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**GERMAN-SOVIET COOPERATION IN THE
BALTIC STATES AND POLAND, 1918 TO 1920**

BY

**Brian David Cameron
B.A., University of Guelph, 1988**

**Thesis
Submitted to the Department of History
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Master of Arts degree
Wilfrid Laurier University
1991**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is based on German, Soviet, American, and British primary source material, as well as memoirs and a variety of secondary sources. Through an investigation of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, the Polish-Soviet War, the Baltic attempts to achieve independence, as well as German and Soviet military manoeuvres in the Baltic region, far reaching and active cooperation, previously largely unnoticed, has been revealed.

The research demonstrates that Germany and Soviet Russia, between the years 1918 and 1920, cooperated extensively in order to prevent Poland from exerting domination over the Baltic States and in attempting to prevent effective cooperation among the Baltic States.

ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

<u>Baltische Landeswehr:</u>	Volunteer defense force consisting of the Latvian army, the German Eighth army, and <u>Freikorps</u>
<u>BDFA:</u>	<u>British Documents on Foreign Affairs</u>
Comintern:	The Communist International
<u>DBFP:</u>	<u>Documents on British Foreign Policy</u>
<u>Dokumenty i materiały:</u>	<u>Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich</u>
<u>Freikorps:</u>	Volunteer German military units
<u>FRUS:</u>	<u>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States</u>
<u>Landesräte:</u>	Provincial Council
Narkomindel:	People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs
<u>Ober-Ost:</u>	Germany's Military Administration in the east during World War I
<u>Sejm:</u>	Polish Parliament
<u>Soldatenräte:</u>	German Soldiers' Council
<u>Taryba:</u>	Lithuanian State Council

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Throughout the course of this research, I have received strong encouragement and support from my family and, particularly, from my wife. I thank Alexandra for her confidence and her encouragement.

INTRODUCTION

Historical investigation of relations between Soviet Russia and Germany during the time period of the 1920's and the 1930's has been conducted from various different perspectives. Hitherto, however, less attention has been devoted to relations between these two countries as they pertained to the Baltic area prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo. This circumstance is rather peculiar given the degree to which Soviet and German interests intersected in the Baltic area. Due to the respective strategic and economic significance of each of the Baltic States, Soviet and German diplomatic and strategic manoeuvres with respect to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, provide a unique perspective from which to observe Soviet-German relations.

A survey of German-Soviet relations concerning the Baltic would, however, be incomplete without an analysis of Polish interests and policies in the region. Moreover, the policies of each of the principal European powers must be examined, because they had a direct bearing on the activities of both Germany and Soviet Russia, and because western policies concerning this area originated, in part,

from perceptions of the diplomatic realities.

The original intention of this study was to provide an examination of the developments in the Baltic States and Poland, as they concerned the interaction, cooperation, and competition of Bolshevik Russia and Germany. The limited success in accessing German archival collections, and the incompleteness of the published Soviet document collections, provided fundamental difficulties. More detailed evidence from both German and Soviet archives would be required to fully understand the extent of German-Soviet cooperation.

As previous comprehensive historical research has demonstrated, the formal rapprochement, heralded by the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo, initiated an obviously more explicit period of collaboration between Germany and Soviet Russia. The conclusion of the Armistice of November 1918, which brought hostilities to an end in Western Europe, did not result in a peaceful settlement in Eastern Europe. *Mêlée* reigned for more than two years in Eastern Europe. In the context of this dynamic situation, while the Treaty of Versailles was being shaped, the Western Allied powers perceived numerous instances of Soviet-German cooperation.

The historical literature, with reference to this issue, is unclear and insufficient. An analysis of American and British diplomatic traffic suggests that actual cooperation with regard to the Baltic States commenced prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo. According to

these sources, once the German military command realized that the annexation of the Baltic States had become impossible, during this pre-Rapallo era, it actively pursued a policy of cooperation with Soviet Russia.

A thorough analysis of Soviet and German activities illustrates the degree of common interest. Systematic and comprehensive Soviet-German cooperation emerged in an attempt to deal mutually with the resurrected Polish state, and to provide for an acceptable reorganization of the borderlands. The research demonstrates, based on the package of available documentary sources as well as on memoirs and secondary material, that Germany and Soviet Russia cooperated extensively in limiting Polish domination of the Baltic States and in attempting to prevent effective cooperation among the Baltic States.

This inquiry can be divided into distinct sections corresponding with specific developments. The first period concerns World War One and the events which contributed to the achievement of independence by the three Baltic States. A characterization of the first period would demonstrate the high degree of competition between the Russian Empire, and later the Bolshevik government, with Germany over the Baltic territories. An investigation of this period also highlights the confused nature of German policy.

The second period of investigation, covering the pre-Rapallo years 1918 to 1920, provides the focal point of this

investigation. During this period, the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia occurred by means of the implicit recognition of them through the ratification of separate peace treaties with Soviet Russia in 1920. The clearest indications of cooperation emerged during this period.

Within this framework, the investigation will highlight the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, the Polish-Soviet War, and their significance for German-Soviet relations. More than any other single event, the Polish-Lithuanian dispute demonstrated the degree to which Soviet Russia and Germany maintained similar goals. As well, the specific aspirations which both Germany and Soviet Russia held, concerning the Baltic States, will be presented in the final section.

The maximum objective on the part of Soviet Russia centred upon the restoration of the status quo ante with respect to the three smaller Baltic States. Soviet Russia, to be precise, wished to overturn these developing governments and desired to extend Soviet rule to these former tsarist provinces on its border.¹ As a minimum objective, the Bolshevik government hoped to use these states as a springboard through which they could export, or lend assistance, to the expected proletarian revolution in Germany.

¹ Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States, (Notre Dame, 1959), p. vii.

The German government, conversely, came to regard the Baltic States, and especially Latvia, as an essential intermediary for German-Soviet trade.² The German government desired to gain access to the enormous untapped commercial markets in Bolshevik Russia. Original German annexationist designs of the Baltic States, later became tempered by a policy of seeking economic dominance in these states and, as a corollary, in Soviet Russia.

It is important to dismiss what may appear to be an underlying conflict. The reconciliation of Germany's quest for economic control with Soviet Russia's desire for the extension of Soviet rule, within a cooperative framework, is not altogether impossible. The weakened condition of both Germany and Bolshevik Russia perpetuated this situation. It should be borne in mind that Germany and Soviet Russia, by necessity, ceased active competition over the Baltic region due to their weakened condition.

Beyond the tacit cooperation, manifested most significantly with respect to Lithuania in her conflict with Poland, collaborative activities between Germany and Soviet Russia in the remaining Baltic area transpired, primarily, as a consequence of their respective mutual weakness. The underlying area of joint consensus continued to be the refusal to tolerate the existence of border states

² John W. Hiden, "The Significance of Latvia: A Forgotten Aspect of Weimar Ostpolitik," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No. 130 (January 1975), p. 390.

separating the two nations and the unwillingness to permit Poland to become a regional leader.

Poland emerged from World War One in a position of relative strength. As a result, German and Soviet interests most closely coincided with respect to Poland. The German government regarded Lithuania as a counterweight to Poland, despite the obvious population imbalance, just as France viewed Poland as a counterweight to Germany. The German government, the German military, as well as the Bolshevik government engaged in diplomatic ventures, as well as direct threats, in order to prevent Poland from consolidating a Polish-led Baltic league.

The mutual propaganda campaign also sought to foil Marshall Józef Piłsudski's Polish government's efforts at achieving political union with Lithuania. Both Germany and Soviet Russia actively supported Lithuania during the Polish-Lithuanian dispute so as to sabotage the realization of Polish objectives. Beyond that, Soviet Russia definitely became the more active of the two in attempts to sow discord among the remaining Baltic States, with the objective of obstructing the formation of any type of union between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Soviet Russia did everything in its power to frustrate their attempts to conclude regional pacts of mutual assistance. The most successful tactic tended to be the offering of non-aggression pacts and treaties individually,

rather than collectively. In addition, the Soviet government played upon the existing antagonisms between these states.

Germany, to be sure, retained some territorial ambitions in the area, as evidenced by her on-going military campaign, which would possibly have been rendered unrealizable in the event of the formation of a security system. In this respect, Germany would have obviously welcomed Soviet efforts at disruption. In fact, it was feared that Germany and Soviet Russia would perhaps achieve an "understanding over the bodies of the Baltic."³

Post-war Germany and the infant Bolshevik Russia found themselves in the position of outcasts in the international community following World War I and the Treaty of Versailles. Germany, together with her allies, continued to be burdened with huge reparation payments and was forced to accept responsibility for the outbreak of the war as outlined in article 241 of the Treaty of Versailles. Moreover, Germany appeared militarily impotent and struggled under strict limits respecting her rearmament. The new régime in Bolshevik Russia, similarly, encountered virtually universal distrust, and suspicion, and struggled to obtain diplomatic recognition. Furthermore, each nation had to deal, though not to the same degree, with the after effects

³ J.Y. Simpson, "Great Britain and the Baltic States," Nineteenth Century and After, XCIV (October, 1923), p. 619.

of both war and revolution.

It should certainly not have been unexpected, then, that these two nations should have collaborated in order to impose an order of their liking on this most critical area between their two nations. As a direct consequence of their weakness, both politically and militarily, each country seemed to retain a strong interest in collaborating. Indeed, Germany and Soviet Russia, as evidenced by their mutual belligerence in Eastern Europe, appeared determined to overthrow the Versailles system which emerged after World War I under the direction of the Western Allied powers.

With respect to the Baltic States, the numerous attempts and schemes directed at realizing a Baltic Union characterized the entire post-war period and even predated the actual achievement of independence. These continuous endeavours, designed to create some form of regional pact of mutual assistance, demonstrated the degree to which these states felt insecure in their precarious position between Germany and Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia, in particular, played a conspicuous role in preventing the establishment of such a system.

The various undertakings on the part of the Baltic States to construct a formal alliance, or simply conclude agreements encouraging closer cooperation in the economic sphere, have been fairly thoroughly examined by such historians as Hugh Imron Rodgers and Edgar Anderson.

Discussion of these undertakings will be restricted to an analysis of the role played by both Soviet Russia and Germany. Detailed analysis of the failure to construct such pacts throughout the 1920's, and of the reasons why the ultimate agreement, the Baltic Entente of 1934, turned out to be somewhat less valuable than anticipated, has previously been conducted.

Briefly stated, the Baltic Entente, comprising Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, eventually materialized in 1934 following years of attempts to forge a much vaster security system. The emergence of Hitler in 1933 and his subsequent vigorous challenge to the Versailles system, combined with Soviet desires to upset the status quo in Eastern Europe, doomed the continuation of the Baltic Entente. The resurgence of Germany and the Soviet Union as great powers ultimately signalled the end of the independent Baltic States as it did the cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union, at least in terms of the Baltic coast.

In order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the time period, a brief examination of the positions of some of the other major powers is warranted. The ambitions of the resurgent Polish state are not least important to this investigation. Poland preoccupied herself with attaining a strategically secure position between Germany and Soviet Russia, which were sure to regain their respective strength and become a renewed threat to the

Polish state. Poland, during this period, waged wars against Bolshevik Russia and engaged in border skirmishes with Lithuania.

Generally speaking, the principle powers maintained little sympathy for the independence of the Baltic States because Revolutionary Russia's access to the sea would be restricted. More significantly, the Allied governments, desired that a non-Bolshevik government be established in a reconstituted Russia. In this respect, they were cautious not to contribute to the disintegration of the Russian state.

French Premier Georges Clemenceau actively sought to secure a strong ally on Germany's eastern frontier as a balance to Germany. As is well known, France attempted to cultivate Poland in this function. Nevertheless, France appeared equally anxious that the Russian state evolve along the lines of a constitutional monarchy or democratic federation comprising the areas formerly encompassed by the Russian Empire.

France clearly supported Poland during this time period. Senn argues that France regarded Poland as the "most reliable element in Eastern Europe." During October 1919, Le Temps printed an article stating that "although one may hesitate to reestablish Russian power in the Baltic, one can

hasten to revive Polish power." ⁴

There is little doubt that France would have preferred a reunified non-Bolshevik state. Georgii V. Chicherin, Leon Trotsky's successor as Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, accused France of encouraging the Baltic States to come to terms with Poland by means of a security agreement. Chicherin warned against these attempts by France to 'encircle' the Soviet Russian state. ⁵ Any such agreement, according to Chicherin, would be interpreted by Soviet Russia as an unfriendly act. ⁶

According to Senn, France desired an agreement between the Lithuanians and either Soviet Russia or Poland, ⁷ indicating that she had little tolerance for an independent Lithuania, which appeared as non viable. Due to Lithuania's sound economic and political relations with Germany, France viewed Lithuania with 'suspicion'. ⁸ France supported military aid to the Baltic States in order to construct this

⁴ Le Temps, October 4, 1919, quoted in Alfred Erich Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, (New York, 1959), p. 162.

⁵ Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume 1 (New York, 1951-1953), p. 407.

⁶ Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume I, p. 407; see also, Hugh Imron Rodgers, Search for Security: A Study in Baltic Diplomacy, 1920-1934, (Hamden Connecticut, 1975), p. 36.

⁷ Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 87.

⁸ George Urbaniak, "French Involvement in the Polish-Lithuanian Dispute, 1918-1920," Journal of Baltic Studies, XVI, No. 1 (Spring, 1985), p. 52.

"cordon sanitaire against the communists and between Germany and Russia." Senn added, however, that France felt reluctant to encourage the full political independence of these states.⁹

Rodgers states that France actively encouraged the Baltic States to join an alliance with Poland.¹⁰ Before October 1920, France desired that the corridor, which Lithuania represented between Germany and Soviet Russia, be closed.¹¹ Furthermore, Rodgers argues that while the French supported the Poles, they ignored the Lithuanians. In this regard, Poland was to be "the chief link in the cordon sanitaire."

The attitude of the British government in the Baltic area centred upon an interest in trade.¹² More importantly, Britain desired a stable European system in order to avert the possibility of another war.¹³ As a consequence, in contrast to France, the British government expressed little sympathy toward Poland, which the British

⁹ Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 179.

¹⁰ Rodgers, Search for Security, pp. 31, 36.

¹¹ Documents on British Foreign Policy, (hereafter DBFP) 1st Series, Volume XXIII, Document 628, Vaughan to Curzon, February 22, 1923, p. 765.

¹² See; David Kirby, "A Great Opportunity Lost? Aspects of British Commercial Policy Toward the Baltic States, 1920-1924," Journal of Baltic Studies, V, No. 4 (Winter, 1974), pp. 362-376.

¹³ H.I. Nelson, Land and Power, (Toronto, 1963), p. 22.

government viewed as an unstable element.

Britain originally supported the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia due to the possibility of the resumption of trade through the Baltic sea ports.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the British government appeared, from time to time, resigned to the prospect that the Baltic areas would eventually be reincorporated into a Russian state. Various documents indicate that Britain became apprehensive about granting full recognition to the newly independent Baltic States because of this very possibility. The British government would have preferred this state to be a White Russian state.

John D. Gregory, Chief of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office, explained that as long as the possibility existed that a reconstituted non-Bolshevik Russia could emerge, desiring to re-absorb the former territories, Britain felt it wise to withhold full diplomatic recognition. Furthermore, he felt confident that Soviet Russia would allow the independence of both Finland and Poland, but she would not permit her northern access to the sea to be blocked.¹⁵ After the three Baltic States had signed peace treaties with Soviet Russia, Lord George

¹⁴ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Curzon to Tallents, February 20, p. 230.

¹⁵ British Documents on Foreign Affairs, (hereafter BDEA) Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 23, J.D. Gregory, April 9, 1920; see also DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 292, J.D. Gregory, April 9, 1920, p. 352.

Nathaniel Curzon of Kedleston, Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, warned that it would be unwise for them to construct an anti-Bolshevik organization. This type of organization would, according to Curzon, expose them to a possible Soviet Russian attack. ¹⁶

Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen George Tallents, the British representative in Riga, argued that after the successful Bolshevik counter-attack against Poland during the Polish-Soviet War, Soviet Russia could either seek to reestablish her 1914 borders in close cooperation with Germany or "to seek these latter ends only so far as they were consistent with a continuance of her commercial negotiations in London." Tallents speculated that the idea of an attack on the Baltic States struck some 'responsive chords' of 'some elements' in Moscow. Tallents, however, did not reveal his source.

The Bolsheviks feared, again according to Tallents, however, that an attack on the Baltic States would be met with an allied blockade. Tallents hypothesized that an attack on the Baltic had been ruled out by the Bolsheviks. Instead, he argued that the Soviet leaders had convinced themselves that the Baltic States would voluntarily join Soviet Russia. ¹⁷

¹⁶ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 420, Curzon to Tallents, August 11, 1920, p. 464.

¹⁷ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 331, Tallents to Curzon, August 21, 1920, p. 350.

As late as 1921, the British government had still been reluctant to recognize the full independence of the Baltic States. Once they had attained nation status, according to this argument, they would wish to join the League of Nations and they could not be refused. On 16 December 1920 the League of Nations had rejected the applications of Estonia and Latvia for membership.

If these states received membership, Britain and the League would be compelled to defend them against a Soviet attack. Britain desired to avoid this obligation because, as Curzon explained:

warmly as we sympathized with their desire for independence, and earnestly as we hoped that they could succeed in maintaining it, we could not forget that they were small in power and population, that they belonged to the old Russian Empire, which the Soviet Government as

it shed its communist principles and increasingly developed imperialistic leanings, was bent upon recovering.¹⁸

The British reluctance to grant recognition clearly illuminates the British expectation and desire that Soviet Russia would discard its communist orientation. More importantly, the British government seemed to concede Soviet Russia's right to these states.

As long as the possibility existed that the Bolshevik government could be overturned, and a federal, or even a

¹⁸ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 25, Earl Curzon to Mr. Dewhurst, January 6, 1921, p. 17; see also, BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 4, Document 91, Curzon to Dewhurst, January 6, 1921, p. 113.

imperial Russia be constructed in its place, Britain refused to accelerate the alienation of former territories. Curzon had previously remarked to Chicherin that any Soviet attacks upon the border states would encourage an allied response, since they had been partially, at least, recognized.¹⁹ Britain had already extended de facto recognition to Latvia.

Gregory, Chief of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office, unsatisfactorily argued that the recognition of Lithuania would be desirable. He proposed that such action would "curb the designs on that country of Polish imperialists." Furthermore, he claimed that it would also prevent Lithuania from "throwing herself into the arms of Germany which...she seems prepared to do..." He concluded by suggesting that de jure recognition would prevent Lithuania from falling into either German or Soviet Russian hands.²⁰

The immediate British apprehension seemed to be with respect to Germany and trade. Estonia, for example, pursued an anti-German policy, yet the possibility that Germany could gain a trade foothold and, by this means, assert German influence, impelled some among the British diplomats

¹⁹ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 264, Curzon to Tchicherine, May 7, 1920, p. 308.

²⁰ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 292, J.D. Gregory, April 9, 1920, p. 354.

to encourage Britain to be 'first in the field' of trade.²¹ A German penetration of the Baltic States would allow German business easy access to the expansive Soviet Russian markets.

In 1919 'The Greene Commission to the Baltic States', as part of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene, Chief of the United States Mission to the Baltic Provinces, reported that 'American sympathies' resided with the people of Latvia in the "struggle against the destructive force of Bolshevism." ²²

Nevertheless, the United States put off recognition of the Baltic States until the middle of 1922. The United States, according to Tarulis, required a "strong Russia to balance both Germany and Japan." ²³ In similar vein, Piotr Wandycz argued that the United States desired a united Russia which would retain direct access to the Baltic Sea. ²⁴ A unified non-Bolshevik Russia, in the American view, was preferable to a dismembered Bolshevik state.

²¹ BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 1, Consul General Bosanquet to Earl Curzon, November 1, 1919, p. 299.

²² General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1931, Roll 222, Volume 196, American Delegation, 'The Greene Commission', (hereafter 'The Greene Commission') (Washington, 1970), May 1, 1919.

²³ Albert N. Tarulis, American-Baltic Relations 1918-1920: The Struggle Over Recognition, (Washington D.C., 1965), p. 55.

²⁴ Piotr Wandycz, The United States and Poland, (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 144-145.

This sentiment received expression in the Greene Commission's findings. The commission reported that:

Russia can not exist without some Baltic ports, ice free ones included among them. With Finland gone, the recognition of Estonia's independence becomes doubly perilous from the point of view of future Russian peace.

Notwithstanding the Greene Commission's reluctance to recommend the granting of recognition, the Commission reported that the Baltic States represented "the most critical barrier against Bolshevism." As mentioned, however, the Commission conceded that due to their geographical position, the fate of the Baltic States would ultimately be tied to Russia.²⁵

A closer analysis of the conclusions of the Greene Commission provides further perspective on one aspect of the policy of the United States. Specifically, the United States, despite her wish to maintain the geographical integrity of Russia, desired to employ the Baltic States to "check the westward flow of Bolshevism." Secondly, the Baltic States were to be used to begin a campaign to defeat Bolshevism and, more importantly, to reconstruct Russia. Thirdly, preventing the German military from dominating Soviet Russia assumed particular significance.²⁶ The use of these provinces as a buffer separating Soviet Russia and Germany, stands in stark contrast to their role, as

²⁵ 'The Greene Commission', June 30, 1919, 184.01502/60.

²⁶ 'The Greene Commission', June 30, 1919.

interpreted by both Germany and Soviet Russia, as transit states. The desire on the part of the western nations to keep Germany and Soviet Russia apart, may have contributed to a perception that these states actively cooperated.

That the Allies, and in particular Britain, wished the Baltic States to be reattached to a strengthened non-Bolshevik Russia became entirely obvious. By May 1918 the Allies had become openly anti-Bolshevik. The Allies landed troops near Riga during the week of 28 to 31 December 1918 as part of their larger campaign to overthrow Bolshevism. Previously, Britain had landed troops at Murmansk, in northern Russia, on 9 March and at Archangel on 2 August 1918. Furthermore, a joint Anglo-French intervention began during the period of 26 to 28 November 1918.

The preponderant majority of the historical literature dealing with the Baltic area has been devoted to an appraisal of the attempts, on the part of the Baltic States, to consummate some type of Baltic Union.²⁷ A large portion, though by no means all, of this material has been written by either Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nationals whose claims to historical objectivity have occasionally been somewhat dubious. Moreover, many of these historical surveys have been quite polemical and bear little

²⁷ See, for example, Hugh Imron Rodgers, Search for Security; Edgar Anderson has published several articles such as: "Toward the Baltic Entente: The Initial Phase." in Pro Baltica, (Stockholm, 1965) and "Toward the Baltic Union, 1920-1927." Lituanus, XII, No. 2 (Summer, 1966): 30-56.

indication of primary historical investigation.

Furthermore, comprehensive analysis of the diplomatic situation in the Baltic area during the 1920's has, unfortunately, received minor attention from scholars publishing in English. Investigation of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, by contrast, has produced quality historical research. The majority of the quality historical material, with reference to the Baltic States, generally fails to adequately address the relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia.

The Formation of the Baltic States by Stanley Page attempts to assess the impact of 'great power politics' on the achievement of independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. As such, it encompasses the years 1919 to 1920. While this investigation is an essential piece of historical literature, it does not satisfactorily discuss German and Soviet interference in this area. Page concludes that "once British, French, and American pressure was withdrawn" from the Baltic region and "Russia and Germany had regained their strength, the delicate equilibrium could no longer endure and neither could the Baltic States."²⁸ Page, however, did not elaborate upon the specific details and mechanisms which contributed to the extinguishing of the Baltic States

²⁸ Stanley Page, The Emergence of the Baltic States: A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, (New York, 1959), p. 184.

during this early period.

The Baltic States: The Years of Independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 1917-1940, by Georg von Rauch, is a protracted yet cursory treatment of the entire independence period. Essentially, this investigation could be described as a narrative of the political histories of each of the three Baltic States commencing with their wars of liberation and concluding with their subsequent loss of independence. Unfortunately, the author devoted little attention to German-Soviet activities. In addition, he preferred to treat the area as a whole, thereby ignoring the differences between each of the Baltic States. Rauch does, nonetheless, discuss Soviet efforts to frustrate Baltic union attempts, but he concentrates on the post-Locarno period and omits any detailed references to the position of Germany.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs's investigation of the Baltic States entitled The Baltic States: A Survey of the Political and Economic Structure and the Foreign Relations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, is an early, having been published in 1938, and beyond doubt, significant investigation. The authors intended to construct a 'deliberately restricted' and 'concise' analysis of the historical background, the political and economic developments, as well as foreign policy. This publication tends towards a descriptive and non-analytical survey.

For instance, the authors state that the Soviet

government desired to bring the three Baltic States into individual pacts of non-aggression, but they do not evaluate the motive behind this Soviet action. Because of its deliberately limited scope, German-Baltic and Soviet-Baltic relations are glossed over. The authors argue that the three Baltic nations, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, all adhered to a common foreign policy. This conclusion has failed to stand the test of further historical examination.

Search for Security: A Study in Baltic Diplomacy, 1920-1934 by Hugh Imron Rodgers, represents an attempt to cover the entire period between 1920 to 1934 and, as such, remains less detailed than could otherwise have been the case with a shorter period. Despite the sub-title of the book, A Study in Baltic Diplomacy, the discussion focuses on Latvia. The publication presents a heavy concentration on the attempts to mould a Baltic union and furnishes a detailed and useful analysis as to why the Baltic States failed to design a successful pact. The book hints at many aspects of the German-Soviet relationship, but to a large degree, much is not fully developed.

John Hiden's work The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, is an excellent analysis of German-Baltic relations. It primarily deals with German foreign policy between the wars in terms of the Baltic States. More specifically, Hiden attempts to demonstrate how Germany's economic policies influenced Baltic politics.

Understandably, Soviet-Baltic relations receive a limited analysis, but this work, nevertheless, provides invaluable insights into German foreign policy.

Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic Nations by Albert N. Tarulis provides an examination of how the Soviet government attempted to stifle the independence of the Baltic nations. Unfortunately, the author chose the year 1939 as his major year of departure. Notwithstanding the fact that the book presents only a peripheral survey of the interwar period, much useful information can be garnered from his analysis.

The historical literature regarding the Baltic States is comprised of various investigations. Several of these investigations are excellent in their own particular area of interest, yet no single English manuscript has successfully proven the existence of Soviet-German cooperation concerning the Baltic States. It is the intention of this study to partially fill that conspicuous historical gap.

The most direct evidence of Soviet-German collaboration was found in several sources. The Times of London between December 1918 and January 1919, reported extensively on this cooperation. In addition, Titus Komarnicki's Rebirth of the Polish Republic and Wiktor Sukiennicki's East Central Europe During World War I, were extremely useful. It should be pointed out that, although valuable, these sources merely scratched the surface of this issue by treating the issue of collaboration incidentally.

Several series of documentary collections were utilized throughout the course of this inquiry. Numerous reels of Microfilm from the National Archives of the United States provided useful information and rewarding results. The most important items utilized include: Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Latvia, 1910-1944, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Estonia, 1910-1944, and Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Lithuania, 1910-1944. It will, of course, be noted that these series of documents pertain to internal affairs. These documents are, nevertheless, rich in their presentation and analysis of foreign relations and foreign policy problems. The observations with respect to internal affairs serve to provide a clearer understanding of the historical situation.

The General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, containing the findings of 'The Greene Commission to the Baltic States', headed by Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene, Chief of the United States Mission to the Baltic Provinces, provided useful and insightful commentaries and observations about the delicate political and military situation in the Baltic. The findings of this commission served to corroborate suppositions presented in other sources. The commission had particularly interesting statements to offer on the topic of the role of the Baltic

States in American policy, as well as on American views of Soviet Russia.

In addition, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, and Russia: Correspondence contained many items of value. Soviet Documents on Foreign Affairs, 1917-1942 edited by Jane Degras provided many translated Soviet newspaper items as well as other diplomatic material. The Soviet documents contained in this edition, due to the restrictions on availability, tended to present Soviet policy in the best possible light.

Other documentary collections which contributed worthwhile items include Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States and Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. This latter Soviet collection was edited, with a view to specific obvious propagandistic objectives, extremely selectively. Hence, the objective value of this documentary series became restricted. One further collection published in Poland includes a wide range of useful items. Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich contains documents pertinent to this period published in their original language.

An appraisal of the documents consulted in the course of this research indicates, as pointed out earlier, a deficiency of documents from the German Archives. The published German documents relating to this time period

have, unfortunately, not been translated into English. The available Soviet documentation is of restricted value. This documentation barrier, it is felt, has been partially obviated by the cautious evaluation of particular English secondary sources which have made a scholarly contribution to this historical field. What has emerged, therefore, is a heavy reliance upon both British and American document collections.

GERMAN WAR AIMS AND BALTIC INDEPENDENCE

The First World War provided the immediate catalyst for the Russian Revolution which gave rise to the concomitant political discord in the Russian state. This situation afforded the Baltic States with the essential political prerequisites which allowed them to assert their independence. Prior to, and during, this independence seeking process, the Baltic States were forced to contend with German war aims and with Bolshevik aggression. An analysis of these aspects is indispensable to a complete understanding of German-Soviet cooperation in the Baltic.

Throughout this period, the policy of the German government often appeared as contradictory. Despite the confusion, Germany pursued a course which assisted the Baltic States to escape from the clutch of the Soviet government. Due to the exhaustion of both Germany and Soviet Russia, and Poland's resurgence, the seeds were laid during this period which led to Soviet-German cooperation.

Hugh Imron Rodgers, in his book Search for Security, paraphrasing Edward Beneš, aptly points out that "The very existence of a small state...and the kind of role it plays in international affairs depends largely on the policy of

the big powers." ²⁹ This statement assumes particular relevance with respect to the three tiny Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, as their fortunes rose and fell with the comparative strength and weakness of the two major powers in the region. Apart from Soviet Russia and Germany, these states became forced to contend with Polish ambitions in the area and its effect upon inter-Baltic relations.

The relationship between the newly independent Baltic States and Soviet Russia certainly became complicated due to the fact that these very states once formed an integral part of the Russian empire and provided Soviet Russia with its most direct access to the Baltic sea and, therefore, to Western Europe. Relations, in fact, between the Baltic States and Soviet Russia quickly became adversarial. The degree of suspicion toward Soviet Russia, however, differed from state to state as did each states' respective foreign policy positions.

Lithuania, for example, did not share a common border with Soviet Russia after October 1920. Due to this circumstance, and her on-going dispute with Poland, Lithuania inclined herself toward closer relations with the Soviet state and, as well, with Germany. Latvia and

²⁹ Hugh Imron Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 7. See; Edward Beneš, "The Problem of the Small Nations after the War," The Slavonic Review, IV, No. 11 (December, 1925), p. 277.

Estonia, which maintained relatively cordial relations with Poland, found themselves prevented from entering into a closer alliance or cooperation as it would have undoubtedly offended Lithuania.

German policy toward the Baltic States certainly altered over time. During the war, the policy of the German government centred upon annexation.³⁰ But, even then, differences raged as to the ultimate fate of each of these states. A brief outline of the circumstances which contributed to the realization of Baltic independence will be essential for a full understanding of the period and of the policy of war-time Germany.

Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, each received its initial liberation from Russian rule following the 1916 invasion by German forces. The final orientation and future status of the three states, however, hung in the balance for some time to come, as the struggle for control raged on all sides. The Russian civil war provided the Baltic States with the opportunity of attaining their complete political independence.

The policy of the German government by no means remained consistent through time, nor amongst the various levels of decision making. Beyond doubt, these problems

³⁰ Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, (London, 1967), pp. 143-144, 236, 273, 348, 598; Gerald Freund, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin, (London, 1957), p. 7.

became exacerbated following the German defeat in 1918. The German government occasionally expressed dissimilar views to that of the military command and even the soldiers. Certain interests groups in Germany proposed ideas and acted upon plans which deviated considerably from the policy of the German government. The policy of the Ober-Ost, the German Military Command in the East, as an illustration, sometimes appeared as contradictory to the central German government.

Germany's interest in Poland and the entire Baltic region remained obvious. Primarily, Germany viewed this region as an area ripe for economic development and opportunity. During the war, debate in the Reichstag centred on what should be done with the occupied areas following a German victory. Edgar Anderson has suggested that the German government had made no definitive plans concerning the Baltic areas at the beginning of the war. He also states that prior to the war, on 9 September 1914, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg declared that the Russian borders should be pushed back away from Germany.³¹

During late 1914, the Prussian Lithuanian deputies in the German Reichstag, such as Dr. Wilhelm Gaigalat and Dr. Wilhelm Steputat, declared their desire for the formation of an independent Lithuanian state. At the same time, some

³¹ Edgar Anderson, "Through the Baltic Gate: Impact of the First World War of the Baltic Area," The Baltic Review, No. 33 (January, 1967), p. 6.

Poles were pressing for a union of Lithuania and Poland. Anderson states, with reference to these union sentiments, that some German 'schemers', who he leaves undefined, "decided to exacerbate the antagonism between the Lithuanians and Poles and encourage the Lithuanians to think in terms of a Greater Lithuanian kingdom closely attached to the German Reich." ³²

Initially, Bethmann-Hollweg seemed to have been opposed to the annexation of the Baltic States because it would ruin the potential of concluding a separate peace with the Soviet Russian state. Nevertheless, on 5 April 1916, Bethmann-Hollweg stated that he could not allow these areas to return to Russia. ³³ More pointedly, according to Dr. Arveds Schwabe, Bethmann-Hollweg proclaimed that the "Baltic would be annexed and its colonial character retained." ³⁴

Bethmann-Hollweg made the preceding statement following the receipt of a memorandum from the Baltische Vertrauensrat, a council set up by, and comprised of, Baltic Germans, requesting that the Baltic States be made a province of Germany. The Social Democrats and the Catholic Zentrum favoured granting self-government to these areas.

³² Edgar Anderson, "Through the Baltic Gate," The Baltic Review, No. 33 (January, 1967), p. 7.

³³ Edgar Anderson, "Through the Baltic Gate," Baltic Review, No. 33 (January, 1967), p. 7.

³⁴ quoted in; Dr. Arveds Schwabe, The Story of Latvia and her Neighbours: A Historical Survey, (Perth, Scotland, undated), p. 27.

The German nationalists and particularly the German military displayed decidedly more annexationist sentiments. It has been asserted that:

The official ruling circles in Berlin were looking for diplomatic means to cover the annexationist designs with the alleged will of the population--at least by exacting collaboration of the leading personalities.³⁵

German Foreign Secretary Richard von Kühlmann maintained in 1917 that Germany would be prepared to look favourably upon any applications for union from these areas.³⁶

The German government, meanwhile, had stressed the necessity that Germany be allowed to settle the fate of Estonia and Latvia free from Russian interference. Bethmann-Hollweg, in this light, pushed for a renunciation of Soviet Russian sovereignty.³⁷ According to Dr. Juozas Pajaujis, Germany's policy toward Lithuania seemed to be: "To divorce Lithuania from Russia--yes, this was agreeable to Germany. But to let Lithuania slip from the German stranglehold--never."³⁸ Bethmann-Hollweg himself, nevertheless, remained opposed to the annexation of Estonia

³⁵ Dr. Juozas Pajaujis, "Fiftieth Anniversary of the Declaration of Lithuania's Independence," Lituanus, 14, No. 1 (Spring, 1968), p. 6.

³⁶ Richard K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1917-1918, (Liverpool, 1979), p. 54.

³⁷ Richard K. Debo. Revolution and Survival, p. 304.

³⁸ Dr. Juozas Pajaujis, "Fiftieth Anniversary of the Declaration of Lithuania's Independence," Lituanus, 14, No. 1, (Spring, 1968), p. 7.

and Northern Latvia. Instead, the Chancellor advocated the establishment of demilitarized autonomous states.³⁹

Bethmann-Hollweg resigned as Chancellor following disagreements over war aims, not the least of which concerned the ultimate fate of the Baltic area. The German High Command had advocated the annexation of these areas, a plan with which Bethmann-Hollweg expressed his disagreement. Indeed, the question of policy affecting the Baltic area has been described by Senn as "a tug of war between the German High Command and the Reichstag majority."⁴⁰

The new Reich Chancellor, Georg Michaelis, appointed in summer 1917, favoured placing control of Lithuania in the hands of the Lithuanian Council of Trustees, formed in May 1915, for the purpose of creating an interest in the annexation of the Baltic Coast. Courland would be governed by a similar body which in turn would be controlled by the military. Obviously, the new chancellor appeared somewhat more annexationist. This new orientation perhaps received its impetus as a result of the worsening political strife in Soviet Russia.

The German military authorities in Lithuania attempted to force Lithuania to formally join the German state. In November 1917 the Lithuanian Taryba, or State Council,

³⁹ Edgar Anderson, "Through the Baltic Gate." The Baltic Review, No. 33 (January, 1967), p. 10.

⁴⁰ Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 25.

received a telegram from the Ober-Ost which insisted that the Taryba declare its intention to unify with the German Reich. The Taryba, however, was unwilling to go so far. It declared Lithuania's independence and asserted only a willingness to enter into military, customs, and economic agreements with Germany. ⁴¹

Beginning with the German occupation of Lithuania, the German government had attempted to force the Taryba to declare its desire for union with the Reich. The Germans argued that an independent Lithuania would be 'helpless prey' threatened by both Soviet Russia and Poland. ⁴² Senn maintains that, due to the fact that Germany expected 'quick and victorious' peace at Brest-Litovsk, Germany's intention to permanently attaching Lithuania to the Reich remained an 'open secret'. ⁴³

It seems fairly certain that the Landesräte, or Provincial Council, formed at the urging of the German government, was designed to advance German claims for Courland. Of the eighty members which comprised this council, forty-nine happened to have been Baltic-Germans. The large Baltic-German populations in the area caused some problems for each of these countries', particularly Latvia's

⁴¹ Wiktor Sukiennicki, East Central Europe During World War I: From Foreign Domination to National Independence, Volume 1 (Boulder, 1984), p. 514.

⁴² Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 28.

⁴³ Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 31.

and Estonia's independence movements.

The German-organized Landesräte in Courland, for example, formally requested that Wilhelm II accept the crown of Duke of Courland. Wilhelm II replied, however, that he would recognize Courland as an independent Duchy and that he would be prepared to form a customs union and a military alliance. The same council also advocated the unification of Courland with Riga, Livonia, and Estonia which would be attached to the German state.

On 12 April 1918 the Landesräte of Riga, Estonia, Livonia, and Oesel Island, now united into a single United Council, requested that the Kaiser recognize the Baltic area as a constitutional monarchy which would be in 'Personal Union' with Germany. Not surprisingly, the Latvian Provisional National Council protested to Germany and suggested that the Landesräte had no authority to speak in the name of the people who desired independence rather than annexation.

As a result, several organizations and conferences emerged attempting to secure a favourable position for those participating interest groups. For example, following the first Russian Revolution in 1917, various local councils in Livonia organized a conference, known as the Vidzeme council, in Valmiera in March 1917. This council desired the creation of a unified Lettish-speaking autonomous state inside a democratic Russia.

The newly constituted Russian Provisional Government, organized under the chairmanship of Prince Lvov on 2 March 1917, and reorganized on 24 July under Kerensky, proclaimed Estonia and Latvia as autonomous provinces on 12 April 1917, and determined their borders based on ethnographic considerations. The Latvian Vidzeme council quickly deteriorated after the revolution in the face of growing Bolshevik strength. In its place, a Soviet of Riflemen's, Workers', and Landless Peasants' Deputies emerged, advocating class war and the abrogation of property rights.

The Provisional Government had never managed to successfully extend its authority into the Baltic. Therefore, the Provisional government conceded autonomy "because [the Provisional Government] was too poorly organized to run Estonia efficiently from Petrograd and too weak to enforce its own desire to retain a strong centralized state."⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the actual administrative apparatus resided completely in Soviet Russian hands.⁴⁵ Lithuania, however, did not receive autonomy but, rather, declared independence on 11 December 1917.

A similar effort to determine the future fate of the Baltic States, through the offices of the Congress of the

⁴⁴ Stanley W. Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, p. 20.

⁴⁵ Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, p. 20.

Nationalities of Russia, occurred in September 1917. It also proved fruitless. Michael Hrushevsky, a nationalist Ukrainian professor, chaired the congress. The council adopted various resolutions designed to organize a democratic federal republic of Russia in which a council of nationalities would cooperate with the Provisional Government.⁴⁶ The resolutions of this conference, however, fell upon deaf Provisional Government ears.

As an interesting aside, the Russian Political Conference, comprising Russian exiles, argued that Germany had artificially created the Baltic States. The Conference, consequently, opposed the independence of these states because they predicted that it would encourage the economic ruin in Soviet Russia and create a strategic danger.⁴⁷ Their sympathies obviously did not reside with the independence seeking Baltic States.

The movement advocating the complete independence of the Baltic States appeared to have been latent prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, perhaps due to the fact that the local population thought the achievement of independence impossible. One of the primary motivating personalities behind schemes for the achievement of mutual assistance pacts, directed against both Germany and Soviet Russia, in

⁴⁶ John Spargo, "What Broke Russia to Pieces," Current History, XIV, No. 6 (September, 1921), p. 1007.

⁴⁷ Tarulis, American-Baltic Relations, 1918-1922, pp. 56-73.

fact, initially expressed his desire that Latvia should remain a part of the Russian republic. On 30 July 1917 Zigfrids Meierovics, the future foreign minister of Latvia and champion of Baltic collective security, opposed a resolution calling for Latvia's independence. The political conference at Riga, as a result, passed a resolution upholding Latvia's membership in the Russian republic.⁴⁸

This original desire to remain a part of a democratic Russia received expression in other parts of the Baltic apart from Latvia. In Estonia throughout 1917, it has been argued, no movement agitating for separation from Soviet Russia emerged.⁴⁹ It has been suggested that during 1917 many Estonians felt compelled to support the Bolsheviks because the Bolsheviks advocated a policy of national self-determination.⁵⁰

Significantly, however, in an article printed in Izvestia on 24 January 1918, V.I. Lenin elaborated upon the Bolshevik policy of national self-determination. According to this article, Estonia would not be entitled to benefit from this policy. Instead, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Ukraine received mention. For many reasons Lenin felt

⁴⁸ Latvia. Sūtniecība [Legation]. United States, Latvian-Russian Relations: Documents. Compiled by Alfred Bilmanis, (Washington, 1944), p. 42.

⁴⁹ Stanley W. Page, "Lenin, The National Question and the Baltic States, 1917-1919," The American Slavic and East European Review, VIII (1948), pp. 19-21.

⁵⁰ Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, p. 20.

forced to accept the likelihood that each of these other states would not wish to accept Soviet Russian suzerainty. Certainly, Poland would never have consented to a federation with Soviet Russia, Lithuania continued to be occupied by the German army, as well as part of Latvia, and the Soviet Government in the Ukraine had expressed its allegiance to Soviet Russia. Lenin did not comment on the anti-Soviet Rada in Kiev, however.⁵¹

The fear of Soviet Russia encouraged Lithuania to be the first Baltic State to express its desire for a Baltic union. A union proposal was advocated by Dr. Jonas Sliupas and by Stasys Salkauskis, a Lithuanian philosopher. It has been argued that these and later expressions desiring unity were driven by a fear of Soviet Russia.⁵²

As early as November 13, 1918 a plan was proposed by Kaarel R. Pusta and by the Estonian delegation at Paris for political and economic alliances among three groups of states. The first group was to include the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The second group would comprise the Eastern Baltic region of Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. The third grouping would have consisted of the Southern Baltic areas of Lithuania and

⁵¹ Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, p. 22.

⁵² Bronis Kaslas, "A Lesson From History: Upon the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Baltic Entente," The Baltic Review, No. 18 (November, 1959), p. 12.

Poland.⁵³ The plan specifically envisioned the development of a common system of defence, a coordination of foreign policy, and would have sought to safeguard the Baltic Sea.⁵⁴ It is interesting to note that this plan sought to preserve the freedom of the Baltic sea by minimizing the interests of both Germany and Russia.

Pusta favoured a union resting upon treaties, rather than a constitution which would seek to realize several goals. He desired the formation of a unified supreme command, the coordination of all the naval forces of the signatory nations, and the formation of a militia. Furthermore, this league would develop a system of defense, coordinate foreign policy, and protect Baltic commerce.⁵⁵ The Scandinavian countries, however, were not interested in any scheme for unity with the Baltic States.

Expressions concerning unity, such as this early plan, received repeated circulation. Time and time again, various schemes and ideas were proposed attempting to group these

⁵³ Hugh I. Rodgers, Search for Security: A Study in Baltic Diplomacy, 1920-1934, p. 14; The Baltic States: A Survey of the Political and Economic Structure and the Foreign Relations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, (London, 1938), p. 66.

⁵⁴ Kaarel Pusta, "L'Union baltique," Les cahiers de l'Union Européenne, No. 5 (1933), p. 162. The Baltic States: A Survey of the Political and Economic Structure and the Foreign Relations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, (London, 1938), p. 66.

⁵⁵ Pusta, "L'Union baltique," Les cahiers de l'Union Européenne, No. 5 (1933), p. 162.

states into an effective alliance or union capable of withstanding German and Soviet Russian intrigues. Not until 1934 did the Baltic States manage to conclude such a pact.

The concern that the Soviet government would directly intervene in the affairs of the Baltic States, came to be fully justified. The elections held in Estonia followed an intense drive by the Bolsheviks designed to create a Bolshevik electoral victory. Nevertheless, those parties which advocated the formation of an independent republic won a clear majority, accumulating 70 percent of the vote in the January 1918 elections. ⁵⁶

In spite of the election results, British diplomatic documents indicate that the desire for complete independence in Estonia did not emerge until 1919. ⁵⁷ Nevertheless, nationalistic sentiments quickly developed in favour of autonomy in each of the Baltic States and Meierovics himself began to actively call for independence while he began a campaign to acquire recognition from the major world powers. Meierovics, on 16 November 1917, became the head of the Latvian department for foreign affairs.

Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in the fall of 1917, Lenin moved swiftly to launch separate peace talks with Germany. Peace negotiations between

⁵⁶ Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, pp. 24-25.

⁵⁷ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, O.C. Harvey, July 3, 1919, p. 4.

Germany and Soviet Russia commenced on 22 December 1917 at Brest-Litovsk. Notwithstanding Lenin's desire to quickly end the war, the talks soon stalled. Germany, in response, began a new offensive and occupied Latgale, Livonia (Northern Latvia), and Estonia. This renewed German offensive compelled Soviet Russia to agree to the German terms of peace, eventually concluded on 3 March 1918, two days after Germany had occupied Kiev. Germany's military defeat in the west prompted Soviet Russia to annul the Treaty on 13 November.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk included provisions allowing for the relinquishing, by Soviet Russia, of all sovereign rights over Courland, Poland, and Lithuania. In addition, Estonia, Livonia, Finland, and the Aaland Islands were to be cleared of Russian troops. Furthermore, Estonia and Livonia would be occupied by a German force until public order could be re-established. The inhabitants of Livonia were apparently to be allowed to select the country to which they wished to belong.

On 27 August 1918 Germany and Soviet Russia concluded a supplementary agreement to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by which Soviet Russia agreed to renounce its sovereignty over Livonia and Estonia, as well as to acknowledge that Germany had a free hand to determine the fate of these areas in

agreement with each of the respective populations.⁵⁸ Germany allowed Soviet Russia to retain Latgale. Germany recognized the independence of Courland on 15 March 1918, and that of Lithuania on 23 March. The German government, nevertheless, did not recognize the independence of Estonia, proclaimed on 24 February.

According to Hiden, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk accomplished the first step in Germany's policy of weakening Soviet Russia by means of the creation of a 'bulwark of border states'. In this way, the 'menace of Bolshevism' became a suitable excuse for detaching the Baltic States from Soviet Russia.⁵⁹ Senn argues that Germany supported an independent Lithuania because she had decided to acquire Lithuania as an ally against Poland, and to use Lithuania as a buffer against Soviet Russia. Once Germany encountered defeat, and the same Baltic States achieved their independence, Germany's policy altered dramatically.

Originally, however, Germany appeared unwilling to surrender any territory unless absolutely necessary. Soviet Russia, by contrast, found herself in a position far too weak to seriously challenge German ambitions. The fledgling state of Latvia, as a result, found itself placed in a precarious position of either choosing a Soviet Russian

⁵⁸ Richard K. Debo, Revolution and Survival, p. 348; Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, pp. 43, 50.

⁵⁹ John Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, (Cambridge, 1987), p. 4.

alliance or federation or concluding an agreement with Germany. These two less than desirable options persuaded the Latvian National Council to seek independence.⁶⁰

The new German Republic, formed after the revolution of 1918, had renounced territorial ambitions in the Baltic. This circumstance afforded Latvia the opportunity to proclaim itself as a sovereign, independent, democratic republic on 18 November 1918. The General Plenipotentiary of the Reich for the Baltic, August Winnig, announced on 26 November that Germany would allow civil power to be exercised by the Latvian Government, but it would retain military power. It is clear that Germany did not desire losing complete control over the area.

Despite the renunciation of territorial designs, the German Freikorps continued to operate for most of 1919 in the areas which formerly comprised part of the Russian empire. This situation resulted because the Allies desired that the Germans act as a defense and as a buffer against the possible advance of Russian troops. Specifically, Article XII of the Armistice of 11 November 1918 declared that the German troops would remain on the Eastern Front as a barrier to the Bolshevik forces until such time as the

⁶⁰ Malbone W. Graham, Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States: Part III, Latvia, (Berkeley, 1941), p. 404.

Allies saw fit for their withdrawal. ⁶¹

The Freikorps were volunteer military units, organized by the German state, intended to supplement the inadequate regular armed forces. To a large degree, the middle and upper-middle classes as well as University students composed the Freikorps. Considering this group's leanings toward what would eventually be called fascism, its role in the Baltic is of importance. This military organization tended to pursue an independent policy, and demonstrated its reluctance to relinquish territory. It should also be noted that this group strongly opposed the Treaty of Versailles because, under a provision of the Treaty, these Freikorps were to be disbanded.

The Armistice of 11 November 1918 also included the specific provision that the German Eighth Army was to remain in Baltic until the Latvian government could organize its own army so that general order could be preserved. The German army, however, began withdrawing its forces from the Baltic provinces in December 1918 because the German High Command intended to consolidate its front. The troops withdrew to the Gontsevichi-Molodechno-Baranovich-Dvinsk line which, as Senn has pointed out, still left Lithuania

⁶¹ Charles L. Sullivan, "German Freecorps in the Baltic, 1918-1919," Journal of Baltic Studies, VII, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), p. 125; Anderson, "Through the Baltic Gate," The Baltic Review, No. 33 (January, 1967), p. 16.

entirely under German occupation. ⁶²

As previously mentioned, on 18 November 1918 Latvia declared independence. At the time of this declaration, the German army still occupied Latvia and proceeded to openly conspire with the Baltic-German population. Approximately one month later on 17 December 1918 the Red Army created the Latvian Soviet Republic when they swept in after the retreating Germans. Along with the installation of the new government came the Soviet expectation that Latvia, and the other provinces, would be voluntarily reunited with Soviet Russia. ⁶³

The Baltic States owed their liberation from Bolshevik occupation almost exclusively to Poland and to the German military operating in the Baltic. These states were essentially defenceless, and found themselves in a position of having to enlist outside aid to achieve liberation. Ultimately, each state, with considerable assistance, managed to expel the Bolshevik army from its territory.

Germany's war-time policy in the Baltic States lacked consistency. The German revolution of fall 1918, and the resulting domestic confusion served to compound disagreement over these areas. A policy of seeking economic control ultimately replaced the policy of seeking political

⁶² Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 54.

⁶³ Jane Degras ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume 1, p. 129.

dominance. The realization of Germany's own weakness, and of Poland's new found strength, propelled Germany on a path of cooperation with Soviet Russia.

Russia's own political turmoil and military defeat allowed the Baltic States to slip from her grip. The Bolshevik government did not abandon hopes at recovering these lost territories. Like Germany, Soviet Russia found herself forced to counteract Polish regional ambitions and, therefore, formed common cause with the German state.

SOVIET-GERMAN CONTACT 1918 TO 1920

Evidence concerning the genesis of Soviet-German cooperation can be located in the period immediately following the Armistice. The most dramatic indications of German and Soviet cooperation can be located by examining the actions of the retreating German forces from the Baltic region. This evidence indicates that the German military voluntarily surrendered territory and munitions to the advancing Red Army.

While the Armistice of 1918 brought hostilities to an end in Western Europe, chaos and military campaigns in Eastern Europe continued into 1921. Soviet Russia, for example, had to contend with a civil war, allied intervention, and a war with Poland. The situation became compounded by border skirmishes between Poland and Lithuania after June 1920. As well, German military activity continued for quite some time.

During this time of discord, American and British diplomatic dispatches present a picture of Germany and Soviet Russia clearly pursuing a remarkably symmetrical policy with respect to the Baltic States, at least in general outlines. Much of this policy seems to have evolved as a result of the mutual concern over the ultimate fate of

the border areas. The individual policies to which both Germany and Soviet Russia adhered, aside from their respective persistent territorial ambitions, coincided decisively.

It should be borne in mind that various German elements, capable of independent action, such as the military command or troops, did not always appear to be in absolute agreement with each other. The German side, to be precise, was hardly monolithic. This circumstance partially complicates the analysis because the policy of the German forces in the Baltic cannot be said to have been thoroughly consistent with that of the German government, or with other elements, such as the industrialist party, for instance, within Germany. A comparable statement could be proposed respecting the Bolshevik side.

A recent Soviet source has commented on this German-Soviet cooperation. The author, Sergei Gorlov, identifies two factors contributing to a desire for mutual action. The first factor centred on Poland's ill-disposition and hostile attitude to both Germany and Soviet Russia. As is well known, Soviet Russia became embroiled in a war with Poland which, under the terms of the Treaty of Riga, resulted in some Ukrainian and Byelorussian territory being awarded to Poland. The 'victor powers--France and Britain', Gorlov unrealistically asserts, stood behind Poland, 'egging it

on'.⁶⁴

Clearly, this Soviet author has acknowledged the existence of Soviet-German collaboration. The article, however, proved to be less useful than anticipated. Nevertheless, Gorlov's identification of Poland's belligerence as a factor, is consistent with the views expressed in American and British sources.

General Hans von Seeckt, Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, articulately discussed the second factor. Seeckt stated that an alliance with Soviet Russia would provide Germany with the objective means of vitiating the effects of the Versailles Treaty. According to Gorlov, Seeckt received support in his plans from Reichswehr Minister Otto Gessler and Otto Hasse, previously Chief of the Operational Staff, then of the General Staff.⁶⁵

Evidence indicating that Germany and Soviet Russia formed common cause, in the interest of preventing the formation of a cordon sanitaire, even before the ratification of the Treaty of Rapallo, can be easily located. American and British diplomatic sources are scattered with such indications. The difficulty lays in attempting to divorce speculation and propaganda from historical fact.

⁶⁴ Sergei Gorlov, "[Soviet-German Military Cooperation, 1920-1933.]" Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', (July 1990), p. 95.

⁶⁵ Gorlov, "[Soviet-German Military Cooperation, 1920-1933]" Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', (July, 1990), p. 95.

American diplomatic dispatches from the Baltic present some evidence indicating that, as early as the partial German withdrawal from the Baltic States in late 1918, tacit collaboration between Germany and Soviet Russia took place. Taras Hunczak has suggested that the German military readily surrendered this territory in order to justify the continued German presence as a bulwark against Bolshevism. Specifically, the German military "wanted to make themselves indispensable to the Allies so as to be in a position to demand certain concessions." ⁶⁶

Despite the wholly selfish nature of the original plan, by the time General Rüdiger von der Goltz arrived in the Baltic, German military activities became obviously more aggressive and directed towards reestablishing the Russo-German friendship of the pre-war period. Goltz desired to conclude an effective economic and political rapprochement with Soviet Russia. ⁶⁷ Ideally, Goltz would have desired to overturn the Bolshevik government. The Baltic States, he conceded, would eventually return to Russia. ⁶⁸

In an interesting aside, Major General Max Hoffmann has noted in his War Diaries that an individual representing the

⁶⁶ Taras Hunczak, "'Operation Winter' and the Struggle for the Baltic States," East European Quarterly, IV, No. 1 (March, 1970), p. 41.

⁶⁷ Sir Stephen Tallents, Man and Boy, (London, 1943), p. 278.

⁶⁸ Hunczak, "'Operation Winter'," East European Quarterly, IV, No. 1 (March, 1970), p. 40.

Russian monarchist parties had requested German assistance in restoring the monarchy in Russia.⁶⁹ In this respect, it is obvious that elements on both sides maintained an interest in cooperating with each other. In order to expedite the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, a large number of troops would have been required. General Erich F.W. Ludendorff realized this logistical problem and urged the German government to avoid involvement in this project.⁷⁰

Hoffmann, however, provided a much clearer suggestion that German troops had consciously handed over territory to the Bolsheviks. In his War Diaries, Hoffmann stated: "I am sorry for the people whose territory we are handing over to the Bolsheviks, but I cannot restrain our men - they want to go home."⁷¹ This statement does not necessarily confirm the existence of a government policy designed to this end. Nevertheless, it is clear that the German troops systematically surrendered territory to the Bolsheviks, preferring a Soviet domination to Polish hegemony or the development of independent border states.

Chicherin, though in a far different vein, suggested the possibility of Germany and Soviet Russia following a 'parallel' policy. On 1 August 1918 Chicherin proposed to

⁶⁹ General Max Hoffmann, War Diaries, p. 210.

⁷⁰ Sukiennicki, East Central Europe During World War I, Volume II, p. 779.

⁷¹ Hoffmann, War Diaries, p. 246.

Karl Helfferich, the replacement for Germany's assassinated ambassador Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, that Germany and Soviet Russia take joint military action against the Allied forces at Murmansk, in the north, and against General A.I. Denikin in the south. Chicherin returned to this very theme as late as 1925.⁷² The German government, at this juncture, however, stated its unwillingness to participate in such a scheme, indicating some limits to the collaboration.⁷³

General Goltz, himself, identified several 'opponents' to his plans for a rapprochement with Soviet Russia in the Baltic area. These opponents included the Bolshevik army, the German Soldiers' Council at Libau, the Latvian government, and the Allies. According to Tallents, Goltz later added the German government as a fifth opponent.⁷⁴ A debate, however, surrounds this assessment. Hunczak argues that it would be difficult to evaluate the attitude of the German government, but he points to Goltz's book Meine Sendung, in which Goltz maintains that he acted with the authorization of his government. In any event, military and business interests in Germany supported Goltz.⁷⁵

⁷² Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 232.

⁷³ Sukiennicki, East Central Europe During World War I, Volume II, p. 782.

⁷⁴ Tallents, Man and Boy, p. 280.

⁷⁵ Hunczak, "'Operation Winter'." East European Quarterly, IV, No. 1 (March, 1970), p. 44.

Some confusion also surrounds the question of the Bolshevik army being an opponent. Had the army disagreed with his plans, the Bolshevik army would have appeared to have been entirely opportunistic in the grateful seizure of land from the retreating Germans. In addition, the Bolshevik Army, beyond question, would have been in dire need of military supplies which would have been available from Germany.

The withdrawal of the disintegrating German army permitted the Bolshevik government to capitalize on this new situation, by attempting to forcibly establish Soviet republics. On 2 December 1918 the Red Army crossed the Latvian border and reached Riga on 3 January 1919. The invasion occurred just as the Germans had agreed to grant administrative powers to the Latvians. The Red Army managed to occupy approximately one-half of Lithuania, three-quarters of Estonia and seven-eighths of Latvia. Early in 1919, the Red Army occupied the Vilna ⁷⁶ district of Lithuania and ruled it for four months. Soviet Russia, however, found itself unable to maintain authority over each of these territories as its advance ground to a halt.

A more detailed analysis of the apparent deliverance of the border areas by the German forces to the Red Army is

⁷⁶ This paper adheres to the spelling of Vilna utilized in the works of Alfred Erich Senn. Vilno, Wilno, and Wilna, were also common spellings. The city is presently the capital of Lithuania and is referred to as Vilnius.

warranted. Subsequent diplomatic dispatches from the region declared that the Soviet invasion followed immediately on the heels of the retreating Germans intimating that "the German authorities allow[ed] Bolshevist troops to invade..." This particular report indicated that because of the 'hand to hand transfer of power', a formal understanding must have existed. The account continued that "The invasion of Lithuania by Bolshevist troops must be regarded by them as a betrayal of Lithuania by Germany." ⁷⁷

Furthermore, the document offered this following suggestion.

The Lithuanian Government are informed that an agreement has been concluded between the Germans and the Bolsheviks whereby the former

will turn over Lithuania to the Russian Bolshevist troops and that at Dvinsk the German and Bolshevist troops were together for three days and that here at Minsk the Germans upon their departure turned over control of affairs. Reliable information received that the same thing will happen at Wilna...

Finally, an additional statement suggested that the Germans agreed to distribute arms and ammunition to the local population provided that they promised not to use them against Bolshevik forces. ⁷⁸ The German motive behind

⁷⁷ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Lithuania, Roll 1, January 3, 1919, Document 2000, 860M.00/5, pp. 4-7.

⁷⁸ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Lithuania, Roll 1, Document 2000, Enclosure 4, January 3, 1919, 860M.00/5, p. 4; Document 3302, 860.00/3, p. 2.

these actions appeared to be the prevention of the "organization of the new Baltic States." This end could most easily be achieved by simply "hand[ing] over the country to the Bolsheviks." ⁷⁹ The rationale for this motive became quite clear.

It seemed apparent that independent Baltic States would become relatively easy prey for a strengthened Poland, especially considering the temporary impotence of Germany and Soviet Russia. Considering this exhaustion, Germany must have felt the necessity of preventing the Baltic States from being subjugated by Poland or merely succumbing to the influence of Poland.

Doubtless, the German government, as well as the industrialists, would have preferred independent Baltic States if it could have managed to secure economic and political dominance, thereby cementing Germany's entrance way into Soviet Russia and her expansive untapped markets. Germany, however, lacked sufficient strength to facilitate this preference and the goal remained unrealistic. Germany and Soviet Russia together, however, presented a feasible option with which to counter Poland if they established direct contact through the Baltic.

The objectives which the German government had

⁷⁹ see; Foreign Relations of the United States, (hereafter FRUS) The Paris Peace Conference, IV, June 17, 1919, p. 11; see also BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 93, November 15, 1919, p. 332.

maintained with respect to annexation, up until this juncture, certainly appear to have waned, yet it would seem unreasonable to conclude that the German government and the German military accepted the necessity of surrendering Lithuania completely. It would be more logical to suspect that Germany desired an independent Lithuania, which would not succumb to either Soviet Russian or Polish leadership. In this way, Germany could attempt to assert economic hegemony over Lithuania and the other Baltic areas.

Clearly, Germany had, at this point, adhered to a policy of territorial aggrandizement, or failing that, the establishment of pro-German régimes to further Germany's interests. Surrendering this territory to the Bolsheviks must be interpreted as an expedient preferable to the potential development of border states between Germany and Soviet Russia under Polish influence. This policy became much more pointed during the post 1922 period, following the ratification of the Treaty of Rapallo.

Several circumstances indicate that Germany only reluctantly resigned herself to Bolshevik dominance of the Baltic States. Indeed, a portentous indication of German hesitation is that German troops continued to skirmish with the Bolsheviks in a continuing effort to maintain a secure foot hold. In addition, the German withdrawal, once it occurred, may have been interpreted as being rather hastily executed. This circumstance could certainly account for the

appearance of wilful surrender of territory to the Bolsheviks.

German policy, considering the actions of the military, appeared as somewhat opportunistic. Attempts to annex the territory gave way to a policy of encouraging the formation of independent states, under German control, and finally, a policy of total surrender to the Bolsheviks emerged. Despite the apparent confused nature of German policy, it clearly adhered to the policy which best suited the situation at the time. Final surrender would seem to have been a policy only reluctantly accepted, faced with the potential of Polish hegemony.

The perception of Soviet-German cooperation arising from these British and American documents can be corroborated through an examination of other sources. The Times of London contains much evidence. In addition, memoirs, such as those from Major General Max Hoffmann are useful.

The beginning of the Polish-Soviet war was accompanied by the quick withdrawal, as indicated above, of German troops from the east. Major General Max Hoffmann, who had been a negotiator at Brest-Litovsk, carried out the withdrawal. The Red Army "immediately occupied the positions vacated by the German forces, and the latter

supplied them with munitions and rolling stock." ⁸⁰ The German forces then constructed a corridor, which they held until the last possible moment while they evacuated the Ukraine. This corridor prevented the Poles from reaching Vilna before the Bolsheviks, who entered the city on 5 January 1919.

In response to this German action, Piłsudski forwarded a telegram, which will be quoted at length, to Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference.

The German authorities have for some time begun a systematic evacuation of the territories of the 'Ober Ost', *delivering them to the Red Army and Bolshevik bands*. On January 4th the Germans will evacuate Wilno, which will thus be exposed to all the horrors of the Bolshevik regime unless the Poles arrive in time to stop the advance of the Red guards and help the local population to organize the defense. The

Polish detachments are ready to be sent immediately to Wilno, but the Government of Berlin has just given orders to General Hoffmann to refuse the right of transit to the Polish troops under the pretext that their presence in Wilno would be in contradiction to the general conditions of the Armistice concluded with the Allies. I urge you to force the German Government to give immediately free passage to the Polish troops which have for sole aim the preservation of order and stopping the Bolshevik invasion. Will you please order the German military authorities to deliver to the local Polish anti-Bolshevik organizations a sufficient quantity of arms to organize the defense.

⁸⁰ Titus Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic: A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe, 1914-1920, (Toronto, 1957), p. 444.

[emphasis added] ⁸¹

The document clearly indicates the Polish, or at least Piłsudski's, perception that the German military voluntarily turned over control to the Bolshevik Army. Moreover, the document implicates the German government as well as the German military in this scheme. This analysis being the case, the conclusion suggests that the German authorities favoured a Bolshevik to a Polish predominance in the region.

Poland was not the only border state to express its dismay over German activities. The Lithuanian government, as well, protested to the German government in April 1919 over the actions of German troops on its territory. A telegram from Puryckis, the Lithuanian representative to Germany, described the "behaviour of German troops in Lithuania" as damaging and illegal in "view of [Germany's] joint defense plans with Lithuania." The report went on to describe how German troops had delivered arms and ammunition to the Bolsheviks, as well as having discussed "the transfer of important strategic territory." Furthermore, the German authorities from Kovno had sold thirty wagons of salt, two wagons of sugar, and one thousand bottles of cognac to local smugglers on the understanding that they would be given to the Bolsheviks. "Under such circumstances," the report continued, "successful joint defense of the front will be

⁸¹ Piłsudski to Clemenceau, quoted in Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, p. 444.

impossible." ⁸²

Material from the German Archives presents a clear analysis of German policy. One document stated that the Germans refused to supply arms to the Poles because the Germans feared that these weapons would be used against themselves. ⁸³ Similarly, Germany refused to provide arms to the Lithuanians believing that Lithuania would become less dependent upon Germany. ⁸⁴

An analysis of The Times of London from December 1918 to January 1919 provides further evidence of Soviet-German cooperation. As the German soldiers abandoned their position, The Times reported that the retreating Germans had handed over their arms to the Bolsheviks. ⁸⁵ More dramatically, in an article entitled 'Germans help Bolsheviks', The Times reported that the Germans, acting in accord with the 'Russians', had destroyed all the railway and telegraphic communications between Reval and Sonda. In addition, they had removed all rolling stock from the 'country'. ⁸⁶

⁸² German Foreign Ministry: Political Archives, Puryckis to German Foreign Minister, April 19, 1919, Reel 430 A.C.P., pp. 1-2.

⁸³ German Foreign Ministry: Political Archives, December 2, 1918, Reel 430 A.C.P., (name of author is unclear), p. 2.

⁸⁴ German Foreign Ministry: Political Archives, December 10, 1918, Reel 430 A.C.P., p. 2.

⁸⁵ The Times, December 5, 1918, p. 10.

⁸⁶ The Times, December 14, 1918, p. 8.

In another vein, The Times stated that Ruthenian troops had been receiving guns and ammunition from Soviet Russia. These supplies, however, had come from German and Austrian forces who had evacuated South Russia. The article suggested that "Many of the Germans seem to be making common cause with the Bolshevik elements..."⁸⁷ One must recognize that these cooperative activities occurred between German and Bolshevik troops. The articles clearly indicate assistance to the Soviet cause, rather than the White Russian forces.

The Times also illuminated the issue of Bolshevik agents with Polish names operating in Poland for propaganda purposes. The article stated conclusively that "the Germans have facilitated the passage of all these men into Poland." The Comintern sent agents to operate behind Polish lines as well. According to Walter Krivitsky, these agents were to publish a newspaper, and to conduct sabotage operations in conjunction with the Communist Party of Poland.⁸⁸

The same article also expounded on the German rationale and its preference of Bolsheviks over Poles.

The Bolsheviks were merely enemies of the human race, and not Germany in particular, and besides, they had plenty of money to buy arms with, so a regular traffic between the Germans

⁸⁷ The Times, December 16, 1918, p. 7.

⁸⁸ Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, (Frederick, Maryland, 1970), p. 29.

and the Bolsheviks began.⁸⁹

Germany appeared quite willing to negotiate with the Bolsheviks, provided that some economic advantage could be gained.

Lord Curzon came to realize that the Baltic States found themselves in a perilous situation. Curzon declared that the Baltic States would surely be threatened by either the forces of Bolshevism or by a return to Tsarism. "[A]t no very distant date" he added "the Baltic States may be confronted... with entire extinction...unless the allied governments take some more active steps..."⁹⁰

At the same time, a report by the Commission on Baltic Affairs concluded that, in the interests of future peace, neither Germany nor Soviet Russia should be allowed to 'obtain a permanent hold' on the Baltic States. Such a circumstance would permit Germany to gain a predominant position in Soviet Russia. Conversely, a Soviet Russian predominance would conceivably allow Bolshevism to spread to Scandinavia and Western Europe.⁹¹

Meanwhile, the Latvian government initiated an international campaign to garner support for her liberation.

⁸⁹ The Times, December 24, 1918, p. 6.

⁹⁰ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 1, Document 13, Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour, March 28, 1919, p. 67.

⁹¹ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 1, Document 53, Report by Commission on Baltic Affairs, [no date] 1919, p. 241.

Meierovics, the Latvian Foreign Minister, managed to convince the British government to assist in the struggle against the Bolsheviks and it finally agreed to send a squadron to the Baltic.⁹² The American administration, despite the pleas of Meierovics for intervention to construct a cordon sanitaire, refused any assistance.⁹³

Each Baltic province, it will be noted, managed to assert its independence. Estonia struggled to liberation with British, Finnish, and White Russian aid in February 1919. Lithuania managed to assert her independence in 1919 due in part to the crumbling Soviet advance. Latvia, with the considerable aid of the German forces was liberated in January 1920. One must not understate the role which the German Freikorps, in the North, and the Polish army, in the south, played in the liberation of the Baltic States.

Meierovics had decided that his best hope lay with the German forces remaining in the area. Interestingly, in April 1919, the Greene Commission's findings indicated that if the German troops, under General von der Goltz withdrew completely, then the entire area would be overrun by

⁹² Edgar Anderson, "The British Policy Towards the Baltic States 1918-1920," Journal of Central European Studies, XIX, No. 3 (October, 1959), pp. 278-279; Edgar Anderson, "An Undeclared Naval War: The British-Soviet Struggle in the Baltic 1918-1920," Journal of Central European Affairs, XXII, No. 1 (April, 1962), pp. 43-44.

⁹³ Tarulis, American-Baltic Relations, pp. 115-117.

Bolshevik troops. The report commented upon the anomalous situation in that the Lettish people had been historically anti-German, and yet the German forces would be the only barrier against a Bolshevik take over. Greene then argued in favour of a relaxation of the blockade and the supply of German troops.⁹⁴

The command structure of the remaining German forces had, by this time, however, become profoundly degraded and was no longer effective. Nevertheless, a volunteer defense force, organized under General von Kathan from the remnants of the German Eighth Army, now called the Iron Brigade, joined the Baltic-Germans who had established a defense force called the Baltische Landeswehr. To this force were appended volunteer Freikorps, which began arriving in February 1919, and the modest Latvian army.⁹⁵ The German Oberkommando Grenzschutz Nord, under General Hans von Seeckt, provided support for this Baltic force. The front commander was General Count Rüdiger von der Goltz, who arrived in Liepāja on 1 February 1919.

The newly amalgamated force initiated its campaign in February and March 1919. The counter-offensive against the Bolsheviks proved successful, and the force eventually

⁹⁴ 'The Greene Commission', April 12, 1919, 184.01502/4 and 184.01504/4.

⁹⁵ Charles L. Sullivan, "German Freecorps in the Baltic 1918-1919," Journal of Baltic Studies, VII, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), p. 124.

captured Latvia, Southern Livonia and Riga. The German troops justified their military campaign ostensibly by citing Article XII of the Treaty of Versailles. More importantly, the German forces declared their intention of maintaining the bridge to the east. ⁹⁶

A coup d'état executed by the Landeswehr against the Latvian Provisional Government of Karlis Ulmanis took place on 16 April 1919. As a pretext for this military action, the German troops argued that they were suppressing Bolshevism. The Latvian government managed to escape, but the Germans installed a new pro-German government under Andrievs Niedra in its place. ⁹⁷

Following the coup, Goltz returned to Germany for consultations, during which he apparently sought authorization for an attack on Riga. It is unclear whether Goltz received this authorization. Nevertheless, on 22 May 1919 the Baltische Landeswehr captured Riga and entered Livonia, but encountered defeat against the Estonian-Latvian force at Cēsis (Võnnu). The new pro-German government collapsed on 8 July 1919 and Ulmanis, the former president,

⁹⁶ 'The Greene Commission', May 1, 1919.

⁹⁷ Alfred Bilmanis, History of Latvia, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1951), pp. 311-319.

returned to power. ⁹⁸

Lack of evidence prevents one from implicating either Goltz individually, or the German government as a whole, for the coup d'état. Similarly, ascribing ultimate responsibility for the military action of the Landeswehr is difficult. It has been suggested that Goltz acted individually in order to acquire the Baltic States for Germany. ⁹⁹ It is possible that Meierovics' request to the German forces for assistance may have rekindled the imperialistic hopes, especially among the Freikorps.

It is possible that the actions of this German force were entirely consistent with German war aims. Fritz Fischer maintains that German war aims remained fairly clear and centred upon the annexation of the Baltic, especially Lithuania. In this respect, Fischer quotes a German document which states that the policy of the German military was "acquisition of land, repatriation, and expatriation." ¹⁰⁰

Repatriation refers to the policy of resettling Germans from Poland and Russia, for example, in the annexed territory. If German policy revolved around deportation and

⁹⁸ United States Congress, The Baltic Provinces: Report of the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the Situation in the Baltic Provinces. 66th Congress, 1st session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919): Document 105, p. 23.

⁹⁹ Evald Uustalu, The History of the Estonian People, (London, 1952), p. 177.

¹⁰⁰ Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, p. 278.

possibly extermination, then allowing Bolshevik domination could possibly have helped to achieve the same result.

The Germans had also assisted the Lithuanians in their struggle with the Red Army. Combined German and Lithuanian troops took the town of Willcomiers on 3 May 1919 and advanced ten kilometres beyond it.¹⁰¹ The Poles, of course, continued to occupy Vilna, which they entered in April 1919. The Greene commission reported that forty thousand volunteer German troops continued to operate, albeit with low morale, in Lithuania. The Lithuanian forces totalled only ten thousand men widely scattered over the entire Lithuanian territory and interspersed with German troops. The commission reiterated the peril that would follow any German withdrawal in the shape of a renewed Bolshevik military offensive.¹⁰²

It is essential to recognize that the German government of Prince Maximillian of Baden, who became Chancellor on 3 October 1918, had discussed two considerations pertaining to its ongoing military operations in the Baltic. The German cabinet felt that it was essential to 'prevent any possible Polish action on Germany's eastern borders'. Eventually, Lithuania came to be regarded as an essential counterweight

¹⁰¹ 'The Greene Commission', May 5, 1919, 184.01502/25.

¹⁰² 'The Greene Commission', May 15, 1919, 184.01502/29.

to Poland.¹⁰³ The cabinet meeting of 24 April 1919 discussed whether Germany should continue the advance against the Bolshevik military in the Baltic area. The cabinet and military leaders decided that they should support Lithuanian independence and believed that this would not damage future German-Soviet relations. However, continuing the offensive would be sure to sour this relationship.¹⁰⁴

John Hiden suggests that this reasoning obviously did not apply to the cases of Estonia and Latvia. He notes that during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, German civilian and Foreign Office circles noted the necessity of not offending Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, by the conclusion of 1920, the fear of being cut off from Soviet Russia by independent border states became very real.¹⁰⁵

Germany appeared to have changed its mind concerning the recognition of Lithuania's independence. "The recognition of Lithuania," the report stated, "damaged German politics toward the east and, in a way, it would be

¹⁰³ John W. Hiden, "The Significance of Latvia: A Forgotten Aspect of Weimar Ostpolitik," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No. 130 (January 1975), p. 391.

¹⁰⁴ D. Unfug, "The Baltic Policy of Prince Max of Baden," Journal of Central European Affairs, XXIII (1963), pp. 1152-1165; Hiden "The Significance of Latvia," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No. 30 (January, 1975), p. 391.

¹⁰⁵ Hiden, "The Significance of Latvia," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No, 130 (January 1975), p. 391.

better if Lithuania fell back into the hands of Russia..." The preoccupation over the concern for the security of the Russian borders was expressed in this document. ¹⁰⁶

Despite the necessity of not offending Soviet Russia, Prince Max of Baden seemed to favour the overthrow of the Bolshevik government. In his memoirs, Prince Max had supported "the right of any portion of territory to re-unite itself to the New Russia." ¹⁰⁷ The term 'New Russia' is key to this statement because he indicates a formation of a post-Bolshevik Russia.

In fact, It appears fairly obvious that Germany's policy had been either to annex the area or to encourage its reunification with a non-Bolshevik Russia. When both of these alternatives became out of the question, Germany's interest became an economic one. This concept led to a policy of exploiting the Baltic area as a bridge to the east.

The German industrialists desired to maintain the bridge to the east in order to expedite the economic exploitation of Soviet Russia. Hiden relates an example furnished by a German economic expert working in Latvia which recounted his impression that England had been working

¹⁰⁶ German Foreign Ministry: Political Archives, April 22, 1919, Reel 430, A.C.P., p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Prince Max of Baden, The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden, W.M. Calder and C.W.H. Sutton trans. (London, 1928), Volume 2, p. 35.

to eliminate German influence and trying to "drive a wedge between Germany and Russia by means of an Entente-oriented Latvia..." ¹⁰⁸ Indeed, Germany feared the emergence of regional alliances proposals because it felt that such alliance systems might have become linked with the French system of Eastern alliances. ¹⁰⁹

Fear of continued Soviet Russian and German cooperation emerged. At the Paris Peace Conference it was stated that "It appears certain that [the Bolsheviki] are working in agreement with the Germans." Such statements exacerbated this belief. This same report also proposed that the Germans continued to supply the Red Army with arms and ammunition as well as "preventing the local (Lithuanian and Polish) contingents from defending their country." ¹¹⁰ It appeared obvious that a full German withdrawal from the Baltic States would result in a Bolshevik attempt to take over the area. ¹¹¹

Following the collaborative German-Lithuanian capture of Willcomiers, the German forces took no further military

¹⁰⁸ Hiden, "The Significance of Latvia," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No. 130 (January 1975), pp. 392, 394.

¹⁰⁹ Hiden, "The Significance of Latvia," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No. 130 (January 1975), p. 398.

¹¹⁰ FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference, IV, June 17, 1919, p. 11.

¹¹¹ FRUS, Paris Peace Conference, IV, April 11, 1919, p. 591.

action against Bolshevik forces. The German General Staff officially informed the Lithuanian General Staff on 9 May 1919 that the German military would undertake no further operations against Bolshevism "in view of the fact that negotiations were under way looking to the conclusion of an armistice with the Soviet Government (due to harsh Allied peace terms.)" Greene added that, although he lacked the evidence, he believed that a 'definite agreement' between the German command in Lithuania and the Bolsheviks had been concluded. ¹¹²

After further investigation, Greene presented the view of the Lithuanian government concerning the transfer of weapons to the Bolsheviks. The Lithuanian government claimed, according to the Greene Commission, that they possessed "positive evidence of trafficking between the Soldatenräte and the Bolsheviks." According to the Lithuanians the Soldatenräte agreed to provide arms, ammunition, food, and even field pieces to the Bolshevik forces. ¹¹³

For clarification, the Soldatenräte councils were Soldiers' councils whose majority tended to be Social Democratic. Understandably, these councils maintained at least moderate Bolshevik sympathies. These particular councils played an active role in assisting the Bolshevik

¹¹² 'The Greene Commission', May 15, 1919, 184.01502/29.

¹¹³ 'The Greene Commission', May 15, 1919, 184.01502/28.

forces, but they can not be said to have represented the German government or the German military. One must also be careful not to implicate all of these councils in this plan. Differences in policy from council to council would have been expected.

The Greene Commission suggested that Germany attempted to bring Lithuania into a clear alliance with her. In this respect, Germany's interest lay in fostering and 'maintaining this spirit of rivalry and ill feeling' between Lithuania and Poland. Germany sought an alliance with Lithuania due to the possibility that Germany shall once again decide to 'go against Poland.'¹¹⁴ This policy of encouraging discord between Lithuania and Poland paralleled Soviet policy. Whether tacit or explicit, Germany and Soviet Russia sought to expedite dramatically similar policies.

In July 1919 numerous interesting reports emerged which suggested that some Russian forces had come under the control of the Germans. One such document indicated that the Germans and the Baltic Germans, as a means of retaining their 'ascendancy' in Courland, attempted to use the Russians to that end. The same description further added that, although Germany had formally recognized the independence of Latvia, German agents continued operating in an attempt to convince the White Russians of Germany's

¹¹⁴ 'The Greene Commission', May 15, 1919, 194.01502/28.

favourable disposition towards a united non-Bolshevik Russia. The German agents reportedly expressed their desire to equip the anti-Bolshevik Russian Army.¹¹⁵

The policy of the German government, according to M. Watson, centred on the maintenance of German influence on the Russian forces by means of granting military equipment and payment as well as secretly supporting the policy of a united White Russia. Germany, the report continues, would have been willing to rescind her recognition of Latvia if this would have gained the support of the Russians. The statement concludes, based upon intercepted orders, that Germany

realizes that the formation of the independent states of Esthonia [sic] and Latvia lying between Germany and Russia and fundamentally hostile to Germany, will severely hamper the relations between [Germany and Soviet Russia]¹¹⁶

Based on this analysis, it is clear that the primary objective was to prevent the independence of the Baltic States, fearing that they might assume a hostile attitude. If this policy could have been achieved by supporting a united White Russia, the Germans would have been anxious to assist. Nevertheless, permitting these states to be reabsorbed by a Bolshevik Russia did not appear

¹¹⁵ See; Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 145; Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, p. 24-27; DBFP 1st Series, Volume III, Mr. Grant to Earl Curzon, Document 9, July 9, 1919, p. 18.

¹¹⁶ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Watson to Curzon, Document 28, July 23, 1919, p. 41.

objectionable.

Instances of German action in supporting the White cause are obvious. For example, while the liberation of Latvia had been rendered with the indispensable assistance of the Germans, Germany had clearly maintained ulterior motives. Behind the German lines, which had been newly liberated areas, emerged Russian armies armed by the Germans. The Latvians logically feared that the Germans would relinquish power to those Russian armies in its pay. These reports indicated, and one would expect that these forces would have been White, yet later reports from 'The Greene Commission' argued that their composition was red.

Russian prisoners of war from Germany constituted the bulk of the White Russian forces operating in the Baltic. 'The Greene Commission', however, reported that these prisoners became Bolshevik. Specifically, 'The Greene Commission' expressed its anxiety and referred to such occurrences as 'incomprehensible'. That the Bolshevik forces should be augmented by trained soldiers, and pass through those very territories resisting Bolshevism, seemed particularly sinister to the commission. ¹¹⁷

As a point of interest, the Russians troops in the pay of the Germans had apparently been recruited from Warsaw and even Germany. The principal source of money which financed this scheme seemingly originated largely from German

¹¹⁷ 'The Greene Commission', May 22, 1919, 184.01504/34.

industrialists and private associations in Germany who desired to exploit Russian resources.¹¹⁸ By these means, it has been proposed that German policy sought to transform the Baltic provinces into a German colony or, short of that, reunify the Russian empire. In any event, the destruction of Lenin's government appeared to be of paramount importance.

The administrative situation in Germany appeared to have been somewhat confused at this time. Several reports proposed that the German government was ill-informed concerning the situation in the Baltic and concerning the Russian armies in German pay. Money had apparently been printed in Berlin and recruits departed for Courland two to three times per week.

General Malcolm, a British diplomat, stated that "in many ways the German government is extraordinarily ill-informed as to what is going on. I can only assume that, somehow or other, information is deliberately concealed from [Herr Gustav Noske]," the SPD's Defense Minister, "and from the government."¹¹⁹ A British Foreign Office memorandum concluded that insufficient amounts of information existed

¹¹⁸ Hunczak, "'Operation Winter'," East European Quarterly, IV, No. 1 (March, 1970), p. 44; DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 43, Report by General Malcolm, August 8, 1919, p. 53.

¹¹⁹ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 175, Extract from report by General Malcolm, October 30, 1919, pp. 207-208.

with respect to the German forces in the Baltic "to implicate the German government as a whole." Rather, many of the officials, especially those in the war office, hailed from the old régime and operated behind the back of Noske.

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In other areas, as well, the German government apparently encountered difficulty in properly or effectively administering the situation. Marshal Ferdinand Foch had demanded the withdrawal of German troops from the Baltic in 1919. Commenting on this directive, David Lloyd George maintained that the "point of view of the German Government was that they had given orders but their troops refused to obey." ¹²¹ If this information had its basis in truth, the German government clearly had lost its ability to command its forces.

An interesting analysis of Germany policy was provided to Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Ambassador to Poland, by 'The Polish Minister in London'. Prior to, and particularly during the war, the representative argued, Germany obviously aimed at the domination of the Baltic countries. This policy would have accommodated an essential area of contact

¹²⁰ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 197, Extract from Foreign Office Memorandum on the Baltic States and Germany, November 15, 1919, p. 275.

¹²¹ Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich, (hereafter Dokumenty i materiały) D. Lloyd George to I. Paderewski, 15 wrzesień (September) 1919, Volume II, Document 203, p. 351.

with Russia while maintaining an important influence on the Baltic area. In contrast, German policy following the war, according to the Minister, pursued different objectives.

This representative makes no distinction between levels of German policy or those responsible for its formulation. He argued, nevertheless, that German policy became 'clearly dualistic and calculated to meet any emergency'. Therefore, while the Germans assisted the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, they concomitantly supplied the Bolshevik army in the midst of its operations against Poland.¹²²

It seems that Germany attempted to expedite both of its policy preferences simultaneously. By supplying anti-Bolshevik forces, Germany demonstrated a willingness to defeat the Bolshevik government. Nevertheless, Germany's best hope in subjugating Poland resided in a policy of supporting the Bolshevik army against Poland.

Of course, the degree to which this analysis may have been exaggerated due to this representative's particular bias would be especially difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the analysis does not seem entirely implausible. In fact, his conclusions closely resemble the outline of German policy determined from a documentary analysis.

An analysis of these conflicting reports indicates that the German policy was unclear and less sharply defined as

¹²² DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 67, August 27, 1919, p. 78.

one would have expected. Such shifting or 'dualistic' tactics connotes a policy of opportunism and perhaps of vacillation. It appears, nevertheless, that sympathy with the White cause did not prevent the German military from following a path of cooperation with the Bolsheviks.

Further evidence emerged suggesting that Germany's primary aim continued to be the reunification of the Russian state as a monarchy. An article in Libausche Worten, reported that an agreement had been concluded between the German and White Russian militaries in Courland. Under the terms of this accord, Germany had apparently agreed to support the Russian troops until such time as the Russian monarchy could be reconstituted and its former frontiers could be reestablished. Finland, however, would be allowed to remain as an independent state.¹²³

As noted, this agreement apparently emerged following conversations between the German and Russian militaries. It is essential to determine whether the military command, by means of this understanding, adhered to the wishes and policies of the German government. It would be fairly difficult indeed to attempt such an analysis, yet indications that Germany preferred an reunified Russian state are apparent. It is unlikely, however, that this scheme could have become a reality. This plan would have

¹²³ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 115, Sir C. Kennard to Earl Curzon, October 1, 1919, p. 132.

required far greater resources than Germany would have been capable of producing. As a result, Germany may have headed on a path of Soviet-German cooperation, to deal with the border states, out of necessity.

An intercepted German diplomatic message originating in Berlin stated that the Baltic provinces would be entitled to receive 'far-reaching autonomy' on the condition that they be reincorporated into the state of Russia.¹²⁴ No mention was made concerning the logistics of this plan with respect to how Germany could expedite these designs. Interestingly, Germany interpreted the blockade of Soviet Russia by the Entente as indicating that the Entente did not maintain a favourable disposition to the reconstruction of Russia within the former boundaries.¹²⁵

The principle leadership of the White Russian forces, according to British sources, consisted of General Nikolai N. Yudenich, Colonel Rodzianko, leader of the Octobrist party, and Colonel Arsenyev, in the north-west army; Prince Lieven and Colonel Bermond (Avaloff), in Courland; and Count von Keller and Colonel Virgolich, both Baltic Barons, in Lithuania. The report does not state the nationality or place of origin of the Baltic barons in Lithuania. Troop commander and Governor of Liepāja, General von der Goltz

¹²⁴ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 94, September 21, 1919, p. 114.

¹²⁵ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 219, Report by Eberhart, October 14, 1919, p. 289.

received no mention in this specific analysis.

According to a British report, General Yudenich, who lead the anti-Bolshevik forces against Petrograd commencing 13 March 1919, maintained pro-Allied sympathies while Arsenyev adhered to a pro-German line. Bermond (Avaloff) and Virgolich also followed an 'avowedly' pro-German perspective and a large segment of their force actually consisted of Germans, although they reportedly dressed as Russians. The Russian forces in Courland and Lithuania had made it clear that they expected Germany to assist in overturning the Bolshevik government.¹²⁶

Communications from Colonel Prince Bermond (Avaloff), contained within the British document series Documents on British Foreign Policy, shed some interesting light upon the role of this person and of German policy. Bermond (Avaloff) declared that he intended to continue to fight Bolshevism in Russia. At the present time, he maintained, he had "been sustained by credit obtained from the Germans."¹²⁷

With respect to Germany's aims, Bermond (Avaloff) maintained that "she does not wish for more than the re-establishment of the frontiers of 1914." Furthermore, he proposed that Germany did not desire the conquest of Soviet

¹²⁶ Senn argues that Bermond openly opposed Baltic independence, Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 145; BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 93, November 15, 1919, p. 331.

¹²⁷ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 293, October 23, 1919.

Russia neither did Germany "advocate the separation of small nations." ¹²⁸

Rumours suggesting that Bermond (Avaloff) had received support from Denikin, who together desired to work towards the recognition of a unified Russia, without independence for the Baltic States, received circulation. Concurrently, however, a later German plan which entailed the organization of a new state to be named Ost Deutschland, or Ost staat, to consist of Lithuania, Latvia and East Prussia, emerged. This state would temporarily secede from Germany for political reasons. ¹²⁹ Once the government of this region had been consolidated, and a "dominating influence in Russia has been obtained," the state would rejoin Germany. ¹³⁰ Once again, the contradictory nature of German policy is apparent.

Meanwhile, propaganda from both Germany and Soviet Russia, apparently made inroads in parts of the Baltic. For example, German and Soviet Russian propaganda had managed in Estonia to increase the anti-Entente feeling.¹³¹ One

¹²⁸ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 222, Avaloff to Admiral Kolchak, p. 305.

¹²⁹ Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 159; DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 175, Colonel Ward to Earl Curzon, October 30, 1919, p. 206.

¹³⁰ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume III, Document 192, Colonel Ward to Curzon, November 11, 1919, p. 221.

¹³¹ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Latvia, February 24, 1920, p. 2.

diplomat commented on the general unrest prevalent in Estonia and attributed it to Bolshevik propaganda.¹³²

Based on the available sources, it appears that the German military in the east, ostensibly supported by the German government, initiated a campaign of collaboration with the Bolshevik forces in order to prevent either a Polish seizure of territory, or the extension of Polish economic and political influence. German and Soviet interests rested on a desire to restrict Polish activities in the border area. German military manoeuvres during the opening stages of the Polish-Soviet war served to give Soviet Russia a huge strategic advantage over Poland. The Polish-Lithuanian dispute, however, most singularly demonstrated this spirit of collaboration. This conflict forms the basis of the next chapter.

¹³² Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Latvia, June 15, 1920, Document 14563, p. 2.

SOVIET-GERMAN POLICY AND THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN DISPUTE

The Polish-Lithuanian dispute allowed German-Soviet collaboration to fully develop. More than any other issue, the dispute between Poland and Lithuania demonstrated the hostility both Germany and Soviet Russia felt towards Poland. Either a Polish-Lithuanian federation, or the emergence of a Polish-led Baltic alliance system, or the continued Polish possession of Vilna, which they held from April 1919 to July 1920, would have been intolerable to Germany and Soviet Russia.

Although far too exhausted to expedite its plans at this juncture, the Soviet government wished to reassert political authority over the Baltic area. Border States with an anti-Bolshevik posture could restrict Soviet Russian access to the Baltic sea. Germany desired to maintain the lines of communication to the east, as did Soviet Russia to the west, which Poland could have slammed closed.

In general terms, the Polish-Lithuanian dispute presented fundamental difficulties which militated against the formation of what would have otherwise been regarded as a natural and expected grouping of the three smaller Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, into an alliance or regional security system. The formation of such a union may

have been doomed from the very beginning. Poland certainly desired that such a federation fall under its leadership, but Lithuania obviously did not. Estonia and Latvia, consequently, were forced to seek some sort of security from another power.

A brief summary of some of the union efforts is necessary. At the conclusion of 1919, Lithuania began to organize a conference between herself, Latvia, and Estonia in order to clarify particular problems. Lithuania desired to form a defensive block against Soviet Russia, but also realized the necessity of preventing Poland from expanding into Lithuania. The Valga conference of January, 1920 led to the signing of a protocol on 6 January 1920, stating that it was imperative for the Baltic countries to arrange a defensive alliance against both Soviet Russia and Germany. Lithuania also proposed that pressure should be applied to the Allied powers in order to force the withdrawal of Polish troops from Vilna.

Lithuania's proposals created difficulties for Estonia and Latvia. Estonia and Latvia were left with a difficult situation because they did not want to support resolutions concerning Poland without consulting Poland. This fear became more significant because their fear of Soviet Russia naturally encouraged them to look toward Poland for support.

In early 1920, an alliance scheme comprising all of the

Russian border states, Poland, Finland, and anti-Bolshevik Russia received expression. ¹³³ Piłsudski explained that such an organization would provide security from both German and Soviet Russia. ¹³⁴ Rumbold, the British Ambassador to Poland, pointed out to a Polish official that Soviet Russia would recover at some point in the future and would not tolerate the existence of autonomous states on her frontier, especially under Polish hegemony. ¹³⁵

The Baltic Conference, held in Helsinki from 15 to 22 January 1920, consisted of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland. The participants discussed the development of a defensive military union and the neutralization of the Baltic sea. Lithuanian-Polish problems, however, successfully militated against the implementation of the plan. ¹³⁶ The interesting aspect of all of the proposed pacts was that they sought security exclusively from Soviet Russia.

¹³³ Dokumenty i materiały, Rumbold to Curzon, 23 styczen (January) 1920, Volume I, Document 302, p. 556.

¹³⁴ M.K. Dziewanowski, "Piłsudski's Federal Policy, 1919-1921," Journal of Central European Affairs, X, No. 2 (July, 1950), p. 118; Hunczak, "Operation Winter," East European Quarterly, IV, No. 1 (March, 1970), p. 40-57.

¹³⁵ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 195, Rumbold to Curzon, February 23, 1920, p. 181.

¹³⁶ Robert Machray, "A Baltic League," Fortnightly Review, CX (July, 1921), pp. 54-63; Ants Piip, "The Baltic States as a Regional Unity," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. CLXVIII (July, 1933), p. 172.

Two plans were submitted for consideration at this conference. Lithuania's proposal called for a military alliance between itself, Estonia, and Latvia. Estonia, on the other hand, envisioned a greater alliance consisting of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and Finland. Understandably, Lithuania remained ill disposed toward Latvia's proposal so long as Polish troops remained on Lithuanian territory.¹³⁷

The Bulduri Conference convened on 6 August and concluded on 6 September 1920. The conference included delegates from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine. Delegations were invited from Sweden, Norway, and Denmark but they chose not to attend. Early on in the conference, ground was covered in terms of technical work on financial, economic, communications, sanitation, and labour problems. In addition, steps were made toward a monetary union.¹³⁸ No headway, however, was made in terms of political or military agreements.

One important outcome, nevertheless, was that the Polish delegation finally succeeded in persuading the conference that a Baltic Entente was needed if the participants wished to secure the independence of the Baltic

¹³⁷ Petras Klimas, "L'Entente Balitique et la Lituanie," Bulletin, No. 8-9, (1934), p. 733.

¹³⁸ Minutes of the Baltic Conference held at Bulduri in Latvia in 1920 (Washington, 1960), pp. 19-43; "Baltic Problems," European Economic and Political Survey, III, No. 7 (December 15, 1927), p. 215-216.

States. ¹³⁹ Finally a treaty was written containing several provisions. The treaty aimed at the formation of a common defense system. Signatory states would have been bound not to permit undertakings hostile to another signatory state.

Since Lithuania could only sign military agreements with countries that had concluded peace with Soviet Russia, Poland, which did not sign such a treaty until March 1921, would have to be excluded. ¹⁴⁰ This episode clearly demonstrates the success of Soviet tactics. By means of Lithuania's treaty with Soviet Russia, her freedom of action became curtailed.

The Lithuanians, not surprisingly, refused to participate in a Baltic alliance if it would include Poland. As a consequence, Lithuania did not participate in any discussions for a lengthy period. Due to Polish belligerence, no state ratified the proposed treaty by the deadline of 15 December 1920. ¹⁴¹ It would seem reasonable to conclude that the main mitigating factor in preventing the successful completion of the treaty was Polish-Lithuanian intransigence.

It would be unfair, however, to place all of the blame

¹³⁹ Minutes of the Baltic Conference Held at Bulduri, pp. 49-50.

¹⁴⁰ Minutes of the Baltic Conference Held at Bulduri, p. 53.

¹⁴¹ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 19.

for the failure to construct a Baltic union on the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. Territorial arguments marred relations between other states. Exaggerated national pride, it has been suggested, made every piece of territory seem important.¹⁴² Border disputes, such as the dispute between Latvia and Estonia over a rail road junction in the town of Valga, interfered with the harmonization of interests and policies among the Baltic countries. Latvia and Estonia both claimed that it would be cut off and strangled without this territory.¹⁴³

Other territorial conflicts, as well as perceived territorial aspirations, caused friction. As a case in point, territorial disputes occurred between Lithuania and Latvia concerning Dvinsk. Furthermore, Latvia feared Polish ambitions with respect to Latgalia.

The persistent friction between these neighbours can be observed through a close examination of their relations with each other. On 10 June 1919, through the conclusion of an armistice, British, French, and American aid assisted in suppressing civil war "between the Estonians and Northern Letts, on the one hand, and the Balts on the other." This armistice came to an abrupt end as fighting resumed in early

¹⁴² Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 7; Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Union: The Initial Phase," Lituanus, 14, No.1 (Spring, 1968), p. 32.

¹⁴³ Arthur Brown Ruhl, New Masters of the Baltic, (New York, 1921), pp. 151-152.

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

July when the Estonians advanced to the outskirts of Riga.

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A brief outline of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, the most protracted of the territorial conflicts, is essential in order to gain a complete understanding of German-Soviet activities. The conflict centred around the disputed territory of Vilna, to which each side claimed historical rights.¹⁴⁵ Because Poland had been left in a unique situation following the World War I, in that her two closest and historically belligerent neighbours became relegated to positions of comparative weakness, she pursued a decidedly more belligerent policy. Piłsudski's Poland, then, actively sought to settle this dispute and attempted to expedite its regional aims.

Undeniably, Poland had, and continued to be, "between the jaws of two colossal powers which by closing them could once more destroy her."¹⁴⁶ Crookshank, a British diplomat, maintained that when the allies created Poland, they realized that it fulfilled the purpose of a buffer

¹⁴⁴ 'The Greene Commission', July 5, 1919, 184.01502/69.

¹⁴⁵ Poland's Chief of State, Józef Piłsudski, was himself a native of Vilna and an outspoken advocate of a Polish-Lithuanian federation. See; Senn, The Great Powers Lithuania and the Vilna Question, p. 12.

¹⁴⁶ Sir Thomas Barclay, "The Garibaldi of Poland," English Review, XXX (1920), p. 545.

state between Germany and Soviet Russia.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, Marshal Foch had asserted that Poland's "true role...was to provide a barrier" against both Bolshevism and Germany.¹⁴⁸

The validation of Poland's new position placed it in a precarious position relative to Germany and Soviet Russia. The existence of the Polish state was confirmed during the Versailles process. Since it was in the interest of both Germany and Soviet Russia to upset the Versailles system, Poland became the most suitable and obvious target.

Poland felt certain that Germany would attempt to gain access to Soviet Russia and seek to develop the untapped expanse as she saw appropriate. Rumbold himself believed that the favourable situation in which Germany found herself would allow her to administer the economic and political reconstruction of Soviet Russia. Piłsudski argued, nevertheless, that Soviet Russia would certainly be weak for a considerable length of time and, therefore, would be unable to resist Poland. In this respect, Piłsudski expressed his intention of pursuing his ongoing policy vis-à-vis Soviet Russia. Piłsudski explained that "his policy had always been to hit...[the Soviet Russians] whenever and wherever he could, and to make them see that he was an

¹⁴⁷ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 225, July 7, 1920, H.F.C. Crookshank to C.M. Palairret, p. 281.

¹⁴⁸ Dokumenty i materiały, D. Lloyd to I Paderewski, 15 wrzesień (September) 1919, Volume I, Document 203, p. 351.

adversary to be reckoned with." ¹⁴⁹

Conversely, Piłsudski also realized that a Bolshevik Russia would seek to penetrate the border states. Lithuania, according to the Polish government, appeared to be the only border state which did not share this opinion. In light of this situation, and its territorial ambitions, Poland continued in its campaign to encourage Lithuania to federate with Poland. To be fair, Poland sought to achieve union with Lithuania for security because of Poland's tenuous geographical position between Germany and Soviet Russia.

Polish goals did not cease at a desired union with Lithuania. Poland, under Józef Piłsudski, entertained grandiose plans which included a federation of such areas as the Ukraine and Byelorussia as well as seeking an alliance with Rumania. ¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, Poland desired the formation of a series of autonomous buffer states located between Poland and Soviet Russia under a Polish protectorate. ¹⁵¹

In this respect, the cooperative enterprises on the part of Germany and Soviet Russia appear more

¹⁴⁹ Dokumenty i materiały, Rumbold to Curzon, 7 listopad (November) 1919, Volume I, Document 238, p. 424.

¹⁵⁰ M.K. Dziewanowski, "Piłsudski's Federal Policy, 1919-1921," Journal of Central European Affairs, X (July 1950); BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 93, Rumbold, May, 1920, p. 134.

¹⁵¹ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 188, Rumbold to Curzon, February 10, 1920, p. 215.

understandable. Poland's territorial designs, if realized, would have resulted in the creation of a greater Poland with a population of 70 to 80 million, and would have included the Ukraine, which Soviet Russia wished to reclaim. Such a large Polish state would have permanently upset the delicate balance of power in the region and alarmed both Germany and Soviet Russia.

Since Germany's major aim in Eastern Europe centred around the isolation of Poland, Lithuania became the centre of intrigue on all sides. The Soviet desire to stifle Polish leadership ambitions also added to the problem. By maintaining formally correct and occasionally cordial relations with Riga and other Baltic capitals, Germany sought to prevent the formation of an alliance system that would group the Baltic States with Poland. The policy of Germany, simply stated, centred upon the necessity of preventing the Baltic States from entering into an alliance with Poland.¹⁵² In this eventuality, East Prussia would become cut off from Germany proper, a circumstance which Germany very much wished to avoid.

This policy became even more pointed when Germany recognized Poland's diplomatic and territorial ambitions.¹⁵³ Dr. Adolf Koester, Germany's Minister in

¹⁵² John Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, p. 134.

¹⁵³ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 32.

Riga, argued that, with respect to keeping the Baltic States separated from Poland, "German and Russian interests coincide completely."¹⁵⁴ Soviet Russia and Germany, in order to prevent Poland from concluding a pact with the other states, supported Lithuania's claim to Vilna.

At other times, Soviet Russia resorted to direct threats. Specifically, Soviet Russia warned of severe consequences if Poland and Finland were to conclude an alliance.¹⁵⁵ Soviet Russia, it should be remembered, did not easily accept the independence of the Baltic States, as evidenced by its invasion following the German withdrawal.

Paradoxically, Lithuania tended to look to Soviet Russia for support as a direct result of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, despite the obvious irredentism of the Soviet government. Lithuania apparently feared German ambitions and, therefore, found encouragement in Russian sympathies with her plight. Nevertheless, Lithuania seemed willing to seek assistance from both Germany and Soviet Russia.

Rumbold observed, in a similar vein, that Poland would eventually have to choose between Germany and Soviet Russia. The Poles, according to Curzon "are inclined to think that it will be more natural for them to be on close terms with a reconstituted Russia than with Germany." The Poles,

¹⁵⁴ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 32.

¹⁵⁵ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 21.

Rumbold asserted, see a "sinister motive in every action of the Germans..." ¹⁵⁶

As a minimum aim, it has been argued that Poland would have accepted the existence of an independent Lithuania, without Vilna, provided that it looked to Warsaw for leadership. Sir Horace Rumbold made the following observation of the Polish government's perspective:

The Poles draw a distinction between Lithuania on the one hand and Latvia and Esthonia [sic] on the other. They do not mind whether Latvia or Esthonia become eventually reabsorbed into a great Russia, but they would view with the utmost alarm the reabsorption of Lithuania into a great Russia whether Bolshevik or not. They have no objection to the independence of an ethnographic Lithuania, but they feel it is vital to their safety that such a state should revolve within the Polish orbit, and they would no doubt accept any arrangement, such as an economic union which offered effective guarantees against German or Russian domination in the future Lithuanian State. Failing some such arrangement, Germans and Russians can join hands across Poland's flank, and inter-alia cut off another possible access to the sea, which is of first-class importance to the future development of Poland. A Germanized or

Russianized Lithuania would be a perpetual menace and would render the strategical position of Poland fundamentally insecure.¹⁵⁷

Undoubtedly, once Poland had seized the Vilna corridor in October 1920, the possibility of Germany and Soviet Russia

¹⁵⁶ B DFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 93, May [date not specified], 1920, pp. 131-132.

¹⁵⁷ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 172, Rumbold to Curzon, January 26, 1920, p. 200; also printed in B DFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 189, Rumbold to Curzon, January 26, 1920, p. 170.

joining hands became impossible. The Poles would have liked to see an independent Estonia, Rumbold had also pointed out, but, he added, Poland realized that it would be impossible to shut Soviet Russia off from the sea. Estonia's best hope, then, became restricted to limited autonomy within the Russian empire.¹⁵⁸

Rumbold's last sentence, referring to Poland's strategical position, perfectly sums up the Polish anxiety during this period. Beyond question, the Polish leadership preoccupied itself with Lithuania and with Polish security in this area. Analysis of Poland's diplomatic manoeuvres during the period in question, in addition, certainly support Rumbold's suppositions. Poland's desires, however, received expression as rather more belligerent than defensive policies.

In essence, Poland's foreign policy aim centred upon a desire to achieve a strong position relative to her neighbours. It had been suggested that, in light of Polish apprehensions regarding her two powerful neighbours, and their expected combined military action against Poland, she "hopes to drive a wedge between her enemies and gain further access to the sea."¹⁵⁹ Rumbold had argued that Poland

¹⁵⁸ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 93, May 1920, p. 135.

¹⁵⁹ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 150, O.C. Harvey, Memorandum on Polish-Lithuanian Relations, February 10, 1920, p. 133.

desired to achieve greater access to the sea. Rumbold observed that Poland had attempted to forge close relations with Latvia in order to guarantee the use of the ports of Riga and Libau, as Danzig would be insecure or insufficient as an outlet.¹⁶⁰

During this period, the Allied effort to keep the Polish and Lithuanian militaries apart proved to be particularly difficult. Following the Polish seizure of Vilna, the Supreme Command of the Allied and Associated Powers created a line of demarcation, which the Poles violated. Poland also violated the second line, established by Marshal Foch.

Polish military activities caused anxiety in Lithuania. Lithuania, based on an analysis of her activities, such as her willingness to cooperate with both Germany and Soviet Russia, suggested that she perceived Poland to be the greater threat. One would assume that this Lithuanian fear of Poland received its impetus from the prospect of losing its cultural identity, whereas, its fear of Germany and Soviet Russia could be interpreted as being primarily military.

To illustrate this point, a document from the German Political Archives is useful. The report stated that a Polish annexation of Lithuania would lead to a political and

¹⁶⁰ BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 93, May, 1920, p. 135.

economic dependence of Poland. More pointedly, however, the document argued that such a turn of events would result in the 'polonization' of Lithuania.¹⁶¹ To be sure, a polonization of its country appeared to be the greatest fear of Lithuanian.

General Piłsudski's Proclamation to the People of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania did little to allay the fears of Lithuania. In April 1919 Piłsudski presented the said proclamation of which an excerpt follows.

Your country has been deprived of Liberty for nearly a century and a half. The Russian, German and Bolshevik tyranny have oppressed you one after another, impressing on the whole population forms of existence that were strange to you, which denied you all liberty of action and which often opposed the very principle of life.

The Polish troops which I have led here in order to drive out tyranny and expel the authorities governing the country against it will bring liberty for all.

I desire to offer the means of solving all internal, national and religious questions

according to your own inclinations without oppression of any sort from Poland.¹⁶²

Piłsudski's statement followed the Polish seizure of Vilna, which the Bolsheviks had occupied in early January, between 19 and 21 April 1919. It is difficult to imagine that all Lithuanians would have accepted the apparent benevolence of

¹⁶¹ German Foreign Ministry: Political Archives, April 22, 1919, Reel 430 A.C.P., p. 3.

¹⁶² 'The Greene Commission', April 22, 1919, "General Piłsudski's Proclamation to Lithuanians."

this message as Polish troops had taken what they considered to be their ancient capital. To be sure, Lithuanian would have preferred a Bolshevik to a Polish occupation of Vilna because it feared that Poland would seek to subjugate Lithuanian culture.¹⁶³

Evidence indicating that Germany and Soviet Russia aimed to keep Lithuania and Poland apart is evident. Rumbold suggested that the aggressive Lithuanian attitude toward the Polish government was due to 'German instigation, direct or indirect'. Furthermore, Rumbold proposed that "I suspect that the Germans do everything they can to envenom relations between the Lithuanians and Poland."¹⁶⁴ To illustrate this point, a German document reprinted in Senn's The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, is useful. The document states that:

There is no need to elaborate on how dangerous a union of Lithuania with Poland would be for the future of Germany. It is all the more necessary to support the anti-Polish, nationalistic endeavours of the Lithuanians and to be as helpful as possible, even unobtrusively, to the Lithuanians in the establishment of their state.

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The 'nationalistic endeavours of the Lithuanians'

¹⁶³ Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 109.

¹⁶⁴ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 172, Rumbold to Curzon, January 26, 1920, p. 200; also printed in BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Rumbold to Curzon, January 26, 1920, p. 170; see also BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 188, H.F.C. Crookshank and J.D. Gregory, Report, February 20, 1920, p. 168.

¹⁶⁵ Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 45.

assumes particular importance. As previously mentioned, Lithuania preoccupied herself with the problem of protecting its culture from Polish infiltration. Considering German and Soviet intrigues in Lithuania, the Poles may have regarded Lithuanian nationalism as the product of this intrigue.

Soviet and German contacts continued on many levels. Various factions within Germany maintained connections with Soviet Russia. The Militarist Party, for example, had apparently been intriguing with Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo, which was signed 16 April 1922, the Soviet government continued to insist that no agreement had been concluded with Germany concerning the Baltic States, and especially Poland.¹⁶⁶ Indications that Ludendorff and members of the Military Party had undertaken discussions which would lead to a joint Bolshevik-German attack on Poland circulated.¹⁶⁷ Their objective to "keep the door open" in order to maintain communications between the two states seemed to have been of paramount importance.

The Russians, according to these reports, desired to acquire much needed supplies. Additional reports indicated that certain groups within Germany hoped to join forces with

¹⁶⁶ See, for example; 'The Greene Commission', May 15, 1919; BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 120, Rumbold to Curzon, February 5, 1920, p. 113.

¹⁶⁷ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 211, Kilmarnock to Curzon, p. 196.

Soviet Russia in order to extract revenge against France. On the other hand, assorted elements desired to fashion an Anglo-German economic cooperation in order to penetrate Soviet Russia.¹⁶⁸ In any event, the British Foreign Office warned that "close cooperation between Germany and Soviet Russia have been rapid and should be carefully watched."¹⁶⁹

This close cooperation had much to do with the Polish-Soviet War. The Treaty of Versailles included provisions for the preservation of an independent Poland. The border between Poland and Soviet Russia was fixed tentatively at the Curzon line. Piłsudski's Poland capitalized on Russia's disorganization and weakness, and launched an attack. The Poles sought the acquisition of land, according to George F. Kennan, rather than the overthrow of Bolshevism. Kennan argues that the Poles perceived that a White Russia would be far less tolerant of an independent Poland than the present Bolshevik government.¹⁷⁰

When it appeared certain that the Whites had no possibility of achieving victory, the Poles initiated an offensive. The Polish attack in April, resulting in the

¹⁶⁸ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 50, Curzon to Acton, April 21, 1920, p. 50.

¹⁶⁹ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 183, General Malcolm to Lord Kilmarnock, February 11, 1920, p. 166.

¹⁷⁰ George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, (Boston, 1960), p. 167.

eventual Polish occupation of Kiev on 7 May 1920, nevertheless, took the Soviet High Command by surprise. In May, Soviet Russia had initiated a counter-offensive against the Poles, following the surrender of Admiral Alexander Kolchak on 7 February, and the defeat of Denikin on 28 March. The Bolshevik army managed to reach the outskirts of Warsaw by 13 August 1920. The well-known and enormously successful Polish counter-attack, served to create the conditions for peace.

In the meantime, the discussions leading to the conclusion of an economic agreement between Germany and Soviet Russia had taken place in February 1920, through which machinery, coal, and medicine would be sent to Soviet Russia from Germany, in exchange for raw materials, had apparently been accompanied by discussion for an understanding allowing for a combined attack on Poland. These discussions, Lord Kilmarnock observed, probably resulted "due to the excitement of the moment."¹⁷¹ This assessment certainly describes the situation accurately as Germany would have been incapable of launching an effective military campaign.

Other observers, as well, expected some sort of military action to eventually come against the Baltic area. The Swedish government, for example, noting the current

¹⁷¹ See; Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, p. 31; BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 183, February 20, 1920, Lord Kilmarnock to Curzon, p. 164.

Bolshevik attack on Poland, expressed the opinion that this attack would only be the first step which would eventually see the Bolshevik government annex all of the former Tsarist territory. ¹⁷²

Information from Reval indicated that the Germans had been supplying the Bolsheviks with arms and ammunition to allow Soviet Russia to overrun Poland during a two weeks period after which time they would sweep north and occupy the Baltic States. ¹⁷³ Eduard R. Virgo, an Estonian Foreign Office official, announced on 8 August 1920 that the Estonian government expected a note from the Soviet government demanding that all three Baltic States join a Soviet Russian federation. ¹⁷⁴ Not surprisingly, Adolf Joffe, the head of a Bolshevik delegation working in Riga in August 1920, attributed these rumours to Polish propaganda. Rather, Joffe expected that these states would voluntarily join Soviet Russia. ¹⁷⁵

Adolf Joffe had been the first Soviet representative in Berlin in summer 1918. During his tenure, he actively worked as a professional revolutionary and spread

¹⁷² DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 375, Ramsay to Curzon, July 31, 1920, p. 425.

¹⁷³ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 315, Mr. Leslie to Curzon, August 5, 1920, p. 344.

¹⁷⁴ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 322, Mr. Leslie to Curzon, August 8, 1920, p. 346.

¹⁷⁵ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 323, Mr. Tallents to Curzon, August 10, 1920, p. 347.

propaganda, since Bolshevik hopes resided in the expectation of a German revolution. The revolutionary activities in which Joffe participated led to his expulsion.

An examination of the policy of the German government during the Polish-Soviet war is essential. The German government clearly maintained little sympathy for Poland and appeared to actively assist Bolshevik Russia in her struggle. The German government seemed to desire that Soviet Russia regain her former frontiers and, for this reason, assisted the Bolshevik Army.

The German Foreign Minister, Dr. Simons, declared that any transportation of military supplies across Germany, originating in France and bound for Poland, would not be permitted.¹⁷⁶ General von Seeckt explicitly spelled out the rationale for this German policy. Seeckt offered the following explanation:

Since the future political and economic understanding with Great-Russia was to be our fixed target, we must avoid anything that might antagonize Russia...I would refuse to help Poland, even if there existed a danger that Poland might be swallowed by Russia. On the contrary I reckon on it and although we cannot, for the time being, help Russia in regaining the old frontiers of her Empire, we must not do anything that might prevent her from doing so. The same refers to Lithuania and Latvia.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic, (Westport, Connecticut, 1978), p. 30.

¹⁷⁷ Taken from; Hans von Seeckt, Aus meinem Leben (herausgegeben von General-Leutnant Friedrich von Rabenau, 1918-1936), Vol II, p. 252, quoted in Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, p. 643; See also, Freund, Unholy

Seeckt had clearly accepted the necessity of assisting the Bolsheviks against the Poles. Assisting Russia in regaining her former territories, even at the expense of Polish and Baltic independence, did not dissuade Seeckt.

Komarnicki quotes at length one further section from von Seeckt. Seeckt maintained that "Poland's existence is intolerable... She must disappear and she will disappear owing to her own internal weakness and by the endeavours of Russia with our assistance." Seeckt added that Poland could be of no economic use and, furthermore, that Poland was France's satellite. Finally, Seeckt advocated a return to the German and Russian frontiers of 1914.¹⁷⁸ As a part of German intentions, von Seeckt had designed military plans designed to capture the West Prussian and Poznań provinces.

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Seeckt maintained a thorough hatred of Poland. Seeckt referred to Poland as "the mortal enemy of Germany, this creature and ally of France, this thief of German soil, this annihilator of German culture..." Commenting further on his need to assist Soviet Russia, Seeckt stated "And should Poland go to the devil, we should help her go." Furthermore, Seeckt stated that "It should be unquestionably

Alliance, p. 69.

¹⁷⁸ See; Freund, Unholy Alliance, p. 69.

¹⁷⁹ Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, p. 728; E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, III, p. 324.

established that Germany deny Poland any help against Russia." The Germans Council of Ministers also agreed with this policy.¹⁸⁰

The German documents provide a similar picture to that of Seeckt's. One document explained that Poland was under French influence and would become, therefore, a German enemy. "This historical development of Poland, being unfriendly to Germany," according to this source, "has become a political necessity because of Polish annexation policy." The report continued that "any gain of territory which could mean additional power for Poland, is absolutely to be opposed." A greater Poland "would isolate Russia and Germany," the report concluded.¹⁸¹

Karl Radek managed to achieve some success at gathering German support for the Soviet state. The head of the German Communist Party, Paul Levi, argued in favour of an alliance with Soviet Russia.¹⁸² Radek, of course, had ostentatiously spread Bolshevik propaganda while he was in Germany.

The Soviet government attempted to accommodate the German government at every step. During May 1920, as Soviet

¹⁸⁰ Josef Korbel, Poland Between East and West: Soviet and German Diplomacy Toward Poland, 1919-1933. (Princeton, New Jersey, 1963), pp. 73, 82.

¹⁸¹ German Foreign Ministry: Political Archives, April 22, 1919, Reel 430 A.C.P., p. 2.

¹⁸² Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism, (Cambridge, 1948), p. 197.

troops were losing ground to the Polish army, Victor Kopp, the Soviet representative in Berlin, stated that "neither the Soviet Russian government nor the Russian people nourish any hostile intentions against Germany..."¹⁸³ Kopp had probably attempted to gain active German support against Poland.

Soviet Russia appeared to have been grateful for the refusal of the Germans to allow military supplies to be transported across Germany to Poland. Germany's position of neutrality was also warmly received by Soviet Russia. In response, Radek pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles intended to destroy Germany, and deprived Germany of Danzig and Upper Silesia. Through the war against Poland, according to Radek, "Russia...was remedying for Germany the injustices of Versailles."¹⁸⁴

The official German neutrality, by all accounts, was rather one sided and favoured Soviet Russia. Josef Korbel in Poland Between East and West, details some of the indications of active German cooperation with Soviet Russia. The Polish government had acquired documents which outlined German military sales to Soviet Russia in March 1920. Furthermore, on 1 May 1920, six zeppelins flew over Warsaw with a cargo of telegraphic and medical supplies bound for

¹⁸³ Korbel, Poland Between East and West, p. 84.

¹⁸⁴ Karl Radek, Likvidatsiya versal'skogo mira, (Petrograd, 1922), p. 21.

Soviet Russia. Some Soviet divisions had used German ammunition, 400,000 rifles, and 200 million cartridges which were transported through Hamburg for Soviet Russia. Polish soldiers, themselves, had witnessed Germans, reportedly 100,000, fighting in Soviet lines. Finally, on 20 July 1920, Major General von Horn had apparently signed instructions detailing air communications with Soviet Russia.¹⁸⁵

'German intrigues' and propaganda have been indicated as the cause of the anxiety that had developed between the Letts and the Poles.¹⁸⁶ As well, Lithuanian-Latvian relations gradually deteriorated. The Latvians became upset with Lithuania's claims to her northern frontier, while Lithuania still harboured resentment from the joint Latvian-Polish attacks, having occurred in the course of the Polish-Lithuanian border skirmishes. Chicherin continued to "[sow] discord between the Finns and Poles" by means of threats and by offering individual treaties.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, the Bolsheviks evidently had contingency plans to send warships in order to intimidate the peace negotiations between Finland and Latvia.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ Korbél, Poland Between East and West, p. 89.

¹⁸⁶ DBFP, 1st series, Volume XI, Document 184, Earl of Derby to Curzon, February 3, 1920, p. 211.

¹⁸⁷ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 372, Lord Acton to Earl Curzon, March 23, 1920, p. 347.

¹⁸⁸ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 343, March 24, 1920, O.C. Harvey, p. 311.

Prince Eustache Sapieha, the Polish Foreign Minister, referred to the Bolshevik-German intrigues in Latvia. He believed that if Poland succumbed to a military disaster, then Germany would occupy West Prussia under the guise of protecting Europe from Bolshevism. In reality, he claimed, the Bolsheviks and the Germans continued to be in active 'collusion'. ¹⁸⁹

The German government argued that if a Lithuanian state was to be created at the Peace Conference, it would have to include Vilna. Germany argued that Polish political influence had to be stopped and, equally important, that Lithuanian-German interests had to be created. The document continued by stating that the "overland route to Russia must be very broad and needs Vilna as a major point of trade in order that Germany has access to Russia's hinterland." Finally, the report concluded that a Lithuanian control of Vilna would restrict Polish access to the Baltic sea. ¹⁹⁰

The German government, however, seemed to care not whether an independent Lithuanian state would be created. If such a state were to be established, then restricting Polish influence was paramount. "The bigger importance," it has been stated in the documents, "lies in the fact that Germany needs to have free access to Russia without Poland's

¹⁸⁹ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 331, Kidston to Curzon, July 15, 1920, p. 384.

¹⁹⁰ German Foreign Ministry: Political Archives, April 22, 1919, Reel 430 A.C.P., p. 1.

interference." ¹⁹¹

The German government had encouraged the Lithuanians to endeavour to seize Vilna. The Lithuanians attempted to seize Vilna, but the Red Army occupied the town on 14 July 1920, before the Lithuanians could manage a military campaign. A Lithuanian military campaign surely would not have been effective considering Lithuania's inadequate military capability. In August, however, the Soviets decided to give the city to Lithuania, following the Treaty which they signed on 12 July 1920.

Tarulis has argued in Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States, that the Soviet-Lithuanian armistice agreement did not require Soviet Russia to turn the territory over to Lithuania. Rather, an unfavourable military situation impelled Soviet Russia to transfer this territory. ¹⁹² Specifically, the 'miracle of the Vistula', wherein Poland successfully repelled the Soviet Russian attack of August 1920, propelled the Soviet Russian government to turn Vilna over to the Lithuanians. ¹⁹³

Soviet policy, as has been mentioned, sought to divide Lithuania and Poland. E.H. Carr pointed out, unconvincingly, that an independent Lithuania would serve

¹⁹¹ German Foreign Ministry: Political Archives, April 6, 1919, Reel 430, p. 8.

¹⁹² Tarulis, Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States, p. 62.

¹⁹³ Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 220.

another purpose. The Soviet Union realized that Lithuania could fall into the Polish orbit, whereas "an independent Lithuania could be a thorn in the side of Poland."¹⁹⁴

The Polish-Lithuanian dispute took a new turn in the fall of 1920. In 9 October 1920, Polish General Lucjan Zeligowski seized Vilna following the Allied Supreme Command's decision to award Vilna to Lithuania on 7 October 1920. The Polish government had decided to allow Lithuania to retain Vilna while future negotiations were planned.¹⁹⁵ Zeligowski, however, took matters into his own hands and, after his military campaign, he formally proclaimed the formation of the state of Central Lithuania.

Piłsudski conceded at a later date that Zeligowski had acted under his own orders in the seizure of Vilna. At the time, however, the Polish government labelled him as a rebel.¹⁹⁶ While the British government suggested that the Poles could have prevented Zeligowski's action,¹⁹⁷ the Soviets assumed a much tougher stance. Joffe, the first Soviet representative in Berlin, made the following statement:

¹⁹⁴ Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Volume I, (London, 1960), p. 314.

¹⁹⁵ Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question, pp. 47-53.

¹⁹⁶ Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question, p. 51.

¹⁹⁷ DBFP, Volume XI, p. 594.

My government is forced to underline that General Zeligowski serves and continues to be a general in the Polish service and that he would not have been able to lead soldiers into action without the active assistance of Poland, and in particular without the use of Polish military materials; relative to this present assistance, my government has absolutely concrete, incontrovertible information.¹⁹⁸

Prior to Zeligowski's seizure of Vilna in October 1920, the documentary evidence suggests that Soviet tactics had been successful. According to Colonel Stephen Tallents, the British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania had expressed a genuine desire to enter into friendly relations with the Polish government, despite the Polish-Lithuanian war. They felt obliged, he continued, to "subordinate this desire to the necessity not only of observing their peace treaty with Russia, but also of avoiding any contact with which the Soviet government could take serious exception."¹⁹⁹

Clearly, Lithuania's posture toward Poland did not suggest any desire to forge closer relations.

Lithuania's need for a strong ally against Poland, and its fears of Polish aggression, convinced Lithuania to maintain its relationship with Soviet Russia. The Red Army, as a matter of fact, essentially had a free hand on Lithuanian territory. Lithuania surely realized the danger

¹⁹⁸ Dokumenty i materiały, A. Joffe to J. Dadskiego, 11 grudzien (December) 1920, Ryga, Volume III, Document 260, p. 536.

¹⁹⁹ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Tallents to Curzon, August 23, 1920, p. 372.

that Soviet Russia represented, yet they felt more intimidated by Poland.

In September 1920, the Polish chargé d'affaires reported to Curzon that Lithuania's neutrality had been infringed by the Bolsheviks and he argued that the Bolsheviks received Lithuania's active cooperation. Bolshevik forces, according to this representative, passed through Lithuania.²⁰⁰ Rumbold reported that unarmed Bolshevik troops had indeed received transportation from East Prussia into Lithuania and had received "every kindness at the hands of the Germans." Once in Lithuania, the troops awaited transit into Soviet Russia.²⁰¹

These reports may have accounted for Polish anxieties with respect to a perceived Soviet-Lithuanian combination formed against Poland. Nevertheless, reports surfaced suggesting that heavily armed Prussian troops from East Prussia had crossed in the direction of Grodno with intentions of fighting along side the Russians. East Prussia, Rumbold claimed, was "extremely hostile to Poland...and in complete sympathy with Soviet Russia." Yet, Rumbold conceded, he could find no indication of the existence of a military convention between Lithuania and

²⁰⁰ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 518, September 6, 1920, p. 548; DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 523, Curzon to Derby, September 11, 1920, p. 556.

²⁰¹ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 540 (enclosure), Rumbold to Curzon, September 22, 1920, p. 568.

Soviet Russia.²⁰²

The Lithuanian-Bolshevik peace treaty which awarded Vilna and a small amount of other territory to Lithuania, reportedly contained a Bolshevik proposal that a joint Soviet-Lithuanian offensive should begin against Poland.²⁰³ Polish sources insisted that a secret convention had indeed been concluded, especially since many Bolsheviks and Germans reportedly fought alongside the Lithuanians. In a further attempt to keep Poland apart from Lithuania, Soviet Russia made it contingent upon Lithuania not to conclude any treaty with Poland if Lithuania desired to receive the territorial concession it desired south of Vilna.²⁰⁴

The Soviet government apparently had managed to receive affirmative support from Lithuania, in the form of territorial concessions. Vilna, in specific, would be handed to Soviet Russia in return for cooperation against Poland. The Soviets seized the city, however, on 14 July. Nevertheless, Count Tyszkiewicz, the Lithuanian representative in London, expressed his opposition to this agreement because he believed that it had resulted from a

²⁰² DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 540, Rumbold to Curzon, September 22, 1920, pp. 568-569.

²⁰³ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume Xi, Document 318, Ward to Curzon, May 17, 1920, p. 318.

²⁰⁴ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume Xi, Document 283, Ward to Curzon, May 28, 1920, p. 338.

secret agreement between the Soviets and the Germans.²⁰⁵ Tyszkiewicz's Polish noble background, however, rendered him highly suspect in the eyes of Lithuania. Tyszkiewicz, in fact, was dismissed on suspicion that he was a Polish agent shortly after.

In August 1920 The Times of London published a secret clause from the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty, signed in July 1920, which established secret collaboration between Lithuania and Soviet Russia. The clause read as follows:

...the crossing of the Lithuanian frontier by the Russian army or an occupation of a part of the Lithuanian territory by the aforementioned army will not be seen by the Lithuanian Government as a violation of the Peace Treaty or an act of unfriendliness against Lithuania.²⁰⁶

Major Pargiter maintained that Poland deliberately inflated the numbers of Germans and Russians in Lithuania in order to discredit the Lithuanians in the eyes of the Entente and to make further inroads into Lithuania.²⁰⁷

Throughout this period, repeated reports that Germany and Soviet Russia had made arrangements to jointly attack Poland circulated. Indeed, Poland definitely feared just that eventuality. Rumbold believed that Poland's past

²⁰⁵ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 140, O.C. Harvey to C.M. Palairret, May 31, 1920, p. 192; see also BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 141, Gen. Turner to War Office, May 29, 1920, p. 193.

²⁰⁶ The Times, August 5, 1920.

²⁰⁷ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 4, Document 2, Major Pargiter on Polish-Lithuanian Situation, November 3, 1920, p. 2.

experiences with Germany and Soviet Russia certainly reinforced that anxiety. Poland, according to Rumbold, needed to block this possibility. Lithuania, Poland felt, could possibly have become the undesirable 'link' between the two states.

Prince Sapieha referred to Lithuania as a 'swing-bridge'. He maintained that Poland must ensure that the bridge headed north and south rather than east and west, which would link her two great enemies.²⁰⁸ This possibility encouraged Piłsudski and Ignace Paderewski, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to regard a union with Lithuania as even more indispensable.²⁰⁹ The Soviet government had been quick to point out however, that no agreements had been concluded with Germany concerning Poland.²¹⁰

Lithuania, for its part, found it necessary to seek security from her two larger neighbours. "The more that the Poles threaten them," the argument proceeded, "the more the Lithuanians feeling that they are being sacrificed in the interests of the Entente, especially France." The

²⁰⁸ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 4, Document 11, Wilton to Curzon, October 29, 1920, p. 19.

²⁰⁹ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 221, Rumbold to Curzon, February 28, 1920, p. 201; BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 343, O.C. Harvey, March 24, 1920, p. 311; BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 142, O.C. Harvey, March 28, 1920, p. 195.

²¹⁰ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 120, Rumbold to Curzon, February 5, 1920, p. 113.

Lithuanians, therefore, needed to find some security from Poland. The Polish-Lithuanian problem has been summarized as follows.

...The Polish-Lithuanian problem revolves in a vicious circle. The more the Poles go for the Lithuanians the more the latter look towards

the arms of the Bolsheviks and Germany. The more the Lithuanians do this, the more do the Poles press them. A satisfactory settlement would go far towards putting an end to Bolshevik and German intrigues in Lithuania.²¹¹

Lithuania became convinced that a Bolshevik attack on Poland had been planned for December 1920. Mr. Stulginskis, the acting President, proposed that in the event of a Polish defeat, the Bolsheviks would attack the Baltic States. This analysis would be consistent with Soviet designs.

Mr. Dewhurst, a British Foreign Office official, indicated how strongly the Soviets felt about Lithuania retaining Vilna. He suggested that if Zeligowski remained in Vilna the Bolsheviks "will certainly attack him next spring..."²¹² This official, however, was certainly in no position to judge Soviet intentions. Although Zeligowski continued to hold the territory, no attack occurred.

Germany, according to several accounts, had decided to

²¹¹ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 4, Document 22, Mr. Wilton to Mr. Gregory, November 18, 1920, p. 27.

²¹² BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 4, Document 27, Mr. Dewhurst, November 22, 1920, p. 31; BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 4, Document 45, Wilton to Curzon, November 19, 1920, p. 45.

assist Lithuania in the event of a Polish attack on Kovno. A Polish occupation of Lithuania could not be tolerated by Germany as it would have restricted the possibility of trade with Soviet Russia. Although, after October 1920, Lithuania did not share a common border with Soviet Russia. "Another war, in combination with Soviet Russia, would be preferable" to allowing Poland to take Kovno, asserted one diplomat.

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Unusual indications that there had been discussion between Germany and Soviet Russia concerning the combination of forces to deal with Poland surfaced at this time. Radek's report to the Soviet Government of January 1920, printed in the British documents, contains a bizarre and unsubstantiated request from a secret military league in Germany to meet with the Soviet government. Radek himself appears not to have been completely convinced of its authenticity. Nevertheless, the points expressed by this league are of interest.

The organization desired that the Soviet government conclude an agreement with this league so that they would 'march together against Poland'. This league would provide Soviet Russia with arms and munitions and would together draw up plans for the Polish campaign. Finally, the league

²¹³ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 633, Wilton to Curzon, November 6, 1920, p. 655; BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 4, Document 2, Major Pargiter, November 3, 1920, p. 3; see also *Ibid.*, Document 10, November 7, 1920.

would guarantee the return of all territory formerly belonging to the Russian empire, and would allow Soviet Russia to decide under which régime Poland should come.²¹⁴ Obviously, Soviet Russia would have been quite unable to participate in this plan as she had just been exhausted by a war with Poland, and continued to be embroiled in civil war.

The German government and the Bolshevik government maintained a similar interest in perpetuating the Polish-Lithuanian dispute in order to restrict Poland's diplomatic objectives. Indeed, the Polish-Lithuanian dispute effectively demonstrates the degree of common policy between Germany and Soviet Russia which may have contributed to the prolongation of the dispute.

The German government displayed its willingness to assist the Soviet Russian government throughout this dispute and during the course of the Polish-Soviet War. A reconstituted Russian state, Bolshevik or not, received more favourable response than a strengthened Poland acting as a regional leader. Bolshevik Russia certainly displayed no qualms about receiving assistance from a militarist, bourgeois power. German assistance seemed to offer the best hope of confining Poland and, therefore, she willingly accepted the assistance.

²¹⁴ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 108, January 31, 1920, p. 100.

THE BALTIC STATES BETWEEN GERMANY AND SOVIET RUSSIA

As the German government resigned itself to the realization that actual possession of the Baltic area would be impossible, it sought to utilize the area in another way. The German government, and particularly German industrialists and big business, then, wished to exert economic dominance and employ the Baltic States as an entry way into Soviet Russia. Similarly, the Bolshevik government desired to use this area for transit and communication purposes, yet, it maintained a desire to draw it into a Soviet Russian federation.

The German government's plans for the Baltic States, and particularly for Latvia, eventually became transformed to their possible use as transit states for economic development. Radek reported that once peace had been established between Germany and Soviet Russia, German traders would implement plans in order to utilize the Baltic States as a means for expediting their economic relations with Soviet Russia.²¹⁵

The American Legation in Lithuania realized the importance of the Baltic States in the area of trade. They

²¹⁵ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 207, Political Report, January 16, 1920, p. 194.

came to be referred to as the 'entry way into Russia'. The American Legation proposed that the country which could manage to "first get into Lithuania with its influence will be the country which will reach all Russia with its trade." ²¹⁶

A British official, approximately two weeks later, noted that Lithuania had already found itself in an economically dependant position on Germany and this circumstance would "render it inevitable that Germany will hold a very strong position in this country."²¹⁷

General Hans von Seeckt, as demonstrated previously, had stated his belief that Germany must seek to come to an understanding with Soviet Russia. He would have welcomed the forcible reincorporation of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia into the Russian empire so as to eliminate the wall of states between Germany and Soviet Russia. ²¹⁸ In fact, General von Seeckt deplored what he referred to as the 'false border state policy'. ²¹⁹ Von Seeckt, therefore, unquestionably desired to come to an understanding with

²¹⁶ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Lithuania, Roll 1 860M.00/18, January 17, 1920.

²¹⁷ BDEA, Part II, Series A, Document 295, General Turner to C.I.G.S. Interim Report. February 3, 1920, p. 256.

²¹⁸ George W.F. Hallgarten, "General Hans von Seeckt and Russia, 1920-1922," Journal of Modern History, XXI, No. 1 (March, 1949), p. 29.

²¹⁹ George W.F. Hallgarten, General Hans von Seeckt and Russia, 1920-1922," Journal of Modern History, XXI, No. 1 (March, 1949), p. 29.

Soviet Russia. Clearly, by 1920, both Soviet Russia and Germany remained opposed to the formation of independent states which would separate their countries.

It would be inappropriate to suggest that Germany and Soviet Russia actively competed for political control of the Baltic region. Certainly, Germany desired to gain an economically ascendant role, while Soviet Russia, to be sure, harboured a desire to regain political control. Each state found itself in a position far too weak to overrun these provinces between their respective countries.

Germany's main interest in this area, then, became economic, due to the fact that these states, according to the German Foreign Minister, would be independent for a number of years.²²⁰ Germany preferred Latvia, above all, to assume the role as a bridge between the capitalist west and the untapped markets of Bolshevik Russia. As an illustration of Germany's perception of Latvia as an excellent area, a German representative named Wilhelm Theodor Erich Wallroth, the German Minister in Riga, stated that Latvia would be the "natural intermediary for German-Soviet relations."²²¹ The documentary evidence suggests that the German government had attempted to reconstruct commercial relations in the Baltic previously and "contrary

²²⁰ Quoted in Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 9.

²²¹ Rodgers, Search for Security, pp. 9-10; see also DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XI, Document 367, Tallents to Curzon, July 29, 1920, p. 414.

to the rules of the Blockade." ²²²

On 21 January 1921, Dr. W. Simon, the German Foreign Minister referred to the Baltic States as an "Undesirable barrier between Germany and Russia." ²²³ In addition, Wallroth expressed his opinion that Latvia's excellent harbours and railway system nominated Latvia as the "natural intermediary for German-Russian relations." ²²⁴ Furthermore, another German official noted that Latvia had excellent ice-free harbours and had once held a prominent place in Russia's foreign trade.

Dr. Adolf Koester believed that Germany had a particularly strong interest in the Baltic States because they purchased German products. He continued by stating that "We have in the Baltic States an economic outpost for exploiting the Russian market." ²²⁵ A further German government official remarked that "Latvia was predestined to serve as the entry area for all economic activity with Russia." ²²⁶

To this end, Latvia's function, as well as Estonia's

²²² FRUS, Paris Peace Conference, IV, February 17, 1919, p. 192.

²²³ Edgar Anderson, "Toward the Baltic Union, 1920-1927," Lituanus, XII, No.2 (Summer, 1966), p. 33.

²²⁴ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 9.

²²⁵ Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, p. 134.

²²⁶ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 9.

and Lithuania's, would be to act as transit states.²²⁷ It should be pointed out that Germany expressed the greatest interest in Latvia and Estonia, and less so in Lithuania. The large number of Baltic Germans in these two areas as well as the fact that after 1920 Germany could not achieve direct contact through Lithuania because Poland had managed to establish a corridor to the sea, determined Germany's preference.²²⁸

Soviet Russia's plans for the Baltic States stood in interesting contrast to the German plans. A Soviet Latvia would be expected to act as a 'funnel' or 'springboard' to export revolution to Western Europe and particularly to Germany.²²⁹ Indeed, as Soviet troops had crossed the frontier of the Baltic States on the heels of the retreating Germans, Izvestia published an article which declared that "Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are directly on the road from Russia to Western Europe and are, therefore, a hindrance to our revolution...this separating wall has to be destroyed."²³⁰ In this respect, it is obvious that each nation maintained contrasting goals for the Baltic States.

²²⁷ Hiden, "The Significance of Latvia," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No. 130 (January 1975), p. 391.

²²⁸ Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, p. 134.

²²⁹ Page, The Formation of the Baltic States, p. 28-30.

²³⁰ Izvestia, December 25, 1918, referenced in Tarulis, Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States, p. vii.

From a German perspective, as previously indicated, Latvia's importance, would be substantially different. The German government received various requests from German business to acknowledge Latvia as a stable and independent state and to recognize Latvia's geographical position, located as it is, on the fringe of Soviet Russia and her potentially vast markets. ²³¹ The German Reichskommissar, August Winnig, desired to use the German military presence in order to force Latvia into political and economic dependence on Germany. ²³²

The "Preliminary Agreement for the Restoration of Relations between the German Reich and Latvia," signed on 15 July 1920, attempted to reestablish diplomatic relations between the two states which Latvia had broken in 1919. Germany attempted to convince Latvia to organize Latvian industry under joint Latvian-German control. It must be made clear that Germany desired to obtain certain raw materials from Latvia such as flax and wood.

For their part, the Baltic States demonstrated an equal eagerness to become the economic links between Germany and Bolshevik Russia. The Baltic States argued that becoming an economic bridge to Soviet Russia did not conflict with their

²³¹ John W. Hiden, "The Significance of Latvia: A Forgotten Aspect of Weimar Ostpolitik," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No. 130 (January 1975), p. 390.

²³² Anderson, "Through the Baltic Gate," The Baltic Review No. 33 (January, 1967), p. 16.

opposition to entering into a political alliance with either Germany or Soviet Russia.²³³ Meierovics, the Latvian Foreign Minister, stated before the Commission on Baltic Affairs that Latvia was willing to become an intermediary to Soviet Russia.

Meierovics added that he would be willing to cooperate with Soviet Russia with respect to transit requirements providing that Latvia's independence was not compromised.²³⁴ Ulmanis, the Prime Minister of Latvia argued that the Latvian-German Peace Treaty of 15 July 1920, would result in large scale German economic penetration. Ulmanis added that "Latvia was of interest to foreign capital less for her own sake than for a stepping-stone to Russia."²³⁵

By entering into this type of arrangement with Soviet Russia, the Baltic States found themselves relegated to a dependent position. Rodgers has pointed out, with respect to Latvia, that the bridge theory "collapsed against the hard reality of Soviet manipulation of its trade policy for political ends." Latvia, then, never really became the economic bridge between Soviet Russia and Germany.²³⁶

²³³ Hiden, "The Significance of Latvia," The Slavonic and East European Review, LIII, No. 130 (January 1975), p. 397.

²³⁴ Tarulis, American-Baltic Relation, pp. 51, 169.

²³⁵ BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 262, July 29, 1920, p. 313.

²³⁶ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 9.

Furthermore, Rodgers points out that Germany did not need the Latvian Bridge since Germany and Soviet Russia eventually constructed a comprehensive relationship based on the Rapallo Treaty of 1922. As a result of the Treaty of Rapallo, Meierovics had predicted that Latvia would be stifled economically. He even suggested that Germany would indirectly support Russian expansionist policies.

Despite these Baltic desires to become links, various reports suggested that the respective governments of these Baltic States were 'most unwilling' to restore formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet government.²³⁷ In light of this circumstance, Sir Horace Rumbold reported that Poland felt it certain that Estonia would not be able to maintain her independence. In an interesting statement in August 1920, Adolf Joffe remarked that Lithuania retained the capability of producing outstanding 'men of European reputation', while Estonia could not. Therefore, he asserted, Estonia would be unlikely to retain her independence.²³⁸

Poland believed that Soviet Russia could not allow its access to the sea to be restricted, forcing Soviet Russia to

²³⁷ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 1, Document 85, O.C. Harvey and others, Memorandum-British Naval Forces in the Baltic, p. 315.

²³⁸ BDEFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 331, August 12, 1920, p. 352.

rely solely on Leningrad.²³⁹ The Baltic States, it would appear, felt that they could not come to peace with Soviet Russia unless they could expect support from the Entente. A German orientation would have been impossible because, in the words of one Estonian representative, "we detest and loathe the Germans, and can never forget our oppression at the hands of the Baltic Barons."²⁴⁰

Nevertheless, the three Baltic States, and later Poland, all entered into individual peace treaties with Soviet Russia despite their pledge to negotiate collectively. The individual treaties of peace between Soviet Russia and each of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, are demonstrative of Soviet efforts to divide the Baltic States. A short examination of the treaties and Soviet efforts at manipulating the individual states follows.

The Treaty of Versailles received its signatures on 28 June 1919. In August 1919 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania drafted a proposal for union. In September, at Riga, following Chicherin's indication that peace with Latvia appeared possible, the three Baltic States along with Finland, met in order to negotiate a common peace with Soviet Russia.

²³⁹ BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume I, Document 102, Sir Horace Rumbold to Earl Curzon, December 8, 1919, p. 17.

²⁴⁰ BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 2, Document 44, Note of Conversation with Karl Menning, Diplomatic Representative of Estonia at Copenhagen on Tuesday December 2, 1919, pp. 34-35.

In Tallinn, on 14 September 1919, the conference adopted the following resolutions. First, all signatory states would negotiate peace collectively rather than individually, and secondly, if the Soviet Government resisted this condition, then negotiations would be suspended. Third, any special conditions deemed necessary to be presented to the Bolsheviks prior to engaging in discussions would have to be discussed in preliminary conferences. An interesting final point regarded the state of the relationship with Soviet Russia and the future prospects. The general interpretation of 'Peace', according to this document, would be 'quite impossible' to achieve with Soviet Russia. Instead the conference referred to the treaty as a means for the achievement of a suspension of hostilities.²⁴¹

The Baltic plan for peace, as they envisioned it, became frustrated by the recurring Soviet refusal to enter into joint discussions.²⁴² The policy of the Soviet government intended to divide the Baltic States and keep them apart from Poland, as such, necessitated that treaties

²⁴¹ Henri de Chambon, Origine et histoire de la Lettonie, (Paris, 1933), p. 59.

²⁴² Georg von Rauch, The Baltic States: The Years of Independence, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 1917-1940, (London, 1974), p. 66.

be concluded with each state individually.²⁴³ Despite the repeated calls for unity and a common peace with Soviet Russia, Estonia entered into a separate peace with the Bolsheviks in February 1920.

The Bolshevik government never abandoned the tactic of pursuing individual pacts or treaties with each state individually. In February 1922, the Soviet government offered to conclude separate pacts of non-aggression to each individual Baltic state in the hopes of preventing the further consolidation of the Baltic States.

The Bolshevik success at achieving an individual peace with Estonia gained recognition as work of 'destruction'.²⁴⁴ At the Helsingfors conference it appeared that Estonia felt "more or less ostracized owing to the peace they had concluded separately."²⁴⁵ More pointedly, the Estonians had become, according to some observers, 'morally isolated' from the remaining Baltic States and had lost Allied 'sympathies'. The Polish view, obviously propagandistic in its purpose, explained that the peace treaty had resulted in the formation, in Estonia, of

²⁴³ Charles Ozols, "Russia, Germany and the Baltic States," International Affairs, XIII, No. 4 (July-August, 1934), p. 559.

²⁴⁴ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Estonia, February 21, 1920, p. 6.

²⁴⁵ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Estonia, February 21, 1921, p. 4.

a government similar to that of Soviet Russia.²⁴⁶

Aside from the Soviet efforts to divide the Baltic States, the Bolshevik government had one other important objective. Soviet Russia desired to prove its willingness to make and hold treaties with non-communist, or non-socialist governments. Similarly, the peace treaty gave them access to the outside world.²⁴⁷

Interestingly, a note by M. Serda, the Secretary of the Lettish Foreign Office, indicated to a British official that the Bolsheviks expressed no immediate necessity in concluding peace with Latvia. He argued that this circumstance emerged as a result of "German influence and orientation." Serda added that, at this time, four official German delegations were in Moscow.²⁴⁸

Once the Soviet-Latvian peace talks began, the proceedings quickly stalled because the Bolsheviks refused to suspend propaganda activities in Latvia.²⁴⁹ Moreover, the Bolsheviks offered no concessions and demanded the use of the port facilities at Riga until such time as Soviet

²⁴⁶ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 12, Rumbold to Curzon, March 14, 1920, p. 17.

²⁴⁷ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 56, Col. Tallents to Curzon, April 23, 1920, p. 62.

²⁴⁸ BDFA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 112, Gen. Turner to War Office, May 14, 1920, p. 173.

²⁴⁹ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Latvia, Young to Secretary of State, E.O-12065, Section 3-401 June 7, 1920.

Russia could establish a free port. ²⁵⁰ The Soviet state had clearly adhered to a policy of intimidation.

The remaining Baltic States eventually signed peace treaties with Soviet Russia. Estonia had come to terms in February, while Lithuania signed in July, and Latvia in August 1920. Each treaty contained relatively similar and uniform clauses, which have since been thoroughly analyzed. Unquestionably, the most important aspect for the Baltic Nations centred upon the clause which stated that Soviet Russia would recognize the independence and autonomy of each state, and would renounce any claims to sovereignty.

Zigfrids Meierovics seems to have been convinced and felt reasonably secure about coming to terms with the Soviet government. In fact, as Latvia's foreign minister he declared that "We are convinced that the peace with Russia will be a real peace and not a scrap of paper...It would therefore be superfluous to conclude an agreement against Russia as we have nothing to fear from Russia."²⁵¹ He clearly saw no need, in light of the peace treaties, to constitute a Baltic Union.

Meierovics opinion down playing the necessity of regional pacts or alliance systems, demonstrates the success of Soviet Policy. Soviet Russia had always adhered to a

²⁵⁰ BDEA, Part II, Series A, Volume 3, Document 287, Mr. Tallents to Curzon, July 30, 1920, p. 330.

²⁵¹ "Baltic Entente," Contemporary Review, CXVIII (October, 1920), p. 580.

policy of signing individual treaties and pacts with the Baltic States. Meierovics became so convinced of the sincerity of the Soviet offer, that he completely disregarded one of the only common foundations of Baltic foreign policy.

Bolshevik attempts to prevent cooperation among the Baltic States became evident with the individual peace treaties it concluded with each state. In these agreements, prohibitions against the recruiting of men for armed conflict against the other became effective.²⁵² In addition, each signatory state would have to prevent the passage of troops or material to be used in military operations against the other signatory. Furthermore, the stationing of troops of third powers would also be prohibited.

After 1920, the Baltic States differed in their orientation toward Soviet Russia. Lithuania seemed to be the most favourably disposed, of the three Baltic States, toward Soviet Russia. Two circumstances contributed to this pro-Soviet orientation. Since Lithuania and Soviet Russia did not share a common border after October 1920, Lithuania felt reasonably secure, at least from Soviet Russia. In addition, Lithuania actually sought security from Soviet Russia throughout her dispute with Poland over the territory

²⁵² Latvian-Russian Relations: Documents, Compiled by Alfred Bilmanis, pp. 71-71.

of Vilna. Indeed, Soviet Russia was the only country to support Lithuania's claims to Vilna, despite the fact that Soviet Russia stated its disinterestedness in the Treaty of Riga. It is clear that these three states, at this point, did not adhere to a joint policy with respect to the Soviet state.

The prospects for the creation of a union, or a regional pact, slowly dimmed. A union composed of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania would have perhaps been interpreted by Poland as an act of aggression. Latvia and Estonia, nevertheless, seemed to have satisfactory relations with Poland, despite their suspicions of Polish aims in the region.

The results of the development of active cooperation are clearly visible in later years. For example, the agreement signed at the Warsaw Conference on March 17, 1922 was regarded by the Soviet Government as anti-Soviet in character because it interpreted the agreement as a military alliance directed against the Soviet Union.²⁵³ In an attempt to counter the accord concluded at Warsaw among the Baltic States, Chicherin organized a conference to be held in Moscow, which was to include Lithuania, which had not participated in the aforementioned conference, to deal with general East European problems.

²⁵³ Tarulis, Soviet Policy Towards the Baltic States, p. 65.

The conference took place in Riga, instead of Moscow on 29 March 1922.²⁵⁴ According to a Soviet historian, it was Chicherin's intention "to split up the unified front of the Baltic States and to blunt the anti-Soviet point of the Warsaw Accord."²⁵⁵ Meierovics himself stated that any attempts to form a "Baltic security alliance in the face of Russian and German opposition and without Western backing would verge on the suicidal."²⁵⁶

In Germany, the results of the Riga conference were viewed as a "foil to the plans for a Baltic League under Polish Leadership."²⁵⁷ The Soviet government achieved a major victory in that the Polish, Latvian, and Estonian delegates at the Riga Conference agreed to cooperate with the Soviet Union at the Genoa Conference. The Baltic States, then, agreed to adhere to Soviet Policy at the forthcoming Genoa Conference concerning arms limitations. In addition, the states agreed to follow common policy with respect to Tsarist debts, for which the French and British Governments wished to make these states partially responsible. Furthermore, the Baltic States as well as Poland consented to assist the Soviet régime achieve de jure

²⁵⁴ Senn, The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question, pp. 93-94.

²⁵⁵ quoted in; Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 25.

²⁵⁶ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 33.

²⁵⁷ Rodgers, Search for Security, p. 25.

recognition.

A previous conference, known as the Helsingfors Conference, was designed to be an economic conference. Many Soviet Russian attempts to frustrate the economic programme became evident. Dr. Holsti reported that Litvinov had threatened Mr. Ants Piip with "a future overwhelming of Finland by Soviet Russia." Litvinov also made it clear that Lithuania should not offend Soviet Russia so to avoid a similar fate.²⁵⁸ At the same time, Estonia failed to be convinced of Soviet Russia's peaceful intentions as contained in its disarmament proposals.²⁵⁹

Soviet efforts to overturn the Lithuanian government have been referred to as 'not conspicuously aggressive'. However, a new political party, ostensibly supported by the Bolsheviks, formed in Lithuania had nominated candidates for the Seim.²⁶⁰ Indeed, five members were elected and quickly capitalized on this opportunity and initiated a propaganda campaign.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XXIII, Document 290, Mr. Rennie to Mr. Curzon, January 30, 1922, p. 358.

²⁵⁹ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Estonia, Document 2783, October 2, 1922, p. 2.

²⁶⁰ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Lithuania, Roll 1, Document 2883, 860m.00/45, p. 4.

²⁶¹ Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Lithuania, Roll 1, Document 218, 860m.00/47, December 29, 1922, p. 6.

A disarmament conference at Moscow, comprised of the border states, broke up because Soviet Russia had decided not to sign a pact of non aggression with the participants unless the Soviet Russian disarmament plan was accepted first. This tactic effectively destroyed the possibility of the collective signing of non aggression treaties. It was stated that Litvinov had made more than one attempt to break the united front of the Baltic States, Poland, and Rumania.²⁶²

Germany and Soviet Russia each maintained a different ultimate plan for the Baltic States. Nevertheless, they both agreed on their use as transit states between east and west. The continued active policy of Soviet Russia to discourage regional alliance pacts paid off in this period, to the relief of both Germany and Soviet Russia. One can also clearly observe, in the years immediately following 1920, that Soviet-German cooperation gradually became more pronounced and obvious.

²⁶² DBFP, 1st Series, Volume XXIII, Document 517, Max Muller to Curzon, December 28, 1922, pp. 647-648.

CONCLUSION

The Treaty of Rapallo has served to focus historical attention concerning German-Soviet relations on the post 1922 Rapallo period. Objectively, the most important characteristic of the Rapallo era concerns the German-Soviet cooperation which the Treaty of Rapallo reinforced. It cannot be stressed too strongly, however, that indications of far reaching collaboration emerged prior to this formal treaty. In large measure, these perceived cooperative activities have been unnoticed, or glossed over, in the historical literature. An investigation of several areas has helped to elucidate this cooperation.

Due to limitations concerning various archival collections, most notably German and Soviet, this evidence of cooperation derives from American and British perceptions of German-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, additional secondary sources, memoirs, as well as The Times of London, have corroborated the conclusions reached through the investigation of western documents. As a package, these sources present a clear picture of active cooperation.

During World War I Germany actively sought to annex the territory comprising the Baltic region. As Germany experienced military defeat in Western Europe, and the

German inability to effectively command its forces in the east became apparent, Germany turned her attention to attempting to exert economic control over the areas of the Baltic. Rather than antagonizing the Soviet Union, this policy served the interests of the Bolshevik government. In essence, both sides required a open area through which to communicate.

The competition that previously existed between Germany and Soviet Russia eventually gave way to a situation characterized by cooperation. Germany desired the Baltic States to act as a bridge in order to pursue economic goals, both in the border areas, as well as in Soviet Russia. The Bolshevik government expected a proletarian revolution in Germany and required an area of transit for assistance. Because both countries desired to prevent the organization of the Baltic States, either amongst themselves or under Polish hegemony, their interests became even more symmetrical.

The confused political situation in Germany following her military defeat allowed the German military command to exercise a greater degree of freedom. The policy of the German military, to a large degree, appeared consistent, in broad outlines, with that of the government. As the German army withdrew in late 1918, it appeared to consciously hand over the area formerly under its control to the invading Bolsheviks. Eager to recoup its territorial losses, the Soviet government willingly participated in this scheme.

More explicit evidence of active collaboration surfaced with respect to the Polish-Lithuanian dispute and the Polish-Soviet War. General Hans von Seeckt became the most outspoken advocate of renewed friendly relations with Soviet Russia, despite its communist principles. The refusal, on the part of the German military, supported by the German government, to allow the Polish army to properly defend its territory from invading Soviet forces has demonstrated Germany's policy. Germany, as well as Soviet Russia, exacerbated the tensions between Poland and Lithuania and, by so doing, served to worsen the entire situation and perhaps prolong the dispute.

The Soviet policy directed towards the Baltic States sought to keep the states separate. Soviet propaganda created or increased feelings of mistrust while more active measures, such as offering individual pacts of non aggression or treaties, prevented these states from forming common cause. The use of threats also played a large role in keeping the Baltic States separate.

In this regard, it may be concluded that, despite Soviet Russia's desire to recoup her territorial losses, and Germany's desire to attain an economically dominant position, active competition between Germany and Soviet Russia can be said to have been negligible. Rather, mutual weakness seemed to have encouraged the perpetuation of cooperation over the border lands.

The shock expressed after the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo, during the Genoa Conference, should not have been so great in hindsight. Clearly, the signs signalling increased German and Soviet collaboration were evident in both British and American diplomatic reports. Furthermore, The Times insightfully reported much evidence of active cooperation, particularly during the period from December 1918 to January 1919. The entrenched ideological divide separating Germany and Soviet Russia may have served to blur the vision of the western Allies.

The western powers made no secret of their desire that the Russian state be reorganized as a federal or even a constitutional monarchist state. Germany, the west expected, would one day rejoin the family of western nations. Conversely, until such time as Soviet Russia discarded communism, the west certainly had no desire to accept her formally.

Soviet-German cooperation, established during the years 1918 to 1920, carried with it a powerful precedent. One can only speculate whether this active collaboration played a significant role in future Soviet-German relations. The infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact which divided the borderlands into spheres of interest and included provisions for much wide ranging cooperation, may well have found its genesis in previous cooperative policies.

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