“For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance”: Kay’yong, 2 PPCLI and the Controversy surrounding the US Presidential Unit Citation

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Despite a growing historiography, the Canadian experience in Korea is still a very much forgotten part of our history. Kap'yong, the marathon battle of 22-25 April 1951 where the Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (2PPCLI) along with their fellow members of the 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, the Third Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) defended the access points of the Kap’yong River valley is the one incident receives significant attention. Without fail, the description of the battle always ends with that passing reference, “for their efforts 2PPCLI were awarded the United States Presidential Unit Citation.” This brief sentence at the end of a chapter does little to define the citation let alone explore its journey from recommendation to its place as a device on the uniforms of members of 2PPCLI. While the battle itself was epic in the context of Korea, the story of the Presidential Unit Citation was not without its own lengthy ordeal. The award was first recommended in the spring of 1951. However, the Canadian government did not officially announce that members of the Battalion would be able to wear the individual insignia of the citation until April 1956, a period of some five years.

After the end of the Second World War, the Korean peninsula was divided much as Germany was, with the Soviet Union occupying the North and the United States occupying the South. Under the auspices of a United Nations [UN] commission democratic elections were held in the south, while a communist regime began to develop in the north. The situation meant two hostile governments were claiming to be the legitimate government of the entire Korean Peninsula.¹ Both Koreas and the UN desired unification but clearly this was becoming increasingly difficult. Border skirmishes became commonplace. The situation escalated in 1950 when North Korea’s leader Kim Il Sung “vowed to liberate the south.”² War was declared on 25 June 1950. The UN Security Council then voted “in favour of a US resolution recommending that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area.”³ The passing of the resolution regarding Korea was only made possible due to the Soviet boycott of the Security Council.

In early August 1950 Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent announced that Canada would send troops to Korea. This decision was made in response to a request from the US government, made on 27 July 1950, for Canada to provide ground troops for a UN force in Korea.⁴ It was also decided that regular force soldiers would not be sent, but rather, the Canadian “Special Force” for Korea would consist mostly of volunteers both civilians and Second World War veterans.⁵

The first group to leave for Korea was the Second Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. It arrived at Pusan Harbour on 18 December 1950. The American commander

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in Korea wanted to immediately send the
Canadians to the front to help stop the advance
of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). The
Chinese had recently intervened and this was
followed by a retreat of UN forces. The
Battalion’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Jim
Stone, refused the American request. He made
this decision based on the national command
authority given to him by the Canadian
government. This refusal ensured that the
Canadian troops had more training before seeing
any action. However, by mid-January 1951 the
Canadians found themselves caught in the
middle of Communist guerrilla warfare, and by
mid-February the Patricias had joined the 27th
British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade (BCIB)
which was advancing against Communist forces
south of the 38th parallel.

After days of advancing north against
Chinese troops, the Canadians were pulled out
to a rest area south of the village of Kap'yong.
The job of holding the new line established north
of the 38th parallel was turned over to the 6th
Republic of Korea (ROK) Division and the
Canadians settled into a period of rest. On Easter
Sunday, 22 April, 1951, the CCF mounted a large
assault, later to be known as the 1951
Communist Spring Offensive, on the United
Nations line being held by the ROK division and
the US I and IX Corps. The Americans withdrew
as a result of the massive offensive leaving the
6th ROK to hold the line. The front began to
collapse rapidly.

The area where members of the 27th BCIB,
made up of 3RAR, 2PPCLI and 1st Middlesex
were resting south of Kap'yong was roughly 25
kilometres south of the UN front line. Geographically, Kap’yong is a town at the
confluence of two rivers approximately 40
kilometres northeast of Seoul. Therefore the
members of the 27th BCIB were put on the
defensive in the expectation of further Chinese
attacks. The Canadians were given Hill 677 to
defend which was about 5 kilometres across
from the Australians who were defending Hill
504, the highest peaks in the area. These hills
were important as they stood at the entrance of the
Kap’yong valley which was being used as a
withdrawal route for the troops of the ROK
escaping the front.

The Australians were attacked first and
suffered heavy casualties. Their communications
were so badly damaged that their commander
ordered the various company commanders to
engage in a fighting withdrawal. The Canadians

Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry photographed shortly after the Battle of Kap’yong.
were then attacked by the Chinese forces. The PPCLI were encircled and their supply lines were completely cut and Chinese forces constantly penetrating their perimeter. The Canadians valiantly defended their hill, and were even forced to direct artillery fire on their own positions in order to halt the infiltration of enemy troops. By the morning of 25 April the Canadians’ first major action of the Korean War was over when the Chinese pulled back away from the route to Seoul. Canadian casualties in the battle were minimal. Shortly after the battle was over, it was announced that the Australian and Canadian battalions, along with Company A, 72nd US Heavy Tank Battalion had been recommended for the US Presidential Unit Citation.

The granting of unit awards is done in recognition of certain types of service and as a means of promoting esprit de corps. The US Presidential Unit Citation has the highest degree of precedence of unit awards which have been established by the President of the United States to recognize outstanding heroism.14 Not only is the Presidential Unit Citation the most prestigious of American unit awards, recommendation for the award must go through proper levels of command and detailed descriptions of the action must be received and verified. Clearly it is handled with great discretion. For example, Australian units have only received three Presidential Unit Citations in their history and they have come under US command more often than Canadian units. Only one citation was awarded in Korea, the other two were awarded for action in Vietnam.15 Two British units were awarded the citation at Imjin, Korea and these are the only British units to have ever received the distinction.16 Only commanding Generals of Armies or higher units are authorized to award a Presidential Unit Citation to battlegroups or battalions under their command. Recommendations have to be supported with data such as: operational orders and reports, maps showing terrain and dispositions and actions of enemy forces, casualties sustained on both sides as well as a list of all units participating in the action.17 In order to be recommended for the citation the commanders in the field had to ascertain that the unit being recommended had shown gallantry and determination in the accomplishment of their mission. This award is considered by the Americans to be of great importance and is not awarded lightly.

The criteria established for the award of the Presidential Unit Citation can be defined as follows:

The Presidential Unit Citation is awarded to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and co-belligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy occurring on or after 7 December 1941. The unit must display such gallantry, determination and esprit de corps in accomplishing its mission under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions as to set it apart and above other units participating in the same campaign. The degree of heroism required is the same as that which would warrant award of a Distinguished Service Cross to an individual. Extended periods of combat duty or participation in a large number of operational missions, either ground or air is not sufficient. This award will normally be earned by units that have participated in single or successive actions covering relatively brief time spans. It is not reasonable to presume that entire units can sustain Distinguished Service Cross performance for extended time periods except
under the most unusual circumstances. Only on rare occasions will a unit larger than a battalion qualify for the award of this decoration.\(^\text{18}\)

As stated in the definition, a unit award is given to an entire unit for heroism as well as accomplishment of a particular mission. Its purpose is to recognize a group effort, not individual acts of heroism. Typically the citation is distinguished by a streamer on the unit colours and emblems worn by individual members of the unit.

An examination of the criteria for the award leaves no doubt that 2PPCLI were deserving of the citation. Though it can be argued that most of the action was experienced by "B" and "D" Companies along with the Headquarters Company, it was still the collective effort of the entire unit in the interest of a common goal that made the battle at Kap'yong a success. "A" and "C" Companies were actively engaged in the defence of Hill 677, which was their mission. In addition, a platoon from "C" Company successfully recaptured a lost machine gun.\(^\text{19}\)

The Presidential Unit Citation can be awarded to companies within a battalion. For example, at Kap'yong, only Company "A" of the 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion was awarded the citation while "D" Company of the Royal Australian Regiment was awarded the citation at the Battle of Long Tan in South Vietnam in 1966. Clearly, the senior officer who made the recommendation believed all companies of 2PPCLI withstood the Chinese attack and as a group successfully defended Hill 677. Other criteria for the citation such as heroism, outstanding performance of combat duties and the existence of hazardous conditions are evident upon examination of the battle itself. The Patricias at Kap'yong were a well-led, effective fighting force who made good use of their experience and combat skills in order to fend off a Chinese force numerically superior to them. They inflicted heavy casualties, 51 dead in front of "B" Company alone,\(^\text{20}\) and received very few casualties themselves, 10 killed and 23 wounded.\(^\text{21}\)

The Canadian government took some time to accept the award on behalf of the unit and it appears this may have been done somewhat reluctantly. Acknowledgement of the award took time to be confirmed and rumours were rampant. According to the war diary entry for 27 June 1951, "Congratulatory telegrams have been arriving for several days, but the official notification only arrived at 1400 hours today."\(^\text{22}\)

How the award would be recognized was already a concern for the men of the Battalion. The war diary reveals some apprehension on the part of the members of the unit that they would not be able to wear the insignia of the award on their uniforms despite the precedent set by other British Commonwealth units:

There was considerable speculation amongst the men and officers as to whether or not we would be permitted to wear the citation as are the surviving members of the 1st Gloster Regt. The feeling of the Battalion is that it should be worn or at least incorporated into the regimental flash. The award of the Citation is the first for any Canadian unit and is unique.\(^\text{23}\)

The delay in the actual acceptance of the citation has been blamed on an unintentional breech of protocol by General James Van Fleet, the American commander who proposed the
award. Fleet had announced the recommendation before official acceptance from Canada, not realizing that permission from the monarch was required in order to allow the acceptance of a foreign award. According to the official history of Canada in the Korean War, “military circles in Canada regarded this type of award and its method of presentation as without precedent in Canadian military experience; never before had a Canadian formation served directly under a US Army Commander.”

However, notice of the King’s authorization did appear in the Canada Gazette on 27 October 1951. The indifference felt towards the award on behalf of certain military officers was best summarized by the Battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Stone. In a memo to General Guy Simonds, Chief of General Staff, in September 1953, Stone reflected on the awarding of the citation:

> After the battle at Kap’yong which was outstanding only because 2PPCLI was the only battalion not running, I was informed by British Brigade HQ that we had been recommended for this citation. Never having been too impressed with US awards I almost forgot about it until I saw in the press that the Minister of National Defence had accepted the award from the US Chief of General Staff.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the awarding of the Presidential Unit Citation to a Canadian formation was the decision as to whether or not members of the Battalion would be allowed to wear the individual insignia of the award. The five-year delay between the awarding of the citation and allowing the individual insignia of the citation to be worn on the Battalion uniforms is perhaps evidence that the awarding of the Presidential Unit Citation to a Canadian unit caused a certain amount of grief for senior Canadian military officials. One can only speculate as to the reasons why this was the case but evidence suggests that military officials were determined to undermine the awarding of the citation. In fact, it appears that some wanted the issue of the Presidential Unit Citation to die a quick and silent death.

Potentially infuriating for members of the Battalion was that they were never able to wear evidence of the prestigious honour while serving in Korea. However, their brigade counterparts, the 3RAR, as well as the British 1st Gloucestershire Regiment were allowed to wear the insignia while still serving in Korea. Both these regiments had to go through similar protocols. Britain and Australia each obtained permission from the monarch and immediately
thereafter permission was granted for their troops to wear the citation insignia. In the case of the “Glosters,” the wearing of the Citation Badge was approved in Army Order 111 of 1951, and the Australian Government gave its approval for the wearing of the citation reasonably quickly after the citation was awarded. The approval for 3RAR was received from the monarch at the advice of the Australian Government in 1952. Arguably given that Canada was part of a Commonwealth force in Korea, it would make sense that Canada heed the precedent set by Britain and Australia. Instead, the decision was left to Canadian senior military officials whose attitude was clearly stated by General Harry Crerar, the former commander of First Canadian Army in North West Europe 1944-1945. In a letter to Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, Chief of General Staff, Crerar advised:

I am opposed to the procedure of awarding specific units in the Canadian army special distinctions by foreign governments...during the campaign in North-West Europe, I reached the conclusion that it was impossible to accept from either the Belgian or US government a unit award of this type.

During the Second World War certain formations and units were offered the *Fourragere* (a shoulder braid created by decree in 1945 awarded to honor bravery exhibited by certain units in the Second World War by the Belgian Government) and the US Army made inquiry as to whether a Presidential Citation would be accepted for certain Canadian formations. According to a memo from General Guy Simonds to the Defence Minister in October 1953, the policy established then was that collective honours of this kind would be represented by battle honours or distinctions on the regimental colour and should not be worn by individuals.

Crerar had been awarded individual foreign awards during the Second World War from both the Dutch and Belgians which in all likelihood would have made his statement all the more infuriating. However, one of the main issues for Crerar was that it was a unit award:

[The awarding of such an honour] would have caused in many other units of the same formation a strong resentment and more damage to the general morale would have been done than up lift to the particular morale of the unit selected to receive it.

Crerar’s discomfort with the notion of the Presidential Unit Citation singling out a particular unit may have come from the criteria that in order to be recommended for the award the unit must have displayed gallantry and determination that set it apart and above other units in the campaign. Certainly there were instances where other units believed they too performed to the same standards and degree of gallantry that 2PPCLI had shown at Kap'yong and therefore felt they deserved a Presidential Unit Citation. What is important, however, is that to the commander in the field making the recommendation, 2PPCLI did perform in a manner which would set it apart and above other units in the campaign. This is perhaps best illustrated by the entry from the Battalion War Diary for 23 April 1951 which commented on the performance of 3RAR and 2PPCLI in light of the actions of the 1st Middlesex:

At 2100 hrs the 1 Middlesex, influenced by the rapid withdrawal of the 6th ROK division and fearing for the safety of their detached company withdrew from their assigned area,...the attack continued without support of the 4.2" mortars or of the 1 Middlesex Coy assigned to protect the left flank – the commander of the 3RAR was forced to relinquish command to company commanders and 72nd Tank Coy made 11 trips to the 3RAR positions to evacuate wounded. It was now the turn of the 2PPCLI to bear the brunt of attack.

Those who viewed the actions that day clearly distinguished the performance of 3RAR, 2PPCLI and the 72nd Tank Company from other units in the campaign. These units made different choices than others in the battle, and accomplished their mission heroically. Thus, it appears justified that their performance was set apart from others. Though the presentation of any award is subjective, the initial recommendation was based on the observations and opinions of the Commander in the field that day. This initial recommendation was then followed by detailed documentation and other proof in order to confirm the award. There may be units who felt they should have been awarded the citation during the course of the Korean campaign and were unjustly overlooked, but the issues of these units should in no way take away from the fact that the 2PPCLI were awarded the citation fairly and justifiably, having met all the requirements.
The uneasiness which may have resulted from putting 2PPCLI’s performance above others in the theatre was also evident in a series of discussions about battle honours for the Korean campaign which took place in August 1956. A memo from Major-General N.E. Rodger, Vice Chief of the General Staff, suggested:

It is possible that to award a multiplicity of honours for such relatively minor operations as those of the Commonwealth forces in Korea might have a cheapening effect. A possible difficulty might be occasioned by the special importance attached by the PPCLI and the Glosters to the engagements in April 1951 for which they were awarded US Presidential citations. However, there were other operations in Korea equally difficult and costly, at least so far as the PPCLI operation is concerned; and it would seem that if these two engagements were singled out there would be no choice but to do the same with others.  

These statements were part of a series of letters and memos that circulated between senior military and ministry officials in September 1953. This particular round in the debate over awarding the individual insignia to members of the Battalion was rekindled at the insistence of a Calgary Herald reporter who, according to Defence Minister Brooke Claxton, “was pounding away at us for not allowing the PPCLI to wear something to evidence their Presidential Citation.” On 18 September 1953 in addition to his previously mentioned disregard for American awards, the Battalion’s commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Stone, clarified his position on the wearing of the individual insignia to Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds in a personal letter:

The citation may be awarded down to a platoon level and is not a battle honour. It is rather a mass decoration and has been treated as such by the British and Australian authorities. The 1st Gloucester’s only wear the blue badge and the 3RAR are the only Australian soldiers to wear it. It does set them apart and above the rest which is good for a battalion’s soul.

The letters of February 1952 do tell us that Simonds sought the advice of many despite his own views. In a letter to Hamilton Gault, the Honorary Colonel of the Patricias, he stressed that although still believing that the honour should not be worn by individuals, he was very much interested in the advice of Hamilton Gault, as Simonds understood that “distinctions of this nature are a natural source of pride to the officers and men who are instrumental in earning them.” One of the choices that General Simonds proposed in this series of correspondence was that, 

The individual insignia will be worn by all those officers and men who were actually serving with the Second Battalion, PPCLI, at the time the Citation was awarded.

General Crerar agreed with the proposed course suggesting, “that would mean the disappearance of the individual insignia, and so the elimination of the visible signs of the unit distinction, in course of time.” Ultimately in April 1956, five years after the stand at Kap’yong it was decided that the individual insignia would be worn by members of the Battalion. The final ruling stated, 

[The citation] will be worn by past and present members of the unit. Men who were on strength at the time of the award will be allowed to wear the ribbon for all time. Those who joined the unit since will wear the insignia as long as they are with the unit, removing it when posted elsewhere.

Once the individual insignia was authorized to be worn on their uniform by members of the 2PPCLI, the Calgary Herald drew attention to the delay in the decision. The former army Chief

Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Stone, commander of 2PPCLI.
of the General Staff, General Guy Simonds was blamed as the primary cause of the delay. Simonds was interviewed by the *Herald* after the decision to allow members of 2PPCLI to wear the decoration was announced. Simonds stated that the Department of National Defence decision was “ill-advised” and that “it is a collective award and should appear on the regiment’s Battle Colors only.” In addition he suggested that the British and Australians were “ill-advised, also.” The article goes on to suggest that acceptance of the award only went ahead after Simonds’ retirement. Simonds’ role in the reluctance to accept the individual insignia is corroborated by Rod Middleton who served with the 2PPCLI in Korea but returned to Canada in September 1951. Middleton stated that during the Spring of 1956 while he was serving as aide-de-camp to Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, for the minister’s visit to Camp Shilo, Manitoba, the minister asked Middleton to be frank about how he felt about not being able to wear the citation. Middleton proceeded to voice that he was quite upset about the unfairness of the army’s decision. Claxton then “assured (Middleton) that within 60 days authority would be received.” General Simonds retired and authority to wear the insignia was established.

Historian David Bercuson suggests, as do many other histories, that the delay in recognizing the citation was a result of the American breech of protocol in that they did not seek permission of the crown. Canada was obliged to accept the Presidential Citation “rather than risk offending,” according to General Simonds. This was only one factor, but even then Canadians should question why other countries of the Commonwealth in similar situations chose a very different route. Britain and Australia not only graciously accepted the award after receiving permission from the monarch they allowed their troops to show evidence of it on their uniforms. If the issue is one of Canadian sovereignty then perhaps Canadians should choose which sovereignty battles to fight. It would make sense to raise the issue of sovereignty if it was thought that the well-being of Canadian troops was in jeopardy.

For example, Lieutenant-Colonel Stone’s refusal of an American request that the Canadians immediately join the front to help stop the advance of the Chinese Communist Forces. By refusing this request Stone ensured that his troops had more training before seeing any action. In the case of accepting the Presidential Unit Citation, it is difficult to understand how denying an entire battalion individual recognition contributes in any concrete way to a strengthened Canadian identity.

The memos and letters that transpired between senior military officials reveal that there was much more to the delay in recognizing the citation than an unintentional breech of protocol. These officers were not only reluctant to recognize the honour, some were hoping that it would disappear in time. One can only speculate as to the motivations of these senior officials. Perhaps it was purely concern over the effect on morale as a whole if one unit was singled out, especially since it would only be one battalion of a regiment that would perpetuate the distinction. Perhaps there were even elements of jealousy that this young group of upstarts and veterans who enthusiastically volunteered for Korea were being awarded an honour that was not bestowed on other men who survived the ordeals and battles of the Second World War, but were denied such awards due to established practice. The considerations of these senior officials were reasonable although emotion certainly had its place in the deliberations. Nonetheless the practice of a unit showing the individual insignia of a collective award was already adopted by fellow units in the Commonwealth adhering to similar traditions. By any standards five years to make a decision is excessive.

The Presidential Unit Citation awarded to 2PPCLI for their gallant stand at Kap'yong is now proudly mentioned in the books, websites, museums and exhibits which chronicle Canada’s role in the Korean War. The prestige and uniqueness of the award is now emphasized, ironically often touted is the fact that 2PPCLI is the only Canadian unit to have received such an honour. It is difficult to understand why recognition took so long and Canadians should learn from this experience that a gracious act on the part of the Americans can be embraced as a sign of the skill and gallantry of the Canadian soldier. Most certainly, as Canadians increasingly
examine the merits of military interoperability and cooperation with the US this situation is bound to arise again. In fact according to the National Post in 2002, Bronze Stars awarded by Americans to Canadian snipers who participated in operations in Afghanistan were delayed due to reasons of Canadian protocol. Perhaps, rather than fear for our identity or show trepidation over the establishment of new traditions, Canadians should at least consider that our allies’ recognition of Canadian capabilities can be a proud part of who we are.

**Notes**

6. Barris, *Deadlock in Korea*, p.62
8. Barris, *Deadlock in Korea*, p.68.
15. Email – 31 October 2002 to Michelle Fowler from Brian Manns, Deputy Head, Army History Unit, Australia
16. Email – 5 November 2002 to Michelle Fowler from Capt. (Ret’d) IG Spence, Regimental Secretary, The Royal Gloucestershire Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment
17. “Army Regulations Regarding Unit Awards,” NARA file AR672-5-1, p.63
18. <www.usarote.com/medals/puc.htm>
20. Wood, p.78
22. War Diary, 2PPCLI, 27 June 1951
26. DHH file #497.013(D3)
27. DHH file #113.003(D23) letter from Lt. Col Stone to Lt. Gen. Guy Simonds 18 September 1953
28. Email – 5 November 2002 to author from Capt. (Ret’d) IG Spence, Regimental Secretary, The Royal Gloucestershire Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment.
29. Email – 31 October 2002 to author from Brian Manns, Deputy Head, Army History Unit, Australia.
30. DHH file #113.003 (D23), letter from General Henry Crerar to Lt.-Gen. G. Simonds
31. <www.ww2-airborne.us/medals/be_medals.html>
32. DHH file # 113.003(D23) memo from General Guy Simonds, Chief of the General Staff to The Minister of Defence, 8 October 1953
34. Email – 23 July 2002 to author from Lynn Bullock, Curator PPCLI Regimental Museum and Archives
35. DHH file #113.003 (D23), letter from General Henry Crerar to Lt.-Gen. G. Simonds
36. War Diary, 2PPCLI, 23 April 1951
38. DHH file # 113.003(D23) memo from Office of the Minister of National Defence to Chief of General Staff, 29 September 1953.
40. DHH file #113.003(D23) letter from Lieutenant General Guy Simonds to Brigadier Hamilton Gault, 13 February 1952.
42. DHH file # 113.003(D23) letter from General Harry Crerar to Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, date unknown.
46. Email to author from Rod Middleton 20 July 2004.
49. DHH file # 113.003(D23) memo from General Guy Simonds, Chief of the General Staff to The Minister of Defence, 8 October 1953
50. DHH file # 113.003(D23) letter to the Minister of National Defence from Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, Chief of General Staff, 8 October 1953

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