“Boforce”: 1st Canadian Infantry Division Operations in Support of the Salerno Bridgehead, Italy, 1943

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Since the end of the Second World War the performance of the Canadian Army and its senior leadership in Europe has come under increasing criticism. John A. English has addressed these issues in *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study in the Failure of High Command*. Bill McAndrew has also drawn attention to the failure of Canadian units in the Italian theatre in an article for *Military Affairs* entitled "Fire or Movement? Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily, 1943." These historians have focused on operations that have had less than completely satisfactory results in order to demonstrate the problems with the Canadian way of war. While this is an important exercise, it is equally important to look at cases in which the Canadian Army performed well. The thrust of 1st Canadian Division to take the town of Potenza is just one of many examples of superior performance in the Italian Campaign.

English and McAndrew argue that Canadian operations over-emphasized firepower, particularly artillery. "The most serious result seems to have been a loss of flexibility - of mind as well as movement - which limited opportunities for exploring unexpected openings."1 Strict adherence to elaborate fireplans restricted the freedom of manoeuvre available to battalion commanders. English also stresses poor leadership and shoddy staff work as leading causes of Canadian ineffectiveness as the subtitle of his book, *A Study of Failure in High Command*, suggests.2

The action at Potenza does not fit this model. First Canadian Division was blessed with a staff seasoned in the hills of Sicily and one of the most able commanders Canada has ever produced, Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds. The plan to take Potenza was not dictated by fire. Indeed, its key was speed and surprise, making maximum use of the initiative of junior commanders who rose to the occasion.

In the middle of September 1943, the Anglo-American Allies were caught in a somewhat embarrassing situation. On all fronts the Axis forces were on the defensive. In the Pacific, the Japanese were being driven out of their only recently won empire by the "island hopping" forces of the United States. In the Soviet Union, the Germans had suffered a disastrous defeat at Stalingrad; their last hope of victory was now gone. The combined armies of Germany and Italy had been surrounded and captured in Tunis. Sicily had fallen as the stepping stone to continental Europe, to be followed closely by the landing of Allied troops on mainland Italy, bringing the final collapse of the Italian war machine. It was in southern Italy that the Allied run of good fortune seemed as though it might abruptly stop. Four days after the landing at Salerno on 9 September 1943, in the "ankle" of the Italian peninsula, the Anglo-American Fifth Army was considering withdrawal in the face of heavy German counterattacks. "The Germans outmatched the Allied build-up and soon pinned

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995, pp. 51-60.
5th Army down on the floor of the great amphitheatre-like plain of the Sele River.3

Highly effective air strikes and particularly naval gunfire helped to avoid disaster, but the most direct means of relieving the pressure on the beachhead would be to speed up the advance of Eighth Army.4 However, its progress up the Calabrian peninsula was proceeding more slowly than had been hoped, due to the extensive demolitions carried out by German engineers along the already poor road network. Allied engineers were the key to speeding up this drive, but their task was exceedingly difficult due to the shortage of bridging equipment, fuel and other vital stores.5 The limited sealift available in the Mediterranean had to be concentrated to build-up the beleaguered Fifth Army.

This period of crisis gave birth to "Boforce," an all-arms combat team which was named for its leader, Lieutenant-Colonel M.P. "Pat" Bogert of the West Nova Scotia Regiment. Their task was to race over 125 miles of winding road to Potenza, in the rear of the main German positions at Salerno, in an effort to assist the embattled Fifth Army.

While the mission was still in the planning stage the Salerno situation improved. By 16 September, the German Tenth Army had begun a phased withdrawal. Thus "Boforce's" task would change; it would pursue the retreating Germans to prevent them from catching their breath long enough to turn and make another stand. While the Salerno beachhead was no longer in serious jeopardy and the Germans were withdrawing, "a quick stride forward by Montgomery's forces would undoubtedly hasten the process."6

It was the German intention that by the night of 21-22 September the Corps [76th Panzer] should have reached a line extending from Salerno through Potenza to Altamura.7

The German left would then continue to fall back to a second line just in front of the Foggia Plain which was to be held at least until 30 September. The question was, as G. W.L. Nicholson points out in the Canadian Army official history, whether or not that plan could be accelerated or disrupted.3

"Boforce" had been the idea of Major-General Guy Simonds, commanding 1st Canadian Division, based on his experience using similar "flying columns" in the Italian foot since the landing at Reggio. The fully motorized Potenza force would possess the elements of speed and substantial firepower, thus making a rapid approach possible, yet with enough strength to take on considerable opposition. This was not the type of operation Montgomery was fond of, compared to his set piece battles in North Africa and Sicily; indeed he referred to Simonds' plan as an "administrative risk," but given the logistical situation and the urgent need to link all Allied forces in a single front across southern Italy, it appeared to be the only possible solution.9

Simonds envisioned a flying column in the advance to Potenza as the vanguard for what was, in effect, a divisional operation. Boforce would be drawn from Howard Penhale's 3rd Brigade, the remainder of which would follow as closely as possible. The other two brigades in the division would not be far behind either. "Boforce," was the largest such team yet assembled by the Canadian Army. In addition to the West Nova Scotia Regiment's infantrymen, the Calgary Regiment (14th CTR) would furnish "A" Squadron as the armoured component. The Royal Canadian Artillery would also contribute substantially to
"Boforce" with "C" Battery of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, and two troops from the 1st Anti-tank Regiment. The divisional support battalion, the Saskatoon Light Infantry, provided a platoon of Vickers medium machine-guns. Three Platoon of the 1st Field Company made up the engineer detachment. "A" Company of the 9th Field Ambulance, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, completed the force. Air power was not considered in the operational planning as air resources on both sides were concentrated at Salerno. As a precaution however, "C" Troop, 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, was included in the column.

Late in the morning of 17 September, Major-General Simonds met with Bogert to give a final briefing, following which, at 1230 hours, "Boforce" set out up the coast road. Just what Bogert and his troops would do if they contacted the enemy was not known, as it was difficult to plan in advance for any action when intelligence on enemy activity was weak and the "only maps available were small scale [1:250 000] things made from old Italian surveys, with little detail of the heights and contours." Once on the move, situations would have to be dealt with as they arose.

That first day of the advance was quite uneventful; the first leg of the route had already been reconnoitred by a smaller column consisting of the Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards as well as one company of the Carleton and York Regiment. The soldiers of "Boforce" instead had the opportunity to enjoy the drive along the scenic coastal highway, although many were no doubt more concerned about when the German Army would stand and fight.

On the morning of 18 September, "Boforce" passed through the forward Canadian positions near San Arcangelo and continued on towards Corleto until it came to an abrupt stop, 2600 meters south of the town. It was time for the engineers to go to work as the bridge over a small river bed had been blown, the first in a series of such delays. The sappers began working on a diversion, but the vehicles would be unable to go on past Corleto anyway as its streets were choked with the rubble created by Allied bombing. "D" Company was immediately set to the task of clearing a path through the rubble. Meanwhile, an engineer reconnaissance detachment continued forward with Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert, part of his command group, and "B" Company.
During the remainder of 18 September and early the next day several more demolitions were encountered, but the enemy remained elusive. Later, on the morning of 19 September, the infantrymen of "A" Company rounded the bend in the road near the Camasra River bridge, south of Anzi, just in time to watch it blast apart. The German sappers who had just carried out the demolition, noticed their audience and opened fire. The West Novas scattered for cover and immediately returned small arms fire with their .303 Enfield rifles and Bren guns. Not everyone made it safely to cover; a vital member of the "Boforce" team. Captain Buchanan, the artillery forward observation officer (FOO), was slightly wounded in the exchange of fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert planned a hasty attack, utilizing the battalion’s three-inch mortar platoon, under Lieutenant R. W. Bullock, to assist in laying down a base of fire, while "A" Company provided the assault element. The brief engagement was reminiscent of the German delaying tactics encountered by Canadian units in the early stages of the Sicilian Campaign, for as soon as Bullock's mortarmen started lobbing shells and "A" Company deployed for the attack, the Germans broke contact and withdrew. No other known casualties were taken by either side with the exception of a German lorry left burning near the destroyed bridge.

The newly formed obstacle was easily bypassed and by this time the heavy vehicles had caught up, so once again, the armour took up the lead, with the adrenaline-charged soldiers of "A" Company riding on top. The last town that would be passed through before reaching Potenza was Anzi, with 17 miles separating them. The leading tanks found another destroyed bridge just outside of Anzi at about midday on 19 September, but a diversion was easily constructed and once again the troops pushed on. In the town itself, contact was made with more German sappers who had been sowing Teller mines in the road, only this time it was the gunner of the lead Sherman who was the quickest on the draw. Several 75-millimetre shells were hurled at three German lorries which promptly collected their passengers and scuttled off. "Thus hustled, the enemy had no time for elaborate demolitions or to properly to conceal the mines, " which, left unburied, were easily dealt with by the Canadian engineers, and "Boforce" continued on. Only a short time after sundown, at 1930 hours, 19 September, the force had reached the high ground overlooking the Basento River valley, and the town of Potenza.

The town itself represented a formidable obstacle, being situated in a dominating position part way up the northern slope of the valley, commanding excellent fields of fire and observation. The town was full of concrete apartment blocks and rubble choked streets created by the Allied bombing which would further favour the defender by preventing, or at least hindering the employment of armour in support of an infantry assault.

It had already been dark for some time when Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert arrived on the heights overlooking Potenza, thus it was impossible to conduct a thorough reconnaissance or take advantage of his excellent observation point. Instead, the tactical plan had to be formulated almost entirely from maps, never a favourable option, made worse by the poor quality of Italian charts. Another negative factor in the plan of attack was the lack of hard intelligence on enemy strength in the area.

Consequently, Bogert had very little concrete information on which to base his plan, making the initial attack a reconnaissance in itself. Bogert originally planned to launch his attack at dawn so that the West Novas could be properly supported by artillery, but this was not to be. In order to offset the German
advantages of observation, which could potentially serve to annihilate a daylight assault, General Simonds ordered "Boforce" to make a grab for the town that very night. 19

This attack was to begin an hour after the moon rose at 2300 hours. The rifle companies would make their approach into the valley in motor transport and dismount near the first of a series of three bridges which carried the main road across the Basento and two other connecting creeks. 20 At this time of year the watercourses were all dry and easily negotiated by infantry, but reconnaissance patrols had discovered that the first of the bridges had been blown and the surrounding area had been mined, including the dry river bed. 21 This new information was factored into the plan which would now see "D" Company move into a position from where it could cover a sapper detail that would clear a path through the mines. Following the completion of the breach, "D" and "C" Companies would advance towards the town. "A" Company would move up to cover the engineers, who would continue working to widen the minefield breach and to construct a vehicle diversion around the blown bridge so that the armour could push through to support the leading platoons. "B" Company would serve as the tactical reserve. 22
It appears that no artillery fire plan was prepared to support the attack, although a Forward Observation Officer would go along with the leading companies. This, however, is not so unusual considering the absence of daylight to observe the ground over which the troops had to advance, coupled with the poor maps. It was also not customary to prepare such a plan until contact had been made with the enemy and the appropriate intelligence gathered regarding their positions. Once this had been done, the fire plan would take time to put together; in the case of the Liri Valley battle, later in the campaign, the plan took three days to complete. Neither the information nor the time was available for such detailed artillery support of the first attack at Potenza.

At 0100 hours, 20 September the infantry and engineers moved down into the valley. "C," "D" and "A" Companies, the sappers, and a platoon of "B" Company, drove down towards the area of the first bridge, sacrificing the stealth of a foot-borne approach for the speed of their lorries. While the soldiers were dismounting, an "A" Company lorry struck a Teller mine, ripping through the cab, wounding seven of the occupants. Three more of the attached "B" Company soldiers were injured when their vehicle ran into the crater of another mine. Ten men were out of action, surprise was lost and not a shot had yet been fired; some of the most decisive factors in war are those which are not expected.

At 0300 hours the sudden roar of small arms fire broke the early morning calm as an "A" Company patrol chased off another German demolition detail as it was attempting to blow the second bridge. In the meantime, after the engineers had cleared the way, "C" and "D" Companies crossed the dry river bed and deployed for their advance into the town. It was nearly dawn as the point rifle sections climbed the steep embankment up to the railyard only to face a wall of flying steel. As the daylight grew, the plight of the lead companies became apparent. The German defenders, members of the crack 1st Parachute Division, had quite successfully isolated "C" and "D" companies from the remainder of the regiment. They did so by pinning those companies down with automatic weapons and at least one towed anti-tank gun, while at the same time pouring fire down in the vicinity of the river bed, preventing the crossing of "A" and "B" Companies. The armour could not yet cross either, as it was held up by the blown bridge and accompanying mines. The best that could be done to support the lead companies at this point was to provide suppressive fire in an attempt to neutralize some of the German positions, but this had to be done with extreme caution as it was unclear exactly how far the forward Platoons had penetrated. The fire of the artillery, 3-inch mortars, and medium machine guns was used largely in a harassment role; firing on targets of opportunity or being adjusted by radio and runner.

The increasing daylight also brought German small arms fire down around the engineers working at the first bridge. Their task was further compounded by the thoroughness of their German counterparts, who had booby-trapped many of the mines with anti-lifting devices. Two 6-pounder anti-tank guns, as well as a troop of the heavier 17-pounder guns of the 57th Anti-Tank Battery, were deployed near the first bridge and immediately began firing on the weapons signatures of the German machine guns that were harassing the sappers. Yet it would still take some time to clear a safe approach on this axis of advance for infantry or armour. In the meantime, Bogert put the Calgary Tanks to use as mobile artillery, the direct fire of their flat trajectory, 75 mm guns being more easily applied to support the infantry, fighting in the close confines of the town, than the indirect fire of the artillery's field guns. The gunners instead went to work pummelling the main German position further up the northern slope where the destructive bursts of the 25-pounder shells would not pose a threat to the West Novas.

The advance of "Boforce" had been much more rapid than the German staff officers had planned for, and only a scratch force of paratroops had been rushed to Potenza from the Salerno sector at the last minute. One company-sized mixed group, heavy on machine-guns, and complete with an anti-tank detachment, had reached the town by the afternoon of 19 September. The paratroopers were to have been only the vanguard for a larger force tasked with holding the town in accordance with the phased withdrawal, but instead they fought alone and unsupported by artillery. The veteran German soldiers used what little time they had before the Canadians were upon them, to skillfully position their machine guns with such effective inter-locking fields of fire that, until the Canadian tanks crossed the river bed, any further frontal assault, while possible, would be bloody.

This was readily apparent from Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert's headquarters. Brigadier
Penhale, under the watchful eye of Major-General Simonds, both of whom had arrived sometime in the mid-morning, put together a plan of attack utilizing the entire 3rd Brigade. To begin with, the 4th Field Company of the Royal Canadian Engineers was brought up to assist the 1st Field Company sappers still working at clearing a crossing near the first bridge, so that the tanks could get forward to perfect. The Vandoos moved off from their startline at 1230 hours, five miles east of Potenza, but still in view of the German paratroopers. This advance began just as the sappers were completing their work at the bridge site allowing the armour to finally get into the fight directly. With their position being outflanked, and only limited anti-tank capability to deal with the armoured threat in front, the Germans faced two options: fight on and be annihilated or withdraw to fight another day. The latter choice was apparently planned for as the German motor transport awaited the retreating defenders on the other side of a railway tunnel which cut through the high ground to the northeast. The bulk of the Germans escaped through the tunnel but several snipers were left in the town to be mopped up by the West Novas. The remainder of the armour, along with two platoons of "B" Company riding on top and Lieutenant-Colonel Bogert in his command jeep, pushed up the main road into Potenza. The officer in command of the Calgary tank support "D" and "C" Companies. The principal effort would be shifted to the east where the Royal 22e Regiment, which arrived during the night, would carry out a wide flanking movement on the Canadian right, to seize the heights behind the town. Such an attack over relatively open ground would be more easily supported by artillery. The fire of all three batteries of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery's 1st Field Regiment was to assist the Vandoos' attack. The Carleton and York Regiment was in reserve.

The plan was not set into motion until shortly after noon, but either by design or by chance the timing could not have been more
squadron was rather reluctant to proceed forward due to the threat posed by the German antitank guns. Bogert informed the tank officer that he intended to drive into the town in his jeep and he expected the tanks to accompany him. After consolidating the town and dispatching patrols to make contact with flanking Allied units, this stage of 1st Canadian Division's operations was complete and the two Allied armies were linked in a continuous front from Bari to Salerno. Canadian casualties for this comparatively small-scale operation were "light," six killed and a further 21 wounded. Casualties among the German paratroopers are unknown, although 16 prisoners were left behind, mostly wounded. The cost of war in Potenza was further magnified by the civilian death toll resulting from the Allied bombing, estimates of which ran as high as 2,000, the corpses still rotting in the sun as the Canadians entered the town.

The Canadian objective of accelerating the German withdrawal program had been accomplished. The unexpectedly rapid advance by "Boforce" to Potenza was a key factor in the German line retreating ahead of its intended schedule. On 1 October, Eighth Army had penetrated 20 miles beyond the notional German defence line in front of Foggia, which was to have become operational just at that time. In spite of these dramatic strides forward the situation was stabilized by mid-October, and the opportunities for further substantial exploitation on the Adriatic front had dried up. This stalling of Eighth Army's advance was the direct result of the same logistical problems that had plagued it since landing at Reggio.

A question emerges from this rather simplistic explanation: Why was the German army, usually so meticulous in operational staff work, so badly mistaken as to the rate of the Canadian advance? The question is a complex one, and it hinges on the fact that the use of fast, mobile, all arms columns was a departure from the operational norms of the Canadian and British armies developed in the close country of Sicily and Italy. It cannot be stated for certain, but it is probable that the German plan for a phased withdrawal, initiated on 18 September, was based on their perception of standard British operational methods, which were seen as rather slow and ponderous, each new step forward being launched from a consolidated base, and only after large stocks of supplies had been brought to forward dumps to sustain the drive. The Potenza mission began without the customary large supply base, and proceeded up a narrow road axis with relatively open flanks, in order to strike deep into the thinly held enemy left. The move was not typically Montgomery, but then again, "Boforce" was not Montgomery's idea.

The spectacular success of "Boforce" went unknown for some time to other Canadians back in England and at home, anxious for news about the only Canadian ground troops active in any theatre at that time. No reports could be released because "it was essential that the enemy should not realize that a single infantry division was covering the whole wide front from west of Potenza to the vicinity of Taranto." Even in the years after the war, in comparison to the larger, and bloodier, Italian battles like Ortona and the Hitler Line, the small action at Potenza would not get much attention. Yet the absence of heavy fighting and huge casualty lists is exactly what made "Boforce" so successful, for the speed and surprise with which the team descended upon the town were the keys to its victory.

The battle does sit at the centre of the controversy regarding whether Eighth Army could have advanced faster out of Calabria, to support Fifth Army in its crisis at Salerno. In this context, some historians and strategists, mostly American, have judged that Eighth Army operations conducted during those crucial days in September were insignificant. This may in fact be true, yet when the Canadian drive to Potenza is considered as part of the effort to hasten the German forces withdrawing from the Salerno area, and to seize the Foggia airfields, then it can only be judged as a great achievement.

William McAndrew points out in "Fire or Movement?" that Simonds' had outlined his offensive method in a 1939 article for the Canadian Defence Quarterly. In "The Attack" Simond's identified two types of defensive action. In one, the defender attempts to deny information to the attacker. "The action required of the infantry will necessitate tactics of manoeuvre and infiltration through close country, not an attack with a set fire plan." The other type of action finds the defender in prepared positions which must be breached in a set-piece assault. Given that the Germans originally intended to hold Potenza in some strength, Boforce does not fit into either model.
The plan was the result of a necessity for rapid advance, combined with limitations of strained logistics and limited intelligence on the enemy's intentions. "Boforce's" success derived partly from the German underestimation of the speed and initiative of the troops facing them as well as strong Canadian leadership at the operational and tactical levels. Simonds' flexible plan was well executed by Bogert who pushed relentlessly forward yet always under the umbrella of his 25-pounders. Once engaged, Bogert effectively employed all available direct and indirect-fire weapons. The operation was daring but not foolhardy. Canadians can take pride in the accomplishment of their fathers at Potenza, yet it is but one example. If historians are to assess the performance of the Canadian Army in battle, then they must examine its success in just as much detail as its failure.

In Memory of Jim Stokesbury, my teacher and my friend.

Notes

7. War Diary [WD], Tenth Army, 18 September, Order #3 Appendix 386 as cited in Nicholson, Italy. p.224.
8. Nicholson, Italy p.224. The Army directive naming Potenza as a Canadian objective was not officially issued until 17 September, but a plan for a rapid advance north had been under consideration at 1st Canadian Division for sometime before. Unit advance parties had received warning orders by 15 September.
12. WD. West Nova Scotia Regiment [West NSR], 18 September 1943.
13. WD. West NSR, 18 September 1943.
14. WD. West NSR. 19 September 1943; Raddall, pp. 126-127.
15. WD. West NSR, 19 September 1943. A Teller mine is one type of German anti-tank mine.
18. WD. 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade [3 CIB], 19 September 1943.
20. WD. West NSR, 19 September 1943.
22. WD. West NSR, 19 September 1943.
23. WD. 1st Royal Canadian Horse Artillery [1st RCHA], 20 September 1943.
24. McAndrew, Military Affairs, p.140.
25. WD. West NSR, 20 September 1943.
29. WD. 3 CIB, 20 September 1943.
30. WD. 3 CIB, 20 September 1943.
31. WD. 14th Canadian Tank Regiment (Calgary) 20 September 1943.
34. WD. 3 CIB, 20 September 1943; WD. Royal 22e Regiment, 20 September 1943. The Royal 22e Regiment is often referred to by their nickname, the Vandoos, which is derived from the French-Canadian pronunciation of the number, vingt-deux.
35. WD. 1st RCHA, 20 September 1943.
36. WD. 3 CIB, 20 September 1943.
37. Raddall. p.129.
38. Interview with Major-General Bogert.
42. Prior to Montgomery's assumption of command of Eighth Army in North Africa, extensive use had been made of "Jock Columns." Neither Montgomery, or the Sicilian terrain were receptive to such tactics and thus these combat teams were not often used in the Italian theatre.
43. Intelligence Summary, 3 CIB; WD. West NSR, 13 September, Appendix 1(a). This report predicts that no major German defensive operations will be conducted south of the Salerno-Naples area.
45. McAndrew, Military Affairs, p.144.

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