1999

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Recommended Citation

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Balkanism: 1. term coined in the West to indicate public mores and customs supposedly prevailing in the Balkans: lack of principles, means justifies ends policy, deceit, bribery, political assassinations, passion for enrichment, servility towards superiors, disdain for inferiors. Cf. Byzantism.[1]

If Europe has produced not only racism but antiracism, not only misogyny but also feminism, not only anti-Semitism but also its repudiation, then what can be termed Balkanism has not yet been coupled with its complementing and ennobling antiparticle.[2]

Introduction

For many of its former citizens Yugoslavia was a peaceful and fairly prosperous modern European country. But economic hardship and political instability in the 1980s led to another type of reality that recalled the brutal and fearsome experiences of World War II in the Balkans — an era most thought gone forever. The apparent similarities have led foreign observers, as well as local participants, to see the 1990s as just another bleak page of violence and destruction in the already grim story of the former Yugoslav state.

The bloody disintegration of the country thus seems to bear out a widespread Western perception of the Balkans as synonymous not only with the parcelization of large and viable political units, but also with the "reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian."[3] Political pundits and academics have emphasized that Yugoslavia was built across civilizational and cultural fault lines, not noticing that the Balkans, in Stephen Pavlowitch's succinct phrase, "are made up not only of fractures and watersheds, but also of passageways and crossroads."[4] They have essentialized supposedly irreconcilable historical, economic, political, territorial and cultural diversities that have always existed in Yugoslavia, so that its

violent dissolution is seen as the unavoidable outcome of a false and imposed experiment in supranational engineering.

This article deals with different images of the former Yugoslavia. First, I present Samuel P. Hungtington's understanding of global politics as an example of "orientalist" and "balkanist" discourses.[5] I try to show how these discourses methodologically impede the examination of Yugoslavia's disintegration, and perpetuate imageries of the Balkans as uncivilized and barbarous.

Secondly, I describe the process of creating the "other" within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The imagery, themes and notions invoked by rhetorical strategists in the former Yugoslavia reflect the "classification struggle" of the European periphery for recognition by the more powerful "Western" players. These images were not chosen accidentally, but were predetermined by their implicit acceptance in the West as accurate descriptions of the Balkans. In this connection, I highlight the role of national intelligentsias in the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Finally, I present an alternative history of the Yugoslav idea which calls into question the widely assumed inevitability of Yugoslavia's disintegration. I point to the existence of a respectable tradition among North American and Yugoslav scholars that runs counter to the prevailing balkanist discourse.

Contemporary Orientalist and Balkanist Discourses of Global Politics

In Huntington's view, the end of the Cold War marked a turning point in global economic and political conflicts. Instead of ideological kinship, new alliances are likely to emerge, comprised of nations that share the same cultural background and belong to the same civilization. In such a world, the principal conflicts will most probably occur between nations and groups of different civilizations because the interactions among people of different civilizations "invigorate differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history."[6] The fault lines between civilizations are becoming "the battle lines of the future," of which the most important one in Europe is the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500.

This line divided the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and today separates Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of the former Yugoslavia. West of this line is the civilization of Western Christianity, characterized by the common experiences

of feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, etc. To the east lie the Orthodox and Muslim civilizations that were never strongly influenced by those later stages of Western development which produced a liberal economic and political system.

To what extent does this view meet the facts of the war in Yugoslavia? Does it mean that it is "our" (read, Western Christian) turn now to install an iron curtain to protect Western cultural ideals from the tides of eastern chaos? How does such a "civilizational" perspective explain, for example, the rise of Fascism and Nazism within western borders in countries which saw the full flowering of the Renaissance and the Reformation?

The "Clash of Civilizations" is the product of Huntington's work on the project "The Changing Security Environment and American National Interests" at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. It is an excellent example of the U.S. international relations tradition of identifying key foreign policy challenges and suggesting U.S. responses.[7] As Huntington concentrates on approaches the United States — or the West, since he uses these terms interchangeably — should pursue to protect their interests and culture, his "clash of civilizations" thesis should perhaps be read less as a definitive view of global politics than as a contribution to the debate among American scholars and policymakers about the agenda the United States faces after the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War.

So, when Huntington writes, "[T]he Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe,"[8] this may be not so much an empirical statement as a suggestion for American policy makers. Huntington extends his list of challenges (threats) facing the United States in the near future as follows:

> In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders. ... If they [Russians] reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians [read, traditional, authoritarian, nationalist] but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West could again become distant and conflictual.[9]

Huntington brings the virtues of Western civilization into relief by comparing them with the vices of other cultures (primarily, Islamic, Confucian and Orthodox Christian) — a procedure which would only seem to exacerbate the problems of a world community. Indeed, Edward Said attributes to Huntington "a sort of detached superiority for a handful of values and ideas, none of which has much meaning outside the history of conquest, immigration, travel and the mingling of peoples that gave the Western nations their present mixed identities"[10] Said treats Huntington's "far from convincing" thesis on inter-civilizational conflicts as a prime example of how "theorists and apologists of an exultant Western tradition" have the power and capacity to "retain a good deal of their hold on public consciousness," thus legitimating their standards as the Western standards.[11] Huntington's approach thus emerges as a methodological impediment to a better understanding of the conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere, and as a covert presentation of the interests of power politics under the guise of analysis.

All this suggests that at the core of the orientalist discourse is the assumption that the West, Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, etc. are known to us only through the symbols of "the Middle East," the "Balkans," "Europe" and the "West." But by identifying, for example, Iran with "Iran," or Europe with "Europe," the difference between the sign and what it represents is lost. Once this is achieved, all the developed Western nations can be described by a single word or phrase, as can "the Balkans" and all of its peoples. Then the West emerges as the "West," *i.e.*, civilized, democratic and modern, while the Balkans are presented as a region best described as barbarous, uncivilized and pre-modern — in a word, as "the Balkans." We are left, says Milan Brdar, with the interplay between two simulacra which identify and maintain the differences between "the West" on one side, and "the Orient" and "the Balkans" on the other.[12]

However, Maria Todorova has argued for the need to treat "balkanism" on its own, and not just as a "sub-species of orientalism." Following Foucault and Said, she insists that "balkanism" is idiosyncratic because the Balkans, while geographically part of Europe are culturally constructed as the "other" of Europe. This dual positioning of the Balkans has enabled the West to externalize the Balkans as "a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of 'the European' and 'the West' has been constructed." The function of such imagery is to exempt "the West from charges of racism,

colonialism, Eurocentrism and Christian intolerance. After all, the Balkans are in Europe, they are white and they are predominantly Christian ...."[13]

James Der Derian offers a somewhat different reading of such symbolism. He maintains that the common understanding of "balkanization" — the breaking up of empires into smaller and mutually hostile states — is meaningless since the term could cover the whole history of the state-system and international relations (the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, the rise of nationalism, the process of decolonialization). The real issue, he says, is what kind of order is being produced by balkanization?[14] In this regard, while the term cannot be separated from its geopolitical implications, "balkanization has legs." A certain type of behavior, whether in the Balkans, Canada or anywhere else, can be labeled as such; that is, it can be pulled out of local contexts only to justify "our" own political choices as legitimate.[15]

But what purpose is ultimately served by this type of strategy? Todorova believes the answer lies in power politics. She tries to define a broad Western understanding ("inventing") of the Balkans that underlies our perceptions (no matter whether Marxist, liberal, or post-modern) of the region today. This inventing has long been shaped by a mixture of romanticism and *Realpolitik* that, according to the power relations of the day, resulted in either advocacy for or demonization of the Balkan population (Philhellenism, Turkophilia, Slavophobia, Turkophobia, Slavophilia, etc.). The latest discovery of the Balkans as the "dark other of 'Western civilization'" stems in her view from the West's need to delineate new borders, the old ideological ones having lost their importance with the collapse of communism. "Balkanist," like "orientalist" discourse, serves to legitimize "Western" standards as world standards. It helps to establish membership rules for entry into the club of the Western nations, and to justify the choice of who to keep out.

In sum, both the "liberal" language of Samuel Huntington, and the "naked realist" prose of "Western" policy makers, end by labeling the "others" of the Balkans as unfit for democracy and liberalism, either because their great-grandparents were incapable of creating an Enlightenment movement of their own, or because of their "undue" propensity for barbarity.[16] Thus, it seems that power politics exercises a stranglehold over perceptions and self-perceptions of the Balkans unless we remember Said's phrase that "East isn't East," or ask the question Pavlowitch and Todorova pose: "Who is balkanizing whom?"

Still, given the dominant understanding of the "true nature" of the Balkan peoples, would a different type of narrative on Yugoslavia be a rather useless exercise? After all, regional, ethnic and cultural stereotyping is not just a "Western" practice. No matter how far south-east we go, further down the road lies "real" south-east, from which our present position appears to be on the north-west. As Marko Živković points out "[T]he South and the East themselves tend to transfer the same odium that they receive from those positioned further 'up' to regions and peoples lying further 'down' the North-South and West-East gradients of depreciation."[17] Also, that from the time when the North assumed political and economic supremacy in Europe, "northerners" and "westerners" ascribe cerebral qualities of rationality, control and mastery to themselves, and visceral ones of emotionality, unreliability and general looseness to "southerners."[18] These "gradients of depreciation" or, in the words of Milica Bakić-Hayden, nesting orientalisms, thus appear both as reflections and reinforcers of unequal distribution of power.[19]

And yet, the identities of "us" and "them" are never static. They always involve a contest among individuals and institutions to appropriate historic, social, political and intellectual processes that define society in a particular age.[20] From this perspective, the causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration are connected to the innate "barbarous" characteristics of the region and the "ancient" enmities among Yugoslav nations only to the extent that powerholders within and outside the region have been successful in using frozen imagery of the Balkans to produce "adversarial knowledge" that suits their particular interests. Having examined some one-dimensional Western pictures of the Balkans, let us now deal with the creation of "adversarial knowledge" within the region.

The Creation of the "Other" in the Balkans

The most ambitious recent attempt to depict the southeastern part of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as the least civilized and most violent part of the Balkans can be found in *Habits of the Balkan Heart* by two Croatian Americans, Stjepan Meštrović and Miroslav Goreta, and the Croatian sociologist Slaven Letica, a former aide to Croatian President Franjo Tudman.[21] Closely following Huntington, they interpret the war in the Balkans as a clash of cultures, specifically, between Western, peaceful and democratic culture (Slovenia and

Croatia) and eastern, primitive and backward Orthodox culture (Serbia and Montenegro).[22] According to them, the "Dinaric social character" of the Serbs, habituated to "fraud" and "deceit," led them not only to symbolically destroy the Oedipal figure of the father of former Yugoslavia — Josip Broz Tito (one of the writers is a psychiatrist) — but to attack Croatia in 1991. On the other side, the authors see the Croatian nation epitomized in the "Croatian Lady," the Virgin ("Mother of God") who has since 1981 repeatedly appeared to the faithful in Medugorje, Western Herzegovina. Thus, against the "father-dominated" and "war-loving" Serbs,[23] the Croats emerge as peace-loving people, faith firm in their "Gothic" hearts for the Virgin Mary.

Medugorje has more than local significance. It symbolizes the dividing line between Western Catholicism and the Eastern type of Christianity, being situated in Western Herzegovina (Croatian majority), just across the Neretva river from Eastern Herzegovina (Serbian majority). Moreover, as communism collapsed, the Virgin emerged as a symbol of the "discovery of one's [right to] national self-determination versus a slave morality that surrenders to the expansionist aim that emanated from Belgrade and Moscow."[24] Lastly, the symbolism of Medugorje is reinforced by the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian aggression and the failures of the West to prevent it, the authors maintain, helped the reemergence of the Islamic self-consciousness and created the risk that Islamic fundamentalism would replace the communist threat to the Christian West. This, the authors hold, "is the ultimate cultural meaning of Medugorje in the post-communist world and the sociological significance of its location in Bosnia and Herzegovina."[25]

How should we read *Habits of the Balkan Heart*? Gerasimos Augustinos observes that it says more about the authors' prejudices regarding the Balkans and the West than about the complex political issues surrounding Yugoslavia's break-up and the dismemberment of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[26] Their dubious social theorizing — loosely based on the theories of Spengler, Veblen, Toynbee, and the Croatian American anthropologist Dinko Tomašić — ends up projecting a particular set of negative social characteristics onto an entire people (Serbs), and, as such, it "borders on genetic determinism."[27] Although cultural issues are at the heart of the Balkan question, one cannot explain the richness of the "habits of the Balkan heart" on the basis of a few ethnic stereotypes.

Stripped of its anti-Serbian metaphors, the book is a reprise of Huntington, for its conclusion is once again that the defining conflict on the global stage is

between the East and the West. *Habits of the Balkan Heart* also reminds us how power legitimizes stereotyped "knowledge" as truth.[28] In this particular case, what Meštrović *et al.* are trying to accomplish depends upon the negative media images of the Serbs as being responsible for the atrocities committed in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course these images rarely, if ever, show the difference between the Serbs in general and the Serbs as individuals, so that the difference between the Serbs and "the Serbs" is completely lost.

Not surprisingly, and in line with the "North-South and West-East gradients of depreciation," "Serbian" accounts of themselves and others mirror "Croatian" ones. The former president of the "Third" Yugoslavia and noted Serbian writer, Dobrica Ćosić, blames the break-up of Yugoslavia on the offensive character of Croatian nationalism:

> The foundation of their nationalism has been religion, ever since the mid-nineteenth century. So, the Croatian is a Catholic even more than a nationalist. Catholicism in Croatia has the role of an outright constitutional principle. Hence the Croat's profound hostility towards the Serb, guilty in his eyes of two capital sins — both an Orthodox or an atheist and a communist! ... And behind Croatian nationalism there lies ... hatred of diversity (emphasis mine, D.G.). This ideology subsequently became part of the Serbian people's unconscious, exacerbating antagonism and antipathy, to the extent of mutual hatred and the desire to fight. The tragedy of Serbia and Croatia is exactly that of Cain and Abel.[29]

This ostensibly objective statement implies that Serbian nationalism was defensive in character. Thus, the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was not Serbia's fault. It was simply helping its "brethren" west of the Drina river who were at Cain's mercy. The reversal of roles is complete. Croats are no longer peace-loving people dedicated to the Virgin Mary, but aggressive folks, ready to fight against anybody who is different from them. The road to labeling all Croats as closet extremists and ultra-nationalists (Ustashas) is thus cleared. Although the "Father of the Serbian Nation" never took this road and the word *Ustasha* is not even used in the previously quoted paragraph, it is implicitly there, ready to be picked up by some less scrupulous (or less tactical) author, such as the Serbian ultra-nationalist leader Vojislav Šešelj, and then thrown indiscriminately upon all Croatian heads.

The general trend of the balkanist approach is now obvious. It delineates national characteristics in a static and non-evolutionary way, while replacing communism's ideological "other" with a geographical/cultural "other" of the Orient.[30] Ironically, none of the former Yugoslav authors seems to realize that their "us vs. them" dichotomizing actually originates in the "West," and moreover that "Western" accounts of the Balkans often lump together all Balkan nations, whether supposedly "barbaric" or "enlightened." But in any case, depicting yesterday's neighbors as barbarous was just the first phase of a "double move" aimed at creating national identities within the region. The next stage was to persuade the local population that the Yugoslav idea and state was never a solution to the national question in the Balkans.

Ivo Banac's *The National Question in Yugoslavia* (1984) marked a clear break with an earlier literature supportive of the existence of Yugoslavia, describing the country as a "firm citadel that could be maintained only by human sacrifice."[31] According to him, the original Serbian aim was to unite all the Serbs living under the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires into one independent state. Only when they realized that a Serbian state was impossible did they choose the Yugoslav option instead. Similarly, the Croats were interested in Yugoslavia as a means of regaining independence from Austria-Hungary and to reclaim large parts of Croatia from Italy. Banac thus implies that Yugoslavia emerged merely to serve the short-term interests of the Serbian and Croatian elites. Once the international situation would allow, this "interim station" could be abandoned in favor of independent national states. In other words, the distinct national agendas that were crystallized in the mid-19th century are to be understood both as the causes of Yugoslavia's creation and of its eventual disintegration:

> Indeed, despite dictatorship and attempts at democratic renewal, occupation and wars, revolutions and social changes, after 1921 hardly any new elements were introduced in the set pattern of South Slavic interactions. The game was open ended, but pawns could proceed only one square at a time, except on their first move, bishops always moved diagonally. ... [The national question] was reflected in the internal, external, social, economic, and even cultural affairs. It was solved by day and unsolved by night. Some days were particularly bright for building, some nights particularly dark for destroying. One horn of the dilemma was that a single solution could not satisfy

all sides. Was the other that a firm citadel could be maintained only by human sacrifice?[32]

But was Yugoslavia just a solution that could not satisfy all sides? Despite Banac's excellent points about the distinct agendas of Serbian and Croatian elites, he underplays the equally important issues over which there never were disputes (at least until the late 1980s) among many of the Serbian and Croatian "chess players." In particular, there was a common understanding that ethnically mixed areas in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia made Yugoslavia the only viable alternative to the politics of ethnic differentiation and homogenization. From this perspective, Banac's view of the impossibility of a single solution satisfying all sides, and his consequent identification of Yugoslavia with human sacrifice, betray an inability to differentiate between the problems caused by one or two particular models of the state and those arising from the idea of the joint state itself. This, however, leads to another question: under which assumptions can we claim that, once the rules of the game are set, nothing can prevent chess-like behavior that leads to the break-up of the state itself?[33]

Both Croatian historian and president Franjo Tuđman and a former President of a "third" Yugoslavia Dobrica Ćosić explicitly conceive a "nation" in organismic terms, i.e., as a unitary body within which there is no space for internal conflict. For Tuđman, every nation has the "natural and historic right to its sovereignty and its place in the human community just as the individual has in society." Even more, "[O]nly a free and sovereign nation, like a fully developed and free human being, can give its full contribution to the world."[34] Of course, Tuđman's "Herderian" nationalism does not look so humanistic and benevolent since the 1995 Croatian "reconquista" of Serb-majority areas of the country, when tens of thousands of local Serbs were forced to leave their homes. According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, since 1991, close to 300,000 local Serbs (out of 600,000) have been ethnically cleansed from Croatia.[35]

Ćosić is even more explicit than Tuđman:

> Only big nations are capable of paying their respect to the individual. In the case of small nations it is not possible because of the national myths and taboos. Only the nation itself can be great, while the moral responsibility of an individual demands sacrifices to community, nation, state.[36]

Tuđman and Ćosić imply that a Serb, a Croat, or whoever, is not a person unless he or she possesses a national self-consciousness. At the same time, such an "individual" can fully develop his potentialities only within the framework of an ethnic nation state.[37] The identification of freedom itself with the nation to which we belong can only have one outcome — the replacement of all differences and complexities within a multi-ethnic society, including political and ideological disputes, with national ones. The final victim in the case of Yugoslavia was Yugoslavia itself, since the ideal of Yugoslavia, as Đuro Kovačević maintains, was the main barrier to the politics of nationalistic differentiation.[38]

The ideological defeat of the idea of Yugoslavia, however, has preceded the political defeat of Yugoslavia; Tuđman, Ćosić and other nationalist intellectuals "analyzed" the national question long before the outbreak of war. From one point of view, the break-up of Yugoslavia seems to vindicate their "historical" insights. On the other hand, their own statements did much to create the conditions that led to Yugoslavia's disintegration. In fact, the aim of their essentialist historical accounts was precisely to promote their preferred alternative to Yugoslavia — completely homogeneous nation states.[37] This could only be accomplished if national intelligentsias could make the Yugoslav public forget the prophetic warning of the great Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža: "God save us from a thousand years of Croatian culture and Serbian heroism!"

Nationally conscious writers, historians and journalists gradually attuned public consciousness to the idea that the Balkans were destined to repeat their history, while the national academies of science and arts became manufacturers of Manichean historical imageries, in which history is a conflict of collective, homogenized actors whose identity is formed and sustained by resilient collective memories.[40] As Živković aptly observes, "[W]e are given to understand that this collective memory refuses to be suppressed by any universalistic ideology, be it that of communism or liberal democracy, and that it time and time again reasserts itself on the stage of history."[41]

But, as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe maintain, identities are never natural or predetermined — although they can be made to seem so by hegemonic discourse that "misrepresents" identities as permanently frozen in time and space. In their words, discourse "is not a merely 'cognitive' or 'contemplative' entity; it is an *articulatory practice* which constitutes and organizes social relations."[42]

Nationalist rhetoric in the former Yugoslavia and balkanist discourse in the West imagined the identities of the former Yugoslav nations in a homogenized "either/or" way. This denied the possibility of a "both ... and" reality, that is of people identifying themselves in multiple ways as being both Serb and Yugoslav, Croat and Yugoslav, Muslim and Yugoslav, etc.[43]

In the final analysis, although we may be appalled by the atrocities of the recent wars in Yugoslavia, nationalists and balkanologists have led us to believe that the "oppressed" collective memories of the Balkan peoples could be only expiated by the politics of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s. Two "facts" appeared to support this view. First, the bloody war between the Serbs and the Croats was thought to be just another explosion of the ancient hatred between these two peoples. Second, Yugoslavia, a product of the Versailles Treaty, was viewed as an artificial creation that could only be sustained through sacrifices of national freedoms. But how true were these "facts?"

Yugoslavia as a Dream, Myth and Reality

In spite of the ignominious end of Yugoslavia, its creation was a "logical and even natural consequence" of the increasing awareness among the South Slavs that they share "significant political and geo-strategic interests and economic aspirations."[44] Moreover, the birth of the Yugoslav national ideology was part of a broader 19th century Eastern European process of Slavic people "discovering" distinctive national identities *vis-à-vis* great powers of the day, under whose tutelage they had lived for centuries. In this respect, the creation of Yugoslavia, as of several other Eastern European states, required the destruction of the Habsburg and Ottoman multi-nation empires that, as Dimitrije Đordević maintains, "impeded the emancipation of Yugoslav nationalities."[45]

South Slav life up until the late 18th century was essentially non-national.[46] This is not to say that a sense of ethnic bonding did not exist, or had not yet been developed. But in pre-modern times, feudal status played a larger role in shaping identity.[47] Even the Serb rebellion against the Ottomans in 1804 started more as a social uprising against peasant conditions than as a protest against foreign rule. Peasant revolt turned into national revolution only through the material help and intellectual guidance of the Austrian Serbs of Vojvodina (then Southern Hungary), who, living in the economically and "culturally" richer Habsburg Empire, were

already imbued with a modern sense of national identity. Furthermore, throughout this period the nascent Serbian merchant class and intellectuals from Vojvodina not only acted as "an established transmission-belt of ideas ... into the Pašaluk of Beograd," but also became "an active reservoir of administrative, political and intellectual leadership for 'Serbia.'"[48]

In the mid-19th century Serbia was already *de facto* an independent state while still *de jure* under Turkish tutelage (Serbia finally won independence at the Congress of Berlin in 1878). The frontiers of the emerging Serbian state, however, did not coincide with those of the Serbian nation.[49] Accordingly, every Serbian national memorandum since Ilija Garašanin's *Načertanije* of 1844 looked to unite Serbs living in Austrian, Magyar and Ottoman territories with Serbia proper; a program which could be accomplished only by actively undermining the dominant positions of Austria and the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans.

The significance of *Načertanije* can hardly be overestimated, since it informed the actions of Serbia's ruling elite until as late as 1939. In a nutshell, it called for the creation of one state in which all Serbs would finally live together. This aim was not necessarily anti-Yugoslav, since it could perhaps have been achieved through a federation where Serbs could have enjoyed, as they did in the former Yugoslavia, equal rights with other nationalities. After all, Ilija Garašanin himself was a Serbian politician who actively promoted pro-Yugoslav policies. In 1866 he agreed with the Croatian Catholic Bishop Strossmayer, the founder of the Yugoslav idea, on collaboration between the Croats of the Triune kingdom (Civil Croatia, Dalmatia and Krajina) and Serbia toward the creation of a Yugoslav state independent of both the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires.[50]

Načertanije, however, rightly became synonymous with Great Serbian pretensions, for its ultimate goal was the creation of a Serbian kingdom through annexation of Bosnia, old Serbia (Kosovo and Macedonia) and Montenegro.[51] Achieving independence at a relatively early stage in the 19th century, as Gale Stokes rightly observes, "gave the Serbs little reason to doubt that their nationalism was a viable ideology and no reason to turn to other unifying notions, such as the Yugoslav idea."[52] Thus, most of the Serbian ruling elite perceived the Yugoslav idea as useful before World War I only to the extent that it facilitated official Serbia's principal goal of uniting all Serbs in one country.

Parallel with this idea of Serbia as the Piedmont of South Slavs in the Balkans, Svetozar Marković argued in *Srbija na istoku* (Serbia on the East) that the

Serbian political system was a mixture of Oriental despotism and the (then not so untypical) European conservative police state. He opposed the project of uniting the Serbian and other Slav areas of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires on the grounds that this would only exacerbate the bureaucratic, anti-liberal character of the Serbian state. Instead, he saw the Serbian national question first and foremost as a democratic question, which could only be solved by internal democratic transformation of the Serbian state and the simultaneous creation of a Balkan (con)federation based on equality and mutuality of all the Balkan nations and their working people (peasants and an emerging class of workers). Anything less would only lead to an imitation of Austria-Hungary's policies, and a repetition of the problems that were plaguing the Habsburg empire at the time.[53]

Marković's approach was never fully accepted in Serbia up till World War II, although his ideas for a Balkan federation gained support among Serbian intellectuals on the eve of the First World War.[54] In that period, Belgrade emerged not only as the cultural and political center of groups advocating a "Greater Serbia," but also of intellectuals and liberal politicians (geographer Jovan Cvijić, historian and politician Stojan Novaković, politician Ljuba Stojanović, literary critic Jovan Skerlić, etc.) who believed that a Yugoslav federal state could solve the Serbian national question in particular, and that of South Slavs in general.[55] As Čubrilović points out, this current of opinion was an important corrective to official Serbian policy based on Garašanin's *Načertanije* and helped maintain political and cultural links among the Serbs in Serbia and the Croats and Serbs in Croatia and Vojvodina in the years preceding World War I.[56]

The national idea in Croatia grew out of the local aristocracy's need to reconcile differences and hostilities towards the Magyars with the political necessity of collaborating with them. Reacting to Austrian centralizing policies of Germanization and secularization, they opted to support the Magyars. However, at the end of the 18th century the Magyars once more assumed responsibility for Croatia and, shortly afterward, introduced the politics of Magyarization. Thus, oscillating between Austrian and Magyar hegemony through the first half of the 19th century, the Croatian elite eventually developed two distinct national programs: Croatian exclusivism, and the South Slav cooperation that eventually gave birth to the Yugoslav movement.

The basic precepts of the Croatian national program already had been developed by the 1830s. They emphasized the importance of maintaining a distinct

Croatian language as an instrument of preserving Croatian national identity; the administrative-political union of Civil Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia; control over Krajina; the absorption of Bosnia into united Croatia (either because of the Catholic Slavic population there, or because of the strategic position of Bosnia between Dalmatia and Civil Croatia); and the modernization of Croatian lands. These aims echo Serbian perceptions of imperial rule as foreign (mis)rule and a consequent ideal of nationhood based on Herderian notions of language and culture. Both programs included confused and eventually conflicting claims over the same territory — Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the 19th century, however, Austria had her own reasons to secure control over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Realizing that if Serbia took control of Bosnia and Herzegovina the collapse of the Empire would be inevitable, Austria developed a radical anti-Serbian posture.[57] After the Ottoman withdrawal from Bosnia following the Russo-Turkish war, Austria managed to assert control over Bosnia at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. A "customs war" against Serbia was introduced in 1904-1906, and Bosnia was finally annexed in 1908. Against this background, Nikola Dugandžija maintains that Austria-Hungary chose war with Serbia in 1914 primarily to wipe out the idea of a joint state of South Slavs.[58]

During its rule in Bosnia, Austria tried to stem the rise of pro-Yugoslav sentiments among Bosnian Serbs and Croats by stirring up animosities between them, and by fostering Bosnian national identity. Such policies led to the radicalization of both Croatian and Serbian nationalist demands. Serbia perceived Bosnian Muslims as converted Serbs, while Croatian intellectuals saw them as converted Croats.[59] Bosnia thus became the "neuralgic point" in Serbo-Croat mutual relations:

> Which national viewpoint would in the end prevail? The Croat view of Bosnians as Croats, and the Serb view of Bosnians as Serbs produced diatribes on both sides and an avalanche of "scientific" treatises on the historical, linguistic, ethnic, religious, and anthropological "facts" involved. The problem, however, was insoluble for the generation before World War I, as it became insoluble for the generation that preceded World War II.[60]

The real problem, however, was in the geostrategic nature of the region. Serbo-Croat squabbling over Bosnia was only partly a matter of competing claims

to a homeland in the face of Austrian control of the region. Establishing the "truth" of proprietary claims on Bosnia had to do more with a recognition that control over a "Bosnian middle zone" would enable either side to dominate any future Yugoslav state. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, both sides already accepted the inevitability of a Yugoslav state.[61]

The birth of the idea that the South Slavic nationalities should establish a joint state, however, goes back to the Illyrian movement in Croatia in the 1830s.[62] Its political aims were to nourish Croatian linguistic and territorial rights in then Hungarian-controlled Croatia. The movement's most influential members had understood Croatia's national "revival" as the first step toward the broader ethnic and political unity of the South Slavs. The basis of these ideas was the view that both Croats and Serbs were just parts of a larger South Slavic, or as they said at that time, Illyrian nationality.

Even though the Illyrian movement is generally perceived as cultural, Elinor Murray Despalatović rightly points out its political significance. It was under the influence of Ljudevit Gaj, the leader of the movement, that the Croatians rejected the distinctly Croatian kajkavian dialect in favor of the štokavian, which was spoken not only by the Croats but by the Serbs as well.[63] Gaj believed that a nation could not perish as long as it possessed its own language. Hence the fight against Magyarization was a fight to maintain and develop language. Gaj was also one of the first to believe that the only possible alternative to the Habsburg Empire was Croatian membership in a South Slav state, "Sovereign Illyria," to consist of "the Carinthians, Istrians, Slovenes, Styrians, Dalmatians, Croats and Slavonians, Serbs and Montenegrins, Bulgars and our countrymen in lower Hungary. I endeavored to awaken in them a yearning for union; I knew that sooner or later harmony would be achieved, so that a united homeland and a Sovereign Illyria would come to life."[64]

In the 1860s, the Illyrian ideas were further significantly developed by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Canon Franjo Rački. For the first time, they developed the somewhat vague Illyrian ideas of a joint Slavic state into a political program calling for the creation of a single Yugoslav state of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes. Both Strossmayer and Rački believed that a supranational Yugoslav ideology emphasizing the common ethnic, cultural and political bonds of

the South Slavs could transcend the differences fostered by centuries of South Slavic subjugation to foreign rule.

Strossmayer and Rački initially hoped to unify the South Slavs under the Habsburg Empire through further federalization of Austria-Hungary. Serbian analysts have often viewed this program of Austro-Slavism as an effort by Catholic Croats to separate Austrian Serbs from Serbia by creating the Serbian Uniate Church.[65] In more radical interpretations, Strossmayer's role as the leading advocate of Yugoslavia has been minimized or presented in a distorted way as a Croatian Catholic plot. These views are belied by Strossmayer's contacts with Ilija Garašanin and by the fact that, after failing to find a solution for the Serbs and Croats in the reformed Austria-Hungary of 1867, Strossmayer moved toward support for the creation of a federal Yugoslavia.[66]

Strossmayer also came under fire from proponents of chauvinistic Pan-Croatianism, which aimed to block cooperation among Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to "sanctify the Croat cause and imbue the 'nation' with self-confidence by harping on the glories of its past and a great future destiny."[67] The leaders of this movement were Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik. It was Starčević who coined the anti-Serbian term *Slavoserbs*, defining Serbs as Orthodox slaves to other Slavs. He presented Serbs as obnoxious beasts, without conscience, illiterate, unteachable, and only differentiated by their individual levels of agility and shrewdness.[68] Nowadays, his statements are used as a "final proof" on both nationalist sides in Serbia and Croatia of their theses of Croats as Ustashas, or Serbs as barbarians.

Even so, Jovan Skerlić, an early 20th century Serbian literary critic and pro-Yugoslav, saw Starčević, despite his anti-Serbian rhetoric, as "our" man: as someone "with the virtues and vices of our race who, had he lived in Novi Sad or Belgrade, would have certainly become ... a proponent of Greater Serbia."[69] Skerlić reconciled Starčević's greater Croatianism and Garašanin's ideas of a Greater Serbia by showing how they each emphasized the historical right of their peoples to a state of their own, and by pointing to their shared anti-Germanism and their hatred of Austria, which both perceived as the key impediment to the fulfillment of their respective national dreams. A final similarity was that both had looked to France and Britain to help achieve their grand political designs.[70]

Despite the Croato-centric policies of Starčević's party, pro-Yugoslav and pro-Serbian sentiments were gaining momentum in Croatia in the early years of the 20th century. In 1905, two Dalmatians, Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić, created a

Croato-Serb Coalition that soon became the leading party in Croatia.[71] At first, they believed that some kind of South Slav unity was possible within a federally structured Habsburg state. However, as the international situation deteriorated, they opted for an independent South Slav state organized on federal lines.[69]   During World War I, Coalition members, organized around the Yugoslav Committee, worked to advance the idea that Croatian interests lay within a "Yugoslav framework, through cooperation with the Slovenes, the Habsburg Serbs, and with Serbia; in other words, through fundamental changes in the international sphere."[70]

However, Supilo's and Trumbić's polycentric Yugoslavism and their disagreements with then Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić made them unpopular with the Serbian government. Pašić, on his side, believed that federal Yugoslavia would only "weaken and isolate Serbia," which was then engaged in a war for survival as the Entente's ally against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Finally in July 1917, Pašić and the Committee, in the words of Cohen, "worked out a compromise on a joint statement (the so called "Corfu Declaration") endorsing the creation of a South Slav state along democratic and parliamentary lines," without specifying whether it would be federal or centralist.[73]

With the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I, the old world order collapsed, and the door for the creation of the Yugoslav state was finally open. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed in Belgrade on December 1, 1918, along the lines advocated by Nikola Pašić, who to a great extent simply followed Ilija Garašanin.[75] This was almost two months before the Paris Peace Conference started. However, even then, the Allies were at best lukewarm: "the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes emerged with the acquiescence of the Allies, but not at their instigation."[76]

The Entente's original plan was to preserve a Habsburg Empire by granting wider autonomies to its constituent nationalities. But when Austria-Hungary, a few months before its final collapse, failed to accept a separate peace, the Entente finally opted for its dissolution. Of course, Yugoslavia would have hardly been possible without the Entente's acceptance. Still, in the end they accepted it not just as a *fait accompli*, but also as a clear embodiment of Wilson's *Fourteen Points*, which enshrined national self-determination as the key principle in the emerging (supposedly liberal and democratic) new world order.

Yugoslavia was, like other Eastern European counties, a "child of the Versailles Treaty." Nevertheless it was not simply an artificial creation, but rather

the culmination of an idea with a long and substantial history. This idea continued to evolve. Yugoslavia as it existed between 1918 and 1941 substantially altered Croatian and Slovenian perceptions of Yugoslavism as the product of greater Serbian ambitions, disguised under the banner of official Yugoslav unitarism. Even so, new differences emerged, which Latinka Perović has encapsulated in the following manner:

> The Serbs responded to the permanent crisis of the first Yugoslavia with a question: why did we go to war? The Croats and Slovenians had another question: why should we have less within a new Yugoslav state framework than we did within Austria-Hungary?[77]

However, these questions were never pushed to the point of rejecting the state. In the 1930s, especially after the assassination of King Alexander in 1934 by radical Macedonian nationalists, the main Serbian opposition parties came to accept the federal option. At the initiative of the Serbian Democratic party, the then-leading Yugoslav opposition parties reached a national agreement in October 1937. This agreement was a clear recognition by these parties of Croatia's and Slovenia's distinct status in Yugoslavia, and called for a new constitution to be adopted only by majority vote of each of the constituent nations of the first Yugoslavia – Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.[78] Thus, while it may not have lived up to the high hopes of some, the Yugoslav federal framework appeared to have gained acceptance in the late thirties. In 1939, Serbian officials finally jettisoned Garašanin's and Pašić's old idea of a unitary state and accepted Croatian demands to create a separate unit, the Banovina of Hrvatska (Croatia). This experiment was, however, cut short by the Second World War.

The first state of the South Slavs did not collapse because of its artificiality, internal weaknesses, or the ancient enmities between the Serbs and the Croats. In fact, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats had lived together for centuries under the tutelage of Austria-Hungary, and there was a long process of increasing linkages in the 19th century. During this entire period, Serbs and Croats never fought each other as two nations: as Steven Pavlowitch asserts, they only fought "each other in earlier wars between empires into whose armies they had been drafted, and in World War II as collaborationist soldiers against insurgents, or as communists

against anti-communists, but in this configuration so had Croat fought against Croats, Serb against Serbs."[79]

Furthermore, although the Yugoslav idea originated with a handful of Croatian intellectuals, by the eve of World War I, the Croato-Serbian Coalition aimed at creating Yugoslavia was the most powerful political force working against Austria-Hungary from within its borders. There were, it is true, disputes over many questions — such as whether a future joint state should be federal or unitary, and the status of Bosnia — as well as exaggerated optimism about the ease of resolving problems. Still, these hardly justify later claims about the ancient animosities between the Serbs and the Croats.

Yugoslavia between the wars was a victim, like many other Eastern European countries of the time, of global structural uncertainties — the breakdown of the principles of international order espoused by the League of Nations, the crisis of liberal and democratic regimes, the world economic crisis of 1929-1933, and, most importantly, the rise of extreme ideological regimes in Germany, Italy and Russia. Rising hopes for a more liberally minded and decentralized, if not federalized, first Yugoslavia were finally shattered by the German occupation in April 1941. When Yugoslavia once more emerged on 29 November 1943, it was under the tutelage of Tito's communists. This guardianship stopped a fratricidal war in 1941-1945, but was largely responsible for creating another one in 1991.[80]

Conclusion

Throughout the 1980s, the peoples of the former Yugoslavia were bombarded by claims in their local media that cultural and political differences among the former Yugoslav peoples were irreconcilable and that distinct Yugoslav national identities and ideologies were fixed and immutable. The Yugoslavia of that time was then increasingly portrayed in terms previously reserved for the first Yugoslavia, *e.g.*, "Serbian graveyard," "Croatian tragic mistake," "national prison," "child of the Versailles Treaty," etc. In addition, through the work of Huntington, Kennan, Kaplan (and others of lesser renown), exclusive nationalist narratives were accepted as guiding principles by Western policymakers. Worse, their use in everyday political conversation became recognized as a sign of a well-informed and sophisticated understanding of the situation in the Balkans, as Mihajlo Markov, a well-known dissident of the former Yugoslavia, aptly observes.[81]

In the Cold War of the late 1960s and the 1970s, no one seemed to doubt the existence of the "non-aligned" and independent socialist Yugoslavia. But with the collapse of communism, geopolitical reasoning required that the old ideological points of distinction between "them" and "us" be replaced with cultural and/or civilizational ones. The first victim of this restructuring of geopolitical understanding, combined with local conditions of severe economic and political crisis, was the former Yugoslavia. The sudden change in attitude toward the continued existence of Yugoslavia required that "alternative" accounts of the Yugoslav national identity from the 1960s and 1970s be virtually forgotten overnight. Hence, in the late 1980s and the 1990s, so-called "experts" (mainly academic journalists and politicians) increasingly accepted and, in doing so, legitimized, the nationalist rhetoric in the former Yugoslavia as a truthful description of the country's "ancient animosities."

In the process, the Yugoslav and international public were to learn that the continued existence of Yugoslavia meant only human sacrifice and national oppression. Yugoslavia had to be abolished in the name of liberalism and national self-determination — the very principles which had legitimized its birth in 1918.

Notes

1. Milan Vujaklija, *Leksikon stranih reči i izraza* (Beograd: Prosveta, 1961).

2. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 19.

3. *Ibid.,* 3.

4. "Who is 'Balkanizing' Whom? The Misunderstanding between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West," *Daedalus* 123.2 (Spring 1994), 216.

5. Robert Kaplan could be added here. After all, his *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) is probably the most thorough representation of the Balkans as European "other." But although his journalist account of the Balkans became one of rare bestsellers of the Yugoslav secessionist wars, I focus on Huntington because of his influence as an intellectual guru of American comparative political science and foreign affairs. I have also concentrated not on Huntington's 1996 book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of*

World Order, but on his 1993 article, because it was this article which shaped many Western scholars' and journalists' understanding of the Balkans in the crucial period for the region.

6. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72.3 (Summer 1993), 26. For Huntington, civilization is the highest and broadest level of cultural identity, which is defined by "common objective elements" such as history, religion, language, customs, institutions, etc. According to him, one may have different levels of identity — for example, one may be a Roman, Italian, European or Westerner — but one cannot become a cosmopolitan, because there are no bridges between civilizations: "The civilization to which he [sic] belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies" (p. 24).

7. See Steve Smith, "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of IR as a Social Science," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16.2 (1987), 189-204.

8. "The Clash of Civilizations?" 31.

9. *Ibid.*, 32, 36, 44. By contrast, Roland Robertson emphasizes that communicative channels among distinct cultures and civilizations are not only possible, but central to the globalization process. See *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992).

10. "East Isn't East: The Impending End of the Age of Orientalism," *Times Literary Supplement* (London), 3 February 1995, p. 5.

11. *Ibid.*, 5.

12. See "Srbi i/ili nova Evropa: preispitivanje odnosa," *Srpska Politička Misao* 2-3 (1995), 19-57.

13. Todorova, 188. See also pp. 14-19.

14. See James Der Derian, "S/N International Theory, Balkanization and the New World Order," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20.3 (1991), 485-506.

15. Between the two World Wars the term "balkanization" was used to delineate the two most articulate ideas of international order at the time — a Wilsonian and a Marxist one. These world views had been using "balkanization" to define their own "solutions" to the question of a world order: "for the Marxists balkanization or federation, barbarism or socialism, nationalism or internationalism; for the Wilsonians, balkanization or confederation, despotism or liberal constitutionalism, nationalism or cosmopolitanism." See Der Derian, 491.

16. In an article that was supposedly written to explain the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, George Kennan fails to mention the word *Yugoslavia*, even though he was once the U.S. Ambassador there. Instead, he laments that the problem with the Balkans is that it goes back to the Byzantine penetration of the region. According to Kennan, this penetration "thrust ... into the southern reaches of the European continent a salient of non-European civilization which has continued to the present day ...." Thus, Kennan manages to save Europe from the embarrassment

of considering the Balkans as part of itself! See "Balkan Crisis: 1913-1993," *The New York Review of Books* (15 July 1993), 3-7.

17. *Barbarians at the Gate: Stories Serbs Tell Themselves (and Others) About Themselves*, (University of Chicago, photocopy, 1995), 10. Also, see Živković's "Stories in Modern Serbia," *Problems of Post-Communism* 44.4 (July/August 1997), 22-29.

18. *Ibid.*, 9.

19. See Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia," *Slavic Review* 54.4 (Winter 1995).

20. See Said, "East Isn't East."

21. *Habits of the Balkan Heart: Social Character and the Fall of Communism* (College Station, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1993).

22. The authors develop their own "clash-of-civilization" arguments: "Specifically, one could argue that Slovenia and Croatia ... tend toward Western cultural values in that they display anti-communist patterns, a Catholic and therefore universalist base, a tendency toward pluralism, a recognition of values pertaining to human rights, European political values, and a willingness to adopt a free-market economy. By contrast, Serbia and Montenegro have espoused neo-communist orientations, an Orthodox cultural base that tends to share power with government, a tendency towards unitary states, and tendencies to dominate existing power structures." See *Habits of the Balkan Heart*, 36.

23. For example, Meštrović *et al.* maintain that "it is well known in Yugoslavia that Serbs and Montenegrins adhere to a sort of cult of warrior. They habitually own guns and engage in hunting as part of machismo set of values.... Within Yugoslavia, they are known for being stubborn, irascible, and emotionally unstable," 36.

24. *Ibid.*, 125-26.

25. *Ibid.*, 130.

26. See "Review of 'Habits of the Balkan Heart,'" *Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues* 5.3 (Summer 1994), 150-53.

27. *Ibid.*, 151.

28. On the relationship of knowledge to power, see Michael Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).

29. Quoted in Lenard J. Cohen's *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 282.

30. See Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics," *Slavic Review* 51.1 (Spring 1992); and Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia."

31. See *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), 416. The book was translated into Croatian in 1988.

32. *Ibid.*, 415-16.

33. Marko Živković maintains that Banac's "rather clumsy" chess metaphor does not grasp the essence of the Serbo-Croat conflict. The aim in chess is to force a king to surrender, while in the Balkans the main targets are the pawns. So he suggests instead the Chinese game of Go, "for this conflict is more about surrounding the enemy's population, making it a minority and 'eating' it, while taking care not to be surrounded and eaten in return." See *Imagination Is Reality: Uses of History in the Yugoslav Conflict* (University of Chicago, photocopy, 1992), 5.

34. Franjo Tudman, *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 289.

35. See "Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji," *Izveštaj o stanju ljudskih prava u Srbiji za 1996* (Beograd, 1997), 225.

36. Quoted in Nebojša Popov's "Srpski populizam," *Vreme* (Beograd), 24 May 1993, 16.

37. Those who are not capable of living up to their national potentials are elsewhere described by Veselin Đuretić, a historian and member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts as: "Serbian sediment," "rootless cosmopolitans," "domestic foreigners," "domestic anti-Serbs," "intellectual weeds," etc. See Popov, 18.

38. See "Jugoslavija: Osvajanje ili gubitak istorije," *Raspad Jugoslavije: produžetak ili kraj agonije*, Nakarada, Radmila, Lidija Basta-Posavec and Slobodan Samardžić (eds) (Beograd: Institut za evropske studije, 1991), 11-35.

39. Aleksa Đilas maintains that the irresponsible behavior of intellectuals is the prime cause of the war. According to him, the war between the Serbs and the Croats is just the continuation of the war which started on the pages of Serbian and Croatian nationalistic historiography and literature. Moreover, he argues that the war is but the consequence of the "pathological subjectivity on the large part of Serbian and Croatian intellectuals in using non-truths and half-truths while interpreting national relationships." See "Krvavo pero: savremeno antijugoslovenstvo i njegovi izvori," *Raspad Jugoslavije: produžetak ili kraj agonije*, 100.

40. The reopening of the Serbian question and the rise of Slobodan Milošević started in 1986 with the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts. In Croatia, the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Arts changed its name to Croatian Academy of Science and Arts in 1991, thus renouncing the name that had been part of its history from its very first days in 1866, when it was founded by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer as the first institution ever to bear the Yugoslav name.

41. *Imagination Is Reality*, 7.

42. See *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (London, 1985), 96.

43. In the Yugoslav Census of 1981, over 1.2 million people identified themselves as "Yugoslavs," and there was a high reported rate of mixed marriages, especially in the ethnically mixed areas of Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ambiguity and fluidity of their identities were effectively denied by republican bureaucracies in the years preceding the collapse of the country, sadly confirming Ulrich Beck's claim that "ethnicity is not an original variable of social differentiation, it is entirely a political-bureaucratic construction." See "How Neighbors Become Jews," *Constellations* 2.3 (1996), 393.

44. See Ivo Lederer, "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs," *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Sugar, Peter and Ivo Lederer (eds) (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 397.

45. See "Yugoslav Unity in the Nineteenth Century," Đordević, Dimitrije (ed.), *The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914-1918* (Santa Barbara, California: Clio Books, 1980), 3.

46. Lederer observes that throughout the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans, not a single school or factory was developed. Even in the Austrian-held territories, the situation was far from satisfactory. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century the population of Slovenia (always economically the most developed region in former Yugoslavia) was largely illiterate, uneducated and uninterested in "the call of blood" or the "power of an idea," that is "the raw material of which ... nationalities are formed." See Lederer, 400-03. Also, see Chirot, Daniel (ed.), *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); and John Lampe and Marvin Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1555-1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982).

47. The current nationalist emphasis on the continuity of the Serbian and Croatian medieval kingdoms serves to justify land claims in the present territorial conflict. As E.A. Hammel astutely observes, the Serbs base their claims "on the fullest dispersion at the height both of the Nemanjić expansion and the Diaspora occasioned by the Turks, turning both victory and defeat into territory." The Croats, on the other side, claim "natural borders" with Serbia at the river Drina on the grounds of "their" medieval presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See "The Yugoslav Labyrinth," *The Anthropology East Europe Review. Special Issue: War among the Yugoslavs* 11.1-2 (Spring and Fall 1993), 41.

48. Lederer, 400. See also Đordević, 7.

49. The widespread dispersion of the Serbian Orthodox population is related to Turkish pressures westward, pressures that have created several waves of Serbian migration into what was then Southern Hungary, as well as Slavonia, Dalmatia and central Croatia. Beginning in 1578 these areas were known as the "Military Frontier" (*Krajina*). Krajina was created to prevent further Turkish advances and it played a vital role in the Habsburgs' defensive system. It was under direct

military rule from Vienna, its population (half of it Orthodox, half Catholic) enjoying special privileges in return. It was incorporated into Civil Croatia only in 1881. From today's perspective, it is important to note that once national affinities replaced religious ones, the stage was set for an ethnic contest as to whether Krajina was more Serbian or Croatian. The 1995 Croatian victory over the Croatian Serbs in Krajina seems to have finally settled this question by creating an ethnically pure Croatian state, at the cost of ending 400 years of coexistence between the Serbs and Croats in the area.

50. See Gale Stokes, "Yugoslavism in the 1860s?" *Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 86.

51. Vasa Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka* (Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1982), 126-148, provides an unsurpassed critique of *Načertanije* and the politics and ideology of a Greater Serbia.

52. "Yugoslavism in the 1860," 84. Stokes also makes the point that both Croatian Yugoslavism and Serbian nationalism emerged as "appropriate reactions to different situations" and that "it is unhistorical to describe Croatian Yugoslavism as particularly good, or Serbian nationalism as bad," p. 92.

53. *Srbija na istoku* (Novi Sad: Srpska narodna zadružna stamparija, 1872), 141-60.

54. See Čubrilović, 203-36.

55. See Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Naučnici Srbije i stvaranje Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1986).

56. *Ibid.,* 292-94.

57. On the catastrophic consequences of Austrian policy toward Serbia for the Habsburg Empire itself, see Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, *A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 375-81.

58. Nikola Dugandžija, *Jugoslavenstvo* (Beograd: Mladost, 1987), 105-09.

59. Some scholars — *e.g.*, Milorad Ekmečić in *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918* (Beograd: Prosveta, 1989) — emphasize religious differences as the single most important dividing factor within the Serbo-Croat-Muslim triangle. Others, like Eve Levin and Michael Petrovich, maintain that the radical nationalism of the Serbs and Croats is unrelated to the supposedly ancient loyalties of the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims to their respective religions and is only presented as such by nationalist radicals to emphasize supposedly irreconcilable differences among the Balkans peoples. For references, see John L. Lampe, "Nationalism in Former Yugoslavia," *Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe*, Latawski, Paul (ed.) (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 143-64.

60. Ivo Lederer, "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs," 425.

61. *Ibid.,* 425. Unfortunately, with the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, the same question reemerged. Serbian and Croatian rhetoric on their rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina only served to justify a land-grab aimed at securing a central place in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

62. On the role of the Illyrian Movement in Croatian national renewal, see Elinor Murray Despalatović, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, No. XII, 1975).

63. *Ibid.,* 14, 84-86. The Croatian acceptance of the štokavian dialect as the Croatian literary language represents a clear example of how nations are created through invention and imagination. Croatian national identity might have taken a noticeably different direction if they had opted instead for the kajkavian dialect. Around the same time, Slovenians rejected the štokavian dialect in favor of the separate local dialect that eventually became a distinct Slovenian language.

64. Quoted in Despalatović, 149.

65. See Milorad Ekmečić, "Sudbina jugoslovenske ideje do 1914," *Politički život Jugoslavije 1914-1945* (Beograd: Treći program, 1974), 11-49; and Vladimir Cvetković, "Moderna Srbija: potraga za nacionalnim identitetom," *Sociološki pregled* 31.1 (1997), 107-24.

66. Kosta Milutinović, "Prvi ideolozi federalističke misli kod južnih Slovena," *Rad* (Zagreb: JAZU, 1962): 85-141.

67. Lederer, 420.

68. See Alexa Đilas, *Osporavana zemlja: Jugoslovenstvo i revolucija* (Beograd: Književne novine, 1990), 58.

69. "Ante Starčević," *Eseji o srpsko-hrvatskom pitanju* (Zagreb: Jugoslovensko nakladno dioničarsko drustvo, 1905), 62.

70. *Ibid.,* 67.

71. Dalmatia has always been a stronghold of Yugoslavism, largely because of Italian territorial ambitions there. Pro-Yugoslav feelings were reinforced in World War II when Croatian ultra-nationalists (Ustashas) traded Dalmatia for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only with the Yugoslav Army blockade of Dubrovnik during 1991 did the Dalmatians finally become disenchanted with Yugoslavia. This military move can be understood only as a deliberate attempt to break all ties that existed between the two peoples in order to make any future cooperation difficult, if not impossible.

72. On the Croato-Serbian Coalition, see Đilas, *Osporavana zemlja,* 59-62, and Nicholas J. Miller, *Between Nation and State: Serbian Politics in Croatia before the First World War* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997). The Coalition's Yugoslavism was based on a liberal ideology which facilitated a shift from historical rhetoric to the phraseology of human rights

and the right of national self-determination. This helped the Serbs in Croatia to become more active in political life there.

73. Lederer, 426.

74. *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, 11-12.

75. On the reactions in Belgrade and Zagreb to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, see Wayne Vučinić, "The Formation of Yugoslavia," *The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914-1918*, Đorđević, Dimitrije (ed.); and Bogdan Krizman, "Hrvatske stranke prema ujedinjenju i stvaranju jugoslovenske države," *Politički život Jugoslavije 1914-1945*, 93-129.

76. Ivo Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiermaking* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 45.

77. "Yugoslavia Was Defeated from Inside," *Yugoslavia: Collapse, War, Crimes*, Biserko, Sonja (ed.) (Belgrade: Center for Anti-War Action, 1993), 60. Aleksa Đilas sees the main dispute in the First Yugoslavia rather as a sort of "duel" between two centrist conceptions — one Serbian and the other Croatian. He maintains that the Croatian nationalists never accepted the idea of a federal Croatia, or the plan to grant Serbs and Italians local autonomy. See *Osporavana zemlja*, 259-60.

78. See Desimir Tošić, "Zablude i greške srpske nacionalne politike," *Stvarnost protiv zabluda* (Beograd: Nova, 1997), 253-54.

79. "Who is 'Balkanizing' Whom? The Misunderstanding between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West," 208.

80. Among the many books covering the collapse of the second Yugoslavia are: Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin, 1992); Laslo Sekelj, *Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration* (Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, 1993); Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy, Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995); Aleksandar Pavković, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway (eds), *Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia* (Durham, North Carolina and London: Duke University Press, 1997); etc.

81. "U carstvu mrtvila," *Nedeljne Informativne Novine* (Belgrade), 30 September 1994, 28-29.