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Introduction: Pragmatism in Canada’s Relationship with China

Canada has had a steadily growing economic relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the latter’s reform and opening up policy under Deng Xiaoping. In forty years, bilateral trade has increased tremendously, with China becoming Canada’s third largest export destination and second largest source of imports, two-way trade reaching $47.6 billion by 2007 (Holden 2008, 1). The development of this relationship was not a smooth and guaranteed path, as Cold War tensions initially heightened ideological tensions between Maoist China and capitalist democracies like Canada. During the apparent height of the Cold War, with the American war in Vietnam raging on and China’s vehemently anti-imperialist Cultural Revolution shaking China to its core, it was a surprise to some that both countries were able to normalize their relations, culminating with reopened diplomatic ties. The path of this normalization was impacted by both domestic and international events involving both Canada and the PRC, which affected how both countries would attempt any form of engagement. This essay seeks to present a historic overview of this relationship as it developed between the 1960s and 1970s and showcase how certain events impacted this development. The economic ties between Canada and the PRC, and pragmatic desire for expanding trade, were essential to bringing these two countries towards improved relations with one another.

To provide appropriate context into Canada’s relations with the PRC, Canada’s limited connections to pre-communist Republican China is briefly examined in order to understand how Canada came to view trade with China as profitable. These early ties would later be hampered by international Cold War roadblocks such as the Korean War and vicious anti-communist sentiments. After covering these roadblocks, a look at the shift in attitudes will take place, since it was still seen by many Canadian policy-makers as beneficial for the economy and regional stability to engage with the communist regime. Beginning with wheat sales to China, Canada embarked on a budding trade-based relationship with the country in the face of American pressure. Within a decade of smoothing over ties with trade, Canada would successfully renew efforts to open diplomatic ties with China, and recognition was reached by late 1970. China and Canada would continue to develop their ties as China began its process of normalizing its relationship with the Western world. With the desire for mutual economic benefit, regulated by pragmatic desires to extend ties to one another, both countries were able to put aside their ideological differences in order to normalize relations with one another.

Background: Canada’s Historic Ties with China
To better contextualize Canada’s relations and approach towards Mao Zedong’s China, it is necessary to have a brief understanding of Canadian dealings with China before the Chinese Communists came to power. The historic relations which Canada had with the Nationalist-ruled Republic of China (ROC) would play an influential role on its later ties with Communist China, although such ties relatively small compared later decades. Up until the Second World War, Canada had very little interest in actively pursuing relations in Asia, with the exception of Canadian missionary activities and business ties with Japan (Holomego 2012, 11). This owed to a large part from the China’s political and social instability from wars and revolutions in the first half of the 20th Century and Canada’s lack of regional influence in Asia (Shyu, 2008, 186). Without any political or social will pushing for significant ties with China, Canada did not consider China of concerning importance compared with Europe. The outbreak of the Second World War, and more specifically the Pacific War would thrust China and Canada together as allies in this global conflict (Shyu 2008, 189). After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Canada accelerated its process to open formal diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1942 and to find ways of substantiely assisting its new war-time ally. This support would come in the form of an aid package of military supplies, initially worth close to $52 million, to support China’s war effort. However, most of it would arrive late in the war due to geographical barriers and lacking British or American support (Shyu 2008, 195). Following Japan’s defeat in 1945, and the resumption of civil war between the Nationalist government and Communist insurgency, China would again request military aid from Canada. One of the last major purchases, consisting of 174 Mosquito fighter-bombers and munitions worth millions of dollars, was especially irksome to the Communists, who condemned Canada’s “reactionary government” as a “running dog of American imperialism” for selling arms to Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime (People’s Daily 1947, 3). From the Chinese communist perspective, these arms sales would associate Canada with American support for the Nationalist Chinese government, which does not look good for Canada to be considered as supporting imperialism and, in the context of the later PRC’s dealings with Canada, this would take time to change Canada’s image in their eyes. While looking at the development of Canada’s trade relations with China, is also important to note why Canada sought to pursue such relations in the first place.

The motivations behind the Canadian government decision to send military aid and sell supplies to China was concerned more with business than anti-communist concerns. The reason why Canada sought to create goodwill with the Chinese was due to the lure of profitable trade with China after the war (Nossal 1978, 137). Canadian businesses and policy-makers had become
increasingly interested in the prospects for post-war trade with China. Descended from a century-old ideal of opening the massive Chinese market to manufactured Canadian goods, it was believed that wartime aid would pave the way for increased bilateral trade. Such ideas were both common and gaining increasing support among Canada’s business community, who were coming to view “the Orient” as a natural market for Canadian goods that “could consume whatever Canada can export to her” (Toronto Daily Star 1945). These sentiments would impact Canadian trade relations with China after the Second World War and even after the founding of the PRC in 1949, as the idea of a vast “untapped” Chinese market influenced Canadian businesses and policy-makers to see engagement with China in a profitable viewpoint. Furthermore, goodwill would be necessary in order to amend for Canada’s previous close ties with Japan leading up to World War Two, in addition to its decades-old immigration policies discriminating against ethnic Chinese (Shyu 2008, 190). Canadian officials further saw that contributing to China’s post-war reconstruction would also benefit the Canadian economy through trade (Nossal 1982, 339). From this desire to expand trade relations with a potentially vast market, Canada would support the ROC during the 1940’s in order to better bilateral relations.

As a way of correcting previous Asian policies and increase possibilities for trade, aid would be provided by the Canadian government during and after the end of World War II and into the Chinese Civil War (Holomego 2012, 19). These efforts proved to be fruitful, as Canadian-Chinese trade did help develop an early trade relationship during the Civil War years. By 1948, Canada ranked third globally in exports to China, behind only the United States and Great Britain (Shyu 2008, 194). The expansion of post-war trade proved to be valuable to Canada, and provided a taste of what further expanded trade with China could potentially look like, fitting into perceived notions of an “untapped” Chinese market. While such dreams would be dashed by the onset of the Cold War and the fall of the Nationalist regime, such ambitions would only be put on hold until a more favorable climate emerged.

**Mutual Points of View: Canada and PRC Perspectives**

The fall of the Nationalist regime in mainland China would mark the beginning of the People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong’s leadership, and Canada’s turbulent relations with the new country. One of the key features of Canada’s approach to the PRC through much of the 1950s was inconsistency between its ideals and actions. As early as November 1949, the Canadian government cabinet agreed in principle that it should afford recognition to the new Communist regime (Beecroft 1991, 43). This example shows that Canada
was considering recognition of the PRC very early on, although international events would hold up this process. Even with the violent nature of the Communist rise to power, and overthrow of the recognized ROC government and its exile to Taiwan, Canada at this time was open to recognizing the new political reality inside China. However, the outbreak of the Korean War would prevent any early recognition or reconciliation between the two countries as Western attitudes hardened against the PRC. The PRC being declared the aggressor by the United Nations General Assembly in early 1951, combined with a staunchly anti-Beijing American government and public, would generate stigma around any efforts to recognize the PRC or have it become a U.N. member (Beecroft 1991, 54). Canadians on the home front would also harbor intense emotions towards communism as Canadian soldiers fought and died against Chinese forces on the Korean peninsula, bringing any talk of rapprochement to an end for the time being (Wylie 1973, 146). The events of the Korean War, and other events that would surround Communist China’s actions in Asia, such as the annexation of Tibet, violent tensions with Taiwan, and eventually support for North Vietnam against the Americans, would lead to it considered as a hostile power in Western views, encouraging a feeling of tension towards them.

A further point of contention in Sino-Canadian relations was the American embargo on the PRC begun early on in the 1950s. The United States sought to block all trade with the PRC as a way of containing the spread of communism across Asia, and aggressively encouraged its allies to do the same. For most of this decade, Canada would follow the lead from the United States and other Western countries in pursuing a general embargo against the PRC (Caron 2010, 126). Pressure from the United States on the issue of China would be a recurring theme in Sino-Canadian relations, and the perception of American influence on Canadian trade and foreign policy would be seen both in Canada and in the PRC. From the Chinese communists, Canadians were viewed in two different perspectives, both as supporters of American imperialism, and at other times as a people victimized by American domination. As seen previously with weapons sales during the Civil War, Canada was seen as a pro-imperialist satellite state of the United States. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also perceived Canada as being economically dominated by American capitalist interests, with a working opposed to foreign control over their economy (People’s Daily 1959, 4). This would become a prevalent view of Canada that was depicted in Chinese state media of exploitation at American hands, even after fighting Canadians in Korea, saying how “the Canadian people have come to realize from a large number of facts that Canada’s future as a sovereign country has been mortgaged to US imperialism” (Lin 1962, 5). Looking past clear ideological overtones, this depiction of Canada from the PRC is genuinely surprising coming from a
communist state media perceived as an enemy of the West. The tone of PRC news articles presents the Canadian people in a sympathetic light to Chinese readers. So even in the early decade of communist rule, the Chinese state was not fully opposed to viewing Western countries in a positive manner, which helps explain their willingness to deal with countries like Canada.

On the Canadian side of the fence, sympathetic reports like these were not entirely wrong in their assessments while Canadian decision-makers continued to hold out for improved relations with the PRC. Businesses from the United States did have a lot of influence on the Canadian economy, as mid-1950s Canada was conducting most of its business with its southern neighbour, Canadian exports reaching almost 60 percent (Donaghy, Greg and Stevenson 2009, 30). The United States’ economic influence on Canada was not lost on Canadians seeking to improve ties with the PRC, and any major efforts to either trade with or recognize the PRC would have to take the American factor into consideration. Lester Pearson, Canadian Foreign Minister for much of the 1950s, believed that Canada’s economic prosperity depended on the flow of goods across the Canada-US border (Donaghy, Greg and Stevenson 2009, 32). Canada also remained skeptical of the U.S. efforts to isolate the PRC, often resonating with the fascination of that “untapped” Chinese market that offered great potential for Canadian trade. Efforts to economically engage with China, it was believed, could also help to moderate the revolutionary zeal of its regime and hostility towards the West (Donaghy, Greg and Stevenson 2009, 31). In Canadian eyes, the American policy against China was counterproductive to efforts at maintaining regional peace, with an isolated PRC being viewed as more likely to commit aggressive actions like it did in the Korean War. It was also in economic rather than ideology terms that arguments in favor of expanding trade with China were put forward to Canadians. One pamphlet, forwarded by the Labour-Progressive Party in British Columbia (one of Canada’s numerous Communist parties over the decades), argued that trade with China would create a market for Canadian pulp, paper and lumber, and create thousands of jobs in these industries and in bustling ports such as Vancouver that would grow the provincial economy (Labour-Progressive Party 1957, 12). This example showcases that trade with China has generally been viewed and argued for in a positive light, and that attempts to isolate this vast country was both harmful to regional peace and stability but also bad for business. Ideology aside, the case for expanded trade with China was founded on a practical desire to recognize China’s realities through proper engagement, which would help to promote both economic prosperity and normalized relations between both countries by the 1970s.

Wheat Deals and Normalization: Bilateral Trade and Evolving Perspectives
The beginning of Canadian trade and business deals with the PRC in the late 1950s would help to normalize bilateral relations and mutual attitude between both nations. The first major efforts to trade with the PRC would surprisingly come under the Conservative leadership of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, elected in 1957. By 1961, one of the biggest wheat deals would be approved under Agricultural Minister Alvin Hamilton, which would see over $75 million worth of wheat be sold to the PRC, and provisions for future purchases under credit (Barrie Examiner 1962, 1). Within a decade of Canada’s first sales in 1958, China-Canada trade would expand from a few million dollars annually to almost $200 million by 1966, mostly made of wheat exports to the PRC (Wylie 1973, 149). The rapid expansion of this trade owes to the interconnection between Canada’s economic situation during the late 1950s, China’s internal situation, and influence of the United States. Despite being a renowned anti-communist, Diefenbaker saw the potential for expanding trade with the PRC, especially in agricultural products like wheat. This was an important issue for Canadian farmers, as they were unable to sell their surplus of wheat abroad due to American competition (Donaghy, Greg and Stevenson 2009, 30). The sale of subsidized grain by the United States to its allies abroad and large foreign aid packages of wheat severely damaged traditional Canadian export markets, dropping Canada’s share of the global grain market from 27.4 percent to 20.6 percent (Donaghy, Greg and Stevenson 2009, 33). From this domestic pressure, the Canadian government, through the Canadian Wheat Board, was eager to find new opportunities where they could sell their surplus goods, and naturally returned their look to the vast Chinese market as an option. This trade tension between Canada and the United States was even noted by the Chinese as early as 1953, seeing Canada and other nations like New Zealand as being victims of American economic domination and of disrupting global trade through the dumping of American agricultural products abroad (People’s Daily 1953, 4). Presenting the capitalist world as divided between itself and showing the genuine concerns of the Canadian government on the lack of concern from the United States government marks a sympathetic view of Canada coming from the PRC, even as the Korean War conflict is still fresh in mind. The purchases of grain would be less difficult with such sympathetic portrayals of Canada, and as trade relations with Canada progressed, so would attitudes towards Canada improve in China’s eyes.

Initial grain sales of forty-five tons of wheat took place in 1958, and by late 1960 the Chinese approached Canada again with $60 million to buy as much grain as they could obtain (Kayaba 1991, 168-169). Despite American pressures against engaging in trade with the PRC, Canada was determined to make its own decision regarding who it traded with, especially if it was not in any materials...
deemed a risk to security. In one example, Prime Minister Pearson would argue in 1963, in defence of expanded trade deals with China, Cuba and the USSR, that “there is no reason that I know that we shouldn’t export food to Communist countries. Food isn’t on any prohibited list” (Spokesman Review 1963, 1). From Canada’s perspective, its sales of food to the PRC and other communist states posed no danger to Western security, which was more difficult to argue for other raw materials or technologies that could be used to build weapons of war. Canada was also eager because China had also reached out to Australia for 300,000 tons of lower grade wheat in late 1960 and with domestic wheat being 30 percent higher in price made Canada concerned about bring driven out of the Chinese market by Australian competition (Donaghy, Greg and Stevenson 2009, 38). Competition from Australia also moved Canada forward on its wheat sales to the PRC, and these efforts would continue to be expanded after Diefenbaker’s initial support for opening trade.

Examining China’s desire to purchase as much grain from abroad as it possibly reveals where it stood at the time of opening trade relations. Internally, the PRC was in an increasingly desperate position between 1959-1961 that necessitated foreign imports of food. Later known as the “three bitter years,” the consequences of Mao’s plan of rapid industrialization and increased agricultural production during the Great Leap Forward was the worst famine in modern Chinese history (Chi-Kwan 2012, 50). While much of the world remained unaware on the degree of the famine, these catastrophically bad food shortages would mean that China needed to reach abroad for assistance to help alleviate starvation. China’s situation would be aggravated by its deteriorating international situation, especially as relations worsened with the Soviet Union. From the foundation of the PRC, the Soviet Union was China’s primary economic trade partner. Their 1950 Treaty of Alliance and Friendship would grant the PRC with $300 million in Soviet credit, and Soviet technicians and advisors would provide much needed skills in China’s economic development (Forget 1971, 6). The Soviets even provided whole industrial factories to the PRC, with 113 completed by the end of 1958 (Forget 1971, 6). From the early years of the PRC, the importance of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union in its industrialization plans was essential for China to maintain reasonable industrial technological development (North 1978, 158). However, rising tensions between the two Communist powers would dry up much of this economic and material aid, contributing to China’s worsening economic conditions.

Disputes over ideological nuances, such as denouncement of Stalin by Soviet Premier Khrushchev and ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the capitalist world, would lead to Mao perceiving the Soviet Union as a threat to both his power and
the security of the PRC. Chinese and Soviet leaders would officially deny any such rift between their countries, with Beijing attempting to reassure Western journalists and governments that the Chinese and Soviet people “remain forever the most faithful and most reliable comrades-in-arms” (Toronto Daily Star 1961, 2). Despite such rhetoric, the two Communist powers could not conceal their mutual distrust for long. The combination of ideological disagreement, struggle between national interests, and Mao’s sensitivity towards unequal relations with other states consequently broke up the Sino-Soviet alliance by 1964, forcing China to stand on its own (Chi-Kwan 2012, 56). Tensions would continue to rise between both communist powers, which would further isolate China on the international stage. By the end of the 1960s, suspicions would become so bad that, coupled with border skirmishes, Mao would come to see the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, as the chief threat to the PRC (Li 2008, 36). During these major border skirmishes, tensions would be highlighted by Chinese press condemning the “Soviet revisionist renegade clique” for its armed incursions into China “in the fashion of the Russian Tsars” (Chai 1972, 152). The volatile rhetoric being thrown around during the height of the Sino-Soviet split would ensure that China could not rely on the Soviet Union for support, and this would necessitate them reaching out to Western powers both in economic terms and to deter possible Soviet attack on the PRC itself.

To add further weight to this point, the height of the Cultural Revolution would also see the total denouncement of ‘Soviet imperialism’ from forces supportive to the Chinese Communist cause. State media even presented publications from the “Progressive Workers Movement,” a sympathetic Canadian Communist party, which denounced the USSR for revisionism by allowing agents of the bourgeoisie within the party to ‘restore capitalism’ (People’s Daily 1967, 5). This condemnation of the Soviet Union reflected the very open hostility between the two communist powers, and also showcased the PRC’s perspective on the Canadian communist movement. Over the years, it was common for Chinese state media to publish reports from foreign communist parties that voiced their support for the PRC and ‘Mao Zedong Thought.’ A number of different Canadian communist groups and parties would receive attention and reporting from Chinese media, showing the Canadian working class as being supportive of China’s revolutionary activities, even with Canadian communists praising the Great Leap Forward (People’s Daily 1960, 6). The efforts would serve to present a sense of international solidarity among the world’s working classes and the PRC. Hence, the tensions between China and the Soviet Union, coupled with an ideological sympathy generated from pro-Chinese communist groups abroad would be an important factor in the former’s decision to ease tensions with the West in order to facilitate badly needed trade and normalized relations.
Past Reflection: Softening of Attitudes and the Significance of Trade

The final following section will examine the historic significance and legacies of this trade-centered relation between Canada and China during the 1960s. One major point in the easing of tensions between the PRC and Canada could be seen in the softening of attitudes towards one another that allowed for normalized exchanges in culture, diplomacy, and trade. One of most prominent examples of Chinese ideological sympathies towards Canada which helped to ease Cold War tensions included the heroic praise China afforded to Canadian Doctor Norman Bethune. His sacrifice to the communist cause while providing surgeries in China made him a legend in Party mythology (Wylie 1973, 144). An essay published by Mao Zedong after Bethune’s death in 1939, which praised his absolute selflessness and professional skill as a doctor, became required reading for everyone in China, who were instructed to study his work (Wylie 1973, 145). He would also receive frequent praise in Chinese state news, especially when relations between Canada and China had become normalized after 1970 (People’s Daily 1972, 3) (People’s Daily 1972, 3). Becoming a symbol of Sino-Canadian friendship, the Canadian government awarded Bethune recognition as a Canadian of national historic significance (People’s Daily 1972, 5). These reports were also well-noted in Canadian media, where celebrations of his death anniversary would see him hailed as a martyr and example of an international hero (Johnson 1979, 14). With the easing of tensions between the two countries by the 1970s, figures like Bethune would be frequently mentioned as someone who helped form the friendship between modern China and Canada. The overall role that the Canadian political left had in China-Canada relations was one in which Canada could be seen in the eyes of the PRC, not as an imperialist puppet, but as a potential friend that was more sympathetic to its ideals than other more hostile countries.

When examining the lasting impact that Canada’s early trade relations had on its relationship with the PRC, a noticeable change also came under Canadian leadership during the 1960s, especially under Prime Minister Pearson (1963-1968). Under Pearson, Canada’s bilateral trade with China would expand considerably, and by the time of recognition in 1970, brought upwards of $3 billion into the Canadian economy (Harbron 1974, 9). The financial benefits brought forth by the sale of wheat would lead to direct impact on Canada’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Pearson. The desire to protect this profitable trade with the PRC would involve trade concessions to China that would value certain Chinese imports to Canada at Japanese prices and expanding credit payments, something Chinese negotiators said had to be done before any new wheat deals could be made (Donaghy, Greg and Stevenson 2009, 46).
concession in trade, detrimental to Canadian trade with Japan, would indicate the gradual shift in Canada’s Cold War attitudes towards Asia and the PRC. On the international stage, Canada would also take further steps favoring the PRC in the United Nations over the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a step before recognizing the Chinese government in Beijing (Holomego 2012, 73). However, in these efforts from Pearson, external factors beyond Ottawa’s control would prevent it from moving forward on United Nations membership. A fear held by Pearson that originated under Diefenbaker was that the PRC’s entry into the United Nations would lead to the United States to boycott or potentially leave the organization in support of Taiwan (Barrie Examiner 1961, 1). This concern would ensure that Pearson’s efforts could not go as far as he hoped in United Nations votes on the PRC’s seat and recognition of ‘Two-Chinas.’ United States opposition to any seat for the PRC and lackluster support from pro-PRC votes in the United Nations would ensure such moves were defeated (Raabe 1970/1977, 8). Despite the defeat of these efforts, however, they would open Canada to the inevitability of recognizing the PRC as China’s official government, which would occur and unfold under Pierre Trudeau’s leadership.

After the election of Pierre Trudeau as Canada’s Prime Minister in 1968, Canada would move quickly towards recognizing the PRC as the sole government of China by October of 1970. Prime Minister Trudeau’s viewpoints on China were dominated by a view that China needed to be brought into the international community, and that exchanges in trade and culture could facilitate such integration. During his 1973 visit to the PRC, which included a meeting with Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai, Trudeau would walk away with a solid trade agreement that placed Canada as a favored supplier of wheat, potash, and plant technology (Evans, 2014, 30). Chinese press would also reiterate the importance of exchanges in medicine, health, science, technology, culture and education, which stemmed from the enhancement of practical trade connections (Peking Review 1973, 5). The development of trade relations, in the form of historic connections over the previous decade and in contemporary trade agreements to secure Canadian goods for export, were important in the betterment of bilateral relations. These agreements and exchanges would not have much of an immediate effect on rapidly expanding trade and exchanges, as China’s internal challenges under the last years of Mao and the transition to Deng Xiaoping’s leadership would occur before economic ties could take off at a faster pace (Cao, Huhua and Vivienne Poy 2011, 20). However, it was the chain of events set off by Canada’s trade connections and recognition which would help catapult China into the world. During Prime Minister Trudeau’s visit to the PRC in 1973, one CBC reporter, for example, would state that Canadian recognition started the global wave of talks and recognition the PRC would receive from the rest of the world.
(Collister 1973). This wave of recognition of the PRC and the normalization of its ties with the West could not have occurred without practical exchanges between China and nations like Canada. Prime Minister Trudeau himself would also say that Canada’s ties with China were built upon these exchanges, and that they provided for the development of a mutually beneficial relationship (Department of External Affairs 1973, 2). Trudeau would further stress to Parliament after his October 1973 visit to China, adding that engagement would allow for greater global dialogue and greater need for mutual understanding between both nations (Department of External Affairs 1973, 3). Basing Canada’s relationship with China on the basis of facts versus ideology would finally be realized, owing to the more effective strategy of engagement being preferable to isolation when dealing with ideologically opposing states (Edwards 2009, 303). This effort of engagement represented the commitment that Trudeau had for the principles of pragmatism in the face of an ideologically divided world. Hence, the ability of Canada to reach rapprochement with Communist China in the 1970s was concluded on the foundations of trade relations and its interconnectedness with other forms of exchange that the two nations developed between one another.

**Conclusion: Pragmatism and Trade in Bilateral Relations**

To conclude, economic ties between Canada and the PRC, and pragmatic desire for expanding trade, were essential in bringing these two countries towards improved bilateral relations. In reviewing Canada’s limited connections to pre-communist China, Canada came to view trade with China as profitable after contributing military aid to the Nationalist government. However, early ties would become hampered by international Cold War roadblocks such as the Korean War and vicious anti-communist sentiments. Attitudes towards China would shift over the years, as many Canadian policy-makers doubted U.S. policy of isolating China, preferring to benefit the economy and regional stability through economic engagement. Beginning with wheat sales to China and in the face of American pressure, Canada embarked on a budding trade-based relationship with China, who’s own views towards Canada began to shift due to the internal need for food and external isolation and tension with the Soviet Union. Within a decade of smoothing over ties via trade, Canada would successfully renew efforts to open diplomatic ties with China, and recognition was reached by late 1970. Trade would be highlighted as a major factor in the renewed diplomatic and cultural ties. In the context of present relations between Canada and China, including tensions over trade, human rights, and other disputes, this research might prove useful. By providing an historic overview of Canada-China relations and how both countries were able to overcome their differences through pragmatic mutual considerations,
one might find answers for present issues within an interconnected past that can help moving forward into a more globally interconnected future.
References


