by strength of identification. This pattern provides further evidence of the apparent similarity in the role that party identification fulfills among Liberal, Progressive Conservative, New Democratic, and Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois identifiers.

Taken together the findings of this study are largely consistent with the notion that, among those who acknowledge an association with a major political party, partisan identification seems to be an important structure around which political cognition is organized. Data from the 1993 Canadian election show that partisans maintain a clear differentiation between their own and rival leaders, parties, and local candidates and that this division appears to rest upon the influence of an individual's party identification. The stronger one's positive ratings of one's own leader, party and local candidate the stronger the negative ratings of rival objects. In addition, this tendency to contrast one's own objects relative to the opposition intensifies as partisan identity intensifies.

In a sense, this is consistent with the classical model, yet, we find some striking contradictions regarding the nature of this identification. The classical model is based upon the notion that partisan identification is the result of extensive, long-term social and psychological reinforcements. As such, the manifestation of identification is commonly thought to require a gestation or maturation period. Our first hypothesis was based upon such an understanding for it was expected that those without the opportunity to form this social-psychological reinforcement over a long period of time would manifest less evidence of partisan screening. The data indicated otherwise; the substantial degree of consistency found among non-traditional identifiers appears to be inconsistent with the characterization of identification requiring a long-term gestation or maturation period.

We conclude that partisan identification is a central structure around which many partisans organize their thinking about political objects. Yet, the gestation requirement for such a profoundly influential effect is far from substantiated, for those without the social-psychological reinforcement appear just as likely, if not

more so, to manifest partisan-consistent thinking. Without such a gestation period, there is no provision for the initial development of partisanship as characterized in the classical assertion. The underlying motivational basis for the formulation of screening and perceptual distortion is unclear. Accordingly, we cannot, within the confines of the American Voter model, explain the relatively high degrees of attitudinal consistency exhibited among the leader, party and candidate evaluations reported by Reform and Bloc Quebecois identifiers. They should not exhibit this degree of partisan consistency, but apparently they do. By the same token, these non-traditional partisans should not exhibit similar (or greater) consistency toward objects as do traditional identifiers, but, again, the non-traditional partisans appear to do just that. If the manifestation of the partisan effect does not require a long-term gestation period, then the characterization of the social-psychological bases of the classical model may require revision.

While there are inconsistencies between some of the expectations of the classical model and the data, the expectations of the revisionist conceptualization also are inconsistent with the data. Substantial, wide-spread judgmental consistency expressed toward objects among all partisan groups suggests that many people appear to be making at least some use of party symbols to interpret and store political information. As Fiorina characterized party identification, there is no need for citizens to maintain attitude consistency if they process information through rational evaluations. Inconsistent information would not be (irrationally) purged by a process of perceptual distortion, but rather accounted for by the individual as part of the rational evaluative process. It is not improbable that some people might manifest consistent, rational-based attitudes toward objects; however, one suspects such thinking would not generally occur across segments of the electorate in the proportions that appear among the data at hand. Evidence of pronounced, consistent

assimilation-contrast tendencies among large numbers of partisans represent a significant complication to Fiorina's revisionist hypothesis.

This thesis has not begun to address many of the crucial issues with regard to evaluations of partisan-relevant objects. The debate over the role of party identification in the minds of voters remains contentious. The notion of a centralized partisan structure that guides the evaluation and interpretation of political leaders, parties and local candidates appears to be valid among many of those who acknowledge an association with a major political party. Partisans of the 1993 election are more similar than one may have had expected based upon an understanding of the classical model.

In order to maintain a manageable investigation and discussion, party identification and attitudinal consistency were treated as isolated concepts. In the broader context of political cognition, however, they are related to many other concepts. Converse argued that belief systems comprise three elements including (1) the expanse of an individual's opinions, (2) attitude consistency, and (3) the extent to which individuals use abstract concepts to organize political cognitions. The notion of political sophistication is very much interwoven with the concepts examined in this study. Indeed, the original *American Voter* raised many important lines of research on the relevance of sophistication to political cognition and specifically to partisan-related cognition. We acknowledge our sole concentration on partisan-related consistency is limiting in our broader understanding of the manner in which the electorate, regardless of party identification, chooses to think about politics and political objects. Our understanding of the behaviour evidenced among partisans would benefit greatly with further investigation into the relevance of political

sophistication with regard to the partisan assimilation-contrast effect. Clearly this topic requires further empirical investigation.

Finally, we must acknowledge that while we have undertaken to make the best possible use of available data, we cannot hope to have reached any definitive conclusions based upon data from a single electoral period. The nature of this thesis has been to investigate a unique phenomenon that occurred with the sudden national presence of two new political parties. If these two new parties survive, which one must presume they will, researchers will have further opportunities to examine any number of intriguing questions not the least of which will relate to political cognition. It is hoped that this thesis may in some way contribute to the understanding of partisan-relevant cognitions and the broader field of Canadian electoral behaviour.

Appendix A:

Correlation of Progressive Conservative Object Ratings (Thermometers) with
Themselves and with Non-Conservative Object Ratings: Conservatives Only, Broken
Down by Strength of Pre-Election Conservative Identification.

Post-Election Campbell Rating With:	Weak Conservative	Moderate Conservative	Strong Conservative
P.C. Party	.50* (225)	.61* (337)	.68* (76)
Campbell			
P.C. Candidate	.16* (174)	.13* (270)	.57* (60)
Liberal Party	-.16* (226)	-.23* (336)	-.15 (76)
Chretien	-.25* (225)	-.18* (332)	-.15 (73)
Lib. Candidate	-.13* (170)	-.23* (246)	.14 (54)
NDP	.00 (220)	.08 (332)	-.04 (74)
McLaughlin	.06 (198)	.15* (300)	.04 (62)
NDP Candidate	-.08 (116)	.06* (160)	-.15 (37)
Reform Party	-.17* (214)	-.22* (328)	-.58* (74)
Manning	-.07 (194)	-.15* (301)	-.60* (63)
Reform Candidate	-.25* (121)	-.24* (182)	-.47* (39)
Bloc Quebecois	-.18* (214)	-.26* (326)	-.34* (71)
Bouchard	-.10 (155)	-.23* (250)	-.44* (53)
BQ Candidate	.14 (30)	-.29 (31)	-.70 (6)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Progressive Conservative Object Ratings (Thermometers) with
Themselves and with Non-Conservative Object Ratings: Conservatives Only, Broken
Down by Strength of Pre-Election Conservative Identification.

Post-Election PC Party Rating With: P.C. Party	Weak Conservative	Moderate Conservative	Strong Conservative
Campbell	.50* (225)	.61* (337)	.68* (76)
P.C. Candidate	.33* (174)	.23* (271)	.62* (61)
Liberal Party	-.25* (232)	-.27* (344)	-.35* (80)
Chretien	-.27* (228)	-.26* (335)	-.31* (75)
Liberal Candidate	-.08 (173)	-.24* (249)	-.20 (56)
NDP	.01 (228)	.09 (339)	-.09 (78)
McLaughlin	-.12* (197)	.01 (300)	-.10 (64)
NDP Candidate	-.07 (117)	.00 (161)	-.16 (38)
Reform Party	-.12* (224)	-.18* (335)	-.18 (78)
Manning	-.12 (195)	-.14* (302)	-.30* (63)
Reform Candidate	-.21* (122)	-.34* (182)	-.17 (38)
Bloc Quebecois	-.16* (221)	-.29* (333)	-.45* (75)
Bouchard	-.13* (157)	-.22* (253)	-.47* (55)
BQ Candidate	-.64* (32)	-.41* (32)	-.71 (6)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Progressive Conservative Object Ratings (Thermometers) with
Themselves and with Non-Conservative Object Ratings: Conservatives Only, Broken
Down by Strength of Pre-Election Conservative Identification.

Post-Election PC Candidate Rating With:	Weak Conservative	Moderate Conservative	Strong Conservative
P.C. Party	.33* (174)	.23* (271)	.62* (61)
Campbell	.16* (174)	.13* (270)	.57* (60)
P.C. Candidate			
Liberal Party	-.10 (175)	-.27* (271)	-.30* (61)
Chretien	-.03 (175)	-.23* (266)	-.34* (58)
Liberal Candidate	-.01 (151)	-.02 (225)	-.28* (51)
NDP	.01* (171)	-.08 (268)	-.28* (60)
McLaughlin	-.15* (152)	-.06 (247)	-.15 (51)
NDP Candidate	-.09 (108)	-.03 (151)	-.05 (37)
Reform Party	-.15 (169)	-.10 (264)	-.27* (60)
Manning	-.05 (150)	-.15* (244)	-.07 (49)
Reform Candidate	-.07 (108)	-.15* (170)	.12 (35)
Bloc Quebecois	-.14* (166)	-.03 (263)	-.51* (57)
Bouchard	-.13* (157)	.02 (203)	-.32* (42)
BQ Candidate	-.63* (32)	.22 (27)	-.73 (5)

* p < .05

Correlation of Liberal Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Liberal Object Ratings: Liberals Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Liberal Identification.

Post-Election Chretien Rating With:	Weak Liberals	Moderate Liberals	Strong Liberals
Liberal Party	.66* (225)	.75* (441)	.72* (158)
Chretien			
Lib. Candidate	.42* (173)	.38* (381)	.53* (138)
P.C. Party	-.20* (224)	-.25* (440)	-.41* (157)
Campbell	-.26* (219)	-.23* (420)	-.41* (142)
P.C. Candidate	-.16* (147)	-.20* (300)	-.30* (101)
NDP	.00* (218)	-.15* (426)	-.29* (155)
McLaughlin	.10 (193)	-.05 (370)	-.03 (129)
NDP Candidate	.04 (110)	-.18* (237)	.02 (83)
Reform Party	-.16* (210)	-.13* (421)	-.13 (141)
Manning	-.09 (179)	-.10* (345)	-.09 (115)
Reform Candidate	-.02 (84)	-.08 (182)	-.17 (63)
Bloc Quebecois	-.19* (218)	-.17* (415)	-.23* (144)
Bouchard	-.27* (171)	-.12* (329)	-.07 (115)
BQ Candidate	-.38* (43)	-.39* (54)	-.25 (15)

* p < .05

Correlation of Liberal Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with
Non-Liberal Object Ratings: Liberals Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-
Election Liberal Identification.

Post-Election Liberal Party Rating With: Liberal Party	Weak Liberals	Moderate Liberals	Strong Liberals
Chretien	.66* (225)	.75* (441)	.72* (158)
Lib. Candidate	.23* (175)	.45* (386)	.47* (139)
P.C. Party	-.14* (230)	-.21* (445)	-.32* (159)
Campbell	-.21* (219)	-.24* (419)	-.46* (142)
P.C. Candidate	-.05 (149)	-.18* (302)	-.32* (103)
NDP	-.04 (224)	-.05 (369)	-.20* (156)
McLaughlin	-.06 (192)	-.07 (432)	-.01 (129)
NDP Candidate	-.09 (110)	-.16* (240)	.01 (83)
Reform Party	-.11 (215)	-.12* (426)	-.23* (142)
Manning	-.08* (179)	-.10* (345)	-.29* (115)
Reform Candidate	.12 (84)	-.12 (183)	-.40* (63)
Bloc Quebecois	-.17* (224)	-.21* (420)	-.16* (146)
Bouchard	-.19* (170)	-.21* (330)	-.09 (116)
BQ Candidate	-.32* (34)	-.45* (55)	-.20 (15)

* p < .05

Correlation of Liberal Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Liberal Object Ratings: Liberals Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Liberal Identification.

Liberal Candidate	Weak Liberals	Moderate Liberals	Strong Liberals
Rating With:			
Liberal Party	.23* (175)	.45* (386)	.48* (139)
Chretien	.42* (173)	.38* (381)	.53* (138)
Lib. Candidate			
P.C. Party	-.10 (175)	-.24* (384)	-.30* (138)
Campbell	-.15* (168)	-.23* (364)	-.31* (123)
P.C. Candidate	.06 (141)	-.10* (289)	-.39* (99)
NDP	.05 (172)	-.12* (375)	-.15* (136)
McLaughlin	.12 (151)	-.11* (327)	.05 (114)
NDP Candidate	.04 (107)	-.09 (235)	-.17 (83)
Reform Party	-.20* (167)	-.13* (368)	-.18* (124)
Manning	-.12 (145)	-.10* (305)	-.17 (100)
Reform Candidate	-.30* (81)	-.01 (178)	-.07 (60)
Bloc Quebecois	-.18* (169)	-.20* (362)	-.15* (128)
Bouchard	-.20* (131)	-.20* (284)	-.13 (101)
BQ Candidate	-.33* (30)	-.28* (51)	-.43 (15)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of New Democrat Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-New Democrat Object Ratings: New Democrats Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election New Democrat Identification.

Post-Election McLaughlin Rating With:	Weak New Democrat	Moderate New Democrat	Strong New Democrat
NDP	.52* (67)	.64* (114)	.33* (47)
McLaughlin			
NDP Candidate	.00 (48)	.23* (95)	.50* (43)
Liberal Party	.08 (68)	.08 (115)	.18 (48)
Chretien	.18 (68)	.19* (113)	.19 (46)
Lib. Candidate	.01 (55)	-.12 (95)	.14 (36)
P.C. Party	-.29* (68)	-.22* (115)	-.17 (48)
Campbell	.02 (67)	-.06 (111)	.00 (45)
P.C. Candidate	-.19 (42)	.00 (74)	-.19 (31)
Reform Party	-.40* (67)	-.34* (113)	-.10 (46)
Manning	-.42* (60)	-.32* (107)	-.17 (39)
Reform Candidate	-.09 (39)	-.28* (71)	-.15 (27)
Bloc Quebecois	.04 (91)	.04 (114)	-.10 (36)
Bouchard	.04 (49)	-.03 (79)	-.05 (45)
BQ Candidate	--- (0)	--- (0)	--- (0)

* p < .05

Correlation of New Democrat Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-New Democrat Object Ratings: New Democrats Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election New Democrat Identification.

Post-Election NDP Rating With: NDP	Weak New Democrat	Moderate New Democrat	Strong New Democrat
McLaughlin	.52* (67)	.64* (114)	.33* (47)
NDP Candidate	.32* (50)	.34* (99)	.55* (43)
Liberal Party	.25* (73)	.09 (119)	.19 (48)
Chretien	.09* (71)	.11 (115)	-.03 (45)
Lib. Candidate	.27* (58)	-.05 (100)	-.06 (36)
P.C. Party	-.28* (73)	-.24* (119)	.23 (48)
Campbell	-.13 (70)	-.17* (113)	-.15 (44)
P.C. Candidate	-.21 (44)	.00 (78)	-.13 (31)
Reform Party	-.38* (72)	-.41* (117)	-.28* (47)
Manning	-.39* (62)	-.35* (110)	-.26 (39)
Reform Candidate	-.08 (42)	-.48* (76)	-.32* (28)
Bloc Quebecois	-.20 (66)	.04 (114)	-.23 (45)
Bouchard	-.31* (50)	-.03 (79)	-.04 (36)
BQ Candidate	.87 (4)	--- (0)	--- (0)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of New Democrat Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-New Democrat Object Ratings: New Democrats Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election New Democrat Identification.

Post-Election NDP Candidate Rating With:	Weak New Democrat	Moderate New Democrat	Strong New Democrat
NDP	.32* (50)	.34* (99)	.55* (43)
McLaughlin	.00 (48)	.23* (95)	.50* (43)
NDP Candidate			
Liberal Party	-.03 (51)	.04 (99)	.32* (44)
Chretien	-.13 (50)	-.11 (96)	.08 (41)
Lib. Candidate	.34* (47)	-.05 (89)	.32* (35)
P.C. Party	-.09 (51)	-.03 (99)	-.11 (44)
Campbell	-.34* (49)	-.08 (93)	-.08 (40)
P.C. Candidate	-.09 (39)	.16 (70)	-.01 (32)
Reform Party	.07 (50)	-.45* (70)	-.21 (89)
Manning	.02 (43)	-.48* (93)	-.24 (37)
Reform Candidate	.31* (34)	-.56* (71)	-.11 (28)
Bloc Quebecois	-.30* (45)	.04 (114)	-.21 (41)
Bouchard	-.50* (33)	-.03 (79)	-.21 (33)
BQ Candidate	.50 (3)	--- (0)	--- (0)

* p < .05

Correlation of Reform Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Reform Object Ratings: Reform Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Reform Identification.

Post-Election Manning Rating With:	Weak Reform	Moderate Reform	Strong Reform
Reform Party	.47* (20)	.72* (96)	.91* (58)
Manning			
Reform Candidate	.72* (18)	.45* (87)	.55* (50)
Liberal Party	.23 (20)	-.32* (96)	-.30* (58)
Chretien	.35 (35)	-.19* (95)	-.20 (57)
Lib. Candidate	-.20 (14)	-.32* (70)	-.50* (45)
P.C. Party	-.04 (20)	-.08 (96)	-.07 (58)
Campbell	-.38* (20)	-.02 (93)	-.11 (52)
P.C. Candidate	-.28 (14)	-.18 (64)	-.04 (42)
NDP	-.26 (20)	-.02 (96)	-.04 (56)
McLaughlin	-.36 (20)	-.24* (88)	.08 (53)
NDP Candidate	-.51* (15)	-.16 (56)	-.29 (31)

* p < .05

Correlation of Reform Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Reform Object Ratings: Reform Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Reform Identification.

Post-Election Reform Party Rating With: Reform Party	Weak Reform	Moderate Reform	Strong Reform
Manning	.47* (20)	.72* (96)	.91* (58)
Reform Candidate	.34 (19)	.65* (96)	.62* (50)
Liberal Party	.31 (22)	-.16 (96)	-.25* (58)
Chretien	.11 (21)	-.28* (95)	-.23* (57)
Lib. Candidate	-.43 (15)	-.17 (70)	-.51* (45)
P.C. Party	.02 (21)	-.17 (96)	-.04 (58)
Campbell	-.35 (21)	-.08 (93)	-.20 (52)
P.C. Candidate	.24 (14)	-.21* (64)	-.07 (42)
NDP	.03 (21)	-.08 (96)	-.07 (56)
McLaughlin	-.26 (21)	-.22* (88)	-.01 (53)
NDP Candidate	-.20 (16)	-.07 (56)	-.33* (31)

* $p > .05$

Correlation of Reform Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Reform Object Ratings: Reform Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Reform Identification.

Post-Election Reform Candidate Rating With:	Weak Reform	Moderate Reform	Strong Reform
Reform Party	.34 (79)	.65* (87)	.62* (50)
Manning	.72* (18)	.45* (87)	.55* (50)
Reform Candidate			
Liberal Party	.09 (19)	-.17 (87)	.03 (50)
Chretien	.43* (19)	-.26* (86)	-.24* (50)
Lib. Candidate	-.05 (14)	-.17 (70)	-.42* (42)
P.C. Party	-.39 (18)	-.19* (87)	-.11 (50)
Campbell	-.72* (19)	-.05 (84)	-.30* (46)
P.C. Candidate	.03 (14)	-.20 (64)	.08 (38)
NDP	.18 (18)	-.05 (87)	-.06 (49)
McLaughlin	-.29 (19)	-.16 (80)	-.15 (47)
NDP Candidate	-.43 (15)	-.09 (56)	-.37* (30)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings: Bloc Quebecois Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Bloc Quebecois Identification.

Post-Election Bouchard Rating With:	Weak Bloc Quebecois	Moderate Bloc Quebecois	Strong Bloc Quebecois
Bloc Quebecois	.64* (36)	.76* (137)	.64* (59)
Bouchard			
BQ Candidate	.35* (27)	.56* (108)	.78* (50)
Liberal Party	.26 (36)	-.25* (137)	-.38* (59)
Chretien	-.18 (36)	-.18* (135)	-.39* (56)
Lib. Candidate	-.09 (21)	-.21* (87)	-.11 (37)
P.C. Party	-.15 (37)	-.29* (137)	-.28* (58)
Campbell	-.40* (37)	-.10 (129)	-.23* (55)
P.C. Candidate	-.02 (21)	-.29* (80)	-.33* (36)
NDP	.00 (34)	-.17* (125)	-.31* (57)
McLaughlin	-.23 (21)	.12 (84)	-.30* (41)
NDP Candidate	.20 (8)	-.22 (38)	.18 (16)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings: Bloc Quebecois Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Bloc Quebecois Identification.

Post-Election Bloc Quebecois Rating With: Bloc Quebecois	Weak Bloc Quebecois	Moderate Bloc Quebecois	Strong Bloc Quebecois
Bouchard	.64* (36)	.76* (137)	.64* (59)
BQ Candidate	.44* (28)	.54* (109)	.60* (50)
Liberal Party	.17 (37)	-.18* (138)	-.52* (59)
Chretien	.01 (36)	-.18* (135)	-.34* (55)
Lib. Candidate	-.35 (22)	-.28* (88)	-.45* (37)
P.C. Party	-.15 (37)	-.23* (138)	-.11 (58)
Campbell	-.40* (37)	-.24* (129)	-.09 (54)
P.C. Candidate	-.02 (21)	-.29* (81)	-.16 (36)
NDP	.00 (34)	-.07 (126)	-.22 (57)
McLaughlin	-.23 (21)	.04 (84)	-.05 (40)
NDP Candidate	.20 (8)	-.13 (39)	-.09 (16)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings: Bloc Quebecois Only, Broken Down by Strength of Pre-Election Bloc Quebecois Identification.

Post-Election BQ Candidate Rating With:	Weak Bloc Quebecois	Moderate Bloc Quebecois	Strong Bloc Quebecois
Bloc Quebecois	.44* (28)	.54* (109)	.60* (50)
Bouchard	.35* (27)	.56* (108)	.78* (50)
BQ Candidate			
Liberal Party	-.14 (27)	-.24* (109)	-.33* (50)
Chretien	-.22 (28)	-.13 (107)	-.26* (40)
Lib. Candidate	.02 (20)	-.03 (83)	-.17 (36)
P.C. Party	-.06 (27)	-.23* (109)	-.23 (50)
Campbell	-.27 (28)	-.19* (104)	-.11 (47)
P.C. Candidate	-.26 (19)	-.16 (77)	-.53* (34)
NDP	-.22 (24)	-.19* (104)	-.44* (49)
McLaughlin	.03 (16)	.00 (71)	-.40* (35)
NDP Candidate	-.23 (7)	.04 (39)	.34 (16)

* $p < .05$

Appendix B:

Correlation of Progressive Conservative Object Ratings (Thermometers) with
Themselves and with Non-Conservative Object Ratings: Conservatives Only, Broken
Down by Strength of Long-Term Conservative Identification.

Post-Election Campbell Rating With:	Weak Conservative	Moderate Conservative	Strong Conservative
P.C. Party	.36* (41)	.73* (96)	.76* (23)
Campbell			
P.C. Candidate	.30* (36)	.14 (79)	.46* (19)
Liberal Party	.20 (42)	-.23* (96)	-.51* (23)
Chretien	-.12 (42)	-.33* (96)	-.17 (22)
Lib. Candidate	.07 (31)	-.14 (71)	.31 (16)
NDP	.07 (41)	.32* (96)	-.18 (23)
McLaughlin	.10 (38)	.20* (89)	-.06 (19)
NDP Candidate	.07 (23)	.22 (47)	-.15 (12)
Reform Party	-.36* (41)	-.31* (96)	-.66* (22)
Manning	-.22 (40)	-.38* (89)	-.90* (19)
Reform Candidate	-.11 (26)	-.14 (47)	-.67* (13)
Bloc Quebecois	-.29* (40)	-.26* (94)	-.39* (21)
Bouchard	-.27 (35)	-.32* (75)	-.59* (16)
BQ Candidate	.21 (5)	-.18 (12)	--- (0)

* p < .05

Correlation of Progressive Conservative Object Ratings (Thermometers) with
Themselves and with Non-Conservative Object Ratings: Conservatives Only, Broken
Down by Strength of Long-Term Conservative Identification.

Post-Election PC Party Rating With: P.C. Party	Weak Conservative	Moderate Conservative	Strong Conservative
Campbell	.36* (41)	.73* (96)	.76* (23)
P.C. Candidate	.37* (34)	.17 (78)	.29 (19)
Liberal Party	-.18 (43)	-.19* (98)	-.56* (23)
Chretien	-.15 (42)	-.26* (97)	-.19 (22)
Liberal Candidate	-.03 (30)	-.26* (70)	-.08 (16)
NDP	-.01 (43)	.17 (88)	-.19 (23)
McLaughlin	-.25 (37)	.25* (98)	-.11 (19)
NDP Candidate	.16 (23)	.04 (47)	-.73* (12)
Reform Party	-.11 (42)	-.25* (98)	-.30 (22)
Manning	-.11 (40)	-.32* (88)	-.69 (19)
Reform Candidate	.03 (26)	-.41* (47)	-.42 (13)
Bloc Quebecois	.14 (42)	-.40* (96)	-.51* (21)
Bouchard	.00 (34)	-.45* (75)	-.64* (16)
BQ Candidate	-.94* (5)	-.32 (12)	--- (0)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Progressive Conservative Object Ratings (Thermometers) with
Themselves and with Non-Conservative Object Ratings: Conservatives Only, Broken
Down by Strength of Long-Term Conservative Identification.

Post-Election PC Candidate Rating	Weak Conservative	Moderate Conservative	Strong Conservative
With:			
P.C. Party	.37* (34)	.17 (78)	.29 (19)
Campbell	.30* (36)	.14 (79)	.46* (19)
P.C. Candidate			
Liberal Party	-.22 (35)	-.21* (78)	.04 (19)
Chretien	.00 (35)	-.18 (78)	.02 (18)
Liberal Candidate	.12 (28)	-.11 (66)	.10 (14)
NDP	.00 (34)	-.16 (78)	-.45* (19)
McLaughlin	.07 (31)	-.03 (75)	-.24 (16)
NDP Candidate	.19 (21)	-.09 (43)	.43 (11)
Reform Party	-.16 (34)	-.16 (78)	-.34 (18)
Manning	-.10 (34)	-.18 (74)	-.50* (16)
Reform Candidate	.15 (23)	-.29* (43)	.20 (12)
Bloc Quebecois	-.31* (33)	.01 (77)	-.36 (17)
Bouchard	-.04 (29)	.24* (62)	-.15 (13)
BQ Candidate	-.33 (5)	.26 (11)	--- (0)

* p < .05

Correlation of Liberal Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Liberal Object Ratings: Liberals Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Liberal Identification.

Post-Election Chretien Rating With:	Weak Liberals	Moderate Liberals	Strong Liberals
Liberal Party	.65* (61)	.82* (122)	.89* (42)
Chretien			
Lib. Candidate	.62* (42)	.29* (107)	.68* (38)
P.C. Party	-.24* (60)	-.12 (121)	-.23 (42)
Campbell	-.20 (60)	-.17* (118)	-.24 (38)
P.C. Candidate	-.25 (38)	-.17 (87)	-.28 (30)
NDP	-.11 (59)	-.06 (115)	-.20 (42)
McLaughlin	.20 (51)	.08 (106)	.12 (37)
NDP Candidate	-.17 (25)	-.16 (65)	.02 (23)
Reform Party	-.15 (55)	-.33* (112)	-.27 (37)
Manning	.00 (50)	-.28* (97)	-.43* (36)
Reform Candidate	-.16 (17)	-.38* (40)	-.40* (21)
Bloc Quebecois	-.16 (60)	-.16* (116)	-.20 (41)
Bouchard	-.26* (53)	-.12 (95)	-.15 (34)
BQ Candidate	-.78* (10)	-.32 (20)	-.34 (5)

* p < .05

Correlation of Liberal Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with
Non-Liberal Object Ratings: Liberals Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term
Liberal Identification.

Post-Election Liberal Party Rating With: Liberal Party	Weak Liberals	Moderate Liberals	Strong Liberals
Chretien	.65* (61)	.82* (122)	.89* (42)
Lib. Candidate	.14 (42)	.36* (107)	.69* (38)
P.C. Party	-.22* (63)	-.16* (121)	-.31* (42)
Campbell	-.13 (60)	-.20* (118)	-.37* (38)
P.C. Candidate	.08 (39)	-.20 (87)	-.34* (30)
NDP	-.20 (62)	.07 (115)	-.04 (42)
McLaughlin	-.14 (51)	.08 (106)	.20 (37)
NDP Candidate	-.19 (25)	-.07 (65)	.09 (23)
Reform Party	-.21 (58)	-.34* (112)	-.25 (37)
Manning	-.18 (50)	-.34* (97)	-.43* (36)
Reform Candidate	.20 (17)	-.38* (40)	-.35 (21)
Bloc Quebecois	-.18 (63)	-.15 (116)	-.11 (41)
Bouchard	-.14 (53)	-.14 (96)	-.25 (34)
BQ Candidate	-.71* (10)	-.39* (20)	-.25 (5)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Liberal Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Liberal Object Ratings: Liberals Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Liberal Identification.

Liberal Candidate Rating With:	Weak Liberals	Moderate Liberals	Strong Liberals
Liberal Party	.14 (42)	.36* (107)	.68* (38)
Chretien	.62* (42)	.29* (107)	.69* (38)
Lib. Candidate			
P.C. Party	-.20 (42)	-.08 (106)	-.43* (38)
Campbell	-.26* (42)	-.13 (104)	-.31* (34)
P.C. Candidate	-.25 (35)	-.17 (83)	-.42* (28)
NDP	.20 (42)	-.13 (101)	-.13 (38)
McLaughlin	.36* (38)	.00 (94)	.14 (33)
NDP Candidate	-.17 (24)	-.13 (64)	.09 (23)
Reform Party	-.22 (40)	-.17* (98)	-.28 (34)
Manning	.00 (38)	-.06 (85)	-.47* (32)
Reform Candidate	-.14 (16)	.03 (40)	-.04 (20)
Bloc Quebecois	-.04 (42)	-.16 (101)	-.09 (38)
Bouchard	-.11 (39)	-.20* (81)	-.04 (30)
BQ Candidate	-.36 (8)	-.12 (19)	-.66 (5)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of New Democrat Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-New Democrat Object Ratings: New Democrats Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term New Democrat Identification.

Post-Election McLaughlin Rating With:	Weak New Democrat	Moderate New Democrat	Strong New Democrat
NDP	.83* (18)	.74* (41)	.79* (10)
McLaughlin			
NDP Candidate	.34 (10)	.24 (29)	.77* (8)
Liberal Party	.07 (18)	.07 (42)	.33 (10)
Chretien	-.11 (18)	.16 (42)	.38 (10)
Lib. Candidate	.07 (13)	-.07 (22)	.94* (4)
P.C. Party	-.33 (18)	-.20 (42)	-.19 (10)
Campbell	-.10 (18)	-.06 (42)	-.12 (10)
P.C. Candidate	-.35 (11)	-.20 (23)	.98* (4)
Reform Party	-.57* (18)	-.36* (42)	-.36 (9)
Manning	-.55* (17)	-.45* (37)	-.12 (8)
Reform Candidate	.00 (11)	-.29 (18)	-.27 (3)
Bloc Quebecois	.19 (16)	-.16 (41)	-.42 (9)
Bouchard	.18 (16)	-.16 (28)	.56 (7)
BQ Candidate	--- (0)	--- (0)	--- (0)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of New Democrat Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-New Democrat Object Ratings: New Democrats Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term New Democrat Identification.

Post-Election NDP Rating With: NDP	Weak New Democrat	Moderate New Democrat	Strong New Democrat
McLaughlin	.82* (18)	.74* (41)	.79* (10)
NDP Candidate	.32 (11)	.27 (32)	.62* (8)
Liberal Party	.38 (19)	.34* (44)	.08 (10)
Chretien	.20 (19)	.21 (42)	.02 (10)
Lib. Candidate	.27 (14)	.15 (32)	-.72 (4)
P.C. Party	-.30 (19)	-.25 (44)	.01 (10)
Campbell	-.20 (19)	-.15 (42)	.07 (10)
P.C. Candidate	-.33 (12)	-.41* (25)	.08 (4)
Reform Party	-.66* (19)	-.54* (44)	-.32 (9)
Manning	-.44* (18)	-.44* (38)	-.19 (8)
Reform Candidate	.04 (12)	-.51* (21)	-.09 (3)
Bloc Quebecois	-.11 (17)	.03 (42)	-.24 (9)
Bouchard	-.13 (16)	-.19 (26)	.19 (7)
BQ Candidate	--- (0)	--- (0)	--- (0)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of New Democrat Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-New Democrat Object Ratings: New Democrats Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term New Democrat Identification.

Post-Election NDP Candidate Rating With:	Weak New Democrat	Moderate New Democrat	Strong New Democrat
NDP	.32 (11)	.27 (32)	.62* (8)
McLaughlin	.34 (10)	.24 (29)	.77* (8)
NDP Candidate			
Liberal Party	.06 (11)	.04 (32)	.36 (8)
Chretien	-.17 (11)	.03 (31)	.31 (8)
Lib. Candidate	.28 (9)	-.15 (29)	.72 (4)
P.C. Party	-.50 (11)	-.06 (32)	.30 (8)
Campbell	-.40 (11)	-.10 (30)	.38 (8)
P.C. Candidate	-.67* (9)	-.20 (21)	.98 (4)
Reform Party	-.52 (11)	-.35* (32)	-.24 (8)
Manning	-.18 (11)	-.24 (29)	-.24 (8)
Reform Candidate	-.24 (8)	-.14 (19)	-.98 (3)
Bloc Quebecois	.06 (10)	-.30 (31)	-.69 (8)
Bouchard	-.13 (16)	.17 (21)	.19 (7)
BQ Candidate	--- (0)	--- (0)	--- (0)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Reform Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Reform Object Ratings: Reform Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Reform Identification.

Post-Election Manning Rating With:	Weak Reform**	Moderate Reform	Strong Reform
Reform Party		.93* (13)	.87* (12)
Manning			
Reform Candidate		.22 (12)	.18 (10)
Liberal Party		-.38 (13)	-.52* (12)
Chretien		-.49* (13)	-.46 (12)
Lib. Candidate		-.14 (11)	-.33 (10)
P.C. Party		.23 (13)	.00 (12)
Campbell		-.49 (12)	-.67* (10)
P.C. Candidate		-.14 (10)	-.30 (10)
NDP		-.04 (13)	-.26 (12)
McLaughlin		-.20 (13)	-.32 (12)
NDP Candidate		.12 (7)	-.24 (7)

* $p < .05$

** No Cases Available.

Correlation of Reform Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Reform Object Ratings: Reform Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Reform Identification.

Post-Election Reform Party Rating With: Reform Party	Weak Reform**	Moderate Reform	Strong Reform
Manning		.93* (13)	.87* (12)
Reform Candidate		.34 (12)	.28 (10)
Liberal Party		-.31 (13)	-.61* (12)
Chretien		-.52* (13)	-.67* (12)
Lib. Candidate		-.32 (11)	-.30 (10)
P.C. Party		.11 (13)	.04 (12)
Campbell		-.50* (12)	-.65* (10)
P.C. Candidate		-.19 (10)	-.29 (10)
NDP		-.06 (13)	-.36 (12)
McLaughlin		-.26 (13)	-.44 (10)
NDP Candidate		.09 (7)	-.57 (7)

* $p < .05$

** No Cases Available.

Correlation of Reform Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Reform Object Ratings: Reform Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Reform Identification.

Post-Election Reform Candidate Rating With:	Weak Reform**	Moderate Reform	Strong Reform
Reform Party		.34 (12)	.28 (10)
Manning		.22 (12)	.18 (10)
Reform Candidate			
Liberal Party		-.55* (12)	-.33 (10)
Chretien		-.63* (12)	-.22 (10)
Lib. Candidate		-.67* (11)	-.11 (9)
P.C. Party		-.06 (12)	.07 (10)
Campbell		-.11 (11)	.09 (8)
P.C. Candidate		.08 (10)	.07 (9)
NDP		-.03 (12)	-.81* (10)
McLaughlin		-.28 (12)	-.76* (9)
NDP Candidate		.11 (7)	-.80* (6)

* $p < .05$

** No Cases Available.

Correlation of Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings: Bloc Quebecois Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Bloc Quebecois Identification.

Post-Election Bloc Quebecois Rating With: Bloc Quebecois	Weak Bloc Quebecois	Moderate Bloc Quebecois	Strong Bloc Quebecois
Bouchard	.72* (11)	.76* (38)	.57* (27)
BQ Candidate	.47 (8)	.31* (30)	.61* (23)
Liberal Party	-.06 (11)	-.32* (38)	-.51* (27)
Chretien	-.21 (11)	.06 (37)	-.18 (24)
Lib. Candidate	-.68 (6)	-.29 (23)	-.74* (16)
P.C. Party	.07 (11)	-.48* (38)	-.34* (26)
Campbell	-.38 (11)	-.28* (36)	-.27 (25)
P.C. Candidate	-.16 (5)	-.62* (19)	-.34 (15)
NDP	.44 (11)	-.28 (34)	-.38* (25)
McLaughlin	-.10 (8)	.21 (24)	-.13 (17)
NDP Candidate	--- (0)	.07 (11)	-.35 (6)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings: Bloc Quebecois Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Bloc Quebecois Identification.

Post-Election Bouchard Rating With:	Weak Bloc Quebecois	Moderate Bloc Quebecois	Strong Bloc Quebecois
Bloc Quebecois	.72* (11)	.76* (38)	.57* (27)
Bouchard			
BQ Candidate	.55 (8)	.27* (30)	.87* (23)
Liberal Party	-.19 (11)	-.19 (38)	-.19 (27)
Chretien	-.48 (11)	.04 (37)	-.21 (24)
Lib. Candidate	-.23 (6)	-.25 (23)	-.36 (16)
P.C. Party	.00 (11)	-.58* (38)	-.58* (26)
Campbell	-.27 (11)	-.11 (36)	-.38* (25)
P.C. Candidate	-.60 (5)	-.65* (19)	-.54* (15)
NDP	.33 (11)	-.34* (34)	-.49* (25)
McLaughlin	.43 (8)	.29 (24)	-.48* (17)
NDP Candidate	--- (0)	-.45 (11)	.10 (6)

* $p < .05$

Correlation of Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings (Thermometers) with Themselves and with Non-Bloc Quebecois Object Ratings: Bloc Quebecois Only, Broken Down by Strength of Long-Term Bloc Quebecois Identification.

Post-Election BQ Candidate Rating With:	Weak Bloc Quebecois	Moderate Bloc Quebecois	Strong Bloc Quebecois
Bloc Quebecois	.55 (8)	.31* (30)	.87* (23)
Bouchard	.47 (8)	.27 (30)	.61* (23)
BQ Candidate			
Liberal Party	.05 (8)	-.07 (30)	-.34 (23)
Chretien	.05 (8)	.17 (30)	-.18 (21)
Lib. Candidate	.15 (5)	.01 (23)	-.43* (16)
P.C. Party	.22 (8)	-.22 (30)	-.53* (23)
Campbell	.00 (8)	-.22 (28)	-.38* (22)
P.C. Candidate	.25 (5)	.07 (18)	-.64* (15)
NDP	.08 (8)	-.13 (27)	-.63* (22)
McLaughlin	-.15 (6)	.10 (19)	-.66* (16)
NDP Candidate	--- (0)	-.39 (11)	.30 (6)

* $p < .05$

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