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“Of Pure European Descent and of the White Race”
Recruitment Policy and Aboriginal Canadians, 1939-1945

R. Scott Sheffield

According to the records of the Indian Affairs Branch, just over 3,000 Status Indians voluntarily enlisted in the military forces of Canada during the Second World War. Of these, 213 were killed. These and an unknown number of other non-status Indian, Métis and Inuit men served in all three military branches, and in every theatre where Canadian ground, sea and air forces fought. However, virtually nothing is known of the military service performed by Canada's Native population. In part, this reflects the paucity of records available on Native soldiers. Personnel files did not include any mention of ethnicity and thus it will never be known exactly how many Aboriginal men served. The figures of the Indian Affairs Branch are suspect, only partial, and do not account for Métis, Non-Status Indians, or Inuit; nor do they include those conscripted under the National Resources Mobilization Act for service in Canada. Historians have tended to focus either on the operational side of the conflict, or on the political, social and economic upheaval of the home front. The recruitment and military service of the Aboriginal population fits somewhere in between, and has been nearly forgotten.

There have been two works published on the topic of Native military experience in Canada's wars: Forgotten Soldiers, by Fred Gaffen, and a Veterans' Affairs publication titled, Native Soldiers Foreign Battlefields. Unfortunately, both these studies place greater emphasis on anecdotes rather than analysis, leaving our understanding of Native military service incomplete. James W. St. G. Walker, has written an excellent article on the recruitment of visible minorities during the First World War, which gives a description of Native recruitment and military service. As yet, no comparable work has been conducted on the Second World War. In an attempt to fill this gap in the historiography, this essay will examine the recruitment policies of the three branches of the armed forces as they affected Aboriginal men, and set parameters on the types of military service open to Canada's First Nations. While many factors combined to determine the nature of Aboriginal contributions to the war effort, recruitment policy played a key role in a process that funnelled the vast majority of Native enlistees into the Army.

Despite the existence of a large naval service, fewer First Nations men enlisted in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) than any other branch of the service. At the outbreak of hostilities, the Naval Service maintained an explicit racial barrier, or "colour line," in official recruitment policy that required personnel to be of "Pure European Descent and of the White Race" before an application would even be accepted. This regulation officially blocked Aboriginals from the naval service.

The motivations for this flagrantly racist restriction were outlined by the Commanding
Officer, Pacific Coast (COPC) in a report on the question of Native naval service on the British Columbia coast.\(^5\) The COPC concluded that:

Although it is considered that there is much excellent material among the Indians on the B.C. Coast, it is strongly recommended that all Royal Navies should still maintain the strict rule that personnel must be of "Pure European Descent and of the White Race."\(^6\)

The report supplied three reasons for this recommendation, the first of which was purely racial in character. It was believed that "The confined living spaces of a naval rating do not lend themselves to satisfactory mixing of the white races with Indians."\(^7\) The close quarters of naval service, therefore, precluded the adoption of Army and RCAF enlistment regulations that allowed for Native recruitment. The second argument involved the legal restrictions on Aboriginal access to intoxicants in the unregulated naval environment where drinking was prevalent and even encouraged.\(^8\) While this problem could arise in the other services, only the RCN still issued a daily rum ration, or grog, to its personnel. The COPC felt certain that "bad feeling would ensue if differentiation of the supply of "Grog" be made between the white man and the Indian."\(^9\)

The third point attempted to dispel the relevance of the fact that Britain's Royal Navy (RN) employed "Chinese, Maltese, and Guernese" in their ships.\(^10\) These men were "only accommodated in big ships and then used in special capacities as officers' stewards and servants. They also mess separately from the white ratings."\(^11\) The RCN was essentially a small ship navy in 1941, and did not have any capital ships where this limited service by non-white ratings could be accommodated. These reasons were sufficient for the Navy to turn down any request for Native access to the naval service.

To these arguments could be added a fourth, raised but not expanded on in the report's recommendation. The COPC strongly advised that the RCN should maintain the strict "colour line" of all Royal Navies, including those of Australia, New Zealand, and most importantly, Great Britain. The Dominion navies all had a common parent organisation in the RN, from whence common traditions, regulations and doctrine were derived. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this link when considering the RCN's unwillingness to remove the "colour line" from its recruiting restrictions, as the transfer of vessels and personnel between British and Canadian service was commonplace. The pressure to fit into this larger structure certainly reinforced the RCN's inclination to preserve its white Anglo-Saxon nature.\(^12\)

The RCN maintained the "colour line" throughout the first half of the war, apparently with very little debate or opposition. It was able to do this in part because the Navy was the smallest of the three services, with 92,441 all ranks at its peak strength in January 1945.\(^13\) As well, the RCN's casualty rate was not as heavy a drain, allowing the Navy to be more selective in its recruiting. With little pressure or need to alter its racial ban, it was not until 1943 that the RCN officially changed its policy.

On 12 March 1943, at the behest of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, the Committee of the Privy Council passed Resolution 1986. It contained the following terse statement:

That the Canadian Naval Regulations provide that personnel entered in the naval service must be of the white race;
That the Army and Air Force are accepting for Active Service personnel of any racial origin;
That it is essential that the Canadian Naval Service adopt a similar policy.\(^14\)

The attached naval draft order required that, "...any male British subject of any racial origin may be entered for the period of hostilities in the Canadian Naval Forces."\(^15\) It is not clear what had changed since 1941 when the "Jim Crow Law," as it was known, had been justified because of the different circumstances of Canada's small ship navy.\(^16\) Regardless, during the last two years of the war, the RCN officially accepted applicants of any racial origin, including First Nations.

The numbers of Native men to see service in the Navy is unknown. What is certain is that some did see service even before the "colour line" was dropped. Fred Gaff en mentions one First Nations man who, already enrolled in the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve before the war began, joined the rush of reserves at the first call up.\(^17\) Others were able to enlist either through the ignorance or the collusion of superior officers and fellow ratings. It is not clear whether Aboriginal applicants were enrolled in greater numbers after 1943, although a report from the Army Historical
Section suggests that the Navy maintained its "colour line" in practice. However, this report gave no substantive evidence for such an assertion. While it is reasonable to assume that there would have been unofficial resistance to the change in policy, in the absence of convincing proof, any allegations of systematic and organised retention of the "colour line" must be treated with scepticism. In spite of its belated change of policy, however, the RCN was clearly not an accessible option for the majority of Aboriginal recruits during the Second World War.

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), on the other hand, proved to be a slightly more hospitable place for Natives than the RCN. The RCAF also had racial restrictions on recruitment when the war broke out, but very quickly exempted First Nations applicants from this ruling. As a result, more Native men saw service in the RCAF than the Navy. However, despite the lack of an overt racial ban on Native enlistment, there were tangible barriers in the form of high education requirements and stringent health standards. Thus, while more significant than Naval service, only a small minority of the Aboriginal men who served during the war did so in the RCAF.

Prior to the war, the RCAF had maintained a "colour line" more strict than that of the RCN. The conditions of entry then stated that:

All candidates must be British subjects and of pure European descent. They must also be the sons of parents both of whom are (or, if deceased, were at the time of death) British subjects or naturalised British subjects. Where there is doubt of nationality or descent, the burden of proof will rest upon the candidate.

These regulations echoed almost verbatim the conditions of service required by Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) in early 1939. Like the RCN, the RCAF would be closely integrated with the RAF in case of a major conflict, and this required the harmonisation of policies in a number of areas, including personnel. Unlike the RCN, however, the RCAF altered its regulations early in the conflict.

The Chief of the Air Staff received an enquiry from the Officer in Charge (OIC) of Montreal's recruiting centre in mid-November 1939, regarding the acceptance of a "coloured" applicant. Flying Officer J. H. Hollies, acting for the Chief of the Air Staff, replied, "I am directed to advise that enlisted applicants must be of pure European descent with the exception of the North American Indians." The motivation for specifically accepting "North American Indians" is unclear. No mention of it has been found elsewhere, and it is not certain when it came into effect; but from November 1939, no racially based regulations barred First Nations applicants from service in the RCAF. The Air Service jettisoned the "colour line" completely in September 1942.

The road to Air Force enlistment remained, nevertheless, a difficult one for Canada's young Native men. The health standards maintained by the RCAF early in the war were rigorous and caused the rejection of many recruits, Aboriginal or otherwise. Each candidate had to be physically fit and underwent three medical examinations before reaching elementary flight school. The health examinations searched for signs of communicable diseases as well as any minor deficiencies in blood pressure, heart action and vision. A glance at the Indian Affairs Annual Report for any year between the wars will indicate the serious deficiencies in the health of Canada's Aboriginal population. For those attempting to enlist in the RCAF, the consequences of outbreaks of various diseases during the interwar period were significant. Tuberculosis and trachoma, in particular, increased Native chances of rejection: the former because it spread readily in the conditions of military living, and the latter because of its damaging effect on eyesight. Health standards, however, along with the age limits, were eventually relaxed as the RCAF came under increasing pressure to fill its personnel quotas for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.

Many able-bodied Aboriginal men were also rejected because they lacked the required level of education. The pre-war regulations continued to be enforced for the first two years of the war. Applicants for pilot training must have completed junior matriculation, equivalent to grade twelve in Ontario and British Columbia and grade eleven elsewhere, before they could be considered. Few Aboriginal applicants were able to meet this criterion. During the twenties and thirties, when most of these recruits had attended school, over 75 per cent of the country's Native children attained only a grade one to three level of education. The RCAF encouraged those who were physically able but short on education to...
In part as a result of the difficulty Aboriginals faced in enlisting in the RCN and RCAF, the Army was the branch in which the overwhelming majority of Native men served. Another factor that accounts for the concentration of Aboriginal service in the Army was its huge demand for personnel. In addition, this may have been the preferred choice for Aboriginal men inspired by the example of the approximately 3,500 Native Army veterans of the First World War. The Army did not officially block Aboriginal recruitment, and generally applications were accepted without incident. However, it should not be assumed that these policies were administered uniformly or that the Army was especially eager for First Nations recruits.

The Indian Affairs Branch received a number of reports, from various points in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario during 1941 and 1942, of Army recruiters refusing Native applications. These incidents were the result of individual initiative on the part of local and district recruiting officers.

T.R.L. Maclnnes, Secretary of Indian Affairs, received the first disturbing report from Robert Howe, the Indian agent at Vanderhoof, British Columbia, in April 1941. Howe's letter primarily concerned itself with other business, but mentioned in passing that, "...the Recruiting Officer for the District has instructions not to enlist Indians for any branch of the Army." The agent's comment drew a prompt reply from Maclnnes, who requested a report concerning the matter. Howe contacted Major R. L. Gale, the Recruiting Officer at Prince George, who, "...stated that he had been instructed not to enlist Indians at the present time." The agent presumed that this alluded to all Aboriginals, at least in Recruiting Area H (Prince George), and referred the Secretary to Gale's attached letter. Unfortunately, this letter did not clarify the origin of these supposed orders. A report sent from the agent at Bella Coola, British Columbia, in October of that year would suggest that this reticence was still in effect and wider in scope than just Prince George. A recruiting officer passing through Bella Coola informed the agent that, "the Army was not very keen on Indian recruits." Despite the apparent difficulties and resistance from some of the military recruiters, over 250 British Columbia Native men successfully enlisted.

The most serious and systemic problem arose in Military District 10, in February of 1942. The initial news received by the Indian Affairs Branch was a report from the Indian agent at Kenora, Ontario, who forwarded some correspondence he had initiated with the local recruiting officer. The recruiting officer in conversation with Major Garton, the District Recruiting Officer, had tried to "point out the good work done by our Indians during the last war, but apparently, he [Garton] is acting on instructions from Ottawa in this connection." A copy of the District Recruiting Order that had inaugurated the inquiry was enclosed:

Indians also present a difficult problem. Out of seven Indians who had had six months training and were boarded for a recent draft, six were boarded out for T. B. and had to be discharged. Experience has shown that Indians cannot stand confinement or training, and their application should not be accepted.

Such a clear ban on native recruitment soon generated more incidents in other parts of Military District 10.

A telegram from Tom Lamb in The Pas, Manitoba, to the Indian Affairs Branch claimed that there were 56 men at Mooselake who wanted to enlist. This group, comprised of Métis and Native men between the ages of 18 and 45, had contacted Military District 10, but their "reception [was] not encouraging." A similar scenario occurred at Norway House, Manitoba, where Dr. Corrigan, an Indian Affairs medical official, had found "a good many Indians who are physically fit and desirous of joining the army." However, like those at Mooselake, these men received an
unhelpful response from Major Garton. Corrigan
did not accept Garton's concerns about a high
incidence of tuberculosis after training as a valid
reason for refusing Native enlistment. He believed
that these men were improperly examined before
enlistment, as a simple chest X-ray would have
revealed the existence of the disease. The
repeated refusal to enlist Aboriginals in Military
District 10 finally provoked some action by the
Indian Affairs Branch.

On 19 May 1942, Dr. Harold W. McGill,
Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs,
passed on a memorandum to the Deputy Minister
of Mines and Resources notifying him of the
situation. Three days later the minister, T. A.
Cerar, contacted his colleague in the Ministry of
National Defence, J. L. Ralston, with the
expectation that he would inquire into the matter
further. Ralston immediately issued instructions
for a mobile recruiting unit to visit Moose Lake.
The recruiters examined over 40 men and
accepted only two. They were shipped to Winnipeg
where both were eventually rejected. Whether
this remarkably high rejection rate reflected
informal opposition to Natives in the Army or
legitimate health concerns is unclear.

Despite incidents across British Columbia,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario, where
recruiting officers dissuaded or even denied
Natives the privilege of submitting an application,
it is unlikely that there was a general Army order
blocking their recruitment. The fact that the
Indian Affairs Branch received no information
about other incidents in other parts of the country
suggests that the occurrences recorded were local
in nature. More importantly, the very fact that
thousands of Native men did successfully enlist
and serve makes the existence of a nation-wide
official barrier to Aboriginal enlistment in Army
recruiting policy highly suspect.

While there is no evidence to support a claim
that the orders blocking Aboriginal recruitment
originated in Ottawa, the Army was clearly not
eager to enlist Natives. In 1944, the recruiting
manual contained a special note on the
"Enlistment of Indians and Half Breeds." The
note stated that:

Care should be taken when accepting
applications from or approaching Indians as
prospective recruits. Here education standards
are strictly adhered to. Experience has shown
that they cannot stand long periods of
Thus, the Army was not closed to Native enlistment. Its attitude might be more accurately described as cautiously pessimistic concerning Aboriginal applicants. In this respect, Native men were in a more advantageous position than other minorities such as Japanese, Chinese and Indo-Canadians who were largely blocked from all military service. Despite the difficulties, thousands of First Nations people fought and laboured in the Army during the Second World War.

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The structure of First Nations military service in the Second World War in many ways resembled closely the structure during the First World War, when all had served in the considerable ground forces of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. The nature and variety of Aboriginal service might have differed greatly in the Second World War, due to the large Canadian air and naval forces that had not existed in the First World War. However, as has been demonstrated, recruitment restrictions based on race, education and health largely eliminated the other services as viable options for Aboriginal applicants. Usually, Native desires to enlist could find an outlet only in an Army recruiting centre.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that once in the Army, RCN, or RCAF, Native soldiers were treated as equals by their peers in a way they had never been before or since. Presumably, when lives were on the line, a man’s skill and ability mattered more than his ethnic heritage, something that policy makers seemingly did not understand. This is mere supposition at this point. More work needs to be done on the military service of Aboriginal men before any conclusions can be drawn about the actual experiences of Native soldiers. In the end, despite the overt racial bans, the less tangible barriers of education and health standards, and official trepidation about the value of recruiting First Nations men, thousands served, hundreds lost their lives, and all of them made an important contribution to Canada’s war effort.

Notes

1. Victoria Times Colonist, 22 August 1946. Quoting sources in the Indian Affairs Branch. Article also listed a further 93 known casualties.
4. McIachlcan to Camsell, 18 March 1941, Directorate of History (DHist), 112.3H.009/D293.
5. Maclachlan to C. Camsell, 18 March 1941. The report is quoted verbatim in this letter. Camsell, Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, had initiated the correspondence to suggest that young Native males be given the chance to serve in the Naval Service off the coast of British Columbia.
7. Maclachlan to Camsell, 18 March 1941.
8. Natives could not legally purchase liquor in Canada until the 1951 Indian Act removed the previous ban.
10. Maclachlan to Camsell, 18 March 1941.
11. Maclachlan to Camsell, 18 March 1941.
12. The difficulty experienced by Aboriginal men in enlisting in the RCN highlights the inability of the Naval service to integrate ethnic minorities into its ranks. Visible minorities were not the only groups that found themselves unwelcome in the RCN during the Second World War - francophones were also discriminated against. While the Army and RCAF successfully organised French-speaking units to accommodate and encourage francophone enlistment, the RCN proved either unwilling or incapable of altering its forces to absorb non-white and non-anglophone recruits.
13. L.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, A Nation Forged In Fire: Canadians and the Second World War 1939-1945 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989) p. 69. The number of personnel in the RCN, though much greater than had been the case in the First World War, was small in comparison with the quarter million personnel in the RCAF, or the 600,000 plus general service recruits in the Army.
17. Gaffen, Forgotten Soldiers, p. 64. Gaffen speaks of George Edward Jamieson who rose from Sea Cadet and Boy-bugler in the RCNVR before the war to the rank of Chief Petty Officer during the conflict, serving primarily in the North Atlantic. Jamieson continued his service after the war.
20. DHist, ABR 2/3788, January 1939. This document is actually pertaining to RAF requirements for their recruiting organisation in Canada, but refers to “paragraph 3 of the conditions of service given on Form 432” of the standard RAF enlistment regulations.
21. Hollies to OIC, RCAF Recruiting Centre, Montreal, National Archives of Canada (NAC), Record Group (RG).
24. Howe to the Secretary, 10 April 1941, NAC RG 10, c-8513, vol.6768, file #452-20 pt.4.
26. Hatch, The Aerodrome of Democracy, p. 120.
29. Janice Summerby, Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields, p.23. The 1942-1943 Indian Affairs Annual Report recorded only 29 Native men in the Air Force, and nine in the RCN (even with the colour line in effect). As of 15 February 1943, total Native enlistment had reached approximately 1,800, giving an indication of how difficult it was for Aboriginal men to enlist in die RCN and RCAF. MacInnes to Doran, 15 February 1943.
31. Howe to the Secretary, 10 April 1941, NAC RG 10, c-8513, vol.6768, file #452-20 pt.4.
32. MacInnes to Howe, 18 April 1941, NAC RG 10, c-8513, vol.6768, file #452-20 pt.4.
33. Howe to the Secretary, 24 April 1941, NAC RG 10, c-8513, vol.6768, file #452-20 pt.4.
34. Howe to the Secretary, 24 April 1941.
35. Christie to the Secretary, 11 October 1941, NAC RG 10, c-8513, vol.6768, file #452-20 p.4.
37. Military District 10 comprised all of Manitoba, northwestern Ontario, and the District of Keewatin, N.W.T.
40. Lamb to Indian Affairs, 18 May 1942, NAC RG 10, c-8513, vol.6768, file #452-20 pt.4. Lamb did not state his position in this incident, but he was presumably the Indian agent.
41. Lamb to Indian Affairs, 18 May 1942.
42. Director to Deputy Minister, 10 May 1942, NAC RG 10, c-8513, vol.6768, file #452-20, pt.4.
43. Director to Deputy Minister, 10 May 1942. Corrigan also stated that, once in the service, Aboriginals were no more liable to contract the disease than anyone else.
44. Director to Deputy Minister, 10 May 1942. T.A. Crerar was the Minister responsible.
45. Crerar to Ralston, 22 May 1942, NAC RG 10, c-8513, vol.6769, file #452-20 pt.5.
49. Shoulder to Shoulder, p.31. It is noteworthy that the Army desired Native people with a residential school background. This should not be surprising, however, as the highly regimented residential schools provided an environment remarkably similar to Army basic training and thus accustomed those who had attended the schools to strict discipline, limited freedom and hard manual labour.

R. Scott Sheffield recently completed his M.A. at the University of Victoria.